The major purpose of this study is to further understanding of conflict management in educational governance. The study compares and contrasts the conflict management behaviors of 52 superintendents and 52 city managers and the conditions that are associated with such behaviors. The sample was drawn from the San Francisco (California) and Chicago (Illinois) areas. Data are presented by geographical location as well as by interviewee position. Similarities between school district and council-manager institutions are discussed. The researchers examine how the respondents both perceive and handle citizen involvement and involvement by other interested parties. In accounting for differences between the two groups, the three dimensions of the nature of conflict (source, substance, and scope of intensity) are explored. Educational and municipal governments are compared for the levels of conflict arising from various sources: the legislative body, segments of the community, staff members, and other levels of government. The discussion of substance concerns how school districts and municipalities are affected by various types of conflict issues, such as those that evolve from collective bargaining, state or federal regulations, or other kinds of tensions within the community. The discussion of the scope or intensity of conflicts focuses on the number and characteristics of parties involved and the duration of the conflict. (Author/MLF)
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Reexamining the
Beleaguered Superintendent Question

by
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Ellen Kehoe
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1981

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I. Introduction

Educational and Municipal Governance: Effects of the Reform Movements

In the early part of this century, the forces of reform in local government shaped both educational and municipal structures. Thus, school and municipal decision-makers today have many issues, problems, and constraints in common. Just as the council-manager form of government is often identified as one of the goals of municipal reform, so the modern school superintendency is a product of educational reform (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Boynton 1976; Dye 1973). Municipal and school district reforms were guided by the same tripartite ideology:

1. The "public interest" should prevail over competing, partial interests.
2. Government is really an administrative and technical problem rather than a political one, since reasonable people can agree on the public interest.
3. The best qualified people should decide on policy and then leave implementation to professional experts.

A brief review of data on school district and council-manager institutions will serve to document how similar these two forms of local government are. The council-manager form of local government has grown over the past thirty years from characterizing one-fourth of the cities of five thousand or more in population, to becoming the most common form of municipal
government (ICMA 1952, 1978). The structural goal of reform—nonpartisan selection of lay legislators—has been achieved in both school districts and council-manager municipalities. Approximately 25 percent of all school districts select board members by partisan election (Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak 1974). Council-manager cities have the lowest rate of partisan elections; less than 13 percent of council-manager municipalities allow partisan electoral competition (ICMA 1978). Ward-based election of legislative officials has been curtailed in both school districts and municipal governments. About 73 percent of school districts have pure, at-large elections (Zeigler, Jennings, Peak 1974). Of the forty-nine cities surveyed by the National School Boards Association, 82 percent of school districts that elect board members do so on an at-large basis (National School Boards Association 1975). Three-fourths of municipalities with council-manager forms of government have consistently elected city council members on an at-large basis over the last quarter century.

Despite a shared history in the evolution of their positions, when educational and municipal administrators are confronted with conflict and with the task of managing conflict, they differ in their personal and professional resources and in their administrative positions. These differences suggest a value in comparative research for understanding the conflict management behavior of local administrators. The utility of the comparison is given credence by the results of interviews with superintendents and city managers, as both expressed an interest in learning from the comparison. The fact that a large number of city managers and superintendents in the same localities meet together informally, and many, routinely,
to discuss mutual concerns demonstrates that city managers and superintendents feel they would benefit from comparative analysis.

Some research has been done on the role of conflict management behavior for city managers in municipal governance (Eyestone 1971; Love-rige 1971; Stillman 1974). But conflict as an area of inquiry is still novel to educational research. Salisbury, in his recent study of citizen participation in education (1980), notes his surprise at the recurrence of conflict throughout the course of his interviews. Salisbury's conclusions are highly revealing:

School activists dislike conflict. They are uneasy about political parties because, in part at least, partisan involvement implies directly competitive struggle. They are uneasy about changes within their communities or in their school program, in part it seems, because change presents the possibility of disagreement. They are, with some exceptions, uneasy in the presence of heterogeneity, of race or class, because this too means potential conflict over what values ought to prevail. . . . Our data are not remotely sufficient to explore thoroughly this issue, but the matter of American attitudes toward political and social conflict is thoroughly deserving of a prominent place in the research agenda (Salisbury 1980, pp. 198-199).

Comparative analysis would have eased Salisbury's concern; we give conflict "a prominent place in the research agenda."

Traditional Views of Conflict

While managers in municipal governance have always operated in a traditional political context, such conditions have been considered to be the exception for school managers. However, the turbulence of the 1960s certainly seems to have politicized education. Popular accounts of highly publicized conflicts portrayed professionals as struggling vainly against
a variety of powerful interest groups. Professionals themselves were active in promulgating the view of the "beleaguered superintendent" (Boyd 1976, p. 545). One observer quoted from the ranks of the beleaguered to support his contention that the world of the superintendent, viewed from the inside, is far more conflictual than is conveyed by the descriptions of students of educational policymaking.

The American school superintendent, long the benevolent ruler whose word was law, has become a harried, embattled figure of waning authority. . . . brow beaten by once subservient boards of education, (teachers' associations), and parents, the superintendent can hardly be blamed if he feels he has lost control of his destiny. . . . Administrative powerlessness is becoming one of the most pervasive realities of organizational life (Maeroff 1974, p. 1; Erickson 1972, pp. 3-4).

While some might be inclined to dismiss such testimony as self-serving, the view has been to some extent echoed by scholars who argue that this model of professional dominance is no longer correct. Representative of this argument is McCarty and Ramsey's The School Managers (1971). This study of 51 school districts in the northeast and midwest led them to conclude:

One can hardly avoid the view that today's educational administrator is engulfed in a pressure packed set of constraints. . . . individuals previously without power are rapidly becoming aware of the strength that can be marshalled if they work together. . . . the tensions so apparent throughout American society have galvanized (school) boards into the political arena with a vengeance (McCarty and Ramsey 1971, pp. 153, 211, and 213).

