The evaluation literature suggests that evaluation studies may be underutilized by policy makers. This possibility has stimulated a good deal of evaluation use research. However, most of the research has not been theoretically grounded. This paper reviews the key propositions of communications theory and related previous research, as they are related to program evaluation. It is suggested that use research might productively be grounded in these propositions and findings, and it is emphasized that program evaluation might be more effective if evaluators viewed evaluation as persuasion. (Author)
Communication Theory as a Framework for Evaluation

Use Research: Evaluation as Persuasion

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ABSTRACT

The evaluation literature suggests that evaluation studies may be underutilized by policy makers. This possibility has stimulated a good deal of evaluation use research. However, most of the research has not been theoretically grounded. This paper reviews the key propositions of communications theory and related previous research, as they are related to program evaluation. It is suggested that use research might productively be grounded in these propositions and findings, and it is emphasized that program evaluation might be more effective if evaluators viewed evaluation as persuasion.
A sense of frustration permeates the literature on the use of program evaluation information (King & Thompson, 1981). For example, in 1970, Wholey, Scanlon, Duffy, Fukumoto, and Vogt concluded that "the recent literature is unanimous in announcing the general failure of evaluation to affect decision-making in a significant way" (p. 46). Similarly, Rippey (1973, p. 9) concluded that "there seems to be no evidence that evaluation, although the law of the land, contributes anything to educational practice other than headaches for the researcher, threats for the innovators, and depressing articles for journals devoted to evaluation." Alkin and Daillak (1979, p. 41) have summed up the situation by reporting that "there have been great hopes for evaluation, not only among evaluators themselves, but also among other educators, elected officials, and the public. Yet these hopes have dimmed."

These citations represent but a sampling of the related comments extracted from a literature review of both anecdotal and empirical work on evaluation use (Thompson & King, 1981a, see pp. 3-4). It is important to note that this characterization of use apparently applies to evaluations performed by various agencies, including local education agencies (Holley, 1979, p. 2). For example, Kilbourne and DeGracie (1979, p. 12) argue that:

All LEAs, with possibly a few exceptions, can point to their volumes of research and

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evaluation verbiage sitting on the shelves of district administrators being used for little else than a door stop, swatting flies, or any of the other various and sundry purposes for which research is used in the public schools.

As King, Thompson, and Pechman (1981, p. 3) note in another extensive literature review, "the non-use of evaluation findings when that use would be appropriate is costly in three ways." Non-use represents an enormous waste of effort (Datta, 1979, p. 22). Non-use represents a waste of money (Kelezo, 1974). Most importantly, non-use means that the clients of educational programs receive less than optimally effective services. As Wise (1980, p. 16) explains, "no one else is given the resources and time to question, observe, assess, weigh, probe, and reflect that the evaluator is given."

This situation has stimulated a good deal of theorizing and research. Some theorists have argued that use levels are underestimated because evaluators focus too exclusively on "instrumental" use of evaluation results, e.g., the use of information in service of go/no go decisions regarding program termination. Several other types of use have also been identified, however (see Thompson & King, 1981a, p. 15). For example, Weiss (1977, p. 534) discusses one form of "conceptual" use:

Government officials use research less to arrive at solutions than to orient themselves to problems... And [even] much
of this use is not deliberate, direct, targeted, but a result of long term percolations of social science concepts, theories and findings into the climate of informed opinion.

These new views of use have led to a recognition that use is occurring (Alkin, Daillak & White, 1979, p. 16), though "evaluators cannot [always] easily see their information being used in the incrementalism of real-world decision-making" (Wise, 1978, p. 24). This may explain the phenomenology of the consistent finding that administrators do perceive evaluation to be useful to them, notwithstanding evaluators' perceptions (King & Thompson, in press).

Despite progress in understanding evaluation use, a very great deal remains to be learned. For example, too little research has examined evaluators' perceptions of their roles (B. Thompson, 1980). To date, two methodologies have dominated evaluation use research (B. Thompson, 1981). First, the literature includes several reports of a limited number of case studies which have not been theoretically grounded; this research has generated important insights but can be criticized on several grounds (Thompson & King, in press). The second scenario of studies involves simulation investigations; simulation research typically presents administrators with a "simulated" evaluation report in which different evaluation features are systematically varied and the impacts of these variations are then assessed.
The Role of Theory in Use Research

Some simulation research has been theoretically grounded (e.g., Newman & Brown, 1980). For example, Thompson and King (1981b) report a simulation study grounded in Meltsner's (1976) conceptualization of evaluator types. Furthermore, quite a few studies are grounded in a communication theory framework. As Braskamp, Brown, and Newman (1980, p. 2) note:

Communication theory provided the conceptual framework for the series of studies... A common framework has been answering the question: "Who says how what to whom with what effects?" For the study of evaluation utilization this means looking at: who (source or evaluator) says what (contents of evaluative information, report contents) how (mode, medium) to whom (audiences, decision makers, users) with what effects (audience reactions including attitudes, agreement, decisions, and actions).

