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ABSTRACT

This paper provides an analytical look at the evolving relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The author explores the prospects for international security and advocates a number of policies which would benefit both societies. The first section in the booklet discusses how U.S. security cannot be assured even if the Congress goes along with the administration's request to approve expenditures of more than a trillion dollars on defense over the next five years. What we buy and how we use it are more important than how much we spend. Soviet vulnerabilities and Western assets are then examined. Republican administrations have been more successful than Democratic administrations--at least since World War II--in defusing conflict with the Soviet Union. The records of various presidents are discussed. U.S. policy must flow from a judicious mixture of firmness and flexibility, of restraints and incentives. Specific steps that the United States can take to improve United States-Soviet relations are suggested. The booklet examines relationships between the superpowers and the Third World. Like it or not, linkage exists between superpower activities in the Third World and efforts to cap the volcano of United States-Soviet arms competition. The survival requirements of each country ought to outweigh any displeasure experienced over the actions of its rival in some remote region. (Author/RM)

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National Security and US-Soviet Relations

Walter C. Clemens Jr.
Occasional Paper 26
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National Security and US-Soviet Relations

Occasional Paper 26 provides an analytical look at the evolving relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. With attention to historical influences, political realities, and technological advances, the author explores the prospects for international security and advocates a number of policies which would benefit both societies.

In addition to the major considerations of Third World interests and US-Soviet arms competition, attention is directed to Eastern Europe. This may well be a pivotal area for future US-Soviet relations.

In this paper, Professor Clemens points out that there are many opportunities to alleviate US-Soviet tensions. However, "Rebuilding detente will be arduous and complex, with potential pitfalls and disappointments at every turn. But prevention of nuclear war is the absolute requirement for all our other ambitions—personal, familial, national, and global."

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National Security and US-Soviet Relations

The limited collaboration between superpower adversaries that evolved in the early 1970s—what many people called “detente”—has broken down. Can it be rebuilt? Is it desirable to do so? What policies can lessen the risk of war by miscalculation, safeguard US interests and those of our allies, and thwart attempts by the Soviet Union to gain political benefit from its growing military power?

These questions become increasingly urgent as the Reagan administration moves from its initial concerns with America's economic health to the problems of formulating a foreign policy that meets the challenges and utilizes the opportunities of the 1980s.

Security: Money Is No Panacea

A wise security policy will seek to protect and enhance the nation's way of life, its cultural and economic well-being, as well as its defense from foreign foes. Indeed, security threats arising from a country's social and economic fabric are often more debilitating than those pressing from outside its borders.

Not by bread alone; not by money alone. Blessed with extraordinary resources—material, technological, financial, intellectual—Americans have tended to assume that any problem can be solved if they expend a sufficient quantity of these resources. In many domains we are coming to realize that money is no panacea. The good life—health, prosperity, justice, clean air and water—cannot be acquired merely by throwing money at our problems.

The nation's security—if we focus only on external threats—cannot be assured even if the Congress goes along with the administration's request to approve expenditures of more than a trillion dollars on defense over the next five years. What we buy and how we use it are more important than how much we spend. Morale and other intangibles cannot be assured just by higher salaries or stockholder dividends. Indeed, larger military expenditures could exacerbate many of our problems, not just economic and social problems at home, but the overarching task of assuring world peace.

To begin with, the strategic military balance does not favor the Soviet Union. The United States possesses over

9,000 strategic nuclear warheads; the Soviet Union, 7,000. Theirs are larger, but ours are more accurate.² They have to contend with nuclear armed foes on all sides—China, France, Britain, and other NATO forces, as well as the United States. We face only one major foe, the Soviet Union. The Kremlin's forces are growing, but so are those of its adversaries.

The Soviets' land-based missiles might knock out many of our land-based missiles, plus some bombers and submarines in a first strike, but that would expose them to a devastating retaliatory blow from the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers that survived and from most of our submarines, which carry the largest share of our nuclear warheads.

The Soviets are not ten feet tall; nor are they devils or madmen. They have suffered directly from past wars in ways Americans can barely imagine; they do not court a nuclear war—especially since they fear Western technological prowess.

What the Soviets spend on defense is irrelevant to our needs. They are less efficient and produce only half as much *per capita* as we. It's hardly a surprise that they must spend twice as much of their gross national product (GNP) on defense just to match the United States. In addition they must cope with China and other foes.

Still, we cannot defeat them by outspending them. They can pull in their belts and sacrifice hospitals for missiles. We too can deprive ourselves of hospitals and other comforts; we can make our inflation worse; we can fatten the relatively few Americans involved in the military-industrial complex, but this will only spur the Soviets to greater arms spending of their own. We are all on a treadmill.

Are our armed forces understaffed? Unskilled? If so, we can hardly resolve these inadequacies just by raising military salaries. So long as recruitment depends mainly on volunteers from the lowest classes of US society, we will lack the spirit and skills needed to run an effective military machine. Not until conscription taps the middle and upper classes will we have military personnel on a par with those who make civilian life hum.

Money—too much of it—also undermines our military hardware in peculiar ways. Gold plating leads to fewer ships, fewer planes, and fewer tanks—all of them taking more years and dollars to perfect and manufacture and

more man-hours to maintain. We are replacing \$5 million planes with planes costing \$30 million. Naturally we can't buy enough of the latter. Worse, we can hardly maintain them because they are so complex. Funds diverted in this way have left us with severe shortages of spare parts needed to keep existing equipment in working order.

Money also stimulates inter-service rivalries. All the services want a share of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). It would be simpler just to send in the Marines—the least affluent but most spirited of the armed services. Though they have been trained for quick assaults and lack heavy equipment, they could probably be adapted to desert service with less difficulty than Army units. Marine maneuvers taking place in California deserts train more personnel at less cost than US Army exercises conducted recently in Egypt. Adequate water supplies—one of the most critical problems for any desert fighting force—will be acute no matter which branch of the armed forces is involved.

While the conduct of foreign policy requires sticks as well as carrots, it might be that more skillful diplomacy sensitive to the needs of the oil producers and oil consumers could substantially undercut the imperative to build up the RDF. And if our West European allies and the Japanese are the parties most threatened by a turnoff of Middle Eastern oil, why not let them play leading roles in creating whatever military forces are needed to prevent that turnoff? As suggested later in this essay, the ultimate trade-off involving the Third World, the West, and the Soviet Union may be to barter peace, energy, capital, and technology. This exchange would cost little, but could gain a great deal.

No expenditure can preserve us from the ultimate consequences if the superpowers begin to exchange nuclear strikes. A large Soviet bomb exploded over Omaha would kill at least two million people and poison food and water supplies. Ten or a hundred Soviet bombs exploded over ten or a hundred other US towns would have similar effects.

Despite occasional reports on the consequences of nuclear war and on the mutual vulnerability of the superpowers, most Americans think we have antimissile defenses capable of shooting down a large fraction of an incoming Soviet missile force. Most remember nothing about the antiballistic missile (ABM) accords of 1972-74—thought by many analysts to be the most important arms control agreements of this century.

Given massive ignorance of the strategic realities, many Americans are ripe for appeals to build shelters and install food kits as reliable ways to survive nuclear war.

Expenditures on civil defense are worse than gold plating, for they perpetuate the myth that we could somehow fight, win, and survive a nuclear war.

Nuclear war cannot be fought in ways that make it a rational instrument of policy—for us or for the Soviets. Its impact on our allies would be even more destructive because they live in more densely populated territories. Our battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe would obliterate the very people they are supposed to defend; even our own military units would likely be poisoned or evaporated by the small nuclears we can launch from cannon. (More than a generation after such weapons were introduced in Europe, CBS television found US tank crews unable to distinguish a mushroom cloud detonated in maneuvers from any other puff of smoke.)

