This edited volume contains 16 social science-related educational research articles based on papers presented at the 1979 annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association (AERA). The articles and associated commentary are organized according to six symposia held at the meeting—anthropology, evaluation, history, political science, psychology, and sociology. The objective of each symposium was to identify the values imposed by the social science discipline and to determine how researchers tend to treat this subject matter, with particular regard to methodology and concept formation. Titles include "Anthropological Fieldwork: Comments on its Values and Limitations;" "Values and Policy in Educational Evaluation;" "Democratizing Evaluation;" "Distortion of the Historiography of American Education;" "Neo-Conservatism and National School Policy;" "Values Imposed by Political Science: Implications for Educational Research and Development;" "The Influence of Psychology on Education;" and "Sociological Arrogance." (DB)
VALUES, INQUIRY, AND EDUCATION

Edited by
Hendrik D. Gideonse
Robert Koff
Joseph J. Schwab

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IN EVALUATION

SERIES EDITOR
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PREFACE

Robert H. Koff
State University of New York at Albany

On April 8–12, 1979 more than 5,000 educational researchers gathered in San Francisco, California, to attend the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association (AERA). Symposia were organized to address three general themes: (a) Improvement of disciplined inquiry paradigms and the methodologies employed by educational researchers; (b) Improvement of educational practice through the dissemination and utilization of educational research; and (c) Improvement of the communication between educational research sponsors, performers, and consumers, and their relationship to the political and policy environment. The first of these themes serves as the leitmotif for the present inquiry.

This monograph consists of a collection of sixteen papers and associated commentary presented at six symposia held at the 1979 annual meeting of AERA. The volume also contains a synthesis chapter by Joseph J. Schwab and an epilog by Hendrik D. Gideonse. The papers were commissioned by Hendrik Gideonse and Robert Koff and were edited for this collection by Gideonse, Koff, and Schwab.

Two or three authors and a commentator were assigned to each symposium. The object of each symposium was to identify the values imposed by a social science discipline on education. The disciplines represented were anthropology, evaluation, history, political science, psychology, and sociology.

Each paper was commissioned for the purpose of inquiring into the values and partialities which characterize various bodies of knowledge identified with the social and behavioral sciences and which serve to contribute to and mold our view on education. The papers were written in response to a dual charge. On the one hand, authors were asked to consider the biases or values which accrue to each of the represented disciplines and, on the other hand, the subject-matter of each discipline, together with the principles, problems, and methods brought to bear on its subject-matter.

The idea for the symposia and this monograph had its starting
point in a dialogue which began in 1975 between Hendrik Gideonse and me. As relatively new deans of schools of education, we were fascinated by the problem of trying to identify the values and analytical skills thought to be essential to the exercise of decanal leadership. One outcome of our discussion was the "discovery" that the social and behavioral disciplines have values of several different types imbedded within them.

This "discovery" did not tell us anything that we did not already know. What intrigued us was the need to analyze the obvious. In addition, we were also concerned with the problem of how to trace the various ways in which values imposed by the social and behavioral disciplines effect the formulation of education policy.

The amount of research in anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, and history, to mention a few of the behavioral sciences, has been expanding rapidly. The last score of years, in particular, has witnessed a significant increase in discipline-based study of education. The reasons are complex and can be traced in part to our faith in research, increases in financial support, and the status of discipline-based inquiry and scholarship. And yet the impact of research on practice and on education policy is fragmented, diffuse, and, at times, highly partisan. It is, to put it bluntly, difficult to determine what effect discipline-based research has on the practice of schooling and in shaping our view of education as a field of study.

This observation, in turn, raises several questions which served to provide the basis for further dialogue between Gideonse and me. During the 1978 annual meeting of AERA we met in the coffee shop of the Toronto Sheraton where, after more than three hours of discussion, we designed the present inquiry.

One starting point was the assumption that the academic disciplines and the tools and methodologies derived from them are not benign, as it were, in terms of fundamental value premises or positions. A further assumption was that the above statement holds true for every discipline irrespective of particular issues, fads, or partisan ideologies.

Drawing on these assumptions, we developed a tentative list of statements that seemed to describe the impact of social science research on the formulation of public policy related to education. The list, which is based largely on the research of others, includes, but is not limited to, the following:
• Discipline-based research is not strictly the logical or value-free process that researchers claim it to be.

• One discipline-based theory or method is not necessarily any closer to the truth than any other. They are simply different. Each discipline-based theory or method poses different questions, makes use of different data, or finds different information relevant.

• Discipline-based knowledge generally is not convergent. Policy-makers and researchers act as if the fruits of research will produce knowledge that will lead to greater clarity about what to think or what to do. More often, discipline-based research produces a greater sense of complexity as well as reveals the inadequacy of accepted ideas about defining or solving problems.

• The impact of the disciplines on the actual practice of education is not well understood. In addition, research cannot arbitrate underlying value choices.

• Discipline-based research creates or reinforces biases and ideological commitments; it serves to mold opinion, facilitates the interchange of information and yet creates new arguments, partialities, and complexities.

Inspection of this list, coupled with our interest in the substantive character of the problem we were examining, led us to organize the statements into the form of problems susceptible to further study. The first problem identified was the need to design an inquiry which would (a) illuminate the values that are embedded within the disciplines and (b) illustrate how the identified values affect our view of education. The next problem was to organize the inquiry so that the product of our efforts would result in more effective use of discipline-based research in the formulation of education policy.

The need to organize the inquiry so that it would result in more effective use of the fruits of discipline-based research was of particular importance to us since we were of the opinion that the translation of theory into practice is a vexing problem for the social and behavioral sciences generally. That is, it is difficult to translate knowledge into materials and methods that will enable practitioners to use the fruits of discipline-based inquiry in their classrooms. Making intelligent decisions is, for example, a basic concern of teachers: how to increase the applicative and
interpretative uses of social science research in this process is an important problem. This problem is made acute and is exacerbated by what Joseph Schwab, in his synthesis chapter, calls the hyphenated social sciences (e.g., educational-psychology, educational-sociology, educational anthropology, etc.).

The difficulty of relating the fruits of the disciplines to education, we judge, is caused by at least two factors. The first relates to the extent to which problems chosen by social scientists bear upon the problems of schooling and classrooms. The second concerns the ability to make the fruits of inquiry accessible in a physical and cognitive sense to those who command the greatest degrees of freedom to modify the character of schools and schooling.

From our experience in examining problems associated with the deanship in education we were able to conclude that there is much that social scientists are prepared to face; there is also a good deal that they prefer to ignore. Concerning this latter point we recalled that most of the research on leadership and management has been done in education settings. Our own knowledge of the large volume of discipline-based research led us to the conclusion that many social scientists tend to choose problems for study which are, for the most part, unrelated to the problems of schooling and classrooms. For example, some social scientists seem preoccupied with the problem of determining the biochemistry of memory while others ignore the need, legislative mandates notwithstanding, to engage in research that will foster the development of basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills. There are also social scientists who avoid educational problems by defining them in terms appropriate to their own discipline. Thus the need to understand the problems of children from different cultures is often translated into sociological, anthropological, psychological, or political paradigms that are of little practical value to the teacher.

The process of translating the fruits of research through various phases of development is highly complex, not well understood, and practically very difficult. Efforts to make the fruits of social science inquiry accessible to practitioners have resulted in extraordinary efforts to disseminate information. Dissemination is also a complex process that is not well understood, but it is known that there are instances when dissemination activities can produce serious problems. For example, in the process of transmitting research findings to practitioners, the research results
are often oversimplified or, at worst, translated into procedures which, by design, force teachers to use curriculum materials and techniques which are unresponsive to the needs of students.

One consequence of oversimplification is that teachers acquire misinformation about matters of central importance. For example, the work of Piaget has been badly distorted and grossly oversimplified. As a result, there are many teachers who believe that there is a fixed time (e.g., age 7) when children must be taught certain concepts. Oversimplification is also illustrated in efforts to train teachers to produce lists of behavioral objectives. Although the objectives may be precisely worded, they still will not help the teacher in the complex task of increasing pupil achievement.

Without trying to prophesy the future, our intention was to explore a few of the more compelling problems that discipline-based inquiry in the field of education has created. At a time in our history when it is easy to become lost in a maze of detail, our concern was to design a procedure that would reinforce our primary objective—to examine the impact of discipline-based values on the formulation and resolution of educational problems.

To achieve this end we felt it would be most appropriate to hold a public dialogue. The public nature of the dialogue would serve to build understanding across the various social and behavioral disciplines and, at the same time, prevent insularity among educators and discipline-based researchers. Thus the idea of designing symposia for the next annual meeting of AERA was created.

The next problem was the selection of disciplines. We selected psychology and sociology because of their rich tradition and significant contributions to education. Anthropology and political science were included because of their relatively new status and emerging interest in analyzing educational issues. History was selected because of its classical locus of bias. As V. S. Pritchett put it so well, "Unlike the novelist and the poet, the historian can never be the absolute ruler of an imaginary kingdom. For however skillful he may be, he cannot invent his facts." On the other hand, the historian can and does choose the facts he wishes to include in his inquiry. Finally, we decided to include the field of evaluation because of its emerging relationship to policy formulation and its susceptibility to political influence.

Given the logistical problems and severe time constraints imposed by the AERA annual meeting schedule, we felt we
would be able to plan and coordinate only six symposia. Therefore, the disciplines of economics and philosophy, although important in their own right, had to be omitted.

Now what remained was the need to relate the fruits of the proposed symposia to education as a field of study. In order to accomplish this objective, we developed the idea of holding another symposium which would be charged with the task of (a) synthesizing all of the papers presented in the discipline-based symposia and (b) drawing appropriate implications for education research and development policy. We needed a chairperson for this symposium who was skilled in dealing with the academic disciplines in an interdisciplinary setting. We also needed someone who was well acquainted with the complexity of relating the fruits of social science inquiry to education. The most able individual that we could think of to undertake this task was Joseph Schwab. After hearing about our plans and the overall idea for the symposia, Schwab “signed on” with enthusiasm and subsequently has become an invaluable and most welcome partner.

After developing the outline for our inquiry, we contacted Paul Hood and Michael Scriven. Hood was the chairperson for the 1979 AERA annual meeting. Scriven was the incoming president of the association. Both Hood and Scriven were intrigued by the proposal and encouraged us to write it up and have it reviewed by appropriate AERA division chairpersons.

Immediately after the 1978 AERA meeting, each of us contacted division chairpersons and explained our idea and plan of organization. Paul Hood, during this period of time, was most supportive and helpful. We also contacted Ed Meade at the Ford Foundation to solicit his interest and help. Fortunately, the Ford Foundation was sufficiently intrigued by our proposal to offer us financial support.

All that remained, then, was the selection of authors and commentators. The objectives for the inquiry served to guide us in extending invitations to paper presentors and symposia chairpersons. Each author was invited to prepare a paper because of his or her recognition as a scholar and identification with a particular social and/or behavioral discipline. Each presentor agreed to prepare and send the paper to Joseph Schwab and the commentator of their symposium well in advance of the annual meeting. Each author was asked to:
PREFACE

- identify the values and partialities which characterize their discipline;
- discuss the ways in which discipline-based values affect the methods, principles, and problem formulations in the field;
- assess the effects that the identified values and partialities have on contemporary education policy and practice.

One of the first problems identified was the potential difficulty authors would encounter in examining the values associated with their own discipline. That is, sometimes it is easier to identify values associated with another area of inquiry because one is not so hindered by the veil of one's own discipline. In order to accommodate to this possibility (i.e., the outcome of inquiry into inquiry cannot be without bias) as well as relate the papers to the purposes of the inquiry, Professor Schwab had this concern added to an agenda of matters he was to discuss in the symposia he was to chair. His synthesis of the papers is presented in the chapter titled "Ends and Beginnings." An epilog, written by Hendrik Gideonse, is the last chapter in this volume. In the epilog, Gideonse summarizes what we think we have learned from this inquiry and charts future directions that research concerned with these matters should consider.

The commissioned papers are organized and appear in alphabetical order under the rubric of their respective discipline. Each set of papers is followed by a commentary section prepared by the symposium chairperson. The editors wish to extend their thanks and appreciation to the authors and commentators for permitting us to impose editorial license. We are pleased to report that everyone responded with enthusiasm to our charge and with good natured resistance to our editorial deadlines.

We had thought, as far back as the time of commissioning the papers, that AERA might be able to publish them. When we later discovered that AERA could not publish them, we submitted them to UCLA's Center for the Study of Evaluation in 1980 for consideration as a CSE monograph. CSE then undertook to do final editing of the papers and to publish them in their monograph series.

Space allows us to mention only a few of the individuals involved in helping us organize the symposia and prepare the manuscript of this monograph.
We are deeply indebted to the following AERA division chairpersons for their encouragement and support: Peter J. Cistone, Ray C. Rist, Stacy F. Rockwood, Thomas J. Shuell, and Charles Strickland. The AERA staff were also of invaluable assistance; and we wish to recognize the efforts, in particular, of David H. Florio. As previously mentioned, the Program Chairperson of the 1979 annual AERA meeting, Paul Hood, was most helpful to us. We are deeply indebted to him for his assistance.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Ford Foundation which has made this monograph possible. A very special note of gratitude is extended to Ed Meade; he provided considerably more than just financial support for this inquiry.

It is our hope that Values, Inquiry, and Education accomplishes the goals set for it by the editors. We have prepared this monograph to further the development and study of the relationship between the disciplines and education and, hopefully, to provide its reader with intellectual stimulation that will warrant its continued use in coming years.
ANTHROPOLOGY

Patterns of Sophistication and Naivety in Anthropology: Distinctive Features of Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Education*

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INTRODUCTION

Max Gluckman wrote a book a few years ago (1964) titled Closed Systems and Open Minds: The Limits of Naivety in Social Anthropology. Its central thesis was that in any discipline it is necessary to think in differentiated ways about some aspects of phenomena and in relatively undifferentiated ways about other aspects. The greater the complexity of the phenomena under investigation, the more striking will be the contrast within and across disciplines in what aspects of phenomena are handled in sophisticated ways, and what aspects are handled naively. A studied naivety, a deliberate crudity, is necessary in the various social sciences. Gluckman argues, because of the tremendous complexity of the phenomena with which they are concerned. An attempt to study everything about everything in social life would be immobilizing, and so scientific progress in any discipline requires that it purchase wisdom about some things at the price of foolishness about other things. The best one can hope for in anthropology is to be studiedly naive; aware of the soft spots in one's own discipline, cultivating a sense of the limits and boundaries of a given disciplinary mode of inquiry.

That argument is a bit too neat; it can be read as an apology for the current status quo in any discipline. I want to argue here that while there are inevitable differences in pattern across the

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by conversations with James Fitting, Lee Shulman, Robert Floden, Perry Lanier, and Albert Robillard. Insufficiencies in the paper are the author’s own responsibility.
social sciences—variation from one discipline to the next in the
texture of wisdom and foolishness—still in each of the social
sciences currently it is necessary to be less naive about what one's
own discipline is worst at, to be more open at the boundaries
between disciplines, if we are ever to come to anything like a
unified understanding of human social life. It is such a unified
understanding which anthropology rather arrogantly claims as
its own project. To the extent that the claim is anything more
than rhetoric, then anthropology is not so much a discipline
(with an inherent pattern of clarity and fuzziness of focus) as it is
a problem-oriented field of inquiry, eclectic in substance and in
method, with the potential to be fuzzy and clear about whatever
it needs to be in order to address the problems at hand.

The field of anthropology emerged, not at all coincidentally,
in the period of most rapid expansion of European and American
colonial empires. Margaret Mead in a speech once said that to
understand the boundaries among the social sciences one should
think of the current map of Africa. She said the boundaries
among new nations are entirely irrational, simply the remains
of lines of struggle among colonial powers.

Neither England, France, nor Germany ever succeeded at
fully doing in the other two great powers, and thus each of the
three great colonial empires of the nineteenth century had limits.
So too for the various social sciences. It is useful to think of their
boundaries as limits of naivety. And if Gluckman is at least partly
right, had anthropology succeeded in its drive for intellectual
lebensraum and for territory within universities—had it gotten
exclusive rights to its most imperialistic central question, “What
is anthropos?”—then there would be nothing to discuss in this
symposium, because there would be everything to discuss. So
anthropology can thank the university departments of psychol-
ogy, sociology, political science, economics, and even histr.;y, for
preventing anthropology from getting all the territory it claimed
in the nineteenth century in its attempt to become the overarch-
ing discipline within which all the other social sciences would be
included.

Still today anthropology keeps pressing her imperial claims,
and persists in trying to answer the question “What is man?”
In consequence, as a deliberately broad ranging field of inquiry,
anthropology is difficult to characterize. There are as many
anthropologies as there are aspects of anthropos. Some areas of
focus, however, are relatively distinctive. I have taken three
approaches in trying to highlight the distinctive. First, I read through the descriptions of all the courses in anthropology offered in my university. Second, I thought of what people had said recently while introducing me as an anthropologist. Third, I considered some practical problems in the field of education—inherently complex problems—and tried to think of which aspects of those problems anthropologists might tend to be relatively wise and foolish about, in contrast to scholars from other disciplines.

Here are excerpts from two descriptions of introductory anthropology courses:

**Anthropology 100. *Origin of Man and Culture***

This course provides an introductory overview of the processes which shaped contemporary *Homo sapiens*. Major topics to be covered include: the nature of evolution and natural selection; our primate ancestors and contemporary primates; the evolution of the human species; relationships between environment, technology, and biological evolution; and natural selection today.

**Anthropology 171. *Introduction to Sociocultural Anthropology***

This course is intended to present an overview of sociocultural anthropology for the beginning student. Course topics will include anthropological approaches to the study of kinship, law, politics, social networks, and systems of belief. Lectures, readings, and films for the course will draw upon examples from a variety of societies around the world, each of which reveals a different way of being human.

*Each of Which Reveals a Different Way of Being Human.*

In anthropology the question, “What is man?” is handled a bit like a question in the classic, awful joke:

Q: How’s your wife?
A: In comparison to what?

When I read the course descriptions I think first of differing skull fragments, differing customs, and differing artifacts whose uses I am not sure of. There is an emphasis on contrast, across the full two million year history of human evolution, across the full spectrum of societies which exist today, not to mention contemporary groups of primates and dolphins. “What is man?”
is asked as "What is man in contrast to other animals, and in contrast to other men past and present?" These are key dimensions of contrast. Other dimensions along which questions of contrast could be asked are not considered empirically legitimate. The question "What is man in contrast to God?" is not asked, nor is the question usually asked, "What is man in contrast to what he might be?" There is an emphasis on careful empirical description and comparison, organized according to principles of contrastive analysis. There is also an emphasis on adaptation, not only in physical anthropology and archaeology but, during the current generation of senior anthropologists, within sociocultural anthropology as well. The organization of human living —biologically, socially, culturally—is seen as actively adaptive: interaction among the individual organism, the human group, and the nonhuman environment, all of which are constantly changing in states and in relationships, although that change is not necessarily rapid or uniform in character. Human learning is seen as one of the essential integuments of human biocultural adaptation, and in distinction to psychology, the primary nexus of learning is not seen as that between the individual organism and its environmental surround, but between the human collectivity, of whatever scale, and its social and physical environment. The nexus of learning between the individual human organism and its immediate environment is considered as secondary, for the following reason. The capacity of human collectivities to "learn" adaptively in response to changing social and physical environmental circumstances and in acting on those environments in ways that change them, is seen as the most essential aspect of being human: the biocultural specialization of a physiologically unspecialized species (with the exception of the forebrain and the hand). Human groups are seen as actively "learning," and possessing to a unique degree the capacity to share and transmit learning among individual learners, within and across generations.

So contrast, adaptation, and human collectivities are of central interest. These three are related, for it is contrast in modes of collective adaptation which is being investigated—kinds of dynamic relations among individuals, groups, and their environments, including the content of the symbol systems shared among group members. Within the field of anthropology as a whole, precise location of classificatory differentia among human collectivities and their ways of life, past and present, is a focal concern.
Contrastive analysis is accomplished in anthropology by a discipline-specific way of handling the disciplinarily universal distinction between the particular and the general. Particularization takes at least three forms in the way phenomena are considered: (1) concreteness—whether bones, customs, or artifacts are being considered, there is a literalness involved; what is salient are things and actions which can be observed to exist in space/time, (2) case specificity—there is emphasis on the “naturally” bounded unit of analysis—this skull, this subspecies of early man, this village, this child-rearing pattern, this politeness display, (3) minuteness of detail—in the description of particular objects, events, and sets of circumstances, the level of detail sought is that necessary to account for all the salient differentia.

Generalization in anthropology has at least two aspects: (1) holism—There is interest in generalization within cases as well as across them. searching out all the ramifications within a case of a given pattern, ramifications both in the sense of breadth of distribution of occurrence, and of frequency of occurrence, and (2) contrast and comparison—patterns found ramified within any given whole case are considered against a backdrop of wide variation, across space and time, in “ways of being human.” Attendant in these two approaches to generalization is an emphasis on (1-a) recurrence of phenomena; one is not very interested in unique or infrequent events, objects, or types of people. Attendant also is an emphasis on (2-a) the exotic and distinctive; to do the most powerful contrastive analysis the widest possible range of variation and contrast is desirable as a frame. This means searching for the extremes—the earliest skull, the every-day customs most different from those of the investigator.

Last year I began to teach medical students for the first time in a sustained way, by going on morning “rounds” with them at a local hospital. On the first morning I was introduced to the students by my fellow teacher during rounds. an attending physician I had never met before. We gathered in a small conference room which was reached by walking along a hospital corridor lined on either side by patients’ rooms. Just as we had settled ourselves down at the conference room table, the physician introduced me: “This is Dr. Erickson. He’s an anthropologist, but he’s done a lot of other things besides that.”

One morning a few days later, before rounds had started, I was standing at the nurse’s station, talking to a hospital social worker I had met the day before. After we had talked about how
she got into doing medical social work, she got a half quizzical
look on her face, hesitated, and said, "What is your specialty
in anthropology?" I said, "I guess you could call it urban anthro-
pology." Instantly her face changed and she said "Oh!", with
what I thought was a note of comprehension mixed with relief.

What was going on in these two little scenes is not entirely
clear to me. But things like that have happened before. Hearing
the term anthropology, or reading the course descriptions cited
earlier in this paper, seem instantly to conjure up some or all of
the following images: skull fragments, potsherds, bloody initia-
tion rites, unintelligible languages, naked genitalia, roasting
pigs. None of the above seem to have much to do with a hospital
ward in an American city, or with the public school down the
street. Paradoxically, anthropology may be a victim of its own
success in public relations. The exotic attracts attention; in
books, films, the reputation of Margaret Mead as a national
institution, as well as in university course descriptions, the form
of anthropology's interest in the exotic is instantly communi-
cable and interpretable by the "lay" audience. What is much
more difficult to communicate, outside the doors of a university
classroom, is the content of that interest in the exotic; the inher-
ent concern of the discipline for contrastive analysis as a means
of answering the question, "What is man?" It takes some sociali-
ization into the discipline before that question seems more than
pointless—impossible to answer—and before contrastive anal-
ysis, in systematic and not so systematic ways, within cases and
across cases, begins to seem significant, indeed essential, as a
means of answering that question. What is of the essence is the
content of the concern for contrast as a mode of knowing; the form
of exotic data is epiphenomenal. Yet the "lay" audience
takes the form literally as the phenomenon of interest rather
than as an epiphenomenon. And the problem is that when taken
literally, while exotic data may attract a certain amount of
instant attention, that interest is only fleeting, especially for
people engaged in practical affairs in a modern society. Much
of the information of anthropological research comes across to
such people as having perhaps some intrinsic interest in its own
right, if one had time to consider such things to broaden one's
general education. But aside from that, such information comes
across as "footnotes" which are of no relevance to the conduct
of practical affairs. What do prehistorical skull fragments and
contemporary pig roasts—or inferences about human physical
and social life drawn from such data—have to do with the practical business of keeping school and teaching children, or fixing them up at the hospital when they get sick? “A great deal,” an anthropologist might want to say. But in order for the practitioner to understand the relevance of what the anthropologist wanted to say, the practitioner would have to sit still while the anthropologist first explained the difference between the form and the content of anthropological inquiry. That takes time, which practitioners may not think they have. It also takes a capacity for sensitive and rapid translation and teaching, which the anthropologist may not possess. One of the aspects of naivety one acquires in the process of being socialized into a specialized field of reflective study and or practice is that the specialist learns not to recognize what the nonspecialist does not know about the specialty. In becoming a specialist, one takes so for granted the fundamental assumptions of the specialty that they may become transparent, held out of awareness, as is the knowledge of the grammars of the languages one has learned to speak fluently. Or the fundamental assumptions may stay within awareness and come to seem so important to the specialist that he or she can talk about them for hours, weeks, university terms, doctoral programs, whole professional careers. The non-specialist does not have that kind of motivation, nor that kind of time.