The upshot of this controversy has been a renewed interest in the question "Are schools really that conflictual?" This new interest is shared by practitioners and scholars in educational administration, political
science, sociology, and other social sciences. Social scientists who see a technological revolution as changing the basis of governmental decision-making are interested in exploring the technological decisionmaking model so well established in the educational policy literature. Simultaneously, students and practitioners of educational administration who see increasing politicization of educational governance are interested in exploring topics such as popular participation and conflict resolution under the democratic decisionmaking model (Boyd 1976, pp. 539-577). There has also been a growing concern that educational policy researchers should make greater use of research techniques employed by other social scientists. Proponents of the democratic and technological models of educational decisionmaking had relied almost exclusively on the case study approach. Their studies typically examined a small, unrepresentative sample of school districts and focused on major decisions in those districts. Consequently, the studies could not be replicated and their findings were not generalizable. A study based on a large sample, systematically selected, which takes a comparative view of the decisionmaking process, is a desirable complement to the growing literature subsumed under the rubric "Politics of Education."

How do we resolve the apparent contradiction between research findings that show professional administrators dominating the processes of educational policy with the assertion of schoolmen themselves or observers sympathetic to them that they have lost control of the governing of schools? (Boyd 1975).

We suggest that the resolution to the problem lies in greater understanding of educational policymaking under conditions of conflict in which
the technological model of decisionmaking is most often challenged as inappropriate and in which the democratic model has a chance to operate. These conditions seem to be particularly trying for school administrators. The major purpose of this research program is to further understanding of conflict management in educational governance.

Contrary to the professional maxim that superintendents should not engage in politics, they are, in actuality, political actors with political powers. As in other units of government, school district governance involves conflict. For many superintendents, political conflict presents a crucial paradox: when conflict occurs, the technical skills so diligently developed not only are of no value, they are a liability. Trained in the tenets of an ideology that defines conflict as pathological and consensus as the most legitimate basis for a decision, superintendents may find conflict more painful than other executive officers. Unfortunately, a lack of experience in handling conflict may result in a tendency either to avoid or over-react to criticism, which may then generate more intense conflict.

This problem is especially acute under conditions of episodic, non-routinized conflict. Episodic conflict reduces the effectiveness of the basis resources of the manager. The basic resource of superintendents, expertise, is not accepted as negotiable. Because superintendents rely on expertise rather than on more traditional political skills, the power base of the superintendent is destroyed when this resource is declared inapplicable. It is no surprise that issues of episodic conflict (such as busing and school closures made necessary by declining enrollments), which cannot be solved by technical skills, are troublesome to superintendents. As
American schools move to an era of scarce resources, the essentially political issue of resource distribution will become dominant. School boards will continue to turn to superintendents for recommendations. Superintendents must use both their political and technical craft as the task of conflict management becomes more prominent in school district governance.

Systematic research should not focus exclusively on those instances in which the technological mode of decisionmaking is inappropriate (i.e., examples of non-routine, or episodic, conflict). However, such instances are important beyond their numbers; they provide opportunities for the democratic mode of decisionmaking (Peterson, Boyd, Zald, and others have suggested this possibility). As Zald explains: "It is during the handling of major phase problems, or strategic decision points, that board power is most likely to be asserted. It is at such times, too, that basic conflicts and diversions both with the board and between the managers and the board are likely to be pronounced" (Boyd, p. 107). Boyd argues that such occasions are triggered by finance and expansion, school consolidation, and the selection of new superintendents (p. 121). However, the evidence is far from clear. Our own research indicates that there is more involved than the substance of the issue, a point which we will develop in the concluding section of this report.
II. Conflict Management Behavior

In general, we are interested in the question of how school superintendents and city managers manage conflict. We reason that given the different types of professional training and experiences of these two types of managers, they will vary in their conflict management behavior. In addition, our sample includes superintendents and city managers in two different locations—the Chicago S.M.S.A. and the San Francisco S.M.S.A. Different types of state laws, financial conditions, socio-economic factors and local precedents may cause further variation in conflict management behavior within the groups of superintendents and city managers. Thus, our research agenda stretches beyond the issue of how conflict is managed. We also compare and contrast the conflict management behaviors of superintendents and city managers and the conditions that are associated with them.

Several of our research variables address these issues. Ultimately, we will be interested in how these variables relate to the other study variables. But at the present time, we are concerned with their bivariate distribution according to the position and location of the respondents.

Conflict Management and Managers' Perception and Treatment of Individuals and Groups

An important component of conflict management behavior pertains to the perception and treatment of individuals and groups who take an interest in school district or municipal affairs. The literature on public administration suggests that managers often attempt to individualize conflict in
order to contain it (Eisinger 1972; Katz, Gutek, Kahn, and Barton 1975). Managers may also attempt to institutionalize citizen involvement by forming task forces, referring citizens to existing committees and organizations, or appointing them to commissions (Cobb and Elder 1972; Thompson 1976).

This section examines how our respondents both perceive and handle citizen involvement and involvement by other interested parties. Specifically, we are interested in how much time the respondents spend with various individuals and groups, both in general and in conflict situations, whether or not the respondent perceives public interest groups as helpful or harmful, whether the respondents prefer to work with individuals or groups, and what measures they take, if any, to maintain conflict at the individual level.

**Time Spent Managing Conflict**

In general, city managers spend a larger percent of their time managing conflict than do superintendents (city managers in California account for most of this difference). Table 1, below, provides this information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Managers</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance: $F = 4.274$  $p < .01$
Additional information from the interviews supports the assertion that city managers spend a greater proportion of their time managing conflict than do superintendents.

We asked our respondents a series of questions about how much time they spend with various groups and individuals and how much of that time is spent managing conflict. Overall, more city managers spent a high percent of their time managing conflict with various groups and individuals than superintendents: 65% for city managers; 49% for superintendents. Table 2 reports our findings for this series of questions.

### Table 2
High percent of time spent with groups and individuals and managing conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% High</th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% time</td>
<td>% time in conflict</td>
<td>% time</td>
<td>% time in conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>69**</td>
<td>27***</td>
<td>81**</td>
<td>42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>8%**</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%**</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Federal Government</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>50%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Administration</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 26  25  27

* p = .10
** p = .05
*** p = .01

NOTE: Since we were looking at groups by position and location, it was not uncommon to find fewer than 5 respondents in a given cell. As a result, statistical tests of significance are not the best indicator of significant relationships. (See Nie, et al. Statistical Package for the Social Science, 1975.)
All groups spend a great deal of time with their legislative bodies, but city managers spend substantially more of that time in conflict than superintendents. The California city managers stand out as spending the most time with their legislative bodies, as well as spending the most time in conflict with their legislative bodies. The vast majority of superintendents in California, like the city managers, spend a high amount of their time with their legislative bodies, but engage in less conflict. The time that both California groups spend with their respective legislative bodies may reflect the difficulties of complying with the financial restrictions of Proposition 13 and related measures.