The Soviets are afraid we may pull a rabbit from the hat—some new technological marvel that will rub in their second-class status. So they keep striving. . . and so do we. The more we spend, the more they spend—and vice versa.

Americans, Soviet writer Alexander Bovin told CBS, can't get used to the idea of parity—rough equivalence with the Soviet Union. If the United States is not ahead, then it is behind. This is an interesting notion for Americans to contemplate. If parity is unacceptable, what are the alternatives? As Henry Kissinger asked in 1974, "What in God's name is superiority?"

Superiority, as we and the Soviets have discovered, has little or no practical utility. We cannot dictate to Cuba nor they to Albania. Surely there are ways in which we could curb the arms competition to mutual advantage. Negotiations take time, but are preferable to fighting. Even without negotiations, self-restraint could prevent us from throwing money at problems requiring deeper solutions. Self-restraint can be abused by the other side, but—properly presented as a first step in a pattern we expect the Kremlin to reciprocate—it could set the stage for fruitful negotiations to curb competition in arms and other spheres.

Soviet Vulnerabilities, Western Assets

The Soviets want much the same things in life that we do. They also have much the same problems, only worse.

Imagine that our two giant neighbors, Mexico and Canada, are both hostile to the United States. Not only are they hostile, but teeming with people, ideas, and inventions hostile to our way of life. Imagine also that their cause is supported by our main adversary in world affairs, the Soviet Union, which has deployed a ring of listening devices, air fields, and other military bases just beyond Mexico and Canada.

This is roughly the kind of challenge which Poland and Afghanistan present to the Soviet Union. But Moscow's troubles extend far beyond these two countries, for the Soviet Union is a country surrounded by hostile neighbors, most of them Communist. The Soviet border with most of these countries is under dispute, openly or covertly, because it resulted from Soviet expansion in World War II. The Kremlin is afraid to give an inch, even to Japan, whose technology Moscow dearly wants, lest the Soviet Union be asked to give thousands of miles to its other neighbors, from China to Czechoslovakia.

The challenge presented by China to the Soviet Union is beyond any comparison with the problems of the United States with its neighbors. To find an analogy we would have to imagine that Canada has the world's largest population, presently confined to a few river beds and barren deserts; is angry about hundreds of years of exploitation by our imperialist policies; is filled with an anti-American ideology and backed by the other superpower which provides it with new technologies that promise over time to make it a modern military power.

The Soviet Union's geographical problems go on and on. Imagine that our navy could pass onto the high seas only by exiting narrow waterways that are closely patrolled, observed, and guarded by our foes (for the Soviet Union this means Turkey, Norway, Japan—all cooperating with the United States), and that many of our ports are ice-bound most of the year.

Imagine also that instead of the world's most dynamic agricultural system we depended for our daily bread upon relatively poor soil, frozen or rain-starved by a hostile

continental climate that gets colder as it moves east and drier as it extends south, leaving us with very unfavorable growing conditions two out of every five or six years. To make matters worse we have committed ourselves to expanded meat production and to depending upon grain shipped by our major adversary and its allies.

We have many problems the outer world hears even less about. Our health standards seem to be falling: infant mortality has increased in recent years. Air and water purity standards are more and more difficult to maintain. Birth rates are declining especially among the better educated, European portions of the population. It will become more and more difficult to maintain our large armed forces unless we cut deeply into the labor force pool. Because of increased tensions with China, Eastern Europe, and our operations in Afghanistan, our need for active armed forces grows all the time, but it is increasingly difficult to sustain existing numbers—especially the highly trained personnel needed to operate modern weapons.

After a few years of quiescence our major adversary and its allies are arming once again. They are not satisfied to have nearly twice the number of strategic nuclear warheads that we do; numbers of men under arms comparable to ours (with fewer foes to deal with); naval forces whose tonnage is twice ours; a monopoly on aircraft carriers; and marines over ten times more numerous than ours. On the soil of our neighbors they will now put large numbers of cruise and modern Pershing missiles capable not only of tactical combat but of striking our cities.

The Soviet Politburo may well reason that experience is on its side. Western governments change every few years, while Brezhnev has reigned since 1964, backed by associates whose technical responsibilities extend back for decades. Foreign Minister Gromyko was ambassador to the United States during World War II; Defense Minister Ustinov has been charged with weapons development and production since before World War II. The most senior Soviet leaders are in their seventies and have cause to be worn out, not like President Reagan whose life has been almost carefree by comparison with those of men who had to cope with Stalin, Hitler, Khrushchev, and the vicissitudes of running a very creaking and complex industrial corporation.

Superpower Politics: Neither Poker nor a Game of Angels

Neither side can compel the other to alter its system or withdraw from the world arena. Nor can either side hope to destroy the other's retaliatory instruments in a surprise attack. Given the present political and military realities, our only alternative is to work out a *modus vivendi* that limits prospects of a military confrontation and enhances joint interests in survival, economic well-being, environmental protection, and other matters of common concern.

Indeed, the security needs of the superpowers in dealing with each other remain, as they have since the mid-1950s, to diminish the chances of war; to curtail the costs of arms competition; and to limit the damage produced in any military confrontation that might occur. Beyond these survival requirements, each may prefer to alter the other's system; but this goal is a will-o'-the-wisp and could jeopardize the *sine qua non* of national survival. Indeed, as Moscow prepares for a leadership succession and copes with mounting centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe, Washington should gear its security policies toward accords not threatening to Soviet domestic tranquility. We must be careful not to goad those within the Soviet Union who may want East-West confrontations so as to justify more repression at home and in Eastern Europe.

The superpower engagement is no poker game. It is variable sum, not a zero-sum relationship. Soviet suffering is not necessarily a plus for the West. On the other hand, the relationship is not necessarily a positive sum where one's gain is automatically a benefit to the other as well. The relationship is more complex—and frustrating. It remains one in which we have some interests in common and some in conflict. A wise strategy will seek to develop joint interests while controlling or diminishing those in conflict.

This outlook probably undergirded the efforts by both Soviet and US leaders in the 1950s (Spirit of Geneva), the 1960s (Spirit of Moscow), and again in the 1970s to relax tensions and build a network of meaningful connections between the United States and the Soviet Union.

What went wrong? Why did the detente of the 1970s, like its precedents in the 1950s and 1960s, prove short

lived? To this question there is no simple answer. Even though Soviet and US leaders sought to negotiate meaningful arms controls, military technology has had its own momentum, making it difficult to cap the volcano. Even with the best of intentions it was not easy for US and Soviet negotiators to reach equitable accords limiting newer weapons such as the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber. Forces hostile to detente exist in both countries, eager to seize on any pretext to scuttle programs for improving US-Soviet relations. Such forces sabotaged the expansion of US trade with the Soviet Union, making it contingent upon drastic changes in Soviet domestic policies, and later obstructed approval of SALT II. Without significantly expanded trade and without any major curtailment of the arms race, Moscow had less incentive for restraint in the Third World. As the Kremlin or its allies in Hanoi and Havana intervened more boldly across the globe, moderates as well as hawks in the United States asked whether it was still feasible or desirable to attempt improving relations with the Soviet Union.

Detente is a fragile flower. Its blossom has been damaged by many forces. It did not bear much fruit—for Moscow or the West. Still, we have no sane alternative except to continue efforts to lessen tensions with the Soviet Union. Moscow, for its part, has today much the same reasons to pursue detente as in the early 1960s and early 1970s. The Kremlin's concerns are weighty indeed:

- To avoid a major war.
- To constrain arms competition with technologically advanced rivals.
- To quiet the Soviet Union's western front so that the Kremlin has more flexibility to cope with China.
- To create an atmosphere of peace and prosperity in which the Soviet peoples and those of Eastern Europe will be less restive.
- To claim victories for the Peace Programme of the Communist Party and its leaders, who, from the 1950s till today, would prefer to enter history as champions of peace.
- To diminish the burden of defense and maximize the economic benefits of increased trade and technology transfer.