Yet some of these studies may be somewhat superficially grounded in the propositions of theory. For example, in one recent summary of evaluation studies titled "Communication Theory and the Utilization of Evaluation" only one theory is briefly mentioned in a single sentence.

It is important to emphasize that grounding use research in a framework is distinct from grounding use research in theoretical propositions. A framework specifies which variables need to be considered in research; propositions predict how the variables interact and explain why the variables behave as
they do (e.g., Davis & Salasin, 1975, p. 185). There are two reasons why it is important to ground use research explicitly in theoretical propositions.

First, research which is descriptive rather than theoretically oriented tends to produce knowledge with limited utility. For example, some use researchers have investigated the credibility of male as against female evaluators. However, a finding that male evaluators are more credible than female evaluators is sterile. Identifying sexism as an explanation of irrelevant sex influences is tautological; furthermore, the "explanation" does not provide insight regarding why the phenomenon occurs.

Non-grounded research will not indicate to which situations the result will generalize; non-grounded research will not inform as to whether the result is likely to remain stable in the face of social change. Most importantly, non-grounded research gives no guidance regarding what can be done to mitigate the observed effect.

Of course, a qualification must be applied. Though it is generally better to be able to explain a phenomenon, in a few cases knowledge of the existence of a phenomenon can be important in and of itself. For example, some simulation research has investigated the use of quantitative evidence in evaluation reports (B. Thompson, in press). Brown and Newman
(in press) report that:

The simple addition of an inferential statement, such as "these differences were statistically significant at the .05 level" however, resulted in lower levels of agreement [with policy recommendations]. In fact, for three of four recommendations, the inclusion of the inferential statement resulted in levels of agreement lower than in the No Data [experimental] condition.

Nevertheless, even the important finding that administrators vest limited credibility in quantitative evidence can be explained to some extent, albeit not by formal theory. For example, it might be argued that administrator disdain for empiricism stems from a belief that quantitative forms of representation "inherently are insensitive to some of the significant aspects of classroom life" (Eisner, 1980, p. 11).

Despite the contrary example, however, it must be concluded that failure to ground use research in theoretical propositions tends to produce knowledge with limited utility, due to the resultant limited ability to interpret the results. As Mouly (1978, p. 34) notes, "facts derive their significance from the theoretical framework into which they fit, just as theories derive their acceptability from the extent to which they bring facts into clearer focus." As Asher (1976, p. 136) graphically explains:

Doing descriptive research with a minimum of theorizing is like putting a jigsaw puzzle together with the blank side up. The "picture" obtained from nontheory-oriented research usually makes
about as much sense as the lines delineating the pieces on the blank cardboard side of a puzzle.

However, the second consequence of the failure to ground use research in theoretical propositions may be even more noteworthy: the failure to ground use research in theoretical propositions slows refinement of theory and thus impedes the further acquisition of new knowledge. Theory intimates where to look for likely causal relationships; science absent reliance on available theory resembles searching for an object in a dark room when we could flip on the light switch. True, knowledge can be discovered in the absence of theory—thus centuries ago Edward Jenner discovered that milkmaids were immune to smallpox because they caught a related, non-fatal disease, cowpox, from their cows. But, absent understanding of why the cowpox was immunizing, where would Jenner look to obtain new knowledge regarding how to prevent polio? Absent knowledge of microbes and antibodies, would he first interview chicken-pluckers to determine if they were differentially less susceptible to polio?

As Gergen (1969, p. 13) notes, theoretically grounded research "not only satisfies our curiosity, but also has the advantage of maximum heuristic value. It leads to new investigations and suggests interesting links to other areas of concern." Consequently, Thompson and King (1981a, p. 42) suggest that theories to support use research "are certainly
not yet fully developed, but further progress in developing theory absolutely depends upon our testing and elaborating the constructs which we already have at our disposal."

