ABSTRACT

This paper examines bureaucratic resistance to implementing policy mandates on sex equity. Three facets of a women's program are examined: 1) the legislative and organizational history of Women in Development (WID) within the Agency for International Development (AID); 2) the resources available to the WID Office within the context of AID policies; and 3) the interaction between the office and outside constituencies at the point of interface—the feminist WID political appointee. The data was derived from the author's field notes, internal memoranda and documents, and participant observation. In recognition of how women have been excluded, even disadvantaged by past national and international efforts, the Percy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1973 established as policy for AID that women are to be integrated in all development efforts in developing countries. Although the WID office is charged with the broad mandate to integrate women through project review, studies, linkage with constituents, and international coordination, its annual program budget has been limited to one million dollars or less since inception. The WID office is constrained in its structural location to an exhorter role, rather than as a supplier of technical assistance or project monies. Monitoring is extraordinarily difficult, and the data produced are not always reliable, due to dependency on resistant field missions for whom paper compliance is a developed art. Overlaying all this is the tokenism which the all women WID staff faces in a male-dominated bureaucracy. (Author/RM)
"Bureaucratic Resistance to Women's Programs: The Case of Women in Development"

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Panel: Women in Development: Problems, Paradigms and Policies

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In the last decade, advocates of sex equity have been accorded some legitimacy on the legislative agenda. Numerous laws now mandate nondiscrimination and imply the possibility of government policy more responsive to women. Indeed, looking at recent laws and policy pronouncements alone, one might perceive that significant advances have been made in moving government policy in a direction of greater accountability to women as well as to men. Administrative theorists remind us, however, that real policy may be found in bureaucratic practice.\(^1\)

Limited gains toward sex equity suggest a reality at odds with seemingly fairer policy pronouncements. Although bureaucratic structures are in place to provide for equal wages and equality of opportunity, women’s economic position relative to men’s has eroded. Enforcement is clearly problematic.\(^2\) Similarly, within bureaucracies, affirmative action monitoring and advocacy structures are in place, yet little progress has been made in achieving outcomes envisioned in original policy.\(^3\) While nondiscrimination in program allocation is mandated in specific pieces of legislation as well as in broad civil rights legislation, data are not even collected to examine program impact by sex or the degree to which discrimination might exist.\(^4\)

Women’s policy studies have alluded to implementation problems, but none have systematically examined the implementation process once policy pronouncements are in place.\(^5\) Public administration and policy studies note frequent breakdowns, distortions, and delay in the implementation process and warn that implementation is far from automatic in this highly politicized process.\(^6\) Bureaucratic resistance to women’s programs may be greater than the usual resistance to new mandates—as one study argues.\(^7\) The realization of policy responsiveness to women or to equity policy hinges on successful bureaucratic politics and leveraging, the burden for which falls upon structural units within the
bureaucracy and constituency pressure from the outside. Such seemingly mundane matters as developing procedures, penetrating training and budgetary processes, monitoring, and collecting data, or what some disparagingly refer to as "paper pushing," are critical to putting policy into practice. Were women's program units to control significant resources, build useful alliances, and create appropriate incentives, other parts of the bureaucracy would be more likely to respond to policy mandates on sex equity.

This study of a women's program examines three matters: first, the legislative and organizational history of Women in Development (WID) within the Agency for International Development; second, the resources available to the Women in Development Office within the context of AID politics; and third, the interaction between the office and outside constituencies at the point of interface, the feminist WID political appointee. The data are derived from the author's field notes, internal memoranda and documents, and participant observation.

Women's Work: Integral to Development

The vast majority of people in the developing world live in rural areas and depend on food production for family consumption needs and extra cash through the sale of surplus. Women work actively in agricultural production, storage, crop processing, trade, and other income-earning activities. Regional United Nations agencies estimate that women's involvement in agricultural production is highest in Africa and Asia with women contributing 60-80 percent of the labor, and next highest in Latin America, with 40 percent of the labor. It is estimated that up to a third of households around the world are headed by women, a result of migration patterns pulling men toward cities.
Although women's economic activities and household maintenance functions fall squarely within development concerns of recent decades, development programs are oriented toward men.\textsuperscript{11} Prevailing development patterns favor men, as capital-intensive development strategies push women out of income-earning labor, and as manufactured goods compete with women's income-earning crafts.\textsuperscript{12} Women's access to agricultural extension and credit is always less than men's, as case studies demonstrate.\textsuperscript{13} Women household heads face particularly acute access problems. New technology bypasses or belatedly addresses women's work.\textsuperscript{14} Planners and practitioners assume that men are the sole providers and that modernization hinges on men assuming the primary productive role. If programs exist for women, they tend to be narrowly oriented toward their roles as mothers and wives, for example, family planning and traditional home economics. Except in the most industrialized countries, gaps exist in literacy and educational achievement between the sexes.\textsuperscript{15}

A consequence of these patterns is that men acquire disproportionate access to and control over fundamental information, resources, and opportunities which affect people's life chances, material welfare and opportunities. Thus, development not only ignores women, but also tends to increase disparities between the sexes. Male preference is expected to take its toll on women's productivity, program effectiveness, and ultimately, development.