The majority of all the subgroups spend a high percent of their time with community members both in general and in conflict situations. Slightly more city managers spend a high percent of their time in conflict with the community members than the superintendents. Also, more of the California respondents spend a high percent of their time in general with the community than is the case for the Illinois respondents.

City managers are more likely to spend more time both in communication and in conflict with other local government officials. While most superintendents spend little time with local government officials, approximately one-third of the superintendents in both states find their time spent with officials to involve conflict. This finding is not particularly surprising. City governments sustain more exchange relationships with other local governments. School districts, however, are generally independent from other local government units. When school governments do interact with other local governments, they are usually meeting about planning, facilities and local ordinances...
that affect school districts—all potentially conflictual situations.

The majority of all the subgroups reported little time spent with state and federal government officials. However, nearly one half of the superintendents and well over half of the city managers spent high percentages of this time in conflict. Apparently the interaction between local governments, on the one hand, and state and federal governments, on the other hand, concerns matters which are conflict related.

Nearly all the superintendents and most of the city managers spend a high percentage of their time with their own administrators. Fewer respondents, but still more than half, report that a substantial percentage of this time is spent in conflict. The percentage of time spent with administrators is logical in terms of the functions of most complex organizations.

Perception and Treatment of Public Interest Groups

Individuals, rather than organized groups, tend to participate in school affairs, irrespective of location. The public tends to engage in municipal affairs, however, more as a combination of individuals and groups. (See Table 1 in the Appendix). Earlier research (Thompson 1976) would lead us to believe that superintendents prefer individual participation over organized public interest group participation while city managers are both more accustomed to and accepting of group participation. This is only partially consistent with our findings. Superintendents in Illinois indeed prefer to work with individuals over groups while the city managers in this state are less likely to have a particular preference. But the
California respondents in both positions are more likely to prefer some combination of individuals and organizations and are least likely to prefer individual participation exclusively. Table 3 delineates these findings.

Table 3

Respondents' Preference for Working with Individuals, Organizations, or Both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' Preference</th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>14 (54%)</td>
<td>7 (27%)</td>
<td>9 (36%)</td>
<td>6 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
<td>8 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>7 (27%)</td>
<td>14 (54%)</td>
<td>9 (36%)</td>
<td>13 (48%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 26 26 25 27

Even though the superintendents in Illinois preferred working with individuals over groups, they and other respondent groups considered the participation of public interest groups to be more helpful than harmful. Approximately 85% of each respondent group considered public interest group participation to be helpful (see Table 2 in the Appendix). But there is a catch to this--both city managers and superintendents in the study sites overwhelmingly agreed that when public interest groups acted as special interest groups they were harmful to school districts and municipalities. More specifically, groups were considered to be harmful when they
had a narrow focus or were overtly political. The respondents were also annoyed when groups lacked information or intruded on the policy process. But these behaviors were not nearly as troublesome as those of special-interest groups. See Table 3 in the Appendix.

The frustration with special interest participation reflects a recurring theme in local governance. A major goal of the reform movement had been to make governance more "public regarding" rather than "private regarding" (Banfield and Wilson 1963). But narrowly focused special interest group participation challenges government officials who believe that they are responsible for protecting the public interest rather than specialized interests. Excerpts from our interviews illustrate many of the respondents' attitudes toward special interest groups. One city manager in Illinois remarked: "It's the same problem as in Washington--people are coming to believe that they have to join a special interest group to be heard. If this is true, it is unfortunate. This goes against the will of the majority. The definition of a special group is 'I've got mine--to hell with you.'" And similarly, a superintendent in California noted: "Groups are harmful when they become self-serving and lose sight of public education which is supposed to be an equal opportunity to gain education for all children."

Regarding overt political behavior, one Illinois superintendent declared that groups are harmful "when challenging elected officials."

We are further interested in whether the respondents attempted to individualize conflict or to prevent group formation, a strategy for conflict management. For example, one parent protesting a particular school closure is generally not as threatening as fifty organized parents. The
responses to this question were very interesting. The superintendents unanimously stated that they attempted to individualize conflict as a rule of thumb. As one superintendent in California explained, "When you have an individual parent with a problem, try to help them before they try to go to the Supreme Court or something. . . ." A majority of the city managers in both sites also attempted to individualize conflict, but there were notable exceptions for these groups: 12% of the city managers in Illinois and 15% of the city managers in California did not normally attempt to individualize conflict. This concurs with earlier research revealing that city managers are more likely to accept the occurrence of group participation than superintendents.

The predominant strategy for individualizing conflict was the same for all groups: address individual needs. Obviously, this may often be easier said than done, particularly in an era of declining resources. The city managers in Illinois indicated another major strategy: Twenty-nine percent of their responses referred to cooptation strategies. In other words, this group would often attempt to integrate a disgruntled individual into the decision-making process or in some other way undermine the effectiveness of an individual in rallying group support. For example, one city manager informed us: "I will coopt an issue if necessary. If I sense that one person is taking a conflicting position I view as harmful, I'll attempt to coopt that person's effectiveness by going to the group and pointing out the negative effect of that person." Another city manager agreed with this strategy: "I do what I can to single out individuals:
Other less frequently offered strategies involved negotiation and compromise, adhering to bureaucratic procedures vis-a-vis staff and rules, and passive delaying tactics. The latter response—passive delay—was only cited twice, indicating an awareness by the respondents that given the power of collective protest, individual concerns must be taken seriously. Table 4 in the Appendix reports these findings.

**Conflict Management Style**

We are also interested in a comprehensive view of conflict management behavior. For heuristic purposes, this behavior can be separated into three distinct phases: anticipation or conflict detection; regulation or controlling conflict expansion; and aftermath or resolving hard feelings. Various styles may be employed during each of these phases, including a political style, a rational/technical style, and a compromising/mediating style. As we are currently reanalyzing the variables concerning conflict management behavior, it would be inappropriate to include these findings in the text of this report. While we have conducted a bivariate frequency distribution of conflict management behavior for each of the study groups, we have not yet determined the dominant conflict management styles utilized by particular respondents. This latter information requires additional refinements in our measurement and analytical techniques.
III. Nature of Conflict

In addition to the exploration of the differences between the conflict management behaviors of superintendents and city managers, this study aims to explain how the nature of conflict accounts for such differences. We are specifically interested in three dimensions of the nature of conflict: its sources, its substance, and its scope of intensity. We will compare educational and municipal governments for the levels of conflict arising from various sources: the legislative body, segments of the community, staff members, and other levels of government. The "substance" issue concerns how school districts and municipalities are affected by various types of conflict issues such as those that evolve from collective bargaining, state or federal regulations, or other kinds of tensions within the community. Regarding the scope or intensity of conflicts faced, we focus on the number and characteristics of parties involved and the duration of the conflict.