These criticisms are not intended
to discredit or denigrate research that is not specifically and consciously theory-oriented. Much valuable social scientific and educational research is preoccupied with the shorter-range goal of finding specific relations; that is, merely to discover a relation is part of science. The ultimately most usable and satisfying relations, however, are those that are the most generalized, those that are tied to other relations in a theory (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 10).

Non-grounded use research has provided important insights into evaluation dynamics, but it is unfortunate that some of this very valuable research was not made more valuable via testing and extension of theoretical propositions.

The Paper's Purposes

The primary purpose of this paper is to convey some of the propositions of communications theory in which use research can be grounded. Specifically the paper discusses the propositions of communication theory in the form of rhetorical theory and related empiricism involving the phenomenon of persuasion. This work has received surprisingly scant attention in use research despite the fact that rhetorical theory dates back to at least 320 B.C. (see
Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as translated by Welldon, 1886, and despite the fact that a sizeable body of related empirical literature exists.

An ancillary purpose of this paper is to suggest to evaluators that they should be more willing to consider evaluation as a persuasive process. Many evaluators are loathe to accept such a view; they will cling to an image of objectivity at virtually any cost. As Patton (1978, p. 46) explains,

> the traditional academic values of many social scientists lead them to want to be nonpolitical in their research. Yet they always want to affect government decisions. The evidence is that they cannot have it both ways.

Isaac (1980, p. 3) concurs:

> Programs that are politically conceived and implemented, are also sustained and defended practically. It seems the better part of wisdom neither to be surprised nor offended by this phenomenon.

Goodrich (1978, p. 632, emphasis in original) explains the evaluator's sometimes tendency to adopt an ostrich, head-in-the-sand attitude: "What has happened is that we have tried to avoid the phenomenon of subjectivity in order to avoid the charge of subjectivity."

Of course, some evaluators have already acknowledged that evaluation can properly be viewed as persuasion (Newman, Borwn & Braskamp, 1980, p. 29). For example, House (1977,
p. 5) has suggested that "evaluations" themselves, I would contend, can be no more than acts of persuasion." Because evaluation studies can never be fully conclusive, House (1977, p. 6) argues that at best evaluations can only be persuasive:

> If absolutely convincing all rational men is too heavy a burden for evaluation, persuading particular men is not. In place of the compelling propositions derived from rigorous logic, one may substitute the non-compelling arguments of persuasion... The thesis may be more or less credible. The audience is free to believe or not believe after inspecting the arguments and exercising its own judgment.

The members of the Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation (1981, p. 47) may have placed some credence in this view; they argue that:

> Evaluators must not assume that improvements will occur automatically once the evaluation report is completed. Such improvements must be stimulated and guided, and evaluators can and should perform an important role in this process.

**Overview and Caveats**

Aristotle (?/1886, p. 10) long ago defined rhetoric "as a function of discovering all the possible means of persuasion in any subject." This broadly defined, rhetorical theory subsumes some related theories, such as cognitive consistency theories, some Gestalt psychology, and behavior exchange theory. Bettinghaus (1968, P. 13) has defined persuasion as "a conscious attempt by one individual to change the behavior
of another individual or group of individuals through the transmission of some message." However, it is also important to note that, "rather than aiming at changes in attitudes and behaviors, much persuasive communication seeks to reinforce currently held convictions and to make them more resistant to change."

Aristotle (?/1886, p. 10) argued that:

The proofs provided through the instrumentality of the speech are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral character of the speaker [ethos] or in the production of a certain disposition in the audience [pathos] or in the speech itself by means of real or apparent demonstration [reason].

These three kinds of proof will constitute the major topics for this discussion of rhetorical propositions and related empiricism. The use of Aristotle's concepts may seem antiquated, but as Thompson (1967, p. 4) notes:

The perseverance of classical rhetoric through so many cultural ages and its continued dominance in a scientific age far removed from the Academy and the Lyceum suggest that much must be right about it, for only a body of principles having insight and near universality could survive such a test.

Prior to discussion of these forms of proof, however, some preliminary comments are in order. For example, it needs to be acknowledged that many of the empirical studies which are reviewed in the paper were conducted decades ago. This partially reflects the status of the literature. As Roloff
and Miller (1980, p. 7) observe, "for some reason(s), the number of 'persuasion studies' published in the 1970s has declined."

Three caveats are also in order. First, although the several forms of proof will be discussed separately, it is important to remember that in reality "a communication event is an indivisible whole in which many elements interact" (W. Thompson, 1971, p. 177). Second, it is important to remember that the findings in oral communication studies will not generalize perfectly to written communication situations, and vice versa. As Bettinghaus (1968, pp. 172-173) notes:

A considerable body of evidence suggests that written communication is better than oral communication for difficult materials... [But] in situations where the persuasive effect of the message will depend to a considerable extent on the credibility of the source, oral communication may be the best choice.