The essence of a Women in Development approach is to ascertain what women actually want and do within a society and provide them with opportunities, skills, and resources to enhance that participation. Moreover, when new opportunities are available, they are to be made available to women as well as men, and girls as well as boys. In full knowledge of the tendency to bypass or exclude women and female household heads, a woman-sensitive program would design specific strategies to involve women. The WID strategy rests on creating more rational and even handed planning which takes
into account the sex division of labor, fair returns for labor, and the equitable infusion of new opportunities and resources to all members of a given community.16

Women in Development Policy in AID

In recognition of how women have been excluded, even disadvantaged, by past national and international development efforts, the Percy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1973 established as policy for AID that women are to be integrated in development efforts.17 AID's response to the Congressional mandate was Policy Determination No. 60 in 1974, which specified that strategies to include women were to be part of all Agency plans, sector assessments, preliminary and final project papers.

A Women In Development (WID) Office was created in 1974. Under the most recent reorganization it has moved from the highly visible location attached to the Administrator's office to the policy bureau of the Agency. The WID office is responsible for reviewing Agency plans and projects to assure that women are integrated, for monitoring Agency progress, and for working with other international donors and organizations. In conjunction with these tasks, its five professionals attend project reviews and track Agency budgetary commitments. The office has also sponsored policy-oriented research, conferences, and the development of a roster of experts who can provide technical assistance in project design, implementation, and evaluation. A policy bureau office, such as WID, does not fund projects in the field. Rather, projects are identified in the field (i.e., AID missions in collaboration with host country governments) and funded primarily through the regional bureaus. Two types of AID projects have been identified in the WID monitoring system: women-specific projects, in which women are the central focus, and women's components of projects, which are
strategies to involve women in larger AID projects.

AID: The Organization

AID, the major U.S. bilateral economic foreign assistance organization, was created in 1962. AID supports development projects in over sixty countries; decentralized field missions coordinate these efforts with relevant host country officials. AID/Washington is organized into nine bureaus, the following six of which are relevant here: four regional bureaus (Latin America-Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Near East), the Development Support Bureau (the technical assistance bureau), and Program and Policy Coordination (the policy bureau). Several layers of political appointees help to make the Agency more responsive to executive and Congressional mandates.

In 1973 and thereafter, Congress mandated a variety of "New Directions" for AID which ostensibly provide a supportive policy context for women in development. AID was mandated to reach the "rural poor majority" in equitable development strategies designed to meet basic human needs in health, education, and nutrition. What this meant in concrete terms was a shift from capital-intensive orientations, such as large construction projects, to more labor-intensive strategies emphasizing agriculture, farm-to-market roads, water, and elementary education in rural areas.

Integrating women in development promotes the full realization of an equitable development strategy. First, women's proportional economic contribution to household maintenance is highest among low-income families where survival depends on the active participation of all members. Moreover, female headed households are often disproportionately concentrated among the low-income segments of society. Development strategies which include women tend to address
low-income households within a society, whether female or male headed. Yet growth with equity should not be conceptualized in economic class terms alone, but also in terms of sex equity. Any strategy which disproportionately favors men cannot be considered an equitable approach.

AID is a politically vulnerable organization operating in an extremely uncertain task environment. Knowledge about development is uneven, data on rural areas are nearly nonexistent, and implementation occurs across numerous vertical organizational layers and horizontal national boundaries. Foreign aid has been termed one of those few cases where close to zero-growth has been the norm for 25 years. Massive RIFs (Reductions in Force) have reduced the number of AID employees, from a peak of over 17,000 a decade ago, to 6,000 in the current period. Yearly scrambles to "save the budget" and periodic concerns with Agency survival itself consume executive energy.

Congress has imposed scores of requirements on AID, a veritable repository of special interests, which pull AID in potentially contradictory directions. Some are designed to protect U.S. interests and others, to promote progressive developmental thinking. These diverse goals can be found in the lengthy checklist of Congressional requirements attached to each finalized Project Paper (the second stage of project design). In the late 1970s, these requirements numbered not less than 62 items. WID is one of many new goals, and its monitoring mechanisms coexist with others, all of which culminate in an overburdened system.