Brezhnev's Politburo sought to achieve these objectives in a state of detente, but was disappointed. The generation of Soviet leaders now in their seventies may

not be anxious for another try at policies which have failed in recent years. Their successors may be cautious about reliance on improved relations with the United States as a way to cope with their problems. But the stakes are too high to ignore the possibilities of mutually advantageous relationships or to miss any chance to sound the dangers which may emerge as new leaders take the helm in either country.

Despite the eclipse of detente in recent years and many pessimistic augurings, the time may be ripe for another effort at improving US-Soviet relations.

The Republican Tradition in US-Soviet Relations

Republican administrations have been more successful than Democratic administrations—at least since World War II—in defusing conflict with the Soviet Union. President Reagan, if he wishes, can build upon masterful precedents set by Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford.

Democrats—from Woodrow Wilson through Jimmy Carter—have excelled at idealistic conceptions and exhortations; Republicans have proved more efficacious in deeds, no matter how stumbling their press conferences.

To be sure, Franklin D. Roosevelt presided over the most friendly era in US-Soviet history, the alliance against fascism, but this coalition fell apart in 1945-47 as Harry Truman faced off against Stalin. President Eisenhower initiated US efforts to move from cold war to detente when he agreed to meet Soviet Party Chairman Khrushchev in 1955, giving birth to a "Spirit of Geneva." Eisenhower also welcomed Khrushchev to Camp David in 1959, marking the first time a top Soviet leader stepped onto American soil. To make these gestures, Eisenhower had to overrule many hard-liners within the Republican Party, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but he believed such explorations necessary and exerted the leadership to pursue them.

Eisenhower's record was mixed. He permitted Dulles' oratory about "rolling back the Iron Curtain" and the "immorality" of nonalignment. He gave license to Dulles' Pactomania, thereby alienating Egypt, India, and the other Third World countries. He also permitted Allen Dulles to plot what became the Bay of Pigs operation.

On balance, however, Eisenhower was probably our most effective president in foreign policy since World War II. His legacy includes the Korean Armistice; a refusal to send United States troops to Vietnam; efforts to apply the Marshall Plan experience in Europe to the Third World; the first technical arms limitation conferences (1958); and our first arms treaty with Moscow and others (Antarctica 1959). Eisenhower also refused to be stampeded into superfluous arms spending by cries of "bombing gap" or "missile gap." When he believed it necessary to act with force, however, he did so quickly and effectively (Guatemala and Lebanon). He also saw the importance of aerial surveillance to arms control—what we now call "national means of verification"—and started the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and planned the satellite observations that followed.

John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson also sought detente and arms limitation with the Soviet Union, but their administrations will be more known for massive arms buildups than for arms control; for the Berlin and Cuban missile confrontations bringing us to the brink; and for launching our Indochina debacle.

Nixon took more than four years to terminate our Vietnam involvement, but he initiated relations with China and concluded SALT I and other far-reaching accords with Moscow. He and Kissinger saw the futility of continuing the arms race and grasped a more subtle point, one that eluded congressional critics of SALT: that strategic equivalence would be found in a combination of asymmetries, never in identical arsenals, for each country has its own assets and problems. With China, they put into effect a strategy of GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction) that led from trade and ping pong to toasts in the Celestial City. With Moscow they saw the value of building a seamless web of ties enmeshing both sides in positive rather than negative interactions. If we are interdependent—hostage to each other's nuclear trigger—why not make the most of it?

Nixon and Kissinger also saw that policy must be based on a blend of power and diplomacy. To enhance this mix they utilized threats and offers, bargaining chips and linkages. No doubt they carried their double and triple games to excess, but the underlying concept—utilizing both force and the bargaining table—was masterful. Gerald Ford had less chance to try out this admixture, but

he came close to concluding a SALT II accord—one that would probably have been approved if put to the Senate in 1975 or 1976.

Jimmy Carter, like his Democratic predecessors, crusaded for high ideals but became frustrated when the world did not meet his standards. The Kremlin, of course, had shifted to a harsh line in Angola and elsewhere even before Carter became president. But his human rights pressures and total disarmament talk struck Moscow as hypocritical propaganda. While Soviet leaders bear some grudging respect for the capitalist (usually Republican) who goads material progress, they have only loathing for non-Communist leaders (usually Democrats) who claim to back the common man.

If President Reagan chooses, he can build on the same principles that made Eisenhower and Nixon effective in dealing with Moscow. After Reagan's election the Kremlin tried to put aside his earlier oratory, suggesting instead that the American public had rejected Carter because of his anti-Soviet and other foreign policies. Despite continued anti-Soviet speech making in Washington, Moscow still wants to probe the possibilities of an accord with the new administration, just as it did in 1969 with the arch anti-Communist Richard Nixon.

While Reagan has a mandate to reestablish US power in the world, US public opinion would certainly welcome an era of negotiation rather than belligerency. Reagan might even conclude, as Kennedy did in 1961, that the balance of power has not deteriorated so badly as some said. The Western allies, after all, still have nearly twice as many strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union and roughly twice the GNP *per capita*.

President Reagan's broad mandate requires that he consider the entire spectrum of opinion, but one can only hope that he will eventually lean toward the centrist and innovative orientation that made Eisenhower and Nixon so effective in dealing with Moscow.

Flexibility and Firmness

In a variable-sum framework US policy must flow from a judicious mixture of firmness and flexibility, of restraints and incentives. A wise policy must always be on guard lest the adversary exploit a temporary advantage in ways that

might do us serious harm. At a minimum we must be sure that we maintain a deterrent sufficient to persuade any rational adversary that attack on the United States or our allies would generate unacceptable damage to the assailant. But we must also have the means to dissuade the Soviets or others from expanding in the Third World or Europe in ways that jeopardize world peace or US interests. These goals probably require that we maintain rough parity with the Soviet Union in strategic and theatre weapons in Europe and that we maintain powerful conventional forces which, in conjunction with our allies, will deter Soviet aggression in Europe or the Third World. This task is not overwhelming or infeasible, for Moscow will be absorbed for some time with digestive problems in Afghanistan and regurgitation problems in Eastern Europe—all of which could reinforce pressures upon the Kremlin to quiet the Soviet Union's western front.

While arms have their role in containment, it is also vital—and perhaps more difficult—to cultivate a sense of solidarity between the United States and our allies and friends along the Soviet periphery. To revitalize our working relationships around the world we must consult, not dictate; show imaginative leadership, not play the blind giant zig-zagging in the dark; provide optimal levels of military and economic aid; and avoid moral exhortations which prove almost impossible to exact in an imperfect world.

The most powerful inducement to Soviet restraint may be a carefully articulated strategy of interdependence. This strategy would make it worth Moscow's while to forgo short-term gains to develop a long-term relationship of mutual advantage with the Western countries and, ideally, a positive role in North-South collaboration as well. This strategy would be rooted in the awareness that the survival of civilization depends upon avoidance of nuclear war by the superpowers and others. It recognizes that all nations have pressing domestic needs which present the most immediate threats to their security. Malnourishment, poor housing, air and water pollution, erosion of top soil, social and racial conflict—these are among the clear and present dangers to the security and well-being of the United States and Soviet Union. Despite ideological differences and imperial rivalries in such outposts as Somalia and Ethiopia, there are few real conflicts of vital interests between the superpowers. If each kept its troops and KGB/CIA agents at home, both

countries could better attend their urgent domestic needs to universal advantage. Even the spectre of a superpower struggle for Middle Eastern oil could be eliminated in a climate of detente and reduced arms spending. In this climate both countries would have more funds and scientific personnel to devote to harnessing fusion, solar, and other power sources. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union could freely purchase US drilling equipment, and US technology could focus on enhanced oil recovery and other technologies to exploit energy resources available within the United States.

