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ABSTRACT Drawn from a 1978 Speech Communication Association seminar, this collection of papers and other materials explores the subject of argumentation as epistemology. The first paper reviews several critiques of traditional argumentation theories and offers directions for new theories, and the remaining eight papers offer responses to the ideas and positions of the first. Specific topics covered in the papers include (1) the constructivist/interactionist approach to the epistemological functions of argument studies, (2) logic-in-use among everyday arguers, (3) the logic of the coordinated management of meaning, (4) conversational arguing, (5) rhetorical argument as reduplication, (6) epistemology as a philosophical ground for understanding the roles of arguing in knowing, (7) argument as epistemological method, and (8) the need for new argumentation theories. Other materials included in the collection are an edited transcript of the seminar and a list of the participants and their topics. (FL)
ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING

SCA Seminar IV (1978)
Minneapolis.

PROCEEDINGS
CONTRIBUTED PAPERS
and
TRANSSCRIPT OF CLOSED DISCUSSION

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ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING

SCA Seminar IV (1978)
Minneapolis

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ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING

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TURABIAN says that the contents of a preface should include such matters as the writer's reasons for making the study, its background, scope, and purpose, and acknowledgment of the aids afforded him in the process of the research and writing by institutions and persons. Since many readers already have a fair idea of the background, scope, and purpose of ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING, I will begin with the last-mentioned responsibility of acknowledging the aids received in preparing it. By this slight unorthodoxy in organization, I hope to answer some questions which may have arisen in the period of time which elapsed since this argumentation seminar was held.

The first acknowledgment to be made is to Mike McGee, who conceived of the seminar series initially. In his conception, the SCA convention should provide a setting for scholars within specialized disciplines to meet in closed sessions to accomplish more than they could in the usual brief, open-to-the-public convention programs. Then the product of those seminars could be published later for all interested persons to read and enjoy. Upon this basis, six seminars took place at the Minneapolis convention. I used his concept that the results would be published as one of the inducements to the scholars to become involved in the argumentation seminar.

Unfortunately, he was unable to get a university press with which he was negotiating to agree to publish the seminars' proceedings on an acceptable basis, so I went ahead with plans to publish just these argumentation proceedings with some other publisher, and on that basis Auburn University awarded me a grant to prepare the manuscript. Ultimately, however, I met with the same luck that McGee did; none of the publishers I approached agreed to take ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING without a subsidy which I was not authorized to give.
Finally, with a completed manuscript in hand, I returned to the Publications Board of the SCA and requested their assistance. I am pleased to acknowledge the support of Jerry Tarver, Robert Smith, and Bill Work, among others, in bringing this contribution to the literature of argumentation theory to fruition at last.

Hopefully, this brief recital of acknowledgments—and the narrative of why they were mentioned here—serves to remind the reader of the original purpose, scope, and background of ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING. The theme of the convention which spawned this seminar was "The Learning Society," taken from Robert M. Hutchins' book of that title. Therefore, the general idea of the seminar was to explore argumentation as epistemology. The seminar itself was designed so as to have the co-chairmen, Richard Rieke and Stephen Toulmin (then in the throes of writing their textbook, An Introduction to Reasoning) write a position paper outlining some critiques of traditional argumentation theories, and sketching some alternative directions for new theories. Applicants to the seminar (competitively selected) then wrote original essays for exchange prior to the convention. At the convention itself, a four-hour period was set aside for the participants to meet and discuss their papers, free from all distractions.

In the instance of this seminar, at least, the design turned out to be enormously successful. The papers prepared in advance of the seminar represented a widely divergent set of approaches to argumentation theory. The approaches ranged from Kelly's Personal Construct Theory through rules theory and conversation analysis to Brockriede's suggestion of "Argument3". Other papers presented theories adapted from Kenneth Boulding, Richard McKeon, and Paul Grice. As a debate coach with some interests and ambitions towards scholarship at that time, I quickly sensed that I was in over my head. But at the seminar itself, the various scholars displayed no such naivete towards each other's subjects. Their discussion proved to be extremely fast-paced and wide-ranging. There was frequent
clash of ideas which sometimes found resolution in the discovery of some sort of common ground, and sometimes remained unresolved. At the time it seemed apparent that Stephen Toulmin was the central figure in nearly all of the segments of the discussion; in retrospect, a study of the transcript supports such an impression. Yet the transcript also conveys the depth of understanding, and the advance towards even deeper understandings, reflected in the comments of each of the other members of that privileged group.

Since that seminar, in the intervening time that has passed, scholarship in argumentation theory has continued under the auspices of the SCA and the AFA at an accelerated pace. Some of the contributions to the seminar foreshadowed the subsequent appearance of new research. Willard's constructivist/interactionist theory has been thoroughly aired in a series of responses and rejoinders in the Journal of the American Forensic Association. There have also been research reports on argumentation in everyday discourse based on conversation analysis. And, most notably, Stephen Toulmin's theories continue to generate new research, stimulating numerous papers at both Alta conferences; the national conventions, and an upcoming issue of JAPA to be devoted to argument fields.

Gratifying as that is, it is also true that this volume of ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING remains a rich, untapped resource of other theoretical thrusts which have not yet emerged into general consciousness within our field of study. In particular, the exchanges contained within the seminar's transcript provide many illuminating insights which have the potential for generating more and more new groundswells of knowledge -- new "ways of knowing," if you will. For this reason, especially, despite the delays in its appearance, this volume's presentation to the community of argumentation students remains timely and important.

Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik conclude the preface to An Introduction to Reasoning with these words: "Finally, in this text we have attempted to discuss practical
argumentation in a wide variety of fields and disciplines. In a rapidly developing field of teaching and study, we shall need to pool our experience if we are to develop a well-founded tradition of teaching and a common body of understanding about practical reasoning and argumentation." Let that stand as a fitting concluding sentiment to this work.

David A Thomas

Houston, Texas

October, 1981
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND TENTATIVE AGENDA

by Richard D. Rieke and Stephen E. Toulmin

In this century there has developed a significant body of literature exposing the limitations of purely formal analyses in the search for knowledge. Coming from widely different fields of interest such as physical and social sciences, esthetics, law, history, politics, ethics, these critiques have argued that formal logic and mathematics do not provide all that is necessary to those advancing and testing claims. In fact, they have frequently suggested that formal procedures are suited to issues of a procedural nature only, and they do not assist us when we deal with the important substantive issues.

For example, until some 20 years ago, the program of "inductive logic" had a dominant position in the philosophy of science, and the goal of the "unified science" movement was to integrate the content of positive science into a single formal system organized around the basic propositional calculus of Russell and Whitehead. In recent years, however, it has become apparent that axiomatization and "confirmation theory" have at best a minimal relevance to the actual philosophical issues facing working scientists: so, there has grown up a "new" philosophy of science that pays much more attention to the historical evolution of scientific ideas and methods, and their relations to the substantive problems of the natural sciences. In this newer philosophy of science, the rationality of scientific procedures and arguments is no longer equated with their conformity to the demands of symbolic logic, or with their formal consistency. Instead, this
becomes a matter to be considered with an eye to the actual explanatory procedures of science, and their relations to the problematics of the scientific investigations concerned.

Correspondingly, the epistemological program developed by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell at the beginning of this century, in conjunction with their formalist program for logic and philosophy of science, has also been called in question. Where, in the earlier part of the century, the task for the theory of knowledge was seen as being to formulate the implicit arguments by which the "hard data" of immediate sense perception were to be related to statements about "material objects" and the rest, using formal logic as a template, the focus of attention has again shifted toward more substantive issues. See, for illustration, Fred Dretske's Knowing and Seeing and J.J. Gibson's The Senses considered as Perceptual Systems as two books which explore this novel intersection between sensory psychology and the philosophy of perception.

Consider, as another example, the philosophy of language in which the formalist program for the analysis of meaning typified by Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and continued more recently in the formal semantics of Fodor and Katz has been increasingly giving way to a more pragmatic approach. In this, the language games of the later Wittgenstein, together with their cognates in John Searle's "speech acts" and John Austin's different "ways of doing things with words," encourage scholars to interpret questions about semantics (and even syntax) in the light of their relations with the practical functions of utterances, rather than by seeking to "map" them on to a formal syntactical base.

Similar patterns of thought can be found in the social sciences. Logical positivism has formed the fundamental rationale in the search for
knowledge. Causal or correlational explanations among operationally defined objects were advanced in arguments using mathematics and logic as guidelines. Formal analysis was the approach to the criticism of any argument whether it emerged from psychology or communication. The nature of the questions asked and the variables investigated was in part determined by the demands of the system of analysis felt to be essential. Within the past few years, however, an increasing number of scholars have refused to accept these demands. They have, instead, insisted upon asking questions and advancing arguments which do not conform to the requirements of formal analysis, sometimes charging formalism with distracting research from the most important questions. Moving instead from such perspectives as phenomenology or interactionism, they have supported their claims with arguments that are not susceptible to the tests of logic as stated in formal systems, and at the same time they have often taken time to justify their rejection of formalism.

Notice, also, changes in philosophical ethics. The period during which moral philosophers concentrated on issues in "metaethics" and avoided substantive problems of ethics has, more recently, been giving way to a new phase of substantive concern. Under different headings such as bioethics, public affairs, and the like, scholars have been finding their way back into the debate about urgent and topical ethical issues such as abortion, battered women, civil disobedience, and so on down the alphabet. At the same time, there has been a revival of interest in the history of ethics, with special reference to the conceptual history of moral concepts and methods of argument.

Commentaries on legal argument have shown a similar concern with the need to identify new ways to analyse critical issues. For centuries,
the stated rationale for legal decision making was the paradigm of formal logic. Legal positivists described their search for justice as a syllogistic process of fitting law as a major premise to the facts of a particular case as the minor premise. The legal decision was merely the conclusion of a valid syllogism. Early in this century critics who came to be called legal realists challenged this model and called for new forms of analysis. Subsequently, legal scholars of various philosophies have suggested new forms of analysis which do not rest on formal systems.

Finally, in spite of centuries of education prescribing formal methods of argument in everyday discussion and writing, it has been clear to observers that in politics, business, and ordinary intercourse, the arguments used are not structured according to the rules of formal logic and they are not typically analyzed formally either.

In general, then, it was largely taken for granted during the first half of the century that expressions should be criticized in logical terms (A is a reason for B), by providing calculi or algorithms for evaluating the formal connections between A and B. But it is clear that the more fundamental questions raised by such expressions have to do with procedures and rules. True, in a few cases, it is possible to develop calculi and algorithms (for example, significance tests), for deciding just how "good" a reason A is for B, but where this is so, that fact reflects the special problematics of the cases in question, and the procedural significance of the formal tests themselves also needs to be considered separately since it will not be apparent from the formalism alone. And, as the limitations of formal analysis have become increasingly apparent, scholars have searched for alternative patterns of argumentative analysis in relation to the search for knowledge or ways of knowing. It is at this point the SEMINAR IV identifies
Problem: What are the alternative philosophical groundings for looking at argumentation as a way of knowing?

Even though scholars have been struggling with the search for alternative patterns of argumentative analysis for some time, this search has not been very well reflected in the work of those whose central problem is argumentation. That is to say, philosophers of argumentation, whether located within an academic department of philosophy, communication, rhetoric, or whatever, have not yet been effective in developing concepts of argument that are not ultimately bound in some way to formal systems. Many philosophy teachers continue teaching as if there had been no change: they persist in starting on the teaching of philosophy by instilling into students certain basic formal techniques that were possibly relevant to the earlier programs of philosophy. They go on to define the "central questions" of philosophy by reference to those formal techniques, and they suggest—even when they do not outright assert—that philosophical issues stated in more colloquial language are defective through being phrased in sloppy rather than in "exact" or "analytical" terms. Teachers of argumentation and debate have been more inclined to recognize the need to deal with arguments on practical issues such as those debated intercollegiately each year, but the theory of argument taught still tends toward formal rules as the paradigm of all arguments. An examination of the leading textbooks in the field—those which are most popular among teachers—will reveal the traditional rhetorical position that while practical arguments cannot achieve the certainty possible in logic, they achieve "probability" which grows stronger as the arguments approximate the structure and meet the rules of formal logic.
Within the very recent past there have been some writers who have addressed the problem of what does argument look like if it is not tied to formal logic. Sometimes this work has come from scholars trying to probe new areas of investigation and who must first work out new patterns of argument in order to pursue their interests. Other commentaries have come from those people whose primary area of specialization is the study of argumentation. Still other writers have sought to reconcile the criticisms of traditional logic with the desire to hold on to some kind of formalism. All of these points of view are represented in SEMINAR IV. With these points in mind, it is possible to set out some questions around which we might focus our talk.

1. What are the characteristics of "rationality?" To what extent can rationality be reduced to formalism as in a logical calculus? If rational arguments cannot be tested through formal techniques, does it necessarily follow that arguments cannot be tested and evaluated systematically?

2. To what extent are arguments advanced by scholars—scientists, philosophers, critics, etc.—similar to or different from those used by people in ordinary daily business—writing advertising copy, selling cars, discussing politics, planning business ventures, and the like? How, if at all, can we distinguish between arguments that are awkwardly expressed or incompletely stated and those which emerge from carefully prepared statements in terms of assessing their strength or cogency?

3. How can a theory of argument reconcile the traditional conflict between "reasonableness" or "logicality" on the one hand and "persuasiveness" or "convincingness" on the other? If the traditional definition of fallacy is an argument which is persuasive but should not be, is there any room for the concept "fallacy" within a modern theory of argu-
4. To what extent should the study of argument move from the prescriptive to the descriptive? Should students of argument abandon the tendency to speculate and conceptualize about the characteristics of arguments and instead spend their time looking at the way people argue? Can the demands of scholars for a rigorous argumentative process be satisfied by reporting how people—including scholars—have actually argued? If so, how should this research proceed?

5. What are the characteristics or constituents of arguments? How do we know an argument when we see one? Is "argument" a meaningful unit of investigation when examining discourse? How does argumentation relate to the totality of discourse—what is its relationship to the "knowingness" claimed in any discourse?

6. Specifically, can we describe the procedure for testing or evaluating arguments? How can we tell whether one argument is "better" than another? What does it mean to say one is better than the other?

Of course, when the SEMINAR gets together we will re-examine these questions to consider which ones we want to discuss and in what order. We will also consider any other questions that ought to be added. These questions should be sufficient to orient your thinking until then.

(This statement reflects the thinking of Stephen Toulmin and Richard Rieke. The Toulmin contribution comes from Rieke's free use of material written by Toulmin for our forthcoming book.)
CONTRIBUTED PAPERS IN RESPONSE
TO RIEKE AND TOULMIN
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF ARGUMENT STUDIES:
A CONSTRUCTIVIST/INTERACTIONIST VIEW
by Charles Arthur Willard

Introduction

Recent speculation on the contributions of argument analysis to epistemological and ethical studies has coincided with--and to an extent been stimulated by--severe criticism of the analytic tradition. The belief that a priori logical systems can be propounded ex nihilo, or at least without regard for the routine practices of social actors, and the corollary assumption that formal systems so derived can substantively contribute to the explication and criticism of ordinary discourse are being called increasingly into question. Viewed analytically, these criticisms have been merely psychologistic or anthropological. Judged from other perspectives, however, these attacks take on a special cogency and urgency. Just as the development of projective geometries undermined the Euclidian symmetry (and attendant logical niceties) of the Cartesian view, the contention that formal systems are inapplicable to ordinary discourse entails, at minimum, the idea that other domains need not accept formalist frameworks as their taken-for-granted archai of inquiry. This is not the place for assaulting citadels, but the senses in which a new framework for the study of ordinary argument might: (i) contribute to accounts of knowledge, or (ii) vitiate the analytic goal of knowledge need to be as explicit as possible. The analytic account of knowledge, which is monistic in spirit if not in fact, holds that to say A knows X is to say that (i) it...
is true that $X$ is the case, (ii) A believes that $X$ obtains, and (iii) A believes $X$ on grounds of sufficient evidence that $X$ is the case. Knowledge must meet all three criteria; and, by this view, "false knowledge" is an incoherent notion. Thus, knowledge is contrasted with beliefs, descriptions, and theories—all of which can be false. The idea that knowledge cannot be merely true belief is premised on the possibility that a belief which turns out to be true might be serendipitously so. Conditions (i) and (iii) are assumed to be interactive or mutually verifying since "sufficient evidence" by definition obtains the truth conditions of $X$, and A could not know that $X$ is the case without the analytic probity of sufficient evidence. The skeptical critique, based largely on the circularity of (i) and (iii), is familiar, as are attempts to check the critique's force by appeals to intuitionist doctrines of self-evidence or to verificationalist accounts of language exemplified by the analytic reductionism of Russell and the descriptivism of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. We are equally familiar with the attempts of psychological or empirical systems, working from the skeptical critique, to replace the Cartesian *res cogitans* with a *res agens* with acts in and on the world. Viewed analytically, these systems cannot conflict with philosophical accounts because they are empirical—no analytically genuine disputes could obtain between them. This has hardly prevented various writers from acting as if their differences were genuine, although there does seem to be a clear stasis in this long-standing dispute at which the differences have become irreconcilable because no mutually satisfactory common ground has been found out of which accommodating views could be generated.
If the study of argument is to be anything more than a footnote to the squabble between inductionists and deductionists, the irrelevance of formal analysis to ordinary discourse needs underscoring. If it is as clear as it seems to be that analytic accounts of knowledge have misdirected and ultimately impoverished argumentation, it may be worth considering whether those features of daily discourse which approximate the analytic ideal are the more trivial ones. Indeed, I suspect that few analysts would object to this interpretation since they conceptualize their formulations as self-contained systems differing from ordinary talk in the same way that Aristotle's apodeictic demonstrations differed from practical reasonings. Such a distinction is not congenial here, of course, because Aristotle's equation of the practical syllogism with the apodeictic in terms of form is precisely the sort of formalist influence which is being questioned. It is in this spirit that argumentation theorists are rightly reconsidering their root assumptions; and, although they are pursuing divergent lines, a certain commonality has undergirded their efforts, viz., a desire to cast off the metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical heritage of Russell and Whitehead, Moore and Bradley, and of the early Wittgenstein. Whether or not argumentation—construed as the study of ordinary argument—might ultimately provide the grounds for calling into question the self-sufficiency claims of the analysts, is an issue of a different order which must await events.

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST/INTERACTIONIST VIEW

The constructivist/interactionist framework is an alternative to formalism which explicitly eschews the serial predicative view of argument.
Argument is a kind of social interaction in which two or more actors maintain what they construe to be incompatible propositions, a definition which is spun out of a conjoining of Kelly's personal construct theory (PCT) with selected aspects of Chicago School symbolic interaction theory. Understood this way, argument becomes a social comparison process of a special kind. Social encounters and relationships, when informed by perceptions of dissensus, lead actors to communicate their constructions of events in unique ways. The statement "we are having an argument" reflects an awareness that two actors share a definition of situation based on dissensus—a co-orientation in which two or more actors correctly attribute argumentative intentions to each other. The epistemic functions of these attributions are easily enough seen: (i) "testing one's ideas" is a tenable construction to place upon interactions when actors enter into them with a tentativeness conducive to criticism—this tentative orientation implying that arguments might fulfill the critical functions which Aristotle assigned to dialectic; yet, (ii) dialectical intentions need not inform the interaction: social comparison, even for actors engaged in Burke's "blunt quest of advantage," might induce change in individual constructs or even in whole systems; and, to be contrasted to functions (i) and (ii) by virtue of their dependence on combativeness, (iii) dialogical goals, as understood by, say, Jaspers or Marcel, might inform argument.

The senses in which this formulation differs from monistic epistemologies have been detailed elsewhere, and it may suffice to note here that Kelly's principle of elaborative choice is our guiding assumption.

Humans are forward-looking calculative beings who seek to predict and
control events. Personal constructions are hypothetical; and human actions are correspondingly experimental in character. Man-the-scientist confronts his representations of events rather than the events themselves, his experience being comprised of his successive replications of events, not the events per se. No skepticism is entailed here: the universe is temporally ongoing regardless of what people think about it, but a person's thoughts are just as "real" as the events. Just as the realities of the world are not shaped by thought, so individual constructions are not causally linked to outside events. Man builds his constructs and tries them on for size. Since a person interprets events by construing them, by dichotomizing them according to their similarities and differences vis-a-vis other events, the principle of elaborative choice holds that choices between dichotomized alternatives are informed by an actor's needs for enhanced extension and definition. A cognitive system is extended when its range of convenience is increased--when it renders more events meaningful. Its definition is enhanced when it seems to become more explicit and clear cut. Choices, then, are informed by the needs of anticipation: people choose to understand things in ways which enhance their predictability. This is why, Kelly says, Hamlet chose a problematic and unappealing life over the unknown terrors of death:

Whatever the breadth of his viewpoint, it is our assumption that man makes his choice in such a fashion as to enhance his anticipations. If he constricts his field of vision, he can turn his attention toward the clear definition of his system of constructs. If he is willing to tolerate some day-to-day uncertainties, he may broaden his field of vision, and thus hope to extend the predictive range of his system.
Yet, whichever choice an individual makes (whether constricted certainty or broadened understanding), the choice process per se is elaborative.

It seems clear that arguments often arise when constricted fields of vision clash with broader but less defined ones; and the corollary sense in which such clashes might induce systemic change is equally clear. The informative principle is predictiveness—not predictiveness countenanced by formal features of the events themselves, but an apparent predictiveness mandated by the construct system in which a choice is embedded. The ways a person systematizes the phenomena which confront him, the ways he combines constructs, are assumed to determine the form, content, and directions of thought. A theory, for example, binds or determines the events which are subordinated to it: "It is not determined by the events themselves; it is determined by the superordinating point of view of the theorist. Yet, it must conform to events in order to predict them." Thus, behavior is experimental. Accurate prediction requires construct systems which conform in more or less dependable ways to the "facts of the world," these facts being understood in terms of the experiments a person has performed in the past which are deemed relevant to the decision at hand.

Construct systems, of course, are assumed to obey their own logics. That is, they are formulated on principles which appear to the individual to serve them best. The intuitive idea here is that reasoning consists of movement along and through pathways of constructs. Constructs are organized into systems according to a person's perceived convenience in anticipating events; ordinal relationships among the constructs are assumed. A given construct might be a superordinate construct in one system and a subordinate element of another. Thus, personal construct theory assumes
that one construct may subsume another as one of its elements, either by extending the cleavage intended by the other construct or by abstracting along the other's cleavage line. Thus, a good--bad construct might subsume, among many other possibilities, an intelligent--stupid dimension, meaning that "good" would include among its many elements all things intelligent while "bad" would include among its elements all things stupid. The intelligent--stupid dimension might have its cleavage abstracted across if it were subsumed as a dimension of an evaluative--descriptive construct. In this manner, constructs are pyramided or otherwise systematized hierarchically as a person orders his experience. These systems may be more or less complex depending, in part at least, upon the perceived importance of the events which fall within their ranges of convenience. The system, then, comprises the pathways which reasoning must follow when it is brought to bear upon given events.

From this perspective, it is difficult to believe that there could be such a thing as a field invariant logic. A person might be said to employ an invariant logic if and only if he felt free to employ it for all systems. Some theorists have accorded consistency invariant status, although recent research guided by construct theory clearly suggests that systems may and often do contain elements which are inferentially incompatible with one another when the systems are sufficiently complex (differentiated) to subsume the inconsistency. Further, there are surely systems for which consistency is irrelevant, e.g., my aesthetic experiences are premised upon systems (symbolic structures of the "felt world," to purloin James) which follow an order for which consistency is an alien notion. Mathematical laws, geometry, and formal logic seem equally inapplicable to
such systems. Stated alternatively, a field invariant logic must itself have been generated out of some field, some assumptive framework or presuppositional grounding, and one could defend that logic's invariant status only with reference to the "facts of the field" in the sense that only mathematical assumptions can render mathematical laws meaningful. It is unclear how these laws could be talked about or justified vis-a-vis, say, political science. Thus, if and only if a person employs one logical system to inform all other systems can he be said to employ an invariant logic. Now, it is obvious that this can be done: Aristotle informed his whole system with biological assumptions. Syllogistic logic was thereby assumed to be isomorphic to nature and applicable to all domains of inquiry. These logical laws were inexorable and all-encompassing, a common assumption of monistic accounts. Aristotle's system exemplifies the sense in which one can posit an invariant logic only at the expense of embracing the *sui generis* weaknesses of monism.

The principle of elaborative choice, in sum, does not assume that an actor's elaborations are analytically explicable. The idea that constructs are systematized according to the actor's convenience in anticipating events implies that a person might employ as large or diverse a repertory of logics as his systems are varied. PCT, in fact, seems to admit the interpretation that it is impossible in principle to generate invariant logics which apply with equal facility to all systems. Argument theorists of the analytic persuasion--because they seek the grounds of "rationality" in the formal structures of arguments--have uncritically taken up a body of field-dependent principles which may have no relevance at all to ordinary talk.
RATIONALITY

Accounts of rationality are usually derived from broader theoretical frameworks and are correspondingly given form and flavor, biases and goals, by the paradigms in which they are embedded. This has usually produced definitions of rationality in terms of some faculty, attribute, or process—and, in some systems, a result—which is assumed to embody or otherwise exemplify it. Thus, rationality has been seen (i) in terms of the correspondences between an actor's reasoning and a priori systems, (ii) in terms of the absence of emotions or sentiments—avoidances of "irrational" or "nonrational" processes, (iii) in terms of correspondences to a priori rules understood to be embedded in social structures; and (iv) with respect to verbal formulation as understood by Carnap and the Vienna Circle. These attempts to reduce accounts of rationality to singular instances—paradigmatic cases—probably reflect an Aristotelian concern with essences, a posture which seems to be pervasive even in those systems explicitly diverging from Aristotelian lines.

The constructivist/interactionist view is that rationality is a multi-faceted aspect of mind. No sense is intended here of "levels" or "tiers" of rationality since we have no clear basis for distinguishing the relationships among levels. The focus here is upon those aspects of discourse, thought, and action which symptomize rational processes, a focus which issues in a conceptualization of rationality which analysts might well regard as perverse. First, since constructions may consist of both words and feelings—and, correspondingly, since words and feelings may both subsume and be subsumed by one another in a system—rationality is manifested in the discursive and non-discursive realms. I am embracing Langer's
distinctions between these realms, viz., that non-discursive symbols
(i) cannot be reduced to words because they differ in kind, but (ii) are
in no sense inferior or subordinate to verbal symbols because they dominate
many domains of activity which exemplify the highest attainments of
rationality, i.e., the creative arts, fine and productive. Those who
equate rationality with conformity to a priori systems might well grant
the contention that musical 'creation' is an archetypal instance of ration-
ality; that music is an exceedingly complex language is easily enough
granted; and that, like formal and/or symbolic logic, it is a system of
pure form--i.e., having nothing whatever to do with referents--is equally
elementary. Beethoven's nine symphonies changed the language in a manner
analogous, in every sense, I can imagine, to the impact of the Principia
Mathematica. To say that musical composition is somehow not rational be-
cause it cannot be translated into words would be purely arbitrary, from
Langer's perspective, since artistic creation embodies a large part of the
highest attainments of mind.11

Yet, PCT predicts a more fundamental kind of relationship between
discursive and non-discursive elements, viz., the sense in which they
intermingle in construct systems. If verbal constructs can be subsumed
by nonverbal ones or themselves subsume nonverbal dichotomies, then words
have no special status with respect to rational action. I have elsewhere
described the implications of this view for ethical intuitionism, viz.,
that situated social actors behave intuitively--behave as if the intuition
were a real faculty--when affective regnant constructs become taken-for-
granted, unquestioned, unexamined parts of their background awarenesses.
Thus, moral propriety, the sense of the proper order of things, the
"natural outrage" or indignation—which I suspect is a common feeling in the race—reflects constructions which have been developed over time and the progressions of which have been forgotten. Words may give meaning to feelings and feelings may give meaning to words; and these interrelationships may become parts of a person's background, his unexamined and not-to-be-questioned framework, his "animal faiths," as it were. In this way, actors may believe they have "intuition" and behave according to its dictates. And, since PCT assumes that actors construe events more or less differently—no-two persons' systems could be precisely the same—it provides the resource for meeting the objection which analysts have traditionally thought was fatal to intuitionism, viz., if intuition were a faculty, people would universally intuit things similarly.

This position is somewhat akin to that of Heidegger, who grounds the ontological question in mood—that is, angst—although the present formulation does not specify the direction of mood. Also, Heidegger's insistence that epistemology is not relevant to ontological concerns because of its dependence on subject-predicate relations is not an especially happy one from our view. If "nothing" is the contrasting pole of "existence," and nothing cannot be either subject or predicate, and the "existence-nothingness" construct is taken to be an exhaustive dichotomy, then PCT would urge examination of these terms as intended-to, phenomena per se. This is an important part of the sense in which Kelly distinguishes constructs from concepts. Constructs are real; they are genuine data, self-constituted— independent of their content. Phenomena and noumena are not contrasting poles of being. Thus, our formulation is consistent with the (broadly construed) phenomenological program: it is a reflective
theory, focusing on things as intended-to rather than things simpliciter. The "truth conditions" or "validity" of a construct are elements of the system in which it is embedded rather than properties of outside events. Thus, Heidegger's inability to contrast being with nothingness is interesting per se as a construct. It suggests a sense in which the most rational of all questions might be couched in mood. Rationality, then, cannot be reduced to words because verbal constructs may be subsumed by nonverbal ones; and it is "not altogether fanciful to interpret the intuitionist position as merely showing the primacy of the non-discursive."

It is even less clear how rationality can be equated with conformity to logical or rule constituted systems. The proposition that reasoning follows rules is broadly tautologous from our perspective since all thought occurs in systems. Reasoning is movement along and through pathways created by constructs; unless a system is changed, the movement cannot be other than what it is. That an actor's reasoning fails to conform to a priori systems seems less interesting than the study of how he in fact does ground his reasoning--the background awarenesses, assumptions, and taken-for-granted feelings which inform his thought. In this respect, arguments may be especially useful objects of study since more evidence about these background assumptions is customarily provided by the actors.