The reputation gained from general public relations may not be the only source of an identification problem for anthropology. The more restricted scope of the university catalogue as an advertising medium also projects an image of anthropology as mainly concerned with the exotic—far from the here and now—and as mainly operating at the (ostensibly) “primitive” stages in scientific inquiry, those of description and classification, rather than having passed on to the (ostensibly) more “advanced” states of prediction and control, and general theory construction.

And at the most micro level, the reputation of anthropology is contributed to by the stylistic display of the faculty member and graduate student. How many scholars of North American Indians there are who wear some small item of Indian adornment on their person. And how many of us have our rug and our ceramic item displayed in our offices. I have a Navaho rug on my wall, and an Ethiopian pot on my bookshelf. I also have a telephone, but that does not seem to get any points as a cultural artifact. This point system is one aspect of the professional subculture.

Paradoxically, anthropologists seem perplexed about the ap-
parent inability or unwillingness of lay people, especially those engaged in practical affairs, to get interested in the anthropologist's stories of exotic occurrences, past and present. The anthropologist may blame the practitioner for being anti-intellectual. Both the anthropologist's and the practitioner's frustration with one another makes sense—in terms of the differences in their points of view. Yet becoming reflective by a process of contrastive analysis about other people's points of view, within the context of which their behavior makes sense, is part of the anthropologist's stock in trade. Even in modern anthropological archaeology as well as in ethnographic fieldwork, trying to figure out some aspects of a community's patterns of intentions as well as reporting evidence of their behavior, is inherent in the research enterprise. Anthropologists, if their own disciplinary claims are valid, ought to be better than other social researchers at understanding how practitioners' perceptions of the anthropologist make sense. The injunction to the physician, "Heal thyself," might be paraphrased when addressed to the anthropologist as, "Become aware of your own professional ethnocentrism and studied naivety."

If one can get past the form content confusion in dealing with the exotic, then one of the most useful things the anthropologist may have to offer the practitioner is the anthropologist's learned distrust of the validity of statements about "universal" traits of human individuals and groups.

Another thing the anthropologist may have to offer is a learned agnosticism about the intrinsic merits and necessity of standard operating procedures. Professionally socialized into knowledge of (ideally) the "full range" of human diversity, the anthropologist ought to be able continually to imagine alternative possibilities, other ways of doing what needs to be done, other definitions of what ought to be done. Looking at any familiar event in his or her own society, the anthropologist as professional alien can say, "I wonder why this is happening this way and not some other?" (cf. Erickson, 1973, p. 16). Sharing that alienated viewpoint too continually with a practitioner can be a nuisance, and the anthropologist needs to be sensitive to that. It can also be dangerous, as the example of Socrates suggests. But anthropological training and experience can be a good base on which to adopt the critical stance of the social philosopher.

Yet another thing the anthropologist has to offer the practi-
tioner is the insight that in a complex modern society it is in the nature of things that in institutional settings one will find systematic variation in points of view and ways of behaving among individuals and groups within the organization; variation which relates to patterns of belief and action which are "normal" and adaptive in everyday life outside the institution, even though they may be defined as "deviant" and troublesome within the institution.

A Case in Point. Let us consider some of the benefits, costs, and inherent limitations in three facets of a relativistic perspective on ordinary happenings in a formal organization. We can do this by turning to an example of educational practice: It is found that in some elementary schools in some neighborhoods of a large American city, children do considerably less well in school, as indicated both by achievement test scores and by staff reports of the children's behavior, than do children in schools in other neighborhoods. Some of these schools are located in neighborhoods in which most of the residents are of working class Mexican-American ancestry. An anthropologist is hired to try to discover answers to the question posed by school officials and by concerned residents of these neighborhoods, "Why do these children do so much less well in school than their upper middle class Anglo counterparts?"

The anthropologist might begin by saying, "That's not a question I feel comfortable in trying to answer. Before answering that we need much more information about particular circumstances. I would rather go to a few schools and ask the question first, 'What's going on here? What's the social structure and the pattern of social networks? What's the cultural organization of social relationships in a variety of scenes of everyday life, inside and outside school?'"

Depending on the anthropologist's orientation he or she might want to make the most of contrast by studying an Anglo school community and a Mexican-American one simultaneously. Or the anthropologist might decide to start by focusing on just one Mexican-American school community. In either case the fundamental unit of analysis would most likely be the school community, rather than the classroom or the individual teacher or child. There would be interest in the issue of teaching and learning throughout that school community—on the content and process of teaching and learning by parents and children and among
siblings at home, and by the peer group on the corner, as well as by the teacher and students in the classroom. If the anthropologist had his or her druthers, this would be the range of inquiry. On the assumption that most people in the school community were multicultural (cf. Goodenough, 1971, 1976), the desire would be to see both students and their teachers in as wide a variety of social circumstances as possible, across as broad a range of variation as possible in the cultural organization of social relationships in face to face interaction.

Firsthand observation is likely to be the preferred mode of documenting all this. Unlike the historian the fieldworker would be producing his or her own documentary record, writing and rewriting copious fieldnotes (see Wax & Wax elsewhere in this monograph). Other documentary records might be collected across a variety of sources of written public information, such as census data and community newspapers, newsletters, meeting notices, and the like. An additional source of documentary evidence might be audiovisual records—films or videotapes—which could provide material for highly focused "microethnographic" analysis (cf. Erickson, 1976), the interpretation of which would depend on the wider context of participation by the fieldworker.

Emphasis would be on discovery of the webs of meaning that people in the scene construct for themselves (cf. Weber, 1922; Geertz, 1973, pp. 5 and 12); on being able to interpret behavior from the members' points of view (Frake, 1964), identifying "distinctive features" of contrast which are salient for them (Erickson, 1977; Hymes, 1977).

Some possible results of such an inquiry are summarized below. If the two-site comparison model were used to do an "ethnography of learning" across communities, one finding might be that there was considerable difference in the pattern of distribution of "academic" teaching across the two sites. In the upper middle class Anglo school community, considerable "academic" instruction might be conducted outside school, as well as inside it, by parents as well as by teachers. In the working class Mexican-American school community, most "academic" teaching might be found in school, with the classroom teacher as the instructor, while what "academic" teaching was done outside school might be more likely to be done by older siblings than by parents. If in both school communities, "academic"
instruction of children in school with other children as the teachers was regarded as "disruption" or even as "cheating," one could estimate in a rough and ready way that the Mexican-American children were likely to receive much less academic instruction than their Anglo counterparts.

One might also find in the Mexican-American community greater cultural difference between home and school—Spanish spoken as the first language at home, and ways of using the language in speaking to accomplish social ends (cf. Hymes, 1974; 1972) might differ from those which were customary at school. The neighborhood and the classroom might be the sites of differing speech communities (Gumperz, 1968), in which everyday interaction was organized according to differing patterns of communicative norms—differing participation structures (cf. Hymes, 1972; Philips, 1972; Shultz, Florio, & Erickson, in press). Value patterns might differ between home and school.

What could all this tell us about why one set of children is not doing well in school? What is the contribution of anthropology's disciplinary sophistications to some answers to that question, and what does anthropology's various naiveties lead the anthropologist to leave out, or handle in crudely undifferentiated ways?

Some Implications

The discovery of gross differences in amounts of academic instruction being received by children in life inside and outside school in the two communities could well be significant. That would be a confounding variable very likely to be left out of a study which tried to address the issue of the children's low school performance through some measurement of the cognitive or motivational states of individual children, or in a study which attempted to compare the behavior of Anglo and Latino children in the classroom setting only, by such yardsticks as observer judgments of amounts of "time on task" or "time in interaction with the teacher" spent by both types of children.

Similarly, findings of cultural "mismatch" in expectations for how one ought to interact with others could point to sources of interactional trouble which inhibited children's learning and increased teachers' frustrations in dealing with them in the classroom. Social and cultural factors (especially subtle ones) which affect children's learning, and which affect their manifestation
of their learning in school work and in standardized test performance, are precisely the factors often left out of more traditional designs in educational research (cf. Schwille & Porter, Note 1, on this point).

Still, information of the kind hypothetically portrayed in the previous paragraphs does not tell nearly the whole story in so complex a matter as that of a pattern of low school achievement by a whole group of students. Even that part of the story which is told may not adequately explain school failure. One reason is that so long as school failure is measured by the school with the individual child as the unit of analysis, rather than the social category or group to which that child "belongs," in order to claim that either outside-school instruction or inside-school intercultural interference "explained" failure, the data would have to be aggregated with the child as the unit of analysis. This is not the form that narrative description usually takes in reports of fieldwork, and given the emphasis in anthropology on the social aggregate as the learning unit, most anthropologically trained fieldworkers would be unlikely to collect data on an individual by individual basis. Potentially, something like that could be done but it would be quite a different sort of fieldwork than what has been usual.

So the anthropological emphasis on breadth in descriptive accounts—on scope at the expense of specificity—would tend to leave the individual out of the picture, even as a "black box," unless somehow there were changes in the way such "holism" were construed, resulting in changes in the substance and method of data collection (cf. Erickson, Note 2).

The individual would be likely to be overlooked in another way as well. Given the emphasis in anthropology on external factors influencing the behavior of individuals, it is likely that internal factors—cognitive style, developmental levels of cognitive functioning, motivation and temperament—might be ignored. All these are characteristics of individuals which, it is reasonable to assume, do affect their behavior and functioning, and thus are likely to explain "part of the variance" in the low school achievement of children. There are individual differences, there are internal states of individuals, and they need to be taken into account. I think many anthropologists, myself included, have been too reluctant to do this. Partly that is for a "good" reason—we are reacting against what we consider to be the design and conduct of much traditional educational research.
which has used these constructs in ways which are "unsophisti-
catedly" blind and deaf to factors of culture and social structure. Our reaction against the study of individual differences and intra-individual processes, while it may from our point of view be well motivated, is an over-reaction. It makes us studiedly naive about individuals and their functioning, and while it is true that individuals do not live in isolation but in collectivities, so it is true that collectivities are composed of individuals.

Anthropological research is likely to be studiedly naive about the opposite end of the social spectrum as well—about structure, process, and influence at the level of organization of the large scale social aggregate, beyond the level of face to face association, beyond the boundaries of the acquaintance network (see Wax & Wax, elsewhere in the monograph, on this point). Social processes at the level of the nation-state and at international levels of organization are usually not considered by anthropologists in nearly so sophisticated ways as are social processes in smaller scale, within the local community or neighborhood. To the extent that life in schools is affected by such factors, demographic and survey researchers in sociology, political science, and economics may be able to account for the influence of such factors better than the classical anthropologist. Moreover, to the extent that such research is conducted according to conflict models rather than homeostatic models of social process, it can say things about what happens to children in school that anthropology often has not said. From my reading it seems that social class conflict and oppression have not been adequately dealt with in anthropological studies of school communities, with the exception of rare instances, such as the work of Ogbu (1974, 1978). If indeed, as he argues, a lower class child of stigmatized "caste" status (e.g., Black or Latino) sees a "job ceiling"—a threshold level of occupational rank beyond which only a few members of that child's own caste group passes—that is likely to affect the child's performance in school and the child's behavior in everyday life outside school. (Here it should be noted, however, that to make such an argument one would need evidence in which the child is the unit of analysis. Such "microethnographic" evidence would need to show how the child learns about the job ceiling, what specifically that knowledge comes to mean, how its effects are expressed in everyday behavior in school by the child and, perhaps, how the ways the child is treated in interaction with others in school communicate the
message, "The job ceiling is there and it applies to you." For not all children of lower caste status fail in school, and neither the social structural explanation nor the general "cultural difference" explanation for school failure can account for these discrepant cases of school success. "Part of the variance is left unaccounted for.

Theoretical orientation may be one reason that anthropological studies of schools have tended to be rather "apolitical," although the relatively recent renewal of general interest in adaptation may change that, as social conflict is viewed as sociocultural adaptation at work. Another reason for toning down the social theory in one's work is, at least for me, more a matter of sentiment. In our research, my co-workers and I have developed close personal relationships with the administrators, teachers, and pupils we study. We are reluctant to portray members of the school staff as unwitting agents of oppression and ethnocentrism. We care about them as people, and so as not to sound too preachy I should also admit that we have more pragmatic concerns too—we care about our relationships of rapport with them. These are relationships of mutual trust which take time and privacy to establish. We are not uncritically fawning in our relations with informants, but we have an ethical and scientifically substantive commitment to show how their actions and points of view "make sense," and it is also in our professional interest not to jeopardize our rapport. As a consequence we may be too reluctant as social critics. That troubles me continually, and at this point I don't know what to do about it.

Finally, another way in which anthropological studies of schools are likely to be unsophisticated relates, I think, to the emphasis on contrast as a mode of analysis, and to the attendant disposition to look for the exotic—the extreme of contrast. In the anthropological literature on schools in the United States, my reading is that there is a surprising thinness of descriptive detail, and a surprising infrequency of description at all, in the portrayal of such highly ordinary "cultural scenes" as everyday interaction between children and teachers in classrooms, and the everyday lives of principals, school board members, union officials, and state and federal education agency personnel. A notable exception here is Wolcott's study (1973) of the everyday professional life of an elementary school principal in an "ordinary" school attended by white middle class children. It may be that classrooms and principals' offices are not exotic enough: sociocultural scenes for many anthropologists. I find such scenes fascinating,
but I think of myself as aberrant in that I do so. Perhaps many fieldwork-oriented researchers would rather be "out in the community." I often would, in spite of my fascination with the extremely mundane. Perhaps the rapid-fire yet so repetitively boring quality of classroom interaction is hard to sit still and attend to and think about. Informal ways people are socialized or enculturated, inside and outside schools, may be more fun to watch. Perhaps being in school at all is something the anthropologist would just as soon not do, just as the predominantly white upper middle class suburb is something the anthropologist would just as soon stay away from. Like the telephone on my desk, one gets few if any intra-professional points for all that. The Navaho rug does much more for the professional image and for the professional self-image.

With this emphasis on the exotic there is a real danger that subtle social and cultural differences among groups of people within communities and within schools may be overlooked by anthropologists. Paradoxically, they may in some situations overemphasize the "culture" factor, and in other situations in less-than-manifestly-exotic schools and communities, anthropologists may underemphasize the culture factor. Microcultures develop in every sort of face to face interacting group, and along all sorts of social networks in which people interact relatively infrequently. These microcultures are all over the place in complex modern societies. Admittedly, such subtle culture difference may not always make a difference—it may not invariably demarcate lines along which social and political boundaries are drawn (cf. Barth, 1969; McDermott & Gospodinoff, 1979). Still sometimes the culture difference does define a boundary as does the difference between the cut of a man's suit made by Brooks Brothers and the cut of the one made by a really first class tailor. Anthropologists themselves need to understand much more clearly how this happens; the ever-shifting dynamics of the micropolitics and macropolitics of subtle culture differences in complex modern societies. Citizens can make use of such knowledge too.

Conclusion

Educational research needs anthropology, I think, especially for what it could say about schools as culture-sorting institutions. Anthropology is also needed for its emphasis on the concrete and particular. As I have argued elsewhere (Erickson,
there is a need for anthropologists to become more sophisticated in addressing issues of generalizability in their research. But for the field of educational research as a whole, there is a need to become more sophisticated about the particularizability of research—of tying generalizable findings back into the case-specific situations of actual schools, children, and teachers in actual community settings. To the extent that the educational research and development community has suffered in the past from an underdifferentiated view of the particularizability of research findings, and from a paucity of studies which are high in particularizability as well as in generalizability, the distinctive research emphases of anthropology have a role to play in the future of educational research and development.

Reference Notes


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Anthropological Ethnography in Education:
Some Methodological Issues,
Limitations, and Potentials

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INTRODUCTION

Ethnography is the process by which an anthropologist obtains observational data on human behavior to describe the culture or some aspects of the culture, such as economy, education, kinship, law, or religion, of a given population.

Most subfields of anthropology use fairly standardized ethnographic techniques of data collection, reduction, analysis, and interpretation. Some subfields have adapted these standardized procedures to suit their particular needs; others, such as the relatively new subfield of educational anthropology, are still in the process of such an adaptation. Moreover, the methodological status of educational anthropology is due as much to its recent development as to its dual heritage in culture and personality studies and the social and political crises of the 1960s. In this paper we are therefore dealing with a methodology still in its infancy and relatively unformalized. Because I think that anthropological study of formal education, especially in the United States, has not advanced in comparison with studies of the same subject in its sister-disciplines, my presentation will depart somewhat from the general outline set forth for this monograph.

Development and Nature of Anthropological Ethnography

The development of modern ethnography goes back to two prominent early anthropologists—Bronislaw Malinowski in Britain and Franz Boas in the United States. On the basis of his fieldwork experiences in the Trobriand Islands, Malinowski established certain basic rules of ethnography for his students: namely, that they should live with the people they studied, learn their language, observe their activities, question, speculate, and
theorize (Foster & Kemper, 1974, p. 4). Boas also emphasized the importance of the fieldworker's command of local language, but this practice was not strictly followed by most American ethnographers; nor did long-term fieldwork "become commonplace in American ethnographic tradition until after World War II" (Foster & Kemper, 1974, p. 5; see also Freilich, 1970b, p. 11). The two traditions have been converging, however, particularly since the 1950s as later generations of anthropologists on both sides of the Atlantic sought to refine the process of ethnographic inquiry (see Beattie, 1965; Berreman, 1968; Epstein, 1967; Freilich, 1970a; Pelto & Pelto, 1973, 1978).

At the heart of the ethnographic process is participant-observation which, in its contemporary form, is summarized as follows by Berreman (1968, p. 337):

[Participant-observation] refers to the practice of living among the people one studies, coming to know them, their language and their lifeways through intense and nearly continuous interaction with them in their daily lives. This means that the ethnographer converses with the people he studies, works with them, attends their social and ritual functions, visits their homes, invites them to his home—that he is present with them in as many situations as possible, learning to know them in as many settings and moods as he can. Sometimes he interviews for specific kinds of data; always he is alert to whatever information may come his way, ready to follow up and understand any event or fact which is unanticipated or seemingly inexplicable. The methods by which he derives his data are often subtle and difficult to define.

The ethnographer needs to live with the people he studies for a year or longer because ethnographic data have to be collected on people's behaviors in their natural setting. An extended period of residence is also necessary to establish the kind of rapport that enables the ethnographer to obtain certain information to which he would not otherwise be privileged, as well as to obtain more reliable data through repeated participation, observation, questioning, and gossips. A long period of residence, furthermore, allows the fieldworker to become fluent in the local language, "whether professional jargon, ethnic dialect," and so on (Roberts, 1976, p. 14). Competence in the local language helps the fieldworker to gain more trust, acceptance, and rapport as well as to collect data coded in the language, much of which are not easy to translate and must be learned through socialization into...
the “native theory of speaking” (Hymes, 1971). Thus, successful use of participant-observation to collect field data depends on a host of factors, including the personal attributes of the ethnographer.

The way in which personal attributes affect ethnographic research has received extensive comments (see Beattie, 1965; Berreman, 1968; Freilich, 1970a). It is generally considered essential for a fieldworker to have a sense of perspective: i.e., to be able to distinguish important from trivial events; to maintain a somewhat objective and skeptical approach to data; to have a good sense of humor; and to have empathy—that is, the ability to experience the world as his informants experience it (Berreman 1968, pp. 340-42). The willingness and ability of the fieldworker to maintain reciprocal relations with the people he is studying are very important; he often gives material things and various types of assistance to the people from whom he demands time and information (Beattie, 1965; Berreman, 1968; Freilich, 1970c).

A good ethnographic attribute is what Berreman (1968, p. 343) calls “an ethnographic imagination.” The fieldworker should be able “to seek and find interrelationships among his observed data, to see relationships between his observed data and other facts and ideas with which he is familiar, to see their relevance and to weigh their importance.” To be able to do this well, the ethnographer should have a reasonable theory of how society or culture works; that is, “an understanding of the nature of social structure, and social interaction on the theoretical and practical planes, both in the culture being studied and in the most general human sense” (Berreman, 1968, p. 344). Such knowledge is a guide to good ethnography though it should be equally enhanced by the ethnographic inquiry.

Ethnographic study is “holistic” in the sense that the ethnographer endeavors to show the interrelationship between the institution studied and other institutions in society. For example, the ethnographer may try to discover how education in, say, Stockton or Chicago, is related to the city’s economy or political organization, among other things.

Although participant-observation is the principal technique of collecting data, methodological flexibility is a major characteristic of ethnography. The ethnographer can and should employ, where appropriate, a host of other techniques, including life histories, interviews, questionnaires, projective tests, docu-
mentary study, and so on. The supplementary techniques used depend on the nature of the research problems and the researcher's competence and judgment (Pelto & Pelto, 1978, pp. 67-122; see also Beattie, 1965; Berreman, 1968; Epstein, 1967; Hansen, 1979; Ogbu, 1974a, 1974b).

There is currently a movement toward "scientific" ethnographic research design among some anthropologists. Other anthropologists, however, prefer the more "humanistic" approach. For the latter, quantification and precision in methods threaten to divert the ethnographer's attention away from people and their culture (Berreman, 1968, p. 366). They prefer an eclectic approach in which specific problems emerge from ethnographic data; and they emphasize insights rather than rigor, and discovery rather than verification (Berreman, 1968, p. 366). Other anthropologists prefer a compromise approach requiring that the ethnographer give an explicit account of his research procedures: "he should describe exactly how ethnography was done, insights arrived at, and judgments about data made" (Berreman, 1968, p. 369). To many anthropologists ethnographic research is just as rigorous as quantitative research; some anthropologists insist that ethnographic research is not the opposite of quantitative research because the former sometimes includes the latter (Hansen, 1979; Hymes, 1972). Some educational and societal problems studied by anthropologists do not lend themselves easily to sharp focus in formulation and precision in methodology. Others do; it depends on the nature of the problem.

With regard to data analysis and presentation, anthropologists are divided as to whether the ethnographer should describe his findings in terms of concepts and categories he has brought into the culture from outside—the ethnographer's concepts and categories—or to describe the culture in terms of its own concepts and categories. Some anthropologists working with analytic techniques derived from linguistics (componential analysis, ethnosemantics, or ethnoscience) increasingly employ the "native" categories and structures in their descriptions.

Ethnographers also deal with problems of biases—both observer bias and informant bias. Freilich (1970e, pp. 567-70) gives several sources of observer bias, including the ethnographer's culture, personality, visual memory, and model use, and then goes on to suggest ways of handling them. Informant bias may also lead to collection of invalid data when "informants see and remember incorrectly for cultural, personality, visual
and memory reasons and [when] in addition they help distort an ethnography by providing some data which they knowingly understand to be false." One safeguard is to type informants and evaluate their information in terms of social variables such as age and sex, class or caste, social marginality and centrality, etc. (Freilich, 1970c, p. 570). Further, where biases are unavoidable, their sources should be recognized, and the ethnographer should compensate for them or, at least, make them explicit (Berreman, 1968, p. 370).

The results of most ethnographic studies cannot easily be replicated, partly because two researchers may bring different orientations to the problem; partly because the field situation is not constant. Yet reliability can be enhanced: for instance, reliability in educational ethnography can be enhanced by interviewing "varied types of participants in the system, such as parents, teachers, students, administrators, school board members, and community-group members with interest in education; documents, such as students' papers, letters to newspapers, official records, personal journals, and so on can be studied; and observational data recorded on classroom interactions as well as on other activities on school grounds and in the community." (Hansen, 1979, p. 54; see also Ogbu, 1974a; Wolcott, 1967).

Some educational anthropologists are critical of the techniques of traditional ethnography, arguing that they are difficult to apply to American education. Critics often single out the so-called "Malinowskian ethnography." They note, for example, that the unit of their own study, namely, an urban American school, is not like a Trobriand village (Erickson, 1973, p. 10). Erickson provides a vivid contrast between an American school and a Trobriand village and concludes that "Malinowski's theories and methods do not work on schools because these methods are not situationally appropriate" (Erickson, 1973, p. 11). It seems to me that the contrast suggested here is not appropriate. The comparison should be between a Trobriand village on the one hand and an American city or urban neighborhood on the other, or between an American school and the educational institution of the Trobrianders. If we compare such population units or social institutions we may be surprised to find striking resemblances, though mindful of differences in scale.

Malinowski's analytic view of society as divisible into units such as social organization, economics, technology, language, and belief system, is also said to be inapplicable to American schools (Erickson 1973, P. 11). Khleif has demonstrated that this
can be done in an interesting paper appropriately titled, "The School as a Small Society" (1971). My own fieldwork experiences lead me to suggest that it is possible to apply the traditional ethnographic categories to Stockton’s school system and to write a reasonably good monograph based on such a study in the manner in which we usually present our accounts of studies of "exotic" and "modern" communities. Included in such a descriptive account of the school system would be: Ecological Setting; Language and Communication System; Economy (including labor, food procurement and consumption, taxes, etc.); Social Organization (including age grading, voluntary associations, social stratification, etc.); Political Organization (including governance, administration, law, and external relations); Belief Systems; Folklore; Education and Socialization; Change; etc. This would be a serious and accurate description and not merely a caricature of the school community. Such an ethnographic account of the structure, process, and function of the school system which links it to other sociocultural institutions defining its context in the wider community is an appropriate field of study for educational anthropologists.

