Analysis of the relationship between employment and crime has been undertaken in several different disciplines. Included among these are economics, sociology, anthropology, and manpower program evaluations for criminal justice populations. Examination of economic perspectives on employment and crime reveals two competing views of their interrelationship. First, there is the view that crime itself is a form of work and that allocation of time to criminal activity can be modeled on the same formal basis as allocation of time to legal work. On the other hand, the segmented labor market theory explains labor market success through a focus on specific economic groups and the historical and institutional influences shaping concrete economic arrangements. Among those factors considered in the anthropological and sociological perspective on employment and crime are the following: family, education, age, subculture, and the social and cultural factors within concrete community settings that determine the kind and extent of opportunities available to youth. Evaluation of such manpower programs as pretrial diversion programs, the Court Employment Project, the Job Corps, supported work programs, and financial aid to released prisoners suggests that more must be learned about specific program processes to enhance future policy formation and program planning. (MN)
Employment and Crime:
A Review of Theories and Research

by
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October 1981

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
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James L. Underwood
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This project was supported by Grant Number 79-NI-AX-0082, awarded to Vera Institute of Justice, by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
ABSTRACT

This is a review and analysis of the literature on the relationships between employment and crime from several different disciplines: economics, sociology, anthropology and the recent body of manpower program evaluations for criminal justice populations. The review of economic literature focuses on two competing explanations of employment and crime relationships: the economic model of crime developed by neoclassical economists and the more structural approach of segmented labor market theorists. The review of sociological literature encompasses various third factors (family, education and age) that have been seen as qualifying the relationship between employment and crime. Structure of opportunity theory and subcultural literature related to employment and crime issues are also considered. Finally, surveys of early manpower program evaluations in a criminal justice context and recent major impact evaluations are reviewed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For two decades the Vera Institute has been working, through pilot projects and research, to improve the operation of the criminal justice system and the services provided to those who become enmeshed in it. In this effort, we have been especially concerned with development of more effective means to introduce offenders to the world of work and legitimate income, and to keep them there. In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent that the assumptions upon which we (and others) have built employment programs for offenders and for groups at high risk of involvement in crime are too simplistic. We have come to feel that labor market strategies and employment programs can more effectively reach these groups, and can have substantial impact on their lives and their behavior, only if they are built upon sounder theoretical and empirical bases.

In 1977, the National Institute of Justice made funds available for Vera to take a reflective, in-depth look at the relationships between employment and crime in all their complexity. The long-term research agenda contemplated by the agreement between Vera and NIJ involves exploration of theory as well as generation and analysis of empirical data that describe these relationships both on the aggregate and on the individual level. Thus this document is but one of what is expected to be a series of related reports from the Employment and Crime Project.
One of the pleasures (and an important comfort) of an effort as ambitious and long-term as this one, is the support and assistance given by colleagues from outside Vera. We offer our thanks particularly to Drs. Richard Barnes and Bernard A. Gropper of the National Institute of Justice. Richard Barnes, former Director of NIJ's Center for the Study of Crime Correlates and Criminal Behavior, served as Program Officer for this project until recently when Bernard Gropper assumed that role. Both men have consistently expressed the Institute's interest and support, while offering the provocative and constructive reactions to our work that one hopes for from colleagues. We are grateful, too, for their gently encouraging us to produce this review for circulation and comment.

From the beginning of this project, Vera has benefitted from the collective and individual support of the project's distinguished Advisory Committee, consisting of Herbert Gans, Kenneth Schoen, Susan Sheehan, Lester Thurow, and Marvin Wolfgang. They are knowledgeable, insightful and concerned individuals to whom we are grateful for help in shaping our approach to the issues, the various elements of our research design, and the work on this literature review.

Although the authors' own intelligence, skill and endurance give this document its quality and its breadth, they benefited from the clear minds and dedication of others who got caught up in the work. Sally Hillsman, Vera's Research Director, offered detailed and far-reaching
comments after meticulous review of the penultimate draft. Three outside readers—Marcia K. Freedman, Steven Mendelsohn, and Jeremy Travis—reviewed earlier drafts of Chapters Two, Three and Four respectively, and their suggestions sharpened the focus and improved the presentation of the material. Present and former staff of the Employment and Crime Project—Lotte Fields, David Howell, Patrick McIntyre, Della Lee Sue and Mercer Sullivan—informed the treatment given to various topics by sharing generously their expertise in several social science disciplines.

Finally, the present document could not have been brought to completion without the too often thankless efforts of an able secretarial and administrative staff, including Leslie Kiss, Patricia Harper, Marilyn Moore, Linda Pollock and George English.

For the reasons suggested at the beginning of these acknowledgements, Vera’s own staff are potential consumers of a review of the kind presented here. The document is already having an influence on program development here. We hope others will find it a provocation to thought and an inducement to action.

Michael E. Smith
Director
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Interest in Employment and Crime

Social scientists, government officials and program planners have, for the last two decades, focused considerable attention on relationships between the economy and the origin, persistence and control of crime. The research and policy literature has continued to consider the influence of various social structures on criminal behavior, including the family, the peer group, the neighborhood and variously defined subcultures. But there has been persistent fascination with the economy, especially the manner in which it structures employment opportunities for different age, racial and ethnic groups; opportunities for and experience with employment have come to be seen as powerful variables both for the explanation and for the control of crime in America.

Beginning in the early 1960's, the federal government through several executive departments and agencies (e.g. Health, Education and Welfare, Labor, Law Enforcement Assistance) encouraged and supported a number of programs designed to expand employment opportunities for people involved with the criminal justice system and for segments of the population considered to be at high risk of becoming so involved. By strengthening participants' ties to the world of legitimate work, these programs hoped to reduce recidivism and facilitate participants' adoption of a more conventional life style. In the mid-70's, the National Institute of
Justice decided to look closely at relationships between employment and crime and to develop a context of knowledge within which to assess past accomplishments and future policies and programs in this area. In September 1977, the National Institute of Justice selected a proposal submitted by the Vera Institute of Justice to carry out this long-term research.

This research effort provides an unusual opportunity to consider carefully the empirical and theoretical reasons for the contention that experiences of employment and unemployment are related to criminal behavior, and to increase understanding of the various ways in which these relationships may be manifested. However, the research is important and timely for reasons that go beyond its intrinsic intellectual attractions.

As this document indicates, a variety of assumptions have been made within several social science disciplines about how legitimate employment and criminal behavior relate on the individual level. In some instances, individuals are seen as rational economic actors weighing the relative benefits and costs of various legal and illegal activities and choosing those that maximize net benefits at a particular point in time. In this view point, legitimate employment is relatively more or less economically beneficial to the actor.

than is illegal activity. The relationship is seen essentially as a direct trade-off between the two.

This view of crime as an essentially direct result of a conscious, rational process of economic decision-making may lead to policy and programs that aim to increase the volume and enhance the quality of employment for selected target populations. Alternatively, it may undergird policy and legislation that aims to raise the cost of criminal activity by increasing the deterrent impact of the criminal justice system (i.e., increasing the likelihood of detection, apprehension, conviction and punishment). At the present time, policy-makers seem to have embraced the notion that much crime is the product of individual rational decisions of this economic type and to be emphasizing deterrence as a means to influence those decisions. The relative lack of emphasis on policy and programs that might increase the benefits of deciding against crime may reflect a growing reluctance to expend public dollars on social welfare programs generally, or a loss of confidence in the potential effectiveness of publicly-supported employment initiatives specifically.

In any case, to define the policy options exclusively as deterrence versus subsidized employment is to limit unnecessarily and unrealistically the potentially useful set of assumptions one might make about the determinants of criminal behavior and the manner in which criminality is, or can be, affected by experience in the world of work. By exploring in depth a wide range of assumptions about these rela-
tionships, Vera hopes to expand understanding of how employment policies may and may not be useful to society’s crime control efforts. Such enhanced understanding would include a more realistic set of expectations regarding the results of employment programs for criminal justice populations.

Toward that end, Vera’s Employment and Crime Project seeks to learn a good deal more about criminal behavior, employment experiences, and the interaction between the two in the lives of individuals and groups in high crime, urban neighborhoods. We need to know more about the kinds of criminal behavior in which people engage, what they derive from it, and the extent and nature of the trade-offs they perceive between crime and employment. We also need to know more about the kinds of employment that are available in high crime neighborhoods, how various work roles are defined and valued, the benefits people derive from these types of employment, how they secure work, how legitimate employment is supported by family and friendship networks in the community, and the circumstances that sometimes foster employment histories in an environment where well-paid, secure employment is the exception rather than the rule.

By careful consideration of both theoretical work and empirical data on the individual and neighborhood levels, the Vera research project hopes to:

- Clarify the theoretical assumptions that may or may not support a policy emphasis on employment initiatives as part of a crime control strategy;
Identify more clearly the types of people in high crime neighborhoods and in the criminal justice system for whom enhanced employment would be likely to avert crime;

Identify periods in the individual's life cycle during which this form of intervention would be more likely to succeed;

Identify more clearly the kinds of economic and social-psychological processes through which enhanced employment would have to work on the community and individual levels in order to be effective as a crime control mechanism;

Identify more clearly the kinds of economic and social-psychological processes through which enhanced employment would have to work on the community and individual levels in order to be effective as a crime control mechanism;

Describe more fully the kinds of work that are valued and the processes by which such work is found and work histories are established in high crime neighborhoods;

Describe how information of this kind can be used to shape the design, planning, conduct and evaluation of employment programs in such communities.

These research goals represent Vera's desire to inform the debate on crime control policy, especially as it focuses on the extent to which, and the manner in which, such policy requires a vigorous employment component. This document, which reviews selected social science theories and empirical research findings in order to summarize what is known--"the state of the art"--concerning employment and crime relationships, is an interim product of Vera's research efforts.
1.2 The Approach Used in This Review

It should be stated at the outset that no single study definitively explores the relationships between employment and crime in all their complexity. Social experiments have not fully demonstrated the impact of employment programs on crime. Studies based on aggregate statistics present mixed results; those that do discover a relationship between unemployment rates and crime rates have difficulty explaining how this relationship is manifested on an individual level. Sociological and ethnographic research reveals little specifically about the relationship between criminal involvement and legitimate employment.

In part because definitive results were not available from any single inquiry or group of inquiries, this review has adopted a multi-disciplinary perspective in its survey of literature. Findings from economics, sociology/anthropology and manpower program evaluations are separately discussed in Chapters Two through Four below. Though ambitious in scope, the review has, of course, been forced to exclude much literature of potential interest. Literature reporting impacts on criminal behavior of environmental variables, health, nutrition, the architecture of urban areas or adap-
tation to stress are not included. Psychological inquiries, including studies of offender personalities and the role of child abuse in the emergence of violence in adolescence and adulthood, are likewise outside of the scope of the review. These exclusions have been dictated more by practical necessity than by a conviction that those materials are less intellectually persuasive or practically useful than those covered in this document.

It was also necessary to limit the level of detail at which the literature included in the document could be addressed. Each of the disciplinary literatures reviewed might, under other circumstances, justify separate monograph-length treatments. The economics chapter is centrally concerned with an exploration of two competing theories of labor market success (human capital theory and segmented labor market theory) and the way in which those theories relate to criminality. Although some attention is paid to aggregate studies of the relationships between employment and crime, this material has been dealt with extensively elsewhere and the interested reader is referred to those other sources. Chapter Three is similarly limited. It is not centrally concerned with social control theory, differential association or anomie, although these theoretical frameworks are indeed relevant to employment and crime issues. Instead, the chapter focuses on various social, cultural, institutional and demographic factors that might qualify relationships between employment and crime, and a review of the influential structure of opportunity theory. Finally,
Chapter Four is specifically confined to reviews of manpower programs that are focused on criminal justice populations; it does not discuss the large body of manpower programs for the hard-core unemployed as a whole.

In addition to excluding some literature and abbreviating the presentation of some topics, it was also necessary to limit the attention paid to technical and methodological issues. In economics, for example, much employment and crime research has been conducted on aggregated data--crime rates have been used as dependent variables in multiple regression models that use unemployment rates and other averaged data (the probability of arrest and conviction, the severity of punishment, racial composition of the population, etc.) as independent, explanatory variables and as statistical controls. In presenting these findings, an attempt has been made to reflect as much technical material as possible without obscuring the fundamental issues.

Similarly, each impact evaluation reviewed in Chapter Four involves complex methodological issues that stem from the inevitable compromises inherent in applying techniques of social experimentation in active program settings. Relatively few of these are detailed in the chapter; those that are have been selected because of their bearing on employment and crime relationships.

The various literatures considered here are relatively discrete, each characterized by the particular traditions, language and methodology of their individual disciplines. They are not usually considered together. It is beyond the
scope of this review to attempt a full synthesis of the various perspectives considered here (economic, sociological, anthropological and program-oriented). However, the review does attempt to indicate areas in which different disciplines overlap and to estimate the relevance to program models of the theoretical approaches explored.

1.3 Major Themes

Several major themes emerge from the separate literatures reviewed. Though the chapters could perhaps have been placed in a different sequence, the present organization emphasizes a movement away from the abstract and theoretical towards increasing specificity. The discussion proceeds from relatively parsimonious, abstract economic models of employment and crime relationships based on aggregated data (Chapter Two), through more detailed and more focused studies by ethnographers and survey researchers exploring social structure and subculture in relation to criminal behavior (Chapter Three) to evaluations of action-oriented manpower programs (Chapter Four). Although much evaluation literature proceeds without direct use of social science models, some evaluations discussed in Chapter Four are based on theoretical orientations reviewed in previous chapters.

Chapter Two begins by presenting the economic model of crime. The economic model explains criminal behavior by postulating a decision-making process based on marginal utility theory. The theory contends that offenders, in com-
mon with all other economic actors, strive to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs arising from participation in a variety of activities: leisure, income generation in the labor market, and participation in illegal activities. Participation in illegal activities in this context is generally conceived of as a type of "market activity."

The major theme in Chapter Two is, consequently, that crime is itself a form of work, and that the allocation of time to criminal activities can be modeled on the same formal basis as the allocation of time to legal work. In constructing a perspective on crime, economists have adopted a human capital theory of labor market success that sees it as the product of numerous economically-oriented decisions by individuals, acting and reacting to one another without reference to non-economic factors or influences. Individuals are seen as investing in themselves in order to maximize their lifetime returns from employment by increasing their skills through education and training. The economic model of crime suggests that crime becomes unlikely among persons who are well educated and well trained, since they are attractive to employers, well paid, and likely to incur high "opportunity costs" if crime involvements lead to the loss of their legitimate returns. The result of blending marginal utility and human capital theories is a model that suggests that crime is concentrated among the unskilled poor because it emerges as the best means of generating income. In this model, crime can be alleviated only by changing its relative attractiveness. If legitimate work cannot be made
more attractive then, under this model, crime can be made less attractive by increasing penal sanctions until it loses its appeal even for those who have little to lose. One of the main focuses of the economic model therefore has been on increased deterrence efforts—policing, prosecuting, and imprisoning.

Even within economics, however, sharp criticisms of human capital theory have been made by economists who emphasize the significance of institutional and structural features of the economy and the artificiality of the assumption of "perfect competition" incorporated in the models of conventional economics. Known variously as "dual economy" or "segmented labor market" (SLM) theory, these branches of economics highlight such economic phenomena as the persisting inequality of incomes, the relative lack of returns to education for many minority and disadvantaged, and the tendency for powerful groups—unions, oligopolistic firms, governmental interventions—to set the overall "bargains" under which the wages of competing groups of workers are determined. The SLM perspective resembles sociological notions in that it explains labor market success through a focus on specific groups in the economy and on the historical and institutional influences that shape concrete economic arrangements.

Much of the material on cultural and social structural concepts presented in Chapter Three can be viewed as a qualification of economists' vision of the relationship between employment and crime. Although some theorists of the eco-
nomic model have criticized sociologists for their allegedly "ad hoc" concepts of anomie and differential association, the sociological and anthropological work considered in Chapter Three presents an implicit criticism of economists for working with too abstract and too narrow a view of human behavior, and for postulating decision-making by economic actors who are neither interviewed nor otherwise directly observed. Chapter Three considers various third factors (family, maturation and subculture) not included directly in the economic model of employment and crime relationships but which may affect both economic and criminal behavior. The chapter also reviews literature on the impacts of education on employment and on criminal behavior from a different perspective than that developed by human capital theorists; education, in this view, is something other than self-investments in future earning capacity.

The chapter also emphasizes the "aging out" phenomenon, pointing to widely-known patterns in arrest data that relate crime to age. On a per capita basis, arrests peak for most crimes in the mid-teens to early twenties and rapidly dwindle thereafter. The decline is so precipitous, that, for example, a group in their early thirties has ten times fewer arrests per capita per year than a group in its early twenties. Although the age-related decline in arrest rates occurs during years when labor force participation is increasing, it seems unlikely that the rapidity of the decline in arrest rates can be totally explained by the operation of purely economic forces.
Chapter Three also reviews structure of opportunity theory, a major influence on some 1960's anti-poverty programs. As developed by Cloward and Ohlin, structure of opportunity theory emphasizes the role of social structure and cultural factors within concrete community settings in determining the extent and kind of legitimate and illegitimate opportunities made available to youth. In its emphasis on blocked opportunity as precipitating criminal involvement, structure of opportunity theory is reminiscent of the discussion of segmented labor market theory in Chapter Two. Both views emphasize structural rather than individual characteristics, and thus stand in marked contrast to human capital theory and the economic model of crime.

In some respects, the material in Chapter Four departs sharply from the preceding chapters. In Chapter Four, the results of impact evaluations are examined. In all but one of the major impact evaluations considered, a random assignment of participants between experimental and control samples makes it possible to relate outcomes to program impact. The impact evaluators do not have to develop elaborate theoretical models in order to cope with confounding influences. Experimental control eliminates (within known limits) the ability of unmeasured variables to obscure assessment of impact.

Some major evaluations have been conceptualized in ways that link them directly to the positions reviewed in the earlier chapters. The evaluation of the Job Corps, for ex-
ample, presents program objectives in explicitly human capital terms. The role of that program in reducing crime among Corpsmembers is in part attributed to the increase in legal labor market opportunities that results from the training and work experience attained by participants. Reviews of manpower programs as a whole suggest that the human capital model is dominant in program settings.

The review also suggests that some correlates of program outcomes can be utilized for informed speculation concerning the role of selected factors in averting crime. For example, stability of employment and of program tenure increases steadily with age, a finding that mirrors other studies of youthful employment in unsubsidized labor markets. Furthermore, some studies suggest that control group and comparison group members who successfully locate and sustain employment manifest less crime (as indicated by arrest data) than those who do not get employed. Though correlational rather than causal, such associations among age, sustained employment and averted crime merit further research attention.

Finally, the review in Chapter Four suggests that more must be learned about the types of employment offered in program settings, and about the larger social, social-psychological and economic contexts within which programs operate. If employment is a correlate of a reduction in criminal behavior and of adoption of a more conventional life style, both in job programs and in the unsubsidized labor market, we need to know if it is in fact employment.
that causes such change and we particularly need to know the processes through which those changes are effected. (The correlation could, of course, be entirely spurious, deriving from factors that codetermine both the employment outcomes and averted criminality.) Because answers to these questions could greatly enhance the information available for the guidance of future policy and the impact of future programs, Chapter Four suggests that increased research attention be paid to program processes: the methods and mechanisms through which programs affect participants, and the contexts within which programs and participants interact.

This review was begun with the assumption that diverse employment and crime relationships probably exist and that each relationship requires separate and close scrutiny. The research and theoretical literature reviewed have reinforced this point of view. Unemployment can lead to crime; but crime can also accompany a pattern of intermittent spells of low-level employment, unemployment and dropout from the labor force. In some circumstances, the labor force status and criminal involvement of an individual may be predominantly influenced by non-economic life events and factors: drop-out from school, declining parental influence, peer pressure, household formation, residential mobility, et cetera. Even in these circumstances, however, entry into the labor market and into employment, if it is available, may crystallize and make effective other stabilizing influences in the life situation of a maturing youth. The literature
reviewed discloses a multiplicity of competing explanatory factors at the individual, group and aggregate levels. In the following chapters we examine the contributions of aggregate-level econometric studies, social surveys, sustained field research by participant observers and experimentally-controlled program evaluations, seeking contributions to a sharper understanding of the relationships between employment and crime.
2.1 Introduction

Economists have conceptualized the tie between employment and crime at two different levels. In the mid-1960's, what has come to be known as the "economic model" of crime was developed to address policy questions at the macro level. This model poses such queries as "What amounts of police and other criminal-justice outputs would bring about an optimal level of crime?" In this context, the phrase "optimal level of crime" recognizes that, assuming it were possible to do so, the costs of eliminating all crime would be prohibitive. Efforts to reduce crime create costs above and beyond those that "wash out" in terms of gains to victims offset by losses to offenders. The policy-relevant calculation suggested by the economic model is thus a comparison of the added social cost of further crime reduction "at the margin." "Optimal crime" is defined as the point at which the social cost of added crime equals the social cost of added crime control.

Embedded in the economic model, however, is an individual-level model of criminal behavior that is of greater interest to this review, and which recently has received increasing attention by economists. At the individual level, the economic model hypothesizes that potential offenders behave like other rational economic actors, choosing between legal and illegal options after weighing costs and benefits.
of each activity. Partly because of its origins as part of a macro crime-control theory, the individual-level model continues to emphasize deterrence as a principal policy option. But the economic model also recognizes the costs that result when imprisonment for a criminal offense leads to loss of legitimate employment income—in economic parlance, the "opportunity cost" of crime for the imprisoned individual. (Social loss also occurs from the lost output of the individual and the use of resources in the prison system. Because of these costs, the labor market prospects of high crime groups have considerable relevance for the crime problem, since an increase in returns from legal opportunities ought to lower crime by increasing the costs of imprisonment for an individual.)

The model of labor market success provided by conventional economics is like its model of crime. In what is known as "human capital" theory, success in the labor market is related to differences in the productivities of individual workers. Productivity is rewarded because employers compete with one another for productive workers. Productive workers command a higher price (wage rate) for their services. Workers become more productive by choosing to spend (or "invest") time acquiring a stock of education, training, skills and work experience—their human capital. The human capital model of the labor market focuses on individual investment decisions and individual rewards. It is a profoundly individualistic view.
Arrayed against the conventional economic theory of the labor market are a variety of segmented labor market (SLM) theories. These viewpoints sharply dispute the vision of the labor market held by the conventional economists. SLM theories rarely address crime issues directly, and do not generally endorse a deterrence policy. Their alternative view of the labor market depicts crime as part of an overall income-generating strategy, no single part of which is particularly successful in raising the structurally disadvantaged out of a condition of chronic poverty.

For SLM theorists, the source of chronic poverty lies in the heavy constraints exerted on individuals by structural economic circumstances. The poor stay poor not because they fail to invest in their human capital or because they are insufficiently productive or attractive to employers; they stay poor because their economic opportunities are limited in ways that do not respond to their own initiatives. The poor are limited to low-wage, short-term, dead-end jobs that do not reward effort or provide training and therefore do not encourage it. The disagreement between conventional economics and the SLM theories is not so much over whether individual labor market participants, especially the poor, are acting "rationally" in committing crime, but over whether it is necessary to account for an array of structural, institutional and organizational features of the economy in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of economic behavior.
As Beck and Horan put it: "The structural context [in conventional economics] is such that, when it is assumed to be working according to the theoretical specifications, it need not be included in analyses."¹ Doeringer and Piore state that the segmented labor market view "...argues that the character of dual labor markets is best explained by institutional and sociological, not economic variables (in the neoclassical sense)—that the problem of unemployment is rooted less in individual behavior than in the character of institutions and the social patterns that derive from them."² SLM theories, as well as a variety of cultural and sociological perspectives (see Chapter Three) emphatically do not agree that structural contexts "need not be included." These theories do see persons as acting rationally, but within structurally constrained settings in which their actions respond to and incorporate structural features, both as means that further action and as goals that shape its direction. To the degree that conventional economists' use of the concept of rational cost-benefit calculation ignores non-economically definable goals and means, or reinterprets them in an unsatisfactory manner, then its approach must be considered as one-sided.


SLM theories themselves appear to occupy a middle ground between conventional economics and other social science approaches which emphasize institutional, structural and cultural factors. Though SLM theories recognize the theoretical importance of structural phenomena, this recognition most often concerns the significance of these factors as constraints on income-generating behavior. Like conventional economics, SLM theories still by and large hold up the goal of income or wealth enhancement as the principal motivational basis for observed behavior.

This chapter is divided into three additional sections. Section 2.2 takes up the economic model of crime, emphasizing its labor market rather than its deterrence side and considering criticisms and revisions of the model. The section also describes the human capital model of labor market success, since this is an important adjunct to the economic model of crime. Section 2.3 reviews selected empirical research on employment and crime and discusses selected methodological issues. Section 2.4 outlines the SLM approach and offers suggestions for further research.

2.2 Human Capital and the Economic Model of Crime

When economists began to develop models of criminal behavior (the "criminal choice") it was possible for them to utilize pre-existing analytical models developed within labor economics. Many crimes require the allocation of time and effort and often result in monetary or equivalent gains, making the crime-choice decision seem analogous to the labor-supply decision. As Block and Heineke observe:
The commission of most offenses results in an expenditure of effort, the possibility of an increase in the individual's wealth position, and the possibility of a penalty. Aside from the penalty, the similarity between such offense decisions and labor supply decisions under uncertainty is obvious. Moreover, if the penalty is a monetary payment, the analogy is precise.

This section of the chapter will first briefly review the concepts underlying the labor-leisure choice. It is important to take this brief excursion into conventional labor market theory since the economic model of crime has been developed in a parallel way. The labor-leisure choice and the legal-illegal choice are modeled by rational choice theory in formally identical fashion, although it will be seen that there are many variants and that the theory can suffer from ambiguous interpretation.

2.2.1 Conventional Economists' Model of the Labor Market

In addressing the question of how individuals decide to allocate time between income-generating ("market") and non-income-generating ("consumption") activities—the problem of labor-leisure choice—economists invoke assumptions embodied in utility theory. The theory holds that a person, when confronting a range of choices having to do with alternative behavior, will select that mix of activities that maximizes his utility. Utility itself is conceived of by economists as having sources both in pecuniary income as well as in

non-pecuniary "goods" ("psychic income," time, etc.). In addressing the question of labor-leisure choice, attention focuses on the economic value of an individual's time. This value is determined in the labor market by his or her marginal productivity, i.e., the increment in total output resulting from the individual's contribution to the production process.

The worker will supply labor in response to a schedule of wages, since wages compensate for lost leisure. Employers, in turn, demand labor as an input in the production process. In this sense, the demand for labor and capital goods is a derived demand, which is determined by the overall demand for goods in the economy. Firms strive to attain an optimal mix of capital and labor, bidding for each—in a purely competitive market—in much the same way that an individual spends a weekly paycheck. Just as the individual purchases those items which provide the most satisfaction per dollar spent, the firm pays labor (and capital) in proportion to the benefits which the firm receives from the labor. Thus, individuals who are thought to be able to produce more are able to command higher wage rates in the labor market.