The data concerning the source, substance, and scope of conflicts will be presented by geographical location (i.e., whether or not they have occurred in Illinois or California metropolitan areas) as well as by position.

Sources of Conflict

Past research leads us to hypothesize that we will find a greater disparity between superintendents and city managers concerning the array of sources of conflicts they face, than between the educational and municipal managers in California and in Illinois. In Governing American
Schools (Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak 1974), the local community was found to have little influence over school affairs, due to the tendency of school boards to defer to the expertise of the superintendent. Peterson confirmed this notion with his argument that "the board becomes the agent of legitimation that provides a facade of public control, while power is really being exercised by administrators" (1974, p. 352). In contrast, studies of municipal governments find a substantial amount of conflict between the council and the city manager over the latter's role in determining municipal policy (Loveridge 1971). One reason given for this is that city councils represent a more diverse range of backgrounds than do school boards (Eulau and Prewitt 1973; Torgovnik 1969, p. 35), and therefore are less likely to defer to expertise than the middle- to upper-class professionals who dominate school boards (Kammerer 1963, p. 439). We hypothesize, therefore, that the local legislature and the community will be less of a source of conflict for the school district than for the municipality.

We also expect that the staff within the school district will be a less active source of conflict to be faced by the school superintendent than the municipal staff faced by the city manager. The findings of an earlier study, Professionals versus the Public (Tucker and Zeigler 1980), indicate that school superintendents are more responsive to professionals within the district than to the clients they serve. We anticipate that this phenomenon also holds true, to an extent, for city managers. However, we hypothesize that the level of conflict between the administrator and the professional staff will be lower within the school district than in the municipality, since educators hold more in common in terms of
professional backgrounds and ideologies than do municipal personnel. For similar reasons we anticipate that there will be a lower level of conflict between state and federal educational agencies and the school district than for state and federal legislative bodies and municipal government. Indeed, Paul Hill suggests that it is an informal management system that relies on professional loyalties, rather than formal incentive systems, which brings about school district compliance with external mandates (Hill 1979). However, while we do expect position rather than geographical location to be a more powerful predictor of the differences in the level of conflict encountered from various sources, we also expect geographical location to account for some differences. In the wake of property tax measures Propositions 4 and 13, many districts and municipalities in California have been forced to make severe budget cuts. Consequently, it is logical to expect a higher degree of conflict emanating from sources in the California area than from our Illinois area sites, for reasons related to James Q. Wilson's comment that "the politics of scarcity is the politics of conflict" (Banfield and Wilson 1963).

The Local Legislature as a Source of Conflict: The Results

The data consistently support our hypothesis that, due to greater deference to expertise, the level of conflict between the administrator and the local legislative body will be lower for superintendents than for city managers. As indicated earlier in Table 2, only 27% and 42% of superintendents from Illinois and California, respectively, reported that
a moderate to high amount of time spent with the legislature dealt with conflict compared to 56% and 74% for the city managers in the two areas. These findings also indicate that the level of conflict with the board/council was substantially higher in the sites in California than in Illinois. However, the gap between the superintendents and city managers is far greater than that between administrators in Illinois and California, supporting the notion that position is a greater predictor here than geographic location. The measure of the amount of time spent with the legislature in managing conflict is not the sole proxy for measuring administrative conflict with the board/council. The superintendent or city manager may instead be helping the legislative body to resolve a conflict within itself. However, the results were similar when superintendents and city managers from both areas were asked how many times they took a stand with which the majority of the board/council disagreed. Only 19% and 23% of superintendents from Illinois and California, respectively, stated that this occurred a moderate to high number of times. In contrast, 36% and 56% of city managers from these two areas reported disagreement occurring a moderate to high number of times. Also, when asked to describe an actual major conflict situation, city managers related incidents in which the local legislative body was the prime initiator twice as often as did superintendents.

When asked directly about the amount of conflict occurring within the legislative body, however, only city managers from California stood out as having a relatively high degree of conflict, with approximately three-fourths indicating a moderate to high level of conflict. Other groups
indicated only slightly more than one-third experienced a high degree of conflict. One plausible explanation for the relatively low levels of disagreement within both boards and councils in Illinois (i.e., the Chicago area) is the prevalence of the "caucus" method of selecting members to run for positions on each of these legislative bodies. When asked "What accounts for the level of disagreement within the board/ council?", superintendents and city managers from Illinois often explained low levels of disagreement by saying that those selected to run on the caucus slate were reported to be fairly similar in backgrounds and purposes and were virtually assured of winning the elections. Stelzer notes that "instead of aggregating [citizen] demands and involving greater numbers the caucus is often used to preclude debate and opposition" (1975, p. 73). The relatively high degree of conflict between council members in California may stem from the tensions created by unpopular budget cut decisions in addition to the fact that council members tend to represent a wider array of backgrounds than do board members.

A greater number of city managers than superintendents also reported a significant difference between themselves and the local legislative body over the appropriate scope of their jobs. Sixty and sixty-three percent of city managers from Illinois and California, respectively, reported a major difference, in contrast to only thirty-one and fifty percent of superintendents in these two areas. In addition, the number of members within the local legislative body who saw the job differently was greater for city managers than for superintendents. These two factors, coupled with the fact that the unpredictability of legislators who view the job differently is higher
for city managers than for superintendents, suggests that city managers have a more difficult conflict management situation vis-a-vis their legislative bodies than do superintendents. It is interesting to note, however, that the level of predictability is also substantially lower in California than Illinois. Over 30% of superintendents from California reported a higher degree of unpredictability in comparison with only 9% of the superintendents in Illinois. Similarly, 65% of the city managers from California noted this unpredictability in comparison to 31% for Illinois. This suggests that the politics of scarcity not only entail a higher degree of conflict, but also of unpredictability.