Reversing the Conflict Spiral

How then to move again toward improving US-Soviet relations? How do we make the most of our interdependence? The strategy of GRIT (Graduated Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction), provides key insights about how to move from a conflict spiral to sustained relaxation and improvement of mutual relations.

The approach of GRIT proved useful both in the early 1960s and again in the early 1970s. It could also prove efficacious in the 1980s. It requires that one side, probably the stronger party (on balance, the United States), announce a long-term plan to improve relations and that it spell out what steps it plans to improve relations with the other side. The first steps can be symbolic initiatives to reduce tensions (e.g., lowering some trade barriers); if these are reciprocated, further-reaching steps will be taken. With reciprocity these moves build a momentum which could take us from symbolic to truly significant actions. But time and persistence are demanded. And both sides must be careful not to permit their tension-reducing strategy to be disrupted by hawks at home, in their alliances, or by peripheral troubles in the Third World.

We can only hint at the character of this strategy, but it would entail movement in many arenas of East-West relations. Just as the cold war ranges the globe and involves competition on many fronts, so a pattern of tension-reduction can and must be multidimensional. Indeed, its multidimensionality makes it easier to select moves that sustain momentum and show good faith.

One first step has already been taken, reducing restrictions on Soviet grain purchases in this country. Rather than making such moves as a response to domestic

American issues (the farm lobby, campaign promises), it would be wiser to link them to sought-for Soviet policies.

Barriers to scientific and cultural exchange should be dropped, perhaps in tandem with Soviet moves to permit emigration by dissident scientists.

Before even symbolic steps proceed very far, however, ways must be found to reduce the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. This is the Soviet Union's albatross, as ours was Vietnam. A multilateral pledge of meaningful detente, arms control, and trade could be part of a package to induce Soviet acceptance of a "Finnish" or "Austrian" status for Afghanistan. Though Moscow rejected in July 1981 a European plan for a two-stage conference on Afghanistan, the basis for a multilateral solution may still be found. Just as Dr. Kissinger insisted on Vietnam accords that gave the Saigon regime a chance to survive, so the Soviets will insist on a package with some hope of maintaining their friends in Kabul. But the Kremlin's willingness to accept a face-saving mechanism for Soviet withdrawal will probably be heightened if the Soviet Union is assured of improved trade and credit relations with Western trading partners. Another inducement would be a cutback in the pace of Sino-American military cooperation (which has been spurred in part by the goal of throttling Soviet intervention in Afghanistan).

Obstacles to free trade should be reduced, and the carrots of most-favored-nations treatment and long-term credits be raised as rewards for specified acts such as withdrawal from Afghanistan.

While enhanced trade between the superpowers would not guarantee world peace, normalization in this arena—as in others—would probably help in establishing bases for a less precarious peace. And while we should continue to make known our abhorrence of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, we should not cut off our nose to spite our face by drastically curtailing cultural and other exchanges. While the human factor cannot be readily measured, its impact can be portentous—whether at summit meetings, in the exchanges of trade or scientific delegations, or in the programs worked out by the Stanley Foundation, the Citizens Exchange Corps, and other such groups.

The anti-Soviet decibel level of administration language should also be lowered because it offends Moscow

gratuitously and grates on our allies. Indeed, public name calling offends many Americans who believe it lowers their own country's dignity. In any event it agitates Kremlin emotions to no useful end. Soviet leaders seem to feel deeply about how outsiders talk about them. Lenin advised Foreign Commissar Chicherin before he departed for the 1922 Genoa Economic Conference: "Avoid biting words." We should do the same, even if Communist propaganda does not immediately reciprocate.

We should avoid fanning unnecessarily the flames of cold war rhetoric. Both Washington and Moscow should refrain from pronouncements implying that they are considering a first strike or that they believe nuclear war could be "winnable." While a few generals and marshals on each side plan how to prevail in a nuclear war, the top political leaders—probably since the mid-1950s—have understood that nuclear war would envelop and destroy all sides. This point should be reiterated, rather than casting doubt on the motives of the top leaders on either side. We should also avoid statements magnifying Soviet military capabilities, if only because this demeans our own assets and influence. Manipulation of Soviet budget data to show that the Kremlin is outspending America in defense is nonscientific and misleading. No matter how much the Kremlin spends, an amount that we do not know and cannot comparatively assess, US defense spending should be based on perceived threat, as rooted in weapons systems, not in fanciful calculations.

Let Us Not Fear to Negotiate

The admixture of firmness and flexibility utilized by the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations proved particularly efficacious in dealing with the Soviet Union, but President Kennedy also left us a valuable legacy of foreign policy wisdom, even though he did not live the years needed to implement it. On June 10, 1963, he delivered an address, "Toward a Strategy of Peace," which took note of the Soviet Union's heavy casualties in World War II and the valuable role played by the Soviet Union in defeating our common foe. His were not "biting words" but conciliatory ones recalling years when collaboration prevailed over conflict in US-Soviet relations. They elicited a quick and positive response from Moscow, one that helped set the stage for a successful conclusion of the nuclear test ban negotiations.

The importance of serious dialogue between adversaries is summed up in Kennedy's words: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

Obvious? Yes, one would think that the wisdom of this epigram is almost self-evident. Yet, the United States and other Western governments have often spurned Soviet proposals to negotiate or work together for common goals.

Most historians concede that the West missed a good bet in not taking up Moscow's call for collective security arrangements against Hitler in the 1930s. Many feel that we should have explored more seriously the Kremlin's proposals in the 1950s to create a unified but nonaligned Germany. By the same token most observers are pleased with the outcome of one set of negotiations where both sides took each other seriously—the European security arrangements of the early and mid-1970s. In that case the West gained much and lost little except the hypothetical option of changing Europe's postwar frontiers by force.

Today the Kremlin reiterates its willingness to negotiate on a host of issues: strategic nuclear arms, theatre weapons, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan (perhaps in tandem with the Gulf), and other problems. An article by a Soviet writer in *Foreign Affairs* emphasizes that the Soviet Union is "very flexible in its approach to these problems because it really wants to abolish today's conflicts and sources of tension, and to prevent new ones from arising."

What is to be lost if we take the Kremlin at its word and pursue negotiations again on a wide array of common problems? Surely we need not wait until we have somehow ratcheted the balance of power a bit more to our advantage. Indeed, history suggests that negotiations are more feasible from positions of parity than from superiority.

Surely negotiations with the present generation of Soviet leaders are more feasible than they were with Stalin or even with Khrushchev. And it may be vitally important to demonstrate to the next generation of Soviet leaders that the Western governments can be reliable partners in the quest for a more peaceful and prosperous world.

Trofimenko's *Foreign Affairs* article reveals many

Soviet sensitivities. The Carter administration, the author complains:

- Listed the Soviet Union almost last in a ranking of US foreign policy priorities.
- Refused to carry on a constructive dialogue, except on strategic arms.
- Sought to remove the Soviet Union from negotiations on the peaceful settlement of conflict situations, even in regions lying within the immediate vicinity of its borders (thereby ignoring the commitment made in the Joint Soviet-American Statement on the Middle East of October 2, 1977).
- Dragged on ratification of SALT II while actively modernizing US and NATO arms.
- Tried to use the China card.
- Intensified the buildup of the US naval presence near the Soviet Union's southern borders.

All these factors affected "Soviet assessments of the strategic situation" and the context in which Moscow responded to the request for assistance from the "revolutionary regime" in Afghanistan. Put into plain English, the author seems to say that Washington gave little inducement to Moscow not to intervene in Kabul.