The theory is further specified by making the assumption that, in equilibrium, the marginal utility of each of an individual's options is the same as that for all others. Were this not true, the individual would continue to choose the activities with the higher marginal utilities until—given the axiom of diminishing marginal utility—these utilities came to equal those of his other options. See, for example, P.R.G. Layard and A. A. Walters, Micro-economic Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978): 52-81.
This bidding process—workers trying to increase their income and employers attempting to decrease the costs of their inputs to production—is assumed to arrive at a balanced outcome that provides a relatively stable market wage for each type of labor. It is important to note that the wage rate for each individual's labor is determined in part by circumstances beyond the individual's control: the price of capital, the prices and quantities of other types of labor, changes in technology, etc.5

Given stable market wages, each individual must still determine the optimal amount of labor to supply at that wage. In other words, the individual must decide how much to work within physical limits and the boundaries of a 24-hour day. Time spent not working may be used in a variety of other ways. Labor economics, however, considers only allocations of time between income-generating and non-income generating activities: work and leisure. (An additional type of time allocation, self-investment activities, will be discussed below.) If income and leisure are both desirable, then a decision must be made concerning the utility-maximizing allocation of the individual's available time.

Since income and leisure are both positively valued, part of the time-allocation decision will be determined by the level of income available to an individual for each unit of time worked. For earned income, this is his wage rate (though it is understood that the total hours worked will be

determined by factors not yet included in the model). In deciding the consequences of changes in the wage rate on the amount of labor offered (or "supplied") by an individual, two influences are conceptualized: "substitution effects" and "wealth effects."

The substitution effect refers to the tendency to consume more of a good when it becomes cheaper or less if it becomes more expensive, other things equal. In the labor-leisure decision, the amount of income earned in an hour (the wage rate) can be interpreted as the "cost" of an hour of leisure. That is, for each added hour of leisure, one foregoes one hour's worth of income. A rise in the wage rate increases the cost of a unit of leisure. Therefore, the substitution effect predicts that a rise in the wage rate will lead to a decrease in the amount of leisure consumed.

The income, or wealth, effect on the other hand, refers to changes in consumption that are brought about by changes in the income (or wealth) of the consumer, rather than by changes in prices. Although substitution effects always predict increasing consumption of a cheaper good, income effects may be ambiguous. For example, a person who works 40 hours per week at $5 per hour earns $200 per week. If the wage rate is increased to $10 per hour, the individual may work only 20 hours and still obtain $200 per week in income. Alternatively, an individual conceivably may work 50 hours per week and increase income to $500 per week. Faced with improved income prospects, an individual might become a
"workaholic" whose only satisfaction stems from still higher income; or instead, the individual might enjoy more leisure time. Wealth effects emanating from a change in the wage rate may operate in either direction—increasing or reducing the amount of labor supplied—and this fact leads to indeterminate predictions concerning the relationship between changes in labor market rewards and decisions to supply labor to the market. (It will shortly be seen that this problem applies equally to the supply of illegitimate activities. The offender whose income rises as a result of his criminal activity may respond by reducing the amount of that activity. This possible wealth effect plays havoc with attempts by economists to predict crime trends based on aggregate data concerning the costs and benefits of illegitimate activities.)

Early formulations of the labor-leisure choice considered the allocation of time between only labor market activities and non-market activities (consumption). Becker, in furthering the human capital model, emphasized a new type of activity—an individual's self-investments in acquiring or enhancing human capital stock. In calling attention to self-investments, Becker sought to extend the time horizon within which "expected utility" calculations that are thought to determine time allocation are made. Self-investment decisions are seen in Becker's formulation of human
capital theory as oriented towards expected changes in a person's income over a lifetime.7

The notion of self-investments in human capital purports to explain how some workers come to be productive, and thus well-rewarded in the labor market, while other workers are not. Differentials in worker productivities (indicated by wage differentials) are related to antecedent differentials in the extent of their self-investment activities. Because individuals have only a fixed amount of time at their disposal, time is "costly" and would not be willingly invested in schooling, training and other self-investment activities unless these outlays were rewarded by employers in the form of higher wages over a working lifetime.

A simple human capital model is a schooling model which hypothesizes a direct, positive relationship between the extent of schooling and the level of earnings. Unfortunately, empirical research relating schooling and earnings has yielded conflicting results. Jacob Mincer, in Schooling, Experience and Earnings, attempts to expand and test the validity of the human capital model by estimating the effects of human capital investments on earnings differentials. Mincer utilizes the notion of an "earnings profile," describing the variation (usually the upward trend) in an individual's earnings over his or her working life. Mincer's notion is that the upward trend in earnings reflects rises in productivity that result from post-school invest-

ments which enhance human capital: on-the-job training (OJT), learning-by-doing, and formal training.

Once this idea is at hand, it is a small step to consider how some individuals might have more steeply rising profiles because they continue to make self investments that increase their productivity. Unfortunately, Mincer's empirical data do not include direct measurements of variables like OJT so that other labor market factors—union seniority rules, employers' institutionalized preferences for mature workers, etc.—might in fact account for the association between age and earnings that Mincer attributes to human capital variables.  

Another difficulty with the human capital literature is that it was developed using empirical data on the labor market experiences of prime-age, white, urban males. Human capital research has provoked criticism in its attempt to explain sex- and race-differentials in earnings. These debates are of interest in the employment and crime context since arrest rates are also patterned by age, sex and race/ethnicity. Recent work has suggested important refinements that are relevant to the issue of patterned wage differentials and thus indirectly, to employment and crime relationships.

For example, Lazear argues that the apparent convergence of black-white wages during the 1960's and 1970's in fact disguises a remaining underlying disparity in theulti-

mate wealth—or lifetime earnings—being made available to the two racial groups. Lazear argues that a worker's real earnings are composed of two components: a current pecuniary wage and on-the-job training (OJT). The OJT component is costly to the employer but attractive to the worker since it will presumably enhance future earnings at the cost of a reduction in his current output. Lazear suggests that although current pecuniary wages in entry-level jobs have been made equal between youthful white and black groups, the less visible OJT component remains reduced for blacks. Employers may have increased black entry-level pecuniary wages in response to governmental anti-discrimination efforts and changes in minimum wage coverage and levels. This impact is likely because entry-level wages are more accessible to outside review than OJT components with their necessarily delayed impact. Employers who have increased entry-level wages of minority workers may recoup some of their costs by reducing OJT. Lazear, analyzing longitudinal data that permit estimating wage growth, corrects for changes in the OJT component and concludes that black-white differentials in real wages (the sum of the two components) have persisted.

Lazear's paper represents a significant advance in human capital-oriented research in its explicit acknowledgment of "political economic" as well as economic considerations. The paper also illustrates the current indeterminacy of research even into seemingly simple matters such as

whether entry-level wage differentials have persisted between racial or other groups. There are other weaknesses and omissions in the human capital account. For example, the theory relating schooling to productivity does not account for the fact that most educational curricula are unrelated to vocational or occupational specifics, and the notion of post-schooling investments does not consider the possibilities of "costless" on-the-job learning. 10

In summary, labor economics and human capital theory propose a model for "labor supply" decisions. Individuals allocate time between labor and leisure activities depending on the associated level of returns. For productive, high-wage workers, leisure is more expensive than it is for unproductive, low-wage workers. To the extent that earnings enter into the labor-leisure decision, and to the extent that crime is viewed as an income-generating or time-consuming activity, then economic analysis and the human capital model are relevant to crime.

In the individualistic vision of the labor market that emerges from human capital theory, the distribution of income is related to the self-investments of workers who compete with one another for higher wages. The labor market envisioned by human capital theory rewards individuals for

those things that they do as individuals. Rewards are not apportioned on the basis of group memberships, whether defined in social class, ascriptive, territorial, industry/occupational or other terms. Differences among groups in these terms must be viewed as "market imperfections" to be ironed out through the effects of market competition.

2.2.2 The Economic Model of Crime

The economic model of crime emphasizes the assumption that offenders, in common with all other economic actors, behave in ways that respond to incentives. Economic theory postulates that individuals strive to maximize their "total utility." When the particular model is one of time allocation, then total utility is maximized when time is divided between legal and illegal "market activities," and between market activities and leisure, in those proportions that result in equal marginal returns. That is, when the utility derived from the last increment of activity of one type equals that from the last increment of all other types, the individual has so balanced his activities that his or her total utility from all efforts is at the attainable maximum (given external constraints on behavior--market wage rates, deterrence efforts of criminal justice agencies, etc.).

In a landmark 1968 paper entitled "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Gary Becker framed the issue as follows:

A person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities. Some persons become "criminals," there-
fore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.\footnote{Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," \textit{Journal of Political Economy} 76 (March/April 1968): 176.}

It is noteworthy in this passage that Becker, though referring to "persons" who become "criminals," uses the term motivation in the singular. It is an appealing yet frustrating aspect of Becker's work that he insists on a generic motivational framework of economic rationality, and distinguishes the economic model from that of other social science disciplines in terms of its rejection of the notion of distinct motivations for distinct types of criminal behavior.

Becker comments:

I cannot pause to discuss the many general implications of this approach, except to remark that criminal behavior becomes part of a much more general theory and does not require \textit{ad hoc} concepts of differential association, anomie, and the like.\footnote{Ibid.}

Though developed separately from the human capital theory of the labor market, the economic model of individual criminal behavior, like human capital theory, views individuals as allocating their time among alternative activities—in this case, between criminal and non-criminal activities—in such a fashion as to maximize expected utility.

Decisions to engage in crime are determined by the expected monetary returns from illegal activity; the earnings lost by not using time allocated to crime in legal activity; the individual's overall allocation pattern between income-generating and "non-market" activity; and the probability of

apprehension and severity of punishment. In considering the latter possibilities, if punishment is by imprisonment, then the cost of punishment is again linked to legal earnings lost during incarceration, and to income opportunities that are reduced over a person's lifetime as a result of the stigma of a criminal record and consequent barriers to employment.

Becker's initial formulation of the economic model of crime took the legal opportunities which individuals confront as given. His inattention to the prospect of improving legal alternatives as an anti-crime policy option is surprising, given his important contributions to the development of human capital theory. For whatever reason, Becker's emphasis on deterrence options stemming from the economic model may have contributed to a shift in policy focus toward increasing expenditures for crime prevention and criminal sanctions.

In an essay written a decade after Becker's article, Isaac Ehrlich (a student of Becker's) reviews the theoretical assumptions underlying the economic model of crime in a manner that may clarify its key points. According to Ehrlich, the following assumptions must be true if use of the economic model is to be justified:13

1. Maximizing Behavior. Offenders are assumed to behave as if they are maximizing their personal

13. Students of economics will recognize these assumptions as those of standard micro-economic equilibrium approaches, cast by Ehrlich in terms of crime.
welfare, subject to available legitimate and illegitimate opportunities.

- **Stable Preferences.** The distribution of individual preferences for crime (of all types) is stable.

- **Unbiased Expectations.** Individuals' expectations concerning criminal penalties and other costs and benefits resulting from criminal activity will converge to their real values; biased expectations would turn out to be quite costly to the actor and would lead quickly to corrections.

- **Market Equilibrium.** The economic approach is based on the assumption that an implicit "market" for criminal activity exists, operating through a relatively stable price system.

- **The Concept of Crime.** In economic terms, the significance of an illegal activity is that it imposes costs on society in excess of the direct costs borne by the offender. 14

Other economists considering the economic model as conceptualized by Becker and Ehrlich have raised additional theoretical issues. In an important, often cited paper, Block and Heineke criticize Becker and Ehrlich's formulation of the model and their conclusion that time is allocated between legal and illegal income-generating activities in such a way that increased relative returns from one type of income generation leads in a simple way to a shifting of activities away from the other type. 15 Block and Heineke show that a time-allocation model along these lines cannot yield


determinate empirical predictions without additional assumptions regarding wealth effects. (These were discussed above in terms of the labor supply decision and that discussion applies equally here.) With increased returns from crime, an individual may either reduce or increase the total amount of his income-generating activity as well as substitute one form of income generation for another. Block and Heineke argue that empirical data are required to ascertain the relative magnitudes of substitution as against wealth effects.

Block and Heineke's criticism addresses the conceptual core of the economic model (at least as developed in the "labor supply" context), arguing the need for a utility function that is "multi-attribute" in nature, i.e., one in which the utility of work time and time spent in criminal activities can be separately evaluated and the potential moral noxiousness of crime and punishment for offenders can be acknowledged. The effect of this reformulation of the underlying utility function is indeed so far reaching that Orsagh and Witte, in reviewing the point, observe:

...a deductive proof for the existence of a relation between crime and economic status is not possible. Its existence depends upon a particular configuration of the model's parametric values and is, therefore, environment specific.

Other important criticisms of the economic model were made in a recent paper by Charles Manski.\textsuperscript{17} Manski argues first of all for data on individuals containing information on both the available criminal and legal alternatives together with other information describing the decision-makers themselves. In addition, Manski criticizes the notion, central to the work of Becker and Ehrlich, that it is desirable to formulate a single, over-all model of criminal behavior. Manski argues:

Because the legal system defines so many different forms of crime and because criminal behavior has so many dimensions, to attempt to capture all crime-related decisions within a single model seems hopeless. One might as easily try to capture all of human behavior. Inevitably, empirical modeling will require the development of models confining their domains to restricted classes of crime types and dimensions of criminal behavior.\textsuperscript{18}

Becker's theoretical formulation, Ehrlich's clarification of underlying assumptions, and the criticisms of Block and Heineke, Manski, and others complete the outlining of the economic approach as it purports to model individual behavior. This discussion excludes consideration of the model's other side, in which macro, policy-oriented propositions concerning optimal crime control measures are developed.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p.404.
\end{itemize}
At the level of individual behavior, the emphasis of the economic model continues to resemble Becker's original paper. The model encompasses the behavior of all actors—not merely a subgroup of "criminals" or other deviants. These actors are thought to weigh the costs and benefits afforded by both legal and illegal activities and to behave in ways that maximize their utility. One important cost—deterrence through the application of formal criminal sanctions (arrest, conviction and punishment)—is emphasized by economists to the virtual exclusion of the role of other factors, such as incentives deriving from improved employment opportunity. Recent criticisms mention the need for individual-level empirical research and for development of models addressed to specific types of crimes and criminals.

In the following section, selected examples of empirical research utilizing the economic model are reviewed, with sustained discussion of Ehrlich's cross-sectional research on deterrence, income and employment. In addition to describing some important empirical results, the section addresses methodological issues that limit our confidence in the empirical findings and that limit our confidence in the empirical findings and that continue to cloud the ultimate significance of the economic model itself.
2.3 Selected Empirical Studies of Employment and Crime and Associated Methodological Issues

Empirical applications of the economic model have been extensively reviewed by a number of researchers. Gillespie reviewed the literature up to 1975 and contrasted findings from versions of the model using cross-sectional and longitudinal data at varying levels of aggregation. In examining the relationship between unemployment and crime, he inspected ten studies meeting "minimum methodological standards," and concluded as follows:

Statistical results of studies relating unemployment to crime show general, if not uniform, support for a positive correlation between these two variables.

Likewise, in assessing tests of the role of income in accounting for crime differentials, Gillespie concluded that "the findings support broadly the theoretical prediction that income plays a causal role in criminal activity; however, the specific findings are more uniform qualitatively than they are quantitatively." Despite Gillespie's conclusions, empirical work produced since his review suggests that the relationship between unemployment and income vari-


20. Ibid., p.4.

21. Ibid., p.5.
ables and crime is not at all clear. Because aggregation normally reduces the variance of income and crime variables within the aggregated units while increasing variance between units, aggregate studies frequently do report extremely high correlations. These reports appear to be easily subject to misinterpretation by a non-technical audience; it is not always understood that what has been explained in such models is variation in rates rather than in behavior of individuals. Instead of drawing conclusions appropriate to the problems of "cross-level inference" associated with aggregate research, the impression is sometimes created that criminal behavior is virtually determined by economic variables. Commenting on the odd juxtaposition of weak and inconsistent empirical results and continuing acceptance of the economic model by a broad policy audience, Orsagh and Witte suggest:

The growing interest in the...model is easily explained. Its esoteric language and its uncommonly rigorous logic are seductive. The statements which are deduced from the theory, relating to economic status and to sanctions, are intuitively plausible, conform to popular opinion, and are, therefore, powerfully persuasive. Moreover, the theory has the added, and very compelling, attraction that it focuses on variables which are, or at least appear to be, capable of manipulation through deliberate public policy.


2.3.1 Ehrlich's "Participation in Illegitimate Activities"

Our review will first discuss Ehrlich's 1973 paper, "Participation in Illegitimate Activities," which extends Becker's model and contains an early, influential empirical investigation of aggregate-level data on crime and employment.24 We describe Ehrlich's empirical model and summarize his findings and then examine some conceptual and methodological issues that relate both to Ehrlich's work and to other aggregate-level crime research. Ehrlich's paper is discussed in detail because of its initial importance, and as an example of use of the economic model in an empirical analysis of crime that illustrates both strengths and limitations of the approach.

Ehrlich reports the results of a multiple-regression analysis using as a dependent variable FBI index crime rates for U.S. states in conjunction with selected explanatory variables that the economic model suggests would account for variations in crime rates. Column 1 of Figure 1 on page 40 lists the key variables in Ehrlich's test of the economic model. They are: the subjective probability of punishment (arrest, conviction and imprisonment), the severity of punishment (time imprisoned), the illegal and legal income opportunities available to offenders and the probability of unemployment (which reduces legal income prospects).

In Ehrlich's paper, the criminal choice is portrayed on the individual level as a decision to allocate time between alternative legal and illegal income-generating strategies.

The theory is able to account for situations in which persons allocate all of their time to either one or the other activity as well as situations in which a mix of legal and illegal involvements is decided upon.
### FIGURE 1

**Major Theoretical Variables and Empirical Indicators:**

**Ehrlich's Supply-of-Offenses Function (For Crime Category i)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Element</th>
<th>Empirical Indicator</th>
<th>Symbol of Empirical Indicator</th>
<th>Predicted Impact</th>
<th>Observed Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of arrest and conviction</td>
<td>Number of offenders imprisoned (Q) per offenses (C&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;) of crime category i</td>
<td>(C/Q)&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Reduces crime</td>
<td>Confirmed for virtually all offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of punishment</td>
<td>Average time served by offenders in state prisons for crime category i</td>
<td>T&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Reduces crime</td>
<td>Confirmed for virtually all offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal income</td>
<td>Median income of families</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Crime increases with increased illegal income</td>
<td>Confirmed for property offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal income from employment</td>
<td>Percentage of families below one-half of median income</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Crime decreases with increased legal income</td>
<td>Confirmed for property offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of unemployment</td>
<td>Unemployment rate of civilian urban males aged 14-24</td>
<td>U&lt;sub&gt;14-24&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Crime increases with increased unemployment</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor force participation rate of males 14-24</td>
<td>L&lt;sub&gt;14-24&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Conflicting Predictions</td>
<td>Inconclusive for crimes against property but consistently negative for crimes against the person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment rate of civilian males aged 35-39</td>
<td>U&lt;sub&gt;35-39&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Crime increases with increased employment</td>
<td>&quot;Somewhat better results&quot; than for U&lt;sub&gt;14-24&lt;/sub&gt;; but not reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 1 (cont.)

Major Theoretical Variables and Empirical Indicators:
Ehrlich's Supply-of-Offenses Function (For Crime Category i)
(Selected Environmental Variables Not Explicitly in Theory)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Element</th>
<th>Empirical Indicator</th>
<th>Symbol of Empirical Indicator</th>
<th>Predicted Impact</th>
<th>Observed Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not in theory</td>
<td>Percentage of all males in the age group 14-24</td>
<td>$A_{14-24}$</td>
<td>No prediction</td>
<td>Indeterminate/partially correlated with crimes against the person in 1960 data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in theory</td>
<td>Percentage of nonwhites in the population</td>
<td>$NW$</td>
<td>No prediction</td>
<td>All specific crime rates positively related to NW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in theory</td>
<td>Percentage of population in standard metropolitan statistical areas</td>
<td>$SMSA$</td>
<td>No prediction</td>
<td>Not significant when punishment and median income also included in model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenses of crime category i*</td>
<td>Current and one-year lagged crime rate: the number of offenses known per capita</td>
<td>$(Q_i/N)_t$</td>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>$(Q_i/N)_{t-1}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The data used are the seven FBI crime index offenses. Analysis was performed on the 36-43 U.S. dates for 1940, 46 states for 1950 and 47 states for 1960.
Ehrlich's paper proceeds roughly as follows: First, the crime choice is portrayed on an individual level as a time-allocation model in which persons allocate time to alternative income-generating strategies. Second, several assumptions are then made and justified in order to extend the theoretical model to the aggregate level to facilitate the use of aggregate data as indicators of individual-level phenomena. Finally, in the third section of the paper, the empirical data are reviewed and interpreted within the model.

In Figure 1 on the previous page Columns 1 through 3 describe the conceptual elements and notation employed in the formulation of Ehrlich's crime-choice model; columns 4 and 5 list the predicted and observed impacts in the empirical test of the theoretical model. Ehrlich's detailed discussion concerning the "mix" of involvements and the conditions under which an individual would abstain from all activity of one type or another are not incorporated in Figure 1. While interesting, their introduction into this discussion would require consideration of other explanatory constructs for which Ehrlich has no empirical data. For example, Ehrlich speculates at length concerning the "risk preference" assumed to characterize those individuals who commit a particular category of offense; e.g., robbers are "risk preferers" and would be expected to continue to engage in robberies even when the balance of incentives would lead other individuals (those who are "risk neutral" or "risk averse") to abstain. Ehrlich's paper is full of speculations of this type, which can be accommodated to his the-
oretical approach, but are not tested against empirical data and may indeed be untestable.

Column 4 of Figure 1 lists the substantive predictions in Ehrlich's version of the economic model of crime. Though these predictions are developed in a sophisticated mathematical context (e.g., the "optimality conditions" associated with expected utility functions are derived in a mathematically rigorous fashion), when put into words the predictions are unsurprising and perhaps even pedestrian. The perceived chance of punishment and its severity lessen incentives to engage in crime. The extent of expected returns from crime increase participation. And finally, legal income opportunities—both the level of legal income and the chances of being employed—reduce crime.

Finally, Column 5 of Figure 1 contains Ehrlich's reported results from the application of the model to the available data for FBI crime rates for the states in 1940, 1950 and 1960. (Because of fluctuations in reporting activity among these years, Ehrlich analyzes data for each year separately.) Ehrlich reports his own conclusions as follows:

Despite the shortcomings of the data and the crude estimates of some of the desired variables...the results of the regression analysis lend credibility to the basic hypotheses of the model.25 Ehrlich then goes on to list the "major consistent" findings as summarized in Column 5 of Figure 1. Ehrlich finds support for the deterrence variables conceptualized in his

25. Ibid., p.544.
model. He also finds somewhat restricted impacts associated with the illegal and legal income variables (this will be the subject of further discussion below) and finally, Ehrlich does not find the expected impacts from unemployment and labor force participation. Besides these conclusions, which were explicit predictions derived from the model, Ehrlich also comments on numerous additional "environmental variables" that were introduced in a more or less ad hoc fashion as statistical controls.

Because Ehrlich's work has been influential in the development of subsequent research using the economic model, it has been subject to detailed methodological review by other econometricians. Vandaele, for example, has published a reanalysis of Ehrlich's work that discusses both his empirical specification and errors in reporting data. Having corrected the errors, Vandaele reaches the following conclusion:

> It appears, therefore, that with the available data and within the present model, the negative relationship between the crime rate and the probability of imprisonment and between the crime rate and the time served is not spurious. 26

In the following discussion, we comment on aspects of Ehrlich's work that are relevant to the concerns of this review and which apply to other aggregate-level research as well. Readers interested in detailed methodological

commentaries are referred to Vandaele and Manski. Ehrlich has also been an important figure in a revived debate on capital punishment's effects on homicide rates. See, for instance, Klein et al., and McGahey.

The central problem for Ehrlich's and other aggregate-level crime research is bridging the gap between the available aggregate-level data and the focus of theoretical interest on individual behavior. In discussing the translation between his individual-level "behavioral function" and the "aggregate function" that he introduces in order to use state-wide data, Ehrlich comments:

If all individuals were identical, the "behavioral function" [described below], except for change in scale, could also be regarded as an aggregate supply function in a given period of time. In general, however, none of the variables entering [it] is a unique quantity, since people differ in their legitimate and illegitimate earnings opportunities and hence in their opportunity costs of imprisonment (if punishment assumes such form).

The problem for Ehrlich is that he has no data to describe these differences. Accordingly, he is forced to translate his model from the individual to the aggregate level in a rigid and unconvincing way:

27. Ibid. and Manski, "Prospects for Inference."


...the behavior implications derived [above] apply here for independent changes in the level of the entire distributions of these variables, or, for changes in the mean variables within specific communities, holding all other parameters of the distribution constant. 30

What this signifies is that in place of observed values of individuals' prospects for illegal and legal income, punishment, and so forth, which are critical to their decisions and which vary among individuals, Ehrlich must substitute means or other averages describing, for example, the distribution of income within entire states. The difficulty is not just quantitative, but also qualitative in character. It is not only the problem that the median income of a state is a poor measure of the income of a given potential offender residing in the state. Aggregate income measures also describe that offender's victims, and there are no empirical data to differentiate the income prospects of offenders from those of their victims, or of either from all others.

As was seen in Figure 1, Ehrlich uses the median family income in a state as his measure of illegal income prospects. He justifies this choice as follows:

We postulate that payoffs on such crime (e.g., property crimes, etc.) depend, primarily, on the level of transferrable assets in the community, that is, on opportunities provided by potential victims of crime and to a much lesser extent on the offender's education and legitimate training. 31

Brief reflection on median income in a state as indicating the opportunities for illegal income illustrates the aggre-

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
gate data problem. On the one hand, as Ehrlich suggests, it may be that a state with a high median income is one in which residents possess more "transferrable assets"—wealth in the hands of potential victims—and this may indicate greater opportunities for theft. On the other hand, a higher median family income may also reflect a lessened need to steal because of reduced poverty. Thus, a single aggregate measure is used as an indicator of several phenomena, including selected characteristics of the state's subpopulations (e.g., offenders, the poor). In the absence of distinct, independent measures of these phenomena, the meaning attributed to the aggregate measure becomes arbitrary.