Our comparative study substantiates the notion that school boards are an "agent of legitimation" and that many superintendents may feel threatened if a policy recommendation were turned down by the board. A full 54% and 39% of superintendents in Illinois and California, respectively, reported that over the period of a year not one policy recommendation had been rejected by the school board. In sharp contrast, only 8% and 7% of city managers from the two areas had a zero rejection rate over one year. Where the number of rejected policy recommendations was five or greater, the geographical location factor seemed to have some influence. While 34% of superintendents from California fell into this category, it described only 4% of superintendents from Illinois. Similarly, while 56% of city managers from California had more than five policy rejections annually, only 36% of those in Illinois experienced the same.
The Public

As previously noted in the conflict management behavior section, roughly two-thirds of both superintendents and city managers in each of the two metropolitan areas spend a relatively high amount of time with community groups and individuals and approximately two-thirds spend a high proportion of this time managing conflict. The exceptions to this is superintendents from California, where more than three-fourths report that they spend a high amount of time with the public, but only approximately one-half report that a high proportion of the time spent is used to manage conflict. This may stem from greater involvement of California superintendents with state-mandated parent advisory councils for school improvement. A fairly high proportion of this time is spent for activities other than the management of individual or group conflicts, such as planning or holding informational meetings. In contrast, 74% of the city managers in California report that they spend a significant amount of time with community groups managing conflict.

As with the legislatures, the city managers seem to face more difficult conflict management situations, with regard to the public, than do superintendents, although the findings are less conclusive. Likewise, local managers in California tend to have a more difficult situation than those in Illinois. When asked about the levels of disagreement among the public, approximately 40% of superintendents from Illinois and California, respectively, noted moderate to high levels of disagreement. A greater proportion of city managers noted moderate to high levels of disagreement. A greater proportion of city managers noted moderate to high levels of conflict,
and 70% of Illinois and California, respectively. City managers are also more likely than superintendents to report that they often take a stand with which the majority of the public might disagree (approximately 55% for city managers in both locations, versus 42% for superintendents in each of the two states).

As stated before, individuals, rather than organized groups, tend to participate in school districts, irrespective of location. City managers, however, indicated that both individual and organizational participation were prevalent in municipal government. The number of superintendents who reported participation of seven or more active organizations was somewhat lower than for city managers, averaged over both locations. While 39% and 50% of superintendents in Illinois and California, respectively, worked with seven or more organizations, this went to 44% and 55% for city managers in these two locations. The number of active organizations is then greater for managers in California, irrespective of position.

A vast difference exists between the types of organizations superintendents and city managers face. The four most active groups (and the percentage of managers who reported their presence) are listed below:
Table 4

Most Active Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superintendents</th>
<th>City Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. P.T.A. (23%)</td>
<td>1. Business and Professional Groups (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Citizen's Advisory Groups (16%)</td>
<td>2. Service Club (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Local Special Interest Groups (15%)</td>
<td>3. P.T.A. (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Service Clubs (14%)</td>
<td>4. Service Clubs (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Local Special Interest Groups (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Citizen's Advisory Groups (16%)</td>
<td>2. Neighborhood Groups (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Local Special Interest Groups (15%)</td>
<td>3. Service Clubs (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Service Clubs (14%)</td>
<td>4. Local Special Interest Groups (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Service Clubs (18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What emerges from this table is that a large number of the groups mentioned by superintendents are internal organizations, while the majority of those mentioned by city managers are external to the municipal government. Leigh Stelzer argues that school district reliance on internal, rather external, organizations may bode ill for future success in conflict management. She uses the PTA to illuminate this point:

The PTA, a mainstay of support of many boards, has several obvious drawbacks. The PTA is a creation of school administrations for passing on information—not for articulating demands—and its members are justifiably perceived as boosters. Furthermore, the PTA appeals to a narrow segment of the constituency. Few members, much less outsiders, would seek or expect its support in articulating grievances.

School government could not survive in the face of conflict without developing some kind of coping mechanism. The sensitivity of so many school-related issues is a natural foundation for conflict. The widespread requirement that school governments submit budgets, tax levies, and bond proposals to public referenda assumes conflict sooner or later (1975, p. 73).
Such a message is all the more foreboding for successful conflict management in school governance when one is also confronted with the data that over half the groups reported by superintendents are internal, while only four percent of the groups mentioned by city managers are intra-municipal. Since trends suggest that the public schools will face increased competition for resources from both private schools and clients of other social services (Guthrie 1981), school superintendents may need to learn to work with groups outside the schools to maintain support for public education.

**Intraorganizational Conflict**

Both superintendents and city managers, in each of the metropolitan areas within our sample, report that the majority of the time spent with their administrative staff involves the resolution of conflict. The percentage of city managers who spend a high amount of time in conflict resolution (64% and 74% for Illinois and California, respectively) was somewhat higher than for superintendents (58% and 69%). The administrative staffs of city managers also tend to move towards the advisory end on the advisory-to-decision-making continuum, than do those of superintendents. This might suggest that superintendents defer more to the expertise of their staffs than do city managers.

With the exception of the city managers from California, most respondents reported low levels of conflict between themselves and the administrative staff members, line officers, and employees in the school district or municipality. A summary table is listed below:
Table 5

Percent of respondents noting moderate to high levels of conflict between themselves and the administrative staff, line officers, or employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% High Administrative Staff</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% High Line Officers</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% High Employees</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all three cases, city managers from California faced the highest levels of intraorganizational conflict, which supports our stated hypotheses to some degree, as the level of intraorganizational conflict is higher in municipalities than school districts, where there is a higher level of professional loyalty, and in California (over Illinois), where positions are being cut due to binding fiscal constraints. It is also only among California city managers that a majority of respondents claim that there are policy areas which they would not discuss with their professional staffs, indicating the lack of professional loyalty and trust. It is interesting to note that the level of conflict with employees was fairly high for all groups, with the exception of city managers in Illinois, where employee collective bargaining units were present in only eight of the twenty-five sites in our sample.
State and Federal Government

We hypothesized earlier that superintendents may spend a lower proportion of time with state and federal agencies in actual conflict resolution than city managers due to a greater reliance on common professional loyalties. The data lend credence to this: 50% of superintendents spend a moderate to high degree of time in conflict resolution when working with state and federal level agencies in comparison with almost 70% and 80%, respectively, for city managers in Illinois and California.

Substance of Conflict

In order to explore more fully the nature of the conflicts from various sources, one must examine the substance of these conflicts. We hypothesize that geographical location will play a larger role in accounting for differences in the substance of conflicts faced due to distinctive environmental characteristics of California and Illinois.