Traditional ethnography, properly applied to urban education systems or urban schools, can provide rich and accurate descriptive data which can be used for theoretical and practical objectives. And there is no reason why such objectives cannot be achieved. The population which makes up “education people” in an American community includes more than teachers and students; it includes other school personnel—certificated and classified—who may never show up in classrooms but whose construction of educational “reality” and their activities nevertheless influence what happens in the classroom in one way or another. The education population also includes other participants in education politics and governance—school board members, parents, various community groups whose pressures on local education are easily visible to an ethnographer at a board of education meeting and in other situations (Mann, 1975). All these people are permanent residents within the legal-political boundary of the education system. The school, especially the classroom, is only one of many settings in the community where education people meet and transact educational matters. If a metropolitan school district is too large (like the “tribe”) to be studied adequately, educational anthropologists should choose a neighborhood (like the “village”) as a manageable unit.

To do a good ethnography of education and education people
requires the kind of participant-observation described earlier. It requires a long-term residence, since education people have their own language or argot which the ethnographer must learn in order to carry out an effective participant-observation. In my Stockton study I discovered early that school people were definitely using many concepts and expressions which were not merely White middle-class standard English; thus I had to learn their language in order to understand the numerous memos from various offices, reports of various local and community studies conducted by the school district, reports of state-mandated tests, proposals for various remedial programs and their evaluation reports, periodic and annual reports of principals or field administrators to the central office, etc. I had to learn the school language in order to communicate with school psychologists, counselors, and other school personnel as well as with students and parents. Frequently school people had to translate their "English" for middle-class Stocktonians who attended board of education meetings or some other gatherings. In fact, my taped interviews with various school personnel often required "translations" into White middle-class English just as my taped interviews with low-income Blacks and Chicanos.

Personal attributes of a school ethnographer are not different from those described earlier. Furthermore, a school ethnographer no less than other ethnographers requires an "ethnographic imagination" as well as a good working theory of the social structure of the school and of the wider community in which the school is located. And "holism" in educational ethnography refers precisely to what was indicated earlier: the ethnographic study should show how education is linked with the people's economy and other institutions, including their belief systems.

Problems of research design, biases, reliability of data, data analysis, and interpretations which the general ethnographer faces are also experienced by the educational ethnographer. In addition, American educational ethnographers face the problem of orientation toward their subject matter—education or schooling—as a social problem, and toward their work—ethnography—as a social service. I shall say more about this dual problem later. The point here is that an American ethnographer of an "exotic" African village may be someone alienated from his own culture, according to anthropological folklore; whereas an American ethnographer of American education may be someone impelled to study the schools because he does not like the way the schools are treating the poor and minorities and he wants to do.
something about it. This orientation is one more source of bias in educational ethnography and the orientation rings true in many accounts written by educational ethnographers.

In general, educational ethnography is not (or should not be) radically different from other ethnographies. Anthropologists who set out today to study “disputing process” (law) in American communities and other societies (Nader & Todd, 1978), changing rural economy in Latin American (Gudeman, 1978), education in an urban American neighborhood (Leacock, 1969), or education in a Japanese village (Singleton, 1967) can benefit from the broad principles of fieldwork laid down by Malinowski without having to follow the details of Malinowski’s field techniques or his analytical framework. An essential attribute of good ethnography is flexibility; besides, anthropological ethnography has come a long way since the days of Malinowski. Our difficulties with the traditional ethnographic techniques in educational studies do not arise from the nature of ethnography per se but from the dual heritage of educational anthropology, i.e., from cultural transmission orientation of culture and personality studies, and service orientation of intervention research. I will now examine this dual heritage and its bearing on educational ethnography.

Development of Educational Anthropology and Educational Ethnography

Prior to the 1960s very few anthropologists had actually studied formal education, though some had written about it, including Boas (1928), Malinowski (1936), Mead (1943) and Redfield (1943). Jules Henry (1963) was probably one of the few who had actually studied the schools (Spindler, 1963, p. 17). Anthropological writings on formal education were primarily commentaries on schooling as a social problem for “natives” in colonial and trust territories and for immigrants, ethnic and racial minorities in their own countries (see various entries of such writings in Roberts & Akinsanya, 1976, pp. 375-81). Anthropologists felt justified to criticize the form and content of schooling for these subordinate groups because of their acquaintance with “indigenous education” or how these groups raised their children. I say, “acquaintance,” because except for some culture-and-personality anthropologists, few were directly engaged in systematic study of childrearing theories and practices among non-western peoples, immigrants, and minorities (see...
Mayer, 1970). Culture-and-personality anthropologists, like other anthropologists, defined indigenous education as cultural transmission or enculturation, "a process by which [a] person absorbs the modes of thought, action, and feeling that constitute his culture" (Kneller, 1965, p. 43; see also Herskovits, 1955, p. 326; Roberts & Akinsanya, 1976, pp. 405-416; Spindler, 1976).

Contemporary educational anthropologists also defined education, including formal schooling, as cultural transmission or enculturation. In this conceptualization of schooling as a cultural transmission process the relative school failure of some ethnic minorities and of the lower class is often attributed to culture conflicts that are actualized at the point of interaction between teacher and student (Gearing, 1973, p. 1238). Ethnographically, however, only a few elements within the culture of the student's social class, ethnic, or racial group—especially language, cognitive, and interactional styles—are singled out for study to demonstrate that there are cultural differences which create conflicts leading to school failures. The classroom or school is the focus of study, though sometimes the neighborhood culture of the minority or lower-class pupils is included. But very few, if any, of the studies deal with the dominant culture which is supposed to be in conflict with the minority or lower-class students' culture. The question of power relations between the groups represented by the teacher and his or her students, even when recognized as an influential factor, (Gearing, 1973, p. 1239) is not investigated. The reason for not probing into power relations is probably simple; ethnographic studies using the cultural transmission model are rarely formulated in ways that allow for an adequate conceptualization of social structure and its relevance to the process of education.

Greater involvement of anthropologists in formal education began in the 1960s. Gearing suggests that anthropologists became more involved because they wanted to make their subject reach a wider audience through anthropology curriculum in the public schools (Gearing, 1973). That was a part of it. But of much greater importance were the social and political crises of the 1960s which propelled anthropologists into intervention rather than basic research in education. That is, when anthropologists began school ethnography in the 1960s they did so under conditions which encouraged the earlier anthropological view of schooling as a social problem. First, I would hazard the guess that some anthropologists “got involved” with formal education.
in the United States as consultants to local school districts and her agencies dealing with urban and minority education when the latter came under increasing criticism for using the "cultural deprivation model" as the basis for improving the education of poor and minority children. I suspect that these anthropologists were not only critical of the prevailing definition of culture and the characterization of poor and minority children by the educational establishment and educational psychologists (Valentine, 1968), but that they also began to do ethnographic studies to provide more accurate pictures of the culture and education of these children.

Some anthropologists also got involved because they wanted to support claims of ethnic minorities that their cultures were different from the culture of middle-class Whites and that the reason their children were failing in school was that schools did not utilize their cultures as vehicles for teaching and learning. Even before anthropologists had conducted sufficient ethnographic studies of the education of the poor and minorities, they were already explaining the latter's school failure in terms of cultural differences: minority children, they asserted, are not culturally deprived; nor are they deprived of stimulating learning in the home environment; instead minority children are

—provided [at school] with culturally different learning environments. Minority children do not acquire the content and style of learning presupposed by curriculum materials and teaching methods encouraged when they enter school (Philips, 1976, p. 30).

The political awakening of various minorities and their ethnic identity movements have combined and continued to enhance the "cultural conflict" theory and model. It is popular not only among ethnic minorities: it is also increasingly being accepted by the educational establishment; and it appeals to politicians who are in need of ethnic votes. Some problems with the cultural difference model as a guide to educational ethnography among minorities in the United States will be discussed later. Here the point is that the social and political contexts in which anthropologists began educational ethnography have encouraged continuing perception and treatment of schooling as a social problem and educational ethnography as a service endeavor rather than basic research.

Neither the cultural transmission orientation from culture and
personality studies nor the service orientation of intervention research appear to encourage the formulation of ethnographic research which indicates an adequate theory of culture or society. Both encourage primarily microethnographic studies which more or less see education as taking place in school, particularly in the classroom, but do not always consider other factors which may shape the classroom processes.

Types of Educational Ethnographies

1. Cross-Cultural Studies: Cross-cultural studies are those conducted outside the United States; they generally most fully utilize the traditional ethnographic approach described earlier in this paper. Examples of such cross-cultural work include Grindal’s (1972) study of education and social change among the Sisala of Northern Ghana; Singleton’s (1967) study of education in a Japanese village; and Warren’s (1967) study of education in a German village. These studies took place in small communities more or less typical of anthropological research settings. The ethnographers lived in the communities for extended periods of time, learned local languages, established rapport with the people, and employed a variety of techniques to supplement participant-observation for data collection. Furthermore, although the focus of each study was education, the ethnographer also examined how education is linked to other institutions. In this way their studies demonstrate how societal forces, including beliefs and ideologies of the larger society, influenced the behaviors of participants in the education system or schools. For example, Singleton shows how the Japanese ideology and mechanisms of social mobility affected the process of schooling in the village; Warren shows the influence of industrialization and new economic models on local educational aspirations and participation; and Grindal points to the educational consequences of changing economic and political circumstances in Ghana, especially with regard to the educational attitudes of the youth among the Sisala. The point to emphasize is that these and similar cross-cultural studies make it clear that families and their children often utilize adaptive strategies in dealing with schools which can be adequately understood or appreciated only if the ethnographer looked at the linkages between education and the larger sociocultural system of the society. These studies did not simply ethnographically document differences in cultural back-
ground of teachers and students as the basis for explaining differences in outcomes of teaching and learning, i.e., as due to differences in teaching and learning styles or in communication patterns, for example.

2. "Early Ethnographies" Bearing on U.S. Education: The second group of studies are those conducted in the United States which Wax (1978, p. 2) has called "early ethnographies." These include *Children of Bondage* by Davis and Dollard (1940), *Elm-town's Youth* by Hollingshead (1949), *Growing Up in River City* by Havighurst (1962), and *Who Shall Be Educated?* by Warner and associates (1944). These studies, using more or less the traditional ethnographic approach, did not focus on education per se; rather they were concerned with showing how school organizational features reflected features of local social structure, such as class, caste (social-race), and ethnicity (Wax, 1978, p. 2). They did not show in great detail how the linkages or "correspondence" they observed between school organization and social structure determined what actually went on within the schools, i.e., how they affected the process of teaching and learning, especially for subordinate groups.

3. Contemporary Ethnographies: Some contemporary ethnographies of education have tried to fill the gap left by the "earlier ethnographies." That is, whereas earlier studies described how the structure of the larger communities were reflected in the organization of schools, some newer ethnographic studies try to document how such features of the schools affect the process of schooling. They describe patterns of interaction between teachers and students or between students and their counselors; the types of skills and subjects which children acquire in school; and the informal socialization that goes on to reinforce the children's social background. Among the better known ethnographies dealing with "how it happens" are those of Eddy (1967), Fuchs (1966), Leacock (1969), and Moore (1967). These studies do not, however, empirically probe into the nature of the linkages between the processes they describe within the schools and the features of the larger sociocultural system they allude to, such as was done by Singleton in his study of education in a Japanese village. In other words, they do not integrate systematically micro- and macroethnographies, an integration which would have enabled them both to describe the process and explain the patterns of cultural transmission in cultural and structural terms.

Wax (1978) indicates that there are some as yet unpublished
ethnographies that combine both micro- and macroethnographic methods. These studies go beyond the social organization of the schools to examine the political and economic life of their respective communities as well as the interrelations between the schools and these sociocultural systems.

4. Microethnographies Based On a Linguistic Model: One group of contemporary ethnographic studies—microethnographies of classroom processes—deserves a special comment because of both its potential contribution to educational ethnography and its present limitations. These studies constitute a growing body of work attempting to show that the interaction (verbal and non-verbal) between teachers and students is a crucial determinant of academic outcomes for children, especially children of subordinate groups. The basic thesis of these studies seems to be that communicative styles of communicative etiquettes in everyday life are culturally patterned; therefore, when teachers and students come from different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, and thus do not share the same communicative etiquette, there are "mismatch" in communication or interaction styles which adversely affect students' learning (see Koehler, 1978; Philips, 1972; Simmons, 1976). Methodologically, the culturally patterned communicative styles can be identified in a heterogeneous classroom through content analysis of repeated videotaping of selected classroom activities involving teacher-pupil interaction, supplemented with observational notes.

Microethnography owes its theoretical and methodological assumptions to sociolinguistic studies, rather than to traditional anthropological ethnography, and its proponents sometimes claim its superiority over the latter. Microethnography has been applied to learning problems among Blacks, Chicanos, Indians, Native Hawaiians, etc., with some interesting results, although the contents of the classroom activities chosen for description in these cases have varied. A brief survey of some of the studies will give an indication of their major features.

Susan Philips (1972), on an Indian reservation in Oregon, examined the communicative etiquettes in a classroom run by an Indian teacher and in another classroom run by an Anglo teacher; she compared these with communicative etiquettes within the Indian community and found major differences which she described within the context of "participant structure." A participant structure is, basically, a constellation of norms, mutual rights, and obligations which shape social rela-
tionships, determine participants' perceptions of what is going on in a communicative interchange, and influence the outcome of the communication, such as learning (Simmons, 1976). Philips found that the participant structure of the Anglo classroom was characterized by (a) a hierarchy of role-defined authority in which the teacher controlled students, and (b) an imposition of obligations on students to perform publicly by the teacher calling on them as individuals, praising and reprimanding them for their behaviors. In contrast, Indian participant structure (a) deemphasized hierarchical relationship and control; and (b) did not encourage individual public performance, reward, and punishment. According to Philips, Indian children did better in their schoolwork when their classroom participant structure approximated that of their community.

Philips' notion of participant structure seems to underlie subsequent studies in this tradition, some of which are, in fact, attempts to test her hypothesis. In his work among Black students Simmons (1976) applies the same notion to account for the failure of Blacks to acquire reading skills. Citing the work of Gumperz and Herasimchuk (1972), he argues that Black children fail to acquire reading skills because they do not share the same communicative background with their teachers; hence, the children and their teachers differ in both communicative strategies and in interpretation of situational meanings. The result is a "miscommunication" which adversely affects the children's learning. The same notion of differences in participant structure or communicative etiquette also underlies the microethnographic studies of Erickson and his students (Erickson & Mohatt, 1977, cited in Koehler, 1978).

Although with somewhat different theoretical and methodological emphasis, R.P. McDermott's microethnography (1977) also assumes that classroom interaction between teachers and students is a crucial determinant of academic outcomes. He employed primarily the techniques of non-verbal analysis to study the process of getting turns at reading. And he found that in a classroom organized into low and high reading groups, the low groups received less actual reading instruction because the teacher defined the group as needing more explicit and consistent guidance which resulted in spending most of her time controlling the behavior of the members of the group (cited in Hansen, 1979, p. 75).

Given the definition of the source of academic failures of
subordinate-group children as embedded in teacher-pupil communication, the unit of microethnographic study is teacher-pupil interaction or communicative interchange during a given classroom activity. Microethnographers may initially map out a wide range of classroom activities but they do not aim at a full description of the entire range of teacher-pupil interaction; instead, they opt for "selective ethnography," i.e., the study of particular activities that are most salient to their background and interests. Sociolinguists tend to select reading (more appropriately, teacher-pupil interchange during reading [Simmons 1976]); others may select any number of activities such as reading lessons, clean up, sharing time, etc. (Schultz & Florio, 1978). The ultimate goal of analysis and interpretation is to describe how the educational outcome for the subordinate-group students is determined by the teaching process, the latter being viewed as a communicative process.

Microethnography—especially classroom ethnography—has a strong and wide appeal, perhaps because it appears methodologically more rigorous or "scientific" than traditional ethnography. With the latest research technology, such as videotape and computer, at his disposal, and with a small number of subjects (one teacher and one or two students)—in a circumscribed setting (classroom), the ethnographer comes closest to a laboratory experiment.

Another reason for the strong appeal is that microethnography provides information which is readily perceived to be of immediate application by "people on the battle line"—education people. The information can be used for in-service training of teachers and other school personnel, for self-correction by classroom teachers, and for teacher training in general. The ethnographer likes it because he sees his work as being scientific and instrumental in "improving" some aspect of the system; policy-makers and practitioners like it because it points to something concrete that can be "remedied" without radically changing the system; clients of the system, the minorities, like it because it "scientifically" documents what they have alleged since the 1960s, namely, that their children do poorly in school because the system does not make use of their communicative etiquettes, their interactional styles, or cognitive styles.

Microethnographic studies have made significant contributions to our knowledge of how subordinate-group children fail. In the 1960s sociolinguists and anthropologists rejected explana-
tions of minority-group children's school failure in terms of "deficit model"—i.e., explanations which, for example, attributed Black children's reading difficulties to inadequate language socialization in the home and advocated teaching methods to replace Black English with standard English. These critics proposed an alternative explanation based on cultural and linguistic differences and suggested that schools could accommodate Black dialect by using special materials and teaching methods. When the reading problems continued it was suggested that they were due to either phonological or grammatical interference, hypotheses which have not been substantiated by empirical research (Simmons, 1976). The present shift to teacher-student communicative interchange seems to show, for the first time, how cultural and linguistic differences might contribute to school failure. By focusing on process, microethnographic studies also help to enrich our understanding of the general phenomenon of cultural transmission. Furthermore, the descriptions of what takes place between teachers and students in the classroom have the potential of encouraging more cautious interpretations of quantitative studies of children's academic performance.

However, from an ecological point of view, microethnographic studies, as presently formulated and implemented, are too simplistic and in some cases may be misleading. More specifically, the microethnographic approach to minority school failure is inadequate because (a) it is not comparative enough; (b) it ignores the forces of the wider ecological environment which actually generate the patterns of classroom processes on which these studies focus; and (c) while data and insights from microethnographic studies can be used as a basis for remedial efforts (Simmons, 1976; Erickson, 1978), they cannot lead to any significant social change that would eliminate the need for such remedial efforts in subsequent generations of minority-group children. Before elaborating these points I want to add that microethnographic studies may document differences between minority children and their Anglo teachers in communicative etiquette, but they have not provided convincing evidence that Indians, Eskimos, Blacks, Chicanos, and others generally do better in school when taught by teachers of their respective groups or backgrounds. If the source of their academic failure were merely one of "mismatch" in communicative etiquette, the policy implication is quite straightforward; replace Anglo teachers with those of subordinate-group backgrounds. However, this is not
necessarily a viable solution; there is no study showing, for example, that when taught by Black teachers Black ghetto children do better in school. The same can be said of Chicanos, Indians, and Puerto Ricans (see Ogbu 1978a; Silverstein & Krate, 1975).

With regard to the non-comparative nature of the microethnographic studies, they have thus far focused primarily on one type of minority group which I have designated as castelike minorities (Ogbu, 1978a). In the United States these include Blacks, Chicanos, Indians, Eskimos, Native Hawaiian, and Puerto Ricans. These minorities differ from the dominant Anglos in culture and language probably to the same extent that another group of minorities, immigrant minorities, differ from the same Anglos in culture and language. Immigrant minorities include Chinese, Cubans, Filipinos, Japanese, Koreans, and “West Indians.” Microethnographic assertions concerning the causes of minority school failure lead one to ask a few comparative questions: Are the communicative interactions between immigrant minority children and their predominantly Anglo teachers plagued by the same “mismatch” in communicative etiquettes observed among castelike minorities in their interaction with the same teachers? If the “mismatches” in communicative etiquettes exist for the two groups of minorities, how do we account for the relatively greater school success of the children of immigrant minorities? If the mismatches do not exist for the latter, how do we account for their absence since immigrant minorities and their Anglo teachers do not share the same cultural or communicative backgrounds?

Microethnographic studies, as presently formulated, do not really help us to understand why differences in communicative etiquette should result in academic failures among castelike minorities but not among immigrant minorities. This suggestion is even more instructive when we broaden our cross-cultural perspective. In Britain, for example, the West Indians are said to be the most similar to the Anglo British in language and culture of all non-White minorities (including Africans, Bangladeshis, Indians, Pakistanis, etc.). Thus it would be expected that West Indians share to a greater degree the same communicative etiquette with the Anglo British than do other colored immigrants. However, studies show that West Indians are the least academically successful among the “colored” immigrants in Britain (Ogbu, 1978b). In New Zealand, immigrant Polynesians from other islands do better academically than the indigenous
caste-like Maoris, even though the two Polynesian groups are similar in language and culture in relation to the dominant White or Pakeha who make up the teaching force (Ogbu, 1978b).

We can broaden our cross-cultural perspective further by noting that the larger degree of relationship between sociocultural background and school performance prevalent in more industrialized societies like the United States is not ordinarily found in less industrialized societies. Despite many economic difficulties of children of non-elites and despite the wide cultural and language differences between them and their teachers, children in the less industrialized societies do not show the characteristics often observed among the caste-like minorities in American classrooms (van den Berghe, 1980; Farrell, 1973; Heyneman, 1976, cited in Perse II 1977, p. 2).

Let us return to American classrooms and look at one other area of comparison that may reveal more inadequacies of the microethnographic studies based on the mismatch model. If we accept the proposition that some children are failing in school mainly because they are not taught in their ethnic styles, how do we account for the fact that some children learn equally well from teachers of different communicative backgrounds, while other children do poorly regardless of the background of their teachers? We need an analytic framework and an ethnographic approach that will provide us with data and insights to explain the success and failures of subordinate groups participating in the same classrooms.

The second major difficulty with current microethnography is that it is not “holistic.” That is, it does not deal with the interaction or interrelation between schooling and other institutions in society and how such interrelationships may affect classroom processes. While the classroom is “the scene of the battle,” the cause of the battle may well lie elsewhere. Differences in communicative etiquettes may be the instruments or weapons with which the battle is fought in the classroom between teachers and students. But certainly, if we want to discover how to eliminate the occurrence and recurrence of these battles, we will make little progress by limiting our investigation to actual processes of battles in the classroom and to the instruments used by the combatants. We need to go beyond the battle scene and beyond the instruments of war.

This leads to our third criticism which is that these microethnographic studies tend to direct the attention of policy-makers
toward remedial action rather than toward actions for bringing about significant social change. We noted earlier the appeal of the microethnographic studies to policy-makers and practitioners. By specifying what it is in the communicative interaction between teachers and students in the classroom during, say, reading, which is assumed to cause reading difficulties, namely, (a) lack of shared communicative etiquette between teacher and student and (b) teacher’s teaching strategies, the most obvious remedial action is to change the teacher’s strategies for teaching reading to Black students, including enabling the teacher to accept Black language and culture (Simmons, 1976). This can be achieved by designing courses for in-service training of teachers and or for college preparation of future teachers. Although some teachers and eventually some students will be helped through such remedial programs, I doubt that any policy that does not simultaneously address itself to the economic and other subordinations of castelike minorities will have more than a superficial impact on the problem of minority school failure. For greater theoretical and policy relevance, microethnography needs to be integrated with macroethnography through the kind of analytic framework suggested below.

An Ecological Perspective on Educational Ethnography

A prerequisite for developing an adequate educational ethnography is an analytic framework. If we reject Malinowski’s “functionalism” or the structural-functionalism of others, there are still other analytic frameworks which can be useful bases for educational ethnography. The particular analytic framework selected by the ethnographer reflects both his training and interests. Different people may, of course, use different analytic frameworks to answer the same questions, such as: Why do minority children disproportionately experience academic failure in American public schools? Some analytic frameworks may be more adequate than others in answering this particular question. Furthermore, how the problem is formulated within a given analytic framework largely determines the ethnographic approach employed. The point I want to emphasize is that it is not methodology—microethnography or macroethnography—which determines the problem. The adequacy of educational ethnography can be assessed only in relation to the way the question to be answered is formulated. I suggest that microethnography
is an adequate methodology if we confine our inquiry to providing answers to questions relating to one dimension of the process of minority school failure, namely, how teacher-student communicative interaction contributes to minority school failure. If, on the other hand, we want to address the larger, overall issue, namely, why minority children (e.g., Blacks) disproportionately fail in school, we need more than microethnography focusing on teacher-student interaction to capture the overall dynamics of the system which lead Blacks to experience a greater degree of school failure.

In my own research I have generally preferred what may be called an ecological framework and all that it implies methodologically. An ecological framework assumes that there is a systematic relationship or interdependence between parts of the system; that education, for example, is linked to other socioeconomic institutions. The ecological framework further assumes that there are processes "which generate, maintain and change the prevailing network of interrelations" (Hansen, 1979, p. 63). Methodologically, the ecological framework requires the ethnographer to study not only the education system (at any level) and how it works but also the physical and social environments in which the system is enmeshed. I accept Teggart's injunction that we need to distinguish (and study) how the system works (from) how it has come to work that way (Teggart, 1962). A good ethnography of minority education must try to answer both questions; how minority children fail and how they have come to fail disproportionately as they do. Answering this dual question leads inevitably to historical and ecological investigations which incorporate micro- and macroethnographies.