By the constructivist/interactionist view, rationality resides in the future-orientation, the calculative aspects of action. Mead's view of role-taking is an important feature of this formulation: the ongoing "I"-'"Me" interactions of the social self, the temporary inhibitions of action, and the adaptations of ongoing lines to the demands of others are assumed to be the bases of social life. The capacity to import the perspective of
another is an actor's central rational endowment. More broadly, man-the-scientist predicts the behavior of others vis-a-vis his own lines of action in the same ways that he attempts to predict and control all events. Of course, an implicit personality theory may attribute more complex characteristics to people than to objects--more diverse motives; yet, an actor's system may animate groups, institutions, and even objects with human intentions. Role-taking, then, is a central but not exhaustive characteristic of the future orientation. By no means does this equate rationality with "scientific method" in a positivistic way. The man-as-scientist metaphor does not assume that all men are good scientists, consistent ones, or even especially intelligent; their choices might be toward constricting their fields of vision. Yet, constriction is elaborative--a hypothetical attempt to expand the predictiveness of a system. Thus, I would delete only the reference to "open-mindedness" in Toulmin's statement that "Men demonstrate their rationality . . . by their preparedness to respond to novel situations with open minds--acknowledging the shortcomings of their former procedures and moving beyond them." The view of rationality here makes no value-judgment about open-mindedness: constriction or expansion may serve to enhance a system's predictiveness. Rationality is a correspondingly broadly based idea, manifested in pre-calculation, role-taking, and in the construing of results. Arguments become fruitful objects of study by this view since more experimental assumptions are brought into public view as actors demand additional support and elaboration. My assumption is that naive actors employ implicit theories of argument (much akin to implicit personality theories) which may or may not correspond to formalist systems. While this view by no means
precludes normative evaluations of ordinary arguments, it implies that the starting place of inquiry is the study of how social actors justify and explain their argumentative practices to themselves and their fellows, how they come by their standards, and how they construe a logic's range of convenience.

No conviction-persuasion duality is assumed here: persuasiveness and logicality are not dichotomized, although situated actors may draw such distinctions. The rationality of an argument resides in the system used to judge it; it is not a quality of the interaction which can be abstracted from the perspectives of the participants. An interaction might contain, of course, many serial predications (although the actors might not treat them as a formalist would wish), but it is pointless to isolate predications for purposes of calling them irrational or rational by virtue of their correspondences to a priori systems. An isolated serial might epitomize "irrationality" to a philosopher, but be perfectly logical for the actor who uses it, given the system-in-use. The study of how an actor comes to think of a serial as logical (if he uses that construction at all) is a more fecund enterprise. Again, my assumptions are (i) that arguments provide more public evidence about the developmental history undergirding the logic of a serial predication, (ii) that, just as constructs are distinguished by Kelly from concepts, the logicality of a serial is not a property of the things it represents but is rather a feature given to it by the system in which it is embedded, and (iii) that this formulation does not rule out normative systems or pedagogical criticisms of arguments. Whether it is worthwhile for normative systems to retain the serial predicative notion is an open question. For one thing, surely the study of how
scholars, academics, and philosophers argue is a valid procedure; and insofar as their arguments are informed by formalist assumptions, the sufficiency of their claims can be evaluated vis-à-vis the systems they choose to use. Further, we may ultimately wish to say that the argumentative procedures of trained thinkers are superior to those of naive actors: they produce more rigorous reasoning, their results are more elaborative for the system-in-use, they make better decisions. We need never assume that their logic informs all being, merely that it better serves the systems for which it is employed. Thus, from this perspective, the "fallacy" notion (while it can be used for serial predication), might have a wider range of convenience: a fallacy is merely a construction which does not enhance the system it serves as well as another construction. Constructions become fallacious as they move toward the outer reaches of a system's range of convenience. This use of "fallacy," however, differs from the formalist view to such an extent that an alternative term might be less confusing.

RESEARCH EXEMPLAR

One way of looking at arguments as interactions is through "conversational analysis"—the study of how talk works. This may take on an anthropological character as the study of the ethnography of speaking, a sociological focus such as that found in the work of Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson—a variant of ethnomethodology, and a linguistic focus as the study of discourse and semantics. The idea, common to Sacks and his associates, that the things of interest about talk are "present in the talk" is possibly not a congenial view from our perspective, although these
Researchers have developed an annotational system which overcomes at least some of my objections to the uses of texts. It seems quite clear that the "conversational sample," the tape-recorded arguments in our case, are the raw data of argument research. The researcher and critic are assumed to be "reflective" in that they stand back as far as is possible from the natural attitude; argument criticism becomes, thereby, a process of perspective-taking. The information in the talk becomes symptomatic of the systems which generate it; the object of research is to determine as clearly as possible how the talk is generated out of an actor's systems. Tape recordings and texts can be augmented when possible by interviews, following some of the procedures outlined by Kelly and his followers for PCT. If, as I suspect, there are such things as "folk logics," the object of argument research would be the understanding and detailing of the nature, scope, and functions of these logics--how they affect the talk of situated actors.
The attacks have come from many perspectives. Ethical and epistemological objects appear in Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); and Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). Legal theorists have often described and attempted to bridge the gap between formal systems and legal reasoning. See, for example, Luis Recasens Siches, "The Material Logic of the Law," Archiv für Rechts-u. Sozialphilosophie, 41, Supplement 4, 269-292; many of the essays in H. Hubein, ed., Legal Reasoning: Proceedings of the World Congress for Legal and Social Philosophy, Bruxelles 30 Aout--Septembre 1971 (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1971); and the rules-based approach of Gidon Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality (New York: Macmillan, 1968). Failures to relate formal systems to legal reasoning have been proportional to the efforts expended. As Moerman has said, "I doubt that any of the distinguished scholars who have worked in this field would claim that the gap has been closed, that we can explicate the workings of actual argument, either as well as we can formal logic, or sufficiently to describe how judges reason." Michael Moerman, "The Use of Precedent in Natural Conversation: A Study in Practical Legal Reasoning," Semiotica, 9 (1973), 193-218. This failure, Moerman believes, stems from the
2 I take this to be the classic statement of the analytic position. See, for example, Panayot Butchvarov, The Concept of Knowledge (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Richard I. Aaron, Knowing and the Function of Reason (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1971).


7Ibid., p. 65.

8Ibid., p. 19.


12Willard, "Accounts of Moral Judgment."

My understanding of this group of procedures is largely derived from Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Adjacency Pairs and the Sequential Description of Arguments," Unpublished paper, University of Illinois, 1976. The focus in this paper is on turn-taking, the sequentially indicated turns at talk which inform daily discourse. These are assumed to be the "elementary forms of conversational organization" which become the bases for larger sequential organizations.


Willard, "On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams . . . ."
LOGIC-IN-USE AMONG EVERYDAY ARGUERS: The Rule of First-Speak

by Robert Hopper

Recent trends in argumentation theory increasingly call for a separation of formal logic from attempts to understand how arguments are certified as true or valid. Instead of using the structures of formal logic to certify arguments, Toulmin and his followers call for description of logics-in-use within human discourse.

The present analysis attempts to apply this perspective (ordinarily applied to public arguments and to entire summarized lines of argument) to a more micro level—short, largely implicit arguments among everyday interpersonal communicators. Specifically, my claim is that if a Toulmin analysis of everyday talk is combined with some recent ideas in pragmatic linguistics (especially the work of Grice on implicature) it may provide an accurate description of ways people argue with each other. The first part of this paper sketches an analogy between theories of meaning and theories of argument as a rationale for this combining of perspectives; then the analysis turns this perspective towards a tentative exploration to a rule labeled first-speak.

Logic-in-use in Argumentation Theory

Argumentation, historically, has tried to examine the validity of arguments, or the extent to which claims represent truth. This distinguishes the study of argument from the study of persuasion, which involves examining the psychological effects of claims upon listener behavior or attitude. In seeking truth value descriptions of argumentative discourse, scholars have often tried to turn to logic for tools to certify truth-value or at least validity given a set of premises. The first to do this was Aristotle, who as architect of the syllogism may be considered a founder of logic. From the very beginning, however, Aristotle
noted differences between syllogistic forms, and forms of proof used in rhetorical
discourse. These latter forms of proof were labeled as enthymemes by Aristotle,
and the syllogism/enthymeme distinction underlies a dilemma of argumentation
theory that continues to the present time: If analysis of argument pursues truth
rigorously, it quickly parts company with ways that humans actually do discourse to
seek truth.

Through the centuries, most thinkers have responded to this dilemma in a
prescriptive manner—advocating the use of more logical forms by arguers. Recently,
the trend has changed. Rallying around Toulmin, argumentation theorists increas-
ingly call for more attention to describing how speakers actually do certify claims,
increasingly carrying analysis of argument beyond the constructs of formal logic.

In the *Uses of Argument*, Toulmin describes the kind of reasoning patterns
speakers use to certify claims, and contrasts these with patterns of logic. Parti-
cularly, he notes that claims are connected to supporting evidence by general
(and often presupposed) warrants. In *Human Understanding*, Toulmin deepens his
focus to include scholarly pursuits of knowledge, claiming that each field of
knowledge shows series of arguments operating according to (usually implicit)
field dependent logics. Argument, he seems to be saying, is the mechanism for
expanding human knowledge, and it seems important to examine historical contro-
versies within each field in order to describe how experts in these fields use
arguments to seek truth.

Toulmin's position comes across as an attempt to free philosophy from Kant's
notion of a priori constraints upon knowledge by demonstrating ways that knowledge
generation (in several sciences and other areas of discourse) reflects conditions
and demands of environment. Environment-concept interaction takes place in ways
suggesting a metaphor of "intellectual ecology"—that is, ideas appear subject
to processes of natural selection similar in several ways to the processes organisms
face.
Toulmin attempts to walk a middle-road between idealism and relativism, though his position is more difficult to distinguish from the latter than the former. The main sense in which his stance is not relativistic is that it leaves room for some truth-dependent criteria in the idea-selection process. He hints that this truth component may actually have an a posteriori rather than an a priori genesis, though both terms are not quite appropriate. That is, discourse constructs truths, and is bound by them as if they pre-existed. Applied to the realm of everyday talk, this position shows similarity to the notion of reflexivity as used by Garfinkel to note the property of language to construct the assumed-presupposed background to which it appears to be conforming. That is, language use constructs realities at the same time as they are acted out after the manner of a work of art sculpting itself. Toulmin's position also suggests discussions of reality construction through acting out implications of social consensus, represented for instance by Berger and Luckman's *The Social Construction of Reality*. Finally, a number of thinkers following Scott have claimed that rhetoric is "epistemic" in the sense of providing means for speakers and listeners to seek and certify various social truths.

Observe, therefore, the completeness of the split between formal logic and logic-in-use. It appears to this reader that this split is quite parallel to a split in theories of meaning between truth-value approaches to semantics and pragmatic approaches.

**Truth-value and Pragmatics in Theories of Meaning**

Theorists of meaning face a similar problem to the one described above in the area of argument. The problem of how words, sentences, propositions are arguments come to be meaningful has been subject to almost endless analysis, much of which tries to deal with the problem of meaning by reducing its parameters. Thus, Bloomfield attempted to reduce the province of meaning to reference—a phenomenon
about which some comprehensive account may be possible—at least as it occurs in
single words or active-declarative sentences. Or, consider Katz and Fodor, who
attempted to reduce the meaning of a word to various conventionalized semantic
features. And most recently, a number of scholars pursuing the problem of pre-
supposed implications of sentences, have advocated a “truth-value” test to certify
them. Hence, the sentence:

John has failed the examination.

presupposes that John has taken a particular examination, since that implication
would remain true whether the sentence were true or false. There are a number
of problems with this account (as with the notions of reference and conventionalized
features) including the fact that so-called performative verb sentences seem
impervious to truth value tests. Our concern here, however, is the parallel between
the present literature in presuppositions and that in argumentation. Attempts
to account for argument in formal terms are countered by field-dependent theories
of logic-in-use, because formalizations cannot describe much of what happens in
argument. Similarly in theories of meaning, formalizations such as truth-value
semantics give rise to refutations on the basis of meaning-in-context. In one
such recent refutation of truth-value semantics, Gazdar employs a pragmatic theory
based upon Grice’s notion of implicature. Gazdar claims that semantics must
actually be split into two parts—a formalized inquiry which could maintain a focus
upon truth value, and a pragmatic, context-centered inquiry which could account
for nuances of ordinary language use that logical formulation seems unable to cap-
ture. (Note that Gazdar does not really advocate throwing out the findings of
formalistic schools—neither, in my opinion, does Toulmin-style analysis of argu-
ment really disregard the findings of logic, only supplements them. This indicates a
two-faceted discipline in both argument and meaning, one logic-centered facet and
one context-centered facet.)
Pragmatics and Implicature

Gazdar's analysis focuses upon sets of sentences which clearly reflect different ordinary language meanings, but whose meanings cannot be adequately distinguished through representing these sentences in formal logic as truth-value statements. For example, the sentences:

1. John stole the money and went to the bank.
2. John went to the bank and stole the money.

appear to be indistinguishable according to formal logic representations. They clearly mean different events, however, and the differences can be disambiguated through application of Grice's "orderliness" maxim. That is, Grice states that speaker-listeners share a social injunction to state items in the most straightforward manner, allowing the two sentences above to imply very different sets of events as ordered in normal time.

Since Grice's analysis of implicature underlies much of the second half of this essay, his perspective will be briefly reviewed here. Language games can be described as cooperative in a sense similar to the use of conventions such as driving on the right-hand side of the road or implicitly setting times and places for repeated meetings. Grice develops a "Cooperative Principle" underlying language use within four categories, which appear as sets of generally stated regulative rules:

1. Quantity. An utterance can be assumed to be informative—that is, to provide as much data as required, but not more data than needed.
2. Quality. An utterance can be assumed to be truthful—that is the speaker knows it is true or at least possesses some supporting evidence.
3. Relation. An utterance can be assumed to be relevant to contextual factors—that is related to what was said before, or to a task at hand.
4. Manner. An utterance can be assumed to be perspicuous—that is, to ex-
hibit clarity, brevity and orderliness.

These four categories form an important cooperative backdrop for spoken discourse, although I argue elsewhere that they do not entirely disambiguate sentences, as Gazdar appears to claim. I hope to show that Grice's categories serve as grounds from which hearers infer the missing premises of arguments, and also that they prohibit speakers from uttering arguments with all premises and conclusions made explicit.

The four categories frame utterances by providing topics to use for inferring what has been implied by sentences and arguments—that is, these categories guide the interpretation of implications. Consider the following:

Speaker A: Robert was rude to me yesterday.

Speaker B: Robert has been working hard lately.

Since B can be presumed aware of the injunctions to be informative and relevant, we can infer that Robert's work habits (in B's opinion) contribute to his surliness.

Due to time/space limitations the rest of this essay refers only to the Grice's Quantity category. (I believe similar analysis are possible for other CP categories; in fact the individual influences of each category are often difficult to separate from each other in particular examples.)

Quantity presents some interesting problems for analysis. The other three categories: quality, relation and manner involve judgements based on information clearly available to the speaker.

A speaker presumably can tell whether his/her utterance is truthful, how it is relevant, and whether it is perspicuous. But quantity involves a speaker's guess about how much information the listener

a) already knows.

b) desires to know for his/her own purposes.

c) should know to suit the speaker's purposes.

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Obviously, items a) and b) on this list are better known to the listener than to the speaker. On this basis, one might predict some problems of coorientation when speakers misperceive listeners information state, or when speakers and listeners seek different goals. Consider these examples:

a1) Parent: Where were you tonight?
   Child: No place special.

a2) Parent: Where were you tonight?
   Child: At an orgy over at Jimmy's.

a3) Parent: Where were you tonight.
   Child: At Jimmy's.

b1) Husband: How do you like my haircut?
   Wife: It's ok.
   Husband: Really, now do you like it?

b2) Husband: How do you like my new haircut?
   Wife: It's really ugly, it's shaggy in back, and the sideburns are uneven.
   Husband: Next time I want support, I'll use a jockstrap.

b3) Husband: How do you like my haircut?
   Wife: It's not perfect, but you're still the handsomest man in the city.

The preceding examples point up two kinds of errors a speaker may commit--he/she may utter too little information (therefore not being cooperative enough) or too much information. Only the third example in each group seems to avoid offending the listeners by offering the correct amount of information. I'm not sure why, but it is my intuition that in middle-class USA discourse, the second of these violations (too much information) may be more serious than the first. Try your intuition on the following example.
Son: Mom, I'd like to bring my girlfriend home for the weekend.

Mom: I apologize for my bluntness, but I don't want you to sleep with her under my roof.

Son: I wouldn't have asked to.

Mom: I'm sorry, I guess I didn't have to say that.

This conversation was followed by several apologies from the mother, indicating that she perceived her violation of some principle in making her proscription (which her son could have inferred) explicit. Of course, I do not criticize the mother's choice of arguments as inappropriate—probably this issue was important enough to her to violate the CP, after the style of assertiveness training graduates.

The point is simply that both mother and son shared the intuition that he had uttered too much information.

In sum, the quantity category in Grice's scheme provides a convenient way of describing proscriptions against explicitness in everyday conversation. It would not simply be poor taste to spell out many arguments in detail, as some theorists argue but an important breach of quantity, and therefore of the CP.

Toulmin explicitly compares the survival value of conceptual entities to the survival of organisms. This analogy suggests raising the question of the function of this pragmatic rule of discourse proscribing too much information being given. The rest of this paper speculates that this rule's function is related to power balance between speakers in verbal conflict. I suggest that the person who speaks first as a conflict emerges is in a rather strong power position, and that the proscription against verbalizing too much information is aimed at putting some restraints on the first-speaker.

First-Speak

In an academic debate, the first speaker faces certain obligations (such as a need to provide a *prima facie* case) but these obligations are accompanied by
certain privileges. There is no previous message which the first-speaker must refute, therefore that speaker is at liberty (within obvious limits) to choose the ground upon which the dispute is to be joined. Whatever the speaker asserts carries a certain power to define the situation. Each proposition that the first-speaker introduces places upon the opponent what Ehninger and Brockreide call a "burden of going forward" with the argument. This appears to be a stylized representation of a "Rule of first-speak" operative in ordinary conversation: any proposition explicitly verbalized for the first time in a conflict (perhaps in any conversation) can be taken as accepted by the listener(s) unless some explicit refutation is offered. It may be noted in passing that there is some interplay between this rule of first-speak and Grice's relation supermaxim--"be relevant." That is to say the definition of the situation offered by the first-speaker holds the other speaker to argumentative ground in that the response must be relevant to previous discourse. The rule of first-speak goes beyond Grice's maxim, however, in noting that first-asserted propositions that do not draw verbal refutation can be taken as accepted.

First-speak operates within a set of cultural injunctions highly unlike those in formal debate. Debate procedures promote explicit disagreement in discourse by providing speakers with the charge of confronting each other's arguments. In ordinary talk, by contrast, custom favors conflict avoidance in most cases, to an extent that might support this generalization: Unless there is compelling reason to argue, speakers avoid direct refutation of spoken arguments. This generalization may seem naive to readers who spend much time in New York City, but my intuitions and some descriptive evidence indicate that explicit refutation is quite a rare event in most contexts, and it is undertaken only when a speaker is certain of being correct and thinks that winning the conflict is worth the price.
This state of affairs puts the first-speaker in a strong power position. Any assertion shifts burden of going forward the other side. The second speaker must add to this burden the probable inappropriateness of refutation. In addition, ethnomethodologists have noted that listeners let pass most arguments that are not entirely clear.

The above state of affairs puts the first-listener in a low power position. The first person getting the floor would nearly always get their way under such circumstances unless there also existed rules or norms preventing extreme abuses of the power of first-speaker.

There is some such behavioral regularity (at least a fairly strong norm) providing that speakers rarely verbalize all portions of an argument. A premise of the statement of conclusion is nearly always left implicit. There is more operating here than Grice's maxims of quantity and perspicuity. There is a distinct tendency, which has been noted by most every commentator since Aristotle, for enthymematic proof to utilize implicit premises. One effect of this norm is to provide a more equitable power balance between speakers than would be available otherwise. If a speaker leaves certain premises implicit in an argument, then listeners may search "unoccupied ground" in the dispute to carve out places to stand that do not require direct refutation. If such areas prove available, then the second-speaker may apply the rule of first-speak by being the first party to verbalize their side of the dispute in these areas. As a crude analogy to what I suggest, imagine a formal debate, the outcome of which turns around three arguable points. Imagine further, that the first speaker is forbidden to present arguments on more than two of these areas. Then the listener is left some ground to speak from, and can then turn the rule of first-speak to his or her own advantage.

How the above procedures balance power between speakers can be illustrated with an example of brief argument overheard in a supermarket:
Customer: I wish to return these items for credit; they're not what I wanted.

Supermarket Mgr: These items were not bought here.

Customer: That's all right, isn't it?

Supermarket Mgr: Uh, yes.

This unusual interaction is best understood through rule of first-speak. The customer verbalizes only her claim. Data supporting the claim presumably include the food packages she is trying to return and the assertion that the food was not what she wanted. The major warrant appears to be a general belief that a customer has a right to return unsatisfactory merchandise. Qualifiers to that conclusion would include circumstances under which the customer could not exercise such a right. The Manager counters the claim by taking first-speak on one such qualifier—that the merchandise was not bought in that store. Data supporting that claim presumably was some brand name or price marking. But the importance of the claim was clearly its status as an exception to the customer's argument, hence an implied refutation. This refutation could be represented as the following syllogism:

major premise (or warrant): Merchandise bought in another store may not be returned in this store.

minor premise (or data): This merchandise was bought in another store.

conclusion (or claim): This merchandise cannot be returned here.

The manager's first utterance expresses only the minor premise of the syllogism, leaving the rest implied. In light of the manager's having "lost" the brief argument, one is tempted to speculate about whether his tactic was unwisely chosen. To show that his choice was actually an excellent one, one need only examine what his other alternatives might have been. The manager could have verbalized the major premise, which might have been effective in this case—but the manager had probably encountered numerous past customers who claimed merchandise was bought in the
store even though he doubted their claims. That means that if he had simply
asserted that merchandise not bought here can't be returned here, a counter-
assertion that the merchandise was bought there (first-speak on minor premise to
the customer) would have left the manager only conflict-ridden alternatives to
defeat. To have just asserted the conclusion: You can't return these—would
have been even worse. The customer could then either say "why not?", or worse
yet take first speak on a premise of his or her own choice. If the manager had
chosen to verbalize either premise plus the conclusion, the customer could have
claimed surliness or overkill (unless the manager's mode of presentation was pretty
smooth.) The choice of the minor premise, then, seems the manager's most effective
gambit. It probably would work for all customers who accepted the general belief
that merchandise can only be returned where bought. This particular argument
seems unique because this customer fails to accept a general belief that most of
us do accept.21 Her failure to do so becomes an argumentative strength, however,
when she takes first-speak on the refutation of the manager's (implied) major
premise. According to first-speak, this tactic shifts the burden of going forward
back to the manager, who must explicitly assert his former warrant in order to
refute the opponent's first-speak—or give up the argument. Since the merchandise
is only worth two or three dollars, he chooses to retire from the argument.

Implication and Rhetorical Effectiveness

Any argument is made up of spoken and implied portions. The implied portions
(missing premises or warrants) often are keys to argumentative effectiveness.

Given the above, how do arguers use implication effectively?

There appears to be a rule of first-imply parallel to rules of first-speak:

IMPLIED ARGUMENTS, IF UNDERSTOOD BY THE LISTENER, HAVE FORCE SIMILAR TO SPOKEN
ARGUMENTS. That is, even an implication can shift the burden of going forward
to the other party. But first-speak "trumps" first-assume. That is what happened
in the grocery story example: a premise left assumed by the manager was verbally refuted, leaving the manager with the burden of going forward. But in the usual case, implied premises carry the day. For example, in most cases, the store manager's assertion of a minor premise would result in a customer's withdrawing the request.

Implication as an argumentative strategy has effectiveness which does not appear to be directly related to first-speak, but rather stems from its hidden or presupposed nature. Thus, if one asserts:

The ancient Pawnee practice of healing colds by inhaling the aroma of Eucalyptus leaves seems applicable to your sick aunt.

The listener could easily believe the presupposed (false) proposition that the Pawnee used such a practice. In fact, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary–knowledge that the ancient Pawnee never crossed paths with Eucalyptus, for instance–a listener could be expected to believe such presuppositions. In essence, many implied premises seem to have an "of course" clause attached to them, making them difficult to doubt (or even to isolate conceptually.) As Hutchenson states:

It is through this propensity to adopt the beliefs of others when we do not hold counter-beliefs that one can inform (and misinform) through presuppositions. Presuppositional lying can be extremely effective. 22

On the more macro level of lines of argument and their suppressed-implied premises, scholars have noted a similar effectiveness of implied arguments. Bitzer, 23 for example holds that the suppressed premises of enthymemes are effective because listeners construct their own missing premises out of their stock of conventional values and maxims. 24 Delman goes even further, and asserts that "a politician more persuasively conveys a particular picture of reality when he simply assumes it in terms he uses rather than asserting it explicitly." This is partly because to assert is to subject to more rigorous criticism, and partly because of the apparent assurance that seems to go with presupposition.
This leaves us with the following set of tentative propositions:

1. An implied premise is difficult to analyze and also implies a meta-implication of speaker certainty.

2. If a speaker can achieve goals by leaving certain premises unstated, rhetorical effectiveness is likely to be enhanced. An implied premise transfers a burden of going forward to the other party.

3. Proposition two is increasingly true to the extent that listeners subscribe to the truth of the implicature.

4. A spoken proposition transfers (for that issue) a strong burden of going forward to the other party.

5. If a speaker leaves certain portions of an argument implicit and the other party to the dispute verbalizes a refutation to the implied proposition, this reply ordinarily returns burden of going forward to the original speaker.

6. Explicit confrontation between contrary sets of verbal premises is fairly rare in everyday talk.

The state of affairs represented by these propositions seems roughly analogous to the concept of "latitude of acceptance" in Sherif's social judgment theory.25 A speaker may be well-advised to leave a proposition implicit if he or she believes it will not be refuted. If refutation of a proposition seems likely, however, the proposition would be more effective if asserted.

Therefore, a speaker may enhance impact by taking first-speak on propositions which are most controversial within his or her position, leaving less controversial parts implied. This extends the power of first-speak where it is most needed, and also avoids violation of the quantity maxim by saying too much or saying something that was already known by the listener. That is why effective arguments imply as warrants or missing premises items which are generally accepted by audience
members. This appears to be the first-speaker's tactic when not allowed to verbalize all premises—to allow the respondent first-speak only on propositions that would be difficult to support.

The only counter-example to this principle that I can think of is the practice of "establishing common ground" with an audience that is hostile to a claim. This example also supports the analogy to latitude of acceptance, however. The speaker who employs this tactic does so because he believes his premises would be challenged or misunderstood otherwise.

A final speculation is that the present boom in assertiveness training is based upon the rule of first-speak. A non-assertive communicator is one who accepts the implicata in other arguments as though they had been spoken. Assertiveness training teaches communicators to counter first-imply with first-speak.

The material in the last section of this essay is intended as a small example of logic-in-use in the field of everyday talk. The analysis appears to point toward considering everyday disputes in a way analogous to the ways that Toulmin and Cassirer describe the arguments of scientists and philosophers.
NOTES


13 Grice, p. 47.

14 Gazdar, see note 10.


20 Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited."

21 I tested this intuition with an audience of thirty-five students and colleagues during a presentation of this paper. All agreed, through a show of hands, that they would accept this general value. Additionally, several audience members expressed hostile feelings toward the customer in the grocery store example because she failed to share the value.


THE LOGIC OF THE COORDINATED MANAGEMENT OF MEANING: A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION IN HUMAN COMMUNITIES*

by Vernon E. Cronen

This paper is grounded on the belief that knowledge is communal—the product of interactions in epistemic communities. The author proposes the logic of the Coordinated Management of Meaning (Pearce, 1976; Cronen and Pearce, 1978) as a heuristic device for studying argumentation in human interaction. Relevant features of the Coordinated Management of Meaning theory are presented and applied to selected topics. The logic of coordinated management purports to be a "metalogic" of social action by which scholars may study the various logics in human communities, the avoidance of topics, the escalation of argumentation into unproductive dispute, and other phenomena.

*Note: Portions of this paper also appear in an article in Communication Education, 28 (January 1979), no. 1, pp. 22-38, written by the author and two collaborators, W. Barnett Pearce and Linda M. Harris.
The genesis of this paper was in the rather simple idea that judgments about facts, values, and policies arise in "knowing communities." Collectivities at various levels of social organization (dyad, family, organization, nation, etc.) may be distinguished by the unique ways they organize experience into ways of knowing and ways of acting (Goodenough, 1971). My argument is, first, that opinion change cannot be understood by concentrating attention on public speeches, debates, and media events. Rather, our focus must be on the commonplace, face-to-face talk that occurs in families, in local bars, on the job. I hold with Berger and Luckman (1966) that face-to-face talk manifests powerful processes through which identities are established, decisions made, institutions maintained, and reformed, and "facts" established. The second part of my argument is that the conduct of face-to-face talk is guided by rules which vary from one collectivity to another and within a collectivity, from one situation to another. Recent studies sustain both parts of this argument.

Research under the rubric "Diffusion of Innovations" clearly supports the conclusion that face-to-face talk in the family, community and work group is the predominant process by which information derived from mass media and public events is transformed into relatively stable opinions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1940; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). The process of face-to-face talk seems to be guided by rules which emerge within a collectivity (Watzlawick, 1977). Chaffee and McLeod (1972) have shown how families differ in the extent to which argument on a topic may be pursued, what media sources are used, and how disagreements are to be managed. Communities have been shown to differ in the amount and direction of talk between status-different individuals, (Philipsen, 1975). The "facticity" of information is clearly established within the rules of particular collectivities as shown by the work of Tichenor, Olien, and Donohue, (1976) at the community level, at the
international level by Stewart (1972), and at the formal-bureaucratic level by
Zimmerman (1969). The rules which guide conversation in a collectivity seem to
vary with the episode in which the collectivity is engaged. This idea of the
"field dependence" of rules was first introduced by Toulmin (1958). Since that
time O'Brien (1978) has shown that in formal organizations the informal rules for
assigning meaning to speech acts varies from social to task settings. Kantor and
Lehr (1975) have shown that families do not manage all their episodes the same
way, and Harris (1978) has shown that important differences exist in the rules
which couples use to initiate, sustain and/or avoid conflict. The communal nature
of knowledge and the corresponding system-dependence of knowledge claims has recently
been established as essential for understanding the enterprise of science as well
as for understanding the enterprise of everyday life (Polanyi, 1946).

