A history of Roosevelt's New Deal education policies shows that the Depression of the 1930s led to unprecedented experimentation in federal educational programs. Three aspects of New Deal education policy are important. First, the New Deal set precedents that redefined and legitimized the federal government's role in education. Working through structures parallel to traditional education—such as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Works Progress Administration (WPA), and the National Youth Administration (NYA)—the federal government constructed schools, helped employ teachers, and offered a wide variety of courses. Second, the New Deal demonstrated the necessity and the effectiveness of federal intervention for the education of blacks and other educationally deprived groups. The CCC, WPA, NYA, and other programs emphasized the training of blacks, though often in segregated circumstances. Third, however, the New Deal failed to institutionalize its new policies. Thus it built no group of professional educators committed to federal participation in education. The New Deal's experiments in educational policy did help establish new ideas about federal responsibility for education and new goals for equal and democratic education.

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THE NEW DEAL: ANTICIPATING A FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY

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Abstract

The emergency conditions created by the Depression of the 1930s provided the context for unprecedented experimentation by the federal government in the development of direct educational programs and the evolution of new ideas of federal responsibility for education. These programs, part of the New Deal's relief endeavor, were at once a radical departure from previous views about the legitimate role of the federal government in education and ultimately circumscribed by the manner in which they were conceived and administered. Although the specific educational programs of the New Deal ended when the relief agencies were disbanded, the Roosevelt educational experiments had important consequences in establishing new goals for an effective democratic education, equal opportunity for blacks and other disadvantaged groups, and federal responsibility for education which anticipated more recent policies and perspectives.
Since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, and especially since the 1960s, Americans have become accustomed to active federal participation in education. We often assume that the recent past emerged from a kind of *tabula rasa*, a long prehistory of federal quiescence in which educational matters rested exclusively and naturally in the domain of the states and local school districts where the silence of the Constitution seemed to leave the matter. In fact, American history is dotted with instances of federal activity affecting education. Usually, however, these were simple legislative acts which, as in the case of the Morrill Act (1862) and Smith–Hughes Act (1917), provided federal assistance for special educational projects like the land grant universities or subsidies to encourage vocational education. Rarely did the federal government actively design a set of programs or policies which reached broadly and deeply into the realm of education.

The one important exception was the New Deal. The reform activities initiated by Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s to cope with the devastations of the depression were unprecedented in many ways. Not the least of these was the significant educational dimension of federal intervention which was carved out of the jigsaw pattern of economic relief. This federal activity was not only fundamentally new but had significant implications for defining a new federal responsibility in educational matters which anticipated our more recent experiences. In telling the story of the New Deal’s educational activities, I will concentrate on three areas which I believe are most instructive in providing historical antecedents and contrasts to the concerns
which have dominated our seminar discussions: how the New Deal helped to redefine the legitimate and necessary responsibility of the federal government for education; the effect of federal intervention for the education of blacks and other educationally deprived groups; the nature of federal administration and its consequences. The New Deal provided important precedents which fundamentally altered beliefs about the role of the federal government in the area of education and, as significantly, made it clear that the education of blacks was integral to any new responsibility the federal government might assume. At the same time, the Roosevelt Administration failed to anchor these changes in a lasting way because of the manner in which its educational programs were administered and because its educational innovations were not the result of a defined set of policies and goals concerning education, but were practical and temporary expedients. In this sense, the New Deal both anticipated the educational developments of the post-1960s period but had no direct links with it either in institutions or programs.

The connections between the New Deal and the present are both real and indirect. The Roosevelt Administration broke decisively with former assumptions about the limited role of the federal government in education, but did so in the context of emergency conditions, without a specific policy or objective concerning education, and hoped to limit its innovations to the short term. In failing to institutionalize the changes it inaugurated, the New Deal fulfilled its own goals but never provided a lasting educational structure nor a continuous bureaucracy to administer the new vision it helped to inaugurate.
"In responsiveness to popular sovereignty, in adaptability to varying need and aspiration, and in richness of experimentation conducive to flexibility and to progress, our management of public schools is without a peer. Certainly no national system of public schools managed in a highly centralized spirit shows such substantial democratic qualities..."

"The American people are justified in using their federal tax system to give financial aid to education in the States, provided they do this in a manner that does not delegate to the Federal Government any control of the social purpose and specific processes of education."

To understand the nature and scope of New Deal innovations, it would be useful to begin with a brief examination of a classic document in American educational history, the 1931 Report of the National Advisory Committee on Education. Appearing before Roosevelt took office, the report serves as a convenient frame against which to define the changes introduced by the New Deal. The report is often remembered for its innovative recommendation calling for federal financial assistance for education, but this is deceptive. In fact, the report highlights and confirms traditional restrictions on the role of the federal government and the tensions in the report, illustrated by the paired statements above, summed up the dilemma of the Committee which at once urged financial assistance and denied the federal government any active supervisory role. Although the Committee appointed by President Hoover in 1929, was composed of a varied group of educators, public officials, leaders of citizens organizations and private industry, it was overwhelmingly dominated by professional educators. The makeup of the group represented, if not a crosssection of public thought on education certainly a good sample of those who were thinking most seriously about American education at the time. And the Committee as well as its report most nearly approximated the dominant views of the educational community.
The Committee took pains to discuss at length, and often with sentimental flourishes, the traditional roots of American localism in education and its fundamental contribution to democracy and citizenship. And even as it pointed to the precedents for federal aid to education, it carefully differentiated the earlier forms of federal aid, like land grants, which supported local autonomy, from the later more intrusive forms like the Morrill and Smith-Hughes Acts, which the Committee rejected as unwarranted attempts by the federal government to make policy. Noting the "conflict between our traditional policy of State and local autonomy and this growing trend toward federal centralization,"² the 1931 Report repeatedly reasserted the primacy of local control and left no doubt about the dangers implicit in innovation.

The Report was not trying to build up an historical notebook of cases to support increased federal participation. Rather, it hoped to confine and severely delimit the proper realm of what it called federal "cooperation." This seemed especially necessary in the light of the Committee's recommendations for direct federal financial aid. The Committee reluctantly supported federal aid because of its recognition of the indisputable economic and social changes which had taken place as rapid industrialization transformed a formerly rural society, and a newly nationalized economy exposed and aggravated the glaring inequities in provisions for education by local communities. At a time when industrial opportunities were draining population into a nationwide labor pool, the local school district continued to serve as the exclusive basis for educational funding. Many of the local (especially rural) districts had become unable adequately to provide for the basic education necessary for a newly nationalized citizenry just when that education was becoming a necessity for the national state and the national economy.
Accordingly, the Committee's recommendations can be summarized as follows: 1) Control of education must remain exclusively with the states. 2) The Federal government should assist the states through a general education fund, to be provided to the states with no strings attached, and to be distributed according to need. 3) There should be no federal aid for special education projects which by their nature result in federal direction and an exercise of controls. Along with this, the Committee urged the elimination of all federal matching fund requirements in existing legislation (for example, vocational education). 4) A major purpose of federal cooperation in education was the collection and dissemination of information. Therefore the federal government should actively pursue, encourage and sponsor research activities. 5) The only legitimate federal requirement for administered aid is audits to ensure the proper expenditure of funds. 6) The Federal government should establish a Department of Education with a Cabinet level Secretary.