Another assumption underlying my ecological perspective is that formal education or schooling, particularly its resultant educational credentials is, in contemporary United States and similar societies, an institutionalized device, channel, or strategy for job and status placement and remuneration (Ogbu 1974a, 1977, 1978a, 1978c, 1978d). The essential features of institutionalized strategies for subsistence and status achievement are that they (a) affect people's social organization and social relations; (b) influence people's notion or "theory" of how one succeeds or "makes it"; (c) influence people's actual practices of rearing and or educating their children; (d) share the images of people who are successful and those who are not; their attributes, such as language, cognitive skills, and attitudes and behaviors from
which parents and other child-training agents may select to foster in children; (e) determine the attributes which children acquire as they grow up; and (f) influence how children respond to the way child-training agents treat them at home, in the community, and in school as they get older and begin to understand the subsistence and status system under which they will live.

An important question is, what happens when the main institutionalized exploitative strategy of a society does not serve various segments of the society equally effectively? Cultural ecological studies in different parts of the world (Bennett, 1969; Maquet, 1970) suggest that in such a situation, members of the segment less well served by the main strategy (usually the subordinate segment) often develop alternative strategies to meet their subsistence and status needs. These alternative strategies, like the main strategy, have important influences on their social organization and social relations, their personal attributes, their theory of making it, how they go about raising their children, and so on. In an ethnographic study of schooling among members of a subordinate segment, crucial questions would include the following: (1) how effectively do educational credentials serve members of the group as a strategy for employment and status attainment? (2) what alternative strategies, if any, have members of the group evolved? (3) why did the alternative strategies emerge and why do they persist? (4) what do the alternative strategies require in terms of personal attributes, theory of “making it,” etc.? (5) to what extent are these requirements congruent with those required for formal schooling for educational credentials?

Using this ecological framework as a guide for educational ethnography in an American community, one soon becomes aware that people’s jobs not only serve to satisfy their subsistence needs; the job is also about the most important indicator of a person’s social standing. The ethnographer moreover discovers that educational credentials are believed to play a central role in determining what kind of a job a person gets and how he or she is rewarded for it. From his observations, formal and informal interviews with informants, gossips, and documentary information the ethnographer is able to construct the “native” theory of “making it,” and is able to assess how this theory influences their childrearing and educational attitudes and behaviors.

The ethnographer may also find that the native theory of making it is not necessarily the same for various segments in the
community, because the theory is based on past and present “economic realities” of a given group, including how members of the group perceive, experience, and interpret their opportunity structures. Thus in some segments of the community the ethnographer may find that the native theory of making it emphasizes the use of educational credentials or strategy; in some other segments the emphasis may be on the use of alternative strategies; still some other groups may combine both education and other channels to make it. Some alternative strategies may require competencies or personal attributes which are congruent with competencies demanded by formal education for successful classroom teaching and learning; other alternative strategies may, however, encourage acquisition of competencies or personal attributes which are incongruent with those required for successful classroom teaching and learning. In educational ethnography one of the most important things to examine and describe is the relationship between formal education as a strategy for achieving subsistence and status and any alternative or even supplementary strategies which may have emerged for the same purpose, as well as how and why the latter came into existence and persist. It is important both in terms of theory and social policy to examine the historical and contemporary circumstances which generate and maintain the alternative supplementary strategies used by minorities and or lower class. Unless we identify these historical and structural forces we may erroneously label them: “coping strategies” (e.g., uncle tomming, partial withdrawal, mutual exchange, hustling, etc.) as “their culture.” What is needed is not merely an ethnographic description that identifies behavioral or attitudinal differences between, say, lower-class ghetto Blacks and middle-class suburban Whites; more important is an ethnographic description that would enable the researcher to explain why the differences exist and how they interact with schooling, i.e., with teaching and learning.

Let me illustrate the ecological perspective with some aspects of my research in Stockton, California. A few months after my research began in 1968 I became very impressed with differences I observed in attitudes and efforts among Anglo, Black, Chicano, Chinese, Filippino, and Japanese students in the same classrooms and in different classrooms; with the same teachers and with different teachers. Taking Black students as an illustration, I observed repeatedly that many did not take their schoolwork seriously; nor did they persevere at it long enough. This lack of serious attitudes
and efforts seemed to increase as the observation moved from elementary through high school. I observed a good deal of “mismatches” in communicative etiquettes between teachers and students of various ethnic backgrounds, but this phenomenon did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the non-serious attitudes and efforts of Black students or the opposite attitudes and efforts of, say, Chinese students. Partly because my research up to that point had included a general ethnography of the school and community, I had some information that led me to suspect that a fuller understanding of the processes I observed in the classroom would require probing ecological factors beyond the classrooms and the schools for forces that might encourage the characteristic attitudes and behaviors of Black students. The ecological forces I turned to examine were those which had to do with local systems of racial stratification and its economic, political, and social concomitants as well as the historical and contemporary physical, social, and economic life of the local ghetto.

Briefly, ethnographic investigation within this framework strongly suggested that the lack of serious academic attitudes and efforts of local Blacks might be related to the following factors. One is the relationship of conflict and mistrust between Blacks and the schools which evolved over many generations. This type of relationship makes it difficult for Black parents and their children to accept wholeheartedly the goals, standards, and instructional approaches of the schools. For their part, the schools tend to become defensive, relating to Black children and their parents mainly in terms of control, paternalism, or “contest.” This contrasts sharply with the relationship between middle-class Whites and the schools. The former and their children tend to see the completion of school tasks and meeting of school standards as necessary, desirable, and compatible with their own goals: ghetto Blacks may interpret the same demands differently, sometimes regarding them as a deception or an unnecessary imposition incompatible with their “real educational needs.” This kind of interpretation of school requirements makes commitment and perseverance to academic tasks very difficult for ghetto children.

For Stockton Blacks and their schools, data showing a high degree of conflict and mistrust were collected from several sources in and out of school; e.g., incidents between individual pupils and their teachers or other personnel, between individual families and the schools, including a case in which one mother...
was jailed because of a conflict with a local principal over her child's behavior. As in a number of other incidents, the case of the jailed mother eventually became an issue between the Black community and the school system. There was also a conflict involving neighborhood groups, a local principal, and the school board over testing and grading of students as well as over treatment of parents by school officials; this particular incident brought in state intervention. There were conflicts between Black civil rights organizations and the schools over school desegregation (which ended in favor of Blacks in a court decision), over quality education for Black children, and over “pushout” problems (which resulted in a school boycott).

Each of these and other incidents observed and recorded led to intense discussion and gossip within the Black community about their perennial “problems” with the school system and to a pervasive feeling that they (Blacks) could not trust the schools to educate their children. Discipline problems and school dropout problems were interpreted differently by Blacks and the schools. Interviews with students, parents, community leaders, others, as well as conversations overheard in barbershops and carryouts which focused on education, almost always led to voluntary statements implying, if not asserting outright, a deep distrust for the schools. From the school side there were complementary data on the relationship of conflict and mistrust: there were actual incidents of conflict between the schools and the students, parents, and other members of the Black community; teacher’s comments in students’ files about their families, neighborhoods, and themselves; memos, reports, and policy statements from the office of community relations; comments by teachers, counselors, principals and other local officials in their annual reports for the central administration; and minutes of the school board; all contained information about the problem of trust and conflict. There was at least one incident I investigated for a couple of days with the help of local community leaders because it involved some elementary school teachers coming to school armed with knives and other weapons.

A second factor I discovered in the Stockton study is disillusionment about schooling, especially among older children. The disillusionment was generated by perceptions and or inferences of dismal future job and other opportunities due to historical experiences of inequality of educational rewards in terms of jobs, earnings, and social credits. Most data on disillusionment about the value of schooling came from outside of classrooms and
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schools. Among the older children at least, there was much evidence that they perceived or inferred from their parents' experiences of discrimination dismal future job and other opportunities and that their perceptions and inferences affected their perceptions of and responses to schooling. I have described this phenomenon elsewhere, pointing out that in spite of their expressed desires for their children to graduate from high school or to go to college, many local Black parents seemed to be transmitting to their children ambivalent attitudes toward schooling (Ogbu, 1974a, 1974b, 1977). Parents tell their children on the one hand to get a good education and to work hard in school; but on the other hand they teach them both verbally and through their personal experiences of unemployment, underemployment, and discrimination, and through gossip about similar experiences of neighbors, friends, and relatives, that their chances of receiving adequate rewards for their education are not as good as those of their White peers. Moreover, the "job problem" comes up in many situations which the ethnographer cannot overlook: in litigations over job discrimination or exclusion; in public discussions and workshops sponsored by community groups or public agencies; in statistics contained in school records and in publications of both county and city planning departments, and local community action councils. The "job problem" is also reflected in students' responses to questionnaires specifically constructed toward the end of the research to assess their perceptions of local opportunity structures.

The third factor identified to influence classroom teaching and learning, though originating elsewhere is, perhaps, the most central in the ecological approach; it is the incongruence between competencies demanded by classroom teaching and learning and those required by local "survival strategies" which historically emerged and continue to persist apparently in response to limited opportunities for "making it" through conventional strategies of the dominant society. The discovery of the possible role of the alternative or "survival" strategies came about midway in my research. It was exciting; and it brought much clarity to some of my earlier observations, rumors, as well as discussions with some informants and certain issues of public debate. I have identified at least three of these alternative or survival strategies, namely, collective struggle, clientage or uncle tomming, and "hustling." Data on collective struggle came from interviews and documents, from petitions, protests, and boycotts of civil rights groups, from subsequent negotiations and results of such
negotiations following protests and boycotts. Data obtained on public incidents reflecting clientage and discussions with both Black and White informants indicate that there is a pervasive ideology about blacks "making it" through "uncle tomming" (Ogbu 1977). My data on "hustling" are based less on direct observation and knowledge than on interviews and indirect clues. But in this ghetto as in other ghettos "street life" is a reality for many Blacks of all ages. And in the streets there are pimps and other types of hustlers described by various writers on ghetto life (see Brown, 1969; Heard, 1968; Liebow, 1966; Haley, 1966; Milner, 1970).

The fourth set of factors influencing Black education in Stockton came directly from the operation of the school system. Although many Black children attended the same schools and the same classes with White children as well as with children of other ethnic minorities, there were often some subtle mechanisms which tended to differentiate Black education from the education of their White peers. Data supporting my contention that Black children received inferior education which contributed to their academic difficulties have been given elsewhere (Ogbu 1974a, 1974b, 1977). My presentation of the situation dealt not only with access but also with the process of their education. For example, I have described the system of classroom rewards in one elementary school which tends to teach the children not to work hard by giving them "average grades" or C grades, regardless of how hard they worked or not.

From an ecological perspective the problem of minority school failure is complex. It cannot be adequately studied through microethnography which focuses primarily on classroom processes. The ecological perspective calls for integration of the micro- and macroethnographic approaches for best theoretical and practical results. The sum of the perspective presented here is that while the classroom is the actual battle scene, the causes of the battle really lie somewhere else, outside the classroom and even outside the school.

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Anthropological Fieldwork: Comments on Its Values and Limitations*

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We will concentrate our remarks here on research methodology, in particular that method which is central to cultural anthropology, and called fieldwork, participant observation, or doing ethnography, and which may be regarded as a species of "qualitative research methodology." We will explore the assets and limitations that inhere in the nature of fieldwork and how these shape the research effort, the findings, and the published report. Throughout we will be alert to the human values implicit in the fieldwork process. Limitations of time and space do not permit us to analyze how the nature and values of fieldwork affect the kind of policy critique that is developed in the context of educational research and development.

The word "fieldwork" is used to cover a considerable range of methodological practices (Wax & Cassell, 1979; Hatfield, 1973). During most of our discussion, we shall focus on the most normative variety, as represented by the classical investigations of Bronislaw Malinowski and Margaret Mead. Such fieldwork has been frankly and vividly described in several recent works, including those by Rosalie H. Wax (1972, 1979), Laura Bohannon (1964), Hortense Powdermaker (1966), Jean Briggs (1970), and Marian Slater (1976), and we shall thus have a set of examples to which we can refer.

The fieldworking ideal is represented by Frazer's claim (1922, 1961, p. vii) in the preface to The Argonauts of the Western Pacific that Malinowski had lived as a Trobriander among the Trobrianders. Not a great deal of knowledge of fieldwork is...
needed in order to expose the pretentiousness of that claim. To live as a full adult member of the Trobriand society—as that society was early in this century—would have required an array of skills requiring years to master, and an involvement in activities that would have been so preoccupying as to have left but little room for Malinowski's work as an ethnographer. Nevertheless, the fieldworking ideal has been to live with the host people as intimately as possible.

Simultaneously, a less publicized aspect of the ideal has been for the fieldworker to retain a scholarly commitment to the academic profession and to maintain elaborate sets of fieldnotes and records, which would be analyzed both in the field and later in the scholarly study. Thus, even in the midst of fieldwork, the researcher is a person of two worlds—the world of the host people, and the world of the scholarly discipline—so that what is produced from the fieldwork is the product or combination of that tension (R. H. Wax, 1971, pp. 42–55; 139–142).

This tension in the role of the fieldworker is nowhere more clearly expressed than in the realm of values. For on the one hand, the fieldworker has been geared within a Western society and been further subjected to the intensive socialization of graduate study within a scientific discipline; yet on the other hand, she or he must then suspend some of these values in order to participate with dignity and grace in the intimate life of the host people. The resulting stresses can be very shaking. When Powdermaker did her fieldwork within a rural community of Mississippi during the 1930s (1966, part III), she found herself in anxious conflict on such simple matters as addressing Negroes by titles of civility—Mr. and Mrs. When Briggs did her fieldwork (1970, chapter 6) among the Eskimo, she found herself in conflict when she wished to protect them from the avariciousness of the hunters who had flown in from the "lower 48," while her native hosts wished to extend to these visitors their customary norms of hospitality.

In the literature of social-science, there is a strong emphasis upon the primary group and primary associations. These are groups, like the nuclear family, whose relationships involve the whole person and engender such emotional intensity that they shape the character and being of the child, as well as having marked influence on the adults. In fieldwork, the researcher deliberately places his or herself into such an environment, with its intensities, pleasures, and displeasures, its familial and interpersonal tensions and satisfactions, ceremonials and rituals. Indeed, fieldwork can be regarded as an experience in radical
resocialization during which the self is put at risk. As Robert Ezra Park remarked some forty years ago:

The child born into a society may be said to go through the same process of socialization as the stranger who is finally adopted into a new society.

We have been talking of fieldwork in a stereotypical or idealized fashion—exemplified by the work of Malinowski, Mead, or others among small bands of exotic, technologically primitive people: Malinowski among the Trobriand Islanders during World War I, Mead among the peoples of New Guinea during her long and productive lifetime of research beginning in the 1920s, and others who found small enclaves where they might practice the traditional arts of fieldwork.

But in the context of annual meetings, such as those of AERA, this form of the methodology must seem archaic or recherché. Likely, there were fewer Trobriand Islanders, or fewer people on Manus, then there are present at an annual meeting of AERA. And if we wish to perform research that is advisory to a metropolitan school system, such as that of San Francisco, or Chicago, or New York, we do seem to require some methodological stretching.

It is easy to see that fieldwork could be adapted to the study of the single classroom. During the school day, the classroom is an ecologically bounded and enclosed unit and, at least in the elementary levels, the pupils are confined to that room and a particular teacher, and to association with each other for many hours of many days per year. Assuming that dropout and turnover are reasonably in bounds, the classroom fosters the development of primary associations and primary groups, and thus lends itself to intensive study by the fieldworker. Not surprisingly, there have been a fairly large number of such studies of classrooms.

Methodologically these classroom studies are deficient in several significant ways. On the one hand, they do not follow the lives of the pupils outside the single classroom. While the researcher may follow the pupils into other areas of the school—the playgrounds, toiletrooms, gymnasium, lunchroom—it is seldom or never that the pupils are followed into their extraclassroom existence, back to families, neighborhoods, peer groups, after-school employment, or other activities. Also, and even
more typically, the researcher cannot follow the teacher into the larger world of the school as a whole, nor can the school itself then be linked to the larger external systems.

We might digress and note that there have been school situations which were small enough that they could be encompassed by the procedures noted, without methodological stretching. The obvious example is the one-room school among the exotic community, as was studied for example by Harry Wolcott (1967) among the Kwakiutl Indians on an island off the west coast of Canada. Wolcott was able to become acquainted with the entire population of the community, and could understand the pupils in relationship to that total milieu. Moreover, the linkage to the exterior system of school governance was from himself, functioning as researcher and teacher, to the relevant and distant authorities of the Canadian government. Such a case has theoretical interest to us as educational researchers, but would scarcely be regarded as a methodological exemplar for the metropolis.

It has also been possible to adapt fieldwork to the situation of the small town, particularly the kind of rural region where the children attend a single elementary or high school. Fieldworkers—and usually these have been couples, husband and wife, or even families with schoolage children—have been able to visualize the township as a whole, and to place the school and its classrooms within that whole. This kind of project has a history of several decades from the studies conducted by Warner (1949), Havighurst (1962), Hollingshead (1949) and associates to the Experimental Schools Project recently completed under funding by NIE and supervised by Abt Associates.

Since our focus in this paper is on values, we must note that one of the dilemmas of the fieldworker is precisely in the area of the necessity to protect the hosts. As a member of a scholarly discipline, the fieldworker is oriented toward publication that would include the frank and intimate details of the lives of the people involved in the schools. But as a person who has been accepted by a host community and been socialized into a responsible adult status within that community, how can the researcher reveal intimate details to an alien and critical audience? For Malinowski in the 1920s, writing to an educated British audience about the conduct of isolated nonliterate exotic folk, there was but little problem. But for the recent or modern fieldworker, whose writings on the community may find wide distribution or even become the texts for class reading by persons intending
to teach in that particular community, the dilemma may become very painful. Not much has been written here, but what there is has been graphic, as in the case of the restudy (1961, 1964) by Gallaher of the small Missouri town that had originally been studied by Carl Withers (1945), or professionally-politically controversial as in the case of a city in New York state that was called "Springdale" by Vidich and Bensman (1958, 1958f).

To return to the issue of methodological stretching, the seemingly natural way for fieldwork to be adapted to the study of metropolitan schools is by the institution of the research team with a life span of several years. In such a team, some persons can be delegated to perform classroom ethnographies, such as we have mentioned above. But other persons can be assigned the task of studying the administrators and their interconnections, while others can be asked to study the informal interactions of hallways, playgrounds, cafeterias, and gymnasiums. Conceivably, with a large enough team and sufficient time, there could also be some coverage of the family and neighborhood.

But the paradoxes of such a research team center about issues of size, cost, and complexity (cf Cassell, 1978). In traditional terms, the research ideal was the young Malinowski sent on a pittance to work for several years among the Trobrianders. A large research team must be headed by a senior person, who can negotiate on equal status with both the funding agency and with the school system under study. But senior researchers command relatively high salaries, and so the project usually buys only a piece of his or her time, and the individual who should be most thoroughly and intimately involved with the fieldwork is instead parttime and preoccupied with other duties at the university or institutional base. The actual fieldwork then devolves onto a host of junior persons, usually graduate students, and their efforts must then be coordinated by a project director. Now the great advantage of fieldwork is its flexibility and intimacy and its opportunity for prolonged intimate interaction between the researcher and the hosts. But given a complex project dealing with as sensitive a host institution as a public school and as meticulous a sponsoring agency as those of the Federal Government, the research team is moved toward formality, rigid research designs, and bureaucracy. A central dilemma arises even about the keeping, storage, and retrieval of fieldnotes and other research data. In traditional ethnography, the researcher relies
on his or her research notes and engages with these notes in a continual process of inquiry. Or, in the case of a congenial couple that jointly conducts research, there is such high interaction and mutuality, that each is aware of the data being gathered by the other, and of its relevance to their research problems (R. H. Wax, 1979). However, in the case of a large research team, the sheer volume of notes by disparate persons means that a highly formalized system of classification and storage must be instituted. Not only does this introduce a high degree of rigidity into the research process, but it frequently leads to a situation of underutilization of data. Great quantities of notes are accumulated, but relatively small portions can be utilized for analysis and reporting.

It has been said of ethnographic fieldwork that it does not see the forest for the trees. By this criticism it is meant that the fieldworker concentrates on the microaspects of the social world, on the intimate personal relationships within a small group, and therefore ignores, or leaves out of focus, the larger social world—the world of nation states, rival imperialisms, multinational corporations, world religions, and international ideological movements. Or, thinking just of North America, the focus on the classroom can leave ignored, or out-of-focus, the environment of school bureaucracy, ethnic and racial stratification and struggles, and national political and economic conditions.

Within the context of a discussion of values, there is a simple and effective response, namely that the only reason to concentrate on the social forest is to understand the human trees. For it is these individual trees—be they named Socrates, Ghandi, Hendrik Gideonse, Joseph Schwab, Joe Kurihura, or Roselyn HolyRock, be they outstanding and eminent or be they the humbler individuals about whom no literary records have been kept—who, for us, constitute the elements of value. It is these individual trees—an oak, a beech, a redwood, a raspberry bush, a poison ivy vine, and how they help and hinder each other—that concern us. So too when we reflect on a metropolitan school system, we can consider the distribution of reading scores of thousands of children, yet when all is said and done, we come at last to this particular teacher assisting this particular child in acquiring the wonderful art of reading.

We do not wish here to enter into the game of academic or methodological arm-wrestling in which the point is to put down an alternative type of methodology such as sample survey re-
search or educational tests and measurements, while extolling the unique virtues of one's own methodology. For those who enjoy the debate on rival methodologies within the social sciences, there is an ample polemical literature, with significant misunderstanding and bigotry among all parties. (The naivete of the present level of debate is demonstrated by the sponsorship within the AAAS of the prize "intended to encourage in social inquiry the development and application of the kind of dependable methodology that has proved so fruitful in the natural sciences." We submit that in the natural sciences, researchers do not cast about for "dependable methodology" but first focus on significant problems and then try to devise procedures which will enable them to respond to those problems.)

Fieldwork is one of the most wonderful if taxing methods that have emerged within the social sciences. More than any other method, it attempts to understand and portray the intimate daily lives of ordinary people. But fieldwork should be and can be more than a particularistic portrait of a unique individual. By its very nature, fieldwork is designed to assist the scientist in discovering that which is patterned, which is more general, that which is an example of the generically human. Let us see how this is so.

At its simplest, fieldwork exposes the social reality beneath the mythic distortion. A simple example may be taken from our own fieldwork among the Oglala Sioux of Pine Ridge (R.H. Wax 1971; Wax, Wax, & Dumont, 1964). Initially, we thought that among the Indian children a sizeable proportion would dislike the federally operated schools, and we imagined that the more traditionally Indian the children were, the more they would be alienated from the school. Instead, to our bewilderment, we found children claiming to like school and to be eager to attend. It took us a while to appreciate that the liking of school was genuine and was grounded in several important facts: first, that the school served pleasant and nourishing meals (and this was especially important to children of families who were desperately poor); and second, school was a center where a child could meet and socialize with peers.

Going further, fieldwork can provide the basis for exposing the existence of a social process that is general but unexpected in this context. Again, an example from Pine Ridge. What especially puzzled us was the transition in the nature of the classes in the school. In the primary grades (1-3), the children were responsive
to the teachers and eager participants in the classroom. But in the intermediate grades, there was what seemed to be a conspiracy of deliberate and noisy stupidity that sabotaged any kind of public recitation. And by the upper elementary grades, the Indian students seemed to withdraw from the classwork into a deliberate policy of silence and nonparticipation. Most attempts to explain this phenomenon centered on a statement that Indian children were "shy"; logically, this made little sense, since they should have manifested the shyness in the primary grades, not in the upper elementary grades where the average student might be aged fourteen or fifteen. Other explanations focused on the gradual development of negative self-images:

It's because by then (fourth or fifth grade) they're beginning to realize that to be an Indian is to be lousy, filthy, and poor. They're beginning to think, "What the hell. They see that their teachers are fools (R. H. Wax, 1971, p. 257).

But in our observation, in the classroom and our conversations with Indian children we found no evidence of negative self-images; (and our view here was later confirmed by Fuchs and Havighurst, 1972). Instead, what finally penetrated our intelligence through much fieldwork was that the children in the primary grades, like all little children, were oriented to adults, parents, grandparents, teachers, or older siblings. Thus, when their parents told them to learn, they tried very hard to do what their parents and the teacher told them to do—and during the first years at school they tried so hard that by the fourth grade many Indian children were doing better than White children. When other children tried to tease or interrupt them, they ignored them. But by the time these children had reached the fifth and sixth grades, the agent of socialization had shifted from an older and authoritative person to the peer group. Any student who tried to learn or who obeyed the teacher was teased, tormented and, sometimes, even physically abused by his or her peers. By the seventh or eighth grade, the power of the peer group had become almost absolute. When our Indian colleague, Mrs. Holy Rock, observed a seventh and eighth grade classroom, she told us: "It was just awful . . . it was like she (the teacher) had a room full of dead people and she was trying to talk to them" (R. H. Wax, 1971, p. 251-266).