Orsagh and Witte comment on the point extensively:

Because direct empirical measures of these income variables do not exist, an acceptable test of these two hypotheses [i.e., that the propensity for crime should vary inversely with legitimate income prospects and directly with illegitimate income opportunities—ed.] is not possible. In the literature, one does find a large number of studies that purport to test these hypotheses. However, the evidence found in these studies defies definitive interpretation because of the uncertain correspondence between the empirical measure actually used and the measure that theory requires.32

The authors go on to show that per capita income measures (and analogous measures such as Ehrlich's median income) have been utilized in six recent studies as proxies for legitimate income and, on the other hand, have been used in seven other studies (including the one reviewed here) as proxies for illegitimate income. The authors conclude:

Of course, control variables are used in the foregoing studies, in an effort to force the measure to reflect either legitimate or illegitimate income, as the particular study requires; but unfortunately, the success of this endeavor cannot be scientifically demonstrated. One's interpretation of the measure becomes largely a matter of belief.33

Similar problems are associated with proxies for legal income (indeed, as just pointed out, aggregate researchers use these indicators interchangeably). As seen in Figure 1, Ehrlich's aggregate-level proxy for legal income opportunities is income inequality, measured by the percent of all families in a state whose income falls below one-half the state's median income. The measure is of income inequality rather than absolute income. (In some states, families may be below half the state's median, even though their absolute income is higher than that of families falling above half the median in other states.)

Though Ehrlich's empirical measure is of relative income inequality, his theoretical discussion does not include a "relative deprivation" hypothesis such as is commonly used by sociologists and by a few economists.34 The choice of this particular measurement was again dictated by methodological considerations, namely the need to avoid high correlations with other income measures introduced as independent variables into the model which would prevent Ehrlich from attributing variation in the model's dependent variables to particular independent variables.

33. Ibid.

The ambiguous role of Ehrlich's key empirical indicators results from the use of aggregate data to explain individual behavior. Aggregation obscures subgroup and individual-level behavior and conditions. For example, though Ehrlich sees median income as reflecting the "level of transferrable assets in the community," the only "communities" about which he has information are states. But a state is surely too expansive a region within which individuals frame their perceptions of criminal opportunity. Indeed, it is likely that the majority of offenders commit crimes within highly circumscribed areas within the communities in which they reside, not even venturing across town, much less to other parts of the state.

Again, since the median family income of a state also describes potential victims, variations in the measure may also reflect victims' ability to purchase self-defense and perhaps their ability to live in relative isolation from the poor even within formal community boundaries. This interpretation would predict a negative relationship between median income level and crime; Ehrlich's interpretation predicts a positive relationship. It is easy to suggest considerations that would lend other interpretations to a given aggregate-level measure. The point is that Ehrlich's elaborate and rigorous individual-level model is applied to data which are not directly or unambiguously related to the issues he claims to test. The theoretical model, when applied, may thus generate inconsistent and ambiguous results.
2.3.2 Selected Findings from Other Empirical Work

In addition to Ehrlich's work, other empirical studies have involved ingenious attempts to tease meaningful results from the inherent limitations of aggregate data. A few examples of these approaches will be described. (The reader interested in a more detailed presentation of findings from research in the last five years is referred to the review by Long and Witte.35)

In an often cited 1975 study, Phillips, Votey and Maxwell specifically address the issue of the relative merits of unemployment rates as compared to labor force participation rates as measures of economic opportunity and, therefore, as predictors of crime.36 They suggest that youth unemployment rates have less weight in explaining crime because of the low labor force participation rates of youth. In turn, they suggest that "labor force participation may be a crucial element" in explaining crime because participation rates capture long-term trends as opposed to cyclical, short-run fluctuations that are more likely to be reflected by unemployment rates.

In relating labor-force characteristics to criminal behavior, they specify two alternative partitions. One partitioning divides the sample between those "in the labor force" and "out of the labor force." In this division, those not working but looking for work are included as part-

35. Long and Witte, "Current Economic Trends."

ticipants in the labor force. In the other partitioning, the split is between those "working" and "not working." When this is done, those looking for work but not working are placed on the "not working" side. The issue is important because it is likely that labor force drop-outs—those not working and also not looking—are more likely to be involved in crime. After analyzing these alternatives, the authors conclude that the "labor force/not in the labor force" classification is the most relevant one for crime analysis.

In their conclusion, Phillips et al. also make the strong claim that "changing labor market opportunities are sufficient to explain increasing crime rates for youth" for the United States during the years 1952-67. They base their conclusion on the idea that a decline in labor force participation rates indicates individuals dropping out of the labor force and presumably entering into criminal activity. However, it cannot be inferred from their study whether rises in youth crime rates tend to result from increases in activity levels of those already engaged in criminal behavior, or whether individuals who formerly did not commit crimes begin to do so. In addition, their hypothesis does not address the observation that, for women, labor force participation and crime rates have both been rising. 37

Leveson, dissenting from Phillips et al., questions the

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impact of labor force participation on crime. Leveson also examines the effects of youth unemployment on crime rates. Although agreeing that youth unemployment has some significant influence on crime rates, Leveson claims that adult unemployment rates show no significant relationship to changes in crime rates.

In Leveson's work, the use of many diverse factors increases the difficulty of identifying distinct impacts of any one factor such as drug addiction or youth unemployment. These specifics do not appear easily separable from such general phenomena as urbanization, racial discrimination and poverty. (Leveson's factors also are highly intercorrelated, creating further difficulties). He nonetheless claims that "the magnitude of the influences can often be determined within reasonable bounds." Specifically, Leveson estimates that youth unemployment accounted for 25 to 30 percent of the change in crime rates from 1952 to 1963, and 30 to 40 percent of the changes from 1963 to 1973. This estimate differs greatly both from Phillips and Votey's attribution of 98 percent of the rising trend in youth crime to youth labor force participation rates, and from Ehrlich's inability to find any significant relation between youth unemployment or labor force participation rates and crime. Comparison of these three studies


again illustrates the difficulties in specifying empirical measures of theoretical variables and obtaining consistent, plausible results in the context of aggregate-level research.

Even a brief discussion of empirical research using aggregate data must mention Harvey Brenner's work. Among researchers examining the relationships between employment (and other economic factors) and crime, Brenner makes the strongest claims regarding the existence of significant, causal impacts of the functioning of the economy on crime. In a report to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Brenner holds that a 1.4 percent rise in unemployment during 1970 was "directly responsible" for 47,660 state prison admissions and 1,740 homicides, in addition to "other social damage." Estimated losses to the economy from these two outcomes alone approach 644 million dollars.

Brenner's aggregate-level research is oriented toward the epidemiology of such diverse phenomena as cardiovascular disease, admissions to prisons and mental institutions, and suicide rates. He has correlated these phenomena with a variety of economic indicators, and found that unemployment rates correlate most highly with the social problems. In his study for the Joint Economic Committee, Brenner tries "to translate the research findings on the pathological effects of unemployment and other forms of economic distress.

into a form that would be useful for national economic policy decisions. For an index of crime, he uses prison admission rates. Correlating these rates with economic indicators, Brenner finds again that unemployment rates show the most significant associations. Through a time series analysis, he concludes that a one percent increase in unemployment sustained over six years would be associated with approximately 3,340 admissions to state prisons.

A serious difficulty with Brenner's work is that it fails to specify a model which tests for the impact of unemployment while adequately controlling for a range of other, possibly confounding factors. These objections to Brenner's work are similar to issues raised in the discussion above of other aggregate research.

Witte's study of the employment and crime experiences of a sample of North Carolina prison releasees provides a rare instance of implementation of the economic model of crime utilizing individual data. Witte, building on the theoretical work of Block and Heineke as well as Becker and Ehrlich, finds some support for the deterrence elements of the economic model.

Witte's data are taken from a study of the post-release activities of 641 men imprisoned in North Carolina in 1969.

41. Ibid.

or 1971. Criminal records are used as indicators of illegal activity (re-arrest during the post-release period) and personal interviews with releasees are used to obtain information on legal activities, including measures such as the number of months between release and a first job and hourly wage rates. The deterrence variables—certainty and severity of punishment—are measured by calculating for each individual separately his fraction of convictions to arrests (prior to the release period examined in the model) and his fraction of prior jail or prison sentences to convictions. Selected background and "taste variables," such as age at first arrest, age at release, race, drug or alcohol use, marital status, etc., are also included in the study.

Witte finds that variables measuring the "expected" certainty and severity of punishment (the individual's conviction rate and imprisonment rate) are negatively associated with criminal activity "in a number of instances" and that the model specification utilized also suggests that certainty has a greater deterrent effect than severity of punishment. Witte notes that "the support we provide [for the deterrence model—ed.] is relatively weak." The statistical significance of a number of her independent variables is influenced by Witte's inclusion of the taste variables described above. Finally, as is true in many other studies, the results relating to labor market measures

43. Ibid., p.79.
are sometimes inconsistent with expectations (a measure of expected unemployment is negatively associated with arrests) and in many other cases they are statistically insignificant although of the expected algebraic sign.

An interesting feature of Witte's work, in accordance with Manski's suggestions, is the attempt to estimate separate impacts of deterrence and labor market measures for subgroups of prison releasees specializing in different types of crime. Impacts are estimated for those committing "consumption crimes" (e.g., assaults), serious and non-serious property crimes and a fourth category of "residual" offenses (e.g., obstructing justice). The seemingly curious use of the term "consumption" to reflect interpersonal crimes follows the standard economic model discussed earlier. Income-generating offenses represent "market" activities; non-income-generating offenses thus become "non-market," "leisure" or "consumption" activities. Witte suggests that various elements of deterrence work differently for different types of crimes, sometimes in ways that seem paradoxical, given the economic model of crime:

For individuals who specialize in consumption offenses, longer expected sentences appear to provide the most effective deterrent, while for non-serious income offenders a higher probability of imprisonment seems most effective, and for individuals who specialize in crimes other than consumption or income offenses, the probability of conviction seems most effective.44

Neither the deterrence nor legitimate income variables

44. Ibid., p.76.
have the expected effect on the serious property offenders, a result which Witte believes attributable to the prevalence of drug addicts among this group. Witte recommends that additional tests of the economic model be employed using individual data, and suggests that these tests "would be most beneficial if they dealt with groups less committed to criminal activity than former prison inmates." 45

The above discussion of selected examples of econometric research concludes the chapter's consideration of the economic model of crime. What emerges from this literature is conventional economics' continuing reliance on the assumptions of utility theory in framing predictions concerning both labor market and legal/illegal decisions. In specific tests of the economic model, however, relatively few characteristics of the labor market are taken into account, and those that are derive almost exclusively from individualistic theory. In the following section, segmented labor market theories are discussed. These theories invoke an assortment of structural features of labor markets. Also, SLM theories have implications for a theory of employment and crime, since SLM predicts a lack of impact of human capital on labor market success in some job sectors. However, these implications have only been sketchily developed in the SLM literature.

45. Ibid., p.82.
2.4 Segmented Labor Markets and Crime

Although both human capital and segmented labor market (SLM) theories range across a wide spectrum of topics in labor economics—including issues of youth unemployment, effects of minimum wage legislation and racial discrimination—it is in their differing accounts of poverty that the two positions most forcibly disagree. Human capital theory emphasizes the individual deficiencies of the poor, arguing that low levels of self-investment cause some labor market participants to be relatively unproductive and hence unattractive to employers. Segmented labor market theories, by contrast, see the economy as divided into two distinct markets:

[The primary market] offers jobs which possess several of the following traits: high wages, good working conditions, employment stability, and job security, equity and due process in the administration of work rules, and chances for advancement. The other, or secondary sector, has jobs which, relative to those in the primary sector, are decidedly less attractive. They tend to involve low wages, poor working conditions, considerable variability in employment, harsh and arbitrary discipline, and little opportunity to advance. The poor are confined to the secondary labor market. 46

Relying on the notion of a dual economy, or in some versions on a plurality of relatively distinct labor market segments and shelters, SLM theorists attempt to show that some groups of workers are more exposed than others to various structural and institutional barriers to full employ-

ment. Problems include racial discrimination, unequal returns to education depending on race and sex, minimal impacts of training programs, and limited access to "internal" labor markets provided by large firms and some labor unions.47

Conventional economic theory attempts to deal with these problems by reference to "imperfections" in labor markets which should work out over time given the pressures of competition. But segmented labor market theorists would agree with Thurow, who notes:

An observer of the economic game should be extremely reluctant to label anything that has existed for long periods of time a "market imperfection." If the phenomenon has survived, the chances are high that it is an integral part of the game and not a market imperfection. Or at least, this possibility should be seriously investigated and each of the deviant observations should be examined to see if they can be explained in some consistent manner that does not rely on ex post ad hoc market imperfections.48

Although SLM theories share a structural emphasis, as well as an interest in the problems of poverty and discrimination, they differ in the structural characterization of the economy. One characterization of worker behavior that

47. "Internal labor market" refers to the range of intra-firm advancement opportunities in which competition for better jobs is limited to those already hired. As such, the internal labor market is one of a number of "shelters" enjoyed by primary workers. See Marcia K. Freedman, Labor Markets: Segments and Shelters (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 1976) and also Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1971).

is of special use for understanding employment and crime issues has been provided by Harrison. As shown in the diagram in Figure 2 below, Harrison locates property-oriented street crime as one of "four kinds of labor-time-consuming and remunerative activities in urban economies which display remarkably similar characteristics." Individuals move among various activities in the economic "periphery" with relative ease and frequency, while mobility into the primary labor market--the economic "core"--is severely constrained. Rather than distinct groups of criminals, secondary workers, welfare recipients, and "hustlers," Harrison suggests that individuals combine various income strategies to fulfill total income requirements.

FIGURE 2

The Structure of Urban Labor Markets

Secondary Labor Market
Substandard wages
Unstable jobs
Training Sector
Government programs recruit largely for the secondary labor market, ghetto schools fail to provide mobility into the core

Primary Labor Market
Adequate wages
Stable jobs
Irregular Economy
Illegal and quasi legal "work"

Welfare Sector
Payments subsidize families unable to work and employed in the secondary labor market

Harrison and other SLM theorists have also undertaken research which challenges the human capital interpretation of the labor market experiences of blacks. Harrison's study of education, and training payoffs for blacks and whites in urban areas concludes that:

...nonwhites living in the nation's largest metropolitan areas have not received returns--measured in earnings or probabilities of unemployment--commensurate with their acquired stocks of human capital, especially when compared with whites living in the same parts of the city. These returns are particularly low--and in the case of reduced joblessness, virtually non-existent--in the urban ghetto.

Other researchers also find that human capital theory does not adequately account for urban labor market experience; these researchers will adopt some form of the segmented labor market approach. Recent work on youth unemployment suggests a heavy concentration of problems among unemployed and discouraged young black males in urban areas. This literature reflects the debate as to whether individual human capital deficiencies or structural labor market issues account for high levels of minority youth unemployment. Feldstein and Ellwood, for example, link chronic youth unemployment to the "relatively little schooling" of some youths, while Clark and Summers attribute much of the problem to


"shortages of acceptable jobs." \(^{52}\) Freeman, in his review of youth unemployment issues, tentatively supports the structural conclusions, and begins to build a foundation for at least some speculation about relationships between unemployment and crime. \(^{53}\)

In general, research on youth unemployment suggests that many young workers are given access to job ladders in firms or trades through family and friends; these informal networks transmit attitudes, expectations, and labor market information. Economically successful families have more extensive and better connected networks, more resources to invest in their children, more access to and influence over other agencies of social control, (e.g., the schools) and finally, more direct control over their children's behavior (see Chapter Three). Economically deprived families are less connected and have less to invest in their children. Given additional impediments to employment which arise from persistent racial discrimination, children and young adults in poor minority families are, in effect, structurally blocked from labor market success and simultaneously exposed to greater risk of criminal involvement.

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Bowen and Finegan report that labor force participation of males 14 to 17 years of age enrolled in school in urban areas in 1960 is positively related to income of other family members for a sample of families whose total income ranges between $4,000 and $11,000. Their explanation is that youngsters in higher income families have a comparative advantage in finding part-time jobs: "Parents are more frequently able to help, mainly as a result of their business and social contacts."54 In another study, Robert Lerman finds that children of white-collar workers have significantly higher rates of employment as compared to children of blue collar workers.55 Finally, Albert Rees and Wayne Gray also attempt to test the hypothesis that parental contacts assist youth in finding jobs. Although their results show no significant effects of parental characteristics on youth employment, they do find an impact of siblings' employment, again suggesting a family influence.56

Other studies relate non-economic variables to differences in behavior and labor market success. Osterman, for instance, relates labor market characteristics to age in studies of aggregate age-specific data and in exploratory,


qualitative research. He sees three distinct stages in youthful labor market experiences: moratorium, exploration, and settling down. The moratorium period, when youths are not interested in full-time, steady work, encompasses ages 16 to 19; exploration, when some jobs are tried out, but not on a fully committed basis, spans ages 20 to 24; and settling down begins at around age 25. Other studies suggest an impact from early labor market experience on subsequent experiences. Adams and Mangum inquire into the importance of unsatisfactory experiences at an early age in workers' subsequent labor market activity and success. Using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys (which include workers experiencing short-run transitional problems) they find that:

There appears to be little question that, on the average those having difficult labor market experiences as youths are the same individuals who have difficulties later on. While many unemployed youths successfully move into well-paying, permanent positions, many will not do so by the time they are in their mid-twenties and, as a result, face a real disadvantage as adult workers.

Though other research is available that supports the range of findings outlined above, we have been unable to locate econometric work that directly addresses the possible linkages between youth labor force experience and crim-


59. Ibid., p. 103.
inality. We have seen that the economic model, bolstered by human capital theory, accounts for employment and crime relationships through calculations of marginal utility that weigh the monetary returns of legal versus illegal options. SLM theories, although they emphasize the role of institutional and organizational features of the economy, would probably concur with the notion of a predominantly economic motivation. The difference between the two positions is in their accounts of obstacles preventing economic success, not in the primacy of the economic goal itself.

In summary, conventional economic analysis and SLM theories offer different interpretations for the relationships between human capital, employment opportunities, and crime. Human capital theory emphasizes the "return on investment" of education and training in the labor market; consequently, human capital and crime would tend to be inversely related since increases in human capital would increase productivity and legal earnings opportunities. Segmented labor market theories, on the other hand, stress that variations in human capital do not automatically translate into labor market rewards; institutional factors play a more important role in determining labor force status. Education and training— if available for individuals in secondary labor markets— will not tend to result in increased employment opportunities and earnings, so the relationships between human capital, employment and crime are much less clear cut. Although SLM theories do not fully elaborate the linkages between employment and crime, they do provide a
rich description of labor market activities differentiated according to structural and institutional settings. In such a context, it can be seen that individuals may engage in crime not just because the competing economic rewards from legitimate employment are minimal, or even because opportunities for economic and occupational advancement are limited, but in part because the array of secondary employment roles available to them are themselves not distinctively different from "hustling" on the street or negotiating hostile welfare bureaucracies.

2.5 Tentative Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

From the literature reviewed above, it can be seen that agreement has yet to be reached both on the most appropriate economic perspective with which to study employment and crime and the most fruitful methodology to employ. SLM theories suggest the need to broaden the set of research questions to include structural factors and some methodologists working within the framework of conventional economics call for pursuing research at the individual level. This section briefly discusses other suggestions for further employment and crime research.

Aggregate measures used and subpopulations studied

Since aggregate-level research remains a much less expensive and more generalized opportunity for studying employment and crime relationships, several improvements can be proposed. Aggregate-level analyses should incorporate
units of analysis that are relatively homogeneous and mutually comparable in terms appropriate to a given theoretical model. Thus, for example, only medium-sized cities were selected by Sjoquist in his test of an economic model. He eliminated cities adjacent to other urban areas because of the possibility of "spill-over effects." For different reasons, time-series analyses also ensure comparison of relatively homogeneous units, since the same city (or other unit) is compared across different time periods.

Individual-level research using broadly-defined samples of potential offenders

The difficulties of interpreting aggregate-level results, exemplified in the discussion above of Ehrlich's research, provide ample reasons for the use of individual-level measures. Manski, in an article discussed above, also elaborates on the need for individual-level crime research.

...anyone can commit a crime. Hence, the relevant decision-making population for a study of criminal behavior should be the entire population of an area and not some a priori specified "criminal element." In making this point, Manski is influenced by the problem of "truncated" sampling or self-selection. Research using individual data on arrested or imprisoned groups is evidently confined to those who "decided" in some degree in favor of one sort of option: the illegitimate one.


Manski's call for sampling from the "entire population" is further supported by the fact that sampling of offenders invariably involves selection at varying distances from the behavior itself. For those doing crime, arrest is a probabilistic outcome, conditioned by numerous criminal justice and behavioral variables about which the analyst will usually have skimpy information. If arrested, then conviction and sentencing to imprisonment are subsequent joint outcomes representing only one of a complex, branching tree of possibilities. The shape of the "tree" is itself determined in part by the extent of aggregate crime.

The offender's progress through different stages of the criminal justice system depends on interactions between characteristics of the system and of the offender. Therefore, any sampling of officially-defined offenders is contaminated by many factors irrelevant to the determinants of the offender's "crime decision."

Relating Crime Research to the Criminal Justice System

So far, we have been concentrating on those methodological problems relating to the adequacy of the economic model as a theory of behavior—with emphasis on the behavior of individual offenders or potential offenders. But as discussed in the introduction to the chapter and, beginning with Becker's initial formulation, the economic model has been explicitly addressed to policy concerns as well as to efforts to build behavioral models. As a policy guide, the economic model has questionable relevance to the administration of criminal justice. For example, to see the "output"
of police and courts as chiefly apprehension and conviction is to overlook much of what police and courts actually do. The police "keep order" in poor communities; they respond in a large proportion of cases to calls not related to criminal offenses; and in general they serve as an agency of "last resort" for many poor people who cannot afford other social services.

Similarly, although the popular image of court activity depicts a process which sends criminals off to prison, the underlying situation is much more varied and complex. Low rates of reporting of crime by citizens; low clearance rates by arrest; further weeding out of cases at initial charging and indictment; and disposition through plea and sentence bargaining suggest that very few crimes among a large estimated volume of felony crimes actually culminate in arrests, let alone prison sentences. For example, calculations based on data from Vera's recent study of the felony disposition process in New York City support the estimate that of 400 felony offenses committed in New York City (only half of which are likely to be reported to the police), 2.7 lead to a jail or prison sentence of any kind, and only 0.3 lead to a felony sentence of over one year.62

62. See Vera Institute of Justice, Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's Courts (New York: Longman, 1981), pp. 1-3. If about one half of all felony crimes are reported, about one in five reports "cleared" by an arrest, then Vera's Figure 1 (Ibid., p.1) gives the results described in the text. As Vera points out, reporting of crimes and clearance by arrest vary considerably according to crime type and circumstance.
Thus, proposals in the economic model of crime for "optimal" policy designs must be reconsidered in light of the actual workings of the criminal justice system. For example, if the policy suggestion is that the proportion of felony offenses leading to imprisonment be doubled, it is not at all clear that such a policy could be implemented. Research in criminal justice is beginning to suggest that the proportions of felony cases resulting in various dispositions (e.g., dismissals, convictions, incarcerations) may be fairly stable over time and across jurisdictions. If, on the other hand, the policy suggestion is that the actual number of people receiving felony imprisonment be doubled, costs involved in implementing that policy are likely to be immense. If we assume the relative stability of the distribution of dispositions, the only way to double the number of people sentenced to jail or prison is to double the number of people handled by the system at each of its various processing points.

Focusing on labor market realities.

Our earlier conceptual discussion of the economic model of crime suggests uncertainty over whether all crimes were to be considered as labor market activities. In Becker's formulation, the time-allocation decision is made between legal and illegal activities, without reference to a cross-cutting division between income-generating and consumption activities. Ehrlich, in elaborating his model to incorporate age-specific labor force participation rates, speculates that crimes against persons are to be viewed as time-
intensive "consumption activities," thus accounting for an observed negative impact of labor force participation on such crimes. Gillespie comments on Ehrlich's theoretical argument:

...if the labor force participation rate falls, more time is now available for consumption activities—a scale effect. Further the fall in labor force participation may also be related to a fall in wage returns of legal activity—a substitution effect. Both effects will make crimes against persons more attractive. The scale effect releases time that may now be spent in part in such time-intensive consumption activities as rape, murder, and assault. The substitution effect also makes the consumption of market goods—less attractive activity for contributing to utility because the lower wage rate will require a greater expenditure of working time to get market goods from which utility is derived. In comparison, rape, murder and assault are activities which can provide a direct increase in utility without any intermediate market activity. 63

Though Gillespie characterizes Ehrlich's argument as one which is "theoretically consistent but otherwise strained one's credulity," the problem lies more in the ad hoc introduction of speculations concerning labor market activity and the personal impacts of unemployment.64 If it is conceded for the moment that unemployment is a stressful condition that in all likelihood places the individual into contact with others similarly under stress, the relationship between declines in labor force participation and increases in personal crimes does not appear at all forced. Indeed, though an inadvertent comic flavor attaches to the jargon-laden characterization of rape and murder as "time-intensive con-

64. Ibid.
sumption activities...that provide a direct increase in utility without any intermediate market activity," the negative correlation between labor force participation and crimes against persons appears plausible. Nevertheless, the explanation of that correlation as a product of the individual's utility-maximizing choices still strains credulity. It may be more understandable if this behavior is seen as particular outcomes within a range of activities engaged in by labor force drop-outs who are under stress and who have "time on their hands."65 (The discussion of street and peer-group subcultures presented in Chapter Three is relevant to this issue.)

The economic model of crime does not address labor market realities in another important respect--the model is not conceptualized in a way to take into account the disparity between black and white labor force experiences and the interaction of this difference with the impact of criminal justice agencies. A rough estimate of male prisoners in state and federal institutions in 1976 shows 141,800 whites and 135,700 blacks.66 If these white male prisoners were added to the count of the white unemployed in 1976, the resulting unemployment rate for white males would only rise from 6.4 to 6.6 percent, a 4.1 percent relative increase.


If black male prisoners were added to their unemployment group, the black rate would rise from 12.7 to 14.7 percent, a 15.5 percent relative increase.\(^6\)\(^7\) Black male unemployment rates may be further increased if accurate data could be obtained on blacks detained or serving misdemeanor sentences in local jails; if undercounts of ghetto populations were corrected; and if the greater incidence of "subemployment" and labor force dropout among blacks were taken into account.

Officially, for every 5.5 blacks who were unemployed in 1976, one was imprisoned; for whites, the ratio is 22.7 to one. These sharply different ratios suggest that black unemployment is much more sensitive than white unemployment to fluctuations in penal populations or other changes in criminal justice procedures. Penal practices thus contribute to obscuring the magnitude of the underlying unemployment problems of the black population, even though existing figures reveal severe problems. The specific labor market difficulties of blacks and other disadvantaged groups are also downplayed when analysts employ overall unemployment rates in lieu of rates specific to the given sub-population; when discouraged and underemployed workers are ignored in conventional statistics of unemployment; and when census techniques fail accurately to enumerate inner-city residents.