Acknowledging the communal nature of knowledge, and the concomitant system-
dependence of knowledge claims brings in its wake certain criteria by which we
must judge any logic which purports to be an adequate way of explicating the
processes by which talk is conducted. An adequate logic must focus on communica-
tion praxis. If the creation of knowledge and belief is a function of the ways
people interact, then we will require a logic sufficiently robust to sustain a
concept of communication that does not treat it as an odorless, colorless
vehicle for enthymemes, examples, statistics or analogies. An adequate logic must
also take into account the "relational" meaning of episodes (Fordgas, 1976), and of
messages within episodes (Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967; Watzlawick
and Weakland, 1977). The work of Watzlawick and his colleagues is derived from the
philosophical analyses of Austin (1970) and Searle (1969) and from the field
research of Bateson (1954). One of the central claims of the Palo Alto group,
supported by their clinical research, is that every message contains a "relational"
level of meaning in addition to its content meaning; and that the process of face-
to-face talk is strongly influenced by the ways in which actors take account of the
relational meanings of messages. Consider this statement by a student: "Senator Blitz says 95% of Boznia's oil reserves will be depleted by 1984." In freshman political science class this statement may count as "brown nosing", in collegiate debate as "gamesmanship", in a sorority discussion as "one-upmanship", and in an oral examination as "competence".

It is the central contention of this position paper that the logic associated with the theory "Coordinated Management of Meaning" (hereafter CMM) can serve as the device for exploring the processes by which people give reasons, justify actions, and attempt to persuade others. Space does not permit a detailed review of the theory of Coordinated Management of Meaning. Extended discussion of the theory is available elsewhere (Pearce, 1976; Pearce, Cronen, and Conklin, 1977; Cronen and Pearce, 1978; Harris and Cronen, 1978; and Cronen, Pearce, and Harris, forthcoming). However it is necessary to certain key elements of the theory to facilitate the discussion of argumentation which will follow.

THE COORDINATED MANAGEMENT OF MEANING: ESSENTIAL FEATURES

CMM theory sets forth: 1) a set of propositions about the nature of communication and human behavior, 2) a hierarchical model of actors' meanings which is derived from those propositions, 3) structural models of constitutive and regulative rules which integrate the hierarchy and organize meanings into guides for action, 4) differentia for comparing rule structures, and 5) an account of how logic of conversation is produced by containing actors' rules.

Four Propositions Concerning Human Communication:

The research literature from a variety of disciplines demonstrates the complexity of communication processes and provides descriptions of various phases of those processes. The four propositions below summarize some of this
literature. They are the "raw materials" for a model of actors' meanings.

1. Normal adult humans are at least sometimes purposeful actors, not passive reactors to stimuli. The concept of purpose has undergone a renaissance in scientific thought during the past 20 years. This may be traced to the cybernetic revolution and the development of machines that exhibited purpose-like behavior (Rosenblueth, Winer, and Bigelow, 1943). Later, Delaney's (1962) hypothesis theory and reanalysis of prior conditioning studies (Brewer, 1972) support the position that human learning is an active process in which subjects attempt to establish meaningful explanations of their situation and test those explanations by acting and then observing the neuro-physiological support for this proposition has been generated by the work of Pribram (1976). Together, these findings extend the trend described by Koch (1964) as moving from "behaviorism" to "neo-behaviorism" to "neo-neo-behaviorism" in which each successive retreat reintroduces cognitive or intervening variables into the organism.

2. Meanings are to some degree individual. Two claims are lurking in this proposition: the first is that meaning resides in the perceiving individual and not in the stimulus. The second is that individuals within a culture differ somewhat in their interpretive processes. Research in the "constructivist" tradition established by Kelly (1955) has shown that differences in the content (Kelly, 1962; Lifshitz, 1974; Landfield, 1971) as well as in the number and integration of personal constructs (Crockett, 1964; Dahlia, 1977; Delia and Clark, 1977; Boynton, 1978) are significantly related to such interpersonal processes as role-taking, person processes as role-taking, person perception, and the maintenance of therapeutic relationships.

3. Meanings are hierarchically organized in a series of levels of abstraction. The concept of hierarchical meanings was introduced by Whitehead and Russell (1927) as the "Theory of Logical Types" and by Wittgenstein (1961) as the problem of reflexivity. The implications of hierarchy for communication were first realized by
Bateson (1954) and his disciples, and extended in the clinical work of the "Palo Alto Group" cited earlier. Hymes (1974) has recognized that variables at several levels of abstraction such as intonation, position in an interactional exchange, and social relationships.

Studies of person perception have demonstrated that the process is not amenable to simple averaging or summing operations (Delia, 1976). Rather, the process seems to involve a tacking back-and-forth between specific traits and a holistic image such that change in one attribute may alter the overall impression which, in turn, contextualizes and redefines the meaning of other specific traits (Delia, 1976; Peabody, 1970).

The work of Rommetviet and Carswell (1971) and their colleagues shows that subjects seem to organize their knowledge and assign meanings to messages by referring to a mol· unit of meaning such as a cognitive "model" of a greeting episode and matching individual messages to the molar unit of meaning.

Meanings are organized temporarily. Shank (1975) has shown that the intelligibility of messages is dependent upon communicators' sharing an unexpressed script. Clarke (1976) has offered data that show subjects ability to predict what a message will be is a function of their knowledge of the temporal sequence which precedes it. Finally, Rauch (1965; 1974) using multivariate information theory techniques, has found that the ability to predict the next speech act in a sequence is a function of both the temporally antecedent act, and the molar unit of analysis—the situation in which the human actors are performing.

The Hierarchy Model of Meanings.

The rules which guide action are composed of people's meanings. We suggest representing the structure of people's meanings as a hierarchical model shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 about here
Level 1. Constructions are the cognitive process by which individuals organize and interpret the world as perceived: "the creative capacity of the living thing to represent the environment and not merely respond to it." The existence of constructs explains why events do not account for experience; an intervening filtering interpretive process generates the meanings of experience.

Level 2. Construction systems are the beliefs and purposes produced by constructs, organized into clusters which are hierarchically related to particular beliefs. Studies of person perception have demonstrated that perceptions of a person as a whole are based on perception of his/her attributes, but that once the molar percept is formed, attributes are reinterpreted.

Level 3. Speech acts are those things which one person does to another by saying something; such as "you are beautiful" counts as the speech act "compliment." There are many communicative events which are better understood as "performatives" rather than "declaratives" whose meanings are acts rather than referents. Some theorists think that all messages invoke meaning on both "content" and "relationship" levels, with "relational" meanings comprising speech acts.

Level 4. Episodes are "communicative routines which communicators view as distinct wholes, separate from other types of discourse, characterized by special rules of speech and nonverbal behavior and often distinguished by clearly recognizable opening or closing sequences." They appear as patterned sequences of speech acts and establish the fields in which the rules governing speech acts exist.

Level 5. Life scripts are patterns of episodes, comprising the person's expectations for the kinds of communicative events which can and probably will occur.

Each of these levels is hierarchically related to the others in this way: the higher level meaning contextualizes and defines the lower. For example, an aspect of the "big, buzzing confusion" may be perceived either by the construction "strong-gentle" or "strong-weak," in which the meaning of "strong" is not quite the
same. The construction actually used depends on the person's organization of
construction systems, in which "strong-gentle" may be a part of a part of one
cluster and "strong-weak" of another. If the perception of, e.g., the Departmental
Chairman shifts from one construction system to another, the meaning of his perceived
"strength" will change as a function of different constructs. Similarly, the meaning of "you S.O.B.!" differs as a function of its definition as the speech act
"friendly greeting" or as "insult," and this determination, in turn, depends on
the location of the statement within an episode "friendly chat" or "personnel
evaluation." In each of these instances, the greater freedom to vary is at the
lower level: given a particular episode, e.g., "friendly chat," there are any
number of ways to perform the speech act "greeting"; but the interpretation of
each of these statements is radically changes if the episode is redefined as
"personnel evaluation."

Communication Rules: The Organization of Meanings

Theorists in a variety of disciplines have suggested "rule" as a descriptor
of the facts that 1) social action exhibits regularities even though persons can
behave in capricious or disruptive ways; 2) persons critique others and are held
accountable for their actions in a way in which inanimate objects are not; and
3) persons perceive an "oughtness" or "expectedness" in their social actions,
sometimes so strongly that they report--quite contrary to the facts--that they
"could not" do other than they did, or that they had "no choice". A rule, unlike
a "norm", may but need not be socially shared. Difficulties may arise when one
individual does not know the rules used by another. Conventionally, two types of
rules are differentiated: constitutive and regulative.

Constitutive Rules. Constitutive rules specify how meanings at one level of
abstraction may count as meaningful at another level of abstraction. For example,
"you are beautiful" counts as "compliment." The sensitive reader knows, however,
that "you are beautiful" in some cases counts as sarcasm or insult rather than
compliment, thus we note that constitutive rules occur at all levels of hierarchical meaning. For example, in the episode Playing the Dozens, a game played by urban Black youths in America, a derogatory comment about Other's mother counts as "gamesmanship" rather than "insult," and to interpret it as an insult is to "call off" the episode.

The primitive form of a constitutive rule may be algebraicized as shown in Figure 2. This primitive form specifies that in a certain context, if specific antecedent conditions are satisfied, then meaning at one level of abstraction counts as meaning at another level of abstraction. For example, constitutive Rule 1 in Figure 2 should be read: In the context of the episode "playing the dozens, if is the opponent's turn, then an insult to my mother and an insult to my father both count as 'gamesmanship.'" In "playing the dozens" both players must share constitutive rules 1 and 2 among others.

Constitutive rules do not guide behavior. Rather, they integrate the hierarchy, showing meaning at one level of abstraction counts as meaning at another level.

Regulative Rules. Regulative rules guide sequential action and thus exist in only levels 3, 4, and 5 of the hierarchy of meaning shown in Figure 1. The form of a regulative rule may be algebraicized as shown in Figure 3.

The primitive form specifies that in the context of certain forms of social action, if given antecedent conditions obtain, then there exists some degree of force for or against the performance of subsequent actions. The primitive form further indicates that within a context of social action if an antecedent condition is followed by specific action(s), then some consequences will follow. For example, regulative rule 1 in Figure 3 should be read: In the episode of playing the dozens, if the opponent insults my parent, then it is obligatory to top his/her last insult in order to avoid the consequence of losing the game. Regulative rules
are cognitive reorganizations of constitutive rules. Figure 3 shows how a regulative rule is built of two constitutive rules.

Figure 3 about here

**Differentia for the Assessment of Rule Structure.**

Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the structural variations that may exist within the primitive forms described above. However, the following list indicates the types of structural variations.

1) Temporal extension of rules. While actors can construct episodic units of meaning they do not always do so. At times we may act like novice chess players articulating our acts to immediate antecedents and immediate consequences.

2) Range of legitimate action. A specific rule may legitimize a wide range of action choices or, conversely, obligate a single specific act.

3) Act-antecedent linkage. The antecedent condition may "require" a specific responsive act with varying degrees of force. For example, a friend's hallway greeting may strongly obligate a reciprocal greeting, legitimate but not obligate sports talk, and prohibit an intensive self disclosure.

4) Act-consequent linkage. An actor may perform a specific act because he/she feels it to be more or less necessary to bring about consequent act(s). Of course, not all acts are articulated to particular consequents. Some come to be functionally autonomous (Allport, 1937) and are performed on the basis of the antecedent, episode, and lifescript that are salient to the actor (Cronen and Pearce, 1978).

5) Act-episode linkage. The performance of an episode may require some acts with greater force than other acts. In rituals the episode exerts an obligatory force on almost every act.

Logic: the Intermeshing of Rules

The logic of a communication system is produced by the joining of the rules of both (or all) of the communicators. The logic works in this way: A message produced by one person is interpreted by the other's constitutive rules. These construed meanings then function as antecedent conditions of the interpreter's regulative rules, bringing various amounts of "logical" and "practical" force to bear on particular actions. The act selected is expressed in a message according to the constitutive rules and, when interpreted, becomes the antecedent condition of the other person's actions. Depending on the nature of the rules, the sequence of actions produced by the communicators may appear "forced" and consist of repetitive patterns (such as greeting rituals or all-too-familiar conflict patterns between spouses) or may feel open-ended and full of opportunities for choice (such as the berating freedom and novel behavior of a vacation trip). Logic cannot be disassociated from metaphysics and epistemology. The logic of CMM assumes a universe that is a hierarchically organized open system as described by Bertalanffy (1968) and Harré (1972). It incorporates an epistemology consistent with the four preceding propositions. The key conception of hierarchically organized meaning intrinsic to this logic is a fundamental departure from aristotelian logic. Aristotle's syllogism requires a major premise—that is an aggregation of particulars. The generalization "all men" in the famous syllogism about Socrates in no way contextualizes and redefines the meaning of an individual member of the class. As a higher-order contexting of molecular unit alters the meaning of the lower order units. Aristotle's rejection of hierarchical recontexting is made explicit in the Physics (225b 14-15) and in his famous dictum "A thing cannot be both A and not A." The logic of CMM is also non-Aristotelian with respect the episode-dependence of its rules. The rules a family uses for resolving conflict with the children may not resemble those employed when arguing the merits of Jimmy Carter. Thus, the proposed logic
is "field-dependent" in Toulmin's sense and also in certain ways not treated by Toulmin. Toulmin's "fields" of argument are only defined by content and ignore relational aspects of context. I would contend that the rules a college student uses for debating the political merits of Carter with his/her parents at Thanksgiving dinner will not necessarily resemble the rules used for the same topic with his/her roommate. For this reason I prefer to call the logic "episode-dependent."

Toulmin's position is extended in yet another way by the logic of CMM. The rule structure proposed here can vary within the basic form. Thus, the structure as well as the content of the logic is context dependent. The rules used by a good salesman, for example, would probably exhibit a range of alternatives for action and strong act-consequent linkages, while the rules employed by two people who feel "locked in" to an episode of symmetrical escalation probably exhibit low range of alternative actions, and functional autonomy. A final distinguishing feature of this logic is its operators. Because it is intended to function in the interpersonal realm of social action the operators are not those of existence ("all A's are B") but of "oughtness." The particular operators we employ were originally introduced by von Wright (1951).

APPLICATIONS: ARGUMENTATION IN HUMAN COMMUNITIES

The theory of the coordinated management of meaning implies two sets of research questions for students of argument who wish to study how individuals justify values and argue about policies. One set of questions focus on the content of rules and the other on the structure of rules.

Argumentation and the Content of Rules

Content refers to the meaningful units at several levels of abstraction which are organized into constitutive and regulative rules. What follows is not intended as a thorough survey but only examples of the kinds of questions which could be addressed using CMM as an approach to the study of argumentation.
The Legitimacy and Meaning of Justificatory Acts. In every dyad, group, or collectivity there are occasions for setting forth assertions and justifying them. The kinds of justifications adduced vary tremendously, and we have no taxonomies of justificatory acts that enjoy wide-spread acceptance in our discipline. Indeed, it may be that no single taxonomy can be developed that can be applied across wide cultural differences. In spite of these problems, a field study was conducted last year under the author's direction by several of his honors students. The study was designed to investigate these questions about argumentation and persuasion: (1) Do social collectivities vary in assigning meaning to justificatory acts? (2) Do the meanings of justificatory acts vary across episodes within a collectivity? Two on-campus groups, the debate union and a sorority were chosen for study because they afforded easy access. As part of this study observers used a modification of a classification scheme for justificatory acts based on the work of the Wenzel (1975) and Nowell-Smith (1954). The classification scheme is composed of four categories:

1. Appeal to the ineffability of experience (e.g., "I don't know...it just seems right to me somehow").

2. Appeal to social expectation (e.g., "We should like it because we're UMass students.")

3. Matching to criteria (e.g., "We should support him because he is liberal, experienced, and supports lower fees.")

4. Projection of future effects (e.g., "A union of undergraduate students will produce undesirable consequences X and Y.")

As part of the project, student observers obtained those constructs which group members used to define the collective self by employing the construct generator developed by Harris and Cronen (1977) and identified key episodes within the groups.

Both groups discussed campus politics but the meaning and legitimacy of justificatory speech acts varied significantly in the two groups. In an episode of political talk debaters seem to employ these rules:
Life script of a good debater

Episode of political talk

any point in the episode → (that which cannot be clearly expressed → illogical, not of any value)

Life script of a good debater

Episode of political talk

any point in the episode → (failure to verbalize experience → being illogical, not a debater)

Life script of a good debater

Episode of political talk

asked to justify candidate preference → (prohibited, appeal to ineffability of experience) → avoid being cast as not belonging

The most common construct employed by debaters to define themselves was this one: "Logical-illogical"—with the "logical" pole carrying the positive valence. To perform acts which count as "illogical" is to place the self outside the group. Thus, experienced debaters employ regulative rules which prohibit appeals to the ineffability of experience. Novice debaters who have not learned this rule soon learn that experienced debaters have consensual rules which legitimate various forms of exclusionary behaviors toward those who are "illogical" and those do not "belong." Debaters, as a subculture, insist on the verbalizability of any experience in the political domain. The sorority members also engaged in episodes of political talk. However, appeals to the ineffability of experience did not carry the relation implication that
the speaker did not "belong" in the group. In the sorority the kinds of justificatory speech acts chosen in political episodes did not seem to carry obvious implications for defining the collective "we."

The implication of "illogicality" from an appeal to the ineffability of experience did not hold across all episodes for the debaters. In an episode of discussing social dating debaters could use this appeal without the negative implications. What was important to certify one's "belongingness" was "being logical" in particular episodes which were seen as closely related to the group's self-definition.

**Topic Choice.** It is not surprising that sorority members and debaters differed significantly in the frequency with which they discussed various topics and the duration of talk about topics. The more interesting implication of this common phenomenon was brought to my attention by my colleague Linda Harris. Harris (1978a) suggests that collectivities will spend more time in episodes in which members know how to affirm the group's ideal identity and the individual's status within the group. For example, the debaters we studied clearly knew how to "be logical" in certain episodes and being logical was a vitally important aspect of group identity. Debaters know a number of messages that clearly count as "being logical" for significant others in the group--such as citing statistics, quoting technical sources, presenting facts, etc. But how would debaters act "logically" in the discussion of a value question where these acts do not clearly entail a claim about a value? In the discussion of abstract value questions, statistics, technical sources and facts are not likely to be sufficient. It is hard for a debater to know how to talk "logically" on this sort of matter since no consensus on how to do it exists. In fact there seems to be a real paradox involved. One constitutive rule for argument calls for "relevant" messages. That is, messages must show connections...
between supporting materials and a claim about the proposition—the claim must seem to be somehow entailed or implied strongly. Debaters, however, are sophisticated enough about argument to sense strongly the existence of an is-ought gap when the essential claim must be the affirmation or rejection of a value proposition. They seem to further sense that the kinds of statements which they take to be evidence of "logicality"—quoting facts and figures, historical examples, and authorities—do not bridge the is-ought gap. The result is that dealing with a value proposition poses a paradox if debaters continue to work within these four firmly established rules:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument about a Proposition</th>
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<tr>
<td>at any point with the episode</td>
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<th>Argument about Proposition</th>
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<td>any point in the episode</td>
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Debaters avoid the paradox by retreating to an Aristotlian world when dealing with policy propositions. That is, they assume the universality of certain American values (e.g., less cost, saving lives, avoiding war) and limit argument to the best means for achieving these ends, not about the ends as values (Aristotle, Rhetoric). Thus, debaters limit their topic choices to areas in which they know how to affirm their identities in action without producing paradox.

Alignment to Systems of Thought. A number of scholars have called attention to the fact that people have access to several systems of thought—sometimes called cognitive styles. These systems of thought embrace both content and rules. Hewitt and Stokes (1975) discussion of "quasi-theories" is instructive. When two conversants align themselves to a shared quasi-theory they accept (1) a common root-metaphor (e.g., "politics as game"), (2) a set of constitutive rules for organizing meaning (e.g., policy stands count as "tactics"), (3) constitutive rules for how to make inferences from one meaningful unit to another (e.g., an analogy between political behavior and some aspects of a sporting contest permits the claim of functional equivalence), and (4) regulative rules for the conduct of talk in an episode based on the quasi-theory (e.g., if your candidate who supports your view is insulted, it is prohibited to show offense, or the consequents will be to appear a "sore-head").

Skill in argument, I contend, requires the ability to work within the root-metaphor, organized content, logic, and legitimate speech acts of a system of thought. However, this knowledge is not in itself sufficient. The conversants must also know the rules for how to align to the intended episode and how to realign to other episodes if they desire. Optimally competent conversants would have the ability not only to work within and align to
existing meanings and rules but also to negotiate new systems of thought upon which future episodes may be based (Harris and Cronen, 1977).

Before leaving the subject of alignments to systems of thought it is important to underscore the relationship between logic of CMM and conventional logics. CMM provides a superordinate framework for observing the orientation of conversation to particular logics. It is assumed that mankind possesses a number of logics for organizing meanings (Stewart, 1972) which are appropriate depending upon the episode and culture. Compare, for example, these two regulative rules:

episode of professional talk among scientists of the positivistic tradition

| challenged to | obligatory (show deduction of hypothesis derived) | satisfy request and show one's membership in the community of positivistic scientists |
| show how your prediction was derived | |

episode of religious talk among fundamentalists

| challenged to | legitimate (draw analogy to scriptures) | satisfy request and show one's membership in the community of fundamentalists |
| show how your prediction was derived | legitimate (appeal to personal revelation) | |

Argumentation and the Structure of Rules

Structure refers to the six differentia set forth earlier in this paper. Again my purpose is not to survey the range of possibilities, for space does not permit it, but again only to suggest the potential by way of examples.

Interpersonal Power and Temporal Extension. We do not assume that all conversants have a hierarchical representation of action at the episode level that is sufficient to give them power equal to the other member of the dyad. An apt analogy may be found in the game of chess. In chess, for example, the
the novice player thinks only in terms of small units such as threats to a piece or opportunities for capture, while the expert has a whole game punctuated into episodes of opening moves, middle game, and closing moves which contextualize and give meaning to individual moves. A descriptive study of door-to-door sales techniques suggests that the ability of the salesman to contextualize actions in terms of long-range episodes from greeting to sale gives him or her a significant advantage over the customer who operates with short term contexts. Two regulative rules functioning for customer and salesman respectively are those shown below:

Customers Regulative Rule:

chatting about family topics

[asked if wife's time and effort are important to you and wife is present] (obligatory (affirm her worth and importance of her time and effort)) [preserve solidarity of relationship with spouse]

Salesmans Regulative Rule:

episode of "sales pitch"

sub episode of chatting about family

[wife is present] (legitimate (inquire of husband about the value of wife's time and effort)) [husband is obligated to affirm value of her time and effort. His affirmation can be used later to make cost of product look reasonable]

Note that the salesman must count on two things: (1) the customer must hold the rule that obligates affirmations of his wife's value and hard work as in shown above; and (2) the customer must recognize the "family chat" as a
separate episode not as a subroutine of the whole "pitch" because the affirmation may not be obligatory if the customer recognizes the salesman's speech act as a sales tactic.

The point of this example, of course, is that power differences can be the product of asymmetry in the temporal representations of the episode.

Unwanted Repetitive Patterns. Many researchers have reported that the efforts of individuals to conduct meaningful argumentation often degenerates into conflict spirals or nag-withdrawal cycles, or advice-demure-request-advice patterns (Walton, 1969; Watzlawick, et al., 1967). Hall (1977) reports that each culture seems to exhibit "action chains"--or unwanted episodes--that conversants seem to enact over and over again and which they report to be out of their control. It is possible to analyze these unwanted patterns by means of the differentia for rule structure. Recently we completed a study of unwanted repetitive episodes (Cronen, Pearce, and Snavely, 1978). In this study it was found that over 50% of the variance in subjects' perceived enmeshment in such unwanted repetitive episode could be accounted for by structural variables and the valence consequent acts. It is hoped that the structural variables will provide an analytical tool for determining what speech acts are likely to trigger unwanted episodes and prevent individuals from enacting useful episodes of reason-giving discourse.

SUMMARY

The logic of the Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) is an attempt to recognize the communal, interactive character of knowledge and knowing. It recognizes the need to account for the relational implications of arguments and communication praxis. The logic presented here entails the explicit assumption that human beings can orient to a number of subordinate logics (syllogistic,
analogical, right-brain pattern recognition, etc.) each imbedded within a system of thought. In making the foregoing statement, the logic of CMM lays claim to the role of a superordinate heuristic device that cuts across cultural differences. Finally, it must be recognized that the logic of CMM is itself an outgrowth of recent reformulations in epistemology and metaphysics. The "corpuscularian" view is implicitly rejected in favor of an open-systems perspective, and associationism is rejected in favor of the new epistemology being developed from the work of Bateson and Bruner.
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Figure 1: A hierarchy of meanings
Primative Form of a Constitutive Rule:

\[
cR = \frac{MC_k}{A \supset [MC_i + MC_j]} \]

where:
- \( A \): antecedent conditions
- \( MC_i \): meaningful construal at abstraction level "i."
- \( MC_j \): meaningful construal at abstraction level "j."
- \( MC_k \): meaningful construal at abstraction level "k."
- \( \supset \): read "count as."
- \( \Rightarrow \): read in the context of...
- \( \supset \): read "if ... then"

Examples of Constitutive Rules:

\( cR_1 \) = episode: Playing the Dozens

- opponent's turn \( \Rightarrow \) insult to my mother \( \Rightarrow \) gamesmanship
- insult to my father

\( cR_2 \) = episode: Playing the Dozens

- opponent insulting my parent \( \Rightarrow \) top last insult \( \Rightarrow \) obligatory

Figure 2: Constitutive Rules
Primate Form of Regulative Rules:

\[ rR = \left[ A \supset (D \supset (A \supset B)) \right] \supset C \]

where 
- \( rR \) = regulative rule
- \( A \) = antecedent condition
- \( D \) = deontic operator (obligatory; legitimate; irrelevant; prohibited)
- \( \supset \) = read "if ... then"
- \( ACTN_i \) = read as "action": a class term for specific speech act(s) or extended episode(s)
- \( ACTN_j \) = meaningful construction of social action at a level of abstraction ("j") higher than that of the ACTN component "i."
- \( C \) = consequent conditions

Examples of Regulative Rules:

\( rR_1 = \) episode of Playing the Dozens

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{opponent} & \supset (\text{obligatory (top last insult)}) \\
\text{my parent} & \supset \text{avoid losing}
\end{align*} \]

\( rR_2 = \) life script of being a brother

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{younger} & \supset (\text{legitimate (engage in episode of playing the dozens)}) \\
\text{other} & \supset \text{maintain status in the group} \\
\text{initiates} & \supset \text{status in the group} \\
\text{playing the dozens} & \supset (\text{legitimate (scoff at that "kids game"))}
\end{align*} \]

Derivation of Regulative Rule From Constitutive Rules:

\( cR_3 = \) formal dining episode

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{at table} & \supset \text{prohibition} \\
\text{slobbering soup} & \supset \text{prohibition}
\end{align*} \]

\( +cR_4 = \) formal dining episode

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{at table} & \supset \text{prohibition} \\
\text{slobbering soup} & \supset \text{unintelligent low class rude}
\end{align*} \]

\( -rR_5 = \) formal dining episode

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{at table} & \supset (\text{prohibited (slobber soup)}) \\
\text{(prohibited (slobber soup))} & \supset \text{avoid being construed as unintelligent, rude and low class}
\end{align*} \]
Figure 4: Logic of Conversation Formed by the Interlocking of Two Person's Rules
Conversational Arguing: The Transparent Structure Of Characterizing, Reasoning, And Making Sense Of Things In General

by Leonard C. Hawes

1.0 Introduction. The charge of this seminar is to address the question, what are the alternative philosophical groundings for looking at argumentation as a way of knowing? What does it mean to assert that argumentation is a way of knowing? Most would agree that knowing is experiencable in a variety of ways. For most people most of the time, one knows that one knows. And one knows it. One may not be able to recall all that one knows, but one can recognize what one knows. Furthermore, one knows one can recall and recognize.

1.1 The validity of our common-sense, practical knowing situates us in a mimesically valid world. Mimesis translates, roughly, as self-imitation or presence-in-motion. Inasmuch as arguing is performed in and through the structure of conversing (see 2.0), and conversation's distribution of turns (see 2.1) usually is transparent (see 2.2), the performative structure of arguing can be characterized as the transparent structure of conversation. Arguing is mimesically valid insofar as it's performative structure remains presuppositional and beyond question and doubt.

1.2 I intend by way of knowing an action "in" space/time, not an atemporal, transcendent phenomenon (see 2.3). A way of knowing is action whose performance discloses and repairs doubts
in the presuppositional foundations of documentary reality (Smith, 19).

For many Westerners, arguing is one such conventional way of knowing; it is a way of identifying errors, correcting mistakes, formulating information, and shoring up incorrigible propositions (Pollner, 1974) against the encroachment of unbridled cynicism and outright madness.

1.3 The essay unfolds as follows. Inasmuch as we shall be looking "to" argumentation "through" conversation, conceptual definitions of selected analytic tools are provided (2.0-2.3). Next, a transcript of a thirteen-turn conversation is provided (3.0). To learn how the arguing—displayed through the transcript—is accomplished, the analytic tools (2.0-2.3) are used to interrogate the transcript (3.0). The products of such interpretive work are preliminary sketches of thirteen features of arguing as conversationally performed in a typical way (4.0-16.1).

2.0 Conceptual definitions. Two or more member talk is organized in conversational form. Conversation is defined as at least two members, each of whom takes a minimum of one turn, the utterance or non-utterance of which addresses a specific other(s). Conversation, as the performative structure of arguing, is characterized as the transparent distribution of space/time open to acoustic/kinesthetic movement. Sounds and movements inscribe space/time as a turn's talk. Beginning to talk not only announces an attempt to take a turn, but is how a turn is sustained.