Conventional teaching techniques deal with children as if they
were isolated units in the classroom, basically competitive with
each other, so that the success of one child lies in the demon-
stration of failure of another. The Sioux children resisted and
successfully frustrated any such effort at placing them into com-
petition with one another, or establishing any system of invidious
comparison.

That Indian children—or any group of children—who develop
together through the successive classrooms of a school should
then form a peer society of great strength should not be sur-
prising to social scientists—once we think about it. But we are
impressed at how long and with how much effort at fieldwork
it took us to gain this insight, and we continue to be impressed
at how this finding of a general social process tends to be ignored
in educational literature. We would suggest that this is an arti-
fact of research methodology, that pencil and paper tests or
related kinds of surveys are improper instruments for discerning
the existence and potencies of peer societies.

Where fieldwork as a research method is unique is in its ability
to enter into the world of meaning of the group or community
in question. That world is perhaps best understood when we
approach it through the distinctive language or dialect of the
community, or even the distinctive terms or argot. So when
Becker and Geer (1957) were studying “boys in white,” the
students in a medical school, they were led to place great stress
on terms unique to that situation: words like “crock” or “pearls.”
In the fieldwork conducted by a variety of researchers among
traditional American Indian peoples, there was the realization
of crucial differences between Indians and Western peoples in
respect to notions of health, social harmony, or again in respect
to notions of leadership and excellence. These differences are
much too elusive for us to explain in the compass of a short paper.
The point, however, is that traditional Indians conceptualized
their world far differently than do the peoples of the West and
that without the insights derived from fieldwork, observers—
even reasonably scholarly observers—have thought of Indians as
childlike, or irreligious, or illogical, or lazy—or indeed have
applied to Indians any number of terms of derogation deriving
from Western conceptualizations of the world.

Earlier we characterized fieldwork as being the most distinc-
tively human methodology of the social sciences. Perhaps you
can now begin to appreciate the several levels on which this is
so. Specifically, that fieldwork brings the researcher into per-
sonal and intimate relationships with the host people, that it enables the fieldworkers then to perceive the unexpected activity of general social processes, and to understand the initially perplexing conduct of the hosts by entering into their cultural and linguistic worlds. On the other hand, it is clear that fieldwork has a natural limitation, in that it is a methodology most easily used by either an individual person or a small nuclear family. Moreover, it is most easily applied to small natural wholes, such as isolated bands or groups of people. During the past generation there have been a series of attempts to adapt fieldwork to the study of institutions or systems within modern urban society and to do so by the use of large research teams, with complex divisions of labor. The findings from these teams, particularly in relationship to research on schools, are noteworthy and encouraging, but they reveal a number of significant methodological difficulties. It is too early to tell how successful researchers will be in adapting the fundamental principles of fieldwork to the study of social entities in modern urban society. One might be tempted to suggest that fieldwork can only be conducted within the framework of small exotic—so-called “primitive”—societies. But in making such a quick and negative judgment one forgets that fieldwork as a disciplined methodology is hardly as old as this century (M. L. Wax, 1972), so that it is too early to forecast the ways in which it will evolve or be adapted. Our own judgment is that because of the human values which it exemplifies, and because of the human quality of the interaction that it engenders, fieldwork will continue to be an important member of the system of techniques employed by social-scientists.

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Commentary: Anthropology Symposium

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The contributors to this segment of the monograph have addressed several distinctive features of anthropological research as they are applied to educational problems. I shall briefly review those few that strike me as being of central importance. We shall first take note of a general perspective and bias—namely, that all people’s views make sense, although not necessarily in relation to the views of other persons with whom they are interacting. On the part of the investigator this requires cultivated self awareness of biases and moral judgments about personnel and the roles they play, especially when confronting schools in which children are apparently at risk in one way or another (they do not learn skills, they drop out, they sabotage classroom activities, and the like). It is not difficult to study a tribal or peasant society at some remove and to think of it as something alien and worthy of being understood empathically but objectively in its own terms. Schools and schooling in one’s own society merit the same objectivity, but we are inclined to lower our guard, so to speak. because the setting and the language appear so familiar or because we have all had experience with similar institutions and are likely to have formed views about them.

The issue is further complicated by a probable self-selection of those who choose anthropology as a career. Ogbu, I think, quite rightly notes that anthropologists tend to identify with the oppressed against oppressors, with the powerless as against the powerful. In this light, those of us who are concerned with access to education—indeed, to the best that it can offer—are prone to see teachers and administrators as villains in the drama of schooling. All the more reason to heed the injunction to be prepared to accept the fact that the familiar can be alien. This is a simple but profound and exacting form of self-discipline when applied to the examination of our own society. I have found it almost equally difficult when doing research in countries like Brazil or Italy, that share with us many elements of historical and cultural background. The connotative and denotative meanings of words and actions, that seem all too familiar, may lead
us up the proverbial primrose path unless we systematically seek to understand them in their novel contexts. This much of cultural relativism still remains in the anthropologist's orientation to whatever problem he or she chooses to investigate.

Both the Waxes and Erickson emphasize conflicting patterns of meaning children have learned before and after they enter school: working cooperatively towards a goal, receiving academic instruction at home or not, or shifting from dependence on parents as authority figures and role models to members of the peer group. If what makes sense to the teacher in terms of his or her own cultural backgrounds is at odds with what makes sense to the children at different levels of their development, then a culture (or cultures) will emerge in the classroom as a response to modes of intercultural communication that develop there. Under these circumstances, the classroom school becomes an arena for working out the diverse cultural inputs and discrepancies brought from the multiplex society. In this sense, like a community, it may be thought to act as a mirror to the larger society (Arensberg & Kimball, 1965, chapter 1).

All the contributors reflect upon a second, related, and very distinctive feature of anthropological inquiry, which is its emphasis upon direct personal relations with members of the group, community, or social unit under investigation. This intimacy of personal contacts requires a long period of involvement with individuals, who serve or collaborate as informants, and participant observation of events and activities. It derives from the village prototype in which an anthropologist commands all possible observations about the life of a small society through sustained intimate relations with its members over at least one year and often more. Diverse methods and procedures are appropriate to this kind of field research; when applied to institutions and problems in a complex, highly differentiated society, they constitute what is often called microethnography. To date most studies of this kind have been limited to a bounded set of individuals sufficiently small in number that they can be examined over a rather long period of time by one or a few observers. A classroom or school, a factory or some segment thereof, a housing unit, or a neighborhood are cases in point. The ethnographer who attends to the classroom or school as a small-scale society seeks to discover social, cultural, and communication patterns that tell us how and why processes of transmission work in the ways they do. Skills in linguistics (especially sociolinguistics and ethnolinguistics) and kinesics (communication by body move-
ment) form part of the repertoire for data elicitation in this kind of investigation. Not all anthropologists are competent to work in this vein, but such analysis, for example, can provide insight for teachers about what they are doing and "saying" that contributes to one form or another of failure. It can thus lead to more meaningful communication with students and correct for what Erikson and others speak of as cultural "mismatch" of expectations in interactions.

The sensitive attention to distinctive fine detail in microethnography has as its object the discernment of values, beliefs, and understandings of the several categories of interacting individuals. In a pluralistic society participants in a classroom may be presumed to come with different mind-sets and to pass in and out of the group with some regularity. The ethnographer must then attend to the contrasting body of meanings brought to interactive situations which constitute the elements in novel structures I have referred to as the culture of the classroom. They involve accommodative patterns in adaptation that develop between teachers and students, and form the channels through which the learning process is mediated.

Ogbu stresses another, and to him a more satisfactory, methodological approach to the study of education in urban, ethnically complex communities. He speaks of this as an ecological point of view, by which he means the examination of the forces of the wider social and cultural environment that generate processes observed in the school or classroom. As he puts it: "While the classroom is the 'scene of the battle,' the cause of the battle may well lie elsewhere." This is a view that is consistent with post-war studies of peasant villages conceived as part of an integral system of institutions and forces ranging from a region to nation-state and beyond. While Ogbu concedes the efficacy of certain remedial efforts in certain academic deficiencies (viz., reading competence) that might result from microethnographic studies, he believes that a more viable solution to these problems will only come from systematic changes in the urban environment that may be discovered to generate patterns of classroom processes. Among anthropologists doing research in education, he is probably unique in having attempted such an ambitious field study as a lone investigator.

The values that anthropologists explicitly and variously attach in their research to intimate sustained, personal contacts with their subject populations, to the search for contrastive and variable patterns of meaning in human relationships, and to the wider
contextualization of lower level organizations under immediate scrutiny, all present certain problems. We shall conclude by considering those of which our contributors have made us most aware, particularly as they apply to educational research.

Long term personal involvement with people, scenes, and events has the advantage of flexibility and depth, of staying close to the lived-in reality of human life. On the other hand, if the anthropologist does this job well, and focuses all or most of his/her energies on eliciting data in small local groups, he she will fail to attend to the role of larger encompassing networks that can inform our understanding of its constituent elements. Malinowski, who analyzed the now famous kula exchange ring among the Trobriand Islanders, failed to look at the system of ceremonial and material exchanges that linked them to a much broader island system. Only later restudy led to a more sophisticated interpretation of their entailment in this institution for the Trobrianders themselves.

To the extent that anthropologists engage in such rich detailed analysis of the single case—in essence creating a theory to account for that culture—they also tend to ignore more general understandings that it implies. General theory testing suffers from the preference for this mode of analysis. Anthropology as a discipline embraces both concerns, but anthropologists as individuals are predisposed to employ one form of research or the other.

Personal involvement and intimacy with one's informants or subjects of investigation, finally, creates ethical problems of reporting in a complex society. The study of schools in the United States and Europe, for example, raises the issue of what to publish and how, or how to invite cooperation while protecting collaborators from possible harm. Moreover, in the course of this kind of field work one acquires feelings about teachers and others as whole persons that can color one's objectivity. In yet another way the detailed information one lovingly acquires about specific individuals—a particular teacher in relation to a particular child—may inhibit the researcher's perception of patterns that pertain to larger aggregates of children, an important goal of the anthropological enterprise. There are thus stresses and tensions in the field setting, whether a tribal or peasant village or a much more familiar organization, and these amplify (as, I might add, do the pleasures) as the anthropologist becomes increasingly a part of the unit he is investigating.

His search for regularities in the trees of the forest, to use the Waxes' simile, also poses the problem of attending to variance in
a given population. Ogbu, for example, makes the distinction between caste-like minorities (e.g., Blacks, Chicanos, Native Americans) and immigrant minorities, a categorical distinction that he arrives at by observing the general tendency for the former to be much more institutionally constrained than the latter in their opportunities for mobility and change. An important question remains, however. That is: how do we account for the individuals who make it in the caste-like minorities and those who don't among others? In more alien field situations anthropologists have begun to pay more attention to this methodological problem, but perhaps in their effort to communicate overlooked important contrastive patterns in urban organizations they have tended to gloss over internal variation.

A third problem which anthropologists recognize in the values they bring to bear on their research in education concerns tracing what goes on in the schools to external institutions and the roles they play in this process. How can the anthropologist resolve the tensions and contradictions implicit in his most cherished mode of personalized field study with the theoretical requirements for studying education in a complex society? Constructing models of these relationships may be a useful first step (Siegel, 1974), but actually carrying out such research faces formidable barriers. To follow students to their families, teachers to their homes and other networks, observe school boards and their functioning, or city councils as they debate educational issues is for each a job in itself. To show the links between them as they ultimately relate to the classroom as an emergent or negotiated structure is far more difficult. The anthropologist may require skills in administering a program for research between himself and research assistants; in other circumstances he may constitute part of an interdisciplinary research team. Whatever the approach, a compromise must be made between intensive and extensive observation, between what one may feel most comfortable in doing as an anthropologist and what the problem demands methodologically. The collaborative project is often felt to be too rigid in design and too inflexible in its bureaucracy, and therefore unproductive by the anthropologist. In this regard, one must also raise the question of how far the boundaries of educational research should extend if one values this perspective. Should it be the city, a metropolitan regional system in which it is embedded, the state, or beyond? Ogbu chose the urban boundary and that was bold enough. But we ought to perhaps go even farther. In this connection, I would suggest that an important
consideration is control of appropriate historiography, in which anthropologists working in American society have been notably deficient.

We should not end this commentary without mentioning one other problem germane to all anthropological approaches to research in education considered in this monograph, namely, the limitations posed by restricted time and funds for doing fieldwork. Rosalie and Murray Wax in particular indicated in their discussion the difficulty they encountered in communicating findings from one of their studies to the community of concerned parents and school personnel. This partly stemmed from the difficulty of funding longitudinal projects and, given this, of finding the time to report or to discuss the results personally with interested parties. Often members of the subject community may be left with the impression that, because investigators came to study a problem in their midst, they are especially problemized but without sufficient guidance in knowing how to effect changes.

In brief, anthropologists who have concerned themselves with the comparative study of education in complex societies share the belief that their methods for doing fieldwork, honed in quite other contexts, have value for analysis and interpretation of these phenomena as well. If they adopt an imperial attitude to their special methods of research, it is largely in their insistence that others who apply them make the effort to acquire more than a superficial control over their use and limitations. Not all anthropologists are of the same mold. Some are predisposed to work in one mode, some in another. In any event, there are limits to anthropological inquiry such that different kinds of understandings may emerge from perspectives provided by psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and educators themselves. It is well to bear in mind the deficiencies and biases of anthropological methods, but this should not obscure the fact that they can provide certain insights for professional educators. The anthropologist's participation in their enterprise should pose no threat to them, but hopefully contribute where appropriate to the arsenal of concepts and methodology in educational research.

References


Values and Policy in Educational Evaluation

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Values grow from nature and experience, but the extent to which they respond to environmental pressures remains debatable. In the field of educational evaluation, emerging as it has within comfortable memory, one can observe that changes in context affected the values espoused and exhibited by educational evaluators. In this compressed period of salient educational evaluation, evaluators have been confronted with numerous changes in context. Expectations for the use of their work, for the types of programs they were to evaluate, and for their relationship with clients altered in discernible (but not linear) sequence. These shifts will provide a basis for inferring the values presently exhibited and forecast for evaluation practice.

Fifteen years ago, when evaluation practice expanded with the assistance of the Federal government, educators trained in research methods found a new home. Not only were the procedures of evaluation modeled on scientific inquiry in education and psychology, but findings of these studies were intended to be used to improve student learning. Evaluation seemed to fuse several elements into an appealing and coherent composite: 1) the respect for rationality derived from science; 2) power and control; 3) altruism; and, 4) perhaps incidentally, a source of livelihood. Educational research had received an intensive flurry of support in the middle sixties but was waning in favor of new initiatives in curriculum development and program evaluation. In a relatively short span of time, a cadre of educational researchers had been trained and now possessed expertise in search of a problem. Evaluation was seen as an opportunity for the application of research skills in a context that would be publicly supportable, for not only were respected scientific principles legitimated, but evaluation would also lead to the practical improvement of schooling.

The frame of mind of many evaluators was indisputably optimistic and anticipated significant progress in educational outcomes. This optimism flowed from belief in the power of
good science. After all, evaluation was independent and disinterested; it sought to minimize or, at least, to identify and control bias; it was orderly; expertise was required for its conduct (that is, by virtue of training, some people ought to be better at it than others). This perspective admitted the value of measurement, the tractability of discovering causal relationships, the suspension of disbelief for shaky human data, and the idea of design. (For complementary expansion of these points, see Kaplan, 1964; Platt, 1966; or Kuhn, 1970.)

The single most important assumption underlying evaluation was that action could proceed from knowledge. Optimism did not simply rest on the idea that we could identify a "treatment" or determine whether or not a program provided opportunity for new learning. Evaluation itself was to be instrumental and contribute to the reproducibility of educational programs. In general, there was convenient agreement among program developers, managers, and evaluators, and evaluation proceeded in an aura of mutual support. Because the training of evaluators cum researchers was technical, contract managers were comfortable with accepting expertise and were unlikely to challenge any well-argued evaluation plan, particularly as evaluation was thought to provide good information for decision making.

In these sanguine times, from an instructional vantage at least, such positive beliefs were frequently verified, and premises were fed. Instructional materials and procedures were developed in a process which demonstrated that information about such things as error rates, how students learned and the amounts of learning gauged by performance indicators could be pieced together and provided as feedback to program designers. It was a fact that improvement in student performance resulted from subsequent program revision efforts. (See Baker, 1970; Rosen, 1968; Markle, 1967; Gropper & Lumsdaine, 1961.) In this general class of evaluation experiences (incidentally the one through which the author was inducted— or indentured— to the field) activities and their logic did approximate a form of scientific experiment: a messy, times-series type of design, to be sure, but one bolstered by accumulating evidence from both the laboratory and institutional efforts that supported the belief that evaluation helped.

The characteristics of the studies in which evaluation was used to improve instruction during the late 1960s and early 70s can be summarized briefly. The programs addressed could be
described generally as "closed systems." Much attention, for example, was devoted to identifying, using that unfortunate term, the "target population," and to describing the innovation itself and the constraints in setting and operation. (See Borg & Hood, 1968) These systems assumed or verified that students arrived at the instructional development table with the right entry skills and with the appropriate appetites to consume the offering, nourishing as it was. Program developers controlled, through what they felt to be artful manipulation of instructional materials and procedures, the type and range of opportunities students received.

As noted earlier, desired learning often did seem to occur. The quality of instructional effort was known by observing students' performance on a set of or single criterion measure. Performance information was sometimes broken into discrete units corresponding to either the phases of instruction or to clusters of content and skill hierarchies to which students were exposed (Gagné, 1970). Belief in the power of analyses of this sort was illustrated by the role the program developer was to play at this time. On the basis of various arrays and displays, aided by evaluation recommendations, the developer would coordinate the attempt to revise instruction, to make changes in the experiences provided, so that pupil performance would increase. Only as an afterthought, if at all, were students' views solicited about what was good and bad in the program. Few people asked students whether they thought the program had personal value for them, or whether it was fun or challenging.

During this sylvan time, some critics dissented from this overall strategy. They complained about the top-down nature of instructional development, and noted that many of the students' personal decision rights were preempted by the developer evaluator team's values. Claims were made that outcome measures were, in any case, incomplete and probably inaccurate. These criticisms were, in large part, summarily dismissed for many of the wrong reasons. For one, similar points were raised by other self-avowed protectors of humanism, protectors who were also anti-technology, anti-schooling, who frequently cleaved to encounter groups and Esalen-type experiences, a group vulnerable to discredit by "scientists." Another reason for overlooking such criticism was that it appeared petulant in its attack on our sense of personal accomplishment.
Values in Closed System Evaluation

Let us summarize the values exhibited in these evaluation efforts. Early program evaluation was based on an optimistic view of what was possible. We believed in our personal power and expertise and assumed that, as such, our work was widely and appropriately respected. We believed that we could learn more and productively untangle causal links between instructional experience and learning. We believed that not only were instructional strategies loosely perfectable, but that our development and evaluation procedures were also capable of improvement. Desires for prediction, control, consistency, and coordination were implied by our rational model. There was also the tacit and seemingly immutable understanding that our competence and expertise bought our independence, and that the evaluator should be allowed to proceed with freedom. Although we made decisions for the “good” of students and teachers in a top-down fashion, we also thought that we were being paid to do just that.

The major conceptual distinction between this line of work (evaluation) and our former calling (university based research) was in the treatment of generalization, an idea at the heart of most scientific effort. We traded generalization for the firmer requirement of replication, the repeatability of our findings. If the instructional techniques used in a particular program happened to generalize to other content fields, so much the better. While certain among us searched, usually in vain, for such regularities as might allow us to consolidate and improve our methods, any finding that our R & D procedures were of general use was frosting on the cake. We were content if the work replicated, and if other students, similarly selected and obviously “treated,” learned from our programs.

Transition States Between Program Types

Whether one holds that the differences in frame of mind in the past—belief in personal power, optimism, commitment to academic verities, improvability, if not perfectability—and the present status of evaluators’ beliefs came from broad, socially inspired shifts, conflicting educational research findings, or the specific rending of our former efforts, it is clear now that times have changed. There is no solace in popular surveys which sug-
suggest that society is having difficulty finding satisfaction in work, personal lives, or in leadership. It may even be that certain education-related events have contributed to the more general malaise. The studies of schooling by Coleman and others suggested that, at the margin, our educational efforts were largely futile. These studies, unlike many in the past, were believed because they apparently confirmed commonplace judgments about schooling. At the same time, support by the federal government for research and development was severely reduced, partly because of tactics of pleading (see Sproull, Weiner, & Wolf, 1978), but also because no identifiable and marketable breakthrough had been associated with educational R & D. In addition, educators' positions as "experts" clearly eroded as decisions about educational programs became more closely identified with holders of law rather than education degrees.

Aside from these broader forces, there have been significant shifts in educational programs, expectations, and roles. The optimism that characterized the educational endeavor has been seriously curtailed. Further, the focus on resource allocation at the legislative level took forms, such as zero-based budgeting, which require the application of presumably tougher tests to determine the merit of particular programmatic efforts.

At the same time, the concern, led by the courts, for equity in educational opportunity, has generated a set of programs whose raison d'être might be legitimately their very existence rather than their immediate effects on student learning. For example, controversial efforts such as those in bilingual education could conceivably be supported without regard to the findings about the effects of such programs. Regulatory efforts to assure equity through monitoring and compliance procedures have further shifted the operating focus from outcomes to procedures, adding the principles of distribution and diversity to those of performance and quality. Educational programs became, in some situations, vehicles to reallocate resources, rather than coherent and specific programs. Instead of closed instructional systems, less control of students and processes characterized newer programs; local options for implementation were provided. Student participation was also less predictable. Students voted with their feet, and attendance itself did not assure they possessed the necessary frame of mind to profit from instruction. Willing or unwilling, students have been participants in the transience mobility bands...
of a good many of our schools. The basic stability required for the identification and evaluation of educational activity or "program" was no longer present

Values in Open System Evaluation

The values which suffuse present programs as they have come to be formulated and implemented are thus different from those which underlay the earlier efforts in curricular innovation. First, there is an emphasis on pluralism, on diversity, on multiple objectives. Next, the content and management of the program is left open. Local preference is preferred because, it is argued, the findings of education research have failed to give priority to particular courses of action. The resultant mix is activity which, by stretch of definition, can be called "program;" but the notion of "treatment" and the attendant concept of causality, if not lost forever, is nonetheless well masked. Program refinement, at a level of precision which characterized the efforts of earlier educational developers, is beyond comprehension and perhaps beyond attempt in many of these programs. The recognition of these changes in program specificity has been slow because the language used in present program efforts, spoken by program participants themselves, persists. Labels from earlier epochs are applied to programs of much greater flexibility and unspecified activities to dissemble as programs of the oldtime, describable sort.

Evaluator Roles

The instructional evaluators in the 1960s, whether looking at instructional units or broader based "policy" efforts, were committed to methodology, to the provision of clear information and to the reliance on a scientific base. The initial response of evaluators to changing requirements was to begin the search for improved dependent measures and better techniques. Improvements in the aggregation of information, refinements in designs appropriate for evaluation studies, and the use of alternative methodologies, such as decision-oriented, Bayesian derived approaches, were explored. (See for example, in Bennett & Lumsdaine, 1973, chapter by Campbell and Boruch, Edwards and Guttentag, and Gilbert, Light and Mosteller.)
Of course, this transition resulted in other tactics not strictly dependent upon the niceties of design and analysis. Various positions were taken regarding the utility of different types of data, tradeoffs, in data intensity vs. reliability. For instance, preferences developed among some evaluators for looser designs and more interactive, softer data sets. Sides were chosen, "hard" opposed to "soft," although it is obvious that these alignments are not necessary and may even be dysfunctional.

The more "radical" approaches identified by Stake (1973), Rippey (1973), Guba (1978), and Cronbach (1980) cast the evaluator more as a responsive inquirer rather than as a provider of purely objective views. Critics claim that this "new responsiveness" was only labeling and legitimating what was the case in any event. That is, the evaluator enters with biases and screens data through perceptions which previously had been ignored or, at least, assumed to "randomize out" given the enormous range of evaluation activity.

The participant-evaluator role was also conceived in some way as a foil to the role of "summative evaluator" with, as it became interpreted, its strict adherence to comparison and choice among program options. Aaron (1977) points out that evaluation methodology has been traditionally based on techniques which provide conservative rather than liberal assessments of the effect of programs. To avoid the specter of status quo perpetuation or, at worst, reactionary development, evaluators needed to find roles which would methodologically permit them to notice and describe good practices that would otherwise be swamped by "no significant differences" findings. There was considerable, if not always lively, debate about the best roles evaluators should take, the type of data most useful for these new designs, and the level of interpretation required of responsible evaluators. These concerns promoted role adjustment and adaptation for the evaluator community.

As noted, the changes were gradual, and only in retrospect appear to be dramatic. Educators, who have often tried hard not to be educators but scholars in a real discipline such as sociology or psychology, continued, by and large, to cleave to the scientific, the theory-based part of evaluation.