Besides the widespread, unpopular perception of foreign aid as a "give away program," AID lacks a strong supportive U.S. political constituency. Due to limited knowledge about development, AID is subject to easy sniping, and serves "as a target--in a way the State Department never could--for criticism of U.S.
The absence of a U.S. program beneficiary constituency has been linked to AID's extensive reliance on outside contracting for technical assistance, to its numerous reorganizations, and to what Anthony Downs terms "excessive rigidity" because it lacks constructive negative feedback from its beneficiaries who are outside the political system.

While these characteristics imply general difficulties for AID in the Congressional authorization and appropriation process, they also suggest a certain receptivity to new constituencies, such as those which advocate women in development. AID seeks and is potentially responsive to groups which support the organization in the legislative process.

**AID's Performance on Integrating Women**

The extent to which AID has integrated women in development is measurable, but slight. The WID office has survived, but has faced periodic calls for abolition, including one in the 1979 Heritage Foundation report to the new Reagan administration. Each AID Project Paper is required to have a "woman-impact" statement (rather than a strategy to involve women, as the Policy Determination states), and the Social Soundness Analysis, required since 1975 for all projects, theoretically considers the division of labor, diffusion, and distribution patterns within communities affected by projects. Woman-impact statements, usually no more than a paragraph, tend to be recycled from document to document and are perceived as "boilerplate," in Agency terms. Representatives of the WID office, or WID representatives in the regional bureaus, raise questions about women's involvement in projects at project review meetings, two of which are held for each project. Initially, those comments and questions were greeted with laughter, even from committee chairpersons, but they are now treated more
seriously. Guidance on integrating women is found in Agency handbooks. Internal training addresses the WID issue along with a host of other new issues mandated by Congress.

Quantitative assessments of Agency performance are more difficult to acquire, but they indicate some degree of progress. Women constitute 13 percent of AID-supported international trainees from AID-assisted countries which represents an increase from the 4 percent of trainees who were women at the time of the mandate, but matches the percentage reached in the early 1960s. Regional bureau budgetary commitment to women in development has grown. The WID office tracking system estimates, based on responses from AID field missions on women-specific and women's components of projects, that 3 percent of regional bureau budgets are devoted to integrating women in development. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Rural Development is the largest development sector, to which just over half of AID bilateral resources are devoted. In an assessment of seven agricultural extension and credit document sets, strategies to reach and include women were found in less than 10 percent of those projects. In many of those projects with strategies, pre-mandate emphases on traditional home economics rather than attention to women as producers were common.

Although policy is firmly in place, actual implementation is minimal. An examination of internal power resources, leverage capabilities, and external pressure reveals why.

Bureaucratic Politics

According to the "bureaucratic politics" model, government action is a result of bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in government. The probability of success in bureaucratic games depends on bargaining
advantages, skill, and willingness using resources. Biasing the outcome of bureaucratic political games are organizational routines and standard operating procedures.

The Women in Development Office's prospects for effective bargaining are dependent upon its power resources, activities, and alliances. The four resources examined here include: expertise, control over material resources, structural location, and internal alliance building.

Implementation occurs in response to appropriate incentives. The strength of positive incentives ranges on a continuum from prescription, weakest of incentives, to resource provision alone (what Bardach calls "enabling") to resource provision tied to performance. Negative incentives, such as sanctions in the form of veto capability or funding termination, are potentially strong molders of behavior, but may incur ill will and even new, more subtle forms of resistance. Moreover, they are vulnerable to political pressure and are rendered meaningless if applied inconsistently or infrequently.

Expertise

In bureaucracy, expertise implies specialized knowledge about a policy, program, or sector. For the WID office that specialization is realized in the power to define, monitor, and supply studies on women. The WID office has the power to define, within the boundaries of the legislative mandate, whether projects are legitimately labeled "WID" and it reports this information to Congress. While the supply of studies is primarily an "enabling incentive," the capacity to gather and report data to Congress on Agency compliance is an incentive more firmly tied to performance. A 1978 Congressional amendment to the International Development Food and Assistance Act (Section 108) provided the incentive for
the Agency to "prove" it spends $10 million on women in development. The deadlines imposed in quarterly reporting to Congress add more leverage to the WID office information requests than its limited authority warrants. Monitoring with targeted, quantifiable goals provides a stronger incentive to change behavior and increase compliance than mere qualitative improvement. Yet the $10 million is itself a goal representing only minimal commitment, or less than 1 percent of regional bureau spending.

Legislative language on WID in 1974, 1977, and 1978 stresses women's economic integration. As spelled out in the AID Special Concerns Code definition, a project labeled WID must increase women's participation, opportunities, and income-earning capacities. Explicitly excluded from the WID definition are those projects in which women are recipients of goods (such as contraceptives and health projects) or of food and services for themselves or their children.