2.1 Conversation organizes talk in accord with turns transparently manifesting themselves only in their being-taken. To take a turn presupposes that others will not, or should not, do
so simultaneously. If, in beginning a turn, members discover two
turns in progress, invariably one member stops talking thereby
relinquishing a turn to the other. The orderly sequence of taking
turns is possible only to the extent that members presuppose a
covenant of sociality. Giving a turn obligates getting a turn.

To give and take turns is the process, presupposition, and product
of sociality: it is to recollect and see. Without recollection
and seeing, both of which presuppose time, the promise of subsequent
speech would be meaningless. The organizing properties of turn-
taking would collapse. Conversation is constitutive of sociality
by taking-place (Gadamer, 1975); conversation's taking place in
and through the distribution of turns and their constitutive talk
and non-talk evidences trust in the very sociality it presupposes.
To trust is to re-collect a past as grounds for seeing possibilities
disclosed in a present turn's talking.

2.2 Turn, as a noun, is self-reflexive; it is visible only
in relation to it's semblance. To take a turn presupposes at least
one other prior turn, or the possibility of at least one subsequent
turn. Thus, to take a turn is to orient one's past and one's
future. The order and symmetry of that orienting is turn-administered
and turn-monitored. One's conversational competence evidences
itself in and through the acoustic/kinesthetic performative inscrip-
tion re-collectable as taking-a-turn. Much as a transparent overlay
organizes, without obscuring, that which it covers, turns organize
talk without obscuring that which they distribute. From this
point of view, the purpose of conversation is to be without purpose;
it conceals itself thereby making room for that which takes its place—the apparent content, substance, or topic.

### 2.3 Talking removes us from a pre- or non-linguistic existence and gathers us together in sociality. By distributing talk among members, conversation organizes the gathering of sociality. In doing so, however, conversation presupposes a distanciation; a here of a speaker and a there of a listener. Furthermore, here and there are not stationary locations; a speaker's body is a mobile locus of intentionality. Conversation, then, presupposes both time (past, present, future) and space (here, there). As conversation unfolds in time, its locus of space alternates with speakership. In its unfolding time and alternating space, conversation—as that which inscribes the immanence of sociality—itself is transparent.

### 3.0 Specimen of arguing.

What follows is a transcribed sample of audio-recorded two-member conversation. The members are two female university students role-playing female university roommates "working out a complaint". I shall focus on how this conversation distributes talk such that it is heard as an argument and its resolution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turn #</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Line #</th>
<th>Transcribed Talk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Well, do you think? ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>I think that maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>we should make a couple of compromises with stuff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>You know how ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>you know how your stuff,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>your junk is always on my bed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(pause)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Okay

Well, I was wondering, do you think you could just keep your junk on your side of the room?
(pause)
Do you think that's a fair compromise?
(longer pause)

That wasn't worded very nicely.

Why not?

Well, I don't know why I don't know why you think that my stuff is always on your side of the room.

Because my bed is my side of the room, you know and your, your bed is your side of the room and my bed is my side of the room.
(pause)

Okay, I.
I don't really agree but that's all right.

//Uh

Well, wait. If you don't agree, then we should talk it all out.

No, no, okay, okay. I'll try to keep my stuff off your bed, but I don't do it on purpose.
I don't use your bed as a . . . as a . . .

Oh, I know you don't it's just like, you know, I'll come in to sit down on my bed and there will be all this junk on it.
(pause)
And it's just that I don't know where to put it 'cause it's not mine and I don't know where it belongs so
(pause)
it's, you know
(pause)
if you could just keep it on your side of the room.

Okay, Susan
(laughs)

Okay

(laughs)
3.1 Where to enter the transcribed conversation is an arbitrary choice. Of necessity, any portion of the analysis is interdependent upon both prior and subsequent portions. The numbered paragraphs are to facilitate access to earlier and later analyses relevant to the particular point being developed. Certainly, a point of analytic entry influences the sequencing of component interpretations; it does not necessarily influence the analyses' collective coherency. We shall enter the transcript at its very first lines.

3.2 R, in [L1], begins formulating a question but [L2] does not furnish the missing object of the verb "think". Instead, [L2] can be read as an assertion the proposition of which is not yet apparent (as of [L2]). The proposition emerges in [L3]; "we should make a couple of compromises with 'stuff'." Is a necessary condition of arguing that at least one utterance be hearable as a proposition? Can the communicative phenomenon, arguing, be constituted in the absence of at least one propositional utterance? If no speaker asserts or declares, how does an argument begin? What are the characteristic features of conversing hearable as arguing? The following paragraphs assemble interpretations capable of approaching such questions.

4.0 Characterizing. To characterize is to locate, situate, put in(to) perspective, instruct proper interpretation, add needed emphasis, and diminish that which is out of perspectival proportion. Consider [Ls4–6]; a thing is first characterized as "stuff" and re-characterized as "junk". Furthermore, it is "always on my bed."
Read the (pause) of [L7] as evidence that initial characterizing is completed (see 6.0). The (pause) at [L7] and the non-existence of a (pause) at [L3] are instructive inasmuch as pauses are a most apparent transition-relevance place at which turn-transfer may occur. Notice in [L8], G self-selects for speakership with a minimal post-pause utterance, "Okay". Read [L8] as granting permission for H to continue talking.

4.1 What are some turn-taking options available to G in T2? The repertoire of options open at any turn is an open set. Suppose G simply is oblivious to clutter; she might have said, "I don't think I understand". Or, G might have disagreed with H's characterizing of G's "stuff" as "junk". An appropriate conversational time/space to disclose such reservations might be in the turn immediately adjacent to the turn containing the utterance of the problematic characterization. But [T2] does not inscribe any of those possibilities. Rather, [T2] can be read as inviting H to characterize further.

4.2 If [Ls4-6] are read as formulating conditions and accomplishing the characterizing in and through the interrogative mode, then [Ls9-11] can be read as explicating the problematic nature of the prior characterization of conditions. Notice that the problem is not apparent in the conditions [Ls4-6] until their problematic-ness is disclosed in [Ls9-11]. The conditions set-up the problem, which, in its simultaneous turn, indexes the conditions capable of being characterized problematically.
4.3 The (pause) of [L12] can be read as conversational evidence of G's apparent willingness to allow for either silence or H's continued talking. [L13] is evidence of H's self-selecting to continue developing [T3]. If one reads the "that's" of [L13] as indexing [L9-11]—and perhaps [L4-6] as well; although there is no clear evidence of the latter interpretation—then a very clear instance of characterizing is apparent. By using a pro-term to index prior utterances, those prior utterances can be characterized sensibly in an indefinite number of ways. Arguing, from this point of view, is the simultaneous existence of two or more characterizations of purportedly the same person, place or thing.

4.4 Constraints of economy to remain within a given collection of categories (see 7.0) until further notice (see 12.0) are reinforced by sociolinguistic constraints. Certain membership categorization devices (Sacks, 1972) are appropriate to certain speaking registers and not others. Thus, characterizing must not only proceed consistently by remaining within the domain of the same device, but it must be performed in and through the same register.

4.5 What it is the speakers are in the process of performing is first characterized in [L3] as "compromise". Talking about—i.e., characterizing—that which is about to happen (in and through talking) as "compromise" is never challenged (unless the "That" of [L11] is read as referencing "compromise"). Thus, what they are in the very movement of doing is taken to be "compromise". Other possible members of the collection of categories of which
"compromise" is a member category might be "bitch", "discuss", "argue", "complain", and so forth. Characterizing that which is about to happen as "compromise" constrains that which is now possible; we are acting in the name of one category and not another (Duncan, 1962; Mills, 1940). By characterizing what is happening, epistemological clarity is purchased at the expense of ontological possibility.

4.6 [L42] is an artfully diplomatic characterization. Notice the problematic locus is now characterized as "'cause it's not mine", rather than, "do you think you could just keep your junk on your side of the room?" The pronouns re-formulate the conditions from H's space/time rather than "yours". Notice also that the conversation can be edited severely (e.g., delete [Ls20-36]) and still be internally consistent and externally coherent. How can a conversation display its own internal consistency? As one brief answer, we shall track the natural history of characterizing (at least partially) in the transcript.

5.0 Tracking characterizing. Consider [Ls10,11]. Now read [L47] as a more "nicely worded" re-formulation or re-characterization. What is "nicer" about [L47] compared to it's initial formulation of [L10,11]? The most notable difference is that [L10] characterizes problematic things as "junk" (read pejoratively) whereas [L47] characterizes the problematic things as "it". Using a conversational convention for locating pro-term referents (i.e., an appropriate pro-term referent is it's nearest immediately prior relevant turn-constructional unit), tracking the appropriate referent for
the pro-term "it" of [L47] takes us back to the "it's" of [L45]. But the latter is a different order of pro-term. The referent of "it's" indexes something more or other than problematic objects; it can be read as indexing the entire conversation as "it is" coming to be. The pro-term "it" appears again in [L43]; here, read "it" as indexing the same thing(s) as the "it" being tracked. [Ls42&41] also contain a variant of the pro-term of concern. Read [L39] as the noun the "it" pro-terms are indexing—"junk". Interestingly enough, [L39] contains a pro-term "it" which is not read as indexing "junk". By applying the same conversational convention (see 5.0), the "it" of [L39] indexes the noun "bed" of the immediately prior line [L38].

5.1 Notice the distance traveled in the indexical tracking of pro-term referents. It may be that the more deeply imbedded the appropriate pro-term referent is "in" prior talk, the more muted it's hearing. The use of pro-terms can also be read as conversational evidence of memory.7

5.2 G's agreeing to "compromise" with H, in [L33], characterizes the problematic thing(s) as "stuff". In [L39], the problematic conditions re-formulate G's "stuff" as "junk". Given the conversational pro-term convention, H formulates the solution as a request avoiding a characterization of the thing(s) which might result in more turns to adequately characterize the nature of the thing(s), or other persons and/or places that may be formulated or re-formulated in the process.
5.3 Prior conversational turns are necessary, apparently, for subsequent pro-terms to disclose eventual characterizings as agreement. Inasmuch as tracking difficulties are known to happen, however, misunderstandings are an ever-present resource for formulating reasons warranting the undoing of the prior agreement and re-opening it through the performative structures of arguing. Built into the indexical relation of pro-term to referent are the very grounds both for doing and undoing agreement.

6.0 Pauses. Notice the different conversational displays of (pauses):

1. the absence of a pause following [L3];
2. the pause of [L7];
3. the pause of [L12];
4. the pause of [L14].

Read [L7] as a transition-relevance place. In taking [T2], G may object to "compromise" as an apt characterization of what they are doing so far; it is not yet apparent what H co-promises. Only G's situation is characterized (i.e., "stuff" as "junk") thus far. It may be that G formulates [T2] as permission to continue, inasmuch as both sides of the "compromise" are not yet in evidence.

6.1 Read the (pause) of [L12] as a transition-relevance place; an appropriate conversational space/time for G to display understanding of H's prior utterances. Such a turn might also be an opportunity to lodge a complaint either about H's characterizing of "stuff" as "junk", or about H's characterizing a one-sided
proposition as a "compromise" (instead of, say, a complaint, favor, or suggestion).

6.2 In [L11], H stops selecting self for speakership and G does not self-select. Silence is accomplished. H eventually reformulates the prior turns' talk as compromise. H, by not self-selecting to continue, thereby displays insistence on the non-speaker self-selecting for next convention of turn-taking. Eventually G does self-select; but [T15]'s utterance remains problematic.

6.3 Consider the (pause) of [T14]. H, as current speaker, ends [11] and apparently waits for G to self-select next speakership. However, G does not engage the non-speaker self-selects option, nor does current self-select to continue. The recognizable product of this recursive monitoring is a (pause) rather than it becoming G's pre-turn (pause). Disclosed is G's apparent lack of acknowledging the implicit problem of action and condition characterized in [L38,39]. In [L41-43], H characterizes the problem explicitly--such characterizing may be read as reasoning (see 9.0).

7.0 **Membership categorization devices.** One convenient analytic tool for systematically approaching the notion of characterizing is membership categorization device (MCD). Sacks (1972) defines it as a collection of categories and a set of rules for their coherent use. "Sacks' concerns are with solving the conversation problem of how appropriate Members are located in times of personal trouble. An adequate MCD is capable of categorizing every object (i.e., person, place, thing) of a sample into..."
at least one category of at least two different collections of categories.

7.1 A device constrains how a person, place, or thing comes to be characterized. Any characterization must be heard as internally consistent to be taken seriously (Silverman, 1974a, 1974b). To remain internally consistent is to characterize in accord with the principle of economy (Sacks, 1972); presume characterizing develops in-terms-of member categories from the same collections, until further notice (see 11.0).

8.0 Member-analysis. Now we shall return (from 6.2) to the problematic referent for the pro-term "That" in [L15]. Perhaps the conversational convention that a pro-term indexes it's nearest prior appropriate referent is violated or suspended momentarily (see 5.0). What would such a momentary suspension accomplish? It is one method of doing member-analysis; commenting on rather than elaborating the emerging topical talk. The comment abruptly characterizes what's-going-on differently from the historically developing characterization. Stated differently, to comment-on is to locate an unfolding action "in" a different perspective (i.e., characterization).

8.1 Try reading [L15] as a comment not on it's nearest appropriate prior turn, but as a comment on all that precedes it. Such a conversational accomplishment might itself be characterized as reflecting on; the locus of intentionality is outside the action characterizable in-terms-of the operative MCD. It is a stopping of conversational space/time by standing outside it and
thereby being unable to inscribe acoustic/kinesthetic movement "in" a next expectable turn. Current speaker has vacated the expectable next turn; a normal turn is takable inasmuch as it it being taken from the expectable to the reflective. Language is, by definition, reflexive and indexical. To shift focus (or commentary, or reflect on), one is shifting both indexical and reflexive foci (see 7.0, 7.1). To reflect is to comment on a collection of categories—rendering the entire collection as but an instance of (i.e., member category of) a broader MCD disclosed in and through the comment—rather than to elaborate any of the member categories from within the collection. To be methodical and systematic about reflecting is to be a member analyst and/or critic.

8.2 On occasion, when appropriate in our everyday practical affairs, we analyze our own talk and the talk of those with whom we converse. Such analysis is instructive, irrespective of what is being formulated topically as the talk being about. That is, member analysis—and professional analysis, for that matter—disrupts the expectable unfolding of characterizing by uttering a comment whose hearable relation to what-is-going-on is no longer transparent (see 2.2). A practical conversation problem is now apparent.

8.3 Given the interpretational credit we extend to others, if topic relevance is under suspicion of being violated, clarification will be sought prior to an outright accusation of violating topic-relevance conventions [unless an argument is already in progress and heated (member term for conversations whose turns are short, closely spaced, frequently overlapping, and loud)].
Member-analysis utterances may be heard as disruptions inasmuch as they open up a different perspective (i.e., MCD) and horizon of possibilities (i.e., member categories and newly discovered combinations). By itself, untied in any apparent way to prior turns' talk, a member-analysis utterance is difficult for a next speaker to either make sense of (Munch, 1975; Heap, 1976; O'Neill, 1974) or to ignore. Not to pay attention to or not to notice apparent conversation problems is to risk being heard as unresponsive and/or dull. It behooves a non-speaker to acknowledge a prior turn insofar as topic-relevance conventions hold at all normal times and places for all normal speakers.

8.4 B, in [T5], is obliged to re-solve the now apparent conversation problem made apparent by member-analysis. The member-analysis of [L15] may be read as a critique of prior wording (i.e., how prior talk characterized what it was about). But which specific component(s) of prior characterizing are being critiqued is not apparent. [L15] evidences only the evaluative conclusion of the critique. [L16] then becomes evidence for such an interpretation.

9.0 Reasons. To ask a question is to assert the right to obligate a hearer to answer in accord with relevance expectations. H's question of [16] presumes the right to obligate G to account for (i.e., formulate plausible reasons) [L15]. If [L15] is heard as member-analysis—specifically, the conclusion of an unfavorable critique of prior characterizing—then there must be reasons for the negative criticism if it is to be taken seriously (Silver-
man, 1974a, 1974b). The quantity and quality of reasons one is expected to develop in accounting for a characterization may be a constitutive feature of status, power, influence, reverence, respect, and so forth. It is plausible to suppose that the more powerful a member, the fewer the number of members who assert the right to ask a question (of relevance, or any other kind). Consequently, few members oblige the speaker to formulate reasons and to be accountable. Such a member is relatively free of the responsibility of the obligation to answer questions of relevance in and through the formulation of accounts as reasons.

9.1 Read [T6] as a technically correct performance of an acceptable second pair-part to a question/answer adjacency pair. G does not characterize conditions such that plausible reasons can be identified to account for the negative criticism [L15]. Instead, G asks (pragmatically, not grammatically) H to formulate reasons for H's characterizing of conditions. G not only does not take advantage of the right H provides by obligating G to answer, but returns unused the right to H (by asking H for reasons). A defensive interpretation of [Ls17-19] may be warranted to the extent space/time was available for inscribing reasons for newly characterizing conditions. Instead, G asks H for H to formulate reasons.

9.2 In [T7], H oblige G's interrogative presumption by formulating a reason. In prior talk (i.e., prior to [L20]), "bed" and "side of room" had been components of the characterizing of conditions as sufficiently problematic to warrant a "compromise".
In [L20], H resolves apparent prior ambiguity as a present reason. Conversely, the present reason is visible only insofar as it discloses the problematic conditions it proposes to affect.

9.3 Read [L34] as an instance of reasoning. G characterizes conditions as not-reasons or not-purposes. Conversationally, [L34] works similarly to a set of directions consisting of elaborate—and sometimes intricate—descriptions of persons, places, and things to treat as not relevant or meaningful. They are directions formulated in and through the negative rather than the positive (Schegloff, 1972).

10.0 Problematic pro-term. G's [L15], at first reading, sounds problematic. The referent for the pronoun "That", in [L15]'s, "That wasn't worded very nicely", is unclear. It may index the same referents as the "that's" of [L13]. If so, the "that's" of [L13] indexes [Ls9-11]. But which portion of [Ls9-11]—and possibly [Ls4-6]—does [L15]'s "That" index?

10.1 If "That" references the characterizing transforming "stuff" [L5] to "junk" [L6&10], then [L15] is placed inappropriately in the conversation. Like laughter and certain conversational reparations, characterizing reparations must be lodged at the next available transition-relevance place. Such an interpretation argues that [L15] may have been located more advantageously for G at [L8], in place of that turn's "Okay". It may be incumbent on non-speakers to challenge characterizing inadequacies at the next available transition-relevance place. To violate this maxim is
to be vulnerable to subsequent criticism of being a defective conversational partner,

10.2 If a characterization is formulated and not challenged, it is presumed accurate and appropriate. It is treated as a corrigible proposition (Pollner, 1974), until further notice (see 11.0). It may be that the further from a characterization it's complaint occurs, the more elaborate and overt is the indexing required to render it's form understandable and sufficiently precise for the practical purposes at hand (see 12.0). From such a perspective, [L15] is at least a partial violation of that maxim. It does not sufficiently index "That" which it is about (i.e., that which is "... not worded very nicely"). Read [L16] as evidence of that interpretation. But it is an equivocal piece of evidence.

11.0 Further-notice. Read [L15] as constituting further-notice. Such further-notice be comes-apparent when the performative mechanisms of conversation cease being transparent and come to visibility in the form of practical conversation difficulties. Specifically, [L15] constitutes such a practical conversational difficulty inasmuch as the referent of "That" is not clear. [L16] constitutes evidence of [L15]'s problematically imprecise formulation,

11.1 Further-notices have to be good ones to disclose mistakes. A further-notice must be both an internally consistent and externally coherent story. It must also resolve problematic ambiguities thereby laying the groundwork for the inevitability of subsequent such ambiguities. New stories become mimetically valid and old stories get transformed into mistakes, errors, and
faulty reasoning.

12.0 **Intention.** The characterizing of "purpose" remains unformulated outside [L34]. Purpose and/or intention are formulated "in" the characterizing conditions such that accountability is a warrantable conclusion. Read [L35], "I don't use your bed as a . . . as a . . .", as characterizing intention in and through listing member categories; for example, laundry hamper, chest of drawers, book shelf, waste basket, and so on. However, G's apparent difficulty in evidencing a reason in a collection of categories precludes—at least "in" this space/time—the development of a perspective from which "purpose" can be revealed.

13.0 **Equivocating.** G's [T8] appears as concession; [L25] appears as acceptance of H's reasons of [T7]; [L26] apparently disagrees; [L27] apparently discounts the disagreement of [L26]; [L28] apparently agrees inasmuch as laughter and reparations are placed immediately subsequent to the laughter's object or to that which reparations repair. Brief statements of agreement also may need to follow immediately that by which they are referenced. "Mm hm", "ya", and so on, may be heard as indexing the talk of the immediately prior's turn. Given the analysis to this point, [L28]'s "Okay", may be read as affirming it's immediate prior [L27] which, in it's turn, can be read as disconfirming the lack of agreement condition.

14.0 **Closure and disclosure.** Technically, [T9] is a conversational opportunity for H to hear a transition-relevance place and punctuate [T8] such that agreement be comes-apparent.
[T9], however, is stronger evidence for the contrary interpretation. Rather than presupposing closure, [T9] presumes dis-closure.

14.1 Consider some practical advantages of H's presupposing dis-closure rather than closure in [T9]. Had H presumed closure, G, in [T10], may then dis-close the presumed closure as premature thereby obligating H to provide additional reasons. Rather than being conversationally situated to exploit premature closure by making visible H's accountability, G, in [T10], agrees to "try to keep my stuff off your bed" [L33].

15.0 Storifying. Consider [T11] in light of how [T10] is terminated. H might have suggested candidate member categories to assist G in listing exemplars. Instead, [T11] presumes knowledge of the collection yet unspecified and also presumes the non-relevance of the as yet incompletely characterized "purpose". Read [T11] as a story. The story is a synthesizing of prior characterizations of people, places, and things. To the extent the story is sufficiently broad to be inclusive of the facts as they be come-known, the story is the way things really were (which, of course, presupposes the way things really are), until further notice (perhaps in the form of some apparent inconsistency). Stories, in constituting further-notice, have the ontological potential of dis-closing mistakes, errors, defective reasoning, blame, fault, and so on.

15.1 [L26] discounts G's nascent characterizing of "purpose" [L34], then from [Ls37-46], H storifies. Read, "It's just like, you know", [L37], as conversationally similar to "once upon a time"
is read as introducing a story. It announces what is to follow
as an analogue. To be a good story, characterizing must set the
scene, formulate conditions such that problems and circumstances
can be come-apparent, and provide for re-solution of problematic
circumstances. [L37] announces a story; [L38] describes action
and [L39] explicates conditions.

16.0 Arguing and knowing. Finally, consider how the
conversation begins and ends; there is a boundedness to the
argument. Perhaps an argument is bounded by the first and second
pair-parts of an adjacency pair (such as, suggestion/acknowledge-
ment; criticism/acknowledgement; insult/acknowledgement; and so
forth). The arguing is that which re-characterizes the first
pair-part such that it's second pair-part can be provided in
agreement with the re-characterized first pair-part. Arguing,
from such a perspective, becomes the negotiated characterizings
of the way things were, are, or will have been—really; or at
least until further-notice. Of course, further-notice is character-
izing at variance with the way things are presumed to be.

16.1 Arguing is a fundamentally practical, inevitable,
ontologic/epistemetic activity. Arguing is the storifying of
characterizings. The mechanics of distributing the unfolding
of the story's development—when two stories are being developed
simultaneously—is the performative structure of arguing. It is
the performative structure of arguing that can be brought to
analysis in and through interrogating the phenomenon from a
conversational point of view.
Notes

1. The three volumes of *Paideia* (Jaeger, 1939, 1943, 1944) can be read as Jaeger's attempt to disclose the mimetic validity of classical Greece in terms of the civilization, culture, tradition, literature, or education (modern concepts for that which is more than their synthesis—Paideia). The three volumes become a translation of that Greek word.

2. For a phenomenological treatment of kinesthetic movement and body as lived-experience, see Merleau-Ponty (1973). See also Pilotta (1978).


4. I am using the phrase covenant of sociality as an admittedly crude gloss of Schutz's (1967) work, particularly chapters three through five; pp. 97-214.

5. Pollner develops the simultaneous accomplishing of process, presupposition, and product in relation to mundane reasoning as a way of knowing. The ontologic and epistemic are undifferentiable at this level of analysis.

6. I owe the transparency analogue to Pilotta (1978).

References


RHETORICAL ARGUMENT AS REDUPLICATION:  
THE EPISTEMIC CONNECTION 
by Thomas B. Farrell

Both arguing and knowing, whatever their other connections, involve some orientation of human consciousness. The person who argues is, whether intentionally or not, an epistemic creature—one who knows or would know in some manner. And, argument itself may be viewed as a reflective emblem of consciousness. Joseph Gabel’s classic study of reification views certain types of political argument (reversal of antecedent and consequent, for instance) as revealing a morbid rationalism of false consciousness in the knower. Yet, an even stronger claim could be made, and will be explored in this essay. If epistemology is seen as a method, it may be that there are as many different ways of knowing as there are of arguing... and no more. For if a person is to know, consciousness must reflect upon itself. There is no knowledge without reflection, and surely no reflection without argument. Rather than attempt to prove this encompassing claim, I assume it here, so that three related matters may be considered:

first, the peculiar reflective (or 'redoubling') character of rhetorical argument, as an epistemic construction;  

second, the substance of knowledge generated by rhetorical argument. 

third, some connectives for extending the epistemic form of rhetorical argument.
The above matters are approached with some hesitation, given the magnitude of difficulty confronting fields of epistemology and argumentation. As the outline of Toulmin and Rieke well evidences, the disjunction of epistēmē and technē tends to restrict knowledge to the "things" of the world, while returning argument to contemplate either the internal consistency of its premisses or the desirata of syntactics. Under such a rubric, both substance and form are reified. Belief, too, is displaced; it becomes either another phenomenon to be operationalized, or an instrumental adjunct to the "merest" of rhetorics. In beginning with the discursive constructions of rhetoric, we might give prominence to neglected matters of conviction and conduct, while pursuing the distinct knowledge embodied by rhetorical argument. First, I turn to the assumptions imposed upon the world by viewing rhetorical argument epistemically.

i) Rhetorical Argument as Epistemic Discourse

The discourse of rhetorical argument does not begin in an attempt to represent or depict an orderly accessible world. Unlike the mimetic impulse of the classical productive arts, the initial impetus for rhetoric is a disruption, a sharp discontinuity in the world of our acquaintance and interest. Whether such discourse is viewed instrumentally; as problem-solving, or magically, as animate appreciation, rhetorical practice continually moves beyond itself. It seeks the prospect of its own extension in the conviction and action of self and audience. Such a conception of rhetoric adds to the contemplative view of knowing one that is both active and communicative as well.

Rhetorical argument, as an active mode of discourse, is also a type of communicative utterance. Yet here, too, a qualification must be
noted. For rhetorical argument is a special type of utterance. Although such argument requires, like all communication, at least the implication of a hearer, rhetoric does not simply appear, in serial form, as the discrete temporal successor to a previous conversational fragment. Unlike, let us say, the answer to a question or an acknowledgement of greeting, rhetorical argument not only occurs in the diachronous sequence of discourse, but would also take "precedence over," or transcend subsequent discourse as well. This dual capacity to make historically discrete claims, as well as the claim to explain, appropriate or accommodate subsequent and contiguous discourse is what I mean by the reduplicative character of rhetorical argument. Moreover, the mode of knowing implied by such argument finds confirmation neither in external correspondence nor internal consistency, but rather in the capacity to overcome and reconstitute the implied subsequent resistance of an other.

Consider, as one example of this phenomenon, the rhetorical argument from inherency. Although there are many views of this argument, one ordinary version offers premises of a claim attributing problems to a serious and continuous structural defect. Yet in the midst of this discourse a second and larger claim resounds. No matter what subsequent attributions, explanations, or alternative recommendations are directed toward the problem, these alternatives will all be encompassed by the single structural defect lodged in the initial claim. Even as the argument turns outward, urging policy action, it anticipates and accommodates subsequent resistance through the duality of its claims.

Now although rhetorical argument constitutes an unusual mode of discourse and communication, it does not therefore follow that argumentative
reduplication is found only in the traditional rhetorical arenas of conviction and social conduct. As many a systematized constellation of thought, scientific, philosophical or religious, must extend itself outward, discourse will redouble in the anticipation of forthcoming resistance. It is possible to locate rhetorical arguments in any number of places, without thereby extending disciplinary jurisdiction to every frontier. As the mediation of knowledge through anticipated audience thought and action, however, only rhetorical practice places its entire complex of discourse at stake with each reduplicative extension of argument. When the stakes are this formidable in science or religion, we shift paradigms or lose faith. Both are rhetorical acts.

In the position sketched thus far, the discursive relationships of rhetorical argument have been employed to suggest a distinct type of epistemic confirmation within the ongoing continuity of discourse itself. One may yet wonder if such a view does not reduce what is known to the sheer intricacies of verbiage. Even in the Classical tradition, of course, 'substance' appeared first as a category. But if rhetorical argument is generative of 'knowledge,' we may inquire as to the status of the creation.

ii) Epistemic "substance" in Rhetorical Argument

In an earlier project, I suggested that rhetorical argument both posits and creates a type of 'knowledge' stipulated as 'social.' Social knowledge has since been interpreted with primary attention to its presuppositional anchorings, and with only occasional reference to the incipient or potential character of this knowledge. Yet what is known socially can hardly be said to "exist" prior to and apart from someone's construction. That such constructions are usually products of partisan
interest should not invalidate them, or remove them from our careful consideration. Central to any such consideration, of course, is the formative role of rhetorical argument.