Nearly all of the studies discussed in this paper involve oral communication; caution must be employed in generalizing their results to evaluation situations involving written communication. Finally, it should be emphasized that this review is not intended to be fully comprehensive; rather, the review is intended to convey the flavor of various rhetorical propositions and related empiricism.

The Proof of Reason
Reason is what most evaluators consider to be the "stuff" of which evaluations are made. Unfortunately, the rational goal attainment model may not adequately describe the context of most educational decision-making (see Patton, 1978, pp. 122-127). Because married administrators never have all the information they need for completely rational decision-making, administrators must engage in "satisficing," i.e., the process "of finding a course of action that is 'good enough'" (Simon, 1957, p. 204). Thus evaluators may be emphasizing a form of proof which is not as persuasive as the evaluators believe.

Although many evaluators have not had direct, formal training in logic, most evaluators are probably reasonably proficient at using this form of proof thanks to their sustained exposure to formal scientific methods. For example, most evaluators may be unfamiliar with a fortiiori logic (Quade, 1964, p. 173), but do recognize that in reasoning from specifics, in addition to the typicality of cited specifics, "if all other things are equal the greater the number of instances the greater the probability of the generalization" (W. Thompson, 1971, p. 123).

However, evaluators may be less familiar with the formal models of proof such as those offered by Toulmin (1958). The three primary elements in Toulmin's model are a claim,
supporting data, and one or more warrants. Consider the following example:

Claim: Title I effectively promotes student achievement.
Data: Title I achievement data from Houston, Los Angeles and Detroit illustrate the program's success.
Warrant: The examples are typical.

As this example suggests, a warrant answers the question, "why should the listener or reader believe that the relation between the claim and its supporting data is correct and reasonable?" Thus the warrant plays a critical role in the persuasion process. Logic suggests a proposition that evaluation reports with explicit warrants should be more persuasive than reports with implicit warrants; this proposition remains to be verified in subsequent empirical research on use.

Research is fairly conclusive, however, regarding the desirability of explicitly confronting logic which contradict's one's own position:

The research to date can be summarized by saying: a) two-sided messages seem to be preferable for audiences with higher educational levels. b) Two-sided messages seem to be preferable when the audience initially disagrees with the communicator's position. c) Two-sided messages seem to be preferable when there is likelihood that the audience will be exposed to messages opposing the source's position (Bettinghaus, 1968, p. 157).

Since evaluation clients are typically well educated and are
frequently exposed to conflicting positions, it might be argued that:

Evaluators should acknowledge and confront evidence which contradicts their findings and recommendations. \(^{(1)}\)

Research also suggests that order of argument affects retention of content and possibly persuasion effectiveness. For example, Tannenbaum (1954) found that items presented first or last within messages are most likely to be recalled. Rosnow (1966), based upon a review of 71 studies, suggested that important controversial information should be located first within a message while information for which retention is critical should be located last. This suggests that:

Evaluators should place important evaluation information either first of last within messages, depending upon whether the information is controversial and on whether retention is the primary purpose of the message. \(^{(2)}\)

However, communication research also suggests that the proof of reason is not the sine qua non of persuasiveness. For example, McCroskey (1969, p. 176) summarized the literature in this area by suggesting that:

1) Including good evidence has little, if any impact on immediate audience attitude change or source credibility if the source of the message is initially perceived to be high-credible... 4) Including good evidence may significantly increase immediate audience attitude change and source credibility when the source is initially perceived to be moderate-to-low credible, when the message is well delivered, and when the audience has
little or no prior familiarity with the evidence included or similar evidence...

The Proof of Ethos

Ethical proof encompasses evidence affecting audience perceptions of the speaker's credibility. Aristotle (?/1886, p. 11) recognized the value of this form of proof:

We may practically lay it down as a general rule that there is no proof so effective as that of the character [of the speaker, i.e., ethos].

Indeed, Milgram's (1974) compelling experimental results suggest the potency of this proof; a disturbingly large number of subjects administered (or thought they were administering) dangerous and severe electrical shock to fellow students--the subjects administered the shocks based upon reliance on the experimenter's authority.