Another strong influence on the evaluation community has been the specter of politics, a factor which has grown in their awareness with each passing year. When the discussion, and
then the execution, of evaluation work slid into the realm of politics. Evaluators' first set of role responses was wholly predictable: they tried to implement old and important values in an effort to control the situation. Somewhat like an amoeba which ingests by envelopment, the evaluation community first sought to confront politics by surrounding and absorbing it. They tried to gain control of what they saw as political incursion to manage what they thought to be the irrational side of their endeavor, and to bring that whole set of experiences within the comfortable boundaries of mainline educational research and development. For example, in an effort to deal with conflicting educational goals, at once being loudly articulated by various constituencies with interests in school programs, evaluators borrowed from the sociologists the idea of needs assessment. That is, we solicited systematically views to inform the goals, and sometimes the means, employed in program development. These needs assessment procedures were implemented to provide a channel, so it was thought, for the expression of pluralistic views, but in a neatly controlled fashion. In an attempt to control the politicization of evaluation findings, evaluators developed and promoted adversary or (depending upon one's mood) advocacy evaluation models, where positive and negative were identified and dealt with as part of the evaluation effort. Here strategies were clearly imported from that exciting and popular realm of litigation. Borrowing once more, now from the market research field, multiple reporting strategies were also recommended in an attempt to provide findings in readable and accessible form to interested parties (Datta, 1979).

Numerous attempts, therefore, were made to transform existing societal and political reality into procedures which supported long-held research values. Many of these efforts were superficial and in their use we have perpetuated some anomalies. We have community advisory committees providing "input;" we have needs assessment activities purported to be instruments of consensus; we have parent advisory groups designed to bring a broadened constituency into continuous planning and assessment of local educational programs. We have allowed the articulation and specification of reams of precise objectives so that there would be something for everyone. Whether these efforts actually restructure the reality of decision making may be disputed and

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1Some where along the way, we also imported the word "function."
may rather be seen as efforts to co-opt dissonant groups. On the other hand, these actions are consistent with the value of control (Dorr-Bremme, 1979), as evaluators continue to attempt to control the way in which politics make contact with education. In their search for reason, they continue to import ideas deliberately from everywhere—from law, from political science, and from journalism (Smith, 1978)—in order to assist them in coping with the complexity of problems that confront them.

Now observe the individual case, the evaluator who has been trained and who practices precision similar to scientific research, as he or she confronts new tasks. Now they are faced with programs which value diversity over performance, distribution over treatment, activity over outcomes. The evaluator attempts to fit these new sets of experience into a rational plan of action, adapting and, in general, ascribing political (and messy) situations to the irrational nature of the political body which spawned and semi-supported the program in question. Wildavsky (1979) makes the point that politics and planning (his term for the application of systematic intellectual activity in the design and evaluation of policy) are equally rational. He says that norms of planning (or evaluation, in our terms) as contrasted with politics differ in whether or not they have content. He points out that the norms of planning—efficiency and comprehensiveness—are virtues without content, whereas the norms of politics—bargaining and agreement—are based upon content, a content which is rationalized both prospectively and retrospectively in Orwellian style. Small wonder that the educational evaluator trained in and believing in the methodology of evaluation (content free) is stunned by contact with the newly recognized, but alien world, whose components cannot be satisfactorily incorporated into old value constellations.

The political use of evaluation has been acknowledged by evaluators in laments about the inherently irrational nature of decision making. Yet, such uses were not at all irrational. Different views develop from differences in the goals and means that the politicians wish to maximize, contrasted with those of evaluators. It is romantic miscalculation to believe that politicians and educators should or do share an interest in a precise and common set of objectives, except on the most general level.

Evaluators have mounted alternative responses to politicization. Some have said that if evaluation is political, put politics first, place persuasion in high relief, and try to convince people
about the value of certain educational programs. Others have simply gone into other lines of work, back to the luxury of small scale laboratory experimentation where the only referee works for a journal. Some have persisted in the attempt to adapt and control the political enterprise while placing scientific values first.

Evaluation of diffuse and diverse programs created to address social issues at large, rather than to bring about specific identifiable treatments, have created a setting where values can be potentially mismatched. Because political phenomena are relatively new to educators, some are dismayed when they make initial explorations of the social policy literature. It is as if evaluators had made a rickety, prototype airplane out of rubber bands, epoxy, and anguish, and then turned the corner to see that their neighbors on the next block, people not much different, were already travelling in production models previously developed and improved. As evaluation work becomes more large scale, with less "targeted" programs, and exhibits more open systems, with greater political charge, evaluators' work begins to look more like social policy analysis. Social policy analysts provide a good contrast in this study of values because they have not had to experience the same shock of contact, the sense of change, which educational evaluators have experienced. The expectation of control is not necessarily assumed by social policy types (Kissinger notwithstanding), as it has been by educators, perhaps because policy people have rarely had the heady and indelible experience of seeing student performance levels change from 60 percent to 90 percent on something that they regarded as important—performance which could, in part, be attributed to their efforts. Furthermore, social policy analysts have been well trained in the notion that politics are a reality, from start to finish, and not something rather lately transmuted into palpable life from a former, abstract, and ascetic existence on the front page of the morning newspaper. Furthermore, some policy analysts even appear to think that politics are fun (a bizarre notion). The task of the policy analyst is not to get control of the politics, to quiet the potential conflicts by using need assessments or community groups; not to strip the work of its biases, nor necessarily to make goals and findings crystalily explicit and allow them to stand on their own merits. Instead, policy analysts acknowledge and, in fact, embrace, political reality as part of the
context in which they work. Decisions are at least informed, at some level, by concern for how they will “play” to appropriate audiences. Ambiguity, which allows both personal and satisfying interpretation, is not always a fault. Goals may be often multiple, and outcomes a little blurred so that many constituents can feel that their own priorities have been addressed. The values of policy analysts seem to combine the requirement of political setting with the desire to use rational and scientific approaches, where they can, to assist in the political decision process. In the field of education this demonstrates the ability to merge both political and technically rigorous value sets, known to only certain individuals. The recent monograph by Cronbach and associates (1980) provides an excellent illustration of the incorporation of both sets of views.

Contracting Agencies and Clients

Changes in programs and the ways in which they reflect changes in expectation for educational evaluation were matched, but not time-locked with the changes in view that contracting agencies took in deciding upon and monitoring the nature of the evaluation work to be undertaken. Views changed because “new” bureaucrats were often better trained than their predecessors and had profited from the experience of evaluation reports which “sold” and those which did not. Other considerations also contributed to the new aggression displayed by the members of this class. First, there was an erosion of belief in the expertise of the evaluator to make unchallengeable technical decisions about his/her efforts. The hired gun strategy (Patton, 1975) was earlier understood as a device which demonstrated the proposition that evaluation people, like educational professionals in general, love to disagree on both major and minor points. Thus, the credibility (an important concept in a political context) of any report could be attacked on the basis of technical disagreement with methodology.

Then, there was also the realization that evaluation offered a terrific means for attacking individuals who seemed to be above—or insulated from—more typical means of discredit. Formerly useful tests of discredit—marital status, sexual behavior, substance abuse, fraud—hardly had the cogency they did in the past; a clear apology was often sufficient, even in the face of
indictment. Thus, evaluation findings could be used as a supplement to discredit public officials whose rhetorical claims outstripped their programs. Evaluation became potentially more important as a political tool beyond the information it provided for direct policy making activity.

Finally, because educators and others were offered the opportunity to provide evaluation and counsel directly to policy makers there sprung up a cadre of “experts,” close to power, occasionally influential. In some cases, they formed a hybrid, bicephalous creature, made up of an evaluator and a policy maker working closely together. In other cases, evaluators obtained access to policy makers by nurturing the interactive with aides and assistants to policy makers, a group, in turn, who learned more about the inner workings of evaluation methodology. The sum effects of 1) equating technical debates with arbitrariness of method; 2) the recognition that evaluation results could depose; and 3) the “sidling up” successes of educators and politicians, was to give the politicians and bureaucrats a sense of their personal ability to understand the heretofore arcane procedures of evaluation, to attempt to use evaluators’ work in more directly political ways than ever before, and even to prescribe methodology and technique for evaluators. An apt illustration is the California legislature’s collective design on evaluation specifications. (See Amendment to RFP # 52035 State of California, 1978). Unfortunately, such newfound hubris was based on knowledge lagging behind the state of the art.

Futures

What can we expect for the future of educational evaluation? Wildavsky (1979) forecasts similar trends for various public policy fields. Principally, he sees a shift in evaluation focus from program impact to program implementation. This shift results from our “failures” to create social programs that work. Instead, Wildavsky foresees our increasing concentration on documenting program processes rather than effects, because we can guarantee processes more easily. In recent educational evaluation efforts, implementation, rather than outcomes have, in fact, been the focus. McLaughlin (1976) studied the requirements of successful implementation in the Rand study of change. The NIE (1978) report on the effectiveness of Title I emphasized the delivery of services rather than the effects on performance of students. In
the California studies of Early Childhood Education and School Improvement (Baker, 1977, 1978) the conclusions of strength were those related to service delivery and compliance with program regulations. These goal substitutions are not related to a corresponding moderation on the rhetorical claims for a program. But the "retreat" to program implementation results from the facts of life spelled out in our data: positive outcome data are hard to come by. Thus, previously articulated objectives have been reformulated into attainable objectives, fewer outcomes, and more delivery of services. This view severs the link between program process and student outcomes, upon which much evaluation and most education: science depends. Thus, what evaluators were able to find in their studies—delivery of services, originally thought to be instrumental to the desired change in outcomes on achievement and attitude measures—will now rather become the sole objective of the program itself and the principal object of study.

Evaluation problems will certainly be easier to manage in this situation. If there can be agreement among evaluator, program manager, and contracting agency that such activity is a legitimate way to address the issue of innovation in educational settings, the effect for the realignment of value perspectives may work to permit evaluators and their work once again to hold trusted status. On the other hand, what sidestepping outcomes does for the long-range credibility and utility of educational programs and evaluation is ominously less clear.

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The Politics of Choice

Historically, in western countries the liberal state preceded democratic government. The liberal society was conceptualized as a competitive market in which the individual was free to make the best bargain for himself in almost any endeavor. The basic liberal idea was that the social system be organized on the principle of freedom of choice. "Liberal democracy is the politics of choice" (Macpherson, 1965, p. 33).

The essence of liberalism . . . is the vision of society as made up of independent, autonomous units who co-operate only when the terms of co-operation are such as make it further the needs of the parties. Market relations are the paradigm of such co-operation, and this is well captured in the notion that the change from feudalism to the liberal apogee of the mid-nineteenth century was one 'from status to contract,' and that subsequent development reversed the process once again. Contract provides the model even for unpromising relationships such as political ones, where laws benefit some at the expense of others. The system as a whole is said to be beneficial to all, so everyone would agree in advance to its existence. (Barry, 1973, p. 166.)

Liberalism was indeed liberating. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, it freed people from custom and authority. It substituted impersonal contract and market relationships for status ones. Although the freeing-up process created as a by-product great inequalities of wealth, this inequality was perceived as an inevitable and reasonable trade-off. Inequalities were not new.

In these liberal societies, even government was made more responsive by placing it in a market situation. Government was conceived as a supplier of political goods from which consumers
selected their preference. Alternative political parties were held responsible to the voters by the procedure of elections. Thus, government was kept responsive to the interests of the electorate, but the electorate was by no means democratic. Initially, it was a small elite of wealthy, upper-class males. Choice in government was offered only to this elite, and government was responsive to the interest of this elite.

Democracy came haltingly. Through the mechanisms of free speech and assembly, the lower classes demanded voting rights. On the basis of equal individual rights and equality of opportunity, the lower classes asked for rights and liberties similar to those attained by the upper classes. Within the logic of liberalism, it was unfair for the lower classes to be denied a choice in government and to represent their own interests. Once enfranchised, the lower classes used the vote not to overthrow the upper classes but to take a competitive position in serving their own interests.

The liberal form of democracy in Western countries was substantially different from the non-liberal forms which later emerged in communist and developing countries. Both the communist and developing countries rejected the idea of the market society. The communist societies saw democracy as rule by or for the common people. The proletariat would rule en route to a classless society. There was little room for liberal freedoms.

Developing societies often rejected both the market and class-based ideas and saw democracy instead as rule by the "general will" of the entire people of a country. Instead of elections by contest, a single political party often dominated government in its pursuit of the general will, there being little basis for competition of political parties in a traditional and non-market society. In these three distinct political societies, democracy had a different meaning.

While equality was a fundamental idea in the liberal democracies it remained entwined with ideas of choice, competition, and the market society. Even though those liberal ideas became more democratized through extending the franchise to diverse groups and through extending the range of public decisions, the principle of choice also remained fundamental. As a basis for guiding evaluations in these liberal democracies, I propose the principle of equality of choice, a principle which combines both equality and choice.

Although consistent with the two fundamental ideas of liberal
democracy, equality of choice is significantly different from the purely liberal position from which much policy and evaluation now tacitly proceed. The purely liberal principle of choice would require that choice be maximized without regard to its distribution. The liberal democratic principle of equality of choice requires not only that choice be maximized but that it be distributed equally. Liberal democracy becomes not only the politics of maximizing choice but the politics of distributing it.

Liberal Democratic Evaluation

The concept of a formal, public evaluation procedure to aid in making choices about public programs and policies is in itself derived from the liberal notion of choice. Insofar as it has reference to the lower classes or to every citizen, it also becomes democratic. Choices about programs and policies are often made on the basis of private preference and private interests. There is nothing in liberal evaluation (in maximizing choices) to discourage its use for private ends.

One can evaluate as readily for a king as for the public, and there is nothing in the liberal notion to prevent this. Indeed, evaluation for private interests would be encouraged. In its most strident form, the evaluator evaluates in the interests of whoever pays for the evaluation. Such liberal evaluation would be judged solely by utility to its audience, whoever that audience might be. But liberal democratic evaluation transforms a choice about a public program into a deliberate public decision. Service to private interests cannot be the ultimate criterion for the evaluation. Utility cannot be the sole value. Liberal democratic evaluation would recognize a societal and public interest beyond the private interests of individuals.

All the major modern approaches to formal evaluation assume freedom of choice as an ideal. They also assume an individualistic methodology, a strongly empirical orientation, and a free marketplace of ideas in which consumers will "buy" the best. All the major approaches are liberal in that they are based on the idea of a competitive, individualist market society. They differ considerably, however, in what choices will be made, on who will make the choices, and on the basis upon which the choices will be made. In other words, they differ in their democratic tendencies.

In practice, program evaluation can be further democratized
by extending evaluative choices to all groups and by extending public evaluation to all public choices. This can be accomplished by expanding the type of data collected, by focusing evaluation on higher levels of decision, by extending audiences and reference groups, and by extending choice to include the method of evaluation itself. These moves would be directed to advancing the principle of equality of choice in evaluation, just as equality of opportunity is advanced in the larger society.

The fundamental notion of equality is to take everyone (or one's designated group) as a single reference group. If people within the group are treated differently, one must justify the different treatment by strong principles or reasons (Barry, 1965). Evaluation necessarily proceeds from a point of view which includes some particular reference group. The reference group is the range of people the evaluator takes into account in making his evaluation. More precisely, the reference group is the group of people whose interests cannot be ignored.

The reference group may be identified preparatory to the evaluation. It may or may not be identical with the audience for the evaluation. For example, the evaluator may direct the evaluation to a key government decision maker, yet hold a disenfranchised group as the reference group, the group whose interests are considered. The reference group need never have heard of the program or the evaluation being conducted in its interest.

The reference group can be very small, such as oneself and one's family, as when one buys a car. Or it may be very large, such as consumers, as in some public program evaluations. While the fundamental notion of equality would suggest taking every single person as the reference group, this would put a rather heavy demand on each evaluation. The proper reference group for an evaluation, I would suggest, are all those who are affected by the program or policy. This limits the range of consideration as a practical matter and allows special consideration for groups who are differentially affected by a program or policy.

Interests

Modern evaluation is not a social decision procedure unto itself but is part of a social decision procedure for allocating resources. It anticipates some kind of situation in which social decisions are
made. In this process, the role of evaluation is limited to rational persuasion on the basis of common principles and values.

Evaluation entails manipulating facts and arguments in order to assess or determine the worth of something. A set of principles or values serves as the basis for making judgments. The criteria employed may be as few as one, such as the utilitarian's criterion of maximizing utility, or be a mixture of criteria with no previously determined priorities, as in the pluralist position.

In making political judgments in a liberal democracy, there are two types of principles or considerations—want-regarding principles and ideal-regarding principles. Want-regarding principles take people's wants or desires as given and suggest how these wants will be maximized or distributed, without making judgments about the wants themselves. Ideal-regarding principles, on the other hand, specify that some wants are better than others and should be encouraged by public action. For example, the desire for the arts may be considered more important than the desire for sports and hence be accorded public support (Barry, 1965).

It is characteristic of liberalism that public decisions are made primarily on the basis of want-regarding principles. Wants are accepted at face value for public purposes, with no judging of one as more worthy than another. Only want-regarding judgments are implemented publicly. Of course, individuals are free to pursue their ideal-regarding judgments in their private lives.

Liberalism considers as legitimate only those wants arising apart from the influence of the state. Since no people are considered to have better taste or judgment than anyone else in political affairs, everyone's opinion is considered to be equal for political purposes. The only criterion of goodness becomes want-satisfaction (Barry, 1965). By contrast, non-liberal positions judge certain wants as being more important than others and as worthy of public support. A perfectionist or a Marxist believes that certain human wants deserve support but not others. The ideals for judgment are included at the beginning. Sometimes the authenticity of the expressed wants themselves are questioned. This suggests the possibility of non-liberal evaluation.

Within the liberal tradition, however, wants are taken as expressed, and the question becomes one of either aggregating or of distributing want-satisfaction. Aggregative principles are those which apply to maximizing want-satisfaction, the key idea
being the pursuit of one's "interests." Distributive principles include concepts such as justice, fairness, equity, equality, and freedom.

The basic aggregative principle is that of maximizing want-satisfaction. To say that one is included in the reference group for an evaluation is to say that one's "interests" have somehow been taken into consideration in the evaluation. A program or policy is in a person's interests when it increases his opportunity to get what he wants. In other words, "interests" represent generalized means to whatever ends a person may have. Presumably, one can protect or increase a person's interests, e.g., his wealth or power, without knowing what his ultimate ends are (Barry, 1965).

By this account, people can also mistake their own interests. They may want a program or policy which will not produce the result they expect, a situation where evaluation may be particularly helpful. Or they may deliberately choose a program or policy opposed to their own interests. Generally, the concept of "interests" serves as a useful guide to the amount and distribution of want satisfaction, and hence as a practicable index for evaluation. It is often implicitly used in this fashion. (See Cronbach, 1979, for such a typical use.)

The concept of "interests" is also comparative. A program or policy is in someone's interests only when compared to another program or policy or compared to the status quo. People may agree on the results of a particular program or policy without agreeing on whether it is in a particular group's interests. Since people may deliberately or unconsciously compare the program to different competitors, the standard or class of comparison changes and ultimate judgments about the program's success may differ.

Much dispute in evaluation is over the class of comparison for the program or policy, and not over the actual empirical results. (See Glass's and Scriven's dispute over the utility of some instructional audio tapes in House, 1977.) Whether the program or policy is in the reference groups' interests hinges on choices of a comparison, a choice often concealed in the discussions of methodology.

Many leading evaluation theorists implicitly assume that the purpose of evaluation is to help decision makers or the reference groups determine the interests of the groups. If the evaluation
is to do this, the interests of the reference group must be represented in the evaluation somehow. The general principle is that the interests of all those affected by the program or policy should be included in the evaluation, although how this is to be done is open to question.

In a purely liberal evaluation, wants are taken as given, each want counting one as a candidate for satisfaction. There is no attention to the derivation of these wants by particular groups or social classes. Thus, there is the apparatus of "needs assessments," which are in reality collections of wants. Insofar as they require people to judge programs directly, they ask for immediate judgments of interests. These surveys are almost always class-biased because of their sampling of respondents and their methodology. They solicit information on instruments containing categories of middle-class professionals.

By contrast, non-liberal evaluations would be based on judgments about certain wants and interests. The most common deviation is that of the professionals, who harbor strong sentiments about what an ideally-educated person should be. Sometimes this ideal is in conflict with publicly-expressed wants for education. An evaluation may incorporate many of the professionals' ideal-regarding judgments. Or the evaluator may be guided entirely by the notion of public sentiments. Of course, the professionals' judgment may be superior to the public's on many issues.

Another ideal-regarding possibility is to promote the interests of particular classes, such as the lower classes. Such an evaluation would be based on an explicit ideal conception of what society should be like, and the evaluation would incorporate values and criteria derived from this particular view of society. Certain things would be designated as important in advance. Non-liberal ideal-regarding approaches do not necessarily promote choices.

The view advanced here is that of equality of choice. People should be given a choice so that things are not determined for them, even in their own interests; rather, choice should be distributed in such a manner that social groups and social classes have equal opportunities for making such choices. Lower social groups should be given an opportunity to determine choices in their interests.
The Public Interest in Evaluation

If one is concerned with the interests of one or a few people, that is a "private" interest. While nothing prevents evaluation from representing purely private interests, it is difficult to see how the evaluation of public programs and policies can be so restricted.

Public programs and policies are almost always concerned with the interests of a large group of people, such as the handicapped or disadvantaged or gifted. At the local level these interests may be those of a particular school or group of students in a town. This is a "special interest." Although many government programs concern special interest groups, even more common is a program or policy that involves the interests of two or more groups jointly. A handicapped program involves not only the students, but their parents, and teachers, and employers as well. These groups may be said to have a "common interest" among them. In a liberal democracy most government programs are advocated by separate special interests but are the result of a coalition of common interests. Evaluators are usually faced with a program or policy representing several interests.

Evaluation itself may be conceived as a policy resulting from a common interest. Parties to the evaluation agree that all will gain from an evaluation. The evaluation will determine if the program at issue meets certain criteria. Even though one of the parties to the evaluation may not like the results, and actually have interests damaged by them, the evaluation as a whole can still be said to be in the common interest.

Finally, there is the "public interest." This is the interest that people have in common as members of the public, the "public" being not some definite persons but an indefinite number of "non-assignable" individuals (Barry, 1965). The public interest may or may not be stronger or worth more than a private, special, or common interest, but it is differently shared.

For example, suppose that two special interests, viz., the automobile manufacturers and unions, reached an agreement in their common interest which required an increase in the price of automobiles. What about the interests of those people not a party to the contract, particularly the consumers? The public interest covers the interests of those non-assignable members of the public who will be affected by such an action. In this sense, the membership of the public is not fixed but varies with issue and
context. Often the public is identified with consumers who generally want more and better goods for a lower price. However, it is not difficult to imagine an issue in which consumers may be in conflict with other segments of the public like environmentalists.

It is the case that different interests will conflict with one another. How then can the public interest be defined? The resolution is not as simple as an individual weighing and balancing his own net interest—several different individuals are involved. In this case, the public interest is often defined as the sum of all interests involved. This is equivalent to maximizing want satisfaction without regard to distribution. An alternative is to advance only those interests that people hold in common (where shared interests exist) and to ignore divergent interests.

Different evaluation approaches represent interests in different ways. I have previously classified the eight major approaches to evaluation into two major groups—the utilitarians and the pluralists intuitionists (House, 1978a). The utilitarians try to arrive at an overall judgment of social utility based on a single dominant principle or criterion, that principle being the aggregative one of maximizing want satisfaction.

The utilitarian group is further divided into a managerial subgroup which takes managers as its prime audience and or reference group and a consumer subgroup which takes consumers as its audience and/or reference group. Within the managerial subgroup, the systems analysis approach construes social indicators, such as standardized test scores, as surrogate measures of social utility, which is equated with the public interest. Any social group’s interest is presumed to be advanced by increasing its scores. Where interests conflict, all interests are summed. Presumably, maximizing test scores maximizes want satisfaction. The public interest is further construed as the greatest score increase for the least money. The “best” program delivers this.

The behavioral objective approach represents interests in its defining of objectives. If the objectives are maximized, or the established minimums achieved, the public interest will be served. The evaluator measures the objectives. In the decision maker approach it is presumed that the decision maker’s official position represents the public interest. The evaluator’s task is to provide her with information to improve her decisions. Whether the public interest lies in social indices, publicly-expressed objectives, or decisions of public officials, all these approaches identify the public interest with the official managerial structure.
Evaluations within these approaches differ as to whether they take the managers only as the audience or also as the reference group. If they take the managers as the reference group, they serve the interests of the managers rather than the public. Unfortunately, this happens all too often. Evaluations are conducted to serve managerial (special) interests, which is unacceptable even within the theory of these approaches.

The consumer subgroup sees the public as divided into producers and consumers. Its audience may be either managers or consumers, but its reference group is the consumer. The evaluator represents consumer interests. The model is Consumers Union. Again, the public interest is often identified as best product for least cost.

The pluralist-intuitionist group evaluates on the basis of many principles, the priority of which is unspecified. It is divided into a professional subgroup and a participatory subgroup. The professionals believe that those most knowledgeable and informed about a field should have most say in it. The public interest is best served by having experts decide. Decision making judgment is in a sense delegated to this group's superior knowledge.