In the 1980s, as in earlier years, Soviet proposals are meant to advance Kremlin objectives. They proceed from an amalgam of both strength and weakness. Now, as in earlier decades, the question is whether there exist bases for agreement that may be advantageous to both sides. Soviet overtures may or may not be made in good faith, but we will never know unless we explore them. If they are hypocritical, this fact will become manifest. If there is room for a compromise accord, we may purchase more opportunities in which to move from cold and hot war toward policies premised on our mutual vulnerability in a world of escalating interdependencies.

The Superpowers and the Third World

Trofimenko, with other Soviet spokesmen, contends that the Soviet Union does not want or need the oil resources of the Persian Gulf; even if it did, the Kremlin knows that this could mean war with the West and would therefore avoid any scheme to cut off oil supplies to the West. Ferment in the Third World is due mainly to the processes of national development and liberation, and not to agitation or support from the Soviet Union. Attempts to

stabilize the Third World by injecting a large American military presence will not provide any "final solution" to the problems created by revolutionary movements.⁸ This appraisal, I submit, is basically correct.

The root problem is that though both superpowers have recognized many parallel interests in East-West affairs, they have tended to see the Third World as an arena of zero-sum competition. So long as zero-sum expectations prevail, conflicts in the Third World are likely to prevent the normalization of East-West relations. It is therefore vitally important to regulate Soviet-US competition and cultivate areas of complementary interests in the Third World.

Though not immediately apparent, Moscow and the West have many common interests in the Third World. The first is to avoid conflicts that could entangle the superpowers or their allies in confrontations, and escalate into regional or extra-regional warfare. Both superpowers have on occasion attempted to rein in Third World clients whose actions threatened regional and even global peace. Moscow even risked its Egyptian connection by refusing President Sadat certain offensive arms in 1971-72. Washington has endeavored to stay Israel's penchant for preventive and preemptive blows, albeit with little success in recent years.

Even when one superpower seems to have gained the upper hand with some new regime, the door need not be shut to advantageous forms of East-West cooperation. Thus, although the Soviet Union and Cuba won out over the United States and South Africa in Angola in the 1970s, Gulf Oil has continued its operations there—with security provided in part by Cuban troops. Since Third World nations often alter their orientations quickly, it is not unthinkable that today's foe may be tomorrow's associate.

These thoughts lead to a larger thesis: Superpower gains in the Third World have generally been ephemeral, especially when weighed against the *costs* and, more importantly, the *risks* of competing for influence there. Both superpowers—not to speak of the Third World nations themselves—would be better off if modes of peaceful cooperation could be worked out to supplant cold world rivalries extended to steaming jungles or barren highlands.

Perhaps some "rules of the game" can still be worked out to regulate competition: agreements not to inject

outside military forces where they do not now exist; areas of abstention; limits on arms transfers. But such rules tend to collapse when one side or the other sees a major opportunity and believes the other is not able or willing to thwart a move exploiting the evolving situation.

A more useful approach would be to identify and develop areas of mutually advantageous cooperation between Moscow, the West, and Third World countries. Iran, surprisingly, provided an example of such cooperation under the Shah. Western capital and steel were used to build gas pipelines that took Iranian gas to the Soviet Union and other pipelines that took Soviet gas to Western Europe. This was a complementary relationship in which one side put up capital and steel; one party put up gas and territory; the third party put up technicians, gas, and territory. Were we to look carefully at the globe in non-zero-sum terms, perhaps we could find other arenas in which Western, Communist, and Third World countries might find positive outcomes in multilateral cooperation.

Though the Iranian case has been eclipsed by political turmoil (turmoil disadvantageous and dangerous for the West and for the Soviet Union as well as for most Iranians), it suggests the elements of a major trade-off: peace for energy, energy for peace. The Soviet Union desperately needs Western capital and technology to fulfill the gas and other energy goals of the new Five-Year Plan adopted in 1981. The West is reluctant to make this capital or technology available unless assured that the Soviet Union will not threaten the West or its energy supplies in the Third World. We are all mutually vulnerable. Our problems can best be solved by cooperative behavior.

The United States and Soviet Union have worked along parallel lines for certain mutual interests in the Third World. Since the late 1960s both Moscow and Washington have supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and attempted to make it viable, though with different tactics. The Carter administration leaned toward heavy pressure and open diplomacy to curb potential nuclear-military developments in Pakistan, Brazil, South Korea, India, and other countries. Moscow has engaged in more quiet methods, e.g., in pressuring India to accede to safeguards in exchange for heavy water supplies. The Kremlin can point to the example of its regional fuel cycle system for members of the Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance with processing facilities located in the Soviet Union. The Kremlin, though less outspoken in its concern about nuclear proliferation, may feel itself even more threatened than the United States, in part because it is geographically closer to the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Thus, though US and Soviet methods and perceptions have differed, both superpowers have worked for similar goals.

Both superpowers also worked to help bring about an accord in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Despite the temptation to mobilize Third World nations against each other, Soviet and US representatives cooperated with diplomats representing many large and small states to reach a compromise agreement regulating commercial, navigational, fishing, and security objectives. This agreement should be quickly endorsed by the Reagan administration lest a remarkable achievement be subverted.

We should build upon these examples of positive East-West cooperation and seek to broaden them rather than attempting to exclude the Soviet Union or downgrade the Kremlin as weak merely because it has shown restraint.

The Kremlin operates at a disadvantage in the Third World, a disadvantage that serves both as an obstacle and as an inducement to Soviet participation in programs of "North-South" cooperation and conflict resolution. The Soviet Union's major vehicle for influencing the Third World has been military assistance, a very narrow option by comparison with the wide array of economic, cultural, and other instruments available to the United States and its allies. The Kremlin is therefore uneasy lest its weaknesses be underscored by collaborative actions undertaken with the West. It worries also lest the Soviet Union be tarred with the same image of "imperialism" or "neo-imperialism" with which Soviet propaganda has attacked the West. More fundamentally, the Kremlin is anxious that peaceful resolution of some Third World conflict may leave the Soviet Union with less influence than a festering no war/no peace situation. To make matters worse, Washington has generally practiced what George W. Breslauer aptly terms "exclusionary diplomacy,"¹⁰ attempting to create a US monopoly on peacemaking if not kingmaking in the Middle East and other regions.

Why, the exclusionists ask, should Washington permit

the Soviet Union to take part in peace negotiations if it can be excluded? Why should we risk Soviet involvement when the Kremlin may merely torpedo the deliberations? Why give the Soviet Union any more standing and prestige than it has won by its own efforts?

First of all, the long-term reality is that East-West relations can never be put on a stable footing so long as each superpower sees the Third World as an arena for zero-sum competition. American diplomacy has helped foster conditions where the only way the Kremlin can penetrate the Third World is by means inimical to East-West détente. We should encourage the Soviet Union to become a partner in peacemaking, trade, and development in the Third World no less than in East-West affairs. We should help the Kremlin to develop a stake in positive North-South collaboration rather than endless conflict.

A second reality is that we may not be able to resolve regional disputes without Soviet cooperation. If the Kremlin feels excluded, it can easily keep Palestinian or Syrian tempers on edge; what is difficult is to calm emotions and to find compromise solutions that leave each party relatively satisfied.

Third, excluded from peacemaking and legitimate diplomatic activity, the Kremlin will be more prone toward the very military and subversive actions that unsettle East-West as well as regional peace. One of the few prospects we have for curbing Soviet military and KGB expansion is by showing the Politburo that some of its objectives can be enhanced by peaceful cooperation.

If we treat the Kremlin as an international outlaw, we help promote a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Soviets will have little reason not to pursue their aims by the very instruments we would have them eschew.

Fourth, increased Soviet prestige and legitimate diplomatic activity will hardly transfer automatically into a swing by Third World regimes toward Moscow. Most of these ruling élites prefer the higher quality goods and services available in the West. The more peaceful their circumstances, the more they can buy from the West, and the more they can export (oil, coffee, tin, etc.). The more turbulent their region, the more they will consider buying arms and, contrary to their own religious inclinations, permit penetration by representatives of an atheistic regime.