It is difficult to tell what effects more specific social indicators and improved measurement techniques would have on the strength of measures of association between age-
aggregate rates of unemployment and underemployment and crime. Current statistics probably underestimate the degree of association between labor market problems and crime to the extent that unrecorded variations in underemployment do correlate with crime but vary independently of unemployment rates. Global unemployment rates are an inadequate proxy for unobserved under- and unemployment rates of specific sub-populations. Direct measures of the latter would almost certainly increase observed associations between unemployment and crime. When it is remembered that the labor force participation rate for black youth (the proportion of those working or actively seeking work) was below 40 percent in December 1979, the current emphasis on changes in global unemployment (all those unemployed but actively seeking work) to account for crime in economic terms does not appear convincing.

Policy Issues

The discussion of the human capital and segmented labor market positions above reveal a fundamental difference in their respective conceptions of the structure and internal processes of the labor market. These differences, in turn, produce substantial differences in how the two schools of thought view the nature of the labor market alternatives available to individuals and how these alternatives are generated. The conception of human capital theory is individualistic, focusing on individual actions of employers and workers within competitive market settings. It assumes that the range of market alternatives is rather equally distri-
uted across racial, ethnic and social strata. SLM theories emphasize the role of historical, institutional and organizational features of the economic environment and suggest that these features of society serve to divide the labor market into segments each of which offers its members different labor market alternatives.

It is not the purpose of this review to voice an opinion concerning the relative explanatory power, cogency or realism of the two economic approaches. It is appropriate, however, to point out the divergence in policy positions that are associated with these competing theoretical positions. In this context, a peculiar irony emerges. The human capital conception emphasizes the notion that labor market rewards are apportioned on the basis of individual productivities that, in turn result from self-investments in schooling and training. Extended to include criminal options, this conception leads in principle to the relatively optimistic, politically liberal notion that improved legal opportunities—embodied in added schooling and training that augment productivity—would reduce crime by increasing its "opportunity costs." Instead, the human capital conception is today associated with deterrence policies. The general notion of the role of incentives in influencing behavior is in practice transmuted into a policy emphasis on increased negative sanctions. (As will be seen, in Chapter Four below, numerous manpower and training approaches have been developed for ex-offender and delinquent groups that embody the assumptions of the human capital model. However, the indi-
individualized economic approach to crime has become linked with deterrence policy, not with raising the returns from legal labor market options.

On the other side of the debate among economists, the SLM positions are concerned to account for the labor market failures of the poor and to avoid a "blaming the victim" approach. The inadequate schooling, training and employment histories of poor, high crime groups are acknowledged but they are seen as an essential component of the structure of segmented labor markets. While this viewpoint certainly avoids blaming the victim, the specific interventions that might increase opportunities and alleviate crime are politically controversial. Such interventions might include: targeted tax credits; affirmative action laws and their stringent enforcement; the funding of urban development under neighborhood control; permanent public sector employment; subsidized on-the-job training in the private sector; minority contracting and employment guarantees; and full employment, monetary and fiscal policies.

The apparent failure of many manpower programs for ex-offenders to reduce crime would be seen by SLM theorists as resulting from these programs' continuing emphasis on secondary employment. Moreover, to provide other than secondary employment opportunities for significant numbers of ex-offenders, without broader full employment efforts, would leapfrog many other disadvantaged groups in the economy.68

In the absence of broad structural economic change, near minimum wage employment will probably continue as the norm for any large-scale efforts directed at ex-offenders. Given these approaches, the SLM position predicts a continuing failure of these programs to substantially reduce crime.

Are employment and crime policy alternatives as bleak as would appear to be the case from the foregoing? The answer may depend on considerations that go beyond the scope of the current debate between the human capital and SLM conceptions of the labor market. For example, Chapter Three discusses sociocultural factors that partly account for crime differentials not readily explained by exclusively economic considerations. Family socialization, schooling, and the cultural institutions associated with different age grades and the process of maturation are among important, non-economic "third factors." These factors will be considered in the next chapter.
Chapter Three.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RELATIONSHIPS

3.1 Introduction

The employment and crime literature reviewed so far has derived from competing perspectives within the disciplinary framework of economics. This chapter opens in Section 3.2 with brief consideration of a number of inter-related, non-economic institutional factors. Characteristics of the family, schooling, and behavioral and cultural patterns that relate to age (maturation). These institutional areas are of course complexly intertwined—both within one another and also within the over-all sociocultural fabric itself. From a strictly methodological point of view, they might all be considered as "third factors" to be taken into account in an analysis of empirical data relating employment to crime. In such a role, they would serve as antecedent or intervening variables that qualify inferences about employment and crime relationships and perhaps complicate empirical analysis.

But besides introducing "third factors," the anthropological and sociological literature also provides a new perspective within which some already familiar topics from Chapter Two can be reworked. For example, in Chapter Two segmented labor market (SLM) theories pointed to an interplay among competing legitimate and illegitimate opportunities from a strictly economic (labor market) point of view. In Section 3.3 of this chapter, the concept of blocked
legitimate opportunities as a causal factor in crime within structure of opportunity theory is considered, here from a sociological rather than an economic perspective. The SLM approach to crime can be seen, in fact, as an economic version of structure of opportunity theory: blocked legitimate opportunities for success make illegitimate opportunities more attractive. As will be seen, however, the overlap is by no means total. The sociological account goes on to predict different types of illegitimate responses depending on such structural circumstances in the local setting as the integration of age groupings and of legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures. These attributes of the local political and social structure go well beyond even the expanded notion of labor markets introduced by the SLM theorists.

Finally, Section 3.4 takes up selected subcultural issues, emphasizing the notion of subcultures as adaptive over the long term when confronting significantly altered external circumstances. This view of adaptive subcultures has emerged from a 1960's debate in which early, tentative formulations of a "culture of poverty" thesis appeared to support a pessimistic, almost self-fulfilling prophecy of continuing disadvantage, in turn supporting politically conservative economic and social policies. At the core of the "culture of poverty" thesis was the untested, and possibly untestable, inference that even if significant new opportunities were to arise in the contemporary situations in which the poor find themselves, they would not be able to take advantage of them because of subculturally-derived shortcomings.
The understanding that culture is adaptive does not ignore the possibility of cultural phenomena that may pose obstacles to the group, but focuses instead on the nature of the collective experience to which these phenomena are a response. Thus particular traits of a "poverty subculture" are not static, but are created and modified as the group adapts to its experience. Change the experience and the collective adaptations of the group would change—even though some traits would change faster than others. Thus, the understanding of culture as a product of adaptation lends support to economic and social policies that are designed to change collective experiences. It also requires that such policies be applied long enough for the cultural adaptations to take place.

3.2 Sociological Research Yielding "Third Factors"

Sociological theory and empirical research have yielded a large and variegated body of findings and conceptual approaches relevant to a study of employment and crime relationships. Surveys of youth, research into determinants of school drop-out and delinquency, and analyses of official statistics that describe age-related patterns in criminal arrests are examples of these approaches. In some cases, this sociological and criminological research also rests upon well-developed theoretical foundations that are relevant to a review of employment and crime relationships; for example, the anomie—structure of opportunity position. In other cases—labelling theory, social control theory—relatively coherent theoretical positions have been developed.
but they are of only marginal relevance to this review. Finally, in some cases, such as the phenomenon of "aging out" of crime, theoretical work is relatively sparse.

aced with this diversity of positions, we have chosen to highlight three "third factors" that appear to mediate employment and crime relationships. The factors selected—family, education and age—were chosen, in part, because they are alluded to often in various explanations of the differential impacts of employment programs on criminality. It is argued, for example, that employment programs have more impact on older, better educated clients, or on those with stronger family ties.

The significance of such "third factors" as family, education and age is that at times they can be seen as acting independently on both employment and criminality. For example, developing conjugal family ties might influence a youth to forsake criminal activities for steady employment. Such a change in social status and experience could result in a correlation between employment and reduced crime, but not as a direct impact of the one on the other. Early family socialization might be seen as encouraging employment and discouraging criminality. In other instances, however, "third factors" might be seen as impacting on social contexts that in turn encourage or impede criminality. Parental unemployment, for example, might be seen as weakening parental authority and family resources, which in turn might translate into patterns of delinquency among youth in the family.

Education, already discussed in Chapter Two in terms of its human capital impact on employment, is here considered
n terms of its direct impact on both criminality and labor market status. Much research suggests that success in school is negatively correlated with delinquency and positively correlated with labor market success; yet the role that educational institutions play as a "third factor," channeling individuals respectively into legitimate and illegitimate paths, is not clearly delineated in the literature.

The last factor to be discussed--and is generally recognized as having some relationship to both crime and employment, but the relationship is complex and not yet clearly theoretically. Property crime is committed disproportionately by youth. Many of those who are involved in crime in their adolescence seem to "mature out" of crime in their late teens and early twenties, forsaking criminal activities and turing to legitimate employment. Although there are various explanations of this phenomenon--some based exclusively on the characteristics of different age groups, others pointing to age-graded opportunity structures--it seems clear that the process of "maturing out" is a major factor to be considered independently of other factors in exploring relationships between employment and crime.

3.2.1 Family, Employment and Crime: Relationships

In the crime and especially juvenile delinquency literature, family factors are accorded important causal status. In sociologically-based theories of delinquency, the family is considered to be central in delinquency formation and
future criminal behavior. Then we turn to economic behavior, a different causal role for the family emerges. Most social scientists see the family within industrial society as an institution basically reacting to imperatives generated by the economy.¹ Unemployment, for example, can create marital discord and family breakup. If, on the other hand, we were to think of family as a "third factor" complicating or elaborating relationships between economic factors and crime, then the simplest assumption would be that family variables intervene between the two. In this view, employment and labor market variables have their primary impacts on family factors (breakup, type of discipline) and these outcomes in turn act on criminality. Of course, these interrelationships may be more complicated than first appears. Many causal sequences involving specific variables subsumed under each factor are theoretically possible, and not all of them may follow the assumed causal sequence from economy to family to criminality. In order to sort out these effects, we first consider the simpler relationships between family and crime, and between family and economic factors.

Criminologists have identified many family variables thought to be related to crime. Following Rodman and Grams, we distinguish between family structure variables (such as family composition), and family interrelationship variables (such as marital or parent-child harmony), and discuss each

¹ For a recent, broad overview of social science interpretations of the family, see Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged. (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
type separately. A review of the criminological literature indicates that family factors have been related mostly to delinquency. Very few citations in this section will refer to the relationship between family variables and adult crime. Implicitly, then, sociologists view the family of childhood as indirectly causing adult crime through its role in delinquency formation.

Some structural factors that have been related to delinquency are social characteristics of child or birth and family location. The literature has generally suggested that the child's family, that is, high correlations between economic status, broken home, and juvenile delinquency rates among white and non-white areas of Washington, D.C., but the large negative correlation between economic status and broken homes makes causality at the individual level unclear. Schuessler and Slatin found high correlations between divorce rates (among many other social and economic factors) and some property crime index rates. By factor analysis, they subsumed this family variable within an anomie cluster. These and other ecological studies have


been criticized for their tendency to derive complicated theoretical constructs from available census data and for their improper inclusion of dependent variables (crime) with explanatory factors.⁵

Studies using data on individuals rather than on areas have found a relationship between broken homes and juvenile delinquency, but the theoretical significance of the relationship remains questionable. In an early review of the literature, Toby suggests that the effect of a broken home depends on the actual control a family exercises over its children.⁶ A family normally has more control over preadolescents than adolescents, and more control over girls than boys. Therefore, the effects of a broken home will be felt more among pre-adolescents (with respect to property crime) and among girls (with respect to non-property crime).

Among other family structure factors that have been related to delinquency are the child’s birth order position (middle children are more likely to become delinquent); family size (positively related to delinquency); and maternal deprivation. Less research has been done on these factors, perhaps suggesting consensus among sociologists about their relative lack of causal significance. Alcock and Grams re-
view these studies and conclude that while the broken home is important, it is less significant as an explanation of delinquency than other indicators of family interrelationships. Before we discuss interrelationships, we will consider relationships between family structure and economic variables.

It is commonly known that economic status affects family structure. It is generally believed that among those of lower socioeconomic status, there is a greater incidence of marital dissatisfaction and breakup. The operant economic variable might be low income, or the characteristics of low-skill jobs, but in terms of crime causation, family structural factors such as broken homes are seen as reactions to economic causes. It is also possible to conceive of family factors as having effects on future economic status, as in "vicious cycle" theories of poverty. As an example of family effects on economic behavior, we might mention Bullock's finding that youths in homes without fathers had less knowledge of the labor market and that Chicanos in Los Angeles had greater access to factory jobs than blacks partly because they were more likely to have fathers present in their


households. Bullock did not consider whether these differences in labor market behavior ultimately had an effect on criminal activity, but it would be reasonable to assume that his was the case.

Todman and Grams review a number of relationship variables that have been found to be associated with delinquency. Some studies have found marital discord and parent-child disagreements to be related to delinquency. Hirschi, on the other hand, finds few differences between delinquents and non-delinquents on these factors. Some studies have found the type and consistency of discipline exercised by parents related to delinquency, but there is much disagreement in the literature on this. Other studies have found a relationship between parental rejection and delinquency, but here again, Hirschi's study questions the relationship.

Finally, one tradition in criminology, control theory, points to the family as the key institution in creating internalized controls in individuals through the socialization process. Control theory has given more attention to internalization of norms and to self-image as key variables, and has not dealt directly with the ways in which the family goes about creating internalized norms in children. Thus, Hirschi argues that delinquents fail to internalize conventional group norms. His theory suggests, but does not directly deal with, the failure of family socialization, by


suggesting that delinquents are formed when parents fail to create conventional role models for children to follow. Failure at socialization might also be related to crime by impairing the future labor market or educational behavior of children.

Turning now to the relationship between economic actors, family socialization and crime, Kohn has shown that certain values that parents want their children to hold mirror the parents' work conditions (not in a one-to-one correspondence but as a view of what people want and how they act). Working-class parents stress external conformity to norms (neatness, promptness, obedience to authority) while middle-class parents stress internalized control (self-direction, self-control). Bowles and Gintis theorize that these value patterns correspond to the types of behavior required by lower and higher positions in bureaucratic settings. Families, on this view, "reproduce" the class structure by the kinds of values they stress in their children's socialization. Extending this to lower class socialization, we might assume that the lower class, exposed to low paying, transient, insecure and often non-unionized jobs, would form a view of the world in which nothing good would be expected to last. Ratcliff suggests this by re-


Referring to working-class socialization for the strategy of the good life, middle-class socialization for the strategy of career success, and lower-class socialization for the strategy of survival. 14

The effects of family factors on crime and employment have been discussed from the vantage point of adolescent development. The adolescent has little control over the family factors that may shape his future. However, these factors recede in immediacy as the adolescent grows up and as a young adult begins to establish his adult life pattern, including the choice of whether or when to marry and have children. These choices, in turn, may affect and be affected by criminal behavior. For example, the literature suggests that choosing a spouse, common-law wife or steady girlfriend precipitates leaving delinquent gangs around age 17. 15 Among prisoners, having lived alone or having been divorced seems to be more common than among the general population. Rand's study of habitual felons found that half of the sample had been married at one point in their life but only 14 percent were married during a three-year study period that centered on the period during which the offense was committed for which they were incarcerated. 16

It would be fair to conjecture that marriage and crime may not be compatible lifestyles. For example, Letkeman reports that career criminals tend to reject on-going relationships because they do not fit in with their work conditions; but it should also be kept in mind that in specific circumstances either factor could feed back on the other.  

In a dissertation based on data from the Baltimore LIFE Project, a program providing short-term stipends to prison releases, Genevie analyzed in detail the relationship between family choice, work, and recidivism. He found that released prisoners involved in traditional family activities were more likely to engage in legitimate work, while those participating in the "street corner society" (for example, living alone) were more likely to engage in activities typical of the "irregular economy." Participating in either of these economic systems, however, reduced the individual's chance of engaging in crime as measured by the frequency and severity of subsequent arrests. Neither living in a traditional family setting nor living alone had direct effects on criminal activity. Rather, their effects were exerted indirectly, mainly through the kinds of economic systems in which individuals were active.

A review of crime studies using family variables leads us to conclude that family factors need to be taken into account in research on the relationship between labor market


factors and criminal activity. However, most studies suggest that family factors (specifically early family structure, socialization during adolescence and family choice during young adulthood) are likely to exert indirect effects on criminal activity through their direct effects on labor market activities.

3.2.2 Education, Employment and Crime Relationships

In the juvenile delinquency literature, education is also considered potentially as related to crime as are family factors. Similarly, education's effects are thought to be of less importance in explanations of adult crime. This section, therefore, deals mostly with the effect of education on juvenile delinquency together with its possible direct and indirect effects on young adult crime.¹⁹

We begin this discussion by stating what amounts to a truism: doing well in school is negatively related to juvenile delinquency.²⁰ While sociologists would accept this as the starting point of a discussion, they would soon diverge on the question of what to make of it. Why do those who do

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¹⁹. In the sense that few adult institutional activities continue to revolve around education. In gross terms, educational attainment continues to be statistically associated with criminality. For example, 80 percent of prison inmates have less than a high school diploma (cited in Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey, Criminology (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lipincott Co., 1974). However, this statistical association, like those of other background factors, does not provide much explanation of the causal significance of education.

²⁰. See Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency.
not fare well in academic competition tend to engage in delinquency? Does academic success directly avert delinquency or do they both result from the impact of other school or family factors?

Sociologists see school as a multi-functional institution. Schools help select candidates for positions within the labor market, supposedly on the basis of academic performance. Schools are also socializing institutions, instilling the general values of the culture, much as the family does. Finally, education may have some negative ide effects in the sense of unforeseen, and potentially disruptive, consequences of routine activities. In the latter case, our interest is in the effect of schooling on prolonging adolescence, although other negative side effects may be conceived.

One interpretation of the consequences of academic failure for juvenile delinquency is that the latter may be a reaction to the strains of failing at an important, socially prescribed activity. Expressed in psychological terms, Cohen focuses on an assumed "reaction formation" in which failure is neutralized by upholding negative values. Subsequent research on delinquency has cast doubt on this interpretation. For example, Elliott and Voss found few dif-


ferences in academic achievement between delinquents and non-delinquents. Similarly, Hirschi failed to find a strain effect in examining the combined effect of aspirations and achievement on delinquency.

One effect of academic failure often ignored by delinquency research is its role in reducing human capital. From the perspective of the economic model of crime, it seems more likely that school dropouts would engage in illegal activity because their low educational achievement supports expectations of low earnings in legitimate labor market activities. Alternatively, other studies suggest that school dropouts may face little or no penalty in finding secondary work. Such studies by economists are based, however, on aggregate data and adult crime. Still other studies by sociologists, specifically of delinquency, suggest that it is questionable whether the human capital problems of dropouts cause delinquency. Elliott and Voss, for example, discovered that delinquents reduced their frequency of delinquent activities after dropping out of school. This does not, however, necessarily contradict a hypothesized relationship between education and crime. It may be that lack of educational achievement has its greatest human capital


effect on crime in late adolescence and early adulthood, which is when the problem of entry into the labor force begins to be seriously confronted. It is at this point that low educational achievement might tip the scales in favor of illegal activity.

Some sociologists have considered the effect of school socialization in fostering delinquency. Elliott and Ross suggest that the competitive and disciplinary features of school life create rebellious behavior that, for some, may be transformed into delinquency. Hirshi concurs that school socialization fails to encourage conventional behavior in some students, but he absolves the schools by arguing that teachers and administrators are powerless to socialize unless parents have instilled the proper orientation in their children. That is, commitments to conformity are said to precede adolescent school experience. Schools may be able only to reinforce such commitments if they are already present.

In this context, it is useful to refer to Bowles and Gintis's contention that the schools support adult occupational stratification. In their view, school socialization mainly molds the young for the world of work. Middle-class schools reward creativity, independence, and other traits suitable for work at higher bureaucratic and organizational levels. Working-class schools reward obedience, dependability, and other traits that are more suitable for work in low-level clerical and factory jobs. For example, Bowles and Gintis show that grades are more related to teachers' ratings on the above traits than they are to objective indi-
icators of competence. Their theory, however, does not account for the modest amount of intergenerational mobility in industrial societies. How do some working-class children wind up in higher educational levels, despite the predominantly opposite influences of their school environments?

Lirschi believes that school socialization fails lower-class youth because schools reward behavioral traits that may contribute to unacceptable self-images for lower-class adolescents. Given the early autonomy from family influences of lower-class children, submission to authority may not promise long-range payoffs. Working-class adolescents, on the other hand, may come to realize that the work worlds of family and friends do provide the promise of future benefits through submission to school and family authority. If the psychic costs of submission for the working-class adolescent seem too great, he or she might decide to drop out of school and leave the family. But, as Osterman points out, even so, the working-class youth's labor market networks will probably place him in a fairly protected segment of the labor force. Thus, it may be that dropout (as a protest against school-enforced traits of behavior that are in conflict with adolescents' own self-images) will be used less often by working-class than by lower-class adolescents. And even when dropout does occur, its consequences for working-class students would be less serious than for lower class students who lack the adult job networks to see them through the transition to adult work experience.

As another explanation of delinquency, some sociologists see schooling as an insulator of adolescents from the adult world. In this view, schools are a major part of a trend in industrial societies towards prolonged adolescence. Proponents of this view point out that the function of schooling in delaying maturity runs counter to other trends in the culture (for example, trends toward earlier sexual relations and teenage commodity consumption). Glaser considers this consequence of schooling as having negative side effects, with juvenile delinquency resulting from the fact that adolescents are cut off by schooling from adult contacts, especially in the adult work world. Those who see schools as insulators favor cooperative education and career education programs, and call for greater efforts to place students in large-scale work organizations and to develop incentives for employers to include students in their organizations. It is argued that involvement with the adult world would cut down on delinquency by giving adolescents realistic ideas about work and by encouraging conformity through development of relationships with adults.

Emphasis on efforts to reduce the insulating role of schooling can lead to program suggestions. For example, many adolescents work part-time and part-year in secondary labor market jobs that provide little occupational advance-


ment. Yet other findings suggest that a crucial link in the job experience chain is provided by what Osterman terms "bridge employment." The part-school, part-work possibilities here come before the stage of "bridge employment." Nevertheless part-time "secondary" work experience, among lower-class adolescents, together with fortuitous adult contacts in family networks and in school, may decrease delinquency and support commitments to conventional behavior.

In summary, we see family structure, family and school socialization, educational achievement, and sustained adult contacts as important "third factors" setting the stage for the work and crime experiences of "high risk" youth. We suppose that these socializing factors can dampen delinquent behavior, and, in addition, exert a cumulative negative impact on subsequent adult crime.

3.2.3 Age: "Maturing Out" of Crime

Teenagers commit more than half of all property crime in the United States, even though they constitute only slightly over a third of the population.28 The modal age for larceny arrests is 15, burglary 16 and robbery 19.29 In contrast, labor market participation peaks much later. For male blacks in central cities, labor force participation increases dramatically around age 19. Rates of unemployment

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Prop sharply for 20-year-olds. It is generally recognized that many youth who become involved in crime in their adolescence gradually "mature out" of criminal activity into employment as they age. In some of the following literature, it has been hypothesized, in fact, that age itself is a significant factor in the movement from crime to employment, as opposed to age being a summary variable, reflecting other things.

The simplest explanations of the "maturing out" process view it as a function of physical aging. In his review of maturation and recidivism findings, Thorsten Sellin refers to perhaps the earliest theory of "maturing out" of crime. In 1833, Quetelet argued that the penchant for crime peaked when physical development neared completion, around the age of 25, giving way to moral and intellectual growth. Crime ended with the beginning of the "enfeeblement of physical vitality and the passions," but this was also accompanied by a shift in concerns and values that also acted to avert delinquency. Sellin also cites the Glueck's theory holding that age is the only factor that emerges in the "reformative process" of diminishing delinquency over time. No one cited by Sellin offers a fuller explanation of maturation than that of aging in itself.


Other commentators, however, see the process as more social than physical. David Matza, for example, sees delinquents as existing in a limbo between convention and crime, flitting with each, evading decision. "Maturing out" of crime is seen as a result of reductions in anxiety about masculinity and group membership. Matured "aspirants to manhood" are said to view delinquency as "kid stuff" and membership anxiety is said to be reduced as alternative affiliations, such as work and marriage, replace the adolescent peer group.

Briar and Piliavin see delinquent acts as inspired by short-term, situationally-induced desires for goods or reputation, rather than long-term role aspirations (subculture) or frustrations (blocked opportunities). Resistance to delinquent acts is seen as a function of a delinquent's relative "commitments to conformity." The reduction in criminal activities among late adolescents and young adults is thought a result of work and marriage, both of which increase "commitments to conformity." Employment has the added advantage of taking young men off the street and providing them with income.

William West views "maturing out" as a process of role transformation. West finds that some young criminals de-

cided to go straight out of a simple desire to "settle down," having had enough of strange hours, violent escapades and nervous tension. The entry into adulthood is marked by increasing fear of the greater consequences of crime associated with adult status. Marriage and family life create roles that are incompatible with a career in crime. The criminal lifestyle no longer seems "cool." Criminal sanctions increase with age and honest work begins to pay better than crime as employment opportunities increase. Marriage and employment appear as substitute roles for the aging delinquent: they are agents of transformation.

It is also possible to see "maturing out" as the product of economic and other structural factors. Glaser, for example, points to the problem created by a prolonged period of adolescence and a highly pressured, consumer-oriented youth culture. Others point to the impact of a juvenile justice system in which punishments for juvenile and adult crimes are not comparable. Still others emphasize age-graded structures of opportunity for employment.

3.2.4 A Model of "Maturing Out" of Crime

Somewhat more speculatively, a conceptual model for relating criminal involvements and legitimate work to age is afforded by considering a hypothetical cohort of "high risk" youth over a five-year period starting when the cohort is aged 16. The process can be conceived of as a series of branchings reflecting choices between legal and illegal com-

35. Glaser, "Variables Affecting Youth Unemployment."
mitments. Over time, paths along various branches might be characterized as careers or career segments pertaining to an individual or a group of individuals who share in the same pattern of legitimate and illegitimate involvements.

Among the career segments that would be of interest to the study of employment and crime are those manifesting changes in the mixture of legal and illegal work. At the beginning of adulthood, some or even much criminality and very little work would be anticipated, because only limited employment is available to adolescents.