The first five points represent a fair summary of traditional values modified by the Committee's reluctant acceptance of the need for federal aid. The last recommendation seems incongruous with the others. If, one may properly ask, the federal government was to dispense funds with no controls and to restrict itself to simple audits and the encouragement of research, why introduce a demand for a bureaucratic structure? Or as a minority report, written by two Catholic clergymen, aptly put it: "A Federal Department of Education will inevitably bring about centralization and federal control... of education... A Federal Department, headed by a Secretary in the President's Cabinet, is of its nature an administrative institution and nothing that could be written into any act setting up such a Department could prevent it from taking on administrative and directional functions in the course of time..." Why then, in the light of the rest of the report,
this recommendation? In some ways, the recommendation is only comprehensible in the context of the rest of the report, for only the last provision could ensure the delicate balance required by the others. Such a national center could provide the legitimacy and stature which an increasingly self-conscious profession demanded while assuring it the leverage, through access to the President and Congress, for the continuous flow of unrestricted funds. The report wanted it both ways—money and the recognition of education as a national concern, and no federal controls over education which technically rested with the states and localities, but was in fact increasingly, if less explicitly, lodged in a self-confident profession. Only a department which educators could confidently hope to control would protect the schools from independent federal action.

The only other minority report reminds us of issues the majority simply ignored as beyond the scope of federal concern. This report, issued by three Presidents of Negro institutions of higher education, presented the most fundamental challenge to the report as a whole. While they proclaimed their general agreement with the report, they asked the federal government to assume the "moral obligation which binds a central government to exercise special solicitude for disadvantaged minorities." Presidents Davis, Johnson, and Moton declared that historical experience of the limitations of state action and the deplorable state of education for blacks made intervention on their behalf through supplemental grants for black education a necessity and an obligation. These grants, they added, should be administered just as the general fund was administered, "in full accord with the principles of state autonomy," demanding only "some definite increase in the per capita amounts and in the percentages of State support made available for Negro education." They based their demands on the requirements of fairness and equity alone, and did not propose any restructuring of traditional federal-
state relationships in education.

This plea, carefully worded to uphold and respect local autonomy and not to insult the Southern states, had no resonance whatever in the majority report. The majority raised the issue of black education only to dismiss it as one of the "perplexing problems" the solution to which "might appear to be hastened by the Federal Government." Instead, the majority noted steady improvement in Negro education and the "impressive advance made by colored people," which the Committee believed would continue to result from private charity. "It seems clear that the actual limitations which still operate to handicap Negroes are primarily due to imperfections in the political, economic, physical and social conditions often surrounding them." In many ways, the Committee's statement was worse than silence since it applauded a progress which was a slap-in-the-face to black Americans.

But as significantly, the statement also suggested that the role of education was limited, that education was only one of many social forces, and that equal opportunity in education could not substitute for or produce social equality. By 1938, a new Advisory Committee, appointed by Roosevelt and deeply affected by New Deal experience, would adopt a more imperial view of education and with it a different perspective on the role of education in society and of the government's obligations toward all the nation's children.

As the National Advisory Committee was deliberating and preparing to issue its findings, the American economy had collapsed. The Depression, the coming of Roosevelt, and the incipient destruction of the financial foundation of thousands of school systems across the nation would profoundly affect
educational experience in the decade of the thirties. But these changes
did not immediately revise traditional beliefs about the role and responsibility
of the federal government in educational matters. Nor were the implications
of the innovations introduced by the New Deal immediately apparent. Indeed
what is striking about the initial development of federal educational
activities in the thirties is how the federal government managed to assume
a good part of the burden and responsibility for education without seeming
to alter traditional relationships between the federal government and the
schools. In this, the New Deal’s actions concerning education were like its
effects on other segments of the economy and society — neither Roosevelt
nor his Administration questioned the legitimacy or normal functioning of
basic American institutions.

The New Deal accomplished this legerdemain by erecting parallel
structures to traditional educational institutions which were federally
administered and highly centralized, but which did not technically interfere
with or challenge traditional local and state control. New Deal structures
were often vitally concerned with education, had an implicit educational
philosophy and purpose and were critical to the maintenance of educational
stability, but were organized and legitimated under the rubric of relief.
That they could do this effectively suggests how important education had
become as a unit of the economy. It also suggests how crucially committed
the New Deal was to federal intervention as a temporary expedient, not to be
confused with basic revision of traditional institutions. The New Deal
never overtly questioned the local basis of educational policy or the autonomy
of the states in decisions about schooling. Roosevelt never even suggested
or offered federal assistance to the schools on a regular and continuing basis.
Nevertheless, the actions of the New Deal focussed attention as never before on the federal government as an active participant in all phases of social life, accustomed American educators to federal action without necessarily alleviating their fears, and directed attention to basic inequities, inefficiencies and "paradoxes" that had been dormant or taboo subjects.

In the end, the Roosevelt Administration injected the federal government into the educational arena in such a way that it not only exposed educational failures but defined their redress as a federal responsibility.

By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office, the schools like other segments of the economy had taken a severe beating. After expanding enormously in the twenties in capital plant, services and program offerings, and population (especially in secondary schools), American schools were financially wounded, and also under siege from those who sought to impose economies in this so-called social luxury. Some schools, mostly in rural areas, were forced to close entirely and almost all school districts reduced their budgets, often by as much as one-third, cutting deeply into teacher staffing and salaries. The National Educational Association, as we shall see, responded with an urgent plea for immediate federal aid as well as with a long term program of federal supports for education. Roosevelt and the relief administrators most immediately involved, Harry Hopkins and Harold Ickes, also responded. But, aside from a one-time money grant amounting to something under $20,000,000 in 1934–35 to keep some schools from imminent collapse, they responded in typical New Deal fashion by assisting not the schools as organizations but school people and plants. They did so through a mixed bag of work relief programs, public works construction and repair projects, work-study schemes, and supplementary social work enterprises. The educational import of these
relief activities would subsequently become clear and was described and evaluated by Roosevelt's own Advisory Committee Reports issued at the end of the decade. But their immediate orientation and administration fell within the much broader scope of general federal relief activities, organized by and subordinated to FDR's alphabet-soup agencies, the Public Works Administration (PWA), Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and the National Youth Administration (NYA). These separately run agencies, relying heavily on discretionary administrative policies whose purpose was to provide maximum individual relief, were coordinated with a variety of federal departments, but almost never responsible to the Office of Education.