Fifth, the more peaceful Third World regions become,

the less need for scenarios in which US expeditionary forces are dispatched to take on the difficult, if not impossible, tasks of guarding pipe lines, tanker routes, and fragile regimes from anti-Western forces, whether indigenous or Soviet-backed.

Sixth, Soviet participation in peacemaking should facilitate ideas and actions that utilize interdependence to mutual advantage, trading on common needs for energy, development, and peace.

Meanwhile, as superpower competition continues, we should guard against overreacting to Third World developments in which Soviet or Cuban activities are suspected or affirmed. If we believe that a prospective Soviet intervention in the Third World poses a serious threat to Western interests, we should make this clear before the Kremlin goes too far to halt or retreat. Before we charge other governments with meddling, we must also ask whether our accusations are factual; whether the alleged meddling is in areas salient to our interests; whether it has been invited by local governments; and how it compares with US interventions, past or present, in similar situations. Private or low-key communications are in any case more likely to resolve such situations than public chest thumping if we find that Soviet behavior is indeed a breach of what we regard as legitimate conduct.

Finally, we should bear in mind the adage, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Prevention of conflicts, though difficult, is more feasible than therapy after they break out into a small or larger war. And surely preventative diplomacy will be easier with Moscow's cooperation than without it.

Alleviation of the social distress that breeds conflict and war would be the cheapest and most humane approach to the problems of the Third World. Here too we should seek Moscow's participation. With or without Soviet cooperation, however, the task of helping developing nations to help themselves is one that we cannot shirk.¹²

Capping the Volcano

Like it or not, linkage exists between superpower activities in the Third World and efforts to cap the volcano of US-Soviet arms competition. In principle this should not be the case. The survival requirements of each

requirements of each country ought to outweigh any displeasure experienced over the actions of its rival in some remote region. But there is also psychological truth in Maxim Litvinov's argument in the 1930s: peace is indivisible. From Washington's standpoint Angola derailed detente and Afghanistan killed SALT II. Americans view Soviet actions in the Third World as a litmus indicator of the extent to which the Kremlin can be trusted in arms control.

Americans, unfortunately, tend to be self-righteous and employ a double standard in judging their behavior and that of their rivals. We may seek to exclude the Soviet Union from Middle East negotiations but fret if Moscow gains the upper hand in Ethiopia. We can expand the numbers and improve accuracies of our warheads but denounce the Soviets for seeking superiority if they move in the same direction.

We have created many of our supposed strategic problems by our deeds, our omissions, our words, and our interpretation of the world about us. Why is there no SALT II treaty in place? Because the Carter team jettisoned for a time the understandings already reached between the Ford administration and Brezhnev and pursued "deep cuts" instead. Because later, when SALT II was finally signed in 1979, congressional critics seized on every possible loophole to attack a balanced compromise agreement. Afghanistan served them well as a pretext for a *coup de grâce*.

Why are Minuteman missiles said to be vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive strike in the mid-1980s? Their theoretical vulnerability stems from the fact that we developed a hydra-headed monster, multiple warheads, in the 1960s and deployed them beginning in 1970, without waiting to see whether they might be banned altogether in SALT I. After all, we had a substantial headstart in this domain. Within a few years, however, the Soviets started MIRVing their large missiles. With ten warheads spitting from its nose cone, each attacking missile might knock out several retaliatory missiles. This situation now drives us to look for ways to eschew the dangers our own technological genius has spawned.

Still, the capacity of Soviet MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) to destroy most of the Minuteman force in a first strike is more a matter of pencil and paper calculations than material or psychological reality.¹³ Neither Soviet nor US missiles

have been test fired in a North-South axis. Their accuracies and general reliability in wartime conditions are likely to be far inferior to those generated in idyllic peacetime tests. Neither Soviet nor US leaders are inclined to risk their country's safety on such slender reeds as a theoretical potential for a knockout blow. Moscow has attacked weak neighbors—usually to reimpose friendly regimes—but never a major power, unless one includes tottering Japan in 1945. Each alternative proposal to deal with the supposed window of Minuteman vulnerability in the 1980s has serious drawbacks.¹⁴ None eliminates the *theoretical* possibility that Moscow could destroy a large part of America's land-based missile forces. Each proposed solution is horrendously expensive. And most of the proposals call for weapons systems which Moscow must perceive as enhancing America's capacity for a preemptive strike against Soviet missiles—even more concentrated on land than the US triad. Last, but not least, each alternative would make it more difficult to maintain the force ceilings and ABM limits already agreed to in SALT I and II. Many of the proposals call for land-mobile systems raising major problems of verification. Were the Soviets to emulate the American plans for mobility and deception, our national means of verification would be hard pressed to ensure that the Kremlin was not deploying more missiles than present or future treaties may permit.

The MX and most of the alternative plans make our problems worse rather than better. Not only are these plans expensive and likely to generate unpleasant countermeasures from Moscow, but they are not needed. In short, they are neither sufficient nor necessary. Assuming that the Soviet Union needs to be deterred from attacking the United States, the Minutemen, bombers, and submarine-based missiles that would survive even a Soviet first strike are more than enough to stay any rational foe. If the Soviet leaders are madmen, they will hardly be more deterred by MX or its variants than by the existing American triad. Indeed, if the Soviets are paranoid, the defense schemes emanating from Washington in recent years might lead them to strike sooner rather than wait until the United States' latest missile plans are implemented.

Why not recognize these facts and return once more to serious arms limitation talks? The reality is that both

superpowers are hostage to one another and there is little either can do to alter the situation. The danger is not so much that a rational Soviet government will scheme to strike first; the greater danger is that both superpowers will become engaged in such a tense, conflictual relationship that confrontations may escalate. What we need is not more arms and tension, but arms control and detente—the easing of tension.

Though the United States has invented much of the present arms dilemma, including nonratification of SALT II, the Kremlin also bears a heavy share of the responsibility. While the Kremlin says it has merely been catching up with the West, the rate of Soviet weapons production and deployment has raised the possibility that Moscow seeks not just parity but a war-winning capacity. Both sides have been shortsighted in failing to contemplate the impact that their words and deeds have on the rival.

Still, history books do not credit statesmen who merely cried out, "Don't blame us; it's not our fault." They value leaders who rose above circumstances, adopted a long view, assayed goals others said were impossible, and achieved them—at least partially. Skeptics could, and did, easily contend that the Marshall Plan for European Recovery and the Fulbright-Hays exchange programs would never be passed by a penurious Congress or accepted by suspicious foreign governments. By dint of statesmanship—abroad and on Capitol Hill—both programs got under way, producing what may have been America's greatest peacetime achievements in foreign policy. As a result, George Marshall will probably be remembered more as secretary of state than for his roles as a five-star general or secretary of defense.

Power connotes responsibility. Leaders of the most powerful nation on earth have a profound responsibility to exert the kinds of statesmanship that will lead us from the dead-end prospects of a perpetual arms race. While Americans rightly worry about gains in Soviet military capability, the fact remains that we possess the margins of power and the climate of free thought that make creative initiatives much more feasible for us than for the Soviet leadership.

President Nixon's opening to China and his participation in the 1972-74 summits with General Secretary Brezhnev demonstrated that staunch anti-Communist credentials need not preclude significant diplomatic

relations with Communist powers. Though President Reagan has been quite outspoken in denouncing Soviet theory and practice, his actions have not been so provocative as Nixon's bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong on the eve of his Moscow visit. Though the Kremlin has parried Reagan's verbal assaults, there is little doubt that the Brezhnev Politburo would welcome serious efforts to cap the arms volcano by negotiation.

The utility and feasibility of returning to the conference table seems clear. What further guidelines can be suggested?