Aggregate data on crime and work by age suggest an important point relating to a career-segment model. At the individual level, criminal experience (including juvenile delinquency) would precede work experience for most people. Thus, decisions to enter the labor force might not solely result from macroeconomic factors such as levels of unemployment in an area. Rather, previous criminal experiences during adolescence may also have work-averting effects. Crime, especially the returns from petty street crime, might condition expectations concerning the desirability of legitimate employment or minimum earnings. Furthermore, early involvement with the criminal justice system may have negative impact on future employment. Indirect evidence on this is supplied by Rand's study of California prison inmates. Men with histories of early juvenile offenses were more
likely than those entering crime at later ages to define themselves as serious criminals and to cite "high living" as their reason for committing crime.36

We assume that the age of transition from predominantly criminal to work involvements varies somewhat among individuals.37 Most delinquents appear to leave crime at the onset of young adulthood and assume conventional roles, although the absence of longitudinal data concerning employment and crime experience makes such assumptions difficult to prove. Others combine work and crime and then make the transition to conventionality in their mid-twenties. An even smaller number first enter crime in early adulthood. Finally, some young offenders persist in crime past their mid-twenties, and begin to specialize in one or another criminal pursuit. An informal and tentative account of these different hypothetical career segments is offered below.

The first group, "reformed delinquents," is the least accessible to conventional research, since it tends to fall between most existing delinquency and adult crime research. Researchers on juvenile delinquency often do not follow subjects past the late teen years, while adult crime re-


37. Peterson et al. found that 25 percent of prison inmates did not report juvenile criminality. These respondents were more likely to combine work and crime, were less likely to define themselves as career criminals, and were more likely to cite economic hardship as their reason for engaging in crime.
searchers cannot say anything about delinquents who do not engage in adult crime. Delinquency theory suggests, however, that family, work and educational factors interplay in facilitating many delinquents' decisions to pursue conventional goals. A lengthy quote from Werthman's study of delinquents' "moral careers" illustrates the point:

By viewing the "delinquent career" as a more or less stable sequence of acts taken in risky social situations in order to claim an identity or define a self, often followed by changes in the rules and judgments that make up these situations, and followed again by new choices of the self in response to these changes, it is possible to see how a gang boy could arrive at the age of 18 or 21 to find that his situation makes it costly, painful, or difficult for him to take the conventional job that he always expected to take, particularly if the boy has come to view the conventional world as a place full of the kinds of people who have labeled him a "delinquent"...

Once a gang boy gets beyond the age of 18, moreover, his situation changes rather dramatically. Whether he likes it or not, he now has a choice to make about what identity system to enter. He could get married, get a job, and assume the status of a full-fledged "adult;" he could decide to postpone this decision in legitimate ways such as joining the Army and going to school at night; or he could decide to remain for a few more years as an elder statesman on the streets, in which case he will continue to make use of the identity materials available to youth.

The decision he makes at this point in his career will depend on his situation. If he managed to graduate from high school, he may well decide to go on to college; but if he was expelled from high school, he may feel either bitter or reluctant about going back to night school to get the high school degree. He knows that he has been administratively reborn in the eyes of the law, and thus the risks he takes by staying in the streets increase considerably since he now may be processed by the courts as an adult. On the other
hand, if his status in the gang world is still high, he may not want to trade it right away for a low-paying, blue-collar job; and he knows he will be rejected by the Army if he has a jail record of any kind.

In short, it is at this point in his career that the "opportunities" available to him will affect his behavior, his attitudes, and the decisions he makes about his life. If there are no legitimate options open to him, options that at best would not make him suffer a sudden decrease in status and at worst would allow him not to face his ultimately dismal status-fate as an adult; then he may well decide to stay on the streets, despite the greater consequences involved in taking risks. He may adopt a "hustle," and he may also adopt a full-blown ideology along with it. Since he now views the conventional world as a place he is expected to enter, he tends to develop a "position" on it. Jobs become "slaves;" going to school becomes "serving time;" and in some cases the assumptions about marriage and getting a conventional job are replaced by fantasies about the quick and big "score." These are no longer the "delinquent boys" described by Cohen. They are the self-styled aristocrats described by Finestone and Sykes and Matza. They have an answer to everything, and they always "know the score."

After a few years of this existence, these boys are really at the end of their "delinquent" careers. Some get jobs, some go to jail, some get killed, and some simply fade into an older underground of pool rooms and petty thefts. Most cannot avoid ending up with conventional jobs; however, largely because the "illegitimate opportunities" available simply are not that good.

Using Werthman's characterization and the idea of a career-segment model, a further task is to determine what predicts the "delayed transition" to conventional life that most young street criminals finally make by the mid-twenties. Who drops out and who stays criminally involved?

Many actors appear to influence the timing of the transition from street crime into conventional roles. They can be discussed under two broad headings: opportunities and aspirations associated with criminal roles themselves and the impact of legitimate labor market opportunities and other sociocultural factors.

With regard to criminal aspirations and opportunities, it is sometimes useful but practically difficult to distinguish among those pertaining to addicts, serious property offenders and occasional property offenders. (Violent offenders and other specialized types whose crimes are considered more as expressive "ends" in themselves than as economic objectives are not encompassed by this discussion.) Addicts often commit crimes in the service of their addiction, although the adaptability of addicts and the extent of their ability to sustain legitimate employment is often underrated. Among non-addicts, serious property criminals are distinguished from occasional offenders in terms of a sustained aspiration to acquire and excel in criminal

skills. Serious property offenders are more likely to have engaged in delinquency at an early age, to have been incarcerated as adolescents, and to cite "high living" as their most important motive for crime. But seriousness is mainly defined by the manifestation of "professional" attitudes toward crime, (i.e., they report monetary success and believe in developing criminal skills).40

Most serious property criminals, like occasional criminals, do not specialize in their criminal activities. The Rand Institute's findings and those from the President's Task Force Report on Science and Technology suggest few offenders specialize in any one property crime: Peterson estimates that only 10 percent of the prison population can be considered to be criminal specialists.41

The definition of serious property criminals in terms of their aspirations towards "professional" criminal roles also should not lead to the conclusion that they necessarily derive substantial income from their activities. Although data are obviously not broken down by "professionalism," the

40. We confine our discussion to property crimes. There is specialization in the sense that property criminals are more likely to be rearrested for property rather than personal offenses. On the other hand, there are few personal offense specialists.

Uniform Crime Reports\(^42\) estimate the average value of a robbery at $32. Glaser\(^43\) estimates the average value of a burglary at about $180. This is far less than the value estimated for lucrative offenses such as criminal crafts (safe-cracking, etc.) or illicit enterprises (numbers)\(^7\) but these opportunities are limited to a very small segment of even serious property criminals.

Thus, although serious property criminals are defined as those who have high criminal aspirations—-at the outset of adulthood, they expect large gains from crime—the actual opportunities afforded in crime are such as to significantly restrict the degree of success actually experienced. As serious property offenders become older, crime opportunities dry up even more and the costs of continued crime also increase.

A brief sketch of the nature of criminal opportunities may clarify this. The literature (Letkemann, Klockars, Ianni) suggests that serious property criminals who operate on the street rank at the very bottom of the criminal hierarchy.\(^44\) Many well-paying crimes—those linked with white-collar roles—are not open to the lower class.\(^45\) Lucrative

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42. FBI, Uniform Crime Reports.


45. This is not only due to the absence of office skills, but also includes the inability to put on a "front," a self acceptable to the victim.
 illicit enterprises—drug wholesaling and distributing, numbers, etc.—are also out of the reach of older serious property criminals, since recruitment channels are restricted and most recruitment takes place during adolescence. Recruitment into rewarding criminal enterprises hinges both on manifesting talent to those already involved and on personal contacts and kinship ties. The typical young serious property criminal is therefore likely to be as "occupationally disadvantaged" with respect to opportunities in illicit enterprises as he is with respect to legitimate enterprises.

Another opportunity theoretically open to the young serious property criminal is in a higher criminal craft. These crafts are guild-like. Like legitimate craft apprenticeships, criminal apprenticeships are made available to those selected (usually in prison) on the basis of personal qualities—seriousness, reliability, modesty. As in trade and craft unions, work shelters are created by regulating the number of openings for apprentices.46

Thus, serious property crime does not offer many entry-level positions leading to lucrative criminal activities. The serious property criminal's remaining avenue of upward mobility lies in fencing. West relates that some of his subjects tried to set up their own fencing operations, but they were only moderately successful. Lucrative fencing requires an initial investment of money to buy goods and to

46. Ascriptive characteristics might also be important in selection. Letkemann suggests that most criminal craftsmen come from white, working-class backgrounds.
finance a legitimate "front." In addition, a mature appearance is helpful in presenting a legitimate "front." So here again, a youthful serious property criminal finds restricted opportunities.

One additional factor helps to bring about a realignment in favor of conventional values among most serious property criminals: the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system. The omnipresence of street crime masks one of its realities: sooner or later almost everyone gets caught. There are, in this sense, no successful street criminals. Because of their relatively low position in criminal labor markets, serious property criminals obtain little protection from imprisonment and conviction. Over time, continuing criminal involvement tends to raise the cost in terms of punishment of each additional crime, thus making conventional prospects more attractive.

While the structuring of criminal opportunities inevitably weeds out many aspiring serious property offenders, weeding out is also bolstered by the structuring of legitimate labor market opportunities and by the influence of an array of non-economic sociocultural factors (including those

47. Various students of criminality make the same point. See Glaser, Crime in Society, Chapter 5.


49. With reference to criminal craftsmen, see Letkeman, Crime as Work.

50. West states lower-class people seem to be more susceptible to this effect. Among California prison inmates, blacks have lower crime inactivity rates, and get arrested more often than whites (Petersilia et al., Criminal Careers).
discussed elsewhere in this chapter). In the discussion in Chapter Two, some labor market factors that partly account for the role of legitimate opportunities in availing crime were described. While the position of "high risk" youth in the labor market is defined as precarious, it is nevertheless expected that some persons in the secondary labor force do accumulate work skills, labor market information or increased attractiveness for employers. Moreover, the mere fact of age may give young adults an advantage over adolescent job seekers.

Thus, contemplating the "maturing out" process both in terms of the role of criminal opportunities and the labor market processes, the literature suggests that the ranks of serious property criminals and occasional offenders are thinned by the combined impact of:

- labor market experiences, even in the secondary labor market, which provide an accumulation of skills ensuring easier job-getting;

- family formation, which provides additional support for conventional roles and the rewards of a sustained family life that are more compatible with legitimate work involvements;

- criminal experiences, which provide little financial gain, and criminal justice practices, which increase the marginal costs of crime.

An important issue linking policy and research interests relates to the kinds of structural and motivational factors involved in different career segments with different mixes of jobs and crime. There may be structural differences between the labor market opportunities of people who
mix crime and employment, and those of conventional workers. The opportunities of criminals who do not work differ from both groups. In addition some current criminal justice practices may sometimes conflict with employment policy goals by blocking legitimate opportunities in the name of punishment or deterrence.

We need to know when—and for whom—employment is most effective as an intervention strategy. Increased job opportunities for youth might have a lagged rather than immediate effect on criminality as knowledge of real alternatives is expanded. It is possible that—with increased knowledge of factors that contribute to "maturing out" of crime—processes of disenchantment with crime and conventional skill accumulation can be accelerated.
3.3 Cloward and Ohlin: Structure of Opportunity

In 1960, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin published *Delinquency and Opportunity*, a work that inspired a considerable range of anti-crime efforts during the war on poverty in the 1960's. In turn, Cloward and Ohlin were influenced in important ways by an earlier, seminal paper by Robert Merton entitled "Social Structure and Anomie." In introducing Cloward and Ohlin's ideas, it is useful for a moment to return to Merton's formulation.

Merton's theory of anomie begins with the observation that the emphasis of American culture on the acquisition of material goods as symbols of success is pervasive—affecting people at all rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. When combined with other elements of American culture, especially its emphasis on democracy and the "rags to riches" myths, the success goal structures the expectations of the people and exerts substantial stress on those lacking material symbols. Furthermore, while the culture defines certain means


as legitimate for achieving success, it nevertheless accords disproportionate importance to the goal itself. Moreover, it is clear that legitimate means are less available and, even when used, are less effective for socially and economically depressed segments of the population.

But slightly differently, legitimate opportunities are themselves structured in ways that make them less accessible and less effective for such groups. Under these circumstances, the disproportionate emphasis on the success goal in the face of ineffective means produces considerable pressure for using alternative means to the goal. Thus, for example, when legitimate employment proves to be an ineffective road to material success for specific segments of society, the groups so affected are likely to look for and create illegitimate means to attain that goal. In this context, high crime rates among disadvantaged groups of society are viewed as resulting both from lack of legitimate employment and educational opportunities (structurally limited access to means) and from the continued cultural pressures to achieve material success to which the disadvantaged, like all members of society, nevertheless remain exposed.

Merton's theory is thus congruent with more recently developed notions of segmented labor markets, adding systematic reference to the cultural context of an over-emphasized, universal goal of material success. The theory also suggests some of the social and social-psychological processes that describe how groups adapt their behavior, especially income-generating behavior, to the sociocultural conditions of anomie.
In developing their own position, Cloward and Ohlin integrated Merton's theory of social structure and anomie with other sociological theory and research, especially that of Edwin Sutherland, to explore the ways in which collective responses to anomie are themselves shaped by social and cultural forces operating at the neighborhood level. These forces structure the kinds of illegitimate opportunities that are prevalent in a neighborhood and the extent to which these opportunities offer residents reasonable chances for achieving material success and establishing fairly stable and protected illegitimate careers. Thus, Cloward and Ohlin suggest that the availability and effectiveness of illegitimate opportunities, as well as legitimate opportunities, are a function of the local social structure. The key structural variables operating on the neighborhood level, according to Cloward and Ohlin, are the extent to which legitimate and illegitimate networks are integrated at the neighborhood level. Effective integration of both opportunity and learning structures supports the emergence of rewarding and stable criminal careers. Where such forms of social organization are not present, illegal activity is more likely to take the form of violent group conflicts and withdrawal into the worlds of drug and alcohol abuse.

The notion of different illegitimate opportunity patterns has also been utilized to account for different crime patterns among adults. For example, Ianni emphasizes cultural differences between groups in the readiness with which
they form "networks" for illegitimate enterprises. He describes Italians as the prototype of network formation, based on kinship, and believes that Cuban groups have successfully followed their example; Puerto Ricans and blacks, on the other hand, have been much less successful at emulating Italian patterns, and have been more likely to form criminal networks based on street-gang and prison associations.

In their discussion of opportunity structures, Cloward and Ohlin saw education as the primary avenue to legitimate career opportunities. Educational opportunities were conceived of as the objective ability to afford education, taking into account the opportunity costs of education to low-income families (e.g., the foregone wages of children who remain in school).

In addressing the role of education, structure of opportunity theory resembles economic, human capital approaches. Unlike its conception in economic theory, however, a group's lack of human capital is seen as a socially structured condition, rather than a result of an individual's unwise time investments. Cloward and Ohlin do not take into account differences in academic ability that subsequently were made much of in the status attainment literature. Structure of opportunity theory easily accommodates itself to the view that wealth and other sources of privilege are transmitted across generations and account for persisting inequality.

53. Ianni, Black Mafia.
The discussion of labor market segments in Chapter Two can help flesh out notions of legitimate opportunity structures found in the work of Cloward and Ohlin, although their emphasis on local, neighborhood social structures has important reverse implications for labor market theory as well. In addition, their notion of illegitimate opportunity structures adds a new perspective to the study of crime. Cloward and Ohlin were able to show that juvenile delinquency is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Membership in criminal gangs (as opposed to other types of gangs) functions as a type of employment. Some members of criminal gangs act like apprentices to trades within quasi-organized criminal enterprises. These roles imitate some features of legitimate employment, manifesting recruitment channels, career ladders, and competition for leadership positions. The concept of structured illegal opportunities suggests that in some settings certain crime careers may be readily available, and may function as neighborhood alternative employment options, requiring discipline and "instrumental" behavior on a par with legitimate work roles. Even given the "apparent disregard delinquents sometimes exhibit for stolen objects," Cloward and Ohlin do not view delinquent theft as a purely expressive activity, but rather as a means of learning criminal skills, an instrumental activity even though the goods stolen during the activity may be unimportant. Stealing beyond economic need constitutes "anticipatory socialization" into crime.

It is evident that structure of opportunity theory diverges from the strictly economic mechanisms of the segmented labor market approach, even though emphasis on the causal significance of blocked legitimate opportunity is the same. The theory, in fact, points out a variety of possible responses to blocked opportunity other than property crime--fighting gangs turn to violence, "retreatist" gangs to drugs--as adaptations to the limitations on access to success through legitimate means. These limitations on success are themselves the products of structural differences among neighborhoods.

For Cloward and Ohlin, delinquent subcultures--criminal, violent and retreatist gangs--represent specialized modes of adaptation to blocked opportunities. As the authors suggest: "Hard work, perseverance and honesty may lose their force as norms when there are more persons capable of meeting those criteria than there are opportunities." They deny that delinquent subcultures are primarily the product of either lower class culture, the stress of adolescence or the need for masculine identification. Even though Cloward and Ohlin emphasize the "subcultural" nature of delinquency, subcultures operate for them primarily as resources to facilitate adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, a point of view clearly echoed by some of the subcultural theorists reviewed in the following section.

55. Ibid., p.20.
3.4 Subcultures, Employment and Crime

A 1974 ethnographic study of a black ghetto community in San Francisco exemplifies the way in which ghetto subculture can be conceived of as mediating employment and crime relationships:

The ability to hold a full-time job (eight hours a day, five days a week, fifty weeks a year) is completely out of the range of experience of most of those who demanded work. Little or nothing in the subculture of Hunter's Point fosters a point of view which values hard work for a productive lifetime to be followed by retirement. A combination of reality orientation and lack of achievement values does not permit the development of attitudes toward work common among middle-class Americans. To be able to "make it" while avoiding the "work game" is a strong, pervasive, and consistent goal in Hunter's Point. 56

Hippler contends that there are distinctive subcultural attitudes towards work and hustling among the materially deprived. He speaks of a persistent "welfare culture", present-time orientation and respect for the "mean" or "bad," aggressive male. 57 Given a subculture such as that described by Hippler, it is easy to see how persistent unemployment and crime could be viewed as joint manifestations of subcultural attitudes. Such a view in many ways simplifies the much debated "culture of poverty" concept as first formulated by Oscar Lewis. 58


57. Ibid., p. 160.

3.4.1 The "Culture of Poverty" Thesis

Much of the acrimony in the "culture of poverty" debate appears to revolve around the supposed support afforded by that position to conservative social and political philosophies. A theoretical disagreement over the definition of "culture" has complicated the debate. The central problem of definition has been the question of the relation of behavior, values and structure. Oscar Lewis' definition implies that the "culture of poverty" is a self-perpetuating system of values. Later researchers have reacted against this definition by stressing the adaptive nature of poverty traits and insisting that the social structure which necessitates these adaptations be considered in the analysis of lower-class life. Some of the adaptationists have proposed that there exists a gulf between values and behavior in the lower-class: widespread patterns of behavior exist which nonetheless are not socially condoned within lower class neighborhoods and do not constitute cultural "designs for living" that hold the allegiance of the poor. Evidence of these phenomena can even be found in Lewis's own extensive ethnography.

Even among later writings which stress the adaptive nature of poverty traits, however, there remains some disagreement over the relation of norms to behavior. Individual writers and ethnographers bring different perspectives to this problem, some stressing "value stretch," some the variation in roles and lifestyles in the lower-class neighborhood, some the differential psychological responses of individuals to the situation of poverty.
In the academic literature at the present time, there are few proponents of the view that cultural patterns associated with poverty in fact would persist over the long run without regard to changes in objective economic opportunities and other conditions. On the other hand, it does remain difficult to establish the nature of current agreement concerning whether certain shared perceptions, attitudes, values and norms of poverty groups make it difficult for them to take advantage of limited opportunities, even if it is also acknowledged that opportunities have been made available only in limited measure.

Lewis's concept was that there is a stable and persistent way of life, passed down from generation to generation within poverty-level families (wherever they are encountered). The "culture of poverty" sustains poverty through wasteful consumption habits, persistent unemployment and patterns of self-defeat. By the age of six, a poor child has fully assimilated a set of culturally patterned values and beliefs. Lewis himself admits that in many ways this culture of poverty also entails a "poverty of culture," that it is not—as culture is generally defined to be—a positive, constructive design for living. He does, however, contend that various positive aspects do qualify the poverty lifestyle as a distinct cultural entity with a structure, rationale and system of defenses that enable the poor to carry on. Given such a definition, employment and crime involvements among the poor emerge as symptoms or "expressions" of culture.

59. Lewis, La Vida, p.liii.
Although he is the most often criticized, Lewis is not the only proponent of a distinctive, determining poverty culture. The political scientist Edward Banfield attributes a pervasive present-time orientation to the poor. This trait can be used to explain a variety of work-related problems—absenteeism, tardiness—as well as impulse-related behavior, including crime. Ghetto residents are said to have habits incompatible with legitimate, steady employment. They are found too accustomed to living off women on welfare and hustling to accept the dull routine of work. Walter Miller, in an often quoted paper, attributes a host of "focal concerns" to lower-class youth—trouble, toughness, smartness (a kind of wiliness), excitement, fate, autonomy—that have also been interpreted as supporting illegal or delinquent behavior. The implications of such theories of poverty culture are that unemployment and crime are culturally engrained activities and that therefore attempts to improve the economic conditions of the poor must also address subcultural obstacles to enhanced economic opportunities.

3.4.2 The Adaptive Subcultural Model

Those who argue against the culture of poverty thesis generally express the view that those traits that seem to make poverty an unchanging cultural inheritance might better


be viewed as continually renewed adaptations to the economic, social and political conditions experienced by poor people. This view sees the poor as exposed to the dominant culture and, in many ways, accepting its elements. However, in adapting to the oppressive conditions of poverty, poor people develop values, norms and behavior patterns that deviate from those of the dominant culture. The important consequence of the adaptive subculture model is that it links cultural elements to collective experience. In this interaction of culture and experience, the former can be expected to respond—possibly with some delay and unevenness—if the collective experience has changed.

Many of those who argue against a rigid and determining culture of poverty—either by contending that lower-class subculture is an adaptation to economic conditions or that mainstream or middle-class values are held simultaneously with alternative subculture values—do not deny that lower-class behavior manifests attributes very much like the behavior described by Miller. The argument centers rather around the extent to which such attributes are the causes or effects of economic conditions; in other words, the extent to which culture of poverty theory is a form of "blaming the victim."

Also at issue is the very meaning of "culture" and "subculture" in such a context. Charles Valentine speaks of an intellectual fad of attributing a culture or subculture to almost any social category—socioeconomic, ethnic, regional

There can be Irish, Southern, youth, professional, prison and left-wing subcultures. Many substrata overlap, each is intrinsically part of the whole, a piece of the social order. Valentine argues, specifically against Lewis, that a lower-class "sub-society" may not constitute a distinct subculture with a shared way of life "because it does not embody any design for living to which people give sufficient allegiance or emotional investment to pass it on to their children." Many of the characteristics cited by Lewis (persistent unemployment, crowded living conditions, low-status occupations) are conditions of poverty, rather than a "design for living." Valentine also suggests that "class-bound behavior patterns" exist without distinctive values and in spite of parental efforts.

Valentine argues that "whatever is distinctive about lower-class life may be no more than a situational adaptation to the structural position of the bottom stratum in a highly stratified society." He suggests that certain subcultural phenomena are better understood as symptoms of poverty rather than inculcated patterns of behavior. He calls for extensive ethnographic research to explore the conflicting hypotheses of a "self-perpetuating subsociety and defective, unhealthy subculture" versus an "externally oppressed..."

64. Ibid., p. 113.
65. Ibid.
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sed subsociety with an imposed, exploited subculture."66 He also suggests a third hypothesis--"a heterogeneous society with variable, adaptive subcultures"--as a means of resolving the conflict, contending that major propositions of both versions might be simultaneously valid.

Like Valentine, Lynn Curtis contends that subcultural traits develop as adaptations to both economic conditions and "institutional racism."67 Yet Curtis seems to shift the meaning of "adaptation" away from an economic perspective, in which illegitimate activities arise in order to satisfy economic needs, toward a frustration-aggression conception, in which homicide, assault, rape and violence are seen as aggressive responses to the frustrations of blocked opportunity. Like Curtis, Charles Silberman is also primarily concerned with black violent crime.68 Both devote attention to specific elements of black culture--such as "playing the dozens" (a contest of wits staged among young males). Silberman argues against the "culture of poverty" position, disputing the proposition that the lower class exists because of its values, rather than its income, echoing the leading spokesmen of culture as adaptation.

Silberman, however, carries the argument a step further. In a sense, he pits poverty culture against ethnic culture, offering a positive version of black culture--folklore, song, ritual--a history of cultural traditions developed--


oped as a means of channeling potential black rage. Silberman presents black culture—e.g., blues, the "dozens," the trickster role of Brer Rabbit—as a means of sublimating violence.

Thus, whereas for Curtis and Rainwater the linguistic combat of the "dozens" or "joning" is seen as training for street corner life—an education in verbal one-upmanship, an integral part of a violent culture—for Silberman it is a way of channeling violence into acceptable cultural expression, controlling the pent-up rage of the heritage of slavery. Unfortunately, according to Silberman, these cultural channels are breaking down:

The process no longer works; black adolescents and young men have begun to act out the violence and aggression that, in the past, has been contained and sublimated into fantasy and myth. It is this shift from the mythic to the real—from toasting, signifying and playing the dozens to committing robbery, murder, rape and assault—that underlies the explosive increase in criminal violence on the part of black offenders.69

Both Curtis and Silberman refer to the impacts of some recent political activist groups as influences on and elements of a less politicized general black culture. In Silberman's view, what Curtis would call contra-cultural values, antagonistic to middle-class norms, are taking hold.

This antagonistic relationship between middle-class and distinctively lower-class values was called into question in an early piece by Hyman Rodman challenging emerging theories of poverty subculture.70 Rodman's theory of "value stretch".

69. Ibid., p.152.
suggests that lower-class individuals share basically middle-class values and norms, but are occasionally forced to stretch those values in order to accommodate the facts of lower-class existence. Thus, an alternative set of lower-class values emerges as a means of dealing with the facts of persistent unemployment, poverty, and street violence. Although conflicting value systems are held simultaneously, middle-class norms dominate. Rodman's theory is basically another form of the adaptation argument: lower-class values emerge as an adaptation to recognized failure or inability to live up to shared middle-class norms.