First, there is a greater degree of state control over finance, especially school finance, in California as a result of property tax measures Propositions 4 and 13, and, prior to that, of the Serrano decision. Secondly, there are differences between the two states concerning the general level of state centralization of authority over educational policymaking. In "School Polity Culture and State Decentralization," Wirt uses an analysis of state laws regarding school policy to categorizes states along the decentralization-centralization continuum. In this categorization, California is ranked substantially higher towards centralization over educational policy-making decisions than was Illinois.
A third factor, state laws concerning collective bargaining, leads us to anticipate differences in the substance of conflict encountered between the two geographical regions. In Illinois, there is no state statute governing collective bargaining processes, so it is a matter of local option. In California, on the other hand, there are extensive state statutes concerning public sector negotiations. These are summarized by Mitchell and colleagues as follows:

... in California ... a 1975 Educational Employment Relations Act established the substantive right of teachers' organizations to have contractual relations and imposed on school boards the duty to recognize unions. Included in the California statute are provisions for a State Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) to administer the act, the concept of unfair labor practices, mediation and fact-finding procedures for responding to negotiations, impasses, and a unique "sunshine" requirement mandating that the original bargaining positions of both sides must be disclosed to the public before they can be brought to the bargaining table (Mitchell et al. 1981, 148).

Therefore, differences between respondents in the two states concerning conflicts related to collective bargaining, finance, and state regulation seem probable.

Community Perception of the Substance of Conflict

We asked all respondents to identify what they felt were areas of tension or conflict for both the public and the local legislature. In addition, superintendents and city managers described a major conflict in which they were involved. A listing of the general substance of the conflict situations most often noted by each group is located in Table 6.

While planning and zoning issues are the most common substance of conflict for city managers, service delivery and labor problems cause
more conflict for superintendents. Resource allocation issues are also a source of high tension in the school district setting, particularly for the public. Presumably such tension is caused by enrollment declines and school closures, as both are prevalent in school districts around Illinois and California metropolitan areas. Service delivery seemed to be given higher priority in Illinois than in California. This might suggest that where the level of local control is higher (e.g., where there is less state involvement in finance, policymaking, or collective bargaining), the public or legislature feel they have more control to influence service delivery. In other words, they may be more likely to express concerns when they feel that the system is "tightly-coupled" and can respond to demands related to service delivery. In fact, many superintendents and city managers in Illinois stated that the public thinks they have greater control over service delivery than is the case. This was not an issue for either group in California.

The legislatures for both superintendents and city managers were more involved in labor-related sources of conflict in California than in Illinois. According to Kerchner, this might be expected due to greater formalization of personnel management in California due to the higher incidence of collective bargaining. Looking at collective bargaining in the public schools he adds, "Likewise, movement in the laws of decision making usually involves politicization because decision making is usually moved away from the school administrative hierarchy and toward school boards, legislatures, or other settings where political decision making prevails" (Kerchner 1979, pp. 183-4). Consequently, one would expect the level of conflict over collective bargaining to be greater in California than in Illinois.
Table 6
Substance of Conflicts among Public, Legislature, and in Major Conflict Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superintendents</th>
<th>City Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Tensions</td>
<td>Public Tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legis. Tensions</td>
<td>Legis. Tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st</th>
<th>Service Delivery (31%)</th>
<th>Labor (31%)</th>
<th>Service Delivery (21%)</th>
<th>Labor (21%)</th>
<th>Resource Alloc/Budget Cuts (35%)</th>
<th>Service Delivery (28%)</th>
<th>Planning/Zoning (44%)</th>
<th>Planning/Zoning (36%)</th>
<th>Planning/Zoning (58%)</th>
<th>Planning/Zoning (57%)</th>
<th>Planning/Zoning (48%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Resource alloc/budget (27%)</td>
<td>Resource alloc/budget (31%)</td>
<td>Resource alloc/budget (24%)</td>
<td>Resource alloc/budget (24%)</td>
<td>Organization (27%)</td>
<td>Planning/Zoning (25%)</td>
<td>Service Delivery (13%)</td>
<td>Organization (20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Financial Taxes (20%)</td>
<td>Labor (16%)</td>
<td>Labor (8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intraorganizational Substance of Conflict

When asked about the major differences between themselves and their line officers, twice as many superintendents as city managers mentioned conflict over the issue of greater centralization versus decentralization. This is consistent with the literature suggesting that principals feel their role as instructional leaders has been eroded by increased centralization over collective bargaining, curriculum decisions, and implementation of state and federal programs and politics (Berg 1973; Johnson 1981). There were also differences between superintendents and city managers regarding the substance of disagreements with the employees. While the majority of city managers stated that conflicts revolved around wages and benefits, the majority of the conflicts between superintendents and teachers were concerned with more broadly defined "general working conditions." What Kleingartner (1973, p. 166) refers to as the "logic of professionalism" makes it difficult to separate out working conditions from school policy issues. Hence, the substance of conflict between the employees and the administrator tends to be of broader scope in the school district than in the municipal government. Since the appropriate scope of bargaining is more difficult to delimit in education, one might expect collective bargaining to pose a greater problem for superintendents than for city managers.

As it turns out, this is indeed the case. Fifty-four and fifty-eight percent of superintendents in Illinois and California consider collective bargaining to be problematic, in contrast to 16% and 48% of city managers. However, collective bargaining units are present in only one-third of the
municipalities in the Illinois portion of our sample. Still, in those
districts/municipalities where collective bargaining is present, 37% and
50% of superintendents from Illinois and California, respectively, con-
sider the process to be threatening in comparison to 0% and 22% of the city
managers in the two areas. Superintendents are also much more likely to
hire an outside negotiator if they do not bargain themselves, irrespective
of location. In addition, those city managers who do select negotiators
are twice as likely as superintendents to have sole responsibility for the
selection process, rather than also involving the local legislative body
in the process.

The fact that collective bargaining is not state-mandated but is a
matter of local option in Illinois may account for the greater prevalence
of the perception that collective bargaining is non-threatening. On the
other hand, more than twice as many superintendents in Illinois reported
the occurrence of a strike than did their counterparts in California. One
superintendent in our sample remarked that he felt that the fairly in-
cidence of strikes in that area was a result of the clash between the more
labor-oriented, Democratic, Chicago style of educational politics, as des-
cribed by Peterson (1976), and the more management-oriented suburban
school systems.