More recently, the Joint Committee (1981, p. 24) also acknowledged that ethos is an important form of proof for evaluators to master:

_evaluators should establish their credibility with the client and other users at the outset of the evaluation. If the confidence and trust of these audiences cannot be secured, the evaluator should seriously consider not proceeding._

This form of proof is embodied, for example, in what Patton (1978) has labelled a critical determinant of evaluation use, i.e., "the personal factor."
Aristotle (?)/1886, p. 113) suggested that ethos has three components: "sagacity, high character and good will."

However, as W. Thompson (1975, pp. 59-60) notes:

Competence, trustworthiness, good moral character, and dynamism, as a consensus, are the major elements compromising ethos in most circumstances. Every situation in which speaker, topic, and audience interact, however, is unique, and one cannot assume that any list of constituents is certain to hold in the particular case.

Nevertheless, research in non-evaluation contexts suggests that ethos can have potent influences on persuasiveness. For example, Burgoon (1975) found that more credible speakers can effectively adopt and are even expected to adopt more certain, unequivocable stances. Zimbardo, Weisenberg, Firestone and Levy (1965, p. 254) report experimental results which convey the possible magnitude of ethos impacts:

Communicator characteristics which were objectively irrelevant to the topic of communication were studied in their relationship to behavioral compliance and to subsequent attitude change. Both college students and Army reservists were induced to eat a highly disliked food, fried grasshoppers, by a communicator whose positiveness and negativeness were experimentally varied. Although public conformity was unrelated to communicator differences, private attitudes [regarding the tastiness of grasshoppers] were significantly influenced.
Various researchers have investigated mechanisms for maximizing ethical appeal. For example, Ostermeier (1967) found that anecdotal personal self-references are more likely to increase ethos than are references to personal prestige or formal position. Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer (1970, p. 1) found that "communicators who are perceived as similar to their audiences are more likely to effect persuasion than those whose sources are seen as dissimilar." However, Berscheid's (1966) findings suggest that only communication-relevant similarities are likely to affect ethos.

These results suggest that:

 Evaluators should acknowledge empathy with clients' interests, particularly insofar as empathy is indicated by the evaluators' backgrounds.

Unfortunately, some empirical research suggests that it may be somewhat difficult for evaluators to establish this form of credibility:

 Not only have only 42% of them [LEA evaluation unit heads] not taught, but 70% have not run a school. This means that even when evaluation heads have teaching backgrounds, they do not take the typical advancement route to the central office (Lyon, Doscher, McGranahan & Williams, 1978, p. 66).

But Eisenson, Auer, and Irwin (1963, p. 289) offer a basis for believing that evaluators can still utilize ethical proof:

 In sum, experimentation supports the conclusion that even the speaker who lacks
ascribed status has it within his power to earn status with his hearers by giving evidence of his sincerity, poise, credibility, fairness, and trustworthiness.

In any case, the limits of ethos as a form of proof must be acknowledged. For example, there is evidence that ethos has a limited impact on knowledge retention (e.g., King, 1966). Perhaps more importantly, some research suggests that impacts of ethos may tend to be short-lived:

Esteem scores and immediate opinion-change scores are positively correlated in both experimental groups with esteem scores and long-term opinion-change scores are not.

Andersen and Clevenger (1963, p. 77) summarize the literature in this area by noting that:

Despite the great number of experimental studies relevant to ethos, the scope of this concept is such that the findings are not yet sufficiently numerous and sophisticated to permit definitive conclusions about the operation of ethical proof. [However,] the finding is almost universal that the ethos of the source is related in some way to the impact of the message.

The Proof of Pathos

Pathetic proof involves efforts, usually on the basis of extra-logical appeals, to favorably dispose an audience toward a message. Effective use of this proof presumes a thorough understanding of the psychology of the audience members. As House (1977, p. 13) suggests:

The evaluator must start from where his audiences are, even though the beginning
premises may not be acceptable to other
parties nor to the evaluator himself.
Otherwise the evaluation will not be
credible and persuasive.

It is not surprising, then, that the Joint Committee (1981, p. 86) argued that "evaluators who do not understand and respect the feelings of participants in an evaluation may needlessly sadden or harm these persons, or provoke in them hostility towards the evaluation."

Unfortunately, as Alkin and Kosecoff (1973, p. 3) suggest, "identification of the program's decision maker(s) is perhaps the most elusive variable associated with a decision context." Furthermore, as Wise (1978, p. 6) notes,

Referring to administrators as "decision-makers" and to what they do as "decision-making" may have been a first step in creating the utilization problem, for we expect to see decisions being made by someone called a decision-maker.