As long as the professional subgroups see themselves as advancing the means of publicly-defined ends, there is no necessary conflict. But, of course, professionals have their own strong ideals about what an educated person should be. Since the evaluation standards are often professional ones, the standards may differ from public standards. In this sense, professional evaluations may deviate, for better or worse, from strict want-regarding principles and employ the professional's ideal-regarding considerations. In addition, these standards are difficult to disentangle from the professional's own interests. Recently, there have been many attempts, ranging from competency testing programs to medical review boards, to assert public demands in their evaluations.

Finally, the participatory group believes that the public interest is best served by having people participate in the evaluation to some degree. The transaction approaches solicit the opinions of those involved with the program and incorporate these, often verbatim, into the report. The adversary approaches allow participation by having affected parties present proofs and arguments in quasi-legal proceedings. These approaches are not only pluralist in that several criteria are used to evaluate but also pluralist in that several political interests are represented in the evaluation.
Power Concentration vs. Power Diffusion

It is instructive to compare two evaluation approaches that are extremely different in definition of the public interest, one a power concentration approach, the other a power diffusion approach. The power concentration approach is exemplified by the evaluation policy of the U.S. Office of Education over the past decade (McLaughlin, 1975; House, 1978b). It presumes that the public interest can be best defined by the central government. Representatives are elected, and they appoint a bureaucracy. The bureaucracy defines policy and makes authoritative determinations. It may engage a group of experts to help in this endeavor (Barry, 1965).

In fact, the federal government often acts as it will decide which social programs are best and has used a variant of the systems analysis approach to evaluate public programs. Social indicators, almost always standardized test scores in education, are used as the index of the public interest. Power and decisions are concentrated in the central government officials, evaluators, and indices.

On the other hand, the power diffusion idea goes back at least to Hume who said, "... every man must be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest." On this thesis, no one is to be trusted with such power. There must be checks and balances, such as were built into the U.S. Constitution. The power diffusion thesis in education is perhaps best represented by MacDonald's "democratic evaluation," the most explicitly democratic of the participatory approaches.

In "democratic" evaluation, the evaluator collects quotations from program participants and faithfully represents their views in the report, which is written as a case study. The evaluator is a "broker" in exchanges of information accessible to non-specialists. He represents a range of interests and has no concept of information misuse (MacDonald, 1974). The evaluator does not make recommendations but rather presents the information to audiences to use as they see fit. Ideally, the evaluator presents the evaluation report to the people from whom he collected the data and lets them veto information they do not wish included.

MacDonald's evaluation seems to envision a decision situation like direct democracy in which citizens discuss and decide issues face-to-face. This, in turn, is based on the classic view of liberalism in which individuals associate directly for their individual ends, without recourse to institutions or government. The indi-
individual's choice is maximized. The government and, in this case, the evaluator, is only a referee.

This view of evaluation compares favorably on some political and moral grounds to the approach of the federal government. I have criticized federal evaluation policy severely for failing to include divergent interests, for unfair treatment, and for technical deficiencies in execution. Even when properly executed, the supposition that social indicators really represent the public interest is dubious. More often, the evaluations represent special interests. Neither do the unilateral and often arbitrary actions of the government enhance the moral quality of the evaluations.

MacDonald's evaluation approach intentionally includes diverse interests, allows people to represent their own interests, and is based on an idea of mutual consent. MacDonald's concept of democracy seems to be close to that of government with the "consent of the governed" or, in this case, of the evaluated. There are, of course, other concepts of democracy, particularly those having to do with distribution of goods among social classes. Compared to federal policy, which has a way of imposing actions without consent or consultation, a consent-based approach has considerable appeal.

On the other hand, a power-diffusion approach (for requiring consent does diffuse power) is not without its own problems. It is somewhat doubtful that direct democracy is possible in an industrialized, mass society composed of fragmented groups. Decisions are usually taken at the group or central level, which may require different information. Of course, one may argue that decisions should not be made at such levels, that bad decision making results.

One may also ask whether soliciting the consent of every person to the evaluation results may lead to a common interest among program participants but neglect the public interest. Will valuable information be excluded? Will the evaluation be biased toward the status quo and not taking action?

Practically, securing the consent of every participant necessitates very high bargaining costs. It may take an enormous amount of time and energy to negotiate with every person. In fact, several of these evaluations have been delayed and even not completed because of this difficulty (Simons, n.d.). If bargaining costs are too high, people refuse to participate and pass on unexamined work. Bargaining over results also introduces the possibilities of misuse by unscrupulous persons (Elliott, n.d.).
way of reducing bargaining costs is to bargain with representa-
tives but, of course, this begins again to concentrate power.

A final difficulty in such procedures is the information cost
(Barry, 1965). In collecting and conveying information from
groups to decision makers, small articulate groups may be at an
advantage. Large, amorphous, inarticulate groups, like the pub-
ic or the lower classes, will find it very costly to formulate their
viewpoints. Hence, even though total information available for
decision making increases, that information may well be biased
toward special interests rather than the public interests. Power
diffusion may actually enhance the influence of special interests
(Barry, 1965).

Of course, all approaches to evaluation have difficulties. I
emphasize these problems to demonstrate there is no panacea
even in a democratically-conceived evaluation. MacDonald's
"democratic" evaluation is weak on representing social class
interests but introduces an extremely important moral idea into
evaluation—that of mutual consent. Mutual consent is mani-
fested in choice. For my part I would prefer that consent be'exercised in the evaluation agreement rather than in the results.

Distributive Principles

It is inevitable that peoples' wants and interests conflict with
one another, and necessary that some resolution of these conflicts
be made. Whereas aggregative principles take into consideration
only the amount of want satisfaction for a reference group, dis-
tributive principles like equality, justice, and fairness are used
to judge the way in which want satisfaction is distributed among
members of a reference group (Barry, 1965). Or, more accur-
ately, the principles are used to judge the procedures by which
allocative decisions are made.

Social decision procedures by which conflicts are resolved be-
come critical in a liberal society. In liberalism there are few
substantive matters on which everyone agrees, so that decisions
cannot be expected on the basis of results or some ideal pattern
of distribution, e.g., to everyone an equal share. Rather, they
must be justified on the basis of the procedures used, of which
public evaluation is one. Distributive principles usually apply to
the decision procedures rather than to the decisions themselves.
I would conceive evaluation as a fact-finding or "value-finding"
procedure preparatory to an actual allocation procedure. It is a
decision procedure only in that it publicly determines a state of affairs on which other decisions may be based.

The fundamental notion of equality specifies that all people be considered as part of a single reference group. Assuming that the reference group has been narrowly or broadly defined, how are things to be distributed among them? A more forceful consideration is that of distributive equality. The "strong" interpretation specifies that a good is to be divided equally regardless of any personal characteristics of people in the reference group. The "weak" interpretation is that only opportunities for satisfying wants should be equal. The weak form, for equal opportunity rather than actual sharing, is the ideal held in liberal societies. Hence, it is easier to argue that the interests of all relevant groups should be included in an evaluation rather than that their interests should be equally met. Only opportunity is provided.

Inequality of opportunity arises from unfairness in procedures or in background conditions. When proper procedures are not followed or when irrelevant factors like race or social class affect decisions, then the procedure is unfair. Presumably fair procedures and background conditions lead to equality of opportunity.

In evaluations, groups rightfully complain not only of their interests not being represented in an evaluation but also of biases arising from improper instruments, analyses, etc. Procedural and background fairness become extremely important in a social situation in which one has an opportunity to enter a competition for want satisfaction but in which one must compete against other interests to win.

How the distributive principles apply is dependent on the particular social decision procedures employed. Barry (1965) identifies seven "pure" types of social decision procedures: discussion on merits, combat, chance, voting, bargaining, contest, and authoritative determination. Different evaluations anticipate different types of social decision procedures.

It is somewhat difficult to see how evaluation can feed into a decision procedure like combat. One may imagine combat as a metaphor for political maneuver and bargaining, but actual combat (imposing one's will by force) would be rare. It usually becomes either bargaining or contest. Likewise, chance as a determination procedure is rare. Voting can be imagined but is seldom used. That leaves bargaining, discussion on merits, contest, and authoritative determinations.

Both bargaining and discussion on merits may be part of nego-
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ittingations. But bargaining narrowly conceived is a situation in which one party offers another an advantage or disadvantage in return for the other party performing some action. Now much social decision depends on bargaining, but that is not evaluation's role. One can imagine an evaluation being used as a threat in a bargaining situation, but it is difficult to envision any moral basis for evaluation that uses threats and material inducements in its design. The role of evaluation should be limited to persuasion in the social decision process. This is a critical issue that marks the boundary between politics and morality, and one to which I will return. To have any moral authority evaluation cannot be conceived as bargaining. Its results are not purchasable by threats or inducements.

This leaves discussion on merits, contest, and authoritative determination as legitimate decision procedures that evaluation should anticipate. Discussion on merits sets out to reach an agreement on the morally right division of goods. Agreement is reached on the basis of what is in the public interest, what will produce the most want satisfaction, etc. There are no threats or inducements. If agreement is reached, then the parties have changed their minds about what they want. Even if one party had the power to change things, it would not want to. In bargaining, by contrast, each party tries to get everything it can by virtue of its power. Through discussion on merits each party becomes convinced that the solution is the correct one. This would seem to be the ideal social decision procedure for evaluation.

Sometimes the discussion on merits will hinge around a question of who is better at something. To settle this the original question may be replaced by a contest, such as a competitive examination. The original question of merit is not settled but is replaced by the question of the contest, which can be more easily, and perhaps more objectively, settled. Evaluations employing comparative experiments and planned variations are such contests. Since the resolution depends on comparative achievement, all parties must know in advance what the criterion of achievement is. And, of course, in order to be fair the result must be an accurate index of the quality which the contest is supposed to be measuring (Barry, 1965). Evaluators call this validity. For example, in the Follow Through evaluation, set up as a contest, there was considerable doubt as to whether the contest measured the quality it was supposed to. In this sense, it was unfair.

Finally, there is authoritative determination. When the parties
cannot agree, they may call in someone to settle the dispute, someone all parties recognize as a legitimate judge. The parties set up an arbitrator. In authoritative determination, the arbitrator determines the result on the basis of the merit of their cases, whereas in a contest the contestants themselves decide the issue on the basis of the skills and competencies at issue. The determination procedure needs an arbitrator to decide the result, whereas a contest needs an umpire to see that the rules of contest are followed. Again, in Follow Through the federal government acted as referee, determining the rules, then acted as an arbitrator by declaring the winner. These are incongruous roles.

Although most evaluators would hold that discussion on merits in which all parties come to an agreement on the basis of the results is the ideal social decision procedure, perhaps most evaluations involve authoritative determination. The evaluator, or government officials, or a group of professionals declare the decisions. Of course, even in these situations discussion on merits usually precedes such a declaration, although discussion is limited to a select group of discussants.

Adversary evaluations which incorporate a jury or judge actually model themselves after legal authoritative determination procedures, thus forcing resolution. Other evaluations, like some of the transaction approaches, try to prolong and enlarge discussion on merits by prohibiting authoritative determinations on the part of the evaluators. Others encourage the evaluator to enter his explicit interpretations of events into the social decision procedure. Actual decision procedures are mixtures of these pure types.

In order to be seen as legitimate and as constituting equality of opportunity, these social decision procedures must be seen as being fair. A fair decision procedure enhances equality of opportunity. A fair evaluation enhances equality of choice. Fairness is a comparative principle (comparing one's opportunities to others') which applies to the decision procedures themselves.

Procedural fairness requires that the prescribed formalities actually be adhered to. In fair discussion on merits there are usually no such formalities (though there may be rules of discussion) except that there must not be coercion or inducements. Otherwise, the procedure degenerates into bargaining. In a fair contest the rules, whatever they are, must be followed, and a fair authoritative determination must follow the procedures established for it. Background fairness is a refinement on pro-
CEDERAL fairness and requires that the parties involved have a correct initial starting position. In authoritative determination, there is also the consideration of whether the arbitrator correctly applies the relevant rules. Correct application of a rule leads to consistency, a basic requirement for justice.

All these considerations of fairness lead to the "right" result in the decision procedure. Together they constitute equality of opportunity. In general, fairness of decision procedure is critical in a liberal society because procedures are all that people do agree on and not the results. Furthermore, when one agrees to such a procedure and accepts benefits arising from it, it is only fair that one continue to adhere to the procedure even in circumstances where it is not personally beneficial (Rawls, 1971).

Evaluation as a Moral Decision Procedure

Evaluation as a moral decision procedure, although I believe more accurately that it is part of a complex mixture of decision procedures. This mixture varies from one social context to another. Evaluation rarely actually decides social issues, though it may. Most often it feeds into another decision procedure in which the actual allocation of goods is made. The way the evaluator envisions this ultimate decision procedure is important.

As the fact-finding and "value-finding" part of a chain of decision procedures, evaluation itself anticipates and takes on features of these procedures. Insofar as it is construed as a discussion on merits, or a contest, or an authoritative determination, it is subject to similar considerations of fairness. The extreme concern with methodology, with "due process" as it were, reflects the criticality of belief in proper decision procedures.

Much of the actual definition of "proper" methodology is derived from professional and technical communities. Through their methodologies, technicians try to eliminate "bias," that is to ensure reproducibility of results. However, reproducibility of results does little to ensure that the evaluation is democratic or morally acceptable.

Reproducible results may be reprehensible from a democratic or moral point of view. Fact-finding is not the same as value-finding, and the positivist methodology, based on reconstructed physical science, misleads the evaluator here. It may be that the government official, anticipating a severe challenge to his authoritative decision making, strongly urges the evaluator to employ
his "hardest," most scientistic methods to bolster the government's authority. But the engaged evaluator will find, belatedly perhaps, that reproducibility is inadequate in this realm.

Democratic theory holds that in order to be acceptable a policy must reflect and respond to the interests of the members of the community (Care, 1978). Democratic decision procedures are designed to absorb and articulate these interests. As a decision procedure in a democratic society, so must evaluation. But even this may be inadequate. Would a procedure that accorded every person an equal share or automatically assigned resources heavily to the lower classes be considered fair? I think not, at least not in a liberal society, though one may envision a society in which such procedures would be fair.

Not every procedure or policy reflecting members' interests is necessarily a moral one (Care, 1978). Such a procedure or policy may result from a bargain or compromise in which inducements or threats were employed. This is not morally acceptable for an evaluation that presumes to provide a basis for discussion on merits. How then is an evaluation procedure to be construed as fair or morally acceptable?

The answer again lies in choice, in giving the parties involved some say in the evaluation itself. Participation in the design of the evaluation procedure itself offers a way of establishing moral acceptability (Care, 1978). Moral acceptability I take to be closely related to moral autonomy and consent. One cannot impose one's will on someone else. Voluntary agreement to a decision procedure I take as morally binding one to that procedure even though one may not like the results of the procedure. However, not every agreement is morally binding.

Care (1978) has advanced the notion of "procedural moral acceptability" such that participating in an agreement makes the results of the agreement morally acceptable. When persons engaged in the agreement reach certain standards and fulfill certain conditions, the results are morally acceptable, as in following the rules of a game. Following Care (1978) I have outlined the conditions necessary to make an evaluation agreement a fair one (House & Care, 1979).

In other words, the parties involved in an evaluation reach an agreement or understanding in advance as to what the evaluation will do. This agreement serves as the basis for judging the evaluation to be a fair one, just as adherence to the rules of a game make the playing of it fair. But not any type of evaluation agreement will do. The agreement may be only a bargain. In
order to confer moral acceptability, the agreement must be reached under certain conditions which guarantee that participants will be able to identify their real interests in the matter. There are twelve such conditions necessary for a fair evaluation agreement (House & Care, 1979).

Whether these conditions can ever be fully met is an interesting practical question. In any case, they provide a moral ideal against which an evaluation may be assessed. To the degree that an evaluation agreement fails to meet these conditions, it cannot be said to be a fair and morally binding agreement. Hence, it becomes suspect as a guide to the fairness of the evaluation itself.

Thus, a fair evaluation agreement is one possible way of insuring equality of choice. The agreement may be entirely informal and unwritten, yet it partakes of the "contract" idea. In a society conceived as a collection of independent, autonomous individuals who cooperate only for their own ends, the essence of liberalism, the contract is a means by which individuals voluntarily place themselves under obligation. The social contract is as firm a moral basis as liberalism has to offer.

References

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To some people, the social sciences should be value free. And of all the methods in the social sciences that ought to be value free, evaluation should be most of all. After all, it is the final gatekeeper that clears applications of social science knowledge for practical use as policy.

But those who have thought seriously about science realize scientists must make many choices. Not all such choices are automatically and completely determined by the logic of the steps of the "scientific method." They involve judgment, judgments such as what is important and what is not, what shall be studied, what shall be observed, what corrected or controlled for, what result is of practical significance and to whom? All these judgments involve the weighing of various factors and deciding what is best in the situation to attain some kind of worthy goal.

It is worth noting, that it is in the act of making these judgments that evaluators demonstrate their professionalism and their skill. These judgments define the unique characteristics of one evaluator in contrast to another; each evaluation position is demarked from others by the way it handles the value questions posed in Section I. In one sense, it is these questions augmented to form a completely descriptive set, which would come closest to uniquely defining the act of evaluation.

But the point to be made here is that values are involved in
the social sciences and, thus, we must ask not "whether" but "how" they are involved in evaluation.

Section I is primarily a demonstration of the persuasive role of values in all stages of the evaluation process. It concludes by noting that the concern becomes not so much that values are involved, but that they are involved in a way that is beneficial (at least not detrimental) to those audiences intending to use the evaluation. Section II picks up at that point, examining the concern that evaluations are so frequently not used by those for whom they were intended. It notes the usual answer is to "do a better job of evaluation." But a "better job of evaluation" is not enough for acceptance where there are value conflicts among the audiences that affect the choice of evaluation goals and methods and the allocation of evaluation resources. This leads to an examination of the actions that the evaluator must take if he/she is to successfully act as negotiator among the competing and conflicting groups. The industrial relations union-management negotiation provides a very useful model that is easily adaptable to the evaluation process.

SECTION I
VALUES IN EVALUATION

The role of values in the scientific process has been of interest to philosophers of science. One of these, Bahm (1971), in the process of analyzing science, suggests a number of points we can use in examining evaluation as well.

It may help to understand the role of values in evaluation if we note that over and over again we are at choice points asking which is the greater value. Sometimes this is done directly, comparing various end goals, but as often or more so, we are involved in means ends relationships. Means may take on sufficient importance that they come to have intrinsic value in their own right, not just having value as instruments to achieve an end. Similarly ends, once achieved, are often but way stations, means to a higher or different goal for which that end has instrumental value.

Thus, we can examine the value issues in the forms: (1) Where in evaluation do means become ends. (2) Where in evaluation does one choose among different means toward an end or choose one end over another. (3) Where in evaluation does an end justify
the means. Using these three forms of value involvement as a guide, let us see how values are enmeshed in evaluation.

**Where Values Enter Evaluation as Means Become Ends**

As an example of a means assuming such value as to become an end, let us look at the process of evaluation itself. Values enter from the very point where one thinks about doing evaluation, becoming an evaluator or employing evaluation methods, where one is implicitly asking: "Is evaluation any good at all?" It takes little imagination to see evaluators everywhere bristling at that question, and answering, "Of course it is!," and perhaps adding a defensive enumeration of benefits: improved decision making, more realistic and effective public policies, more effective education and social-action projects, more appropriate and efficient allocation of resources and so forth (all worthy ends or goals).

Like science itself, evaluation is essentially instrumental in character, a means; one uses it to achieve goals. That it helps one to achieve these goals is its *raison d'etre*. Having proved its instrumental value in the past, presumably it will so perform in the future. There is, therefore, a fundamental value commitment to evaluation as a means on the part of those who engage in it, which constitutes the first of the many value judgments involved.

**Evaluation as a Process (Means) or Product (End).** What is valued about evaluation may differ, however, from practitioner to practitioner. For most evaluators, the "bottom line," "Is the practice effective?" is most important. Without that terminal decision, would one engage in evaluation at all? It turns out that some might. For them, the process of evaluation has intrinsic value as well as the product.

*The Process Value of Specifying Behavioral Objectives.* Long before "management by objectives" was a fad, Tyler's educational evaluation model called for the specification of behavioral objectives (Tyler, 1942, 1950). Those who followed Tyler's practices often found the process steps to be of major value almost to the point where once completed, the actual gathering and analysis of data was anticlimactic. Clients emerged from the process declaring that they had a much better idea of what they sought. Knowing where they were going markedly simplified and made its achievement more effective.

Though this outcome of the process is particularly associated
with the specification of behavioral objectives, there is an element of this effect regardless of one's evaluation orientation. Indeed, just as broad curricular goals must be concretized, so the vague goals formulated for social policies (with the political purpose of attracting a broad spectrum of supporters), must be translated into specifics if they are to be evaluated. Sometimes preparation for evaluation is the first place where these outcomes are clearly analyzed. Thus, many evaluators believe that, as they practice it, as much good comes from the evaluation process, a means, as is derived from the accumulation and interpretation of results, which end is normally perceived as the major value of evaluation.

**The Process Value of Needs Assessment.** Like those who see value in the specification of objectives, there are those who value the legitimization of the objectives through assuring that they are the goals most valued by the clientele. Such evaluators press for a needs analysis as a fundamental step in evaluation. Only as one knows what is needed can one know whether a goal is worthy. Such analysis, however, involves value judgments about how one defines the clientele, who of the group one deems worthy to ask, and what is important to ask them. Further, the very term "need" implies a discrepancy between a standard and an existing state. Setting such standards is a value judgment. So those valuing "needs assessment" not only place a high value on that part of the evaluation process as an end in itself, but are involved in a variety of value judgments in setting standards.

**The Process-Product Continuum.** The importance of all this is that the very shape of an evaluation may be determined by the relative value an evaluator places on the process or product aspect of an evaluation. Rarely do sponsors consider process (means) important in engaging an evaluator; they are after a product (an evaluation report—an end). Only as the evaluation proceeds may a sponsor realize the importance of the process as an end in itself. How evaluators apportion personnel, time, and resources will be reflective of what they personally value about evaluation, and how much they impose those values on sponsors and others and or persuade them to their point of view.

The value dimension involved here may be expressed on a continuum from process as of primary value to product as primary value with numerous positions in between.

**Where Values Enter Evaluation in Choices Among Means and in Choices Among Ends.** Suppose you were to describe for me
the scene around you right now: you would not include everything. You would not only find it impossible to describe any scene in complete detail, but it squanders your time and energy to do so. You abstract the scene, concentrate on what is important. Evaluation, also an abstracting process, goes a step further. Like description, choices are made regarding which outcomes are most important, but in addition evaluators judge how well different outcomes measure up as valued ends. And because evaluation is never undertaken with unlimited resources, choices must be made to be sufficiently broadly inclusive yet to concentrate enough effort in the right places so the report is satisfying to the sponsor and relevant audiences.

These many choices, some between means, some between ends, are reflected at every stage of the evaluation process. To exemplify the points where values enter let us look at (a) problem choice, then at the (b) start, (c) middle, and (d) final parts of an evaluation.

(A) Values and Choice of Problem. Evaluators, like all people, want to maximize both their paycheck and other, such as psychic, income. Thus, they continually ask themselves: "Where shall I spend my time and energy, assuming the resources are available?" Evaluators typically turn down a sponsor who wants a biased evaluation or who seeks the impossible in terms of time allowed or activities required, value decisions about how they spend their time.

Homans (1978) suggests another basis for refusal, "that we should studiously avoid doing obvious harm" (p. 536). The argument he presents suggests that one should not evaluate prominent compensatory education programs for fear that negative results would be used as an excuse to stop funding other efforts to equalize educational opportunity. Values are clearly involved in deciding what shall be considered "obvious harm."

Problem choice values are involved on some kind of continuum from "personally positively committed to the program" through "uncommitted, but think the program ought to be evaluated" to "personally negative toward the program, but think it ought to be evaluated." Social scientists differ on where the investigator ought to be on this continuum to do the best job.

Some would argue for the positive end since evaluators who are personally committed will presumably work harder. But in research, where the methodology is typically tighter than in evaluation, there is evidence to indicate that expectations for
how an experiment will turn out are sometimes as powerful as the treatments themselves in creating effects (Rosenthal, 1976). Since evaluators typically do not control treatment as do researchers, they may not have as much impact on a project, but it is clearly a warning.

The most severe test and, therefore, the fairest some would argue, is that of the hostile evaluator—"if it passes that test, it will pass anyone's." But sponsors more often want a "fair" test than having to beat "loaded dice." Given a choice, most would opt for the uncommitted evaluator for an accurate reading.

(B) Value Choices at the Start of an Evaluation. Given an evaluation, there are the problems of what to evaluate, and who is to decide. Consider these choices:

1) Is the sponsor alone to set the problem? Should other audiences of the evaluation help? Who should be included? Should only those with power to change the decision be included? Should all publics who would be affected by the results be included?