Even if we were to begin with the most concrete objectification of noematic realms—some combination of Peircean "secondness" and Bitzer's rhetorical situation—we have yet to identify anything that is "known" rhetorically. To so identify rhetorical "substance" (and qualify its meaning), we must introduce the inferential movement of argument as the active communicative discourse described earlier. An exigence, a brute actuality, an extreme urgency, all seem to require the horizon of tacit and subsidiary social norms and principles in order to provide initial impetus and 'facticity' (i.e. semblance of fact) to a rhetorical encounter. Yet social knowledge would remain subsidiary and tacit, were it not for the transformational capacity of rhetorical argument. Such argument actualizes social knowledge premisses by requiring their conscious application to generalized human interests. The movement I am describing is not unlike Peirce's concept of abduction; that inferential movement demands the articulation of previously unspoken premisses so that the unusual or striking particular may be deliberated. Regularities of interest, norms of conduct, principles of duty and obligation cannot be considered substantive in a sense analogous to the materials of normal science. Yet these premisses, however general, may be said to acquire "substance" through their propriety or pertinence to the ongoing evolution of reasoning consciousness. There may be more specific field-dependent determinants of expertise on conjectural issues of arguments;
but the substance of rhetorical argument may appeal to no more decisive arbiter than the interest-dependent relations of an historical community. The mere allegation of such a warrant, however forceful, could never count as proof, were it not for the similar fidelity expressed by argument itself. Whether anticipating resistance, or positing an enlarged and unknown agreement, rhetorical argument does not wait for the historical verification of its epistemic product. Rather, argument assumes the actuality of its knowledge in the very act of positing some norm or rule of pertinent interest. My own earlier example of rhetorical controversy is ample illustration. In the exploration of social knowledge, I employed the traditional construct of stasis as a periodic juncture of rest for consensus attributed by rhetorical discourse in social controversy. Upon later and less morbid reflection, however, the structure of controversy appears to be anticipated by the initial moment when argument articulates the premises of "knowledge." As we have seen, this moment is reduplicative. In giving focus to conjectural, definitional, qualitative issues, I direct an attributed consensus to premises supporting my concerns and simultaneously regard these premises as a substantive foundation for further argument. Whether the implied sequence of subsequent argumentation conforms to "reality," will be determined by the delicate interplay of arguers themselves. We may yet offer some assistance to this process, however, by more closely attending to those devices allowing for the extension of argumentative "knowing" in the social arena.
iii) Some Epistemic Connectives

Earlier in this statement, I expressed concern at the apparent disjunction of argument and knowledge. Perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence of such segmentation in the classical tradition. While Aristotle's Organon, for instance, is an enlarged compendium of argument types, it is also a discursive chronicle for the various ways of "knowing," assembling materials, interrelating them, extending them, and so forth. It may be that Neoclassicism appropriated an unnecessarily restricted sense of logos from the ancients and replaced their modes of construction with the constructs themselves as a priority for inquiry. By returning to the classical origins of argument, we may sense again the compass of its epistemic vision, while sketching some directions for applying this vision to a more fragmented social world.

In a sweeping and suggestive study entitled, "Symbols, Myths, and Arguments," Richard McKeon includes within the traditional conception of argument, "... all kinds of calculation." And, in a provocative extension, McKeon writes:

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It is a mistake to suppose that 'myths' or the accounts of happenings deal with particulars in a peculiar sense distinct from the generality of 'arguments,' that is, of discursive inferences from premisses ... . The construction of an argument concerning particulars depends on the establishment of premisses from causally related particular instances, the construction of a likely story depends on the use and suggestion of causes to relate the incidents or the parts of the narrative plausibly.
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Here may be an implied directive for the epistemic concerns of argumentation theory. McKeon makes the expected linkages between Platonic dialogues, historical dialectics and the "likely stories" of mythic argument. But then he adds: "Myths are narratives which construct particulars in
discourse—persons, institutions, events—by means of sequences and structures which may have the universality of recognized necessity or probability. The scope of this definition—terminology notwithstanding—should be familiar to students of rhetoric. The structure of myth argued rhetorically, could provide one conceptual avenue from the "flow sheet" to the world of historical events. But how might these enlarged "social calculations" be argued?

Let us suppose that an ideology, rather than being a formal pattern of arguments, or a psychological condition, is a loose constellation of discursive connections. Moreover, in the interests of stability, these ideologies, as systems of discourse, strive for continuity in the ongoing flow of time. They must reduplicate themselves. If these suppositions are granted, then the rhetorical argument of ideology is apt to consist in a series of "likely stories," rather than the formally explicit reconstruction of inferential patterns. Moreover, if these discursive constellations are to reduplicate themselves, then it may be possible to formulate—within argumentation theory—rule-like devices allowing for the appropriation and reconstitution of subsequent discourse.

One fruitful source for devices of reduplication is the Aristotelian topic, accident // definition. In McKeon's reconstruction, this is a range of conceptual associations, where terms and ideas may be combined. 16 Yet I have noticed recently that much of what we might call "revisionist" discourse (from conspiracy theory to the interventionist critique of foreign policy), includes devices for anticipating discrete particulars or exceptional "accidents" so that these may be reconstituted as an ongoing part of the likely story. According to one interventionist critique
offered by Norman Podhoretz, for instance, the resignation of Richard
Nixon was the result of a liberal, isolationist assault on the power of
the Presidency—an assault, moreover, which resulted from McCarthyism in
the fifties and which is associated (in a later article) with everything
from drugs to homosexuality. What has happened, in discourse such as
this, is that the purely categorical relationships of the Aristotelian
topic are "horizontalized" so as to appropriate and accommodate tem-
porally sequential events. The actual "unpacking" of reduplicative
devices in operation is an important, but as yet uncharted project. Thus
far, I have found Foucault's four devices of similitude (convenientia,
aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy, in The Order of Things) and also Burke's
"casuistic stretching" to be helpful reconstructive instruments. Even
such potentially incompatible paths as these must invite our careful
attention.

The preliminary implication of this statement may be to raise
unsettling questions. To name but one, our radical removal from worldly
realism underlines the problem of judgment in argument, and the spectre
of a fragmented social world repeated itself endlessly. Yet the epistemic
view sketched here requires at least that the discourse of others be heard
and appreciated before it is appropriated. An arena in which such
mutuality is possible remains, in theory, at least, the best defense
against critical interruptions.
Notes


2 The concept of "reduplication" recurs throughout the work of Michel Foucault, most specifically in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 53-67. Although Foucault does not restrict reduplication to rhetorical practice, and no such restriction is claimed in the present statement, I do confine my attention to rhetorical argument for the purposes of illustration.


4 The reference here is not only to the breakdown of the classical ontology, but also to the discontinuities marking theories of contemporary rhetoric. Bitzer's rhetorical situation begins with an imperfection marked by urgency. Burke seeks identification for rhetoric precisely because there is division.


6 Aristotle, Categories, 41a 25-30.


10 Charles S. Peirce, "Abduction and Induction," Philosophical Writings, Ibid., p. 151. It should be noted that, while abduction has never been considered a valid form in reconstructed logic, Peirce's device would seem to describe a means whereby both norms and striking particulars could be confirmed through their mutual propriety.
11 Farrel, op. cit., p. 10.


14 McKeon, pp. 18-9.

15 McKeon, p. 21.


17 From a series of such articles, I have drawn the following two: Norman Podhoretz, "Making the World Safe for Communism," Commentary, 61, April, 1976, pp. 31-42; and Norman Rodhoretz, "The Culture of Appeasement," Harper's, 255, October, 1977, pp. 25-33.


19 The suggestion here is that all argumentative discourse may be assessed according to its capacity to continue itself in a world where many others are simultaneously talking. Reduplication is not possible without the inclusion of others. The alternatives are forceful exclusion (terrorism) or silence. Some evidence that the discourse of interventionist critique may be approaching an "end" was a recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal, (August 23, 1978, p. 20) attacking "isolationist" George McGovern's suggestion that America somehow intervene to halt "genocide" in Cambodia. After the expected amusement at this irony, the Journal wrote, in part: "One of the few good things to come out of the sordid end of our Indochina campaign was a period of relative silence from the people who took us through all its painful contortions. They should have the grace to maintain their quiet for at least a while longer." However "likely" the story told by interventionists may be, a mode of discourse that excludes even its recent "converts" from the right to speak invites a rather forboding future.
Less and less frequently do contemporary theorists and philosophers posit inductive or deductive ideals as epistemological models which are obvious or self-evident. To argue against these ideals seems tantamount to flailing already dying perspectives with an all-too-deadly arsenal of assembled arguments. In contrast, the notion that knowledge can be best understood within the historical framework of human inquiry and creativity seems to be enjoying increasing acceptance. More exactly, one of the most appealing epistemological assumptions is that knowledge is somehow sired, born, and nurtured within the context of specific disciplines; the study of knowledge, then, is a study in the evolution of ideas, concepts, and claims to know.

One of the problems with the "evolutionary" perspective on knowing is that there is no such thing as "the" evolutionary perspective: there are several. Moreover, and relatedly, the potential role of argumentation in evolutionary views of knowing may well vary with the particular interpretation of "evolution." What seems obviously the case is that the "evolutionary" perspective serves an analogic, rather than a philosophical, role in describing the advance of knowledge. In this essay, I shall attempt, first, to discriminate among various evolutionary perspectives; second, to outline briefly a philosophical perspective from which to understand the role of valuing in "purposive" knowing; and finally to specify the systematic functions of arguing values in purposive knowing.
Alternative "Evolutionary" Perspectives on Knowledge

First, it is important to survey briefly the sense in which there are several evolutionary perspectives on knowledge. Pre-Darwinian theories of biological evolution—traditionally traced to the botanist Lamarck—served as a ground for early perspectives on the growth of knowledge. Just as these evolutionistic theories of biology emphasized the controlling power of the Cosmos, evolutionistic perspectives on knowledge interpreted the growth of knowledge as the unraveling of a Cosmic plan. The advance of knowledge was assumed to be at the behest of Divine purpose. With the advent of the Darwinian terms of "selection" and "survival of the fittest," misinterpreters of Darwin misapplied the principles to the growth of knowledge. In their view, what we might call claims-to-know became knowledge because of their survival value or simply because they survived. The purpose of advancing knowledge was to ensure the survival of knowledge—and perhaps mankind—in its best form. One of the problems with this perspective is that the universal value of survival came to be treated as the secular counterpart of God's Will.

The reason for these misinterpretations, as Toulmin and others have argued, is that they omitted the critical issue of Darwin's populational analysis. The populational factor makes clear that evolution—in biology or knowledge—can occur in different directions according to local variations and selection. Kuhn, even when he retracted his much attacked theory of revolutionary knowledge advances, still remained ignorant of the importance of local variation and
selection; he aligned himself with an evolutionary perspective, but argued that the growth of knowledge was irreversible and unidirectional. Toulmin, in critiquing such views, says that "our own descriptions of conceptual change as 'evolutionary' have implied only that the changes from one temporal cross-section to the next involve selective perpetuation of conceptual variants . . . ." without, he adds, any notion of long-term, unidirectional change or a larger Cosmic purpose.

When this contemporary interpretation of evolution is used as an analogue to the evolution of knowledge, the notions of Cosmic purpose or survival-as-purpose are happily lost. Still, even in this contemporary interpretation, there is danger in pushing the biologically evolutionary model past its merits. The focus upon the populational analysis still treats animals as animals and plants as plants. I assume it safe to assert that neither plants nor lower animals exhibit high degrees of purposive behavior in their variation and selection. The same assertion cannot be made of man's quest for knowledge. Man plays a role in the attempted variations in knowledge and in the selection of those conceptual mutants. In discussing the creation of knowledge, Hendel puts the matter succinctly: "Knowledge is the outcome of . . . complex rapports and processes. But there is a special emphasis upon the forwardness, or better, the responsibility of man in the whole affair."

A concern for various manifestations of human purposiveness in the evolution of knowledge stimulates a concern for a philosophical ground for understanding purposive variations in human knowledge. Such a
philosophical ground may be provided by the theorizing of economist and social critic Kenneth Boulding.

Eiconology and Disciplinary Images

In several of his works, but most notably in The Image, Boulding has propounded the basis for a theory which he calls "eiconics." The new theory involves "images," rather than truth or knowledge directly. But, to Boulding, the image is not merely an apparition or an illusion; "what I am talking about," he says, "is what I believe to be true; my subjective knowledge." Boulding's idea of the image does not imply a concern for "validity" or "truth," but, on the other hand, he is not highly susceptible to the charge of solipsism. He does not seem to be concerned so much with what we might call purely "private" images or pure subjectivism. Rather, his notion of the image is based upon feedback in the form of symbolic messages from ourselves—and others. Moreover, the image, partly because of the feedback, is a public image—a public belief about what is true.

Eiconology—as I shall call the philosophical view implicit in Boulding's works—possesses three valuable attributes which may aid the understanding of the role of argumentation in knowing. First, Boulding's perspective involves a conceptually neat fusion among ontology, axiology, and epistemology. As I understand the position, man's sense of being arises from the complex interplay of his valuing and knowing. Human "images" of what "is" are inextricably bound with already intertwining "facts" and "values." In writing of eiconics, Boulding argues that it is "distinctly unfriendly to the position that..."
facts and values are quite distinct, that facts are a proper subject for scientific study, whereas values are not, that facts are objective and values are subjective. I would argue strongly, he says, "that these two processes, though there may be some differences between them, are essentially similar." Boulding's particular stress upon the relatedness of "facts," "values," and what seems "to be," however, may not be as important a contribution as, second, that "facts" and "values" may be seen as "processes." Perhaps without knowing it, he is echoing the words of Plato in the beginning of Theaetetus: instead of concentrating upon "knowledge," let us look at what it is "to know." And, a concern for the verb form "know" may compel our attention toward "valuing," a process which may help explain the human purposiveness in variation and selection in the evolution of knowledge.

Third and finally, Boulding's concept of eiconics allows the making of (without his consultation) variations among types of images. Although Boulding speaks of public images, perhaps we can conceive of personal images being less public and less sanctioned by feedback from others. Then, too, perhaps we can conceive of disciplinary images which are shared and confirmed by disciplines as a whole—what Toulmin might call the relevant Court of Reason. If public images are what one believes to be the case, personal images might be what one thinks might be the case, and disciplinary images might be what is (said to be) known to be the case. These proffered kinds of images may be a way of describing the relative amount and kind of support granted a particular claim.
Taken together, these interpretations of the implications of Boulding's theorizing may serve as ground for understanding variation and selection in the evolution of knowledge, and—more specifically—the role of argued values in the creation of a known.

Arguing, Valuing, and Knowing

Perhaps the best method of explaining the evolution of knowledge from the eiconological perspective is to assume the existence of a "known." Whatever is considered known has been granted that status by one or more relevant disciplines. Something that is known is assumed by the discipline to enjoy the very best possible justification; the justification has been accepted by what Perelman would call the "universal audience"—that body of rational people most competent to judge the idea; the justification has been accepted by what Toulmin might call the Court of Reason. In either case, the idea is considered "known" simply because it is no longer considered to be vulnerable to further argumentative challenge. From this perspective, the known is a disciplinary image: a belief valued so highly that it enjoys what a debater would call the "presumption." In this sense, knowledge is enshrined in what Rossiter would call "philosophical conservatism"; the "burden of proof" falls squarely upon the shoulders of anyone challenging the disciplinary image.

There are times, however, when a researcher's personal image differs from the disciplinary image; when what someone thinks differs from what is regarded as known. When such a conflict exists, the stage is set for the introduction of purposive conceptual variations.
These variations, from an eiconological perspective, are neither divinely inspired, nor the casual participants in a battle for survival. The variations may be motivated by any force that can explain any other human action. As humans will have their purposes in action generally, they will have their purposes for presenting personal images which conflict with the disciplinary image.

The decision to present a conflicting personal image, we can assume, is the result of intrapersonal processing—and argumentation—about which we need to know more. But whatever intrapersonal processes are important, they are explicitly overshadowed by the demands of the interpersonal and group argumentation which are required in presenting a case against the disciplinary image: a challenging claim-to-know must always be argued within the context both of the specific discipline and of the particular "known."

This claim-to-know, for example, must be justified by the kinds and amounts of evidence valued by the discipline. A claim in thermodynamics, it is clear, will not be supportable by the same kind of evidence required in theology or aesthetics. To justify a challenge to the disciplinary image, then, one claiming-to-know must utilize the justification valued by the specific disciplinary Court.

The method of arguing that justification introduces another role of arguing—and another instance of the intertwining of valuing and knowing: the justification must meet the standards valued by the discipline for epistemological advance. The valued standards might be predictive power, inclusiveness of explanation, coherence with the rest of what is "known"—or some other standard. The role
of argument here is to defend the personal image as being better than the disciplinary image when judged by the valued standards.

Beyond arguing the merits of a claim-to-know vis a vis justifications and standards, the conflicting personal image must be argued as being consistent with the philosophical framework valued by the discipline at the present time—or (and this is more difficult) it must be argued as being consistent with a superior philosophical framework. Whatever the disciplinary image, it will be grounded in some sort of philosophical bias and a competing image must be argued within its context.

If it is the case that the claim-to-know is defended successfully in terms of the justification, standards, and philosophy of the discipline, then the personal image may well become the new disciplinary image through the process of disciplinary argumentation. At that point, the formerly encased image gives way to the new, and knowledge is seen to "evolve." If so, it is not the case that the old image has been proven false; it is simply that the new image has been successfully argued as superior for whatever the disciplinary standards and purposes have been. What has happened is that a purposive variation has been presented and disciplinary selection has occurred. The purposive mutant has become the purposive survivor for a time.

Eiconology and Arguing in Knowing

From an eiconological perspective, "rationality" is a uniquely human attribute. The maker of a claim-to-know demonstrates his
rationality by consistently arguing his personal image in the context of the disciplinary image; or, as Aaron has said, rationality in reasoning is 'the checking, judging, or testing of thought in light of what is known.' The discipline, on the other hand, demonstrates its rationality, as Toulmin has suggested, both by its appropriateness and modifiability in responding to what I have called the challenge of the personal image to the disciplinary image. The eiconological perspective provides a ground for understanding how argumentation about valuing results in knowing—and the evolution of human knowledge.
1 Relevant is Hawes' comment that "Analogies, then, are the embodiment of implicit questions, primarily questions of structure and function." See Leonard C. Hawes, Pragmatics of Analoeuing: Theory and Model Construction in Communication (Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 7.


3 "Evolutionistic" is the common term for denoting the pre-Darwinian, "progressivist" view of evolution.

4 In fairness to what I label "misinterpreters," it must be acknowledged that Darwin himself only later outgrew the bias of the continuing providentialist doctrine implicit in early views of evolution. Cassirer says, "One may always regard it as the peculiar merit of Darwinism that it carried through a strictly unitary causal explanation, with no assumption of any special type of causality equal or superior to the physiochemical." See Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 166. Toulmin speaks of Darwin's departure from
teleological explanations even more succinctly. "It is to revert to an earlier, providentialist view of evolution, which it was Darwin's chief merit to have outgrown." See Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 323.

5 Cassirer, for example, translates Oskar Hertwig as arguing, that the "disciples" of Darwin who prided themselves in overthrowing the bias of teleology were "the greatest teleologists of all." See Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 167.


8 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 323.


11 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

12 Ibid., pp. 164, 172.
13 Ibid., p. 166.

14 Ibid., p. 173.


17 I wish to make it clear that these delineations are my interpretations of potentials suggested in Professor Boulding's works.

18 By personal image, I mean to imply those images not strictly speaking either public or purely private and purely subjectivist. The personal image would be still based upon feedback from others to some limited extent.

19 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 95.


21 In contrast to possible other interpretations, I wish to make clear that I am not attempting to distinguish between types of "mentalistic processes;" I distinguish the terms on the basis of the kinds and degrees of justification for an idea.
22
In some cases, obviously, disciplinary boundaries do not indicate the limits of a "known."

23
For understanding of the concrete implications of the "universal audience," I am indebted to discussions with Professor Chaim Perelman of Brussels at various times.

24
Much of this analysis was originally presented in Richard E. Crable, "Rhetoric as Architectonic: Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin on Valuing and Knowing," unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1973.

25

26

27
See for example, Richard E. Crable, Using Communication (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1979), ch. 7.

28
In a very important sense, the standards function as "warrants" for the argumentation involving the acceptability of the claim. For a discussion, see Richard E. Crable, Argumentation as Communication: Reasoning with Receivers (Columbus, Ohi: Charles E. Merrill, 1976), ch. 5. When the disciplinary standards are used in arguing the merits of a claim-to-know, the argument is "warrant-using;" when the maker of a claim-to-know additionally must provide novel warrants
for his argument, the argument must include other argumentation aimed at "establishing" warrants. See the distinction in Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 120 ff.

Toulmin comments, for example, that "No judgement on Man's success in the rational organization of his experience is ever final, or immune to reconsideration." Human Understanding, p. 50f.

Aaron, Knowing and the Function of Reason, pp. 176-77.

Toulmin argues, "...rationality is an attribute...specifically of the procedures by which the concepts, judgments, and formal systems currently accepted in those enterprises are criticized and changed." Human Understanding, p. 133.

The perspective outlined here is distinctly inconsistent with Bergmann's view of "facts" and "values" when he claims that "The motive power of a value judgment is often greatly increased when it appears not under its proper logical flag as a value judgment but in the disguise of a statement of fact." See, Gustav Bergmann, Ideology, 61 (1951), 205-18. For a different view of ideology—and one consistent with that implied here—see, William R. Brown, "Ideology as Communication Process," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (April 1978), 121-40. The perspective here which sees the advance of knowledge as claims advanced and defended vis à vis the discipline and the accepted known denies the easy bifurcation of what Kaplan calls "discovery" and "justification;" see Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing, 1964), ch. 1. There are
ARGUMENT AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHOD
by Wayne Brockriede

In this essay I intend to focus specifically on one of the questions implied by the title of this seminar: To what extent is one entitled to construe argument as a way of knowing? In doing so, I shall advance two claims: (1) Although persons may look at argument profitably as a product to make or as a process to use, they may see it also as a method of knowing. (2) If persons characterize argument as a way of coping with uncertainty and regard knowing as determined neither by systemic formal analysis nor systemic empirical observation, they may view argument as the epistemological method.

Traditionally, students of the subject have regarded argument as a product, a set of statements providing a rationale for a proposition of judgment or policy, a projective or retrospective justification for a conclusion. Treatises on argumentation from Aristotle through Whately to most writers of this century have discussed the production of reason-giving discourse. Most persons have approached argument as a unidimensional enterprise dealing with substantive statements with rules and procedures of formal logic as judged by criteria of internal consistency or correspondence with reality; more recently, some persons have proposed an informal logic that takes into account also the role of persons, ideas,
and situations. With either group of persons argument is something persons produce about ideas in a situation.

Still more recently, persons from somewhat different theoretical or philosophical perspectives have argued for a focus on argument as a process, the action/interaction/transaction of persons as they reason their way projectively or retrospectively to judgments or decisions. I interpret many of the participants of this seminar as participants or applauders of such a movement. Daniel J. O'Keefe expressed the distinction as one between argument, and argument, the former focusing on a noun, on a product made, the latter on a verb, on a process persons pursue. Interpreting argument as a process implies multidimensionality with an explicit concern for interpersonal and situational variables and for ontological assumptions about the nature of persons and reality.

The thrust of this seminar, "looking at argumentation as a way of knowing," implies argument, a focus on method. Argument, functioning at a meta-level, is concerned with theoretical judgments about alternative explanations or with philosophical judgments about competing presuppositions. This perspective on argument assumes that rational judgments at this level are possible. Our agreement to participate in this seminar may imply such an assumption. John Kekes has argued convincingly that rational judgments do occur at the meta-physical as well as at the theoretical level. I cannot conceive any kind of theoretical or philosophical position (except radical skepticism) to which some contribution would not be made by some conception of argument. Given a particular characterization of argument and a particular view of epistemology, however, one may be entitled to say that argument is the way of knowing.
This claim may be pursued by delineating a view of argument, a view of epistemology, and an interaction between the two. Elsewhere I have discussed six characteristics of argument, and in my exchange with O'Keefe I have written of this definition "as constituting a gestalt one can focus on in six ways." Although I believe all six characteristics relate to a conception of argument as method, three are especially significant: an inferential leap, a choice among competing claims, and a regulation of uncertainty. These characteristics imply that argument deals with important problematic situations. Persons need not use the method of argument for what is trivial or nonproblematic. When a theoretical or philosophical question cannot be resolved with certainty, when a choice among competing explanations or presuppositions must be made, and when persons cannot justify conclusions rationally without making inferential leaps, the optimal epistemological method is argument: persons "reason their way from one set of problematic ideas to the choice of another."

The epistemological position for which argument is the method par excellence must be constructed by presuming a dialectical tension between two polar systemic positions taken historically by epistemologists. One system emphasizes nouema, form, ideas, constructs; a priori presuppositions, field-invariant principles, and general topoi extended elegantly to high levels of abstraction. The other stresses phenomena, empirical data, behaviors, the relativisms of time/place/culture/discipline, field-dependent principles, special topoi, and a respect for the
uniqueness of concrete experience. Stephen Toulmin puts a version of
this distinction sharply:

The absolutist treats the actual diversity of men's con-
cepts and beliefs as a superficial matter, behind which
the philosopher must find fixed and enduring principles
of rationality, reflecting the pure, idealized forms of
concepts. By contrast, the relativist takes the historico-
cultural variety of concepts too seriously. Instead of
ignoring the diversity of conceptual systems, he yields
entirely to it, abandons the attempt to judge impartially
between different cultures or epochs, and treats the notion
of "rationality" as having no more than a local, temporary
application. 6

Toulmin argues well the inadequacy of these positions and points to a
shared problem, the requirement that persons "give final intellectual
authority to one or another logical system: either an axiomatic system
of propositions or a presuppositional system of concepts." 7

A promising way out of this predicament is to deny the utility
of an adherence to either system as an exclusive way of knowing. Such
a solution involves coping with the dialectical tension between the
legitimate demands of both formal constructs and empirical phenomena and
arguing one's way in context through an inferential leap to the optimal
choice of regulating uncertainty.

I shall try to illustrate the distinction between a systemic
and a contextual approach to epistemology by means of a model set forth
in the early 1960s by Robert Levine, an economist who used it to study
policy options regarding disarmament. 8 Imagine a continuum shaped like
a horseshoe and bisected by vertical and horizontal lines. Represented
on either side of the vertical line is an emphasis on one or another of
two values salient to a judgment or policy. In Levine's analysis of the
controversy over disarmament one of the values was avoiding war and the
other was anticomunism. Underneath the horizontal line is posited a systemic commitment to one ideology to the virtual exclusion of the other. Levine put at one prong of the horseshoe persons systemically determined to avoid war, virtually ignoring the cold-war value of defeating communism. He put at the other prong persons systemically determined to roll back communism even if doing so resulted in war.

Above the horizontal line, along the arch of the horseshoe, Levine placed marginalists (I shall call them contextualists), persons who recognized and used both values when making judgments in the context of concrete circumstances. Levine illustrated the contextualistic position with John F. Kennedy's preference for the value of anticomunism during the Cuban missile crisis—although he hoped to avoid war, and his preference for avoiding war in a speech six months later—although he still saw communism as a threat.

Levine's model may help distinguish options in epistemology. Located at one prong are absolutists committed systemically to some enduring universal constructs to the virtual exclusion of the world of phenomenal experience and historico-cultural diversity. Located at the other prong are relativists committed systemically to diverse phenomenal experience to the virtual exclusion of the world of ideal form. An interesting feature of Levine's model is that the ends of his continuum bend toward one another, polar extremists approach one another, and so the model reflects a similarity in styles of thinking between opposing systemic positions. Although absolutists and relativists base their systemic epistemologies on very different ways of defining knowledge, they share a reliance on one systemic definition.
A third kind of epistemologist, located above Levine's horizontal axis, accepts both absolutistic and relativistic values, copes with the tensions between dialectically opposed values, and recognizes that reliable and rational knowledge results from an interaction between the two. Such a person, a contextualist, takes into account what can be observed and described within a particular context (defined by time, place, culture, persons, and situations) and more enduring formal paradigms (such as theory, presuppositions, recurring patterns, generalizations, or other principles) useful for structuring and interpreting the data.

For the contextualist, no formulary system exists for making judgments analytically (by absolutism) or empirically (by relativism). Judgments in context can be made only by a kind of argument that involves inferential leaps, rational choices, and optimal regulation of uncertainty. In such a context, arguers employ the one and the many related symbiotically as they pursue the process of epistemological evolution.
ENDNOTES


2 A Justification of Rationality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). Kekes establishes five criteria, one external standard of problem solving and four internal standards of logical consistency, conceptual coherence, explanatory power, and criticizability. He argues that conformity to these five criteria is "severally necessary and jointly sufficient" for the rationality of a theory or a metaphysical position.


4 "Characteristics of Arguments and Arguing," p. 130.

5 Decision by Debate, p. 23.


7 Ibid.


In their "Problem Statement and Tentative Agenda," Rieke and Toulmin observed that there have been important changes in the theories governing the disciplines which have traditionally constituted the foundations for the study of argumentation. Also, attention is increasingly being paid to ordinary discourse in such settings as politics, business, and conversation, where it is clear that "the arguments used are not structured according to the rules of formal logic and they are not typically analyzed formally either."

The common thread running through these various shifts in theoretical assumptions and subjects for study is a growing disenchantment with formalism - particularly with an exclusive, limited type of formalism which transforms (some would say "distorts") complex problems into simple ones leading to single solutions derived by "calculi or algorithms," i.e. mathematical tests. Contemporary expansions seem to run towards encompassing more humanistic assumptions into our theories of how conflicts arise, and how they are disposed of by both the disputants and those to whom disputes are directed for ultimate judgment.

In view of this growing disenchantment with formalism in argumentation, our focus in Seminar IV has been proposed: "What are the alternative philosophical groundings for look-
ing at argumentation as a way of knowing?" Or, "what does argument look like if it is not tied to formal logic?" It appears to me that these questions represent a good general basis for our seminar, especially in connection with the interests of the individual members of our group for research and/or application. The various perspectives from which we each view the problem will lead to lively discussion at least, and possibly some clarification of the role of argumentation in generating or establishing knowledge.