If More Doesn't Work, Try Fewer

Adding thousands of warheads to their arsenals since SALT I, both superpowers have become less and less secure. Neither can acquire a completely effective first-strike capability, but each worries that the other may score such a breakthrough. If procuring larger and more mobile missiles doesn't assure our retaliatory forces, many voices now call for building ABM defenses, even if that means abrogating the 1972-74 ABM limitations.

Deterrence, we should recall, derives from the same Latin root as "terror." What weapons are required to terrorize and thus deter a rational adversary? Not more than a generation ago responsible leaders in Washington and Moscow mulled over the notion of a stable minimum deterrent—what some termed a nuclear umbrella. Andrei A. Gromyko and Robert S. McNamara concurred that a finite number of nuclear weapons, perhaps several hundred, could provide a minimum but stable deterrent. Mao Zedong, for his part, told Andre Malraux in 1965 that just six atomic bombs would suffice to ensure China from attack.¹⁵

The logic of minimum deterrence has become lost in a frenzied arms buildup in which we and the Soviets build more and more weapons, only to become less and less secure. Can this momentum be reversed? Having achieved considerable redundancy, could we not whittle away at existing forces in such a way that leaves both superpowers (and their neighbors on this planet) feeling more secure as well as less impoverished?

George F. Kennan has suggested that the President propose to the Soviet government:

... an immediate across-the-board reduction by 50 percent of the nuclear arsenals now being main-

tained by the two superpowers—a reduction-affecting in equal measure all forms of the weapon, strategic, medium-range, and tactical, as well as all means of their delivery—all this to be implemented at once and without further wrangling among the experts, and to be subject to such national means of verification as now lie at the disposal of the two powers. . . . Whatever the precise results of such a reduction, there would still be plenty of overkill left—so much so that, if this first operation were successful, I would then like to see a second one put in hand to rid us of at least two-thirds of what would be left.¹⁶

Such a proposal, conceived by the originator of “containment,” needs to be taken most seriously. Its merits, I believe, far outweigh its risks. But meaningful arms reductions might be easier to reach if we included the other nuclear powers in the equation. How can the Soviet Union reduce its arsenal unless it knows at what point the Chinese and European arsenals will level off? How can the Chinese and Europeans stop their buildup while Moscow churns out more and more intermediate-range missiles?

Why not accept the Soviet definition of “strategic” weapon—any nuclear explosive capable of being delivered to the other’s homeland? This conceptual device would permit joining the strategic and theatre nuclear arms discussions.

To be acceptable and effective, ceilings on “strategic” weapons thus defined would have to satisfy the security needs of each nuclear power while preserving roughly the existing balance of power. An impossible dream? Not necessarily. Our problems resemble those confronting the naval powers after World War I. Then, as now, arms competition fed on fears and asymmetries of forces.

Some sixty years ago another Republican administration turned to the other naval powers and asked whether there was not some way to stave off an arms race none of them really wanted. The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–22, cut the Gordian Knot by adopting ratios of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 for battleship and aircraft carrier tonnage. The United States and Britain had parity; Japan was allowed 60 percent of the US-British limit; and France and Italy were each permitted one-third of the US-British quota. Some capital ships were scuttled and a ten-year moratorium on new ones was proclaimed.

Corollary political agreements sought mutual confidence and stability in Asia.

Could we not build on this model?" Adapting the 1922 Washington Naval Conference ratios to the five nuclear powers today, we would have parity for the Soviet Union and United States; a middle position for China; and somewhat lower levels for Britain and France, though their total would exceed China's. For example, the two superpowers might cut back their arsenals in stages to 1000 nuclear warheads, a total approximating that which would remain after Kennan's "second operation"; China could build up to 600; and Britain and France would be permitted to retain 334 each. Each country would have "freedom to mix"—deploying its warheads on land, at sea, or in the air, but not in outer space where such deployment is forbidden by existing treaties. The existing limitation on United States and Soviet ABM launchers—one hundred for each country—would be applied to the other three nations as well, giving each some additional means to ensure that all its land-based missiles would not be taken out in a first strike.

Each government could contend that it needed higher quotas, but these ratios approximate the existing balance except that they would allow China, the latecomer, some room to grow. France and Britain would each be permitted a substantial *force de frappe*. The Soviet Union would have only 1000 warheads against 2268 for its potential adversaries, but Moscow would still be able to launch more than 300 against the United States, Europe, and Asia simultaneously. The Soviet Union would be assured formal equality with the other superpower. The Kremlin should be permitted to retain some heavy warheads while Washington forgoes warheads larger than those it has already deployed. America's 1000 highly accurate warheads could stay an attack from any quarter and extend a nuclear umbrella to allies around the globe.

Accepting Moscow's definition of "strategic" weapon, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's forward-based systems would be included in the 1668 warheads allocated to Washington, London, and Paris, while Moscow's intermediate-range systems against Europe would fall under its 1000 ceiling. All tactical nuclear weapons should also be removed from Europe. In one swoop we could resolve the intertwined problems of strategic, theatre, and tactical forces!

The accord would leave each party the means to retaliate with no prospect of a successful preemptive strike to disarm an enemy. The ceilings are much higher than those believed adequate for deterrence two decades ago. They are short of total disarmament and would allow each country an arsenal sufficient to cope with a foe who hid some forbidden weapons or introduced new systems.

The treaty, although not perfect, would make the world more predictable. It would limit the parameters of change and create a solid foundation for asking all nations to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

The five-nation pact might help establish conditions in which other nations with nuclear capability—such as Israel, India, and others—stop short of assembling and deploying nuclear weapons.

The 1922 accords failed to curtail other weapons which had already proven to be critically important in battle—submarines, bombers, tanks, and others. The treaty proposed here tackles head-on the most deadly of existing weapons. It might well ban the deployment of any other modes of mass destruction weapons such as energy beams. Though research and development of such weapons may be impossible to prohibit, a ban on testing could serve as a workable barrier to production and deployment. Unlike conditions in the 1920s, we have "national means of verification" to make such a ban effective.

If the signers push arms in every avenue not closed by treaty, however, the pact could collapse. More important, if they pursue their East-West and Third World rivalries unabated, the moral atmosphere needed for meaningful arms curbs will fail. Such a treaty should serve as a vehicle for relaxing tensions and moving on to deal with the environmental, economic, and other challenges which also challenge our security.

Missile envy should give way to triangular detente. The proposed treaty could be a vehicle to improve relations not only between Moscow and the West but also between the Soviet Union and China. Prolonged Chinese-Soviet conflict could engulf the world. Hence, the West should improve trade and cultural ties with China but not encircle the Soviet Union with a Chinese-NATO entente.

Triangular detente could also pave the way to a new economic order; one that gave a larger role to nonnuclear powers such as West Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil. If the nuclear giants were at peace, others could

breathe more easily, and all could work together to meet the needs of developing countries and our imperiled environment. The pact could permit enlightened self-interest to steer humanity from mutual destruction to mutual aid.

An End to Empire?

This essay has attempted to examine salient security problems facing both superpowers, focusing particularly on the Third World and the arms race. Many other problems cloud the horizon. But there is one particular challenge facing the Kremlin which must be mentioned, if only because its evolution is likely to affect the whole spectrum of East-West and North-South relations. This is the future of Eastern Europe.¹⁸

The Kremlin has viewed Eastern Europe as a buffer zone against attack from the West; as a showpiece of Soviet-style socialism; and as a forward base for intimidating Western Europeans with Soviet military force. In the 1980s, however, the challenges to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe are likely to become much more severe than in the past.

Poland may well mark the beginning of the end for the Soviet empire. The most important link in the mailed vest guarding its western flank has become unhinged, portending an unraveling of the entire system.

The Kremlin finds itself in a no-win situation. To send troops against Poland would plunge the Soviet Union into a conflict it can ill afford at this time; but non-intervention signals a failure both of will and of ability to control Eastern Europe.