Silberman agrees with Rodman, but argues that, even so, something more remains, that those committed to criminal lifestyles--confirmed hustlers, pimps and con men--choose different ends as well as different means. In Silberman's version, "Lower-class life involves an almost unbearable tension between the ideal and the reality--between the desired adherence to the norms of the larger society and the insistent demands of life on the streets."71

A somewhat different adaptation approach to poverty culture is represented by Eames and Goode's cross-cultural review of coping strategies of the urban poor.72 Although they object to Lewis' pejorative tone and use of the term "culture," Eames and Goode point to cross-cultural similarities among poverty groups in many nations, similarities in both occupational status and participation in illegitimate


activities, as well as consumption, child-care and kinship patterns, characteristics not dissimilar to those portrayed by Lewis. They acknowledge that behavior that in a short-term view may be seen as "coping, rationalizing and maximizing" might seem dysfunctional from a long-term perspective. They insist, however, that such behavior is not unchangeable, but that new behavior is learned as status improves. Although Eames and Goode object to Lewis' attribution of a crippling ideology to the poor, they find his definition of a variety of common coping responses extremely perceptive. A similarity of behavior is again confirmed.

There seems to be some confusion over whether a body of consistent, similar traits among poverty groups does or does not constitute a "subculture." Although some of the adaptation group argue against use of the term, there nevertheless seems to be consensus on the existence of common behavioral attributes to which the term is applied. Ethnographic research-participant observation studies in ghetto neighborhoods-helps flesh out the nature of these traits.

3.3.3 Ethnographic Studies

A. Versions of Adaptation

With the major exception of Oscar Lewis and the minor one of Arthur Hippler's work, previously discussed, most ethnographic studies of the urban poor share the adaptation approach to poverty culture. They attempt, however, to explain the nature of such adaptation in diverse ways.
Even Oscar Lewis, who started much of the culture of poverty debate by making a brief, tentative excursion into theory, was primarily a descriptive ethnographer and not a theoretician. It can be argued that his extensive ethnographic accounts support the adaptation view even though he postulated the existence of a self-perpetuating culture of poverty (references in note 58).

In a study of residents of a black lower-class housing project, Lee Rainwater contends that youth in the ghetto are continually confronted with a world fraught with danger to which they adapt by developing defenses to danger and learning to exploit and manipulate peers. Similarly, negative work habits--irresponsibility, lack of ambition, absenteeism--develop as normal responses, realistic and rational in the ghetto environment. Disinheritance from society--blocked economic opportunity--creates the need to develop a valid identity based on alternative values. Rainwater points out that the slave had only his individual identity, his "dramatic self," to use as currency. He argues that value in the ghetto develops around the expressive or dramatic, a world of action seeking and/or "soul."

The dramatic self is, in one or another of its forms, the valid identity to be achieved within the expressive style of life. It is a self markedly at variance with the official socialized self legitimated by the dominant sections of American society. Only when the dramatic self is turned into an occupational role...as among musicians or athletes, does it earn credit with the middle class.73

For Rainwater, work is an "instrumental" rather than an expressive activity. Rainwater concedes that valid identi-

73. Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls, p.380.
ties are from time to time sought... "instrumental role performance," but argues that the expressive mode is far more prevalent. Expressive lifestyles are often at odds with work values, insofar as they support both drug and alcohol abuse as well as various "expressive" forms of criminal behavior. Even though Rainwater presents subculture as an adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, his emphasis on the "expressive self" again raises the problem of the relation of behavior to values. Like Eames and Goode, he suggests that once values have been developed, they may delay adaptations to future changes in opportunity.

Elliot Liebow sees subcultural elements of street-corner life as a "phantom" or "shadow" system of values, deriving from, but less weighty than, prevailing middle-class norms. Liebow's view is an extension of Rodman's "value stretch." He sees street-corner life as a special segment of lower-class life in general, a sanctuary for those who can no longer endure failure. It is not that Liebow rejects what Rainwater would term expressive behavior. He simply sees it as less substantive, less central. Comparable behavior patterns across generations are not entirely the product of cultural transmission, but are also in part parallel responses of father and son to the same social milieu.

Liebow explains away some traits called "subcultural" by others. What looks like "present time orientation" to the outside observer is, according to Liebow, as much future oriented as middle-class behavior. The lower class, however, cannot defer gratification by investing for the fu-

74. Liebow, Tally's Corner.
The street-corner man must expend all his resources simply to maintain himself from moment to moment. Similarly, what might look like a group of idle street corner men to the outside observer, might actually include employed night workers, construction workers hindered by bad weather, the laid-off and physically or emotionally disabled. Most have not entirely rejected the work ethic.

On the other hand, Liebow admits that "the don't-work and don't-want-to-work" minority is especially significant because "they represent the strongest and cleanest expression of those values and attitudes associated with making a living." Liebow acknowledges the low priority of work, the prevalence of voluntary quits, absenteeism and lateness. Such behavior, however, can be seen as normal responses to the structure of labor market opportunities, or as others would put it—the availability of nothing but secondary employment. Liebow also suggests that persistent employee theft in such a group is almost part of the employment structure, a form of supplementary income for low-paying, tedious work, recognized and informally tolerated by the employer. A central solution then for Liebow would be the opportunity for more and better employment. Subcultural attributes are not viewed as either unchanging or resistant to change. Both Liebow and Rainwater are equally convinced by the adaptation model, but for Rainwater the existence of a distinctive ghetto subculture seems a much stronger reality, less a "shadow" system of values.

75. Liebow, Tally's Corner, p.34.
Extending Liebow, who attempts to explain apparent street corner idleness, Betty Lou Valentine contends that every phase of ghetto existence is "work"—from spending long hours at the welfare center to hustling a few extra dollars to make ends meet. She argues that the general need to combine work, welfare and hustling is communally recognized and condoned as a means of subsistence. Welfare fraud and the buying and selling of "hot" goods are not only a common, but a necessary means of survival. Living full-time within the ghetto community, the Valentines found themselves exposed to the same alienating institutional structure—schools, welfare, fire departments, police, housing agencies, insurance companies—as their neighbors. In spite of their middle-class skills and style, they were no more able to cope with such institutions, to make the system work, than other ghetto residents. The inadequacy of employment and structurally induced institutional alienation contribute to the need for a multi-faceted support system—for hustling and other hard work. This emphasis on the need for multiple sources of income presents ethnographic support for Bennett Harrison's conception of urban labor markets. (See Chapter Two above.) Betty Lou Valentine argues repeatedly against subcultural stereotypes and presents an insistent version of the adaptation model.

B. Lifestyles

Writers on lifestyles within the ghetto have developed further the emphasis placed by Liebow and Betty Lou Valentine on variation within particular neighborhood settings.

Hannerz, for example, distinguishes between groups of mainstreamers, street families, swingers and street-corner men within a single ghetto neighborhood, each with its own degree of commitment to middle-class norms. His mainstreamers tend to be committed to legitimate employment, whereas street-corner men with no resources demonstrate more "ghetto-specific" behavior—e.g., public drinking, lack of a steady job and illegitimate means of income. He points out that these ghetto-specific behaviors are often denounced even within the ghetto community.

Hannerz acknowledges that individuals can shift from one lifestyle to another in the course of a lifetime, seeming to support a theory of adaptation. Yet the variety of possible lifestyles within the community creates some tension between mainstream and ghetto-specific values. Hannerz does suggest that there are some elements of subcultural transmission through role modeling, which might sustain a "culture of poverty." Although much prevalent behavior is condemned according to dominant values of the mainstream held within the lower-class, the fact it is so often an so publicly performed suggests that it is condoned, at least in part, by those who demonstrate ghetto-specific behavior. "Morality," Hannerz suggests, "is partially a matter of statistics." He points out that these behaviors are often denounced even within the ghetto community.

Hannerz, like Liebow, sees the resolution of conflicting cultural values in an extension of Rodman's value stretch—an explanation of ways in which conflicting


78. Ibid., p. 188.
values can be held simultaneously. The major contribution of Hannerz's "soft culture concept," however, lies in the perception that the ghetto culture is not a uniform set of values but permits a range of lifestyle alternatives. Only ghetto-specific behavior accords with other definitions of poverty culture.

In recent work, Elijah Anderson develops a similar kind of lifestyle analysis, specifically of a street corner drinking group.79 Even among a single stratum of Hannerz's typology—that of street-corner men, the most ghetto-specific sub-hierarchies exist, again deriving from mainstream values. Although "regulars," "wineheads," "and "hoodlums" all drink on the corner, deference is paid to the regulars who value employment and take pride in having no criminal record. As in Hannerz's model, individuals can slip in and out of roles—a man who loses his job may become a "winehead" (wine is cheaper than whiskey) during his spell of unemployment.

Even those who participate in illegitimate activities—the "hoodlums"—accept the values implicit in street corner social ranking, yet because of that ranking, the "hoodlums" develop antithetical values.

Though group members know who is working and who is not, a hoodlum does not broadcast his job because the kind of work he usually can get, when compared with the "good jobs" of regulars, pays little, is hard and is considered demeaning, especially by himself. Thus, the hoodlum has little incentive to be employed, let alone brag about it.

...If they do have jobs, they tend not to emphasize them in the company of peers, or they talk about them negatively, speaking freely about how much they hate to work or hate their current jobs.60

Anderson takes issue with Rodman's theory of "value stretch," arguing that his street-corner men create their own particular standards of social conduct in which status is defined by social interaction and peer-group approval. As in Rainwater, individuals constantly challenge each other's "dramatic" self-presentation. Employment, however, plays a major role in the stratification of values and is a valued currency in the attempt to gain status among peers.

Subcultures may vary according to a variety of other factors, including region, as well as class and ethnic group. Bernard Rosenberg, for example, argues that there are many distinct subcultures that vary from community to community—each with its own particular response to the condition of poverty.81 He contrasts Washington blacks, New York Hispanics, and Chicago "Appalachian" whites—and finds that employment and crime activity varied from setting to setting. The Chicago whites had a great deal of job knowledge about potential factory jobs, but were also heavily involved with car theft and violence. The New York work experience involved strictly menial jobs and theft was frequently motivated by addiction. Rosenberg's focus on specific individual subcultures that mediate employment and crime is unique in its combination of regional socioeconomic and ethnic elements.

80. Ibid., p. 154.

C. **Crime Cultures**

Even more specialized are those ethnographic studies that deal specifically with various deviant or crime-committing groups as distinct subgroups within ghetto neighborhoods. For those who have been channelled into full criminal careers, the issue of subcultural mediation—lower-class culture as causal—is no longer central. They are what they have become. The focus has shifted to the distinctive value systems and behavior of deviant or criminal subcultures.

In an early study, for example, Harold Finestone explored the world of the drug addict, or "cat":

When asked for his reasons underlying the rejection of work, the cat did not refer to the uncongenial and relatively unskilled and low paid jobs...available. He emphasized rather that the routine of a job and the demand that he should apply himself continuously to his work tasks were the features that made work intolerable for him. The self restraint required by work was construed as an unwanted damper upon his love of spontaneity.

Each "cat" has his own particular hustle—any nonviolent means of support that does not involve legitimate employment. Finestone's "cats" share the expressive values of Rainwater's lower-class culture as a whole. Here addict sub-culture apparently is a mediating factor. The unstructured freedom of street-life is preferred over employment.

Edward Preble's study of addict behavior in some ways qualifies Finestone's vision of this subculture. Like Betty Lou Valentine's ghetto residents, Preble's addicts


83. Preble and Casey, "Taking Care of Business."
work hard simply maintaining their habit, or, as Preble puts it, "taking care of business." Preble explodes the myth of a fully incapacitated addict population. Supporting a habit is seen as requiring energy, discipline and diligence, qualities not antithetical to those required by employers in fact. Preble points out that, in the 1940's, when the price of heroin was low, many addicts did work at full-time jobs, using income from employment to maintain their habits. If current addict lifestyles are oriented more towards expressive than instrumental values, as in Finestone's view, it does not appear to be because addiction itself is intrinsically incapacitating.

In another study of addict subculture—emphasizing a shared language, understandings and expectations—Michael Agar found that almost all of his addicts, studied in an institutional setting, were competent hustlers before they became street junkies. Rather than being driven into hustling activity due to increased costs, they simply applied previously developed street skills to meet new needs.

David Caplovitz presents a complementary finding in his study of addicts in treatment programs who held full-time jobs. Most had become addicted after entering the labor force. Having established a pattern of employment, they remained employed, even though many supplemented their income with either outside crime or employee theft. Such studies of addict culture seem to qualify the hypothesis that addic-


tion in itself plays a primary role in mediating employment and crime behavior. Instead of presenting an image of addicts as incapable of employment, driven to crime by their habit, these studies suggest that the cultural orientation of addicts is more important than addiction *per se* in determining employment and crime roles. As Caplovitz suggests:

"...it may well be that drug addiction is the devastating social problem that it is not so much because of the debilitating effects of drugs on the users but because so many of those who use drugs are otherwise socially handicapped by virtue of belonging to minority groups that suffer discrimination."

Just as addict street culture can be considered a distinct phenomenon, so can criminal lifestyles. Bruce Jackson's *In the Life* demonstrates that those who are fully committed to criminal activity do tend to have distinctly different values, seeing themselves as participants in a kind of club—"the life"—a club largely based on shared prison experience, separate and distinct from the straight world. For Jackson's thieves, many of whom are white and a few of whom are middle-class, crime itself is the common cultural element rather than race or socioeconomic status. Work is no longer a viable alternative to crime and the fast, exciting life of the criminal.

Francis Ianni's *Black Mafia* depicts successful pimps and hustlers as role models for neighborhood youngsters. But rather than focusing on common cultural traits as causes

86. Ibid., p.44.


88. Ianni, *Black Mafia*. 
for criminal lifestyles, Ianni presents informal networks that develop for crime-business reasons. Ianni contends that organized crime has traditionally been a path of upward mobility for some within the various new ethnic groups in America. Movement upward through illegitimate means becomes a way for some to move into legitimate enterprises. A clothing boutique can serve as a joint cover for a drug salesman and a pimp—a legitimate business investment with illegitimate funding. Similarly, a dry-cleaning store becomes the front for a fencing operation.

At times, illegitimate forms of employment, such as driving a gypsy cab, have connections with still shadier activities—car theft rings for stolen auto parts, phony insurance scams. At times, legitimate work can even be a means of moving towards lucrative illegitimate opportunities. A Cuban youth worked his way into criminal involvement selling cocaine by proving himself and making connections in a series of legitimate laundry and restaurant jobs. Work involvements facilitated criminal involvements.

Ianni's analysis seems to illustrate Cloward and Ohlin's theory in portraying a group of lower-class individuals with high aspirations and inadequate means who find a channel for their aspirations in criminal activity. Some move from the illegitimate sphere into increasingly legitimate activities. Others maintain a connection between employment and crime.

Karl Klockar's fence, on the other hand, is a well-established businessman who hustled his way into his busi-
ness. In his store, legal and illegal goods mix freely. The fence himself began as a con artist and entrepreneur, selling cheap items with expensive labels. Yet, it is interesting that the fence distinguishes between reliable thieves—dependable, married men—and unreliable ones—unattached junkies, "the scum of the earth." Thieves are rated according to criteria similar to those that would be used to rate a legitimate employee or business associate.

William West's participant-observer study of serious thieves, a group of 16- to 19-year-olds in Canada, found that many of his thieves moved in and out of the labor market, working, or stealing for six months at a time. They earned about the same amount doing either, just enough to fill their needs. Employment was generally not career-oriented. It was simply "a money-making opportunity seized to eke out an existence." Theft was seen as a short-term occupation that offered exciting, low skilled work with short hours under the control of the individual. Neighborhood fencing networks contributed to the structure of opportunity for criminal enterprises and the purchase of hot goods was accepted as an informal means of income redistribution. Yet theft was a self-limiting occupation. Risk of arrest was seen to increase with time. For most of West's young thieves, the pattern of alternation between employment and crime lasted only a few years. Most of them eventually left crime for employment and family life.

89. Klöckars, The Professional Fence.
90. West, "Serious Thieves."
Such ethnographic studies of crime-committing groups present some concrete examples of unexpected linkages between employment and crime, rather than uniformly demonstrating negative employment and positive crime orientations. In addition, the ethnographers of occupational criminals constantly demonstrate that professional criminals, in order to be successful, must emulate most of the values and behavior of legitimate businessmen. That finding casts considerable doubt on any notion of crime as the product of self-perpetuating lower-class cultural values.

In the majority of formulations reviewed above, subculture is not to be thought of as a factor which is completely autonomous and determining, but rather as a collective response to structural conditions which may vary among and within groups. In retrospect, the early formulations of the "culture of poverty" may perhaps best be seen as a stimulus to later researchers to pay more attention to both the behavior and values that poor people evolve in order to adapt to their situation. Among those later researchers, however, there remain differences as to the relations of behavior to values and of both to structure. Liebow and Valentine see social structural changes—the development of improved employment for ghetto residents, for example—as likely to have direct impacts on such adaptive behavior. Rainwater and Eames and Goode on the other hand, who also believe in culture as adaptation, suggest that the impacts of such change might be delayed, given the impacts of developed "expressive" values and other coping responses.
As studies of subculture have progressed, both the theory and methodology shaping the research have been refined. Greater attention to the interplay of behavior, values, and social structure has informed this progression. The concept of adaptation has made it necessary to consider the structure being adapted to. The debates over "value stretch" have focused attention on the relations of behavior to values. The lifestyle analyses of Hannerz and Anderson have called attention to variations within the ghetto community. Rosenberg has shown that subcultures vary by region as well as by class and ethnic group.

The concept of culture has been closely intertwined with the use of ethnographic methods. Since ethnographers study people in the midst of everyday life, they are in a unique position to consider both naturally occurring behavior and the values and ideas that shape and rationalize that behavior. Further progress in understanding the role of subculture as mediating the relationships of employment to crime is most likely to emerge from ethnographic studies that build on previous efforts in investigating the interaction of values, behavior and structure.

As will be seen in the review of impact evaluations of manpower programs in Chapter Four, it is likely that subcultural perspectives would have usefully complemented research designs that overemphasized abstract, human capital conceptual approaches.
4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines literature concerning the impact of employment programs for populations involved with the criminal justice system on crime. The programs reviewed ranged from the very modest in scope, such as a few hours devoted to job readiness training, to such intensive efforts as more than a year's enrollment in supported work.

In this review, it has been necessary to limit our examination of manpower programs to those efforts which have been specifically developed for high risk youth and ex-offender groups. It would have been far beyond the scope of this review to examine the enormous body of literature that has developed concerning manpower programs in general. Yet it is necessary to turn briefly to that literature to help us define some of the particular program strategies developed in manpower programs in general and subsequently employed in the context of vocational programs for criminal justice populations.

The fundamental components of today's manpower programs, funded through both the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and private program initiatives, were developed primarily in early programs based on the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. In a study of government manpower
programs, Charles Perry et al. not only outline the basic components of manpower programs as developed under pre-CETA legislation, but also point to a dual focus inherent in the development of such programs even in their beginnings.1 Perry's review finds that:

...manpower programs differ significantly in the extent to which they focus on skill training as compared with removing barriers to labor market participation other than lack of skill.2

Most programs, with specifically human capital goals, were dedicated to improving the competitive position of individuals thought to be barred from employment because of lack of skills, deficiencies in basic education, lack of job market information, social-psychological handicaps and the inability to obtain supportive services. A few other programs, more concerned with labor market structures than the individual deficiencies of participants, were dedicated to breaking down social, political and institutional barriers to full participation of racial minorities in the labor market.

Perry et al. divide early programs into four major types: skills training; employability development; job development; and work experience.


2. Ibid., p.10.
Skills training was the major focus of early MDTA programs, providing both institutional training and on-the-job training at work sites. The Perry group suggests that skills training programs provide the greatest short-term gains.

Employability development placed emphasis on educational upgrading, counselling, pre-vocational training and placement. Opportunities Industrialization Center, WIN (Work Incentive Program) and the Job Corps are presented as examples of this approach. All were programs developed to provide remedial services (upgrading education and coaching for interviews) for particularly disadvantaged segments of the population—disadvantaged minorities, AFDC mothers and unemployed youth.

Job Development programs, exemplified by the National Association of Businessmen's JOBS Program, attempted to encourage employers to relax entry hiring standards to employ the disadvantaged. Job development efforts coincided historically with government pressures to promote equal opportunity employment. Perry, however, points out that job development efforts did little to change the structure of opportunities for the hard-core unemployed. The Perry group criticize such programs as providing mostly unskilled job opportunities and being "more nearly a short-term employment-generating program for the disadvantaged than a program which has significantly increased the human capital of dis-
advantaged workers." Other job development programs included the Apprenticeship Outreach Program which helped minority youths break into construction trade unions, a narrow job development focus capable of having impact on the human capital of participants through placement in skilled job settings.

Work Experience programs like the Neighborhood Youth Corps are seen by the Perry group less as a vehicle for providing employment than as a "major vehicle for income transfer." They report that there is some question about the extent to which the Neighborhood Youth Corps contributed to the investment in the human capital of disadvantaged youth. The Perry review does not include any more intensive efforts to provide employment experience within a program context.

The Perry group's emphasis on the human capital goals of both job development and work experience programs point to the human capital assumptions that underlie the majority of manpower programs developed since 1962. In a manpower program setting, work is judged as valuable only insofar as it enhances the future employability of participants. In spite of Perry's reference to programs focused on "removing barriers to labor market participation other than lack of skill," most program efforts appear to have been devoted to human capital concerns.

3. Ibid., p. 10.
In a recent study of ex-offender employment program models, Cicero Wilson presents a comparable typology of manpower program components. Wilson identifies six program components: skill training, job readiness, job development and placement, supported work/work experience, financial assistance, and the comprehensive services model. The last two models in Wilson's classification--financial assistance to releasees and comprehensive services in sheltered residential environments--are more specifically related to ex-offender programs than they are to general manpower programs.

The other four program models--skill training, job readiness, job development and supported work/work experience--are very similar to the components of the Perry typology. Wilson's "job readiness" is analogous to Perry's "employability development," although Wilson emphasizes its role in coaching ex-offenders on how to deal with their ex-offender status on applications and interviews.

The supported work model, on the other hand, is more complex than Perry's "work experience as transfer payment" mode. Supported work, according to Wilson, is "potentially the most effective tool available to prepare the hard core unemployed and high risk ex-offender for unsubsidized

Supported work eases entry into the world of work for participants through peer support, graduated stress and close supervision. Work experience in the supported work model is conceived of as a means of promoting the transition into the world of unsubsidized employment.

In programs directed specifically at delinquent populations and those involved with the criminal justice system, as well as manpower programs in general, the human capital model predominates. A number of programs developed under MDTA represent a combination of program strategies, offering a mix of "job readiness training" and "skills training" and job placement efforts. Nevertheless, most programs appear dedicated to improving the employability of individual participants, rather than expanding the opportunity structure of the hard-core unemployed as a whole.

In this review, we ask four primary questions of the program literature examined. First, what can it tell us about the organization, operation, assumptions and objectives of programs reviewed? That is, what can it tell us about the nature of that program experience for participants? Second, what do we learn about the demographic and behavioral characteristics of program participants? Third, what were the program impacts on employability, criminal

5. Ibid., p. 64.
justice involvement and labor market variables such as job opportunities? And fourth, what do we learn about the current capacity for program review and evaluation?

Two major types of documents are reviewed here. First, general surveys of program literature are examined. These documents, generally dating from the mid-1970's, serve to define what was known about vocational programs for offenders after the first ten to fifteen years of program operations. They provide an early, but extensive review of pretrial intervention programs, vocational programs in the context of corrections, and post-release community-based efforts for ex-offenders. Second, we turn to some notable impact evaluations released in the past few years: the Court Employment Project evaluation, Mathematica's Job Corps evaluation, evaluations of supported work (Wildcat and the Manpower Development Research Corporation) and the LIFE and PARP experiments in providing financial aid to released prisoners. These major evaluations are each particularly noteworthy in some respect, either for the rigor of their method of the significance of their findings in policy circles.

We had considered an organization of the chapter according to stages in criminal justice processing (pretrial, correctional, post-release). However, that form of organization seems more relevant to specific criminal justice system concerns than to an interest in employment. Yet the criminal justice population does have certain distinctive
characteristics from an employment point of view at different stages. Some argue that offenders become increasingly disadvantaged in terms of employment after the stigmatizing experience of conviction and/or incarceration. They point out that incarceration entails an enforced, extended period out of the labor market, inevitably a handicap in terms of employment. This might suggest that there are different employment needs at different stages of criminal justice processing and therefore different kinds of employment services needed. Insofar as this is noted in the literature reviewed, it will be noted here.

4.2 Surveys of Manpower Program Research in a Criminal Justice Context

By the early 1970's, manpower programs for offenders had been operating for nearly a decade and a large body of individual program reports and evaluations had emerged. Recent surveys of a variety of evaluations of manpower programs for offenders provide an overview of the experience of those programs as well as a general assessment of what is known about the impact of such programs on the vocational and criminal activities of participants.

4.2.1 Pretrial Diversion Programs

Roberta Rovner-Pieczenik's review of pretrial intervention program evaluations that were released between 1970 and 1973 made extensive, explicit use of methodological criteria.
to determine what findings could be accepted as valid for
individual programs, what findings could be generalized
across programs, and what claims needed further substantia-
tion. In attempting to assess the technical adequacy of
reports from pretrial intervention programs, Rovner-Piecz-
enik reviewed the findings of 15 demonstration projects in
detail. In addition, she considered 194 responses from a
national questionnaire survey addressed to program operators
and conducted 50 in-depth interviews in six cities in an
attempt to ascertain the concerns and perceptions of policy
makers in regard to such programs.

The pretrial intervention programs reviewed were for-
malized court-based programs which diverted alleged offen-
ders from court-based processing before trial into programs
providing manpower services (vocational counselling, skills-
training and job placement). The cases of defendants who
successfully participated in such programs were dismissed.
The goals of pretrial intervention were three-fold: to re-
lieve the over-burdened criminal justice system by diverting

6. Roberta Rovner-Pieczenik, Pretrial Intervention Strate-
gies: An Evaluation of Policy-Related Research and Pol-
icy-maker Perceptions (Washington, D.C.: American Bar
Association, November, 1974).
defendants before normal court processing; to allow defendants to avoid the stigma of such processing; and to provide rehabilitative services for disadvantaged defendants. For the purposes of this review, we are more concerned with the impacts of rehabilitative services upon employment and criminal involvement than we are with either system impacts or impacts on dispositions.

The populations participating in the programs reviewed and the criteria for eligibility in these programs varied widely. Most programs explicitly excluded addicts, alcoholics and those with extreme behavioral problems as beyond the program's service capability. Participants were generally unemployed or under-employed and "severely disadvantaged on social, economic and educational indicators."7 (A single program, Operation Midway, was largely composed of middle-class students and high school graduates.) Although participants were mostly young, the age compositions of programs varied widely. Participants also varied according to the extent of prior record allowed, although "hardened" criminals, those with extensive records, were excluded. Programs varied according to the degree of seriousness of offense permissible; some programs excluded alleged felons,

7. Ibid., p.111.
while other programs were specifically aimed at defendants who might be more seriously involved in criminal justice processing. In general, program clientele were economically and vocationally disadvantaged, relatively young and relatively free of previous, serious criminal justice involvement.