Thus, to speak of the New Deal's educational activities is both to describe a massive program of school construction and repair, teacher employment, courses in literacy and naturalization, vocational rehabilitation, nursery schools, correspondence courses, educational radio programs, subventions to high school and college students, and to describe no educational policy at all. In most cases (the NYA was in part an exception to this) education was a byproduct of work relief and the educational content and purpose was defined in the course of the agencies' activities by the need to find appropriate employment for teachers, carpenters, masons, students, nurses, and unskilled laborers. Because of the way in which they were administered, it is difficult, probably impossible, to estimate even how much money was expended by the New Deal on educationally relevant programs. The WPA spent over $213,000,000 on school construction and repair and loaned an additional $85,000,000 for this purpose. The most clearly school-based program, NYA, spent $53,000,000 on scholarship-like student work programs in the two years between 1935-37 and lesser amounts in subsequent periods.
But how is it possible to determine what portion of the CCC budget was
directed to education, or which of the many WPA programs were educational?

Since many of its educational endeavors were unfocused,
the New Deal often discovered its educational commitments in the process
of program administration. When the CCC, the most popular of the New Deal-
work projects, got under way, its aim was to provide out-of-work youth from
relief families with immediate employment in conservation work, expecting
that they would pick up what they needed to learn in the process. This
would give them something useful to do while a portion of their salaries
was sent home to aid their needy families. It soon became clear that
explicit instruction, not only in the technical aspects of conservation,
but often in basic literacy was urgently needed. Additionally, as the CCC
sought ways in which to occupy and stimulate camp enrollees in their non-
working hours, they turned to education in subjects like Latin, mathematics
and history, as well as in vocational skills and literacy. At first, these
activities were entirely voluntary, but the moral pressure on enrollees to
occupy their time usefully made the educational supplements almost as basic
to CCC activities as the work regime. By 1938-39, more than 90 per cent of the Corps
was enrolled in some instruction, averaging four hours per week. Two-thirds
of these enrollees were in job related, but one-third were in strictly
academic classes. An educational adviser had early been attached to each
CCC camp and it is clear that the camps, by utilizing various local educational
resources, helped to educate thousands of young men, providing many with
basic literacy, remedial instruction, and some with welcome advanced education.

When Congress extended the life of the CCC in 1937, it formalized its
educational activities by providing each camp with a school building and
increasing specifically educational appropriations. By 1941, credit for
educational work completed in CCC camps was provided by 47 states and the District of Columbia. The CCC had certainly become the center of a federally administered educational enterprise, but the camps were run by the War Department, with personnel and responsibilities shared with the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, and to only a limited degree, the Office of Education.

The ambiguities which marked the administration of the CCC and its policies pervaded New Deal educational activities. The National Youth Administration, superficially more focused in its goals, was even more administratively fragmented. Established in 1935 as an autonomous division of the WPA, the aim of the NYA was clear — to permit students in secondary schools and colleges to continue their education by providing them with part-time, often on-campus, jobs as clerks, janitors, research assistants, or in construction projects, playgrounds, and nursery schools. The NYA also provided work relief with a prevocational goal to unemployed out-of-school youths of school age. During 1936-37, at the height of its activities, the NYA provided almost one-half million students with this kind of assistance.14 Some of this work had already been done under the auspices of the FERA on an ad hoc basis.15 Organizationally autonomous, though nominally under the WPA, the NYA "has in principle worked in close cooperation with local, State, and other Federal governmental agencies and numerous nongovernmental agencies," the 1938 Advisory Committee Staff Report concluded.16 As we shall see, this close cooperation was strongly disputed by some educators, who felt that they had, in fact, been ignored in both the organization and administration of the NYA. More significantly, the Office of Education had no major role in its organization or operations.17

In reality, the coordination of the NYA was often a nightmare chart
of responsibilities, with cooperation between student aid officers, work project administrators, State Departments of Education, and school officials necessary to establish school quotas, to determine who qualified scholastically and financially, and to define which jobs were necessary or desirable. Students receiving aid sometimes changed from month to month, depending on any number of factors — their continued need, their academic status, the determination of most appropriate work, whether quotas had been filled, etc. At each step, a host of variables (with responsibilities in different federal, state and school agencies) had to be coordinated. Nevertheless, the NYA worked — from the perspective of the student who was able to stay in school; of the public, with whom it was popular; and in terms of New Deal policies, whose principal objective was to keep youth off the labor market. Similarly, despite the resentment of educators, the NYA in no way affected the content of education which was the main basis of the stated fears of the educational establishment. Educators, like Lotus Coffman, President of the University of Minnesota, proposed that innovations like this provided but "an easy step...to a situation where the materials of instruction were suggested and then required from Washington." In fact, educators, as well as the NEA and the Office of Education disliked and were suspicious of the NYA, more because they were irked by the fact that they had been ignored by Roosevelt in instituting and administering the program and that it was "divorced from the existing educational agencies" than they were seriously worried about centrally imposed curricula. By 1938, the Office of Education was actively seeking to undermine the NYA and in 1941 the Educational Policies Committee of the NEA called for the abolition of the NYA and the CCC. Thus the NYA both succeeded and failed. It succeeded in instituting a truly radical new program of student assistance and initiating a wholly new sense of federal responsibility for education.
And it failed, not because it was difficult to administer, but because it
did not muster the support of that educational establishment without whose
support the NYA’s innovations could only be shortlived and temporary.

In addition to the CCC and NYA, which were the only exclusively
youth-oriented programs, the New Deal also provided a variety of other
educational programs, many run by the WPA. These included worker education,
nursery schools, vocational retraining, and parent education. In all
these programs, the federal government saw its role as simply providing
funds. It selected personnel on the basis of relief needs, but left
program content to various professional groups and state departments of
education. "Under the Works Progress Administration the emergency educa-
tion program is conducted on a State basis. This practice derives from
the principle of operation underlying all Works Progress Administration
policies, which assumes that the determination of the nature and content
of the program is essentially a State and local government responsibility."23

In short, according to the Advisory Committee Staff study which issued this
statement, the federal government had no intention of determining educational
content. Indeed, it had no policy concerning education.