Turning to the proposed tentative agenda, the questions posed by the Seminar IV Co-chairmen are stimulating and provocative. Any of them should arouse a prolonged, lively, and (hopefully) productive discussion within our group. As a matter of passing interest to me, Question 2 refers to the arguments employed in selling cars. As it happens, my wife and I bought a car recently. We were comparison shoppers. First we considered our needs and desires, to settle on a general type and price range, then we visited the local dealers to find the best available deal. In the end, however, we bought a car from the dealer we liked the best. In particular, we were so turned off by one dealer's "hard sell," we agreed we wouldn't have bought from him no matter what kind of deal he would have eventually offered! We tried to use rational argumentation in deciding on a general type of car, but we substituted a more ethos-oriented decision method when it came down to purchasing a particular car.
When I read and re-read the questions listed in our tentative agenda I find it disquieting to interpret "argument" first as argument\(_1\) and again as argument\(_2\). The questions remain comprehensible in both senses, but they lead in different directions when different senses of the term are employed. For instance, Question 2 asks, "To what extent are arguments advanced by scholars -- scientists, philosophers, critics, etc. -- similar to or different from those used by people in ordinary daily business -- writing advertising copy, selling cars, discussing politics, planning business ventures, and the like?" If the sense of argument\(_1\) is used, I can envision a focus on the self-contained units or messages produced by people in these varying roles, possibly using the Toulmin layout for this purpose. On the other hand, if the sense of argument\(_2\) is used, I can envision a focus on the phenomena of ongoing controversies between and among the actors in those settings, in which argument diagrams would be of less usefulness. In the latter case, an analysis similar to that of Martin Joos in *The Five Glocks* comes to mind, wherein matters of style, preparation time, opportunities for interaction, and mutual expectations become paramount.¹

Since each of the suggested questions on the tentative agenda is similarly susceptible to this potential ambiguity, perhaps Question 5 should be the first one we should raise: "What are the characteristics or constituents of arguments?"
How do we know an argument when we see one? At any rate, without implying that we need to stipulate any given sense of "argument," to the exclusion of other senses of the word, at least when we are discussing a question we should make our intended meaning clear in each context as we go.

Persistent Questions About the Meaning of Argument.

The domain of argumentation studies has broadened in the past several years. We are moving from the formal analysis of the logic of speech texts, through recognition and approval of emotional and attitudinal materials in the text and the context of argument, until today we hear intimations of the primary importance of extra-linguistic, intrapersonal, symbolic activity. At the least, it can be said that scholars no longer relegate arguments to mere form, leaving more interesting and relevant aspects of persuasion to others. Most of our Seminar members have recently written of argument in terms of human communication, not simply of logical forms. For instance, Rieke and Sillars' textbook refers to the process of argumentation as "that ongoing transaction of advancing claims with appropriate support, the mutual criticism of them, and the granting of adherence to one." This definition, like others which could be cited, attempts to provide a synthesis of approaches allowing for a more inclusive understanding of what is involved in argument. At the same time, it suggests questions which might appropriately be addressed by our Seminar with a view towards increasing clarification.
1. How central is the notion of competing claims to the definition of argument? Traditional theory is characterized by an analytical approach to verbal messages in confrontational contexts. Typical settings include legislative debate, courtroom trials, administrative hearings, and negotiations. However, argumentation is also studied in situations where a claim which is advanced and supported with reasons meets no apparent objection, yet analysis of the resultant messages by formal methods is possible. Rhetorical criticism sometimes takes this approach to the study of speechmaking by public figures. Of course, the potential for disagreement exists anytime a claim is advanced; but if this type of qualification is appended to the definition of argument, then any and all claims must be considered as arguments. Do we wish to imply that the study of argumentation subsumes all instances of communication?

2. Who is to judge? The sample definition mentions "the granting of adherence to one" of the claims advanced. What is the source of the grant of adherence? Is such a definition meant to include adherence by the disputants themselves, as consensus within an initially divided group? Some studies suggest that the achievement of consensus is based on a compromise process which de-emphasizes substantive aspects of conflict in favor of more personally oriented, less argumentative bases of agreement. If so, can it be said that knowledge is enhanced, or degraded? There is also the possibility that no agreement can be reached by
conflicting parties: in the event, does the definition require that some decision be arbitrated by some third party such as the audience, judge, or federal mediator? And if we should stipulate that ultimately no agreement or decision is really a requirement for a definition of argument, then to what other purposes may argumentation be aimed? Return to our Seminar IV problem, "What are the alternative philosophical groundings for looking at argumentation as a way of knowing?" Whose knowledge are we concerned with—the advocate, the opponent, or some third party who is a spectator?

3. Upon what basis is adherence granted? Assuming that a decision is needed or desirable, the criteria for decision becomes the heart of our concern. In a recent essay, Michael Leff pointed out that it is possible for rival arguments to interpret material in different ways (i.e., present different views of reality). If both systems exhibit internal coherence, then there are no purely formal means of demonstrating the superiority of one system over the other. Leff cites Edwin Black's position that style alone determines which of two equally coherent syntheses will be most persuasive (reminiscent again of Joos' The Five Clocks, or perhaps Osborn's theory of archetypal metaphors), but other than that, no one has yet offered a direct and detailed answer to this issue.

Recently, as we have seen, there has been a shift away from the formal analysis of messages as the primary mode of
argumentation study. Our seminar is engaged in exploring some of the possible alternatives to the formalistic approach to the study of argumentation. Although traditional argumentation theory may still be a fruitful and insightful foundation for the analysis and evaluation of verbal messages in certain contexts, our Seminar commission is to try to broaden the perspective away from the limits imposed by traditional theory—limits which tend to minimize or exclude such aspects of argumentation as nonverbal and extralinguistic modes of communication. Such a commission implies that serious attention be paid to other alternatives.

The Argumentation of Intraperonal Sources of knowledge.

Philosophy offers a wide range of epistemological systems which may be arranged on a continuum anchored by Rationalism at one end, and Empiricism at the other. Correspondingly, each epistemology is related to a metaphysical system which may similarly be arranged on a continuum anchored by Idealism at one end, and Materialism at the other. Traditional argumentation theory seems to be located at the Rationalism and Idealism ends of their respective continuums of possible approaches to knowledge and reality, since both of them make common assumptions of the primacy of mind, reason, and deduction. Yet scholars of communication have pointed to the importance of psychological and sociological processes in human understanding, so that any study of argumentation limited to rational, idealistic assumptions regarding human thought are seen not only as being arbitrary,
but also extremely so in light of other possibilities on the continuums. On the other extremes of the continuums, an epistemology of Empiricism, and a metaphysics of Materialism; both share common assumptions of the primacy of matter, objects, the senses, phenomenal evidence, and induction. In the extreme, such a position is also limited in that abstraction, ethical purpose, esthetics, and rationality (in the traditional sense) are minimized or excluded. However, to the extent that theories of argumentation can be synthesized from epistemology(ies) and metaphysical assumptions between these extremes, we have the possibility of making progress towards alternative frames which include intrapersonal thought processes as they appear to exist in people.

A commitment to try to incorporate intrapersonal processes into argumentation theory clearly brings in the relevance of constructivist interactionism (both personal construct and social construct applications) and of phenomenological methods of communication analysis. It also opens other doors. It is important to remain cautious of some possible outcomes of these approaches which traditional theory warns against: elevation of demogoguery; uncritical acceptance of questionable arguments having constituencies within some interest groups (the rhetoric of the insane asylum); and the lowering of resistance to the next Hitler. Also, as Freeman has suggested in his description of the enlarged scope of contemporary intrapersonal studies, we
must account for the growth of interest in self-awareness and self-consciousness movements; burgeoning interest in paranormal (ESP) modes of communication, and the serious study of alleged out-of-body experience—since all of these stem from reported intrapersonal phenomena.

Finally, an argumentation of intrapersonal sources of knowledge could bear some relevance to the argumentation of public communications in a variety of settings. Mass media of communication are now analyzed in terms of individual intrapersonal reception, since individuals make up the mass audience and typically use radio, television, recorded music, books, etc., in solitary attentiveness. Intrapersonal processes relate to how the media arouse human responses through visual and auditory imagery, and thereby generate attitudinal and behavioral influences in advertising, electioneering, news (both agenda setting and story presentation), and more. Rather than strike agreement on verbal conclusions, the media could be explained as functioning to strike a "responsive chord." Clearly, this type of approach de-emphasizes the formal verbal content of messages presented via media, and emphasizes intrapersonal activity.

An Introduction, Not a Conclusion.

This paper draws no conclusion. My purpose is to encourage the exploration of alternative approaches to argumentation as a source of knowledge, drawing on the special competencies and expertise represented among the Seminar
participants. My concern is simply to channel our collective efforts toward new definitions and new implications of those areas for argumentation, so that eventually our results will bear fruits for application. Our format is experimental, designed to encourage our interaction on a deep and sustained level, and I have no doubt that such will occur. If so, perhaps our proceedings can also strike a responsive chord or two, beyond our immediate group.
FOOTNOTES


ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING

SCA Seminar IV (1978)
Minneapolis

Transcript of Closed Discussion
edited by
David A. Thomas
Participant/Observer

INTRODUCTION

The following transcript represents one of the two end products of Seminar IV, the other being the collection of original essays prepared by the members during the year, prior to this discussion. The stated purpose of the discussion was to permit the members to respond to each other's contributions candidly and in depth, without having to observe the constraints of brief program time slots, or of adapting to the presence of an audience of convention-goers. All of the members of the Seminar participated in the discussion except for Prof. Leonard Hawes, who had an unavoidable conflict in another city. The discussion lasted for nearly four hours and was tape-recorded by On-the-Spot Company, which has cassettes available for sale.

This transcript is not a verbatim version of the tape recorded discussion. My guiding principle was to produce a faithful rendition of the ideas exchanged, rather than the literal conversations which transpired. Each of the
participants was invited to examine the preliminary rough transcription of the discussion with a view towards correction, deletion, or addition of materials. Many took advantage of the opportunity. For readability, I translated the oral style into a more formal essay style.

In addition, as editor of the transcript, I freely cut passages which seemed redundant or irrelevant. Furthermore, occasionally I disregarded the actual chronological sequences of comments as given in order to re-arrange certain materials for greater organizational clarity. For these editorial actions, I must caution the reader that this transcript as edited is several steps removed from the actual discussion we held.

Although all members were encouraged to contribute freely to the discussion, (and generally speaking, they did so), it should be noted that the bulk of the group leadership function was shouldered by Prof. Rieke, who was the Co-Chairman of the Seminar. The membership consisted of "senior scholars" and "junior scholars," but these roles were not formally assigned. As participant/observer, I identified myself very definitely among the latter sub-group; I made very few verbal contributions to the discussion.

Clearly, one of the most frequent speakers was Prof. Stephen Toulmin, as was intended. Prof. Toulmin was designated Co-Chairman of the Seminar; and throughout the evening's
discussion, many comments, questions, and rejoinders were
directed towards him. Often, what seemed to be productive
exchanges developed between Prof. Toulmin and other members
of the Seminar. In particular, sharp distinctions were seen
between Prof. Cronen and Prof. Toulmin. For these and other
exchanges, the reader can judge how productive they were,
and to what extent the differences were identified and re-
solved.

As an aid to locating specific passages, I have arbi-
trarily inserted headings into the running transcript to
signify the topic under discussion at that point.
ARGUMENTATION AS A WAY OF KNOWING
SGA Seminar IV (1978)
Minneapolis

Transcript of Closed Discussion
edited by
David A. Thomas,
Participant/Observer

Members Present:
Stephen E. Toulmin and
Richard D. Rieke,
Co-Chairmen;
Wayne Brockriede,
Richard E. Crable;
Vernon Cronen,
Thomas B. Farrell.
Robert Hopper,
Charles Arthur Willard;
and David A. Thomas
(Participant-Observer)

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Rieke: Let's address ourselves to the topic.

Brockriede: As I read the papers, I sensed a danger that we might go off into our own directions and interests and fail to locate issues that are general concerns. I'd like to hear us discuss our commonalities.

Rieke: Do we agree that there is such a phenomenon that can be called argument? What are the conditions of argument? What are the differences between the various kinds (or levels, or meanings) of argument as some of us have talked about? Are we satisfied that there is a kind of discourse which can be uniquely identified as argument exists?

Toulmin: It's not clear what it would be to disbelieve it. Could we make it go away?

Cronen: One could make it go away if one took the position that you couldn't identify anything that wasn't argument. In that case, it would be a common, absolutely trivial term. As it's frequently defined, it becomes trivialized. If one takes the position that any assertion with any implication of support comes as argument, such that "Hi, nice day," is an "argument" (in a sense that one can adduce a contingent
about the day with some supporting observational material, it would be a meaningless concept and would have no particular use. So, I think that the notion, "What does it take to deny it?" is an extremely cogent one.

Rieke: So how would you characterize it, if you think it should be distinguished from ordinary discourse?

Crohen: I don't think it should. I think it's a way of looking at some aspects of ordinary discourse. I would argue that it is useful to look at the distinction between efforts at making truth claims, as in contrast to what Von Wright calls "dedntics," or logics of conversation.

Toulmin: Yes, but we are running this distinction by too fast. I think what you were saying is absolutely right, namely that whenever you have any kind of verbal exchange, you don't necessarily have an argument. We are disinclined to use the word "argument" unless there is some element of dispute resolution involved. If two people don't argue about something, there isn't an argument. From one point of view, this is one way we could go.

Another way we could examine the question is as a matter of pragmatics. What has to go on between a number of people in order for us to say that didn't just exchange the time of day, but they actually engaged in an argument? Alternatively, we could do it in kind of an evaluative way,
and ask, what kinds of appraisal are there to which a stream of discourse has to be accessible in order for us to say it wasn't just chit-chat, there was some kind of an argument there which we could criticize? Now, to race straight on to deontic logic, and so on seems to me to be begging a lot of intermediate questions. I would favor going slowly and keeping deontic logic on the horizon.

So, I am suggesting two things. First, we can look at it in terms of the kinds of appraisal to which we expect a bit of discourse to stand up in order for us to say, there is an argument which has some pretensive strength of some kind or another. It need only be, "Well, there really was some kind of an argument there;" it doesn't have to be, "That was a highly rational, persuasive exposition." I think that what you were saying about "Hi, nice day," is that, there is nothing there that one could appraise. Alternatively, there is the behavioral aspect of it. What are the criteria by which we are led to say, here was a situation, a human interchange, in which the participants involved were arguing? These questions are clearly related, because the question of appraisal has a certain significance for people who are in such a behavioral interchange, but they're not the same questions.

Crable: Some of us talk about arguments and some of us argumentation. I prefer to talk about argumentation rather
than argument simply because I think it avoids problems. Any statement has the potential for being challengeable. That would put argument into a category of all things. Any statement can potentially be challenged. We can't prove otherwise, so we have to accept it that way.

What I'm concerned about when I talk about argumentation is a response that an individual makes to a statement that has been advanced, that the person is willing to defend and begins to defend. At the point when the statement is challenged, it becomes a claim. At the point where we get a defense or a support of a claim, then we have argumentation. It makes sense for me to think that two people can be engaged in discourse, one of whom would be convinced that they were having an argument, and the other person not perceiving an argument at all. That makes sense to me because I'm concerned about how those statements function for each individual. Argumentation transpires when individuals exhibit the kinds of behaviors that say, "Yes, I've advanced a statement and I interpret it as being challenged." To provide support for a challenged statement means that in that person's mind, argumentation is occurring.

Hopper: Is your position reduced then to this: it's an argument if a statement is made, challenged, and defended?

Crable: I think it's possible for a statement to be made which functions potentially as evidence. If it's not
challenged, then I use a functional definition of evidence as being something that is not challenged. To the extent that it becomes challenged, then it functions as a claim.

Farrell: To assert the notion of defending and challenging a claim leaves unclear what it is to defend or challenge. There may be something special about argument that is different from the simple serial occurrence of the statements, "Hello," "How are you?" For instance, I can defend or challenge a claim by saying, "No." I don’t think saying "no" is an argument. We have to mean something special by defend or challenge that takes a statement away from simply being a serial occurrence, I hope.

Argument Occurs in Context

Toulmin: I am a bit worried with the way Prof. Crable was presenting it, because without a fuller story about the context, it may not be clear whether there has been a challenge that calls for a defense. In law, we can’t say, "No case to answer," unless we know what kind of court we are in.

Cronen: Am I interpreting you correctly as saying that a set of messages becomes an argument at the point when someone disagrees or potentially disagrees? I have trouble with the retrodictive implication that you don’t know it’s an argument until later.
Toulmin: Well, why should that matter? We find ourselves in a situation in which things are said in retrospect. How are we to say whether it was an argument or not? It depends on the context in which the question arises whether we're to label it an argument or not.

Cronen: I agree with the notion that context is the key to this, that the larger context will contextualize our definition of the molecular happenings. That leads to one other point where I need clarification. From whose perspective are we operating when we say the larger context tells us whether something is an argument or not, the outside observers, or the individual participants?

Toulmin: Situations often arise in which you've got two people who are caught up in discourse; and each of them, when asked about what the other did, says, "Well, I was producing a real argument, but he was just blathering." Each of them may be presuming a different framework. For example, one of them is talking law; the other is talking psychiatry.

Hopper: That kind of intuitive distinction is a difficult base because it is equivalent to somebody saying, "I was speaking English, but this other person was speaking some corruption." This would be a situation to which most linguists would be unfriendly. I would be afraid to trust the ordinary person's intuition about what an argument was.
Toulmin: I was only responding to Prof. Cronen's original position. He was pursuing the idea that we might be stuck with a situation in which there was no way of saying definitively whether it was an arguable context. Of course, taken out of all context, then there may well be no way to say whether it was an argument or not.

Willard: Therein lies the signal difference between how we define actors' perspectives and how we want to define argument. Criticism is an act of perspective-taking. A better way to study argument is to look at "normal" people rather than trained debaters—people dealing with one another in taverns and what have you—to see how they act when they think they are arguing. This is the only way to distinguish between the effects of argument per se and the personal abilities, accommodations, and allegiances of the arguers. It's possible that argument has no epistemic effects—it's just the attributes of the people whom we have usually chosen to study. Their arguments are intelligent and insightful because they are themselves intelligent and insightful. If argument per se is a way of knowing, it should be so for people who are untutored in argumentation. This does not deny pedagogic values, but argument may have epistemic implications heretofore unsuspected, thanks to normative standards of academic debate.
Rieke: Are you going to say that there is a difference between the argument that occurs in ordinary discourse and the trained argument of a professional?

Willard: If there is no difference, that would surely be significant. But I've got two recorded conversational samples. In one, a very inexpert argument is taking place in a bar with Dolly Parton records in the background. A few gentlemen are arguing about abortion, and they negotiate the movement of the idea of abortion from one frame of reference to another. During the course of the argument, they have no strategic sense at all. I've got another tape recording of some trained debaters having an argument and it's almost exclusively strategic. They're much less concerned with the great truths that they're propounding. They have a different framework for looking at their own activity. They are willing to give more ground. They make strategic decisions to abandon part of an argument and carry it on later elsewhere. The people in the bar do not have this sense. They are "naive social actors" who believe they are dealing with the fundamentals of the world. They won't abandon part of the "capital T" Truth.

Farrell: It's like conviction without direction, and direction without conviction.

Hopper: I'm not sure what you're saying, Prof. Willard. Are you speaking in response to what I said before about not
wanting ordinary communicators to define when they were doing arguments? I wanted our definition of what was in the domain of argument to be a cure for that. But once we have settled on the domain of what's an argument and what's not an argument, then I would agree with what you've just said.

Willard: I'm questioning what's the most elegant or useful definition of argumentative domain.

Toulmin: The idea of an argument in which there is nothing constituting a challenge is empty. There has to be a challenge in order for there to be anything to be resolved. If two people are of the same mind, take your pub again, if two people are both of the same mind as they clap each other on the back and say, "Let's drink to that," nothing is advanced. There is no challenge. Nothing's advanced to meet the challenge. There's no resolution.

Rieke: I think that whenever you share an idea in a communicative sense, you do so in the anticipation that it is challengeable. Before making the statement, you have pondered what is the possible fate of that statement when it becomes public. And in fact, you may have rehearsed arguments in its behalf to see whether or not, should the challenge come, you would be happy to live with it. You then utter the statement, depending on how important it was to you. To utter it is to
make it fair to challenge it, to invite the challenge, and in a way to suggest, "I am prepared to some extent to engage in the challenge and discuss it."

The Episode as Context?

Cronen: Could I suggest another way of looking at this? Conversants are attempting to bring about a coherent episode of talk. One conversant identifies the episode as a serious discussion. The other conversant says the following: "All chickens like feed, I like chickens, so I like feed." The first conversant takes these words to constitute the speech act of justifying a claim and he answers the remark. However, suppose that the person who uttered these words did not think this was a serious discussion, but rather an episode of friendly banter. The words about chickens and feed were intended to constitute the speech act "joke," not a justification of a claim. What counts as an argument has to do with identifying what the speech act level of meaning is, an identification which may be made differently by participants and observers.

Rieke: What data does one need in order to know that you have argument under investigation? For instance, do you need the words? Do you need the non-verbal? Do you need to know what's in the minds of those engaging in discourse? Do you need to know what happened before or after? What are the
data that you require as an analyst to know that you are dealing with argument?

Cronen: The data is rather straightforward, from my point of view. You could scale it. For example, I would set forward a Likert style item to which someone would indicate their agreement with a statement, such as, "This individual was seriously trying to justify claim Y." Or, "In Episode A, message X counts as a joke."

Argument as Inference?

Toulmin: It is not clear to me that we are talking about inference at all, not as I understand the way the word is used in logic books. What part inference has to play in arguing is very problematic. If I'm talking about argument, I am concerned with the appraisal of argument, whether or not some arguments are stronger than others, or in better taste than others. It remains quite open to question how far the nature of arguing will lend itself to analysis in terms of an inference pattern of any kind.

Hopper: One can have an argument without any inference?

Toulmin: I don't know what inference is. I understand what arguing is. If I say intuitive, I don't mean the incognizant, and ineffability of experience. I mean doing things which we learn to do, which we learn to give some kind of articulate statement of.
Farrell: I understand the notion that there has to be some idea of a challenge; but in the discussion in Human Understanding, in the growth and generation and extension of disciplines, a lot of these challenges aren't active ones. If I deduce a conclusion from a number of premises or a body of precepts, I'm not necessarily responding to an active challenge. If I can lay out an analytic argument, a deductive argument, it is an argument even though I'm not responding to a direct challenge. Am I anticipating one?

Toulmin: Prof. Farrell implied another issue in a way which I want to question, not to challenge. The moment you start talking about deducing things, inferring, construal, and so on, you are really shifting away from argumentation to inner questions about, shall we say, calculations. Inferences are not necessarily arguments; calculations are not necessarily arguments. Sometimes I do a calculation and there is simply no argument about it.

Rieke: Is that different from announcing publicly that you subscribe to a position?

Toulmin: Do we have a proof of Pythagoras's theorem? I'd say, "Yes, I can show you how we'd prove it."

Hopper: If you prove something, say Euclid's theorems in geometry, and you can't challenge it, then you have a proof.
but if you have something that you're a little more worried about, say a position in social science or moral philosophy, then you have an argument.

Farrell: I think that is where I wandered off. I quoted McKeon in my paper on all kinds of calculation. Clearly we are not talking about all kinds of calculation. We are talking about probable inferences of one kind or another.

One Party vs. Two Party Argumentation

Crable: I like to talk about a distinction between something that functions to someone as an argument (or argumentation) as opposed to something that is intended as argument but might or might not ever function that way. For example, the kind of thing you were talking about, Prof. Farrell, where you erect a categorical syllogism might or might not ever be a part of argumentation. It depends on what kind of response it gets. If it's "Oh, yes," than I don't see argumentation occurring, regardless of its form, because I am not concerned about the form at all.

I think the issue of two party versus one party argumentation is crucial because the one person, unless the one person is simply trying to sit down and argue with himself, is literally presenting and weighing the evidence. I understand argumentation as occurring when there is a response, and somehow or another it's challenged and questioned. In some way there has been a demand for some kind of justification.
Willard: If nothing else, I would first ask people what they thought they were doing. I've noticed in the past couple of exchanges a movement to very different senses of the word argument. When Prof. Cronen spoke a moment ago, he was speaking of something close to serial predication. Prof. Toulmin spoke about something two people might do. Prof. Crable spoke about something two people might do, possibly ratiocination. Yet Prof. Farrell mentioned something one person might do. There is a confusion here between some kind of predication, some kind of speech linking, what two people think they are doing with each other. It's important to arrive at some clear distinction. Many of us address that issue in our papers here. Some recent papers in JAFA, especially O'Keefe's "Two Senses of Argument," have addressed the task of breaking down the senses of argument. I suspect that some of the real disagreements between us may come out in trying to pin down what we mean, and where we stand on this.

Cronen: I just want to be clear about one thing. I used that old chicken as a funny example. I'm not claiming that you must have serial predication. Rather, regardless of whether the form of justification for a claim is a formalized deduction, an analog, or simply a statement of intuitive feeling, the message could count as a very different kind of speech act in an alternative episodic context.
Are There Any Essential Characteristics of Argument?

Rieke: Can you judge whether you have an argument by looking at a bit of discourse alone? You don't need to know who said it, to whom, under what circumstances?

Willard: I don't think so at all. Discourse cannot "stand alone," as it were. However, I perceive another difference, in some of our positions, with an underlying value judgment. I invite Prof. Brockriede to reply to this. Consider the idea that he and I might say we're having an argument and we're going to fight it out. Now, perhaps this descends to the level of a squabble. We're still having an argument. I noticed in several of your papers the idea that somehow an argument needs to eventuate in something good (viz., something "rational" or "critical"). For me, this is not an absolutely essential criterion. I read in Prof. Brockriede's work the idea that he wants to distinguish between a mere shouting match, a mere disagreement, and an argument. Am I correct?

Brockriede: Yes, but I'd not be happy with the view that we should define "argument" by its necessary and sufficient conditions. I'd prefer our pointing out the family resemblances of argument, whether viewed as a product or as a process. Although this group may not want to focus on the characteristics I discussed in several papers, we might be able to pull out some distinguishing characteristics.
I think we've already started doing this. Some of us have said argument is characterized by a challengeable, criticizable statement. I interpret what Prof. Farrell was saying that if what is said is challengeable, it is potentially an argument. If somebody, in fact, does challenge an argument Prof. Farrell has produced, then he and the other person are engaging in the process of arguing about it. The idea that arguing involves the justification of a claim may be a characteristic. Probability may be a characteristic of argument or arguing. Perhaps we could draw up a list of features that generally characterize what we mean when we think of producing an argument or engaging in the process of arguing.

Thomas: A lot of our discussion has been whether having a characteristic or trait is essential to a definition of discourse as argument. At the same time, it apparently does not imply that not having such-and-such a trait eliminates the discourse from the realm of argument. Some of these areas are whether to require a conclusion by an outside party or not; whether a decision, or an award of a decision, must be made, as in a debate; whether an inference must be made upon the basis of some formal structure or not. These things might be present in a discourse and we would call it an argument; but would we disqualify a discourse as an argument because they're not there?
Willard: Unless I am badly mistaken, we have only had a couple of "arguments" at this table so far, and they have tended to die down rather rapidly. We have engaged in serial predicative speech, and we have acted in many respects as if the spectre of argument loomed large; but we haven't really gotten down to an argument. An explicit attribution, "We are arguing," has not been sustained. We have not explicitly recognized clear dissensus, clear disagreement, and we have not gotten to the stage yet where I say "You're wrong, I'm right, let's go at it," because it seems manifest that many of the things you say occur in argument also occur in many other kinds of talk—normal conversation and so on. These elements cannot, therefore, be defining characteristics of argument. I have trouble with defining argument by references to a priori assumptions about serial predication; I would prefer to focus on how people behave when they think they are having a disagreement. For example, they surely act as if challenges have been made. The nature of the challenges, I think, resides not "in the talk" but in the definitions made by the arguers. We are talking about a fundamental social comparison process which perceptions of dissensus make possible.

Brockriede: There must be something in the notion of justification. There has to be some rationale exchanged by the parties. We could believe that we were having a disagreement.
and we could fight over it, but unless we exchange rationales for our positions, I'd not characterize what we were doing as arguing.

Willard: When people think they're arguing, they do precisely that. They are comparing their individual construct systems. If we were to have a discussion in which we were trying to figure some complexity out, we were cooperating as much as we possibly could, there would be no real disagreement between us. We would just be trying to hash this out. We might also engage in argument about our claims to justify them, to test them. That could mean that we behave as if we were having an argument, although if anyone were to ask us, we would say, "No, we aren't having an argument." I don't deny that any of those things happen in arguments, I just question whether they're really defining characteristics.

Crable: We've talked about argumentation or argument generally, rather than talking about argumentation as a way of knowing or in terms of epistemology. For the sake of the seminar, I would like us to stay away from what happens down at the corner bar, and deal more directly with the business of knowing.

Hopper: Here's a suggestion that may lead us toward the "knowing" issue: episode and forum as applied to science
bring to attention the importance in those settings of the story as a form of proof. Whether it be a case law or whether it be researches in arts and science; whether it be episodes; I would say a story is a major way of knowing and arguing.

**Appraisal and Justification as Essential Characteristics of Argument**

Toulmin: Right at the beginning I said there seemed to me to be two independent, but not separate, routes we could follow. One was to seek what it is about a verbal interchange between people which leads us to say they're really arguing. The other was to look at the kinds of appraisal which discourse, or an exchange, must lend itself to if we're to say this is an argument. I said there are these two ways of going ahead.

I think it's important that they co-exist, because, of course, there are many typical situations in which both are relevant. There are many typical situations in which what gives rise to the demand for appraisal is the fact that there is a disagreement. As one way to solve the disagreement, we engage in appraisal. On the other hand, there can be a disagreement, but it may well turn out that the things that were said are never coherent enough, relevant enough, or sufficient enough in one way or another, to lend themselves to the right kind of appraisal. So, we can say that two people got into an argument; they fell into an argument, but they really didn't get anywhere. Neither of them really produced an argument.
We can say that you and I both agree about something, but what we're interested in is how we could argue for it, if somebody else came along and were to challenge us from some standpoint which we could identify. This is hypothetical—how would we then, if they were to do that, make out a case for what we jointly believe? So, it is the case that sometimes we say, "They presented an argument," even where there wasn't an initial disagreement. We sometimes have a situation in which there is a disagreement, and therefore an argument in the behavioral sense, even though neither of the parties to the argument actually by producing the kind of discourse that we can appraise.

But, typically, both conditions are fulfilled, and we can do various things. We can say we are going to insist on both conditions being fulfilled, and say that other kinds of discourse are only called arguments by courtesy. Or we can say we can see how the term comes to be applied in all cases, and the only thing we have to be clear in our heads about is which kind of case we're concerned with.