Several programs claimed responsibility for positive changes in the employment status, wage and skill levels of program participants. All programs reported that significantly more participants were employed at termination than at intake. Two of those programs (Manhattan Court Employment Project and Project Crossroads) also reported more participants earning above $2.25 an hour at termination than at intake. In addition, two programs (Project Crossroads and New Haven) reported a positive impact on the skill level of participants. Other programs did not report on these issues.

In addition, some programs reported positive impacts on participant re-arrests. The Miami program, and Project Crossroads claimed to demonstrate a decrease in participant recidivism during program participation, based on a comparison between participant and non-participant groups. A third program (MCEP) found no difference in program recidivism rates based on comparison with a non-participant group. A few other programs also claimed longer term (up to two years) impacts on recidivism.
Rovner-Pieczenik, however, cautions that not all of the affirmative findings reported by pretrial intervention programs can be accepted as valid. She warns that methodological problems in the evaluations limited the extent to which impacts on employment could be seen as continuing into the post-program period. Although she accepts within program impacts on employment as valid, she acknowledges that the differences found in the pre-post test design might have been partly a function of maturation.

Rovner-Pieczenik also has reservations about program findings of impacts on recidivism. In some instances, comparison group members were not randomly selected and "most matching remained incomplete." In another instance, she questions the equivalence of a small control group (n=34) selected during a different period than the participant group. Although Rovner-Pieczenik accepts the validity of these within-program impacts on recidivism, she contends that because of methodological difficulties longer term impacts have not been validly demonstrated.

Rovner-Pieczenik argues that many positive impacts claimed by pretrial intervention programs have been based on evaluative research of questionable validity. She indicates that most programs did not conduct any form of controlled research, but relied on summary statistics and cost figures submitted in annual reports to prove or disprove impact.

8. Ibid. p.83.
Over-all, she notes that "evaluation research has not been an integral part of early program planning. This has resulted in *ex post facto* research designs which are beset by methodological and operational problems." 9

### 4.2.2 The Prison of Unemployment

In contrast to Rovner-Pieczenik's intensive review of a single-program type, Robert Taggart reviewed literature concerning a full range of manpower programs for offender populations developed between 1966 and 1970 at various stages of criminal justice involvement.10 His review, in fact, provides a relatively full outline of vocational efforts aimed at offenders: pretrial intervention, vocational training in prison, education in prison, work in prison, work release programs (permitting selected inmates to be employed in the community before release), post-release services, income maintenance, job development and placement services and efforts to remove barriers to employment for ex-offenders.

Because he covered so broad a range of programs, the populations involved in Taggart's review varied greatly in age from arrestees, 40 percent of whom were under 21, through inmates, most of whom were in their 20's and 30's,

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9. Ibid. p. 177.

Taggart reports that this population was disproportionately minority, highly disadvantaged, and burdened with serious education, employment and health problems. He cautions, however, that the population of offenders may not differ greatly from other disadvantaged groups:

For perhaps a majority of first offenders and even a substantial minority of those in prison or jail, the only characteristics which distinguish them from other disadvantaged groups in the population is that they got caught. 11

Taggart is particularly concerned with the employment-related handicaps of offenders, pointing to the waste of human resources, "skills and abilities which are underdeveloped and underutilized," 12 characteristic of incarcerated groups. He argues for a "manpower" rather than "rehabilitationist perspective" in reviewing employment programs for offenders:

...proving there is a correlation between unemployment and crime does not prove there is a cause and effect relationship, nor does it prove that employment can be improved to a degree or at a cost which will make it an effective means of reducing illicit activity. 13

Taggart contends that increased employability among offenders at reasonable cost is sufficient justification for manpower programs, apart from any additional impact on recidivism.

11. Ibid., p.3.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p.16.
Taggart finds "glimpses of success" among the generally disappointing manpower efforts aimed at offenders. He acknowledges positive impacts on employment reported by the earliest pretrial intervention programs, Manhattan's Court Employment Project and Project Crossroads. He finds a single successful vocational training program in an institutional context, the Rikers Island Project, which had a significant impact on the proportion of inmates placed in white collar jobs (48% of experimentals compared to 18% of controls). He argues, however, that the success of this program was more related to extensive placement effort than to the specific training (data processing) offered; few inmates could be placed in that field. Taggart also points to the success of the Draper Project in upgrading the educational levels of participants using non-traditional teaching methods (programmed learning and teaching machines). He finds that efforts to gain bonding for offenders under the Concentrated Employment Program "helped most of the recipients get jobs which would otherwise have been unobtainable."14 Taggart also acknowledges the potential effectiveness of limited intensive Employment Service placement for offenders under MDTA training, but points to the generally disappointing outcomes of most of these efforts.

14. Ibid., p. 89.
In general, Taggart finds that successful manpower program efforts for criminal justice populations were few and far between. Community treatment as an alternative to incarceration had not shown any positive impact. Prison vocational training programs based on the Rikers Island project were hampered by serious equipment problems and poor implementation in the prisons; a large-scale evaluation of the post release experiences of enrollees in "251" projects showed little impact on employment experience. Taggart sees most prison industries as "degrading and irrelevant;" work experience in such industries had no impact on future employment. In summary, Taggart finds "no proof that any single manpower service has had more than a marginal impact on its recipients, and no proof that any combination of services can make a substantial contribution." 

Taggart argues for increasing experimentation on a larger scale with implementation of successful models. He contends that vocational programs for offenders both within and without the prison context can be made effective. He also recognizes that offenders were particularly difficult to place because employer resistance to offenders was difficult to overcome; offenders were often "last hired, first fired."

15. The "251" projects were funded under Section 251 of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1966.

He recommends the provision of public sector employment for offenders as a means of reducing "wasted human resources."

Taggart is generally less concerned with methodological problems in reviewed evaluations than others who surveyed manpower programs for offenders. He does, however, point to inadequacies in the control design of the Rikers Island Project evaluation; experimentalists and control groups were not found fully equivalent since experimentalists reported far less drug use than controls. He also discounts claims for impacts on recidivism in work release groups compared to offenders as a whole, pointing out that only the lowest risk prisoners were permitted in work release programs. In general, Taggart's critique of the programs reviewed has more to do with the implementation of manpower programs in a criminal justice context than with methodological problems of program evaluations.

4.2.3 The First Decade: Manpower Programs in a Correctional Context

Many of the programs reviewed by Roberta Rovner-Pieczenik in her survey of ten years of criminal justice manpower programs from 1963 to 1973 overlapped with those in Taggart's review. Rovner-Pieczenik specifically reviewed

reports of projects funded by the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Labor's Manpower Administration. She also conducted on-site visits and interviews with project directors.

According to Rovner-Pieczenik, in the ten years reviewed, emphasis shifted from prison-based skill-training efforts to community-based projects focusing on job development and placement. Parallel to this trend was an increased awareness of "the need for change within the established social institutions," primarily concerned with barriers to ex-offender employment. Specifically, early programs, based on a 1963 amendment to MDTA, provided prison-based training to youthful offenders. By 1967, Section 251 of MDTA extended such training to older offenders. After 1968, attention shifted to alternatives to incarceration, pretrial intervention, work release, post-release supports and efforts to reduce barriers to ex-offender employment.

She finds that participants in the projects reviewed were relatively disadvantaged members of an already disadvantaged population. The typical participant was a young (19-25) male high school dropout or "pushout," untrained, unskilled, with little career potential and an early history

of criminal activity. Employment experiences had been in low-paying, high turnover, unskilled, deadend jobs. Long range vocational plans were infrequent. Rovner-Pieczenik also reports that "successful" program participants (those who completed programs, were placed in jobs and maintained employment) were generally older, more educated, had relatively good employment histories, were married and had strong community ties.

Rovner-Pieczenik reports positive program impacts on employment in programs also cited by Taggart. The Rikers Island Project was successful in that more experimentals than controls found white collar jobs. In Project Crossroads, a pretrial intervention program, "successfully terminated" participants had better jobs and wages after a year than a matched group of controls (the project did not report job outcomes of program dropouts). Rovner-Pieczenik also cites the Experimental Manpower Laboratory of Corrections (EMLC) educational program (an extension of the Draper Project cited by Taggart) as successful, because more experimentals than controls were working six months after release. Other programs reported improved work performance from project entrance to termination (Youthful Offender Project) or high job placements.
Rovner-Pieczenik sees such impacts far more positively than Taggart. She finds it "evident that projects were successful in achieving employment goals." Yet she also notes that ex-offenders received minimal assistance from correctional institutions, probation and parole officers and government employment agencies in finding work. Job development effort is deemed inadequate: "It has typically been limited to securing jobs for participants and has overlooked the potential of close work with employers in job redefinition and restructuring." 20

Rovner-Pieczenik also reports that many ex-offenders had job stability problems, leaving their first jobs after only a few months. She qualifies the finding of job instability, however, by pointing out that "high job mobility did not necessarily mean lack of project success (but) was often part of a stepping stone process in which a temporary dead-end job was taken until a more desirable opening is available." 21

Her report also indicates that few evaluations were designed to measure impacts on recidivism. Both pretrial diversion programs reviewed (Project Crossroads and Court Employment Project) report positive impacts on recidivism. A

19. Ibid., p.25.
20. Ibid., p.4.
21. Ibid., p.96.
longitudinal follow-up of post-release behavior of MDT-trained and non-MDT-trained releasees conducted by EMLC showed no difference in recidivism rates, in spite of more time spent employed by experimentals. Like Taggart, Rovner-Pieczenik warns that an over-emphasis "on reducing recidivism can be harmful to projects' other goals."\(^\text{22}\) She argues that valid manpower questions deserve consideration apart from concern about recidivism.

Although efforts to overcome barriers to ex-offender employment had not been specifically evaluated, Rovner-Pieczenik does point to intensive efforts to disseminate information about such barriers and to inspire legislative change by the National Clearinghouse on Offender Employment Restrictions. She finds that efforts, such as the Federal bonding program, had unmeasured impacts on structural conditions of employment for ex-offenders, although major "societal barriers to the employment of the offenders"\(^\text{23}\) remained.

Rovner-Pieczenik emphasizes the fact that most programs did not provide for any controlled evaluation of their impact. Only the evaluations of pretrial diversion programs and one Manpower Development and Training Administration program utilized a control group and post-program follow-up design. Rovner-Pieczenik also points to a need for increased

\(^\text{22}\) Ibid., p.21.
\(^\text{23}\) Ibid., p.89.
attention to early planning for program assessment. She maintains that there has been a close tie between early assessment and program effectiveness, citing the example of pretrial intervention programs. If she is generally more positive than Taggart in her assessment of manpower efforts for criminal justice populations, she is also far more critical of the methods used in the evaluation of those programs.

4.2.4 Community-Based Programs

Mary Toborg et al. reviewed a more limited group of efforts, specifically community-based programs operating between 1966 and 1975, providing employment services to prison releasees. In addition to an extensive review of program evaluations, Toborg conducted a mail/telephone survey of 250 employment service programs and made 150 visits to 15 programs.

Services provided by these programs included counseling, job readiness, skills training, transitional employment, supported work, educational upgrading, support services, job development and placement, and follow-up assistance. Median program length was six months. Over 80 percent of all programs reported that they provided some form

24. Mary Toborg et al., The Transition from Prison to Employment: An Assessment of Community-Based Assistance Programs (Washington, D.C.; The Lazør Institute, 1977).
of counseling, job placement or development and follow-up. Transitional employment and supported work were the program components least likely to be provided among programs reviewed. Toborg points out that they are also the most expensive.

Typical clients of such programs were adult prison releasees who had been incarcerated for at least six months. Participants were generally low skilled, had low educational levels and had demonstrated problems in maintaining steady employment. Toborg points out that female ex-offenders are at least as disadvantaged in terms of employment as male releasees, but few programs are specifically addressed to the particular employment needs of women ex-offenders.

Toborg's review of surveyed program impacts on employment variables considered each program strategy separately. Toborg finds that there had been little analysis of the impact of skills training on employment outcomes, but suggests that impacts on employment depend on training being tied to the needs of local labor markets. Like Taggart and Rovner-Pieczenik, Toborg refers to the success of the non-traditional education program developed by EMLC in improving educational levels, but suggests that the impact of educational gains on employment had not been tested. Similarly, although she acknowledges that ex-offenders lacked job-readiness, Toborg finds that the impact of job readiness programs on employment had not been assessed nor had evaluators ex-
explored "the relative value of job readiness training, vis-à-vis other program services, such as counseling or job placement." 25 She reports that supported work programs (Vera's Wildcat) had been successful in promoting good work habits among participants, but points out that as of January 1975, many participants had failed to move into non-supported jobs. Finally, Toborg reports that although most surveyed programs claimed that the majority of their clients were successfully placed, there had been little controlled evaluation of placement efforts; the extent to which successful job placement might be attributed to the programs' intervention could therefore not be determined.

Although Toborg acknowledges that several programs reviewed claimed positive impacts on recidivism, she also reports that there have been few controlled evaluations of program impact on recidivism. In a three-year follow-up study, conducted by the Experimental Manpower Laboratory for Corrections (EMLC), parolees who had participated in a prison-based program were found to have initially lower recidivism rates than a control group of parolees who had not participated; these differences, however, dissipated in the course of the three-year study. Toborg complains that evaluations that did contain measures of recidivism generally failed to relate employment to recidivism, nor were different recidivism measures comparable across programs.

25. Ibid., p.16.
In Toborg's assessment, the state of knowledge concerning the impacts of community-based employment programs for ex-offenders at the time of her review was far from adequate. She points repeatedly to the absence of systematic evaluation and the dearth of cross-program comparisons. She argues that employment programs must measure impacts on job stability and job quality as well as placement. She also recommends comparative analyses of outcomes of various program characteristics, in order to determine the value of providing a broad range of program services in contrast to more specifically focused assistance.

In summary, surveys of offender-oriented manpower program evaluations and reports serve to define the state of knowledge about such programs in the mid-1970's. Toborg's 1977 review reveals that, although a battery of service components ranging from job-readiness training to follow-up assistance had been developed, little is known about the effectiveness of individual program components or the impacts of particular program efforts. Several surveys of manpower programs for offenders point repeatedly to the same few reported successes--EMBC's educational program, the Riker's Project, early pretrial intervention efforts, but there is no systematic knowledge of what program components are responsible for these apparent successes.
The surveys are generally rather positive about the potential of offender-oriented manpower programs to have desirable impacts upon employment; but they tend to view possible impacts on recidivism as being second in importance to alleviating the employment problems of vocationally disadvantaged populations. Taggart's assessment of the "generally disappointing" results of program efforts reflects an acknowledgement of poor implementation of manpower programs in a correctional context; he remains optimistic about the potential of such programs for reducing "wasted human resources." Other reviewers seem more positive, but emphasize the limitations of what is known about the impacts of vocational services for offenders. As a group, surveys of the first ten to 15 years of manpower programs for offenders point to a need for rigorous controlled impact evaluations of such programs, a need recognized and addressed in the latter half of the 1970's.

4.3 Impact Evaluations

In the past few years the first several of what promises to be an extensive series of rigorous, controlled, long-term impact evaluations of major vocational efforts for offender populations have been released. The six impact evaluations reviewed here vary greatly in terms of their program populations, program designs, and reported impacts on employment and recidivism. Yet they are all, in some sense,
important contributions to evaluation literature and figure greatly in current policy discussions of offender-oriented employment programs.

4.3.1 The Court Employment Project (CEP)

The recent Court Employment Project evaluation can be seen as a response to demands for more methodological rigor in evaluation of pretrial intervention programs. Inadequacies of previous evaluations had been pointed to repeatedly, not only by Rovner-Pieczenik, as discussed above, but also by Joan Mullen (in an evaluation of nine pretrial intervention efforts reviewed by Rovner-Pieczenik) and by Franklin Zimring in a specific re-assessment of the first CEP evaluation. Zimring points to inadequacies in recidivism data, follow-up data on employment and case disposition data for the comparison group in the early CEP evaluation. He points out that most comparisons in the evaluation were between successful participants and either unsuccessful defendants (those who had been terminated from the program)


or the comparison group. This tended to bias the results in favor of the program given the self-selection attending successful participation. Zimring argued that "the only cure for a poor evaluation is a good one--in this case, large-scale and careful random assignment experimentation." The recent CEP evaluation emerged in response to such recommendations.

In January 1977 the Vera Institute began a controlled design evaluation of the Court Employment Project, with the assistance of funding from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The evaluation tracked 410 experimentals and 256 controls for a year after intake. Two follow-up interviews were conducted at six-month intervals. The evaluation design called for random assignment of defendants screened as eligible for pretrial diversion to experimental and control groups.

The Court Employment Project has a long, well-documented history. The Manhattan program was initially funded in 1968 by the Department of Labor, along with Project Crossroads in Washington, D.C., as one of two demonstration pretrial diversion programs in the country. These programs served as models for DOL's further expansion of manpower-based pretrial diversion programs in 1971 and again in

1974. Other pretrial diversion programs, heavily funded through LEAA, developed rapidly in the course of the 1970s. After the initial demonstration phase, CEP was spun off as an independent, not-for-profit corporation of the City of New York funded through the Human Resources Administration.

As initially articulated, CEP's goals included providing needed employment services to a population of criminal court defendants pre-adjudication as a means of demonstrating that employment services can be life stabilizing (i.e., reduce recidivism) within a short period of time (three to four months of program participation). The charges against successful participants were dismissed to eliminate the potential stigma of criminal justice involvement.29

In the course of its history, the kinds of employment services provided by CEP changed dramatically. Early program emphasis had been on job placement. Over time, CEP came to see itself less as an employment service and more as a comprehensive vocational services agency, providing referrals to social services, situational counseling, vocational counseling, and preparation, limited in-house training and job development, and placement for "job ready" participants. In 1977, the Job Development staff was re-organized into a

29. As discussed earlier, although primary goals of pretrial intervention programs were concerned with impact on case outcomes, we are here interested in such programs only in terms of their impacts on employment and recidivism.
three-part unit: vocational counselors, who ascertained vocational goals; job developers, who located jobs in the community; and vocational placement specialists, who made specific job referrals to participants. As noted in Baker's evaluation, however, the new organization was far from successful, being faced with a poor job market, difficult clients to place and severe understaffing. Recently, the vocational services offered by CEP can be seen as primarily confined to limited endeavors to improve human capital (improve literacy, teach participants to read subway maps and telephone directories, job readiness training and vocational counseling).

CEP underwent other changes as well. But in 1977, when the evaluation was begun, CEP participants were felony defendants residing in New York City (except Staten Island) who had no outstanding bench warrants or other pending charges, and who consented to participate in diversion; specifically excluded were alcoholics, addicts, juveniles, and those fully employed at the time of contact. The 1977 evaluation revealed that during the evaluation period participants were young (median age 18), largely male, over three-quarters minority, mostly single, relatively uneducated and generally unemployed. Half of the participants came from welfare families. The population was typically "street" oriented, likely to "hang out" or "hustle" in their free time. Although a quarter were enrolled in school, at-
tendance was sporadic. According to Baker, staff found CEP participants were particularly difficult to place in jobs because they were "unmotivated, articulated poorly, dressed inappropriately, had negative attitudes toward employment, and often didn't show up for appointments."30

The CEP evaluation failed to find any program impact on participants' vocational activities. During a 12-month period following program intake, program participants experienced significant increases in their salaries and the amount of their employment, compared to the 21 months before intake. Controls experienced exactly the same improvements. The data suggest that this improvement was probably a result of maturation. In addition, the evaluation showed no difference in the educational activities of experimentals and controls during the twelve months after arrest, in spite of the program's emphasis on establishing vocational and/or educational goals.

The CEP evaluation showed no difference in within-program period recidivism rates for experimentals and controls, either in the number or the severity of rearrests. There were also no differences revealed in the recidivism rates of the two groups either in the twelve month follow-up or in a subsequent collection of recidivism data 23 months after the beginning of research intake.

According to Baker, the CEP evaluation raises some question about whether pretrial diversion was an appropriate context for effective social service delivery. Although over half the experimentals in CEP attended the program regularly and were successful in having their cases dismissed, these clients were no different on measures of vocational, educational and criminal activity than experimentals who did not attend. Baker suggests that CEP participants were far more concerned with getting their charges dismissed than they were with the services provided by CEP. She suggests that the client population was suspicious of formal helping organizations and more likely to turn to family and friends in solving personal and employment problems. She also cautions that young, urban minorities face powerful barriers to any successful intervention in their vocational lives.

Clearly, the recent CEP evaluation severely qualifies the positive findings of the earliest review. In large part, this represents, as Zimring demanded, a "cure for a poor evaluation" i.e. large-scale, careful, random assignment experimentation. It might be pointed out that the vocational services offered by CEP in 1977 were greatly diminished from those provided in the healthier job market of 1967, but it is nevertheless apparent that the vocational services offered during the evaluation period by CEP had no impact on either the vocational or criminal activities of program participants.
4.3.2 The Job Corps

Established by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and transferred from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the Department of Labor in 1969, the Job Corps is one of the oldest, largest efforts targeted at the employment problems of extremely disadvantaged youth. The Job Corps combines in a comprehensive service model a mix of education, vocational skills training, health care, residential living, counseling and other ancillary services. The program has recently reached out for special target groups such as "solo parents," the handicapped and ex-offenders. The Job Corps has been incorporated without change into the Department of Labor's Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) efforts as Title IV of the 1973 Act. Under CETA, the Job Corps continues to be administered at the federal level and is mainly implemented in two approaches: "contract centers" run by private groups selected in competitive bidding by regional offices of the Department of Labor and "civilian conservation centers" (CCC centers) operated on public lands by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior.

A Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) survey of Job Corps participants in the spring of 1977 revealed that, at that time, Corps members were overwhelmingly young (one half under age 18), minority (59% black, 11% Hispanic, and 5% American
Indian) and predominantly male (70%). Nine out of ten Corpsmembers had not as yet completed high school and one third had never worked as long as one month. In all, Corpsmembers were found to be among the most severely disadvantaged of manpower program target groups: according to MPR, "Almost all Corpsmembers have experienced poverty, welfare dependence, or both."  

Because of its size and the scope of its efforts to improve the labor market prospects of extremely disadvantaged groups, the Job Corps has received considerable attention during the first decade and a half of its existence. In 1969, Louis Harris and Associates conducted a survey of former Job Corps participants; in 1975 Levitan and Johnson published another study of the program. This early research, however, was handicapped by an inability to obtain information from comparison or randomly selected control groups of non-participants. The studies furthermore were concerned only with employment measures even though the target population was characterized as including those with behavioral

32. Ibid., p.11.  
problems, often involving serious criminal records. Levitan and Johnson nevertheless concluded that the Job Corps was largely "a social experiment that works." They cited data showing a positive impact on employment which increased the longer an enrollee remained in the program. "Almost all studies have found that Corpsmen are better off after the program than they were on entrance, whether their standard of measurement is employment, earnings, educational level, motivation, or work habits." 34

These early indications of Job Corps success have been substantially confirmed by Mathematica's recent, rigorously conducted longitudinal evaluation of the program. Beginning in 1977, MPR surveyed both a cross-sectional sample of Job Corps participants and a comparison group sample that combined selection from among young school dropouts (70%), and somewhat older applicants to state Employment Service offices (30%). The MPR researchers took advantage of the fact that in fiscal 1977 the Job Corps was relatively unevenly available to disadvantaged groups around the country. It was accordingly possible to obtain a sample of non-participants from areas not "saturated" by the program; subsequent comparisons between Job Corps participants and the non-participant sample were further refined by statistical adjustments aimed at eliminating any effects attributable to pre-existing differences between the two samples.

34 Levitan and Johnston, Job Corps, p.401.
The MPR researchers also sought to conceptualize the evaluation of Job Corps impacts in human capital terms and to apply this conceptual scheme both to labor market impacts of the program and to its potential for averting crime. Mallar et al. comment:

The theory of economic choice underlies many studies of employment and training programs. This theory suggests that individuals choose among competing demands on their time according to the wage rates they can receive, other prices, and sources of nonemployment income that are available. A person’s wage rate is hypothesized to depend on his or her productivity, which increases with education and vocational training. Job Corps should increase participants’ productivity, wage rates, and economic motivation to work.35

The MPR researchers identify four distinct areas within which the program would exert impacts. First, experience in the program should affect the labor market activities of the participants, enabling them to increase their productivity and thereby receive more employment, higher wage rates, and higher earnings. Besides short-term effects directly attributable to the Job Corps, the ultimate impacts on labor market activities might include “subsequent reinforcing effects.” These would occur in cases where early post-program employment provided “on-the-job training, and a record of worker reliability that is, in turn, rewarded with even higher wage rates and earnings in the future.”36

35. Mallar, Evaluation of the Job Corps, p.32.
36. Ibid., p.24
Besides its impacts on labor market activities, it was expected that Job Corps participation might have impacts in three other areas: increasing human capital investment (training and work experience, education, mobility, health and military service); reducing welfare dependence; and reducing antisocial behavior (drug and alcohol abuse and criminal behavior). In suggesting theoretical reasons why an anti-crime impact should occur as a result of the program, the evaluators add a mix of other reasons to the already developed theme of economic choice:

The post-program reductions in antisocial behavior stem from the entire Job Corps effort to promote more regular life styles and employment— from counseling and center living to the vocational training and educational services. Training and education are important because, to the extent that Job Corps is successful in increasing the employability (i.e., labor-market productivity) and the educational abilities of Corps members, legitimate activities become increasingly more attractive relative to illegitimate activities.37

Mallar finds that Job Corps participants usually experienced a two-month interval of depressed employment and earnings after leaving the program and while re-entering the labor market, but then achieved gains greater than would have occurred without participation. In the week prior to the follow-up survey, at an average of seven months after leaving the program, Job Corps males who completed the program earned $23.24 more than it was estimated would have been the case without the program. Youths who failed to

37. Ibid., p.28.
complete the program, including both early drop-outs and "partial completers," experienced short-term re-adjustment problems and their longer term impacts "are far less certain (small, sometimes negative, and most often statistically insignificant)."38

Program completers also increased their human capital investments, reduced their reliance on welfare and other transfer payments and reduced their criminal and drug-abuse activities. The impact on arrests was evident for all experimentals, including early dropouts and partial completers. The authors conclude:

While not all of these individual effects are statistically significant, several are, and the pattern seems clear for program completers. These other economic impacts are also more questionable for youths who do not complete the program, except for the reductions in arrests for males, which amount to over eight fewer arrests for every 100 Corpsmembers.39

Difficulties arise in interpreting the implications of the research for a behavioral model of employment and its impact on criminality. The evaluation concentrated on program completers, but this group constitutes only thirty percent of all enrollees. Forty percent of enrollees in Job Corps in fact dropped out during their first 90 days in the program and another 30 percent were "partial completers."