Presuming that some audience identification is possible, however, a reasonable next-step is to estimate the "persuasibility" of the audience members. There is some evidence (Hovland & Janis, 1959, pp. 225-226) that "persuasibility" exists as a construct reflecting a general susceptibility to persuasion:

The present series of studies indicates that there is such a factor as general persuasibility, although there are certain limitations to its generality imposed by the experimental procedures employed. There is evidence that persuasibility exists as a "content-free" factor; that is, it exists independently of the subject...
matter or appeals presented in any particular persuasive communication.

But, as Perloff and Brock (1980, p. 88) note:

After over 20 years of research, we still are not certain of the impact of individual difference variables on persuasion; nor do we know which personality variables exert the greatest influence on persuasibility, and why.

Apparently the major component of persuasibility is self-esteem. For example, Cohen (1959) found that people with low self-esteem are more persuasible than persons with high self-esteem, when the message source is perceived as having high self-esteem. High self-esteem audiences disregard the self-esteem of the message source, presumably because the issue of self-esteem or perceived self-esteem of others then becomes an irrelevant background issue (Shafer & Shoben, 1956, p. 134). Levanthal and Perloe (1962) found that persuasion is more effective when the communicator uses an optimistic tone with high self-esteem receivers and a pessimistic or threatening tone with low self-esteem receivers.

These results suggest that at least message tone must be varied for different evaluation clients, unless they have uniform types of self-esteem. Specifically, the results suggest that:

Evaluators should try to convey an image of positive self-regard during their dealings with evaluation clients.

and that:

(4)
Evaluators should convey an optimistic attitude to high self-esteem audiences, and a more pessimistic attitude to low self-esteem audiences.

Once the audience has been identified decisions must be made regarding what can be done to stimulate attention to the message. As Zimbardo, Ebbesen and Maslach (1977, p. 57) emphasize, "obviously, if people do not attend to the communication, no matter how persuasive, well organized, logical, and appealing the arguments, it will not change anyone's attitude." Thus, Tiemens (1965, p. 213) found that "the correlation between the experimental subjects' ratings of the 'most interesting speech' and the retention score was .693," and Furbay (1965, p. 148) reported that audience members "who said they enjoyed the speech were more persuadable than those who did not." MacLean and Pinna (1958) found that people are most likely to attend to news events which took place nearest where they live. These results suggest that:

Evaluators should stimulate audience interest in messages conveying evaluative information, and may effectively do so by appealing to the interests and needs of evaluation clients.

Appeals to Related Values and Beliefs

Once audience interest is stimulated, numerous strategies can be utilized to foster persuasibility. The Joint Committee (1981, p. 32) implies one possibility:
Such information—whether quantitative or qualitative, process or product, formative or summative—will be of little interest or use if it is not interpreted against some pertinent and defensible idea of what is good and what is bad.

More directly, Bettinghaus (1963, p. 104) characterizes previous research as suggesting that if you write enough ads calling a particular product "tremendous," "superior," or "successful," readers or listeners are likely to begin seeing the product as the advertiser describes it.

In short, Evaluators may stimulate action based of evaluation results by associating findings and policy recommendations with clients' values.

The various cognitive consistency theories (see Arkes & Garske, 1977, pp. 228-249, for a highly readable and balanced discussion) explain why this strategy might be effective. In essence, the theories suggest that people are uncomfortable with positing logically inconsistent positions, and will try to resolve this situation by reconciling one or more of the positions with the remaining positions. The theories are certainly not without their critics, but the theories do seem to explain some important persuasion phenomena, such as selective perception. For example, in a study of the reactions to the Nixon-Kennedy debates, Sebald (1962, p. 149) found that 72% of sampled subjects ascribed ideas to the speaker other than the person who actually presented the idea. Samovar (1962, p. 279) presented related findings by noting
that "the listener sees to reaffirm his predispositions by finding meaning in a message that appears to lack meaning." As Bettinghaus (1968, p. 28) summarizes this literature:

If the receiver's frame of reference is extensive and relatively complete, new information that is contrary to the frame will produce few noticeable changes in behavior... In such a situation the communicator either has to bring a new frame of reference into play or has to continue communicating until enough information has been applied to force changes in attitude structure.

Appeals Employing Group Norms

Social pressure represents another dimension of the evaluation situation which can be tapped to affect persuasion. For example, administrators may push their colleagues for use of evaluation findings: this is essentially the "linking agent" function recommended by Havelock (1968). Hayman (1979, p. 1, emphasis removed) defines "linkage" as "a process of promoting knowledge utilization in educational organizations, and a 'linking agent' is an individual or group which causes linkage to occur."