This was no doubt what Roosevelt wished to believe and was, probably,
initially also true because the educational programs were mere spin-offs
of relief activities. A glance at the WPA projects makes clear that the
programs were careful to provide educational offerings that did not conspicu-
ously compete with traditional school programs, or compensated for cuts
made necessary by the emergency. In fact, however, this was a less than
honest assessment of the impact and consequences, if not the intent, of
New Deal educational endeavors. In the first place, the New Deal programs,
ad hoc and administratively derivative rather than policy oriented
as they often were, were making statements about American education and direction. The programs were all work-coordinated; that is to say that education in the CCC camps, student supports, and various supplemental programs sponsored by the WPA were heavily vocational. In the process of administering relief, the New Deal discovered not only massive illiteracy, but also a population with outdated and inadequate skills. The relief projects became actively involved in underwriting a practical vocationalism and helped to define this as a deeply educational issue and responsibility. In so doing, they helped to emphasize the value of education in job terms and as essential to economic opportunity in America. Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee would confirm this relationship between education and economic opportunity, in sharp contrast to the 1931 report which had proclaimed the more traditional association between education and citizenship. Secondly, the experience of education as a byproduct of relief helped to legitimate a broader, more welfare oriented view of education which included a variety of school-centered services like health, vocational guidance, preschool and adult education, and would culminate in a policy which eventually placed education in a broadly defined Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Thirdly, the Roosevelt programs avoided, even circled around the Office of Education. Thus, at a time when Federal involvement in education was thickening, and might have invested the Office with vastly more power, a greatly expanded staff and proportionately increased vested interest in continuing federal action, FDR chose not to do so. This negative action was probably crucial to the subsequent dismemberment of the educational programs which remained fragments of a temporary set of relief expedients. It most likely also prevented the articulation of any real educational policies which might have resulted in vastly more federal control over education.
In not wishing to deal with, compromise with, or contend with the educational establishment, Roosevelt at once made certain that his programs would be tentative and preordained that educators would evolve their own set of principles or demands about federal aid. The NEA, as we shall see, did just that.

Fourth, the educational programs of the New Deal were aimed at the poor. As the Advisory Committee Staff Report on the WPA explained: "Here, perhaps lies its greatest contribution and its strength. An educational offering of major significance has been made available to the poor and the needy. ... That there was and is a demand for the services rendered is manifest in the persistence and growth of enrollments. The people can learn; the people want to learn; the people intend to learn. What the regular educational agencies have failed to provide the people have found—in a relief program." The point was clear: Education for all was a possibility and an imperative. Only the inattention of traditional educational institutions had failed to awaken or to feed the legitimate educational needs of all the people. The New Deal programs were at once an implicit criticism of established educational offerings and a demonstration of the fact that the federal government could do what established agencies had failed to do.

The criticism implied by an educational agenda for the poor meant more than an extension of education to those previously ignored. The New Deal programs encouraged an awareness of how poverty often underlay inequalities in educational attainment. Before the 1930s, equal educational opportunity was more often a catchphrase for providing people with only as much education as they could use than it was a platform for eliminating inequalities in access to education. But the NYA subsidies especially
provided a profound challenge to this perspective. As Harry Hopkins made clear in an informal address to NYA state administrators in 1935:

Well, I think we have started something. It seems to me that what we are starting is this: that anyone who has capacities should be in college and should get a higher education, and that he is going to get it irrespective of his economic status. That is the crux of the thing, to decide once and for all that this business of getting an education and going to law school and medical school and dental school and going to college is not to be confined to the people who have an economic status at home that permits them to do it.

All this about anyone being able to go to school who wants to go to school is sheer nonsense and always has been, in my opinion. I grant you there are a few exceptional students who can do it, but the great majority of people cannot; and anyone who knows anything about this game at all knows that in the good old days of '28 and '29 tens of thousands of young people were leaving school to go to work for no other reason than that they were poor. They were quite capable of going to college, far more so than some of us in this room.

What Hopkins had done was to change fundamentally the meaning of equal educational opportunity and to propose that the federal government "should meet the problem of equal educational opportunity head on. . . . we propose to give anybody in the United States a chance to go to college if he wants to." Whether the source of this radical understanding was the eye-opening experience of a depression during the long duration of which from one-quarter to one-third of a normally hard-working population was unemployed, or whether the depression and the Roosevelt Administration provided a haven for the expression of radical ideas that could not have been voiced in such high places before, the New Deal provided a context in which a new view of the role the federal government could and should play in making education available for all emerged. The New Deal programs exposed not only educational deficiencies, but also the social condition which explained them. In this context, the federal government became responsible for education as part of its new found obligation to eliminate gross inequalities and social deprivations of all kinds. Once again, education became
part of a much larger national picture, too large in fact to remain exclusively in the jurisdiction of the states or in the care of those professionals whose concern was largely pedagogical.

Finally, the New Deal's educational programs both exposed and were attentive to the educational needs of black Americans in a wholly unprecedented way. Much of this attention was the result simply of the discovery of black-poverty—a poverty long borne, but also deeply exacerbated by the depression. It is fairly clear from the most recent study of the New Deal's relationship to blacks that Roosevelt initially had no plans or policies to deal with the special needs of black Americans, in education or anything else. Nevertheless, by the mid-thirties, Roosevelt, often through the intercession of his wife Eleanor, and in response to aggressive actions of individuals like Mary McLeod Bethune, President of the National Council of Negro Women, his Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, and the activist head of the NYA, Aubrey Williams, began to take note of and make provision for the needs of blacks. Where blacks had received far less than their fair share of relief in the early phases of the New Deal, they began to be employed in larger numbers in construction projects and other relief programs by mid-decade. More significantly for our purposes, black schools and colleges received significant federal appropriations, some of it specifically earmarked for Southern Negro colleges. The response of blacks to New Deal offerings was enthusiastic. Turning eagerly to the many opportunities for instruction offered through the WPA, blacks benefitted especially from the skilled manpower programs and literacy classes. Their response revealed the extent of black educational deprivation and provided blacks with instruction that had simply not been available to them before.

The experience of blacks with NYA and CCC is especially instructive since it reveals something of the manner in which New Deal programs operated
and the possibilities of federally sponsored programs. At NYA, executive director Aubrey Williams, attacked as "a nigger lover," saw "progress in the Negro's educational and economic status as one of his top priorities." The NYA regulations specifically forbade discrimination in student selection and paid black students exactly what was paid to whites for their jobs. The program included almost all of the one hundred and twenty Negro Colleges in the student aid program. NYA also had a special fund to aid "Eligible [black] graduate students who cannot be cared for within the quota for graduate aid of a particular institution, after it has made a just allocation for Negro graduates from its regular quota." This fund, set aside for use by blacks only, was specifically aimed at answering the sad lack of opportunities for professional education for blacks.