Substance of Conflicts Related to External Influences

In order to capture the array of potential conflicts stemming from
external sources, respondents were asked whether any of the following
areas presented a problem for them: affirmative action policies, racial
issues, finances, collective bargaining, state intervention, and federal
intervention. The following table includes those who responded in the
affirmative to these questions:
Table 7
Problem Areas for Superintendents and City Managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Issues</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Bargaining</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neither affirmative action regulations nor racial issues pose a problem for the majority of superintendents or city managers in either locale, although these issues are more prevalent in the more racially and ethnically diverse sites outside San Francisco than in Chicago. While the Chicago metropolitan area also includes a large number of racially and ethnically diverse municipalities, the city manager form of government is less common in those communities than in ones where the population is less diverse and is generally of high socioeconomic status (Banfield and Wilson 1963, p. 167). City managers are more prevalent, in general, in the newer more western cities. Despite the attention given to busing controversies and whether school programs are in compliance with Title IX, both racial issues and
affirmative action policies create more problems for city managers, overall, than they do for superintendents.

A majority of respondents in all four categories stated that finances are a major problem. The financial situation is particularly acute for superintendents in California, who not only have lost local property revenues due to Propositions 4 and 13, but also have suffered cutbacks in state aid stemming from declines in enrollment and the overall stringencies of the state fiscal situation.

As stated earlier, collective bargaining is found to be a greater problem for superintendents than for city managers. In addition, few Illinois city managers mention collective bargaining as a substantial problem area since collective bargaining units in these municipalities are rare. A greater number of California respondents reported that state regulations posed a constraint, as was predicted due to the higher degree of centralization in that state. However, within Illinois, more superintendents reported that they had encountered problems due to state regulations than did city managers, as seems consistent with the fact that the state role in educational policymaking is greater since education is a state responsibility. Superintendents also feel more tension about federal interventions than do city managers, due to a greater federal role in educational policymaking. When asked why federal interventions were a problem superintendents generally reported that they resented mandated programs while city managers were more bothered by the paperwork, supporting the notion that federal control over school districts is greater than over municipalities. Indeed, when asked what their major restraints have been, superintendents in both regions named external mandates as their primary restraint. This contrasts with
city managers in Illinois and California, who both named local pressure groups as their major restraint. This seems consistent with the fact that they generally faced a larger number of local pressure groups and that a higher proportion of these groups were external to municipal government.

Scope and Intensity

We also seek to explore how superintendents and city managers in each of the two settings compare in terms of the scope and intensity of conflicts they face. We measure scope of conflict by the number of parties involved. The intensity of a conflict situation is measured by the duration of the conflict as well as by the depth of change. The concept of depth of change takes into account the number of people to be affected by a change, in addition to the degree of the effect. For example, a school closing would be classified as having a high depth of change.

Superintendents and city managers in our sample were asked to describe a major conflict situation including the disputants involved. From these descriptions of actual conflict situations, two patterns emerged. First, city managers have more major conflicts solely between themselves and their respective legislative bodies than do superintendents. Secondly, when superintendents are engaged in major conflict situations they are more likely to have an expansive scope than those of city managers, including a wide range of disputants such as the school boards, administrators, teachers, and members of the community. In addition, the majority of superintendents, regardless of site, had major conflicts that fell into
the high depth of change category, while this occurred for only one-third of the city managers.

No real pattern emerged about the intensity, or duration of conflict, variable. The bulk of major conflicts were described as lasting one year or less. Only the California city managers stand out by the fact that over one-third of their major conflict situations lasted fewer than six months. Surprisingly, with school closures prevalent in both metropolitan areas, one would expect that the major conflict situations described by superintendents would be significantly longer than those for city managers, but this does not emerge from the data.
IV. Conclusions

One of the aims of this study is to resolve the apparent contradiction between research that indicates that superintendents, rather than lay boards, dominate educational decisionmaking (Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak 1974; Peterson 1974; Tucker and Zeigler 1980) and the assertion that superintendents are beleaguered (McCarty and Ramsey 1971; Maeroff 1974). When one attempts to address the question, "Are superintendents beleaguered?" it makes sense to also ask, "Relative to whom?" In this study, the role of the superintendent in educational governance is compared to that of the city manager in municipal governance because of their similarities: both are managers of local politics shaped by the reform movement; both are selected by and legally accountable to lay boards or councils; and both face similar conflict issues such as those related to finance, state and federal regulation, and collective bargaining.

When one compares superintendents to city managers the data seem to refute the beleaguered superintendent hypothesis. Superintendents spend significantly less time managing overall conflict than do city managers. Superintendents also spend substantially less time resolving conflict with their legislative bodies than do city managers. Likewise, superintendents report low levels of disagreement among the public significantly more often than do city managers. Also, when the public does get involved in conflicts regarding school matters, they tend to participate as individuals rather than as members of groups more often than is true for municipal matters. Furthermore, when groups did form to influence
educational issues, they were more likely to be internal to the school district than the counterpart groups in municipal governance. In California, where both school districts and municipalities are facing cutbacks in resources and personnel, city managers report higher levels of conflict between themselves and the administrative staff and line officers than do superintendents. In addition, city managers generally spend more time with state and federal agencies attempting to manage conflict than do superintendents. All this suggests that superintendents are not beleaguered when compared to their counterparts in local government, city managers.

On the other hand, another plausible response to the question of superintendents' relative state of "beleaguerment" is "Compared to when?" Over the past two decades both superintendents and city managers have witnessed increased levels of state and federal involvement, a higher incidence of collective bargaining, greater concern over equity issues; and changes in educational and municipal finance. In addition, increasingly scarce resources make conflict management skills an ever more important part of the job of public administrators. If one accepts the hypothesis that the professional training received by superintendents reflects the ideology that tends to view conflict as negative, then one might expect superintendents to report more tension as a result of conflict-laden changes than do city managers.