Thomas: I hear two terms here. I would like to hear Prof. Brockriede and Prof. Toulmin apply them together. Prof. Brockriede said earlier, and has repeated the qualification now, that an argument is somehow connected with justification—a statement which is made to justify a claim. Prof. Toulmin was talking about a statement which calls for appraisal.
Now, suppose Prof. Brockriede presents a justification to Prof. Toulmin, and Prof. Toulmin says, "I don't appraise that as justifying your claim." Are these justifications and appraisals now to be made by us as professors and critics and students, third parties from the outside?

Brockriede: I think that this is one instance where the context is terribly important. In some contexts, one is essentially arguing with another person, presenting one's justifications to someone, perhaps hoping to influence the person's attitude or behavior. In other contexts, for example in a debate, arguments are addressed to a third party.

Toulmin: For me, the virtue of using the word "justification" in this context is that it's only when some discourse is presented as justification that it clearly calls for appraisal. Did he really manage to justify his original assertion? I may say, "Yes, that seems good enough," or I may say, "No, I don't think that supports what you said." The question of whether what you have done to give your original assertion some kind of support then comes up for judgment. If what you're doing is not presented as some kind of justification for your original assertion, then my evaluation, which is another perfectly good word rather than appraisal, just is not to the point.
Brockriede: Depending on context, justification could be aimed at one's self, at one other person, or at a group of persons.

Toulmin: Sure, it could be aimed at a jury.

Brockriede: The appraisal might be done by one's self, by a person with whom one is arguing, or by an outside party, a critic.

Toulmin: To spell out what you're saying, sometimes I have to convince the judge, sometimes I have to convince the jury, but then some newspaper columnist commenting on the trial says the judge and jury or the lawyers involved really made a hash of this trial. There's always a variety of standpoints from which another criticism of a piece of argumentation can be perfectly apropos.

This is why I'm a little unhappy about talking in this context about the statements as what you appraise. I was more concerned with the way in which the subsequent statements supported or failed to support the original statement. The kind of thing which would be open to appraisal as argumentation would typically be presented in a whole string of which one statement could be identified as what was really being claimed, and some of the other statements could be identified as what was really being claimed, and some of the other statements would be identified
as what was intended to be understood as supporting the claim.

Unstated Relational Levels: As Argument?

Cronen: This is an effort at summary from one point of view. We've talked on three levels of meaning. First in terms of context, we can identify an episodic level. The episode must be defined in part as including reciprocal patterns of messages in which conversants act as if they are making claims, justifications, and appraisals.

At the speech act level of meaning, particular messages are identified as serious claims, justifications, appraisals, etc.

At a level below the speech act, there is meaning involving various contents and forms of that content. These could be serial implications; there could be analogs about dealing in that material. They could take any of a variety of forms and contents, in the content level of meaning.

Toulmin: And what's the third level?

Cronen: The third level is a content level. We're dealing with a phenomenon, but not its relational or speech act meaning. For example, "Shut the door," may have the meaning of doing something with the door, putting it in a certain attitude as compared to the wall. But my speech act interpretation of the statement might not be, "It would be good
to shut the door." It might be, "Someone is pulling a one-up move, seeing whether I will obey his request and do a service for him." In that case, I would not interpret it on the speech act level as being a claim that the door should be shut, but instead an effort to manipulate our status relationship.

Toulmin: I asked you what the third level was; and you said as I understood you, there can be all kinds of ambiguity about the true status of an utterance on the second level. The speech act isn't always what it seems. He may be trying to pull a one-upmanship thing on me. But this doesn't tell me about the third level. This is only to tell me the second level is highly problematic. Give me a specific example of what you mean.

Cronen: I think you're asking for something impossible; namely to give you an utterance that has content meaning without any speech act meaning. That's impossible.

Toulmin: I was asking you to make some kind of specific example, not produce a label. Make some specific comment about an example which would enable me to pick out for myself the content aspect of it, as contrasted with the act aspect of it.

Cronen: "Shut the door." There are the words. The content level involves an individual going over to that door, and
putting it in a certain attitude with regard to the wall, without taking account of the implications that act has for the relationship between the two individuals.

Willard: Prof. Cronen, you've used the phrase "speech act" several times. Am I correct in essentially equating your view of that term to Searle?

Cronen: What I mean is the relational aspect of meaning. This view is primarily from Searle, along with some changes which Pearce, Harris, and I have elaborated elsewhere.

Willard: You're forcing, I think, a triviality.

Cronen: Oh, I don't think so at all.

Willard: The work of the people you've mentioned, such as Searle, is not especially clear. The idea of great differences between the content of my speech and the implications of my relationship to you is not a distinction that my exposure to this literature has shown to ever generate a significant or an interesting example.

Cronen: I'm trying to use a specific example. There is a whole literature of interpersonal communication, specifically in relational communication, that refutes that claim that there is nothing interesting about the relational aspect of the message.
Willard: I'm not denying that we made relational claims or that they are important. It's the forcing of distinctions somehow that I feel is unclear. It's the contrasting of content and acts that's troublesome. Intuitively, these elements are bound up together, intractably. I don't deny that you can generate examples of content and speech act distinctions. They all tend to be trivial.

Cronen: Trivial in regard to what? If you were to say to me, "Close the door," and I refused to do it because I do not regard it trivial in the sense that puts me in a status relationship with you that I don't like, and so I say, "No I won't, I'm very comfortable." It's not trivial in the sense that our difference of opinion stems from the relational meanings attached to the act, and really is not related to the question of temperature.

Toulmin: We got into this because you said you were going to try to summarize the debate. Now, I understood the whole debate, but I haven't understood what you said.

Hopper: I think that's what we really need to get back to. Quite aside from what Searle said, something about this summary is not working. Episodes in the speech act, relations and content are all real distinctions to make, but I don't see that we're talking about assertions that can be appraised in justificatory context. We're trying to set up conditions for what is an argument, and make them apply to...
individual statements or to larger discourses, and it seems to me that that's a criterion that applies to a fairly broad ground of discourses and also excludes a broad ground of discourses. I would suggest that as a summary.

The Nature of Appraisal

Rieke: Why don't we move on to another idea? What is the nature of the appraisal? It seems to me that that's a central question. In a formalist system, you've got a set of rules to tell you how to appraise. We find that's not doing for us what we want. There's something in the concept of appraisal which we think is particularly apt for the discourse argument, and is more than "any response." It's something else. Presumably we want to get to the point where we can say, "That argument is a good argument," or "That argument is a better argument than another one."

What are the routines, what are the characteristics, what can we say about appraisal?

Toulmin: When you were stating this question, I caught in your particular wording something that might imply that there is a monotonic scale, according to which arguments can be appraised. This is what worries me about bringing up the word probability prematurely. People may have a kind of 0-1 monotonic scale; a claim is "probable" or it is "not probable."
It seems important to look at the different ways in which arguments can be appraised. There are some times we argue, and we ask whether an argument is to the point, or whether it is excessively roundabout, whether it's overly general, or whether it's excessively narrow. One argument is an outline, another one is excessively detailed. There are all kinds of merits that arguments can have, or fail to have. All its solidity and shakiness comes in a whole lot of different ways.

Rieke: If you could come up with that monotonic scale, that would be great; but I don't think you can.

Toulmin: I don't know if anybody wants to defend the idea that the strength of an argument is something you are able to appraise on a 0-1 scale.

Brockriede: Not apart from the context.

Toulmin: Even if you have the particular context absolutely defined, there are still multiple kinds of appraisal.

Brockriede: I would put within the context more than the subject matter which is being discussed and more than the place in which it is discussed. I think that Prof. Cronen's comment is quite relevant, that the relationship between the people who are doing the arguing also makes a difference.
Toulmin: Insofar as it helps to define the standpoint from which the argument is being appraised.

Appraisal in the Context of Argumentation

Brockriede: This is what the dyad, the group, the community presumably would do in reference to whatever norms it had or could develop. Although we can't get anything like the precision of a scale on any context, we could develop general principles of appraisal that would be useful in a context-dependent appraisal of an argument. Ultimately, the participants or observers interested in criticizing an argument would need to determine standards for appraisal. They also might need to appraise the criteria used in establishing such standards.

Farrell: How not to misappropriate a term. Do you mean by context something approximating field?

Brockriede: I take the examples in Uses of Argument as characterizing field by subject matter. By context, I mean to include this feature along with others: a relationship between or among the people who are doing the arguing; aspects of the situation and the norms that relate to the arguing situation; dimensions of time, place, culture, history. All of these things come into play when establishing standards for appraisal or when applying such standards in a particular instance of arguing.
Toulmin: But at a certain point we have to spell this out. I mean you've given us a very general formula for saying, "It may be culture, it may be time, it may be history." In a particular case, how would one spell these things out? What source do we look to in the relationships between the parties to an argument in order to determine the standpoint from which the justification is being evaluated, therefore, the criteria that are relevant? When may one conclude, "The argument he produced really settled the matter?"

Brockriede: I am not prepared to answer that question. But one must consider the issue you raised in your discussion of absolutism and relativism in *Human Understanding*. Some standards of appraisal are cross-cultural, cross-historical, in that they are relatively generalized principles, but their application needs to take account of the context of an argument. Admittedly, putting the context-invariant and the context-dependent dimensions together is very difficult.

Farrell: Can I pose a question here? Built into your notion of context, is there some notion of supervening contexts? In other words, that we know more about a previous context, so we're therefore able to make some further appraisal?

Brockriede: One brings into any context his or her individual and collective history of contexts, any one of which has the potential of revising standards one might bring
into a subsequent similar context. I see an interaction between principles that evolve as standards for appraising arguments generally, and the appraisal of any particular argument.

Farrell: There is something that saves us from relativism, because otherwise you'd end up saying all arguments are good for this context or bad for that context.

Brookfield: I would not want to say that at all.

Cronen: There is some danger of staying entirely episode-dependent, and the danger has to do with the utility of it. Even if you could spell out the relevant standards for any group or any dyad in an episode at a particular time, you'll run into the problem that the anthropologists ran into.

Even if you could describe a culture completely, there is an infinite amount of change over time. All you would be able to do is retrodictive. If last week, they did argue it this way, you could say, "Yes, they did it well by all the then-existing standards for doing that episode in that manner."

**Precedents and/or Predictions**

Toulmin: But you see this is precisely the point that is met and overcome by the use of precedent cases in law. All argument is argument by precedent. All argument derives much of its force from precedent in this sense. So you
know, I'm puzzled that you produce this as an objection. You say all we can do is retrodict. For Heaven's sake what else could we do?

Cronen: Well, you can predict.

Toulmin: I don't like the term retrodictive. We're talking about justification. The question is: What can we adduce which is ultimately relevant to the present appraisal? We can't produce future appraisals. What else could we produce which is ultimately relevant to the present appraisals except the outcome of past appraisals? What about the anticipation of future appraisals?

Farrell: That seems to be an extension of even the precedent argument. You have a principle of continuity built into the interpretation. It takes a previous precedent, and it makes law and extends law. In an argument you have to improvise, you have to anticipate without the institutional context. I agree with Prof. Cronen to the extent that one test might be the anticipatory power of the future.

Cronen: I want to be clear about my position. Based on my paper, I'm surely not saying, "Don't use episode accounts." I say you can go beyond past examples. If you can go beyond simply describing what was done at one time, and build instead an account of the tradition of change within a
community, then you can use episodic accounts to go beyond simply a recounting of what was. That is predictive.

The Forums for Argumentation

Toulmin: I really have been playing some of my cards too close to the chest. If I could spend a moment or two to tilt my hand at this point, I think really what I care about is the now. This isn't in the *Uses of Argument*; a good deal of it is in our new book, *An Introduction to Reasoning*. What I care about most is that one should indeed develop some kind of systematic way for differentiating between kinds of episode and kinds of context, and so on, and get to the point where we can see how the criteria for the evaluation of arguments grow out of the character of different sorts of context as so taxonomized. My only worry about looking at a pub conversation, it tends to be rather less clear what's an issue between people in pub conversations. Any account that we give must be capable of covering the pub conversations, but it does seem to me that the virtue of starting with law, science, art criticism, management, and so on, is that in these cases there is a job going on which the various participants in an argument are drawn into. We don't just say there is a dyad, and the evaluation of the argument depends upon the character of the episode in which they are dyadically involved. We say, I'm going to the court, or diagnosing an illness, or campaigning for office.
The moment you start specifying the forum in this respect, and this is a word which we use a lot in the new book, which wasn't in the *Uses of Argument*, the moment we specify the forum within which the argument is going on, a lot of specificity comes in.

What does more to fix the character of the criteria which are going to be more relevant to the evaluation of argument than anything else, is an understanding of the character of the forum which is either explicit or presumed. This determines the standpoint from which people look at the argument, and again determines the presumptions that they bring to their evaluation of the argument. If an argument breaks out in a pub, it may be possible to say that Joe Jones and Bill Smith are at cross purposes because Joe's arguing about whether something is illegal, and Bill's arguing about whether it's immoral. Of course they're not going to agree. Each of them coming to the same question, but from a different standpoint.

I want to say the people in a culture get into various enterprises together, like trying to set up some kind of a legal system, some kind of a judicial system, or trying to figure out what's going on in the world of nature, or trying to develop some way of comparing reactions to beautiful landscape.

Hopper: I want to ask you to see if I can peek at your hand a little longer. How far can we get, or how far have we
gotten already in thinking in terms of sketching out the various kinds of forums?

Toulmin: The problem is to see how general one's account of the criticism of an argument can be. There is a limit to the account that one can say of a completely general kind. For instance, there is a point in the evaluation of legal arguments where one has to raise the question, on what condition is the standard of proof required: "beyond a reasonable doubt;" again, under what condition is the standard of argument required: "the preponderence of the evidence supports the view that." There are three or four different standards of proof, and the theory of rhetoric by itself cannot say which of these standards of proof is appropriate in what kinds of case. It really is a matter of jurisprudence and even of judicial practice and tradition.

Rieke: Interestingly enough, because you choose that example, there was a convention paper this morning which tested the difference between a reasonable doubt, and a reasonable degree of certainty. The same case was presented with instructions to four juries. They had one using reasonable doubt, one using reasonable degree of certainty, one using both, and one using neither. They found in the one where they said "reasonable doubt," they got a large number of convictions. When they said "a reasonable degree of certainty," no convictions. You wonder what that says to naive subjects (they
were college students)? That's the only difference. In one case they were given "reasonable doubt," the other "a reasonable degree of certainty," and it made a difference in the way they appraised the argument.

Brockriede: We start with the premise that we don't want to try to set up standards of appraising arguments taken generally.

Toulmin: Oh, we want to, the only question is how far this ambition can be carried without tripping over ourselves.

Brockriede: Well, I'm not sure I want to, because I'm not sure it can be done. A more modest attempt would be to take a more generic approach by slicing into the context in varying ways. Forum is one way. Relationships among people may be another. The forum has the advantage of being a relatively structured situation with a history of rules that often are applied in appraising arguments within it. But also we might want to appraise arguments in less structured situations. In other words, the context is composed of half a dozen or more constituents, of which forum may be one. I'm not sure any person interested in exploring one dimension of context ought to rule out any other person's interest in exploring another way of cutting into the context of an argument.
Toulmin: The only reason I produced forum at this particular point is that I think that a lot of the relevant features of the relationships between the participants in an argument are very often conveniently defined relative to the forum. If you're the judge, he's the prosecutor, I'm the attorney for the defense, that's a relationship which determines what kind of appraisals to employ.

The Scientific Arena as a Forum for Argumentation

Willard: Would you care to rephrase the position you just expounded? All through this discussion your examples have come mostly from Law. I wonder if you would care to cast the same position in terms of science? I had running through my head a notion of normal science while you were talking, and I had a feeling that I was reading all sorts of things into it that possibly you would be unhappy with. Would you like to cast the same position into the language of the sociology of science? Stick with idea of forum.

Toulmin: The reason why I talk about legal examples, and this is obviously why I found the jurisprudential model useful in the Uses of Argument, is because there is rarely any serious ambiguity about what kinds of arguments are capable of being produced in that kind of situation.

In the scientific case, there is commonly what one could call the current opinion in the profession. Therefore,
somebody who writes a scientific paper, puts forward a new hypothesis, or reports on an experiment and interprets the relevance of the results of this experiment, is presenting material which he conceives as having a certain significance for those who are in the front line debate in a particular discipline.

However, this may not be the case. Imagine two evolutionary biologists in California sitting down and writing an article about an evolutionary proposition. What kind of arguments they would produce would depend entirely upon whether they were going to publish this paper in the Quarterly of Evolutionary Biology (or whatever), or whether it was going to be presented to the California school system in the context of a discussion about the legitimacy of teaching Darwinism in the schools. Again, I think that the conduct of science does determine the general character of certain kinds of forums, and a particular kind of claim viewed from the standpoint of science. But, of course, the same kinds of claims may also have to be appraised from other viewpoints, that of an anti-evolutionist rather than another professional biologist, for instance. Does this answer your question?

Willard: Yes. For some reason, each of the papers we wrote, I think, mentions a sense of a scientific community existing in some way or another.
Whether the scientific community ever behaves in an entirely normal way by "cum" standards is another issue.

Perhaps approaching it with that example area might get us closer to the goal of viewing argument as a way of knowing. For some reason the jurisprudential model is less clear to me than the scientific model in trying to explain argument as a way of knowing.

**Identifying Interests Within Forums:**

Standpoints for Argumentation

I suggest matching or controlling for interest. In the scientific forum, there is a kind of agreement to keep one's own individual partisan interest out of the picture; I'm not sure that it's openly agreed upon, but it's at least implicitly agreed upon. To some extent that's true with judicial reason as well. Whereas in politics, interests influence argument a great deal in a much more public, obvious way.

But rightly.

Oh, very rightly, and the reason this came to mind with me, ambiguously or not, is your example of the two biologists in California. One of the things that differed in the forums was the interest. You could introduce the same findings whether scientific or not, and back to Prof. Brockriede's term, with our context interest.
Toulmin: There is a distinction that has to be made here. There is a sense of the word interest in which we can say people approach different arguments with different interests, meaning "having different kinds of things in mind," and a sense of interest we talk about in politics about each person defending his own interests, meaning "the things that would be to his good." I can have quite different interests, and I can approach the same proposition from different standpoints. When it comes to politics, I've got my interests. You know, I don't want the taxation system to ruin the University of Chicago, because that will be the end of my job. The political process is there to mediate the conflicting interests of different groups and individuals within the polity.

Farrell: I'm not exactly sure what direction this takes us in.

Toulmin: I think it's a significant question to look at the respect in which interests in some sense or other are relevant or are not relevant. For instance, even in aesthetics it does seem to me it's very important to give a well grounded and fully worked out appraisal of art work. It need not be to say whether you like it or not. Somebody can write a piece of wonderfully detailed and perceptive critical statement about some painting. If you ask him his private feelings, and he can't stand the artist, but he knows what's
going on. Thinking that "interest" means what you like or what you don't like or what you want or what you don't want, is something which you should be able to abstract out. I'll give a better example: Bill Buckley is a first rate arguer. Personally, I can't stand him. I wish he weren't so good, because so many of his conclusions are ones that I feel no sympathy for. I can take this standpoint of judgment and look at the quality of Bill Buckley's arguments independently of whether the strength of his arguments does anything for my interests. Though I don't think the specific word saves any situation, I rather carefully used the word "standpoint," not "point of view," and the word standpoint goes with concerns. The concerns I had in mind were not just the concerns of individuals.

Farrell: There is implicit in that a certain ideal of appraisal. That's one of the things I was getting at. Forum to a certain extent coalesces interests of a certain kind, as in the courts. It detaches them, as a certain notion of the scientific community. There are examples that we can appraise arguments altogether apart from a type of engagement that our interests would prompt us to bring.

If discourse can be appraised, that certainly is one mark that counts in argumentation. It can be appraised as a justification. You could also appraise discourse in terms of its formal symmetry, its expressiveness, but you wouldn't be appraising it in the sense of its argumentative force.
Cronen: I started out thinking we were in great disagreement. Since then I have heard your term, "forum," and your explication of that term. I have placed the notion of "forum" up against my notion of episode. I have heard your notion that we work out and negotiate the forum, and I argued that you can negotiate the episode. I am now getting the feeling that we don't disagree so strongly. I'm wondering if you see a major difference between your usage of the term forum, and my use of episode?

I want to suggest one possible difference. I chose episode specifically because of its temporal implications; that is, there is action which includes something coming before something else. If your notion of forum includes a temporal understanding, where do we disagree, or do we?

Toulmin: For me a forum is the locus within which episodes occur.

Cronen: A larger scale episode?

Toulmin: No, not an episode.

Hopper: It's almost like a tradition of episodes. I think the common law has been made up of many, many episodes of forum on the law court. Any given playing of the game of law court could be characterized as an episode as you are saying, but I see time as a big difference between them.
Toulmin: On a certain naive level, my word forum certainly has a significant spacial reference--spacial rather than temporal. We can say in the traditional courts of equity, it very often happens that so and so, and here would follow an account of certain typical kinds of episodes, namely the kinds of episodes which very often happened in the courts of equity before the unification of the legal system.

Rieke: Are we ready to summarize and move on to another question? We are agreed that there is a concept, a process called appraisal. We agree that it is not likely that we can come up with a universal, cross-situation method of appraisal. We're talking about notions such as episodes, context, forums--they're not the same in our thinking. We are trying to be specific in terms of relating the appraisal of an argument to a context, a forum, a place, or a locus or episode.

Toulmin: ... which involve certain types of interests, and standpoints.

Rieke: Right. With that in mind, can we solidify that and then let Prof. Willard move on to another question:

The Rhetorical Situation As a Forum?

Willard: I am confused about the difference or similarities between the individual human being's point of view, and a
context or forum. To be very specific, about ten years ago, Lloyd Bitzer published a finely turned article in *Philosophy and Rhetoric* called, "The Rhetorical Situation," in which he elaborated a view of situation that sounded very similar to Prof. Toulmin's summary a moment ago. Bitzer's article was very severely (and, I think, justifiably) criticized on the grounds that it was extremely unclear how the views of any individual person or any two persons related to a context (situation or forum). Secondly, Bitzer displayed a tendency to assume that many aspects of the context or forum or situation are somehow independent of the point of view of the persons involved. It is unclear to me whether or not, 1) you think you are saying the same thing as Bitzer. If not, 2) what are the relationships between a single person's point of view and a forum or a context, or any other term you care to use?

Toulmin: I think this can be dealt with. I'm not going to attribute anything to Bitzer or criticize him particularly, but I think the phrase "point of view" as you were using it was shifting between two possibly different interpretations. You ask, "How is it possible to define a forum in terms of any individual's views?" I agree it can't be done. Sometimes the word "point of view" slides over into the world view. You go to a scientific meeting and everybody participating in the scientific meeting is presumed to have
a common concern; for example, improvement of understanding in molecular biology. It is with an eye to that collectively shared concern that the proceedings of a meeting have to be considered. This is how I see it. Now, obviously, different people at their meeting will have different views, and they may disagree about a lot of things that come up for debate in that meeting; but what defines the forum for me is the collectively shared concerns which are being addressed in the meeting regardless of the specific views that people may put forward and may disagree about within that larger framework.

Crable: But what if we have two people rather than a whole group of people, and they are divided in their standpoints?

Toulmin: Well, I think there's a variety of different situations. There is a situation in which there is no ambiguity about what their joint concern is. On the other hand, they can disagree about something because each of them comes to a different concern. This is the case we talked about earlier when I say Joe's talking about whether it's illegal, Bill's talking whether it's immoral. It's at cross purposes. Finally, they can think they agree when they don't really, because they both shared a common form of words that they're prepared to go along with, although when you look at it more carefully you see that actually their concerns are quite different. They're saying the same things, but they're not
really addressing the same sort of issue. All of these seem to me to be possible cases.

Crable: In that final case, you have to assume the existence of a third person who says, "They don't know it, but they really disagree."

Toulmin: They may find out afterwards. This very often happens in political coalitions. There are groups that unite in some political causes or another, and then the situation changes slightly, and this has an effect on the underlying reasons why each party may or may not be inclined to support the particular move that they were jointly agreed in taking before. As a result, you get a situation in which for instance, John Gardner starts saying, "I thought Ralph Nader and I agreed, but now it seems that really we didn't agree." This is the case in which there are two people who begin by thinking they believe the same things for the same reasons, and who later discover otherwise. I'm giving this example because it doesn't involve the third party. It involves a retrospective judgment by the two initial parties in the light of a subsequent situation which forces them to recognize a difference which had originally been imperceptible to them.

Crable: But, they could advance further and say, "I guess the differences really aren't that severe. We are more
alike. This is a possibility, a continuing thing is what I'm trying to get at. We can't simply rely on the second judgment, because the second judgment may be the one that's inaccurate.

Farrell: Can I try this, the forum of third party in a sense? One of the critiques of a rhetorical situation is a notion that maybe you missed the exigence, but it's there. A person can miss a rhetorical situation that has sort of independent priority over an individual. I sense that the forum has something like this too, but it's emergent; and you and I can't just sit together and suspend a forum.

Rieke: Doesn't that begin to get to the whole notion of appraisal? That if, two or more individuals can define for themselves the forum, or conditions can suspend the forum, then it raises the serious question of what if anything you've got going in the way of appraisal?

Toulmin: There's a very nice Gadamer point, which is very closely related to this. He makes great play with the respect in which human activities acquire a sort of autonomy independent of the particular participants.

**Applying the Forum to Individual Situations**

Cronen: I have some reservations. A culture may share what you're calling a forum. We are all somehow subject to
experiences by which we learn, for example, that is a law court, and we recognize certain rules and procedures for the court. My worry is about overusing the concept.

Consider studies of middle-class families. I think the article I'm referring to is in Sociometry '62. Leik says you can find great communality among people if you ask them what are the sex roles of the middle-class American family. There is great communality among them about what you might call the forum: "family decision making about the kids." The forum includes certain features, such as, the father is dominant, etc. Yet, as the social scientist investigates each particular home, he finds in practice the individuals report that they deviated significantly from that forum which they know. There is no predictive power from the forum to the act, but there is predictive power from the episode that the individuals have negotiated.

Hopper: But I would see this not as a reservation to the point of view at all, but another confirmation. That's exactly what happens in science; that's exactly what happens in the courtroom.

Farrell: In fact, often people will appraise themselves; there's a consequence of the deviation.

Toulmin: This is a very nice example. On the whole, the American family does it, but one may not seek to give that
general pattern any kind of authority. When I was saying about forums in science and law is that there are indeed certain kinds of procedures which acquire an authority. If there isn't any authority, we can ask what this authority is rooted in ultimately, and what accredits it and so on. But that's to carry the question down to yet another level. But in your case, one can be terribly tolerant and say, well American families do this, but they're Jewish so they celebrate Hannukah; you know, they don't have a Christmas tree; or, their mother has quite a different role in the family from mother in our family.

Thomas: I want to ask a question about forum, conflict, and getting agreement as a basis for appraisal. How far do we want to take the notion of a forum? I am questioning what I would call the danger of trivializing argument, or spiritualizing it. When the forum agrees on issues on some unusual basis such as ESP, out-of-body experiences, theological values, demogoguery, or the rhetoric of the insane asylum, what kind of line do we want to draw for argumentation? Are we going to regard any of those as a forum's agreement, and therefore good examples of arguing?

Brockriede: One distinction hinted at earlier may be relevant here. A forum consists of a relatively structured kind of situation in which a relatively high degree of consensus exists about rules, norms, and standards of appraisal. In
this kind of a situation, the gap between episode and forum may not be large. But if we move to a less structured interpersonal situation outside the parameters of what Prof. Toulmin is talking about as forum, we do not have as much agreement about appraising an argument. In relation to a forum, a looser interpersonal situation has a great deal less authority behind the norms that operate, and a great deal more variation in standards of appraisal. Consequently, that gap between a particular episode, a particular act, and a larger forum is much greater.

Knowing the Intent of the Arguer: Description or Prediction?

Rieke: I want to move the discussion a little bit in a direction that I am interested in, and suggest an avenue. Prof. Cronen is working on something here, and we're skirting around it. We're doing a lot of talk about what people intend, how they perceive, what's in their mind. We're also talking about episodes in which we can examine some kind of behavior. There is something in people's minds which is reflective of their culture, their context, their forum, their values which in large measure shape the way in which they appraise the arguments in which they're engaged.

We are faced with the problem that the psychologist must face: we cannot know for sure what's in people's minds. To what extent can we know, to what extent should
we try to know, what goes on in people's minds? Or do we have to rely upon the actual transactions that go on to see what are the negotiated agreements, to see the way in which the people by their interaction indicate their forum? Are they negotiating a forum that is different and in fact may be unique, and that here we are talking about ourselves as analysts of what the people are doing?

I'm inclined to think that we're going to have to look at what they are actually doing. We can fill in some assumptions. We can say that it seems that this is the forum and it is like what we've called law; therefore, we could probably make some analyses based on what we know about that forum.

We're going to have to be very careful about trying to guess what was intended, what was in people's minds, what were the values that they must have been engaging in. We've got to look very carefully at that.

Cronen: We have a legitimate difference on this episode/forum business. We agree that the explanation of argument is somehow context dependent. We want to understand what is happening when two real people engage in the process. Then we ask, what are the explanatory powers of our concepts? If you go to the "forum" for explanatory power, you may have no understanding of the action you observe because the individuals have negotiated a very unique kind of episode that deviates in some significant ways from the culturally shared forum. Thus it is the uniqueness of the episode that
has its explanatory power for understanding what counts as sufficient justification—a good appraisal in this context. Thus "forum" may not have any particular power to explain what's going on.

Crable: I'm not concerned about trying to pry into their brain to see whether or not there have been certain electronic impulses that are moved one way or another on a graph.

Cronen: I think we disagree on that point too.