The concept has unevenly penetrated central and regional bureaus as well as field missions. In part, this is the result of an overload of new special concerns and the periodic revision of definitions. More important, however, is the limited agreement about whether the definition of women in development should stress direct participation in productive activity. Because of its small staff and inability to observe whether mission responses are legitimate WID efforts, the WID office is dependent upon verbiage from AID field missions.

The provision of substantive policy, program, and project-oriented data is a potential power resource. With monies budgeted for the funding of small, policy-oriented research, the WID office has emphasized the documentation of women as decision makers, heads of households, employees (or self-employed), and participants in sector-specific development issues such as agriculture, forestry and water. WID-supported studies, enabling staff to plan, design, and
implement projects with more comprehensive information, reduce the burden on missions to fund studies and thus serve as positive incentives to WID permeation. Academic studies also lend legitimacy. Yet there appears to be a tendency toward requiring more data on women than on men or "demanding particularly strong documentation that a program for women is really needed." This pattern can serve to delay implementation of the WID concept.

For all the WID office's attention to scholarly documentation of women's work and decision making as it relates to AID activities, the widespread reaction to WID is not a recognition of expertise, but rather, an ideological association with some of the more uncomplimentary perceptions of late 1960s feminism. Agency personnel frequently complain that WID is a "women's lib" issue being used to export U.S. ideas, rather than an issue grounded in development and/or equity justifications. Among those ambivalent about or somewhat receptive to the concept, the recentness of the academic literature, its straddling across several disciplines, and its "ghettoization" in women's studies reduce its credibility. Furthermore, WID is sometimes trivialized. In testimony before Congress, a Representative repeatedly tried to prompt and extend the words "male chauvinism" and "male chauvinist pigs" to the WID Coordinator's comments, to which she replied, "it's your term, not mine."

Several grounds are used to justify resistance toward WID. First, WID is accused of being "social engineering," a label not accorded other equity-oriented development strategies, family planning, or the encouragement of private investment. This is in part derived from the prevailing "public-private" distinction prevalent in U.S. political culture which lodges women in the "private" sphere and rejects government interference in that sphere. Second, support for WID is assumed to be anti-family. As one regional bureau agricultural office once
commented, "I'm not interested in WID; I'm interested in families." Third, women in development as a concept is distorted and/or personalized. According to the former WID Deputy Coordinator, AID agriculturalists sometimes perceive women's labor on family farms as "abnormal, an incursion into . . . a male sphere." A senior agricultural specialist in AID once stated, "the happiest day of my life was when my mother no longer had to go out to help in the fields" back on his family's midwestern farm. 34 The term Women in Development also lends itself to tedious joking about the absence of a "men in development" program or comments on how "I'd like to develop a woman."

Complicating the reaction to WID is the gender composition of the office. The WID office is currently an all-woman office in an Agency where most professionals are men and most clerical staff are women. Numerous studies of token group members demonstrate the special performance pressures to which tokens or small proportions of physically different people are subject. 35 A woman professional's personal style takes on extraordinarily significant dimensions in determining receptivity to the issue. An earlier WID Coordinator is remembered as "abrasive," a characteristic that has lingering association with the issue.

In sum, the power of WID expertise is substantially dimmed in the AID context. While WID has the power to define and monitor Agency performance on the issue, and with the 1978 amendment, to tie Agency performance to compliance, the vague definition and dependency on mission responses render the resources less meaningful. The emphasis on expertise and legitimacy through academic studies is insufficient to mute the strong ideological and personalistic responses to the issue and its supporters. Implementation analysts have argued that "when oversight is taken seriously, it generates pressures to develop indicators of program performance." 36 AID evaluations, however, rarely disaggregate
data by sex. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether women even participate in projects, much less whether project impact is positive, negative, or neutral.

Financial Resources

Although the WID office is charged with the broad mandate to integrate women through project review, studies, linkage with constituents, and international coordination, its annual program budget has been limited to $1 million or less since inception. As a result, WID exhorts other bureaus to commit resources ("jawboning") to implement its mandate. Thus, WID's limited resource base precludes it from playing much more than a prescriptive role, one of the weakest of incentives. Moreover, the existence of an average of five professionals in an agency of thousands is a limited staff resource base for promoting prescriptive efforts.

The "no friends" testimony to Congress illustrates how jawboning alone, without funding reinforcement, is a weak base from which to diffuse new values and concepts. As the WID Coordinator testified, "The missions have come to us . . . and we have said no. We have not made friends that way, with things they want to finance, new opportunities." At those hearings, the WID constituency submitted an amendment which would have earmarked $10 million for WID activities to be divided between the WID office and WID projects in sector offices. Fear was expressed that the money designated would be the only money spent on women, resulting in a separate program at the expense of an integrated concept. These concerns formed part of the amendment's legislative history and caused some later confusion in interpretation. The AID General Counsel's office determined that the amendment constituted minimum funding levels, rather than a financial source for new activities over which the WID office had influence. Had the WID
constituency foreseen this interpretation to target a goal rather than supply new resources, a larger goal would have been set. Other confusions resulted from this interpretation; missions perceived that WID was budgeted more generously and were dismayed to have their requests to WID for small projects denied. The WID office continues to lack monetary incentives to promote compliance.