In fact, when one looks at the data on specific issues, superintendents report that finances, collective bargaining, and federal intervention are problem areas substantially more often than do city managers.
However, these issues may create more problems for superintendents because of their nature. School districts may suffer budget cuts due to declining enrollments in addition to suffering constraints from financial factors that also affect municipalities. The scope of bargaining may be more difficult to delineate in the educational, rather than municipal, sphere and therefore the level of conflict may be greater. Furthermore, a higher level of federal involvement in educational policymaking may account for the fact that superintendents named federal intervention as a source of problems more often than city managers. In addition, though, the fact that superintendents report a greater number of problem areas, yet spend less time managing conflict, may be attributable to the fact that they are less likely than city managers to view conflict management as an essential part of their job and consequently may have a greater tendency to avoid it. A greater number of superintendents than city managers indicated that they would not take a stand that either the board/council or the public disapproved. Similarly, almost half of all superintendents interviewed reported that they had not made any policy recommendation that was rejected by the board. (A number of them stated that they did not make a recommendation unless they felt reasonably sure it would be supported by the board.) In contrast, all but a few city managers had made policy recommendations which were later turned down. This evidence suggests that superintendents seem less willing to enter into situations that may generate conflict, perhaps because they had been relatively sheltered from conflict until fairly recently.
One city manager offered the following insight about the relative changes in the jobs of superintendents and city managers over the past two decades:

I, and I think other city managers, used to be jealous of superintendents until about 1965. They were referred to as 'Dr.' (when we felt our master's programs were as or more difficult), they got paid more, and they had less conflict because people were more deferential to them. They also had less work in the summer and had contracts which city managers didn't have. Since the late sixties, however, the two groups have become more similar. The superintendents joined 'the real world of conflicts,' average salaries approached each other, and superintendents have become less secure in their positions due to higher turnover while a greater number of city managers have been given contracts.

The change in the role of the superintendent was also succinctly described by the superintendent in the same locality as follows:

The job of superintendent has changed radically over the past twenty years. When I started as superintendent I came in with an orientation that I wanted to help people and be liked. But over time I have undergone a difficult personal transformation by learning to accept conflict as the reality of the job. Now I have to deal with teacher militancy, closing schools, firing teachers, being more accountable for costs, and working with more active parents and citizens.

At a recent conference, Kenneth Duckworth (1981) described the tensions of school administrators as stemming from a conflict between the job roles of "heroes" versus "heralds." He referred to the definition of hero as "a mythological or legendary figure often of divine descent endowed with great strength or ability" and suggested that it was this type of idealism or ideology that might encourage people to enter into the field of school administration or instructional leadership. The comment by the superintendent wanting "to help people and be liked" illustrates this idealism.
On the other hand, due to the increased political nature of the job, superintendents are more frequently called on to play the role of heralds, which is defined as "an official at a tournament of arms with duties including the making of announcements and the marshalling of combatants." Both of these symbolic images exemplify the alterations in the role of the superintendency over time; having one's job description changed from hero to herald may be grounds for claiming "beleaguerment."

The number of differences between superintendents and city managers leads us to conclude that there is more to account for in the lack of board power over decisionmaking than the nature of the issue, as suggested by Boyd. Boyd, Zald and others have argued that board (and therefore, community) influence increases vis-a-vis the educational professionals when the issue is more major and has visible or external effects, such as school closures or strikes. However, even when superintendents described a major conflict incident (many of which involved school closures and strikes) they rarely reported that the major conflict was between themselves and the local legislative body; this was much more frequent for city managers. Further exploration into the differences in professional characteristics between and within the two groups may help to shed light on this school governance issue.

Geographical factors accounted for a number of differences regarding the source and substance of conflicts faced by each group of local managers. The level of conflict with and among members of the legislature was somewhat lower for the cities in Illinois, where the caucus method for selecting
board and council candidates was more prevalent, than for those in California. Collective bargaining is generally perceived to be more threatening and more of a problem in California, where there is a higher degree of state control than in Illinois. In addition, state regulations were reported as a source of problems by superintendents and city managers in California more often than by those in Illinois, presumably due to the higher degree of state centralization there. Further work needs to be done to explore how the contextual variables for school districts and municipalities influence conflict management situations and behaviors in each of the metropolitan areas included in our sample.
References


Table 1
Frequency of Anticipation Methods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anticipation</th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use Staff</td>
<td>20 (24%)</td>
<td>11 (14%)</td>
<td>32 (32%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Visibility</td>
<td>28 (33%)</td>
<td>24 (31%)</td>
<td>28 (28%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>16 (19%)</td>
<td>22 (28%)</td>
<td>17 (17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby</td>
<td>2 ( 2%)</td>
<td>4 ( 5%)</td>
<td>3 ( 3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Opt</td>
<td>7 ( 8%)</td>
<td>2 ( 3%)</td>
<td>2 ( 2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instinct</td>
<td>11 (13%)</td>
<td>12 (13%)</td>
<td>15 (19%)</td>
<td>17 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 84 93 78 99

104 valid cases
0 missing cases

*This table is an accumulation of multiple responses to the same question. Consequently the N indicates total responses not total respondents. Whenever a table uses multiple responses we use M.R. to indicate this procedure.
Table 2

Frequency of Regulation Methods (M.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use Staff</td>
<td>5 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>9 (11%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>8 (9%)</td>
<td>8 (9%)</td>
<td>12 (15%)</td>
<td>13 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand Firm</td>
<td>5 (6%)</td>
<td>9 (10%)</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible-Meetings</td>
<td>7 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>6 (7%)</td>
<td>8 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>24 (28%)</td>
<td>30 (33%)</td>
<td>15 (18%)</td>
<td>20 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational/Technical</td>
<td>37 (43%)</td>
<td>35 (38%)</td>
<td>32 (39%)</td>
<td>44 (45%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- N = 86 (Illinois) 91 (California) 82 (Illinois) 97 (California)
- 104 Valid cases 0 missing cases
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aftermath</th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>11 (24%)</td>
<td>7 (16%)</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Relations</td>
<td>29 (66%)</td>
<td>23 (50%)</td>
<td>20 (47%)</td>
<td>29 (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand Firm</td>
<td>6 (14%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>13 (30%)</td>
<td>10 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational/Technical</td>
<td>7 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>3 (7%)</td>
<td>9 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 44 46 43 54

100 Valid cases, 4 missing cases
Table 4
Frequency of Anticipation Methods in Major Conflict (M.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anticipation</th>
<th>Superintendents (Illinois)</th>
<th>Superintendents (California)</th>
<th>City Managers (Illinois)</th>
<th>City Managers (California)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use Staff</td>
<td>6 (29%)</td>
<td>4 (15%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Visibility</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>5 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
<td>8 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Opt</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>5 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instinct</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 21 27 20 22

44 Valid cases 60 Missing cases