At the CCC camps, blacks initially shortchanged in their 10 per cent quota were by mid-decade enrolled up to that proportion. At the same time, the CCC program, useful as it was for individuals, had less to recommend it as an advance for black equality, since blacks were sequestered in segregated camps where educational advisors but not other supervisory personnel were black. Black CCC units constantly provoked local opposition and according to one student of the camps, "in response to any slight pressure CCC camps for Negro enrollees were cancelled or moved." This paradox, an apparently aggressive program to provide blacks with their due and a program which continued traditional social policies, was thoroughly in line with the New Deal's record in general. The explanation has as much to do with the fragmented way in which the New Deal programs were organized and run, as with Democratic party politics to which it is usually attributed. The agencies provided a wide berth for discretion,
and positive leadership as well as stand pat policies where possible. The CCC, run by the War Department which was accustomed to segregated units, found it difficult to give blacks even their due; the NYA run by Williams and Ickes sought to do more.

But the paradox is more far-reaching, for New Deal policies, despite the benefits rendered blacks, can be summed up in the term "separate and equal." This sounds incongruous to our post-1954 ears, but had meaning in the context of the manifestly deprived condition in which black schools were kept in segregated states by state appropriations—a condition shockingly revealed by New Deal investigations. The retention of segregated schools in the context of a developing ideology of equality meant that New Deal activities were both ultimately limited and fundamentally distinguishable from the issues which define equal opportunity today. The New Deal experience, especially at NYA with its special fund for additional graduate instruction and its clear anti-discriminatory policies, suggests that in the case of the education of blacks, experimentation by the federal government, and indeed administrative discretion, could and did open up new possibilities for blacks; providing many with literacy, others with skills, building classrooms and permitting thousands to remain at school. As significantly, the New Deal experience demonstrated the potential efficacy of federal intervention. As Aubrey Williams noted in a statement to the Chicago Urban League in 1936, "It is only by having a national administration . . . that it has been possible to break down and overcome . . . attitudes and provide a program in which all men are treated as equals . . . their need and not their birth nor their color the only criterion for their treatment." The New Deal thus provided a significant precedent for federal intervention in efforts aimed at producing racial equality.
At the same time, the Roosevelt Administration had established neither a policy of equality or goals for black education which could institutionalize the advances achieved and insure the continued responsibility of the federal government for black educational advancement. In this sense, the experience of blacks in the New Deal highlights the failures as well as the successes of the New Deal in the field of education generally. Clearly the federal government could intervene effectively and beneficially on behalf of a "disadvantaged minority." But it did so in the way charity is dispensed — through the good graces and caprice of the benefactor. Like charity too, the actions made the need for help apparent and raised the issues to social consciousness. By acting in this way, however, with no accompanying statement of the legal rights of the recipient or the moral obligation of the benefactor, the New Deal failed to establish a new pattern of government intervention on behalf of blacks that could bind its successor.

The manner in which the New Deal went about its educational business — through a package of relief expedients, without educationally specific goals, with each program separately run and all of them largely independent of the Office of Education — meant that the New Deal was not burdened by the views of the traditional educational establishment or confined by a central administrative agency which defined policies across the board. But this independence had its costs. Roosevelt was not able to enlist the assistance of that establishment in his efforts, nor develop their stake in the enlarged vision which was gradually emerging from New Deal experiences. Instead of cooperating, the New Deal and the educational establishment,
at least in so far as this was represented by the National Education Association, went their separate ways. Throughout the twenties and thirties, the NEA had hoped that the federal government would provide the profession with more authority through a new Department of Education. At the very least, they expected that educational programs of the New Deal would be directed by and channeled through the Office of Education, where the NEA's views and assistance would be sought. As we have seen, Roosevelt acted differently, usually ignoring and bypassing the Office in the administration of his programs. Roosevelt continuously acted apart from both the profession and its closest government bureau. As a result, professional educators found themselves slighted at just the time when education was becoming a federal concern. A look at the attitudes of the NEA, the most articulate, well-organized and powerful of the professional educational organizations, demonstrates the degree to which the Administration increasingly diverged from the profession's more traditional views about the legitimate role of the federal government in education. It also helps to define the actual limits of New Deal activities, since by failing to develop professional commitments to its innovations, the Administration restricted the scope of those innovations and made their coordination with traditional views unlikely.

Beginning in 1932, the NEA began a series of efforts in the form of special emergency investigatory committees, educational coalitions, and legislative lobbying groups to alert teachers, the Congress and the public to the dangers that threatened American education. Initially, the NEA hoped that Roosevelt would welcome its participation in efforts to meet the emergency situation and sought to find ways to "bring the nation's schools... within the beneficent sphere of the New Deal." Roosevelt, however, ignored the organization. In that context the NEA
developed its own comprehensive program for longterm federal aid to
education as well as demands for immediate relief. The overwhelming
consensus of NEA policies was that the time had arrived for some kind of
federal assistance to education, but that it should be assistance in
line with traditional federal-state relations. Thus, Willard Given,
Secretary of the Association, introduced the organization's recommenda-
tions bluntly: "Federal participation in the support of education is
inevitable... The Federal Government has an inescapable interest
in the maintenance of public education, and must bear with the
states the financial burden of supporting school facilities throughout [sic]
the nation."39 The organization's actions were based on two considera-
tions, one practical, the other strategic — the financial distress in
local school districts had now become dramatically clear, and the
educational establishment had to act quickly, on its own, before as
many feared, they were presented with a fait accomplis. This
conclusion was partly based on exaggerated fears about the increasing
power of the federal government in all spheres; partly a justifiable
recognition that the Roosevelt Administration was in fact developing
educational programs which increasingly threatened traditional
federal-state relations.

In 1934, the NEA's Educational Policies Commission was organized
in light of "present trends to establish new educational agencies to
serve large numbers of youth and then to remove them from the custody of
the organized agencies of public education and new practices in such fields
as preschool and adult education, and even deep into secondary and college
levels."40 We should note the word "custody" used here. As the thirties
progressed, the NEA repeatedly made clear that it, together with the traditional local and state educational boards, had a proprietary interest in the nation's children and that the federal government threatened that interest. Thus, Lotus Coffman noted in a statement that undoubtedly touched many sore wounds, "Every school superintendent knows that during the last three years there have been at times as many as three, and sometimes more, federal officers seeking jurisdiction over some of the youth of his community. Each educator knows, too, that there have been established in each state a federal officer in charge of adult education and another in charge of the education of unemployed youth; and that these officers were appointed in many instances without the knowledge or consent of the state superintendents, and that they may operate entirely independently of them." Note how easily Coffman moved from claiming jurisdiction over the youth of his community to a claim of jurisdiction by the states over adults and unemployed persons who were manifestly not within the domain of state superintendents. In the course of countering the perceived threat of Roosevelt's relief programs to traditional sovereignty, the NEA engaged in considerable turf protecting.