Structural Location

Office locations provide clues about their formal authority and the timing of participation in bureaucratic politics. AID periodically undergoes reorganization, and WID has moved from its initial location in the Administrator's office to the policy bureau. This movement is logical for new mandates, but location in policy foreballs the possibility of supplying technical assistance and pilot project monies (typically available in technical bureau offices).

A 1974 internal memorandum requested responses from a variety of bureaus about the appropriate location for the WID office. In the six organizational proposals made in 1974, no bureau or office recommended placement in itself. These responses run contrary to "bureaucratic imperialism" which is said to characterize agency stances, and they suggest an early inhospitability to the issue. Although turf conflict is portrayed in the administration literature as dysfunctional, the absence of conflict over or demand for housing a function suggests a worse fate, that of marginality.

Although the WID office plays a legitimate representative role at project review meetings, it lacks the authority to veto projects as is the case for other special concerns such as environment. WID can raise doubts about the project which may shatter the consensus and delay or forestall the project. However, WID "success," realized in terms of blockage, "wins no friends" among mission staff.
WID's small staff is hard pressed to read all the often more than inch-thick project documents and to attend the hundreds of review committees scheduled in the course of a year for the various bureaus. Massive time requirements have forced the WID office to prioritize attendance into sectors, missions, and project types. One prime priority is the women-specific project, which tends to be a small-scale pilot model focusing on women to help them "catch up." By default, the WID office is its prime supporter--support which ties the office to an unpopular project type. Women-specific projects are typically reviewed with special scrutiny. Detailed questions are raised about what is an extremely low budgeted project in Agency terms ($25,000 to $1 million); reviews take longer and require more justification and rewrites. In a typical example, one bureau spent 1 1/2 hours in a committee over a $50,000 women-specific proposal and a half hour over a $10 million regular AID project. As a form of "compensatory policy," women-specific projects arouse resentment; nevertheless, the level of relative funding is far less than the heady term connotes.

WID's formal authority and location provide it with few resources for leverage and bargaining. Indeed, its responsibilities are more than its limited authority warrants.

Allies

Alliance-building is crucial for establishing the base, momentum, and capacity for expanding the incentive structures for compliance. The mandate to "integrate" necessarily requires ties with offices that will draw the issue into their scope of responsibility. Several sets of allies to women in development would be logical in a development oriented agency, stemming from both their functions and the extent to which AID success aids in advancing their own
efforts. Among these are sector-specific offices, process representatives, women, and WID representatives in other bureaus and the missions. Logical allies do not always overlap with actual allies, however.

Sector-specific offices which oversee areas in which women are active, or in which women's disadvantage is apparent, are logical allies of WID. Yet this alliance depends on the regular supply of data which focus attention on the issue. Although women's involvement in water collection, agriculture, forestry, and rural development generally is extensive, it is unpaid and/or included as undifferentiated "family labor;" no data are regularly supplied to those offices which specify women's involvement. The technicians who dominate those sectors have limited awareness of the social science or women's studies literature that document that participation. In contrast, the education sector staff, regularly confronted with easily accessible data on sex differences in literacy and educational achievement now mainstreamed into general documents, have an interest in women in development. Those sectors in which traditional women's concerns are addressed, such as health and population, also represent potential allies. Certain new sector issues such as renewable energy have periodically allied with WID, because of women's fuel collection activities and fuel use in cooking. While some technicians continue to doubt whether women farm, trade, earn income, or head households, women's near universal cooking responsibility requires no alteration of assumptions.

"Process" representatives who are responsible for social analysis in projects and evaluation of impact on people might be expected to serve as allies. Well within their jurisdiction would be analysis of the sex division of labor and differential benefit distribution by sex. Yet these concerns are frequently unrecognized in preference for using the household as a unit of analysis with
the assumption that men universally head households. An agricultural program, based on radio communication in Central American highland communities where women are agriculturalists, began shows with "Buenos Dias, Señor Agricultor." Not only did communication aimed at men continue throughout the project, but the bias escaped even the evaluation. Moreover, this "successful" project model was further disseminated in a special studies monograph.

As is evident, not all social analysts are familiar with the literature on women and development. Moreover, measurement tools and indicators on women and women's participation are far from developed. Much of women's work is unpaid, yet agricultural work, water, and fuel collection contribute to production for consumption and sale. Without easily identified monetary labels for work, other methods for assessing work such as time-budget methodology become complex, costly, and time-consuming to collect.