38. Ibid., p.iii.
39. Ibid., p.34.
The detailed findings of the MPR research point to sometimes puzzling patterns in the experiences of participants when they are grouped according to program completion status. Examining the relationship between Job Corps participation and criminality, it becomes evident that the program's impact on crime consists of a mixture of "social control" and "behavioral change" dimensions. Placed in residential settings under close supervision and at a distance from their inner-city homes, it is not surprising that the incidence of self-reported burglaries and auto larcenies declined three-fold among Job Corps participants as contrasted with a comparison group still residing on their "home turf."

Furthermore, in the post-program period, experimentals exhibited dramatically more geographical mobility than the comparison group, although the researchers did not consider the relationship between increased mobility and other variables. As the evaluation's detailed data show, an anti-crime impact did continue into the post-program follow-up period, but only at about one third the level of the in-program impact. It is also puzzling to note that arrests were reduced much more during the follow-up period among early dropouts (11 fewer arrests per 100 over six months) than was true for either those who completed the program or "partial completers" (six fewer arrests per 100 over six months for both groups).
Since the evaluators estimate that half of the economic benefits to society accrue from reduction in arrests (both during the program period and afterwards) it is hoped that the research will attempt to further analyze the interconnections among residential living/mobility, employment impact and crime. Furthermore, since the Job Corps serves a very young population (aged 16 to 21) and since the incidence of arrests begins to decline precipitously shortly after this age range, it must be expected that it will become increasingly difficult to assess longer term program impacts on arrests as their incidence decreases among both older ex-Corpsmembers and the comparison group.40

4.3.3 The Supported Work Programs

One of the more intensive efforts to improve the employability of ex-offenders was begun in 1972, when the Vera Institute set up the Wildcat Service Corporation to provide jobs and job training to chronically unemployed former heroin addicts and criminal offenders. Wildcat introduced the concept of "supported work" as a means of structuring work

40. A recently released follow-up study of Job Corps impacts, Charles Mallar et al., Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the Job Corps Program: Second Follow-up Report (Princeton, N.J.: Mathematica Policy Research, 1980) revealed that program impacts on employment and earnings remains stable over a two-year period after the baseline interviews, but program impacts on criminality faded out rapidly after Corpsmembers were out of the program for a year.
experience for these hard-to-employ populations. The main elements of the supported work structure were:

-- employees worked in crews;

-- a member of the crew served as chief with special responsibilities;

-- supervisors oversaw chiefs and crews with an eye on production goals as well as rehabilitative needs of the workers;

-- tasks and work rules were defined clearly for the workers;

-- workers were provided with regular feedback on their performance;

-- stress, demands and expectations imposed on the worker began at a low level and were increased as the worker’s capacity developed;

-- frequent rewards were used to reinforce effective work performance;

-- discipline was imposed at the work site to teach good work habits and increase production;

-- the work performed was productive and seen as valuable by the workers;

-- counseling and other forms of support services were made available after work hours.

The Wildcat program was supported by a consortium of funding agencies including the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the Ford Foundation, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Operating funds were also provided by fees charged for Wildcat services, and by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which diverted to the Corporation’s salary pool the welfare pay-
ments to which participants would have been entitled if they had not been earning a Wildcat wage.

The Vera Institute conducted a controlled design evaluation of the program, with the assistance of funding from NIDA and the N.Y.C. Department of Employment. The evaluation covered only those participants who were referred to Wildcat from heroin addiction treatment agencies. One hundred ninety-four experimental, who were randomly assigned to the program, and 207 controls, who were randomly prevented from entering the program, were tracked, for three years starting in July of 1972. The evaluation showed that the program increased employment stability and earning capacity among the ex-addicts in the sample, but that this difference between experimental and controls narrowed as the three-year period wore on. In addition, the program appeared to reduce long-term welfare dependency among participants.

The evaluation also showed that a smaller percentage of the experimental were arrested than controls over the three-year period. However, these data showed a very large difference between arrests of experimental and of controls at the end of the first year, but virtually no difference at the end of the third year. Finally, the evaluation showed

that employment was closely associated with low arrest rates in both groups. Indeed, "for both experimental and controls, the three-year arrest rate of sample members who were employed for more than 18 of the 36-month study period was less than half the rate of sample members employed for fewer than 18 of the 36 months."\textsuperscript{42}

The apparent success of the Wildcat program led the Department of Labor to collaborate with the Ford Foundation and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in funding a large scale, multi-site supported work program known as the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). MDRC was planned on a broader scale than Wildcat, providing services to four distinct groups: ex-offenders, ex-addicts, juvenile delinquents, and welfare mothers. The program was specifically conceived as an experiment, a means of testing the impacts of supported work on different populations.

MDRC implemented an evaluation similar in its controlled design to the design used by Vera in researching the Wildcat program.\textsuperscript{43} The research was carried out by Mathematica Policy Research and the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin. Eligible volunteers were randomly assigned either to a group of 3,214 partici-

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{43} Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1980).
pants or a group of 3,402 controls. Data on each of the individual participant groups (ex-offenders, ex-addicts, juvenile delinquents, and welfare mothers) were examined separately for program impacts at nine-month intervals over a three-year study period.

During the period of the demonstration, from March 1975 through December 1978, 10,043 persons were employed as participants in MDRC: 38 percent ex-offenders, 21 percent AFDC recipients, 23 percent youth and 12 percent ex-addicts (an additional 6 percent were composed of mental health patients and alcoholics, groups not examined by controlled research within the program). Eligibility criteria were designed to ensure that participants be severely disadvantaged--AFDC women must have received welfare for over three years, ex-addicts and ex-offenders must have been in treatment programs or incarcerated within the past six months, eligible youth must be high-school dropouts, and 50 percent of them must have had prior contact with the criminal justice system. Participants were "poor, minimally educated, with little connection to and experience with the regular labor market, but with considerable links to and experience with criminal justice and public assistance agencies."44

Several features of supported work were rigorously standardized across program sites. All sites maintained the

44. Ibid., Ch.II, p.7.
same eligibility requirements, wage and bonus structure, and period of maximum participation. In addition, all sites provided peer support, graduated stress and close supervision. Yet graduated stress was implemented differently at various sites, sometimes as increased productivity demands over time, sometimes as increasingly complex task assignments and sometimes in the form of decreased degrees of supervision. The types of work provided also varied across programs, including building, maintenance, security, day care, construction and manufacturing jobs.

Characteristics of the performance of different participant groups within the program varied greatly. Average length of stay in supported work was 6.7 months, yet there was considerable variation across participant groups. Welfare mothers stayed longest in supported work, an average of 9.2 months. Ex-offenders were most likely to leave the program quickly, staying an average of 5.2 months. Overall, 30 percent of all participants were dropped from the program for poor performance. Welfare mothers were least likely to be dropped (11%); ex-addicts and youth were most likely to be dropped (37% each). Welfare mothers were also most likely to move to full-time unsubsidized employment after program participation.

Impacts on the employment activities of different participant groups as compared to their respective control groups also varied considerably. Throughout the post-pro-
gram period, AFDC experimental's did significantly better than AFDC controls in terms of increased employment, increased earnings and reduced welfare dependence. Research also showed that ex-addict experimental's demonstrated more post-program employment and better wages than ex-addict controls in the final nine-months reviewed (the period between the 27th and 36th month) although there were no significant differences in employment between the two groups in the immediately preceding period. There were no significant differences in the post-program employment and earnings profiles of experimental's and controls for either the ex-offender or the youth groups.

The ex-addict experimental group also demonstrated substantially less criminal activity than the ex-addict control group, both during and after program participation. There were, however, no apparent impacts on the criminal activity of either the ex-offender or the youth groups, either during or after program involvement. Drug use was not significantly affected in any of the samples.

The final findings of the MDRC evaluation can be seen as to some extent qualifying the earlier positive findings of the Wildcat evaluation. Although there was apparent impact on the employment and criminal activities of the ex-addict group, as reported by Wildcat, there was no evidence that supported work could be extended to ex-offender and youth populations with equal success. Nor was there evi-
dence, as in Wildcat, that employment was closely associated with low arrest rates across experimental and control groups. For ex-offender and youth groups there was no apparent within-program impact on criminal activity, although, because program employment was supplied to all participants, experimental groups displayed far more employment during the first nine months than controls.

The MDRC final report indicates that supported work had very different impacts for different groups. It has not, however, been shown to have any positive impact on either the employment or the crime activities of youths and ex-offenders, the two groups with which this review is centrally concerned.

4.3.4. Financial Aid to Released Prisoners: The LIFE and TARP Experiments

In recent years, increasing attention has been focused on the plight of the released offender, particularly on the difficult re-adjustment period faced by releasees immediately after release. It was known that many releasees had long criminal histories at the time of confinement and evidenced substantial likelihood of being re-arrested after return to the community. It was reasoned further that the typical inmate's experience while in prison was often destructive in a social-psychological sense and, because of the dearth of high quality programs, offered little that would effectively
prepare him for re-entry. Finally, it was recognized that the vast majority of inmates leave prison without savings, without immediate entitlement to unemployment benefits, and with very poor prospects for employment. Thus, they are without resources at a time when the need for them is acute.

This perspective on the plight of ex-prisoners identified them as a population critically in need of vocational assistance, and suggested that recidivism among ex-prisoners could be reduced by increasing their employment and expanding their future employment opportunities. Although the Department of Labor incorporated those objectives in MDTA and implemented that directive during the 1960's and 1970's in the various vocational training and job placement programs for inmates within prisons and after release, for those who could not find work immediately the problem of acute financial need at the time of release remained.

For this reason, the Department began experimenting with the provision of modest financial aid to ex-prisoners for a short transitional period after release. These experiments were organized and supervised by the Office of Research and Development within the Employment and Training Administration. They began in 1971 with the Baltimore LIFE experiment (Living Insurance for Ex-Prisoners).45

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The LIFE program was a research and demonstration project, directed by Kenneth Lenihan. It sought to determine whether or not the provision of transitional aid payments upon release would reduce re-arrests for property crimes among ex-prisoners. Persons being released from Maryland state prisons were randomly assigned to one of four groups—those who received transitional aid payments, those who received vocational counseling and job placements only, those who received both payments and job placement services, and those who received no treatment at all. Alcoholics and addicts were screened out. The target population had committed at least one property crime, been arrested more than once, were under 45, had not participated in work release, had under $400 in savings, and were generally vulnerable to rearrest and unlikely to find work easily. Participants were entitled to the full allotment of $780 even though they secured employment. In that event, the weekly payments were reduced but extended in time. This arrangement was designed to prevent the payments from acting as disincentives to employment among the participants.

Lenihan found that those receiving payments evidenced a 23 percent re-arrest rate for property crimes over a one-year period. This compared with re-arrests of 31 percent for those who received either job placement or no service at all. This 8 percent difference reflects a relative decrease of approximately 25 percent in property related arrests among experimentals.
The study also found a strong, consistent relationship between being employed and reduced arrests among the research subjects in all groups. However, despite intensive efforts at job placement, the program did not show greater levels of employment among those getting this service than among control groups. Indeed, Lenihan believes that the re-arrest differences among experimentals and controls produced by the payments would have been substantially greater had the program been more successful in finding employment for participants.

Although encouraged by the findings of the LIFE program, the Office of Research and Development recognized that the program was implemented under particular experimental conditions which limited its applicability. Specifically, the participants in LIFE were given a great deal of skilled, individualized attention by the research staff which would not be replicated in a large scale employment security office. In addition, the participants in LIFE were all people with a high probability of re-arrest, rather than the general population of those discharged from prison.

For these reasons, the Office decided to test the effects of such transitional aid under conditions that more closely approximated those that would obtain if and when this form of intervention were institutionalized. Therefore, two new experiments were begun in January, 1976.
The new experiments were operated in Texas and Georgia and were researched together under the name Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP). TARP involved approximately 2,000 participants in each state. All were ex-felons who entered the program at the point of release from prison; however, eligibility was extended to all releasees. In addition, the financial aid, analogous to unemployment benefits ($64 per week in Texas and $70 in Georgia), was distributed through the Employment Security Offices in each state and its continuance was subject to all the normal unemployment insurance rules and regulations. The most notable impact of these rules was that the payments were reduced substantially by the amounts which participants earned from employment.

The TARP program also sought to determine whether or not larger payments had any effect on re-arrests. Thus, there were five research groups established in each state as follows: 1) 26 weeks of payments within a one-year eligibility period, with benefits reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis for earnings received; 2) 13 weeks of payments within a one-year eligibility period with benefits reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis for earnings; 3) 13 weeks of payments within a one-year eligibility period with benefits reduced 25 cents for every dollar of earnings; 4) no payment eligibility, but job placement services provided with up to $100
for the purchase of tools, work clothes, etc.; 5) no payment eligibility nor job placement services of any kind, i.e., the full control group. Finally, approximately 1,000 other prison releasees were followed up, through checks on re-arrest record and FICA earnings records.

The findings regarding the overall effects of the TARP experiments were summarized by the researchers as follows:

First of all, there were no significant overall differences in either state between experimental and control groups in average numbers of arrests on property-related charges during the post-release year. Secondly, there were no overall differences in other types of arrests (not related to property). Thirdly, the work disincentive effects of TARP payments were considerable in both states, with persons in payment groups working considerably fewer weeks over the post-release year. Finally, there were not very strong differences in the total annual earnings of experimental as compared to control groups, a finding that suggests that the experimental subjects managed to get higher wages when they did work and hence earned about the same amount over the year as the controls even though they worked overall fewer weeks during that period.46

The most interesting findings of these experiments are those which the authors describe as the "Counter-Balancing Effects" of the program:

The findings suggest that the TARP payments had two effects that opposed each other and balanced each other out. On the one hand, TARP payment lowered the number of arrests experienced by per-

sons receiving the payments. On the other hand, because TARP payments increased unemployment and unemployment increases arrests, the payments produced a side effect that wiped out the direct arrest averting effects.47

The work disincentive effect of the TARP program was not found in the LIFE program because, as previously indicated, the payments in LIFE were not reduced by earnings from employment. Instead they were stretched out over time and the participant never lost his full entitlement. In TARP, however, the regular rules of unemployment insurance resulted in employed participants permanently losing funds they would otherwise have received. The evidence is clear and strong that these administrative arrangements produced greater unemployment and considerably longer average times to first employment among experimentals than among controls.

Thus, the TARP findings are consistent with those from the LIFE program: where there was no administratively induced work disincentive, transitional aid payments did reduce arrests for property crimes. Indeed, the TARP payments had a similar, but weaker, effect on non-property arrests.

Another element of consistency between the two experiments is the finding that employment is associated with decreases in post-release arrests. In fact, in TARP this relationship was stronger than that between the financial aid and reduced recidivism. It is also interesting to note that

47. Ibid., I, p. 21.
employment in the TARP experiment was associated with fewer non-property arrests. Finally, the TARP group that received job placement services did not experience any more employment than the control group, which received no TARP services of any kind.

In summary, the LIFE and TARP experiments both demonstrate that financial aid to ex-prisoners for a transitional period immediately following release can reduce the number of re-arrests that would ensue otherwise. Employment has a similar, but even stronger effect on re-arrests. The financial aid, however, is a potential disincentive to employment, and its net impact on recidivism can only be realized if this disincentive effect is blocked.

4.4 Reflections on Recent Research

It is clear from our review of recent evaluations that employment program models for high risk youth and ex-offenders vary greatly in terms of the scope and intensity of vocational efforts. Tabor suggests that job readiness training, counselling and placement services constitute the majority of such programs.

Among the programs considered in recent impact evaluations, CEP provided the least intensive vocational services, consisting largely of once-a-week vocational counselling, in spite of the existence of a job development component. The Job Corps must be considered far more intensive, because of
its longer-term, residential design. The services provided were also more intensive than those offered by CEP (educational and vocational training, skills development--sometimes involving on-site worker presence--and counseling). Yet both programs are clearly efforts to upgrade the human capital of participants. While sharing the human capital orientation of other vocational programs, supported work provides the most intensive employment model, offering a full year of within-program employment experience for severely disadvantaged populations.

Program services in the programs reviewed were generally aimed at two distinct program populations--disadvantaged youth and ex-offenders (supported work also provided services to ex-addicts, a population which often has extensive criminal-justice involvements). The CEP evaluation suggests that high risk youth may be a difficult group for whom to provide vocational services. For youth, being employed at the time of a first interview was not necessarily a good predictor of employment at the time of the second interview, although such a relationship is expected in samples of adults. The CEP evaluation found that high risk youth are extremely erratic in their work histories, and particularly in need of vocational and educational upgrading.
Although the Job Corps evaluation concurs about the vocational disadvantages of their young population, it suggests that young program participants do respond to vocational services in supportive, residential settings. The extremely high drop-out rate in the Job Corps, however, might be noted as supporting the CEP contention that young program participants display unstable work—and program—behavior. MDRC, in assessing post-program employment, found that youth were "less stable in jobs once they get them than the ex-addicts and ex-offenders, and far less stable than AFDC women." The fact that MDRC expanded services for the youth cohort to include remedial education and skills training suggests a belief that intensive human capital upgrading is particularly appropriate for high-risk youth.

The employment problems of older ex-offenders, on the other hand, may be as tied to employment barriers for such groups as they are to lack of skills. Surveys of employment programs point repeatedly to statutory limitations on ex-offender employment and employer reluctance to hire ex-offenders. The LIFE and TARP evaluations suggest that ex-offenders are particularly disadvantaged in terms of employment immediately after release. They have limited resources with

48. MDRC, Summary and Findings, Ch. VI, p.2.
which to finance a job search and are further burdened by an obvious, lengthy gap in their employment history. In addition to financial aid to released prisoners, extensive job development and placement efforts for ex-offenders are called for repeatedly in surveys of program literature.

The results were mixed for the recent impact evaluations reviewed, in terms of both effects on employment and recidivism. CEP reported no impact on employment or recidivism. The Job Corps evaluation showed a significant impact on the post-program employment and earnings of experimentals in contrast to the comparison group; the impact was particularly strong for program completers, following a brief lag after leaving the program, and women. Both Wildcat and MDRC reported positive impacts on the employment activities of ex-addicts; the MDRC evaluation showed no impact on employment for youths and ex-offenders.

For those groups for whom there was a reported impact on employment (Job Corps youths and ex-addicts in supported work), evaluations also reported a positive impact on recidivism. For other groups, for whom there was no program impact on employment (CEP youth, MDRC youth and ex-offenders) there were no reported impacts on recidivism. The relationship between employment and crime suggested by this concurrence of impacts, however, is far from clear cut.
The evidence concerning linkages between employment and crime in the recent program evaluations reviewed is mixed. Both the Wildcat and TARP evaluations point to an association between employment and reduced criminal activity. In Wildcat, among both experimentals and controls, those who worked over 18 months in the three-year study period were arrested significantly less often than those who worked less than 18 months. The study of TARP also found that employment had a strong effect on re-arrest, but that financial aid, as structured in the Georgia and Texas experiments, served as a disincentive to employment. The MDRC evaluation, however, did not find an association between employment and reduced crime: ex-offender and youth experimentals, during participation in program-based employment, demonstrated the same amount of criminal activity as controls. Furthermore, although the Job Corps evaluation reported positive impacts on both employment and arrests for the experimental group, part of the impact on arrests resulted from "social control" efforts and the impact on arrests was apparently strongest for early program dropouts (a group who received few employment-related benefits through program participation and who displayed the weakest post-program employment).

There is no clear-cut evidence about the relationships between employment and crime in these types of program contexts. And if it is the case that employment is associated
with reductions in crime, as suggested by some of the evaluations reviewed, there is still much to be learned about how to increase the rates and lengths of employment for youth and ex-offender groups.

Despite the recent spate of methodologically sophisticated impact evaluations, many questions remain unanswered about program impacts on employment and the impacts of employment on criminality. For example, impact evaluations generally tell us little about the experiences of participants within the program. Is program employment typically seen by participants in the same terms as unsubsidized employment, or is it discounted as a "trial run?" Are high program dropout rates related to participant perception of potential program ineffectiveness or (as currently suggested) are they representative of participant instability?

There has been an increasing awareness among program evaluators of a need to supplement the findings of an impact evaluation with a qualitative overview of program functioning in the form of "process evaluation," although the meaning and format of such evaluation vary considerably. There are, in fact, two distinctly different kinds of process evaluation. MDRC, for example, currently has plans for a process evaluation, the "process documentation analysis," to supplement its impact evaluation. They describe this ef-
fort as including "a qualitative assessment of variables in the local projects: differences in the quality of leadership; types of job creation, placement and funding strategies; and the geographic, economic, and political environments in which the program operated." Process evaluation, in this form, can tell us a great deal about whether and how programs actually deliver the services called for in the program design and can explain program factors involved in program impact.

There is another sense in which the term "process evaluation" is generally used. In this second sense, the term refers to the interaction between program elements and the sociocultural, social-psychological and economic processes that are believed to produce unemployment, criminal behavior, or both. Program evaluations which include this type of formal "process evaluation" are rare indeed, but they offer an opportunity to learn more about the phenomena which programs must change to realize their objectives and about the nature of program effects on relevant aspects of the participants' life. The Baltimore LIFE evaluation attempts to get at this type of evaluation in its four in-depth case studies of the post-release experience of participants. The case study volume stands as a companion to the impact evaluation findings. The participant case studies

49. Ibid., Ch. 1, p. 5.
point to the influence of family ties and peer group pressures in a day-to-day context, providing a portrait of the problems of re-entry for the prison releasee. The Wildcat evaluation contains a similar but smaller effort to present a qualitative image of program participants, but provides less detail concerning the role of the program experience within the overall context of individual lives.

In this broader sense, process evaluation permits not only inspection of interactions between program personnel and clients, but also helps describe the phenomena that programs are trying to change, as well as the social psychological and political processes into which they intervene. Process evaluations may also expose overly abstract theoretical models—human capital theory, theory of economic choice—to the tests afforded by the concrete, experiential contexts within which participants and programs interact.

In addition, none of the research reviewed in this chapter addresses the larger questions of the economic forces that produce jobs and the labor market factors that place people in jobs. Programs are often built on a series of assumptions about how these processes work, but those assumptions are often not applicable to the employment experiences of program participants. Job readiness training, for example, coaches participants on how to go on job interviews, read want ads, search for work, etc. Yet research has shown that most jobs are not found through formal means,
such as want ads and employment agencies, but instead through informal networks of family and friends. Programs have not as yet been based on how labor markets really operate.

Recent impact evaluations also tell us very little about efforts to remove barriers to ex-offender employment and efforts to make post-program employment more available or more rewarding. We know little about program impacts on labor markets; yet it appears that, in spite of attempts to upgrade the human capital of participants, most program graduates still move into relatively unskilled, low-level jobs—basically secondary sector employment.

Our review of such employment in Chapter II suggests that variations in human capital do not offer a sufficient explanation of employment outcomes in the secondary labor market, and that the dynamics of employment in this market may not be particularly sensitive to such differences. For example, consider the job instability found in the impact evaluations reviewed. SLM theory suggests that this instability may be characteristic of the jobs participants move into—intrinsically short-term, dead-end, secondary jobs—rather than an indication of individual performance.

program efforts may be based on assumptions applicable to the primary labor market, while making little effort to overcome structural barriers and facilitate entry into primary jobs for participants.

In considering the rather meagre returns to vocational program efforts for youth and ex-offenders, it may be important to recognize that programs have yet to attempt any extensive upgrading of job opportunities for these groups. Early NAB-JOBS* efforts to place severely disadvantaged clients in primary sector employment were quickly dissipated by the economic decline of the 1970's. Affirmative action requirements, to some extent, represent efforts to affect structural labor market barriers, yet ex-offenders are not likely to share immediately in affirmative action gains, at least by virtue of their offender status. Such efforts in any case can only place previously excluded groups into already existing employment. They do little about upgrading the structure of employment opportunities for the hard-core unemployed as a whole.

A review of manpower programs in a criminal justice context makes it clear that SLM theories and perspectives have not generally been incorporated in program designs. Although most of the policy implications currently drawn from SLM are targeted at the macro-level, it is possible to conceive of some smaller scale efforts that would not be inconsistent with such theory. Training programs for hard-

*National Alliance of Businessmen.
core unemployed populations specifically directed at given areas of recognized labor shortage, if such programs can be delivered effectively, might significantly enhance placement in relatively skilled jobs. Efforts to eliminate labor market barriers for groups such as minorities and ex-offenders, who currently face structural impediments to employment are also consistent with SLM. From an SLM perspective, current manpower programs place too much emphasis on improving the human capital of participants and give too little consideration to the labor markets within which program graduates move. It should be recognized, however, that even SLM oriented program strategies are limited in the extent to which they might be capable of providing sufficient numbers of primary jobs for those that want them.

Our review of impact evaluations also suggests that we may need to pay more attention to the characteristics of youth labor market behavior in manpower program design. Impact evaluations criticize repeatedly the job holding instability and erratic work histories of high risk youth. To some extent, this behavior may be related to the nature of

51. For a review of these issues, see U.S., Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Program Evaluation and Research, "Employer Barriers to the Employment of Persons with Records of Arrest or Convictions," by Neal Miller, Washington, D.C. May 1979. (Mimeo.)
jobs in which they are placed. Yet it is also possible that what looks like erratic work behavior to an outside observer may be an intrinsic part of the process of work establishment for young people engaged in a long-term exploration of their employment options. Given an awareness of the many facets involved in the experience of "maturation," discussed in Chapter Three, the program perspective may be too limited a viewpoint from which to evaluate youth labor market behavior. If programs were to expect job exploration and rejection as an intrinsic part of work establishment, job placement and job stability alone could not be viewed as adequate measures of program success. Nor would a series of short-term jobs and employment transitions necessarily be cause for "negative termination."

An awareness of the exploratory nature of most youth employment experience might lead youth employment programs to revise their program goals. Instead of seeking simply to provide youth with a work experience, these programs might set the entire process of work establishment as their target with youth. In so doing, the program design would recognize the exploratory and volatile nature of work experience in the late teens, and would provide for longer-term support featuring different types of intervention at different points in time in order to aid youth in their explorations and provide relevant skills when they show interest and aptitude.
In summary, a number of the themes developed in our review of program literature reinforce themes developed in the empirical literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three. Our examination of literature related to employment and crime leads us to believe that manpower programs for high-risk youth and ex-offenders need to be based on broader knowledge of the social, psychological and economic processes into which programs intervene. We need to know more about what kinds of jobs are available in high crime communities, how they are valued and defined, what people expect to derive from them other than their daily wage. We also need to know more about the nature of stable employment in environments where primary employment is the exception rather than the rule. Finally, we need to know more about the kinds of criminal activities engaged in in these communities—what residents derive from them, the extent to which they vary with patterns of legal employment, and how the relationship between legal and illegal involvements are viewed by the participants (the community perceptions of the nature of the tradeoffs between crime and employment). Only with such an expanded base of knowledge can we significantly advance our presently limited understanding of the possible impacts of enhanced employment opportunity on crime.
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