Indeed, the NEA was so eager to protect its turf that its views and policies tended to rigidify in response to New Deal activities. Throughout the thirties, the NEA sought federal aid and repeatedly reaffirmed traditional educational values. Thus, while he noted that "Much discussion has gone on [sic] America during the period of the emergency as to whether the federal government has by grants and subsidies sufficiently stimulated education. . . ." John Sexson, of the Educational Policies Commission went on to declare, "Public schools should grow up as local units; they should be administered by local boards of education, elected by a vote of the people. This however, should not
be interpreted to mean that the Federal Government should not render financial assistance to the states in carrying on services or institutions of government which are under the control and management of the states.\textsuperscript{42} Paul R. Port, who spent much of his time during the thirties devising mathematical formulas for federal aid to the states,\textsuperscript{43} reflected the NEA's determined posture most succinctly: "Our social and economic welfare demands a more adequate educational program than the poor states can provide... There would seem to be no question but that all people, rich and poor, are vitally concerned with the establishment of a minimum of educational opportunity at least sufficiently high to safeguard ourselves against danger... This result cannot be attained without federal aid."\textsuperscript{44}

In its programs, the NEA proposed that both interim aid\textsuperscript{45} and more long-term comprehensive federal assistance to education be distributed to the states directly according to a predetermined formula (so as to leave no room for administrative discretion) and "the manner in which the funds received shall be used for the maintenance of a program of public education is left wholly to the respective states."\textsuperscript{46} In the various versions of their legislative programs the NEA agreed to a limited set of conditions upon which federal funds would be contingent: that each state set a minimum term of 160 days; that the states spend at least the amount per school age population that they had spent at some earlier time (variously 1936 and 1933); and that the states in distributing aid take "into consideration the total population and each population group for which schools are specifically maintained."\textsuperscript{47} This last proviso was meant to assure equal distribution to black schools in segregated states. In fact, the first contingent would have little affect on the quality of education received by deprived groups unless the states also raised their minimum days require-
ments in compulsory school attendance laws; the second was playing with depression shrunken budgets; and the third could in no way prevent the siphoning off of state and local appropriations from black schools which would be substituted for, not supplemented by, federal funds. The NEA permitted the federal government just enough control to save face, but not enough to affect education. This version of the NEA legislative program was the most federally muscular of all the versions prepared by the NEA.

In its programs the NEA consistently upheld local autonomy and general school fund appropriations. It opposed special appropriations which were viewed as a form of federal control over the content and direction of education. It decried federal interference in all essential matters. Indeed, NEA's agenda profoundly resembled the proposals of the 1931 Advisory Committee. The NEA stood pat with its hand out.

The NEA's position on local control was at once traditional and defensive. For the NEA, the depression and New Deal confirmed the wisdom of conservative policies. In this sense, Roosevelt was both justified in acting apart from the organization, since it seemed wholly unable to support federal experimentation, and helped to strengthen the organization's intransigent posture. In acting separately from the recognized organs of the profession and not including them actively in the formation or administration of his policies, Roosevelt not only alienated a group which remained constantly suspicious of federal encroachment on sacred turf, but one whose active assistance would have been necessary to any continuing federal program and in the formulation of effective longterm policies. Roosevelt appears to have been interested in preventing just such a development. He never proposed that education become a continuing part of federal
activity nor did he envision a larger, more aggressive role for the Office of Education, and certainly not a place for a Department of Education in Washington. Roosevelt repeatedly ignored the NEA not from neglect, but with conscious intent. As a result, the profession had no reason to see the federal government as anything other than an antagonist. The Administration had simply not used the occasion to educate the organization to a more expansive view of federal participation. Thus, while the New Deal had raised federal participation in education to the threshold of social consciousness and while some individuals like Hopkins and Williams had begun to envision a new federal leadership in education; the New Deal programs had not developed an effective cadre of professional policy makers, educational bureaucrats, and rank-and-file educators with a commitment to and stake in that new federal participation.

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The NEA's experience of the depression and the New Deal's growing awareness of the requirements of American education as it bumbled along were radically different. For the educational establishment, the depression had emphasized the basic need for federal assistance to shore up an antiquated and inadequate financial structure which underlay what they believed to be a sound locally-rooted educational enterprise. The New Deal programs had responded to human needs and miseries, primarily for bread, but eventually for literacy, skills and other forms of learning. The relief efforts uncovered vast inequities not only in local abilities to fund education, but in Americans' ability to afford to be educated and in their access to the education they needed. This was agonizingly clear in the case of blacks, but also obvious from experience of students aided by the NYA,
The depression thus generated two quite distinct and irreconcilable sets of perceptions. On the one hand, it sharpened the views already contained in the 1931 National Advisory Committee Report and reaffirmed by the NEA which called for federal aid with no active, independent federal participation in education. On the other, it produced an unprecedented degree of federal involvement in education which, for some New Dealers, like Williams and Hopkins, resulted in a new vision of an aggressive federal leadership in a new educational democracy.

Just as the 1931 National Advisory Committee Report provides a convenient statement of pre-New Deal views, its successor, published just seven years later, allows us an unusually effective perspective on the possibilities and limits of federal participation opened up by the New Deal. Although the Committee's report was never adopted by either Roosevelt or his immediate successors, it is significant to us because it articulated a new vision of federal responsibility for education and a new ideology of equal educational opportunity which incorporated the New Deal's ad hoc experiences. The 1938 Report provides a striking contrast to that of the 1931 National Advisory Committee. The composition of the 1938 Committee was very different from Hoover's. Significantly, educators were now in the minority, their places taken by a kind of Rooseveltian coalition — labor, government, agriculture and industry. This personnel profile anticipated the new, more comprehensive conception of education as a necessary part of a functioning society that the Report would adopt. The report of the Committee and its twenty-one Staff Studies were based on an exhaustive set of investigations of various aspects of American education, as well as investigations geared to defining the legal precedents for federal aid and possible financial aid formulas. These were conducted by a staff of ninety-nine researchers and advisors. A number of the staff reports summarized the
educational results and implications of several New Deal relief agencies thus at once evaluating and legitimating these new educational endeavors.