The linking function may be most effective when both the "linker" and the "linkee" are members of the same reference group. As defined by Bettinghaus (1968, p. 8), "reference groups can be groups of which the individual is a member or groups which he knows of [and aspires to] but to which he does not belong." Appeals employing the norms of a reference group
can have potent impacts. For example, Asch (1951) classic study of conformity pressures demonstrates the magnitude of the effects.

Subjects were shown a "standard card," on which a short line was drawn, and a "comparison card" on which three lines were drawn. One of these three lines was the same length as the line of the "standard card." Five subjects at a time would participate in the experiment. Subjects were shown various pairs of "standard cards" and "comparison cards," and for each pair of cards were then asked to report which line on the "comparison card" matched the one line drawn on the "standard card."

Unbeknownst to the one naive subject in each set of five subjects, the remaining four subjects were all confederates of the experimenter. On certain prearranged pairs of cards, the confederate subjects answered first and each selected an obviously wrong match from the "comparison card." On these occasions roughly one-third of the naive subjects consistently adopted the majority viewpoint even though their reported perceptions of directly observable facts were clearly wrong; these individuals reported in post-experiment interviews that they felt compelled to question their own perceptions in the face of the answers from other group members. These effects were even more dramatic in a replication study performed by
Jacobs and Campbell (1961). In the replication study, naive subjects were gradually substituted for confederate subjects and it was determined that the effect continued through several generations of subject sets.

Taken together, these findings suggest that:

Evaluator's should attempt to conduct evaluations which a preponderance of client reference-group members will buy into—otherwise conformity pressure may preclude even interested clients from taking action based on evaluative information.

Of course, it is important to acknowledge that individuals employ a "latitude of acceptance" when judging the behaviors of others; this concept is defined by Sherif and Sherif (1967, p. 115):

1. Latitude of acceptance: If a person voluntarily states his view on a topic, he usually gives the position most acceptable to him. The latitude of acceptance is simply this most acceptable position plus other positions the individual finds acceptable. 2. Latitude of rejection: The position most objectionable to the individual, the thing he most detests in a particular domain, plus other positions also objectionable to him define the latitude of rejection.

As Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965, p. 187) note, the latitudes "vary with degree of familiarity, the extremity of the individual's stand, and the degree of ego-involvement with the issue." Thus, group clearance of deviant evaluation use or non-use will vary somewhat from situation to situation.
It is also important to acknowledge that some group dynamics mitigate against evaluation use. For example, Petty, Harkins, Williams and Latane (1977) found that people use group membership to lessen cognitive burden by sharing tasks; they also found that groups tend to be less positive toward products they evaluate than are individuals. The tendency of group members to substitute group for individual identity has been termed "deindividuation" (Diener, 1977). Deindividuation is exactly what the evaluator does not want to happen—it tends to promote the inertia which is so characteristic of some bureaucracies.

Appeals to Both Group and Individual Psychology

There is also evidence that the combined reliance on both consistency and conformity pressures can have potent impacts on behavior. These impacts were demonstrated in a classic study by Freeman and Fraser (1966). In the first phase of the experiment, experimental subjects were asked either to put a sign, supporting either safe driving or keeping California beautiful, in a front window of the home, or to sign a petition on one of these two issues. In the second phase of the experiment, a different experimenter asked both experimental and control group subjects to place a large "Drive Carefully" sign on their lawns.

The subject was shown a picture of a very large sign reading "Drive Carefully" placed in front of an attractive house.
The picture was taken so that the sign obscured much of the front of the house and completed concealed the doorway. It was rather poorly lettered (Freeman & Fraser, 1966, p. 200).

Only 17% of the control group subjects agreed to the request. When either the first-contact issue was different from the second-contact issue (first sign request "Beauty" petition or put up a small "Beauty" sign), or when the first-contact task was different (sign either a "Beauty" or a "Drive Safely" petition), approximately 48% of the subjects agreed to put up the large sign. When the initial contact requested putting up a small "Drive Safely" sign, fully 76% of the subjects agreed to install the defacing, large sign.