Regardless of their office and tasks, women tend to be more supportive of WID than men. The WID office sponsors briefings, discussions, and lectures on the issue and notifies both men and women. Yet women predominate at meetings. For example, for an August 1979 series of four briefings from policy-oriented researchers, over a hundred persons were notified, 53 percent of them men. Approximately 25 persons attended each session, many of whom were consistent attenders of WID briefings. In two sessions, there were no men and in two others, one and three, respectively. In an Agency where more than nine out of ten senior officials and executives are male, alliances limited to women restrict the pool of powerful supporters.

WID representatives are located in the regional bureaus and in AID field missions. The former are assigned approximately 50 percent of their time to the issue, while the latter, 5 to 10 percent. The WID officers vary in their
interest in, commitment to, and knowledge of women in development. The WID office does not formally participate in their selection, and loyalties tend to be with the geographic bureau and mission. Consequently, there is little consensus among WID officers about the meaning of women in development.

Opportunities present themselves for making new allies at meetings, through internal Agency media and conferences. Support from top-level administrators can also build support at middle and lower levels and provide incentives for Agency staff to respond to the issue. Former AID Administrator Governor Gilligan gave support in the form of speeches to outside groups, but WID never constituted an Agency budget priority. A former Deputy Administrator publicly stated in a meeting where the argument about women being disadvantaged by development was advanced, "Isn't that the silliest thing you've ever heard?" The Administrator appointed by Carter, however, sponsored a guidance cable to missions (drafted for him by WID and its allies) offering several positive incentives, including technical assistance and budget prioritization.

To the extent other offices take on the responsibility of Women in Development, the burden on a women's program office with limited resources is relieved and the prospects for genuine integration are heightened. Movement toward that integration exists, but is uneven.

Constituency Links

As Allison and Szanton describe, interests can be vested within a bureaucracy, but influence does not automatically follow from vesting. Rather, it arises from linkage to sources of power outside government. AID, like other public organizations, depends on constituencies for its health in the authorization and appropriation process. Given its political vulnerability and public unpopularity, AID is especially dependent on diverse constituency support. The strongest constituency group for WID, the Coalition
for Women in International Development (hereafter referred to as the Coalition), drew much of its early strength from a key liberal supporter of foreign aid, the League of Women Voters. Women researchers in U.S. universities, particularly in agricultural universities, also represent a significant constituency.

A crucial interface between internal Agency offices and outside constituencies is found in leadership, in this case study a feminist Carter appointee with strong ties to the women's movement. She has engaged in a variety of constituency-strengthening and mobilization efforts which provide leverage for bureaucratic politics within the Agency.

The WID appointee is a self-defined feminist who believes women, both in the U.S. and in developing countries, must be politically empowered to make claims upon government on their own terms. Reaction to feminism within AID is generally negative, and the term itself is assiduously avoided in Agency dealings.

Feminists have argued that organizational structure and leadership style should be participant, nurturant, and sharing of information and resources. Such values place strong performance pressures on feminist appointees responding to a feminist constituency. Compounding that pressure is the performance pressure placed on lone, visible tokens, or small proportions of female professionals in male-controlled bureaucracies, as mentioned earlier. Indeed, the WID appointee faced the triple constraints of being a woman executive vastly outnumbered by men counterparts, who is a feminist promoting sex equity policy in a women's program office. She was quite conscious of the divergent pulls of feminist and AID program responsibilities. As she stated in a Radcliffe-sponsored panel on Women and Power:
If I am too much of a feminist, I lose credibility as a policy maker and manager. If I am not enough of a feminist, I lose credibility in my job, which is to help women overseas. I lose credibility with those outside whom I need to do my job effectively.

The Coalition, representing eighty organizations (such as church and women's groups as well as private voluntary organizations) and fifty individual members, creates visibility for WID and affirms outside support for WID both to Congress and to top AID officials. Since 1977, the Coalition has made regular visits to top officials in AID to discuss efforts both to integrate women in development and to increase female professional staffing. That year, ten calls were made to bureau heads and office directors. A Task Force for Revisits to AID Administrators and Office Directors plans female delegation visits to administrators with pre-submitted questions. In early 1979, a WID office memorandum briefed the head of the policy bureau about the WID Coalition and provided possible responses to their questions. Besides visiting administrators, members of the Coalition testify in hearings before Congress. That testimony tends to be more critical than that coming from the WID Coordinator and her Deputy, who must demonstrate a certain degree of Agency loyalty.

Coalition activities have ripple effects, both in private voluntary organizations which constitute part of the coalition and run development projects overseas, and in other networks such as those ad hoc coalitions that form around various U.N. conferences including the FAO World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the Conference on Science and Technology for Development, and the several Decade for Women conferences.