From the outset, the Committee report adopted a broad perspective on education, noting that the schools had become the most important educational agency in modern city-centered society eclipsing community, church, and even family. According to the Report, children needed and the schools must provide new social and welfare services which would assume the burden of socialization once carried by a closely integrated network of family and community agencies. Educators had said this often enough before, but the report must be compared not with the usual rhetoric of educators, but with the modesty and local community orientation of the 1931 Report, which described schools as part of and not a substitute for the richly democratic life of small communities. Where the earlier report emphasized how the schools were an extension and product of that local democracy, the new proposed that the schools provide a means for bringing it about. The Report noted that many of these new social services had been provided through various agencies of the New Deal and concluded that the time had arrived for a continuing commitment to "improved educational services for all children. The American people are committed to the principle that all of the children of this country, regardless of economic status, race, or place of residence, are entitled to an equitable opportunity to obtain a suitable education... The principle has never been fully realized in practice. There is now no reason why it cannot be, and it is time that it should be." The benefits of localism as the primary context of democratic schooling had given way to a new imperative for national goals for the education of all of America's children, and we can already hear the early strains of "entitlement" arguments with which the 1960s and 70s have made us familiar. Finally, the Report noted that "The Committee is convinced that the Federal Government must continue and expand its efforts, to improve and enlarge the social services, includ-
ing education, and that it must exercise a large measure of constructive national leadership, because in no other agency can representative national leadership be vested. The federal government thus had the obligation to protect and to provide for the legitimate rights of its citizens in various areas, including education. The document is in fact dotted with forceful statements of this kind: "If the educational programs of local communities and states could and would accomplish all of the purposes that are vital to the nation as a whole, the Federal government would not need to participate in education. Past Federal participation in education has been necessitated by the fact that local programs never have been adequate to accomplish all vital national purposes." Education can be made a force to equalize the conditions of men. It is no less true that it may be a force to create class, race, and sectional distinctions. The report thus raises not only the principle of entitlement, but describes education as a force which can and should be used as an instrument to encourage social equality.

And yet, in the context of the trumpet blasting of enlarged principles and objective, the report shows the strains of the mixed New Deal experience whose innovations were at once radical and limited. Those limitations were the result of the New Deal's failure to develop a long term program for federal action, a concrete set of objectives, or to challenge the traditional local basis of school control and administration. Roosevelt hoped his programs would serve their purpose and evaporate. In fact, however, they generated new ideals and possibilities. At the same time, they produced neither effective policies of a strictly educational kind, nor a new professional educational leadership, nor machinery for turning the principles which were implicitly emerging from New Deal experience into policy. This tension is reflected in the report which ineffectively knits together
new ideals with old procedures — enlarged federal responsibilities with an almost exclusive dependence on local school administration and state distribution formulas. Those limitations make the report a less than completely convincing document of the possibilities of federal leadership in education. In the end, the report shortcircuits its radical new vision by concluding, not that the schools had been inadequate, but that their financial structures were inefficient: "The major reason for the great inequalities in educational opportunity is the manner in which financial support is provided for the public schools." "If every locality were equally provided with taxable resources in education, there would be little need for Federal participation in the financial support of education." The spirit, they implied, was willing but the purse was weak.

In fact, this conclusion flew in the face of some of the evidence, especially that provided by Doxey Wilkerson in a detailed study of the state of black education in segregated school systems. The inequalities in facilities, the disparities in funding and teachers' salaries, the blatant discrimination against blacks and black schools in segregated states could not be defined as good faith inefficiently underwritten. And the New Deal programs had, as we have seen, uncovered the special need of blacks in ways that could not be ignored if the federal government was to exercise real leadership. The response of the Committee, however, was not to call for special aid for black education, or for new federally administered programs, but to make each of the elements of the federal funding program (divided by goals like teacher education, adult education, vocational education, apprenticeship training, etc.) contingent on "an equitable distribution of the Federal funds between facilities for the two races." This proviso was repeated throughout the recommendations made by the Committee which, by prohibiting a reduction in state and local funding when federal funds were received, further protected Negro schools. The recommendations
of the Committee were much more far reaching and much more specific than those of the 1931 Report, defining a host of target areas for appropriations in addition to the general fund, and making each of these contingent on equitable allocation to black schools, and on other provisos to which I will return. And it is in the context of this much expanded view of federal obligations that the statements about equal opportunity for blacks must be placed. Blacks were to get their fair share of each of the allocated funds, but the report called not for equal education for blacks (obvious in its acquiescence in segregated schools) and not even for equal though separate facilities. The demand was restricted to equal distribution of federal funds, and a maintainence of present levels of state and local appropriations. In other words, the federal government was not to correct the fundamental inequalities, but would assist in improving education for blacks, commensurate with the improvement offered to education in general. The mixed legacy of the New Deal for blacks is nowhere clearer than in this report, which was so much a product of New Deal experience. The Roosevelt Administration raised the issue of inequality to national consciousness and made it central to any federal aid to education, but never fundamentally challenged the traditional institutional matrix within which this inequality functioned. The New Deal had not questioned segregated schools, as it had not challenged segregated CCC units. Its goals for education as part of an enlarged commitment to social welfare were large, but its procedures ultimately limited to small objectives like an "equitable allocation" of federal funds. This was, in fact, the limitation of the report throughout, and it illustrates both the strength and weakness of New Deal educational activities. The New Deal projected the federal government into a new educational orbit, but its measures were meant to be temporary, so that after the depression, the nation could return to "normal" operations. The precedents set by the
New Deal were thus self-limiting. In the long run, the only permanent machinery available for education were the existent state and local agencies. The New Deal had created no permanent federal agencies with a continuing educational outlook and policies which were intended to outlive the emergency. Moreover, as we have seen, the New Deal had done nothing to assuage the profession's fears about the dangers of federally sponsored education programs. Little wonder that the Advisory Committee fell back on local administration. It had no basis for assuming that any other form was either possible or desirable. The one exception to this was the Committee's recommendation that the CCC and NYA be retained, and newly coordinated in a National Youth Services Administration, to be run as a separate agency under the auspices of "a department including public health, education and welfare, if such a department should be established." Here the New Deal agencies provided a direct precedent, both in program and in administration.

The report thus tried to bridge the old and the new, and in order to effect the larger educational purposes to which it committed the federal government, it provided the government with considerable muscle. The federal government could withhold money if certain conditions for funds were not met. These terms included not only the already noted "equitable distribution" clauses for black institutions, but the provision that certain kinds of aid — school books, transportation and scholarships — be made available to children in private (including parochial) as well as public schools. This too was a notable departure, based on the principle that the federal government issued these funds to individuals not to schools, a view heavily influenced by New Deal experience. Another recommendation permitted the federal government to withhold funds for school buildings if rural districts did not proceed with consolidation projects; another required that the state establish special departments through which funds would be channeled and who
would be responsible for overseeing proper expenditure and reporting. The Committee thus took seriously its belief that the federal government had an obligation to assist in the education of all its citizens and that it also had a responsibility to see that the funds were actually used for that purpose.