Toulmin: I'm not sure if there is a disagreement between us. There is a difference between us. You keep talking about what we can and cannot explain. I'm not sure that in this whole enterprise I'm in the explaining business at all. I'm not sure that is what we're called on to do, either as philosophers or as people writing about argumentation in some other context, bother the labels. I'm not sure that what we have to do is produce explanations. So far as I'm concerned, the job of characterizing what goes on descriptively, in terms that are adequate to the complexity of what has to be described, is a hard enough job in itself without bothering my head about explaining. I don't know what explanations are called for. For me, it would seem enough if I could get to the stage of being clear, of clearly analyzing what alternative standpoints there could be from which issues might give rise to arguments.
Cronen: You are drawing an important distinction between your interest in clear, descriptive analysis as a philosopher, and my interest in explanation as a social scientist. I also differ with you on this question of staying with the text. "Here is what they said, and we can't get into people's minds." This is an argument we were hearing from the behaviorists and Watson at the turn of the century. My argument is that your description would be worth nothing if you go simply by the words on paper, by what is said. I think this is the powerful difference between communication and language that Jerome Bruner, and Argyle at Oxford, are trying to make. You have to ask what's in people's minds. Yes, people have some problems reporting motivations, and there are some scaling problems, but I think there is a relatively large body of literature that indicates that you can get reasonable predictive power by measuring these internal things. Unless you can model the social action, and unless that model is an explanation of what underlies the observed events, you don't have any data of real interest. If this is context dependent, then you have to explain what's going on within the context as the participants understand it.

Rieke: I'm always troubled by this. If we're in an argument now, you've got something in your head, Prof. Cronen, I don't know what it is. The only way I can know what it is, the
only way I can appraise what you're saying and respond to it critically, is to talk with you. I can say, "Vern, what's in your head?" You will say something to me. I still don't know what's in your head, but I know that in actual argumentation, we don't carry Likert scales with us and pass them around. Now, some people do say, "What are you feeling at this point in the argument? Let's stop and you tell me what you're feeling." I would still get in terms of your discourse what you're feeling, and I would respond and adapt my appraisal to that.

I don't see much value in the outside critic coming in and saying, "I can guess their meaning better than they could because I'm not interacting with them. I'm dealing with this apart from them." If you're the scholar, you're supposedly not in the argument. You're coming presumably after the argument has happened and saying, "I believe that what was going in his head was not what he said. What I think is in fact the case." I think at that point, you're engaging in speculation. Now you can, of course, measure psychological variables. We have good history as you suggest. But we have to do it under certain circumstances where we can get at people, where we can get them to respond to scales. It's not much good, when we're not able to do that in any kind of practically applied situation.
Cronen: You're drawing the logical extension of my argument to some extent. If what you're saying is there isn't much utility in a critic speculating about what's in people's heads with no way of finding out from them, I would agree. I think that's useless. On the other hand, I don't think that you come to grips with the thrust of my argument. Trying to infer meaning from a transcription on paper when you have no idea of the inferences people assigned to the words, is not useful either.

Rieke: Don't limit me to just something written on paper. I can do a lot more than that.

Cronen: Ok, video record. But, you see the problem is, these things are context dependent. This is one of the things we have pretty good data to show, that the meanings people assign are context dependent. I refer you to Jess Delia's material and Peabody's material that indicates that the meaning we assign to a particular message or unit of behavior is a function of a larger context. And if that's true, and you don't know what the larger context is in the person's head, you don't know what meanings were given to what's on paper or what's on video tape, therefore, what can you say about it except, "That happened, that happened, that happened?"
The Complexity of Knowledge Over Time:
Perception and Inculturation

Rieke: There's a lot you can say about the context without getting into their head—there's a whole lot. We've used a lot of the more established forum situations in which we know about the context based not just on what they said, but what has been said and has been done over time. We can talk quite a lot about the context.

Cronen: But there are powerful social sanctions requiring that individuals conduct their episode in accordance with the shared cultural definition.

Toulmin: It isn't just social sanctions. This may be where we do have to go down onto the other level. These sanctions, though enforced in social context by social means, nevertheless are sanctions which carry weight with us. The question is how we mobilize our experience in order to decide just what kind of authority particular kinds of norms are entitled to possess in a particular kind of forum, when a particular kind of issue arises. That's a further question we haven't even begun to ask yet. I think that to talk about the sanctions as merely social is to make it look all too conformist.

Cronen: Let me add one more plank to my argument. Operating in this way, one of the things that you can't account for is
social change. You have to assume that the forum is fixed, but we know that a number of these forums have changed quite radically.

Toulmin: Why?

Cronen: In order to make sense of the message as you have it interpreted, you have to be able to say we know what the forum is, given the forum in which the people are operating. That argument is considered a "no-no" in scientific discourse.

Rieke: But we only know the forum by the examination of discourse over time, and that does not necessarily mean that it's laid out in as clear rule-oriented way as the law.

Farrell: Can I just make a point here? I don't agree with all of your argument down the line, but it does seem to me that there has to be some discussion of the need for intermediary concepts that mediate between forum, and actual discourse, and how discourse operates. Now I'm not sure that episode has to be the concept, although I think episode is important too. Your example was a little bit slippery. You offered a case where forum supervened an individual's perception. In other words, I could simply make a mistake and the forum could correct it--"That's inadmissible evidence" or "That's an improper charge" or some such thing. That still doesn't respond to the question, how do we describe this without first going into people's heads, and
still come up with some definitional terms that take us from forum down to performance?

Toulmin: I like that. Can I state a case that I was hoping Prof. Cronen was going to state, because it's an expression of what for me is the most fundamental difficulty. You know, I've written in Human Understanding and elsewhere about how we come to recognize the things that make one theory better than another, or one kind of scientific argument better than another in a particular kind of context. If you use the kinds of methods I use, you get to a point at which you end up with an elaborate kind of case law of science. A lot of people are really very unhappy about this. They feel I've given a sort of conceptual history of biochemistry, at the end of which you say, "Well, this is how they're doing it nowadays, and it's a betting matter what it'll be like in 75 years."

I share the feeling that there ought to be some terms in which we can stand back and say something about the kinds of considerations that are relevant to the question, how we're going to tell whether one biochemical explanation is better than another in another 75 years. On the other hand, I've never found anything anywhere about this which doesn't on closer examination meet insuperable difficulties. This is a problem that I don't know what to do about. So, again, this is connected with the whole question of what degree of generality is legitimate in this context.
Although I can see the legitimacy of Prof. Cronen's ambition to be explanatory and to introduce general social science categories in terms of which you can subsume all this speculation and say, "This argumentative behavior is a special case of behavior considered in some larger framework," I still don't for the life of me see any way of going beyond this taxonomic-descriptive level. Whenever I've tried to, I've ended by falling on my face. Whenever other people have tried to, within the philosophy of science, I've been forced to the conclusion that they have fallen on their faces, too. I find myself confessing sheer incapacity at this point. I don't know what more one can do than the case law descriptions.

**Development of Constructs:**

*Kelly, Piaget, Kohlberg*

**Willard:** This conversation has gone full circle to focus on individual interpretations. Fortunately, the last remarks brought this out. I perceive the difference in our positions in your willingness, Prof. Toulmin, to assign to that body of case law, a more independent existence and a very clear, obdurate set of characteristics independent of individuals.

**Toulmin:** Obdurate, but mutable.

**Willard:** The focus I wanted to express was on individual interpretation. I was reacting to your notion, that there's
reality in talk. If I remember my reading, you're widely disagreed with.

The best thing I can say is that there is a more elegant way to go about it, and that's in the work of some (not all) of the phenomenologists. I'm thinking particularly of Schutz who articulates most clearly the idea of the natural attitude, and how people can behave as if there's a commonly shared set of meanings; as if daily life is unproblematic; as if the world "pours into" their eyes and men of good will see it in pretty much the same way; and as if our language is a codification of that shared reality. We behave as if this was so, and it allows us to pursue our activities. We can, however, become reflective (if you prefer Mead's word, reflexive) and we turn our attention to our own perspectives and start to question the natural attitude. I'm trying to avoid jargon as much as I can, but I want to ask questions about the natural attitude. David Swanson had two articles in Communication Monographs recently about criticism and how it seeks to move away from the natural attitude. I think you are embracing, and advocating research and theory in the natural attitude and I perceive that to be a serious criticism.

Toulmin: Why? Wouldn't that be a lovely thing to do?

Willard: Only insofar as you're willing to tolerate the same level of error and difficulties for the analyst that
you see as common to daily life. The critic, I'm thinking of the rhetorical critic, is aiming at a little more exactitude than that. Seeing it as a process of perspective taking is the only way of going about the analysis that any of us want to do. What you are trying to do is to refurbish Hume again, and go back to looking at "reality" and the talking and the people. I'm saying it's false security. You fool yourself into thinking that you see it all there. I'm saying it's not there. Social discourse has no ontological status apart from the perspectives of the people speaking. Their perspectives are discourse's reality.

Farrell: You're assuming within your case law example, a view of knowledge which assumes a built-in notion of structural invariance. In phenomenological terms you horizontalize everything until you hit adequacy, whatever that is. I think that the case law is a structure.

Toulmin: It's none of this. Absolutely none of this. I don't understand the application of the term "structure" to what we've been saying.

Farrell: I was trying to work on the natural attitude analogy. When you take this notion of forum, and when you build into it notions like accreditation, generalizability of concern, legitimacy of commonly understood criteria toward admissibility, and point of view and vantage, etc., then that becomes a weighty concept.
Toulmin: Sure, but these are all things that have a clear application to the behavior of any single individual only to the extent that they have gone through a long process of ontogeny, a long process of inculturation. Now, my trouble with Schutz here is that he talks (as Piaget sometimes talks) as though any individual can re-invent the whole of culture for itself, singlehanded, simply by being exposed to something called experience. Somehow or another you recapitulate in your own experience the whole heritage of the culture and come out with the late 20th Century notions about causality, morality, and all the rest. I just don't think it happens that way. It seems to me that in learning what is demanded of us when we're challenged to justify some belief, action, opinion, course of behavior, commitment, or what not, we have to learn what is expected in the situation. I even said that, if there is a structure, the structure exists in the common world, it's not something that developed out of the experience of the individual. It's something into which he is initiated. But why the fixity of it?

Farrell: I don't think there is a fixity. It gets horizontalized all over again when you have changes in case law, and you have shifts from paradigm to paradigm. You have disciplines that disrupt the new ones that are built. The difficulty then becomes, what do you do with the admittedly clear case or case law, when you go into these periods of transition?
Crable: The problem is in assuming that a given set of variables within the forum (whatever that set of variables happens to be) is all going to be aligned simultaneously. The cases could be used in different ways. Clearly the cases have to be manipulated this way and that way. So, even though you have the consistency of the elements in the forum, you wouldn't necessarily have to be talking about structure at all. Is that compatible with what you're talking about?

Toulmin: Well, obviously the word structure is a red flag to me, or I wouldn't have reacted like that. I have a certain feeling of shared views with some phenomenologists. I found myself able to have a constructive dialog with Paul Ricoeur. I think I understand what he is saying and vice-versa. There's a confusion about the way in which some of the phenomenologists start which I don't find helpful.

Willard: I'd like to pursue this a little further. I think you're a bit brusque with Piaget. Piaget's notion that the world is recreated each time a human develops or is inculturated.

Toulmin: Inculturated?

Willard: The individual mind as a locus of causality started with Aristotle, didn't it? The locus of causality is all I hear completely categorically, particularly more pronounced in Heinz Werner's work than in Piaget's. There's a lot of
interesting research being done. Lawrence Kohlberg argues that children acquire moral concepts; applying Piaget's point of view to the development of ethics. I have strong reservations about most of his ideas, but this general notion seems reasonable. Why do you say it doesn't happen that way?

Toulmin: Because I don't think either Piaget or Kohlberg gives nearly enough attention to the cues that other people in a situation give to these children.

Willard: I agree that they terribly underestimate the social cues, the importance of communication, but even so...

Toulmin: That's exactly what I'm saying. That is a criticism which I'm adopting. Kohlberg is oblivious to the educating influence that his own questionnaires have on what the children say about their moral views.

Willard: You could argue that developmental line, and be much more sensitive to social cues, as Jerome Bruner and his followers do, and as many Wernerians also do. You don't have to be a Kantian to be a developmentalist. This still could draw some blood from your position.

Toulmin: No, the point is this. So far as ontogeny and individual development are concerned, I prefer to throw my lot with Vygotsky and the Russians rather than with Piaget.
Werner seems more satisfactory than Piaget and Kohlberg. The Russians show in a very powerful, empirical way, the nature of the processes by which we give structure to our own mental processes through the internalization of modes of behavior. To begin with they take place in the social domain, the public domain. They do give ways of recognizing what are the prior conditions for a child to be ready to internalize something. The actual character of the structure is then internalized, which is to say, part of the common world. This enables you to build up in the end a story which is free of this kind of marvelous unfolding myth that I find in Piaget and Kohlberg. That's a position I hold.

Cronen: We have a common agreement on the notion of context. The most recent data will support your position. About a year ago one of our students did a factor analysis on Kohlberg's levels of moral development. He found that Kohlberg's levels of moral judgment are presented as a single continuum because he never did a rotated factor analysis. If you interpret the data properly and redo it, you'll find that there is a context dependence to the application of the level. The individual decides, "Ah! In this situation I operate at this level, in that kind of problem area, I operate in another." Your position is quite supportable.

Toulmin: In relation of argument to knowing, as in the relation to a lot of other epistemic notions, we have to operate
on a number of different directions. Some of what we've been talking about is what I would call phylogeny. That is to say, the way in which the culture developed significantly, or the ways in which argumentation developed significantly, within some sub-part of the culture such as the community of astro-physicists.

That's one thing that we can look at in Human Understanding, in the first volume. I was concerned with the changes which lead one to say in 1850, it was not yet known that so and so; in 1870, it was known that so and so.

When we ask questions about coming to know, or coming to understand, or coming to develop adequate ways of thinking about arguing about, etc., we could ask this along the ontogenetic dimension; the ways in which individuals develop. Piaget uses the phrase "genetic epistemology" in both senses, and I think he's right to do so. We have to find some way of seeing how the historical development of the culture and the personal development of the individual intersect in the individual in a culture who has particular ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.

I think this is true about argument too: what kinds of appraisal particular individuals, or families, or sets of individuals regard as having legitimate intellectual authority over them. This is a question both about the community and about the individuals who grow up into and regard themselves as fully paid-up members of that particular
community. My complaint here is not with introducing the concept of individual development. My complaint is merely one against Piaget and Kohlberg in particular. There are better discussions addressed to the same general issues; namely, how from the cradle to adulthood, individuals come to share in and operate within a kind of chronological, topographical map of the phylogeny.

Hopper: One approach that we might take descriptively is to look at various forums—law, family relationships, child development, or whatever and how that has happened historically.

The Limits of Argumentation: As An Approach to Knowledge

Toulmin: I began by talking about forums this evening, because where there is a fairly clearly recognizable forum like a law court, or a scientific meeting or something, it becomes that much easier to define. Where there is a recognizable forum, it's much easier to make sense of a notion of a standpoint.

The notion of standpoint is more clearly generalizable, than the notion of a forum. Some of us tonight have asked, "In everyday argumentation, isn't it rather artificial to talk as though there were a forum?" Nevertheless, it seems to me in many cases where there is no clearly definable forum, there still is something that we can define as
different standpoints that different people take. The overall concerns that they bring to the situation within which the argument blows up determine the criteria that they regard as relevant. Come back again to the case where two people disagree about something, one of whom is saying that something isn't illegal, the other who is saying that it is immoral. They both use the word "wrong" and get at cross purposes. Obviously there is no forum, because the only forum is a pub or a bar. Nevertheless when one says it's not wrong and the other says it is wrong, we have different standpoints. So, in many situations, one may have to or presume from somebody's way of approaching an argument, what his standpoint is in order to recognize why he argues as he does or why he appraises somebody's argument as he does. I think one does have to presume what is going on in his head in the sense of how he is perceiving the situation. In the everyday conduct of arguments where there is no set forum or ritual, we do an awful lot of presuming of or attributing. This is where Kelly's Personal Construct Theory is interesting. We do a good deal of attributing standpoints, to other people in our construal of what's up between us.

Rieke: I would respond that what you say makes all kinds of good sense. I find it very dangerous. We have plenty of history of inferring what was going on. We have spent a lot of time saying, this must have been what was going on.
We have overlaid our own perceptions. We have done a lot of guessing, leading to our conclusion.

Cronen: We need to be very careful to rely as much as possible not on what we think people are doing, but on what people are doing to the extent that we can judge that. I agree that some of the instruments that approach the assessment of attitudes or values get people to do things, which we interpret as information about their thoughts or attitudes. The troublesome part about that is the giving of the instrument, the doing of the testing, is highly influential as to the data we get. It also is reflective of what we expect to get. I'm nervous about going into the laboratory and looking at college students and trying to think we're learning about what was going on in the minds of the people in a bar. I am not trying to raise an issue or attack the whole history of experimental psychology.

Toulmin: Oh, I'd prefer to do that.

Cronen: In 1978, I feel no obligation to defend science as a method.

Riek: I feel that we have done enough artificializing of the study of argument either from a prescriptive paradigm handed down by the sages of old, or by experimental research done under artificial circumstances. I'm convinced that we must go to people arguing and try to understand what they're
doing. I'm interested in the process of appraisal, both as appraisal is done in the business of arguing, and as appraisal is done in the business of studying about people arguing.

Cronen: Don't you see that there's an analogy here between what we used to do—"Here are several statements which we interpret as a syllogism,"—and looking at people arguing and saying, "I see a pattern--there must be a forum."

Rieke: I think you must be equally cautious about what you're doing there--absolutely.

Toulmin: But leaving aside generalizations in taking the individual case, if you see somebody making some assertions, and then going on and on, dragging in all sorts of considerations and arguing away, there must be something that he's concerned about. There must be some concern to which this argument is addressed.

Hopper: In other words, argumentation can explain a long line of behavior.

Toulmin: Exactly. Why should he be going through this series of statements if there weren't something which was of concern? Now, that's what I mean by attributing a standpoint. There must be some sort of standpoint in terms of which one would then understand how an argument is
presented as carrying weight. This is quite different from gratuitously forcing argumentation into a traditional syllogistic pattern of attribution for purposes of theoretical synthesis:

Rieke: I'm not sure that that's any different from what people do in arguing. You say something to me, I necessarily draw conclusions about what you are doing, and my response includes in my appraisal a report of what I've come up with. You will respond to what you think I'm coming up with.

Hopper: That's so problematic for analysis, because most arguments are not so discursive, even though they do go on, and on, and on.

Toulmin: But the specificity that you attribute to somebody's position, for practical purposes, will go beyond anything that you can produce solid behavioral evidence for. Occasionally you may go wrong because you take him to have been arguing from one standpoint, and it turns out that he was arguing from another. For practical purposes we can't confine our interpretation of somebody's standpoint to things for which we could give a specific justification in terms of their behavior.

Crable: In theoretical terms we would have to assume that the meanings were simply lodged within the talk that's there. You were trying to make a distinction earlier between
what goes on in the argumentation situation between the arguers, and then what happens when a critic looks at the argumentation. It seems to me that the critic has no more choice than the participants in the argumentation in assigning interpretations.

Rieke: That's correct. I was moving right up on that. The critic isn't substantially different from the arguer because when the critic begins to function, the critic is in the argument.

Research Approaches in a Transdisciplinary Mode

Willard: The discussion has taken an interesting turn, possibly worth pursuing. The best way to describe a theoretical stance is to describe a research exemplar as clearly and specifically as possible. Appraisal always presupposes descriptive assumptions, viz., how the arguments should be researched. I take strong exception to the view that "meanings are simply lodged in the talk" (and my position paper does some violence to Sacks and Jefferson because of this). A critic has many more choices than the participants—he's a third perspective coming to the event, presumably uninvolved as a disputant in the stakes at hand. The ethnomethodological approach can only be a preliminary stage of inquiry. It must be augmented. Criticism is one augmentation; interviews are another. Criticism is argument,
but of a special kind; it presupposes a disinterested (vis-a-vis the stakes at hand) perspective-taking. A clear commitment to some variant of ethnomethodology, at least, gives critics their ground rules. It makes them reflective about their materials. The interesting exchange between Professors Toulmin and Cronen passed almost unnoticed about not wanting to attack the whole history of experimental psychology; there are some among us who are less fearful of that prospect. It tells us little that is useful about Prof. Toulmin's "standpoints."

Cronen: The only place where we differ is the implication that the limitations of doing quantified laboratory research are so monumental that they might not be worth doing. That I object to. Of the notion that there are limitations to it, that one kind of research will not a field make, I have no reservations about espousing at all. We need research that is field descriptive, experimental, historical; we need the whole armatorium of things.

Hopper: We all agree on the absence of a set of axioms. That is a very good perspective of the extent of new knowledge.

Cronen: The notions that somehow meanings are hierarchically organized, that the most meaningful unit is not necessarily the smallest unit, and that larger contexts somehow reconstruct
the meaning of smaller units, make up a tremendous point of agreement among us. One of the things it does is to devastate the assumptive base of the Aristotelian system. One of the major premises in a syllogism is simply the collection of particulars in a universal statement. In Aristotle, wholes are simply clusters of particulars; wholes do not redefine parts.

**Toulmin:** I think I now begin to see the form of the question that would lead us beyond the point where you and I both seem to be bogging down. I come to this simply out of the fact that we are all here meeting. If indeed it were the case that the only criteria of judgment were those currently accepted within a particular discipline, if disciplinary relativism were the last work, then there would be no scope for bringing together people from all these different disciplines, and expecting there to be any kind of terrain on which they could argue things through together. I don't think we have had a great difficulty in understanding one another. There has been no difficulty in our engaging in an enterprise which we all recognize as a kind of rational enterprise. We would know what success would consist in namely, there should be some kind of common account of the outcome of having this series of discussions.

I want to move beyond the point which relativizes the standards of judgment. I want to draw a contrast here.
you take that disciplinary relativism for a moment, which I think is fine, as far as it goes, the question then arises, what is it to go beyond this? The way things have gone in the past, and why some of us are chary about going too quickly beyond this, as there seems nowhere else to go except Platonism, to generalize across everything and probably to be stuck with temporal fixity as well. This is what we were busy trying to get out of in the first place.

There does seem to be a more modest alternative. It arises out of a sense that there is always a job which can be done like the job which Charles Maxwell did for electricity, magnetism and light, namely, the production of a more comprehensive account, which is still something less that a universalistic account, but which enables us to say things within the framework of a single discipline that were previously only the provinces of different disciplines. This is particularly important. What we're concerned with is anything that has to do with our conception of human beings, and the way human beings operate. In particular, we have the deplorable spectacle of the behavioral and social sciences, all of which profess to be talking about human beings.

Hopper: Recent philosophers of science are drawing the same kinds of conclusions. They are talking about greater generalities.
Toulmin: I think this is what we are trying to do. I feel that when I talk about argumentation, reasoning, rationality, human understanding, in relation to my epistemological concerns, it is very important that the language I use will be language that will sit comfortably for people who are analyzing argumentation from rhetorical theory, and will also sit comfortably with developmental psychologists and also hopefully with anthropologists and sociologists. At the moment, we have no social vocabulary.

Brockriede: I see one kind of transdisciplinary universal about argumentation. That is a chariness found both the Platonic and the relativistic positions. Somehow, when we reject an exclusive reliance on either of these positions, we must learn to cope with the dialectical tensions between general standards and contextual judgments. Perhaps that comes down to the advice to be smart and appraise well. We ought to be able to go beyond that, but I'm not sure how.

Farrell: Wait! I think I've just awakened from my dogmatic slumbers. Could there be a second criterion in addition to what you have been talking about? Human Understanding indicated that one of the places where you go beyond disciplinary relativism is in the evolutionary status of the disciplines. At certain points, I sense perhaps an overamount of faith in evolution. There is an alternative. We don't want to go into Platonism, and we don't want to find ourselves
reduced to a vicious relativism, so we take root in faith in rationality as a process of evolution. Sometimes I sense ourselves sounding like the Progressives at the turn of the century. I wonder if there isn't a very active role all the way along in developing, let's say, devices for improving context. That's why I asked the question earlier about supervening contexts. I think it's something you would have to re-invent because much of our argumentation, isn't bounded by a forum or forums. I think our conversation is an illustration of that. We've had to improvise occasionally.

Falsifiables: The Process of Discrediting; The Prospects of An Argument's Survival

Cronen: Try to carry that just a little further. I'm very sympathetic to the notion that somehow the culturally relativistic position rubs into trouble. I'm not very comfortable living with that alone. Is one possible way to go at it Popper's notion of falsifiable? To what extent does the community have consensus at least in some general sense as to what counts as a falsification? I think there is some potential in that when I look at the history of scientific work on some theories that went far beyond the time which they should have, like dissonance theory. The theory was so badly stated in part, a consensus could never emerge as to when to get off. Now, fortunately, the scientific community also has a general consensus about how many studies you can run which show contradictory findings
that are ungeneralizable to the world. At some point, you are not buying into Kuhn's, "There is a refutational single case that is proof to everyone." I think that's silly. But there is a notion generally as to how many disconfirmations you can see in a journal and you know a theory doesn't work.

Hopper: As I'm reading the anthropologists, there's an awful lot going on. We can learn when to back off, and how to know when things have been falsified.

Toulmin: Could they have said "discredited" for "falsified?"

Cronen: Yes. I'm backing off of that Kuhn position.

Hopper: This is something we could carry on with. For the kinds of things we've been talking about, forums, standpoints, what constitutes standards for falsifiability or discrediting?

Rieke: I am attracted to Popper's notion (without liking the term falsifying over the term discrediting). We see some evidence about the way decision groups function, about the concept that decision is not a selected justified position as much as it is a survivor among all of the ideas that are thrown out. A final consensus keeps the undiscredited, the residue of the discrediting process. We see it in some of the work in group decision making, and also in observational studies of the way public policy decisions are made. Ideas
are stated, and the opponents go after them in response to that discrediting process so that a political decision that comes out is a survivor. It's a residue of a constant discrediting process.

Farrell: From Prof. Toulmin's description earlier, there is an affirmative moment in this discrediting process.

Toulmin: Yes, Popper talks too much in that way.

Cronen: I agree with that. In fact, I ascribe generally to Harré's attack on the adequacy of Popper's falsifiability criterion. There's one advantage this gives us that could almost be quantifiable. You can demonstrate empirically that some groups cannot falsify. Take for example the John Birch Society. No Bircher can admit, or think of an instant which, if it were to be observed, would not be consistent with their perspective.

Hopper: I have a proposition. There is a suggestion that certain kinds of arguments are survivors in the sense that they are undiscredited. Speaking to this suggestion is a possible relationship to those portions of arguments that are not spoken. Is it possible that bringing an assertion to the point of explicit examination increases the probability of its being discredited, whereas remaining implicit helps it to survive? Perhaps the inability of John Birchers to discredit a theory is related to their inability to bring it
into conscious examination? It seems there is survival value in remaining hidden that a almost like camouflage. If a thing remains totally unsaid, it increases its survival prospects.

Rieke: You may be stating the essence of what defines an argumentative situation: to get the argument identified, so that it is susceptible to challenge.

Hopper: Yes.

Rieke: As you spoke, I was thinking of inoculation theory. By never bringing out a cultural truism, it holds, it is strong, but it is also extraordinarily susceptible the first time it is stated. The systematic expression of counter-argument seems to strengthen just by rehearsal of argumentative process. To engage in the business of saying, "This is my argument," and therefore in so saying, "I invite the critical comment," is the essence of the argumentative situation.

Hopper: Yes, I think of the old archetype which is never challenged, which is more and more specialized. It's a lot like an idea that just passes time challenged. It finally is proposed and survives in some kind of active life. Could you say that, to get to knowledge generation, that argument may be generative of knowledge to the extent that it brings a previously unspoken supposition into the light of discourse?
Crable: Not necessarily, because what it could be is a claim to know that simply fits well within the context of the words that are prescribed by the discipline. It doesn't necessarily have to be an aberration at all.

Toulmin: What he's talking about also happens.

Crable: Yes, but it doesn't have to happen is my point. The kinds of justification that are applicable to a claim to know in a particular field are subject to change as the discipline progresses. A justification process in a given discipline may be acceptable to the present group of members or that discipline, but historically, futuristically, that's it going to be? We don't know. That's my point. At the same time, it could be justification could mean, being accepted at this point; but as you said, it happens to be justification that either does or does not relate well to the disciplinary criteria and standards. Those things become warrants in relation to the claim to know. If the standard functions as a warrant for this claim to know, then there is no problem. There is no serious challenge to the standards of the field. But if the justification seems somehow to go beyond the standard, then some evolutionary or quasi-evolutionary process will see the standards change as well.

Farrell: I think Prof. Hopper's argument carries forward a curious ambiguity in that some propositions and beliefs
don't survive. They break up very quickly after they have been held for a long period of time. There are examples of risking propositions; the fact of risking a proposition tests the validity to see if you want to retain it. In a strange sort of way, rhetorical argumentation not only tests knowledge by revealing premises to scrutiny, but also determines or establishes places of conviction by telling us which premises we don't want to continue to subject to scrutiny. Otherwise, tacit knowledge would be falsified all the time as soon as it was subject to reflection. And it isn't.

Toulmin: But not because it is accepted uncritically.

Farrell: Not at all. Simply because of a type of mutual avoidance of vicious skepticism. We were talking about absolutism and relativism before. The very process of avoiding those two things is one way we have of saying to ourselves, we are not going to continue to reflect on propositions which we want to accept as a matter of conviction for our culture for our lives.

Crable: That would seem to be a matter of irrationality of a discipline in terms of whether or not it's going to allow us standards above description.

Farrell: It may be. But at the same time as we are talking about cultural knowledge, we are always setting demarcations.
Toulmin: You are talking about unstated propositions. The legitimacy of criticizing these unstated concepts may be impossible unless we can find some other concepts to replace them, whereas with a proposition, that just doesn't happen to be true. If there's something we've been assuming all this time and it turns out not to be true, we may just have to drop it without trace. We have no other proposition to replace it by. If the implicit presuppositions of our thought are construed as conceptual rather than as propositional, I don't think that the consequences are as vicious as they are embarrassing.

Crable: But it would be rare, the instance where a concept within a field would be rejected without a concept to replace it. I assume that a rejected concept would be replaced by a more powerful or generalizable concept. Or, it would be replaced by a conceptual description of why the original concept was no longer necessary. In either case, the development—not necessarily the progress—of the discipline continues on the basis of the argumentative acceptance or rejection of claims to know.