The WID Coordinator also extended ties to women researchers and practitioners at U.S. agricultural universities. The WID-sponsored Women and Food Conference in 1978 strengthened the tie between women and a major AID development sector.
Later that year, another smaller conference within AID was designed to enhance participants' understanding of AID and the WID literature. Participants at that second conference developed a set of recommendations to the Agency, for which an official response was made and later disseminated to missions—activities which heighten WID visibility. Rosters of women-sensitive persons who can serve on project design and implementation teams have been developed at various schools. However, women at those schools are often isolated into separate departments and disciplines, making it difficult for them to penetrate the decision making and allocation processes. Even among potential WID supporters, there is some tension between home economists and social scientists.

The WID Coordinator also attempted to build a constituency among women in development researchers. Such attempts were fraught, however, with the typical problems associated with practitioner-researcher relationships. Policy makers and researchers come from different traditions, with the former operating in a shorter time frame than the latter. They each speak and write a different language, creating reporting barriers which obscure research results. Coming from a political rather than research background, the WID Coordinator had a continuing skepticism about researchers, but recognized the ability of scholarly literature to legitimize the issue to the broader development community.

Unlike the former Coordinator who drew research from consultants in the Washington, D.C. area, the current Coordinator developed liaison with scholarly researchers from around the country, many of whom were isolated in their own institutions. These efforts were partially a result of the background and orientation of the former Deputy Coordinator, herself a scholar and valued for the network she brought to the office.
A series of networking sessions were sponsored in 1977 and thereafter, at which discussions were held on research and gaps in the literature. Little consensus was achieved, due to disparate orientations, with some researchers concerned with the New International Economic Order, others with third world women themselves defining gaps, and still others interested in short-term policy concerns amenable to AID action. WID policy makers, however, were not in a position to alter the international economic order, and some researchers were unwilling to participate in an effort that appeared to only marginally address a wider problem.

A major problem with mobilization strategies is the potential competition and tension among organizations for limited resources. Already diverse, but initially diffuse, groups tend toward what has been termed the "hybridization of interests." The constituency factionalized around special research concerns, sectors, and perspectives, and the WID office was unable to respond and support that diversity, given its own vulnerability. The WID Office was perceived by constituents to have a substantial budget, with high expectations about probabilities of funding for proposals submitted; the confusion over the $10 million added to that perception. The existence of program money, whatever the amount, stimulates the mentality for getting a "piece of the action," which is highly problematic with small sums available and the resulting need to reject numerous proposals. An acute sensitivity develops over choice criteria in proposal funding and office priorities. A wide net is cast to build momentum for an issue, but with limited resources, few are satisfied.
Conclusion

Clearly, WID resources for influencing internal bureaucratic politics are quite limited. A program budget of $1 million to turn around a multi-billion dollar agency is small, as are five professional staff in an agency of thousands. The WID office is constrained in its structural location to an exhorter role, rather than as a supplier of technical assistance or project monies. Monitoring is extraordinarily difficult, and the data produced are not always reliable, due to dependency on resistant field missions for whom paper compliance is a developed art. Despite these resource shortages, WID has been able to formulate alliances and generate academic literature which in turn sparks interest and builds credibility in the agency and in other institutions.

Given these resource limitations, the importance of outside constituencies to catalyze demands in AID and elsewhere is clear. The energy invested in mobilization is not without costs, however. That time detracts from direct WID efforts within AID. Permanent staff are somewhat resentful about political "interference," and some perceive WID as "purely political." Moreover, resources spent for outside groups detract from resources available for missions, technical assistance and other services to the AID field. Yet, without outsider constituency ties, particularly given that special attitudinal resistance WID seems to encounter, WID could all too easily dissipate. Maintaining an appropriate balance is a delicate matter. The WID office is caught between the fundamental need for diverse constituencies and the need to prove to internal AID offices that its priorities lie in those offices.

While resistance to new mandates is a typical bureaucratic stance, women's programs face special and unique forms of resistance as this case demonstrates. Detractors personalize their hostility. The effort to legitimate the issue
academically is made complex with long-standing research traditions which exclude women and collect little or no data on their work. From its inception, adequate resources and staff were not appropriated, suggestive of "symbolic politics," or the use of policy to placate the public and/or constituencies. Overlaying all this is the tokenism which women professionals face in male-dominated bureaucracies. All this implies a deep and profound pattern of resistance, for which special and unique compliance strategies will be necessary. Unless equity policy is put into practice, equity policy will have been but a fleeting, symbolic gesture and not part of government standard operating procedure and therefore impact on people.
FOOTNOTES