In the end, despite its limitations, the Report of the Advisory Committee provides a striking contrast to its predecessor. For the 1938 Committee, education had become a national responsibility not only because many local school districts were poor, but because the education they provided was weak, limited and unequal. The federal government’s role was therefore to provide financial assistance not simply to remedy the districts’ poverty as the 1931 Committee had proposed, but in order to rectify this situation. In contrast to the recommendations of the 1931 Committee which rejected special education grants, the 1938 Committee sought to use money for very specific purposes — for better vocational training, better teacher training, in order to make textbooks free and available to all, to provide transportation, to permit college students to continue their education despite family poverty, to consolidate and enrich rural schools, to strengthen black schools. Although Roosevelt had hoped to return the nation to a situation that existed in education in pre-depression days, the Committee he appointed incorporated the experience of his emergency administration to propose a profound alteration in the federal government’s relation to education. For the Committee, the depression had brought the federal government face-to-face with the underlying defects of American schools and made it clear that the federal government could do something about these.
While the depression thus changed the relationship of the federal government to education, it did so in ironic and problematic ways. The New Deal had operated without a sense of the future. Its discoveries about education and the goals it pursued came in the course of experience. At no time did Roosevelt seek to anchor his educational programs in long-term commitments or in a central bureaucracy with clear aims and enforcement procedures. Roosevelt never intended to challenge the traditional principle of local control. He never even supported federal aid to education. The National Education Association never revised its views about the role of the federal government in education and continued to seek general assistance without federal supervision. The way the New Deal operated, by providing temporary alternative channels of educational opportunity, without the active assistance of the educational establishment and without developing a vested central educational bureaucracy, meant that it failed to provide clear policy goals or produce a vested educational interest in innovative approaches.

The New Deal thus had a profound effect but left no immediate legacy. Its greatest strengths — experimentalism, freedom from rigid central directives, ability to innovate by allowing agencies wide discretion as at NYA or to create programs as it went along to suit the needs of its clients as at CCC — were also its greatest weakness. The New Deal could be innovative because it was unencumbered by a bureaucracy which would have enforced regularity and most likely have been dominated by a generally conservative profession. As a result, however, it was unable to leave to the future any continuing programs, personnel or agencies. The New Deal experiments in education were effectively over when one-by-one between
1939 and 1942 the depression agencies, WPA, CCC, NYA were reduced and disbanded. The war, the accompanying renewal of prosperity, an increasingly conservative Congress, and the strengthening opposition of the NEA and the Office of Education to educational programs operating outside of "normal" channels together turned the New Deal programs into temporary experiments of an emerging welfare state. Although the New Deal programs were thus no more than an educational flash-in-the-pan, the experience nevertheless changed the meaning and nature of all future discussions about the federal government and education. For the perceptions about the nature of educational deprivation, the meaning of federal responsibility, the definition of equal educational opportunity and the right that Americans possessed in education, and the role of education for national prosperity and the welfare of the people represented a quantum leap in American educational ideology. And the New Deal itself would serve as a precedent and reservoir of ideas in the 1960s and beyond.
Notes


2 United States National Advisory Committee on Education, Federal Relations to Education: Report of the National Advisory Committee on Education, Part I, Committee Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D. C., 1931), pp. 18, 30 (my emphasis); hereafter cited as 1931 Committee Report.


4 1931 Committee Report, p. 103.


For a summary of expenditures on various programs and projects directed by the WPA, see, Doak S. Campbell, Frederick H. Bair and Oswald L. Harvey, Educational Activities of the Works Progress Administration, Staff Study Number 14, Prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education (Washington, D. C., 1939), pp. 29-31, 44. For a summary of expenditures of NYA, see Palmer O. Johnson and Oswald L. Harvey, The National Youth Administration, Staff Study Number 13, Prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education (Washington, D. C., 1938), pp. 28, 44.

10 See, for example, C. S. Marsh, "The Educational Program of the Civilian Conservation Corps," Bulletin of the Department of Secondary-School Principals of the National Education Association, #50 (1934), 222.


12 Zeitlin, p. 95.

hereafter cited as 1938 Committee Report.

14. See, Johnson and Harvey, p. 7 and passim; Reeves, p. 28.


17. According to George Rawick, the Office of Education was actively hostile to NYA and by 1938 was campaigning to destroy the agency. In 1940, the Office of Education was given some role in its vocational education program, and very soon thereafter, the Office absorbed large portions of its defense industry training program. By then the NYA had been effectively destroyed as a New Deal agency. Rawick, pp. 252-261.

18. For a chart of responsibilities in administration, see Johnson and Harvey, p. 10.


20. Idem. See also Zeitlin, pp. 295-298 for a discussion of NEA's resentment of Roosevelt's handling of NYA.

21. Rawick, p. 266

22. See, Campbell, et al., passim.


25. Hopkins' statement is reprinted in Zeitlin, pp. 348-352; the quotation appears on p. 349.


27. Harvard Sitkoff, The New Deal for Blacks, The Emergence of Civil Rights

28 Sitkoff, p. 68.
29 Sitkoff, p. 73.
30 Johnson and Harvey, pp. 27-28.
31 For the state of professional education for blacks in segregated systems, see Doxey A. Wilkerson, Special Problems of Negro Education, Staff Study Number 12, Prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education (Washington, D. C., 1939), pp. 65-69.
32 Zeitlin, p. 107.
33 American Council on Education, p. 18.
34 Rawick, p. 148.
35 See, Wilkerson, passim.
36 Quoted in Zeitlin, p. 205, note 36 (my emphasis).
37 According to a report by John K. Norton, "An investigation just completed for the Joint Commission on the Emergency in Education reveals that no less than four hundred educational committees and commissions have recently prepared reports or are now conducting investigations, which are pertinent in planning educational recovery and reconstruction." "Work of the Joint Commission in the Emergency in Education for 1935," NEA, Proceedings, 1934, p. 36. Norton also
reported that there was now available, "A Directory of National Deliberative Committees on Education." Of course, not all of these were NEA organized or directed, but the number tell us something about the alarm within the educational community.

41 Coffman, p. 417 (my emphasis).
43 See, for example, his staff report, Paul R. Mort, Eugene S. Lawler, et al., Principles and Methods of Distributing Federal Aid for Education, Staff Study #5, Prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education (Washington, D.C., 1939).
45 For the NEA's Six Point Program for emergency relief, see, Rule, pp. 43-47.
46 "Federal Support for Education; The Issues and the Facts," 158.
47 Idem
48 Reeves, p. 29,
49 1938 Committee Report, pp. 4, 4-5.
50 1938 Committee Report, pp. 38, 33.
51 1938 Committee Report, pp. 29, 48.
52. 1938 Committee Report, p. 49.
53. 1938 Committee Report, p. 42.