This strategy of escalating requests has been termed the "foot-in-the-door" technique; consistency need is involved since it would be inconsistent to discontinue compliance after an initial compliant action. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of the request escalations is a critical factor (Seligman, Bush & Kirsch, 1976). It should also be pointed out that "the evidence clearly demonstrates that forcing a person to publicly commit himself to a belief is [also] an effective way to increase resistance to subsequent persuasive appeals." Taken together, these results suggest that:

Evaluators should try to promote favorable initial responses to evaluation efforts, even when these initial responses involve seemingly trivial issues.
An alternative to the "foot-in-the-door" technique is the "door-in-the-face" technique. In effect, this approach views communication as a behavior exchange (Scott & Lyman, 1968) similar to bargaining; the persuader is advised initially to adopt a relatively extreme position, and then solicit compromise. Research (Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler & Darby, 1975) suggests that this can result in a more favorable outcome for the persuader, since the message receiver may view the finally adopted position as favorable in comparison with the initial position. Komorita and Brenner (1968, p. 18) explain the technique thusly:

In a bargaining situation, if one party wishes to reach an agreement at a "fair" price, clearly a strategy of making an initial offer at that level and remaining firm thereafter is not an effective means of reaching an agreement.

The application of this technique to evaluation is less obvious, however, except that evaluators might obtain tighter designs if they initially solicited acceptance of relatively rigorous designs. The ethics of such an approach would certainly require careful reflection. It must also be recognized that adopting a "car salesman" view of clients may damage ethos.

Appeals to Receiver Fears

Researchers have also investigated the effects of basing persuasive messages on fear appeals, e.g., indicating that
failure to comply will produce dire consequences. For example, Colburn (1967) notes that fear appeals are much more effective when the topic is important to the receiver. Furthermore, as Miller and Burgoon (1973, pp. 25-26) explain, frightening a person (even on irrelevant issues) can have one of two effects: it tends to increase resistance to persuasion when the person is chronically high in anxiety and to lower resistance when the person is chronically low. We also suggest that when dealing with complex persuasive appeals, the interactive effects of increased arousal and increased comprehension of the message make predictions about subsequent resistance to persuasion difficult.

Becker (1963, p. 203) notes that, in addition to personal anxiety, "other personality variables [also] relevant in determining relative effects of fear evoking and nonfear evoking messages." Zimbardo, Ebbesen and Maslach (1977, P. 99) summarize this research thusly:

The findings generally show a positive relationship between intensity of fear arousal and amount of attitude change if recommendations for action are explicit and possible, but a negative reaction otherwise.

The application of this research, however, is again not so obvious. Administrators might be prompted to use results if they were warned that non-use might subsequently be detected and might then provoke sanctions. The evaluation use literature does not, however, currently suggest that this prospect strikes fear into the collective administrative
Counterargument

"Counterargument" refers to the tendency of persons to resist persuasive messages, when they are forewarned that a forthcoming message will attempt to modify their attitudes or behaviors (Petty & Cacioppo, 1977). Perloff and Brock (1980, p. 76) suggest one possible strategy with which to reduce counterargumentation:

The cognitive response interpretation holds that distraction interferes with the dominant cognitive response to a persuasive communication. If the dominant response is counterargumentation (that is, if the message presents discrepant information), then distraction will interfere with the generation of counterarguments and will increase the persuasiveness of the communicator.

These factors suggest a final conclusion:

Evaluators should be cautious in their efforts to persuade evaluation clients to use results, or the persuasive effort may become counterproductive.

Summary

Several propositions of rhetorical theory have been discussed, and some of the accompanying previous empirical work has been discussed. Several recommendations for evaluation practice have been adduced from these sources. Notwithstanding the conclusive tone with which the
recommendations were offered, they must be viewed as tentative. This is partly because it has not yet been directly established in use research that these propositions and findings will generalize perfectly to evaluation settings. Insufficient knowledge regarding this generalizability is one consequence of the previous failure to ground use research in theoretical propositions and related empiricism.

And W. Thompson's (1975, p. 8) admonition must be remembered:

Persuasion is an art, not a science. Only in rare and highly specific circumstances does behavioral science make it possible for one individual in effect to push a button that elicits a predictable response by a second person.

But it is equally important to remember House's (1977, p. 42) admonition that "an evaluation may be 'true' in the conventional sense but not persuasive to a particular audience." It may be time to place more emphasis on being both right and effective, i.e., it may be time to try to be persuasive to administrators. As Polivka and Steg (1978, p. 697) argue:

Traditionally, the evaluator has been very hesitant to claim any responsibility for the use of his/her findings. This approach has helped make it very easy to ignore evaluation results.
Being persuasive does not have to mean being manipulative, but it should mean being deliberate and proactive. The decision to remain in the ivory tower of social scientific method may be more than a decision to not be persuasive—it can be a decision to persuade clients to be non-users.
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