1 Michael Lipsky, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (N.Y.: Russell Sage, 1980), p. xii

2 "The Earnings Gap Between Women and Men," Women's Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
Employment Standards Administration, 1976; Joan Abramson, OLD BOYS NEW WOMEN:


4 For example, see "Equal Opportunity Report: USDA Programs," Office of Equal
Sex Differentiation in Donor Agricultural Policy," Paper presented at the Ameri-
can Political Association Meeting, 1979, Washington, D.C. For an exception, see
"Need to Ensure Nondiscrimination in CETA Programs," U.S. General Accounting
Office, June 17, 1980. GAO examined program impact and found sex and other dis-
rimination; they recommended to the Dept. of Labor that reporting systems be
improved, but DOL responded that it aims to "eliminate noncritical reporting."
For an example of research addressed to examining distributive patterns in
Kenya agricultural policy by sex, see Staudt, "Agricultural Productivity Gaps:
Male Preference in Government Policy Implementation," DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE

5 Dale Rogers Marshall and Janell Anderson, "Implementation and the ERA," in
California Commission on the Status of Women, IMPACT ERA: LIMITATIONS & POSSI-
BILITIES (Millbrae, Cal: Les Femmes, 1976) and Ronnie Steinberg Ratner, ed.,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN: STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE U.S.,

6 Among the many studies on implementation, see Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron
Wildavsky, IMPLEMENTATION (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973),
Downs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (Boston: Little, Brown; 1966), and a special issue
on implementation in PUBLIC POLICY, Vol 26, No. 2 (Spring, 1978).

7 Staudt, BREAKING THE INVISIBLE BARRIER: BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE TO WOMEN'S
PROGRAMS (unpublished manuscript). Much of the material in this analysis is
taken from Chapters 3 and 4 of that manuscript.

8 The author spent one year in the Women in Development office as Social Science
Analyst/Program Officer under the Interdepartmental Personnel Act.

9 United Nations, "Effective Mobilization of Women in Development," Report of
the Secretary General, 1978.

10 Mayra Buvic, Nadia Youssef, and Barbara Von EIm, "Women Headed Households:
The Ignored Factor in Development Planning," Monograph Submitted to the Office


UNESCO, "Estimation and Projections of Illiteracy: (Paris: Unesco Office of Statistics on Education, 1978). A massive review of studies, existing data, and projections indicates that percentage of female enrollments is less than male enrollments, except in Latin America from age 6-11, for all years, regions, and ages in developing countries. By 1985, Africa and Asia will have approximately half of primary age girls enrolled, compared to two-thirds to three-quarters of eligible boys; secondary school projections are a third of girls and a half of boys (David Kahler and Janis Droegkamp, "Characteristics and Needs of Out-of-School Youth," Prepared for USAID/DS/ED April, 1980, p. 28).

Projects alone, however, do not operate in isolation from the broader social, economic and political structure, in both national and international arenas. A comprehensive treatment of Women in Development must consider the functions of women producers and reproducers in prevailing national and international distribution patterns. (See Wingspread Workshop report on "Women & Development" convened by the Center for Research and Development, Wellesley and prepared by the Editorial Committee (Lourdes Casal, Suad Joseph, Achola Pala, and Ann Seidman), 1976.) This paper considers only a part of that process.

Section 113 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. Senator Charles Percy (thus, the "Percy Amendment") introduced the measure on behalf of women activists, some of whom are in the WID Coalition (see later section).


20 Judith Tendler, INSIDE FOREIGN AID (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1975).
21 Heclö, op. cit., p. 91.
24 Tendler, op. cit., p. 42.
26 Material in this paragraph comes from internal agency documents. A more extensive discussion is found in Staudt, BREAKING ..., op. cit., Chapter 1 and Staudt, "Tracing Sex ..." op. cit., 1979. AN&RD represents just over half the near $2 billion bilateral development assistance effort of AID; slightly surpassing that amount is the Security Supporting Assistance category representing economic aid granted more on political than developmental grounds (AID CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION FY80, 1979).


U.S. Congress, op. cit., p. 83.

Matthew Holden, "Imperialism in Bureaucracy," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 60 (December, 1966), pp. 943-951. The internal Agency memorandum is D. Bliss thru ExSec to Administrator, 7/12/74.

Chafiey, Simmons, and Staudt, op. cit.

Elsa Chaney (former Deputy Coordinator), personal communication, 1979.


This section is focused on the benefits of interaction for the WID office and AID. Substantial benefits also flow to the constituencies, but are not discussed here (see Ch 4 in Staudt, BREAKING THE . . .).

See the special issue on leadership of QUEST: A FEMINIST QUARTERLY, Vol 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1976) and Jo Freeman, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION (N.Y.: David McKay, 1975).


The term is Heclo's, op. cit., p. 96.