Moscow's problems in imposing its will along Soviet borders produce much more serious consequences for Soviet imperial interests than the United States' defeat in Indochina did for US positions abroad. None but a few ideologists imagined that American interests were seriously jeopardized by events in Indochina. But centuries have shown how vital Poland is to Soviet security. Either Poland or the Soviet Union has usually dominated the other; but if both were weak, Poland often served as the invasion route for Western armies.

Warsaw now threatens Moscow, not by force of arms as before but by its democratic upsurge against Soviet-style rule. Solidarity is more than a trade union or even a political party. It is a popular movement demanding

self-rule as well as economic change. (Though Lenin warned that the Party must lead—not tail—the people, Solidarity has become the avant-garde; the Party at best the tail.

Solidarity's transforming role, the revitalization of Poland's parliament, greater democracy within the Party itself—all these and other changes underway in Poland will elicit a domino ripple throughout Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union. "If the Poles can do their thing, so can we." This line of thinking will probably spread from one erstwhile satellite to another.¹⁹

The Kremlin's failure of will abroad is certain to exacerbate control problems at home. For decades the Politburo has tolerated a degree of dissent and deviation unthinkable in Stalin's time. To be sure, the Soviet authorities violate their own legal norms in persecuting dissidents, but the overall picture shows them losing their grip: The regime commutes death sentences for treasonable acts, sometimes in response to foreign pressures. Army commanders discharge troublemakers rather than throw them in the brig and admit they can't maintain discipline. Prison wardens fear hunger strikes by rebellious inmates. Soviet psychiatrists balk at condemning sane men to psychoprisons lest they be ostracized by foreign peers.²⁰ The Kremlin suppresses requests for emigration visas, but it has permitted an exodus of over 300,000 Jews and other minorities in the last decade, a flood compared to earlier times.

Why? All the concessions reflect systemic weakness. Moscow must beg, hat in hand, for the right to buy Western technology and grain. The leaders are exhausted from incessant struggle and from sheer age. They hold fast, having failed to introduce younger blood and innovative spirits into the leading ranks. Mindless momentum produces more missiles and tanks than needed; the system's genius is to take on such burdens as bailing out Cuba and Ethiopia (before being evicted, as in Egypt and much of Africa). All this stretches the system to the point where it is unable to cope with a real challenge to Soviet interests as in Poland.

As the empire unravels, the men who succeed Brezhnev will consider sterner measures to reassert Moscow's rule. This contingency was examined in simulations held at Boston University. Our scenarios focused on a Soviet succession crisis accompanied by independence movements in Eastern Europe and by demands for better

living within the Soviet Union. Hard-line leaders moved to the fore, backed by the military, but they chose to batten the hatches of internal stability rather than to embark on foreign adventure. They saw that war against Poland could ignite popular unrest among related peoples of Belorussia and the Ukraine, just as an attack on Romania would stir ethnic unrest in Soviet Moldavia. They remembered the guerrilla warfare waged by Polish partisans against the Red Army in the 1940s, a picnic compared to the resistance heavily armed Poles could mount today.²¹

Moscow's response to its disintegrating empire depends also on the carrots and sticks it perceives in the West. Reagan has wisely warned that invasion of Poland would kill arms talks and elicit severe economic sanctions. There is no need to crow now. Rather, we must show the Kremlin how it might gain from a world without empire. We must demonstrate a willingness to negotiate on nuclear arms, expanded trade, and other issues of great import to Moscow. The West would do well to show its willingness to pursue foreign policy without being the first to resort to arms.

Guidelines

We all have lessons to absorb about empire. Empire building is exhilarating but costly, especially in resources diverted from domestic needs. Rule by diktat is not viable in this age of nationalism and transistor communications. Exploitation of one people by another may seem profitable for a time, only to boomerang in the long run. The Soviet Union's rebuff in Poland resembles that which the United States suffered in Cuba a generation back.

The economies and fates of all peoples are vulnerable to each other, but free association based on mutual advantage is the only workable answer to the dilemmas of global interdependence.

Rebuilding detente will be arduous and complex, with potential pitfalls and disappointments at every turn. But prevention of nuclear war is the absolute requirement for all our other ambitions—personal, familial, national, and global. It is the precondition for tackling the economic, environmental, cultural, and other goals to which mankind aspires.

Notes

1. This reality has been hammered home in such works as James Fallows' *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981) and in the interviews and other data presented in the CBS News television series, "The Defense of the United States," aired in June 1981.
2. See United States Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington, DC: January 19, 1981), p. 33.
3. This example is drawn from the CBS special cited above. For more detailed analysis see J. Carson Mark, "Consequences of Nuclear War," in *The Dangers of Nuclear War*, eds. Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 7-24.
4. Even well-informed Americans assume that we have substantial antimissile defenses. Almost 90 percent of those polled in 1980—stockbrokers; reporters for major newspapers, university students majoring in political science, diplomatic history, or business—assumed that United States defenses could shoot down 200 to 900 missiles if the Kremlin launched 1000. Men and women in a blue-collar district near Boston were even more hopeful. See Walter C. Clemens Jr., "A Quiz for a Peaceful Sunday," *Los Angeles Times* op-ed, March 22, 1981, V, p. 5. More detailed figures available upon request.
5. See also Walter C. Clemens Jr., "Waltzing with Moscow: Republicans Do It Better," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 26, 1981, p. 23.
6. Henry Trofimenko, "America, Russia and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, LIX, 5 (Summer 1981), pp. 1021-1040 at 1040.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 1031-1032.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 1035-1039.
9. See Gloria Duffy, "The Soviet Union and Nuclear Drift," in W. Raymond Duncan, ed., *Soviet Policy in the Third World* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 15-48 at 35-37.
10. "Why Detente Failed," Berkeley, California, manuscript, May 1981.
11. See also Walter C. Clemens Jr., "Independence and/or Security? Dilemmas for the Kremlin, the White House and Whitehall," 1977. *The Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 27-58.
12. For elaboration, see Walter C. Clemens Jr., *The USSR and Global Interdependence* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).
13. See, e.g., William H. Kincaid, "Missile Vulnerability Reconsidered," and Kostá Tsipis, "Precision and Accuracy," in *Arms Control Today* (Washington, DC), XI, no. 5 (May 1981), also Council on Economic Priorities, "Misguided Expenditure. An Analysis of the Proposed MX Missile System," New York, mimeo., July 6, 1981.
14. See the conflicting views of the Charles H. Townes Committee established by the Pentagon to review the problem, reported, e.g., in the *Los Angeles Times*, July 6, 1981, pp. 1, 6.
15. See the *New York Times*, February 9, 1972, p. 4.
16. Address by the Hon. George F. Kennan on receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, May 19, 1981, Washington, DC.
17. This proposal was first put forward by Walter C. Clemens Jr., "How Much Terror for Deterrence?" *New York Times* op-ed, July 28, 1980, p. A21.

18. See also Walter C. Clemens Jr., "Will the Soviet Empire Survive 1984?" *Christian Science Monitor*, July 10, 1981, p. 23; for broader perspectives, see George Liska, *Career of Empire: America and Imperial Expansion Over Land and Sea* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) and Robert Wesson, *The Aging of Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

19. The first national congress of Solidarity passed a resolution on September 8, 1981, greeting workers throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, supporting "those of you who have resolved to enter the difficult road of struggle for a free union movement."

20. This information derives from interviews by Clemens with Eduard Kuznetsov and other Soviet émigrés.

21. See Walter C. Clemens Jr., "Simulation in Soviet Studies," *Soviet Union*, 3, Pt. 1 (1976), pp. 109-126 and "Games Sovietologists Play," *Teaching Political Science*, 111, no. 2 (January 1976), pp. 140-160.

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