2) If other publics are to be included, who shall represent them? Is the selection made by them? The sponsor? The evaluator? Who empowers them to speak for or negotiate for the group they represent? How much communication should the representative have between the represented group and him herself? On what issues? For what purposes: voting instruction, mutual education on issues, persuasion to sponsor's or evaluator's viewpoint?

3) How are the various publics and audiences to be weighted in determining which of their questions shall be examined, what data gathered and how and to whom it is reported? According to the sponsor's weightings? The evaluator's? Their apparent power to change the decision? The extent to which they are affected by the decision? Directly? Indirectly? Both?

These are all questions of "Who is to control the evaluation?" and by implication, of course, "Whose values are imposed on whom?" Evaluators have a variety of answers for this, and have taken different positions. Their answers can be spread along a continuum, which for convenience, we might call "locus of control." Locus of control in the psychological sense refers usually to internal and external control, where one's actions are more the result of one's own or other's influences. Similarly, the evaluator's determination of what is to be investigated and how, may come from others, from one's own thinking about the situation, or somewhere between.
External Control. Responsive evaluation as proposed by Stake (1975) is about as close as evaluators get to the extreme of the continuum where the questions to be asked and the framework of the evaluation are determined by the audience—the evaluation locus of control is largely external. Responsive evaluation "trades off measurement precision in order to increase the usefulness of the findings to persons in and around the program" (Stake, 1975, p. 14). Stake sees the role of the evaluator as a facilitator to help the client and audience determine what the evaluation shall be—"When someone asks 'How do you do a responsive evaluation?' I am likely to say 'Let the people decide'" (p. 34). Similarly, the facilitating role comes through in "he is making his greatest contribution . . . when he is helping people discover ideas, answers, solutions, within their own minds. So the evaluator I want is an arranger and facilitator. He promotes internal authority (the clients) rather than external authority (the evaluators)" (p. 36).

Stake realizes the evaluator's own value positions may lead to conflict with this position, but he argues it is not the evaluator's "responsibility to 'straighten out' . . . (the clients') thinking or their valuing" (p. 38). He is to acknowledge these value commitments when they lead to a better understanding of . . . the program" (p. 38), and "(the evaluator) should tell the story of what is happening no matter how unpopular the message" (p. 38).

Stake seems a little ambivalent about the role of the evaluator as social reformer. He admits it is a role he admires, but not one he believes the evaluator is necessarily adept at. About as close as he comes to moving toward internal control is to note the role of social reformer and evaluator are overlapping but not synonymous.

Internal Control. At the opposite end of the continuum, the locus of control is internal, and the evaluator makes all these decisions in terms of his her best judgment, without regard to what the purpose of the project was, who the various audiences are, or what their concerns are. The closest to a statement of this position is that of "goal-free" evaluation as described by Scriven (1975). Scriven describes its essential characteristic as talking to the users, rather than the producers of a product or treatment in order to determine what the effects are. "Since one has not been told what the intended effects—goals—are, one works very hard to discover any effects, without the tunnel vision induced by a briefing about goals" (p. 32) Clearly, the evaluator's values will
help him her determine what to attend to and what to ignore, which users to listen to and weight heavily, and so forth. Further, of course, the evaluator determines what evidence is appropriate to documenting any effects.

**Between Internal and External Control.** Scriven, Stake, or any evaluator, however, is concerned that the evaluation results be used. Scriven relies heavily (though not entirely) on the power of the evaluator’s insights. As Stake notes about Scriven, “Mike reasons this way: ‘An evaluator has some very special training. He should be expected to come up with some very unusual insights or else he is not doing his job’” (Stake, 1975, p. 37).

Assuming the evaluator is lucky, bright, or well enough trained to have insights, what the evaluator values as insights, the audience may not. Thus, most evaluators are very concerned with their audiences, and cleave to positions toward the center portion of the continuum.

Cronbach (1978) in a recent draft sees the evaluator as educator. Like Stake, he argues that “Payoff comes from the insight the evaluator’s work generates in others. . . . Teaching begins when the evaluator first sits down with . . . the decision-making community to get at their questions. It continues in every contact. . . . Educating is as much a matter of raising questions as it is of providing answers. Especially in value laden matters the educator’s (and evaluator’s) responsibility is to help others ask better questions and determine actions appropriate for their aims” (p. 11). In terms of the social reformer issue, Cronbach notes, “our formulation leaves the teacher-educator free to take a stance,” and “seek to persuade others of that view” (p. 11 & 11a).

The proactive role of the evaluator is further developed by Cronbach with respect to the multiple audience problem, a difficulty for any position on the continuum other than that of total evaluator control. The sponsor who funds the evaluation, of course, often initially defines who else, if anyone, shall be an important audience. But social action projects in particular may

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*Cronbach continues “the end report is only one means at his disposal” (p. 11) It is clear that in terms of our first continuum the evaluation process has been elevated to a status where it possibly rivals the end product in importance. Cronbach’s material is quoted from a draft circulated primarily for comments. By the time this is published, it should also be available in book form, probably under the draft’s title.*
have many important and influential audiences with a stake in the evaluation: those directly and those indirectly affected by the policy, subjects of the study, sponsors of competing programs, program administrators, legislators, taxpayers, and so forth. In some cases their interests not only differ but are diametrically opposed. How does one prioritize potential audiences? How does one rank their concerns? To answer these questions places one somewhere near the middle of the continuum, since the evaluator is taking a proactive stance but is doing so with careful attentiveness to audience needs, perhaps even identifying audiences and needs that are not clearly apparent on first analysis of the situation.

Cronbach is one of the first to devise a scheme of values for multiple audiences. He proposes an initial phase of divergent question identification to identify the broadest scope of relevant questions. Cronbach explicitly recognizes the evaluator's role in bringing certain values to the fore in the divergent phase of values:

I . . . recommend that the evaluator by his choice of questions open the door to neglected values. . . . It is proper that the more nearly voiceless sectors of the community be heard from. To give priority to their concerns, however, is a political act that deliberately injects the evaluator's values into planning and interpretation. The justification for this is less compelling than the justification for attending to the interests of all sectors of the community, (Footnote: A reasonable rejoinder is that the insistence of evenhandedness in this paper . . . is also value laden. A Marxist, a technocrat, or even a liberal would object to the implicit acceptance of the political system . . . but the evaluator does accept his commission from that system.) (p. 425)

In the succeeding convergent phase, the evaluator selects the questions to be included in the investigation. The evaluator winnows the questions by choosing those of high uncertainty (not much is known about the questions in a Bayesian sense), high leverage (they are important questions to an audience, and evaluation evidence would bear heavily on the policy decision as a function of the political power of the audience and their willingness to accept evaluation evidence), and low cost (the questions can be investigated at a low cost, or at least at an affordable cost within the resources available). This set of values is proposed with the intent of best using resources to maximally affect decision making. Values are clearly involved.
Judgments Involved in Choosing Between External and Internal Control. This review of Scriven, Stake, and Cronbach shows that the values brought to the choice of evaluation questions is in large part a function of the point of view the evaluator employs. Most evaluators are eclectic, choosing the point of view or combination of them that seems likely to be most effective in the particular situation faced. For example, goal-free evaluation is particularly useful where the side effects of a treatment appear to be as important as the main effect; a value judgment, of course, regarding the relative importance of effects (ends). Responsive evaluation is particularly useful where the audience is skeptical of the evaluator's role, being designed to replace resistance with trust by making clear that the audience's values are clearly represented. Eclectic evaluators choose the form of evaluation (means) they believe best for the situation—a value judgment.

(C) Value Choices in the Middle Operational Phases of Evaluation. Having demonstrated the choices among means and ends involved at the initiation of an evaluation, let us touch briefly on the middle operational phases. Choices among means are especially rife here.

The evaluator must make many choices: what variables bear most importantly on the chosen questions? How is evidence best gathered on those variables? By tests? By observation check lists? By running accounts? What trade-offs in the band-width fidelity dilemma are appropriate? (Cronbach, 1970). How is "best gathered" defined? Psychometrically? If psychometrically, what is the "best" balance between reliability and validity? Is "best" what is most convincing to the audience? Which audiences? One could enumerate a similar series of questions regarding how the data are "best" summarized—best for whom? What purpose? And so forth.

Values Implicit in Choice of Observation Instrument. A rather subtle involvement of values occurs in the selection of measurement or observation instruments. Though on the lookout for biasedly worded questionnaires, we are less alert to the value choices embedded in instruments. Take as an example the Flanders Interaction Analysis method for observing a teacher's classroom behavior (Flanders, 1970). With only ten categories, it records with some differentiation how teacher and student interact. But it does not differentiate prolonged teacher talk—were students listening in rapt attention? Was what was said well
organized? Accurate? Well integrated with chalk board use? A teacher who excels at these latter skills may show up poorly on the Flanders' instrument. Choice of this instrument to observe teachers makes an implicit value choice about what is important in teaching.

Value Choices in Evaluation Design. In choosing among evaluation means, perhaps the biggest problem is properly balancing characteristics of design, which link treatment to its presumed effects, with those that permit the results to generalize to other persons, places, and times. Generally referred to as internal and external validity, it is widely recognized that many of the steps taken to assure internal validity decrease external validity and vice-versa. Trade-offs to achieve enough of each are necessary in any design. For example, providing more adequate control over rival hypotheses not only consumes resources that may be devoted to providing greater generalizability, but may impose conditions such as randomization and obtrusive observation that make the situation unique rather than generalizable.

Yet without clearly demonstrating that certain effects do consistently and controllably accompany prescribed treatments, there is little point in providing for generality. The "proper" balance will be a value judgment weighing the importance of tightly linking treatment with effect against the importance of generalizability for policy formulation (as well as the costs of a failure either way). It is apparent that values are involved, especially in balancing the "costs" and "benefits" associated with the success or failure of these inferences: problems of which means are to be preferred, and which ends are most important.

(D) Values in the Closing Phase of Evaluation. Choices among means and ends, especially among ends, are involved in the last stages of an evaluation. Which results have significance? Not just, but including statistical significance—setting the size of the significance level is a value judgment! Which results and, therefore, which ends shall be given the most emphasis? Which deemphasized? What qualifiers need to be put on the conclusions? How much importance shall be accorded the qualifiers? Who should receive the results? How shall they be portrayed? Who is

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2Treatment often changes during an evaluation, as projects managers seek to improve its effectiveness. Extrapolation to the latest treatment version further taxes both internal and external validity.
being catered to by the portrayal? How much effort shall be put into dissemination of the results? What directions shall dissemination take? And why?

For some, answers to these questions, especially regarding dissemination, will have been negotiated in the contract. For example, the right to release results and disseminate them is sometimes reserved by the sponsor.

Some evaluators leave judgment of result significance to the sponsor and or audiences. Only the analyzed data are presented; judgments of whether outcomes are good or bad are left for others to decide. It is to be hoped that these evaluators are not fooling anyone into thinking their work is, therefore, value free.

Some evaluators apply values to determining the relative benefits of policies and weighing alternatives, often in terms of reckonings of cost. In fact, cost-benefit analyses are being increasingly sought. How far the evaluator goes in drawing such conclusions, in advancing "ought to's" suggesting social policy varies markedly. Some sponsors request clear-cut evaluation opinions; Senator Muskie is said to have wished for "one-armed experts," those who would take a stand, not qualifying every remark with "on the other hand." Those hiring goal-oriented evaluators typically expect value-based observations regarding which ends are most important as part of the evaluation report.

Value choices among means and ends abound throughout the evaluation process, its initiation, its implementation and its conclusion.

Value Choices in Terms of Ends Justifying Means. Perhaps of all the value choices, those in this category appear the most insidious, for we generally suspect that good ends do not justify evil means.

For the evaluator, such choices can take the form of: "If I have to do it this way, is it worth doing?"—a discontent with the circumstances under which the evaluation is to be done. That discontent may stem from a variety of causes, many of which contrast "looser" evaluation methodology unfavorably with the "most rigorous" social science research methodology. Evaluation is generally delineated from other social science research by such characteristics as having to: meet prescribed deadlines, be relevant to decision-making, employ natural settings, use preformed groups, report results in special ways to audiences and/or sponsors, and, because evaluation is often an afterthought added to an already overlarge budget, succeed with gross underfunding.
Each of these conditions may impose nearly impossible conditions on the evaluator, where the benefits of the evaluation process and product must be weighed against the conditions under which it must be conducted. Inadequate time to do a careful job, pressure to produce a particular finding, emphasis on reporting where process appears of primary importance, inadequate control so that treatment-outcome links have too little certainty, reservation of sponsor rights to editorially change or even to not release the report—these only begin to enumerate conditions that cause evaluators to question whether the means by which the evaluation must be done are worth the benefits that may result from its completion. The implicit value judgment here weighs the effects of the restricting conditions against potential benefit.

So whether ends justify means is of concern not only in events as nation-shaking as the Watergate conspiracy, but to everyday evaluators as well.

Evaluation is Value-Laden

By now it is apparent that evaluation is value-laden, and this exposition may greatly trouble those who have not studied evaluation. It should come as no surprise to evaluators, however, nor do they unduly worry about this matter. For them, the essential protection is the basic attitude the competent and trusted evaluator brings to the task, an attitude essential to science, that of seeking objectivity.

Homans (1978) describes the search for truth as the “one value we commit ourselves to when we enter the academy... a truth that is objective in the sense that the test of a statement is some degree of conformity with evidence; the evidence is in some degree public, in that others can obtain it also; and that it is in some degree independent of ourselves” (p. 534). Bahm (1971) elaborates on objectivity, indicating that it involves:

- the willingness to reach conclusions only on the basis of actual evidence and not on the basis of wishful thinking, prejudice, personal profit, or fear... a willingness to follow curiosity... wherever it may lead... a willingness to be guided by both experience and reason... a willingness to suspend judgment... until sufficient evidence warrants a conclusion... a willingness to be tolerant and unprejudiced concerning what the
outcome may be... a willingness to be neutral, impersonal and unselfish in whatever way is needed in order not to bias the results (p. 393).

Clearly the definition of objectivity rules in certain values, and rules out just as firmly certain others; most certainly a matter of prejudice. To paraphrase Bahm’s statements regarding science to fit evaluation, “Success in... (evaluation) depends not upon complete absence of prejudice, but upon the presence of beneficial prejudices” (p. 394).

Perhaps this is enough to suggest that “any (evaluator) . . . who stops to reflect . . . long enough to understand the nature of (evaluation) . . . will conclude that (evaluation) . . . is not, and ought not be, value free . . . (evaluation) is saturated with values. There is no aspect of . . . (evaluation) which is totally value free and from which duties and obligations are completely absent” (p. 396).

Summary

This analysis of the role of values in evaluation clearly shows that values are involved; indeed they must be. The choice of evaluation as a useful process, the definition of its role, what is studied, how it is studied, how resources are allocated, all involve value judgments. Judgments are made regarding the relative value of various evaluation means versus evaluation ends. There are value choices among various means and ends at all stages of the evaluation process. There are even times when the evaluator questions when ends that evaluation seeks are justified by the kind of evaluation means that must be used.

The problem is one of determining what is “beneficial prejudice” in any given instance. Perhaps this suggests why evaluations have been controversial and not had the impact expected of them. Section II continues this discussion by proposing how an evaluator might help sponsors and relevant audiences determine what is “beneficial prejudice” in a given situation.

SECTION II

Section I notes that the value problem is primarily one of ensuring that the values involved were beneficial and beneficially applied. This helps us to understand but does not completely
explain the problems audiences have in accepting evaluations and in turn, therefore, leads us to ask: "What is necessary for evaluations to be more accepted and used?" The alternative, creating social policy without the best possible knowledge of its results, almost everyone would agree is "a less beneficial prejudice." Our clues come from the previous analysis. We must be sure (1) that the evaluator has made choices as objectively as possible, and (2) that those choices are perceived as representing beneficial prejudice as far as the relevant evaluation audiences are concerned. These two statements, especially the first, involve evaluating the evaluator, a process typically called meta-evaluation.

Meta-Evaluation

A number of authors have discussed the evaluation of evaluations, including: The Committee on Evaluation Research, Social Science Research Council (1979), Cook and Gruder (1978), Gowin and Millman (1978), Guba, Clark, McClellan, Sanders and Turner, (1972), Krathwohl (1972), Sanders and Nafziger (1976), Scriven (1975), Stufflebeam (1974); U. S. General Accounting Office (1978, 1979).

The many excellent suggestions in these articles can be characterized as (1) those which attempt to assure that pressures that would lead to advocacy are not present; and (2) those which validate the choices as beneficial and unbiased by (a) retracing a sample of the steps of the evaluator (auditing), (b) replicating the study, and/or (c) reanalyzing the data and critiquing the method (critiquing).

Removing Pressures—Conflict of Interest. Removing pressures which might lead to advocacy is, in part, a matter of eliminating conflict of interest. The National Academy of Science handles this problem by demanding a "bias statement" from scientists who provide information to the government, a report that is intended to reveal one's true interests, as may be inferred from a list of all jobs, consultantships, and directorships held for the past 10 years, all current financial interests whose market value exceeds $10,000 or 10 percent of the individual's holdings, all sources of research support for the past five years and any other information, such as public stands on an issue which might appear to other reasonable individuals as compromising of your independence of judgment" (Hammond & Adelman, 1976, p. 391). A similar statement by evaluators would appear to be appropriate in many instances.
Scriven (1975) points out that sponsors also have a conflict of interest, wanting to know whether a project was successful, but also wanting their original judgment in supporting the project confirmed. He convincingly argues that the evaluation contractor should be separated organizationally from the directors or sponsors of the evaluated project. Thus, to remove conflict of interest pressures, the evaluation contract for a project of one branch of the Department of Education (e.g. Office of School Improvement) should be handled by another branch (e.g. Office of Educational Statistics and Evaluation).

No doubt the best protection against advocacy is the reputation and competence of the evaluator. Organizations are beginning to emerge that are gaining public trust. There have been suggestions that we might license certified public evaluators, just as there are certified public accountants. This would have the advantage of assuring minimal technical competence. Considering the usual “grandfathering” procedures for such certification it would be some years before it had any appreciable effect on the field as a whole, however.

Meta-evaluation by Auditing, Replicating, or Critiquing. Checking a study can take the form of auditing various steps in the evaluation process, replicating parts of it, reanalyzing the data, or replicating the study in its entirety. Auditing is exemplified by actions of the U. S. General Accounting Office, which has expanded its responsibilities beyond the search for fiscal improprieties to assure methodological accuracy as well (Abeles, 1978). Though innocuous in concept, auditing is not without its problems. For example, the GAO has indicated they may reinterview respondents, a process which as caused considerable concern. A callback by an auditor could violate participant confidentiality and could potentially interfere with both the evaluation and the social experiment itself.

Reanalysis of data, particularly for large and complex studies, has become increasingly popular, especially where the appropriate unit of analysis (individual, classroom, school building, school system) is disputed, or where a less desirable unit was used as a trade-off to achieve other desirable design characteristics. Critiquing the methods goes hand in hand with reanalysis.

Perhaps the most complete and direct check is replication of the evaluation by funding competing evaluations to determine consistency of results. This may create problems in auditing to an even greater degree. Scriven (1975) sensibly suggests that the replicators should have an opportunity to publicly comment on
the others' original report and vice versa, and these comments should be published with the final report.

Analytic critiques of evaluations by outsiders have long been the staple method of meta-evaluation. These can be particularly helpful, especially when the critics have specialized knowledge about the area being evaluated.

This once-over-lightly characterization cannot do justice to the literature on meta-evaluation. Having noted that the literature is available, let us note also that most of it deals with the technical improvement of evaluation.

**Beneficial Value Choices**

Those responsible have often been stung by criticisms of the evaluations they sponsored. It is generally agreed that evaluations have not been as useful as the investment in them would suggest they should be. Corrective action has sparked interest in meta-evaluation, in means for avoiding bias and in the improvement of the technical aspects of evaluation, especially its methodology. These are very desirable steps, but in and of themselves they will not necessarily solve the problems, since in many instances where evaluations are criticized, the problem lies in the definition of evaluation itself. This can be illustrated with the definition of program evaluation developed by the U. S. General Accounting Office:

---achieving their stated objectives; ---meeting the performance perceptions and expectations of responsible public officials, interested groups and or the public; and—producing other significant effects of either a desirable or undesirable character; to assist future policy and management decisions. (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1978, p. 4-5).

This definition, by its inclusiveness, makes it clear that improving evaluation by concentrating on its technical aspects will never entirely turn the tide. The evaluation of the achievement of "stated objectives," where objectives are so vaguely stated as to be politically viable, and therefore, appeal to that wide range of publics whose "perceptions and expectations" are mentioned in the next phrase, typically poses an impossible situation when looked at solely from the standpoint of technical improvement.

Different publics have different perceptions and expectations...
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of the same project, often in terms of major outcomes but almost always in the sum total of outcomes. Side effects, unintended consequences, prerequisite requirements of skills or equipment, the planning and logistics of project operation are all aspects which are likely to be differently valued by project clients in contrast to sponsors and designers. Can an evaluation plan be devised that will adequately satisfy all those publics? Where the perceptions and expectations of relevant publics and sponsors are in relative harmony, perhaps it can be. But when they are in conflict, mere technical improvement will not resolve the basic conflict. This is a distinction that is not widely enough recognized by either sponsors or evaluators.

All too frequently evaluating a program that is surrounded by controversy is perceived only to call for the development of an exceptionally "tight" evaluation design that cannot be attacked by protagonists or antagonists. To ensure this, sponsors often assume that only they are wise enough to design such an evaluation to satisfy these diverse publics and, thus, carefully structure the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the evaluation so there is little for the evaluator to do but follow instructions. Such RFP's assume that by complete specification a more technically perfect evaluation product will result, and therefore, a more acceptable one. Alternatively, the sponsor may issue an RFP that is vaguely worded, so that the evaluator assumes this responsibility. Since in a typical competition, a specific plan will beat a vague one, the evaluator, like the RFP writer just discussed, must anticipate in detail the requirements of antagonistic publics and spread the resources so that presumably everyone will be satisfied.

Presently, efforts at improving the satisfactoriness of evaluations tend to be focused on anticipating the concerns of various audiences either by the sponsor in the RFP, or by the evaluator in the response to an RFP and on improving the quality of information provided. Some improvement in this process can, no doubt, be made by analyzing the beneficial judgments and the quality standards that would apply to almost any evaluation. This is the basis for the development of a set of standards of evaluation.

A project to gain consensus around a set of standards for evaluation was begun in 1976 by the Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, with Daniel L. Stufflebeam, The Evaluation Center, Western Michigan University, as Chairperson. Its 17 members represent 12 professional associations.
and it has attracted support from the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Education, and the Lilly and Weyerhaeuser foundations. This work (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1981) has identified 30 standards in the broad areas of utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy. Following these standards should increase public trust that evaluators make beneficial value judgments.

The problem is that although standards will help in determining what are the beneficial choices in a general sense, for the results to have full impact the choices must be perceived as beneficial by that sponsor and by those relevant audiences involved.

Three Problems in Determining the Most Beneficial Values in a Project

There are at least three problems that make complex the determination of beneficial values in any given instance. One basic problem is that there may be honest differences between what evaluators and various audiences see as the most appropriate choices. Even if both are trying to be objective, since they are likely to come at the problem from different value bases, choices beneficial to one point of view may not be to the other. For example, a most fundamental choice is: which outcomes are to be examined thoroughly, which cursorily, and which not at all. In Headstart this meant allocating evaluation resources to the cognitive, nutritional, or corrective medical effects of the project. Various publics would prioritize these differently. Indeed, differences can develop around any of the variety of choices in the various phases of the evaluation described in Section I: What rival hypotheses to control? What instruments to use? What sampling unit is most appropriate? etc. Different choices usually result in quite different evaluation products and conclusions.

A second problem is that the only way of validating what is beneficial and what is not is by human judgment. Thus, the validation of beneficial values for audiences, especially if they are to perceive them as beneficial, generally requires that those audiences be involved in the judgments.

A third problem is that though it is possible that the underlying values are identical or at least compatible across various audiences, sometimes they may not be perceived to be. Perceived differences are as real as actual differences to the perceivers. Except as such perceptions are changed by someone such as
the evaluator or as the audiences interact to arrive at some solution to this problem, these differences may lead to a rejection of the evaluation by some.

—And a Solution

This brings us to the crux of the question, namely how can the audiences be helped to perceive the choices as beneficial, especially when some of the choices may be antithetical to one another. It becomes clear then that an evaluation becomes acceptable as audiences interact with each other or through the evaluator: to mutually find the points of common benefit, to modify their views of each others' value positions, to change their views as to what is beneficial, or to agree on the best compromise in terms of evaluation plan trade-offs so that each audience benefits to a "satisfactory" degree.

The missing link where there is real or perceived conflict among the sponsors, publics, or audiences, is interaction to find commonalities, to change attitudes and to agree on how to distribute resources across the areas of disagreement. The audiences must have a chance to work with the evaluation problem so that they understand what the evaluator is up against and help decide on the trade-offs. Then when something less than a perfect solution is settled for, which it will be, these groups will still feel an ownership of that decision and the results will be more acceptable to them.

Such involvement is no guarantee that an evaluation will be accepted. Indeed as publics begin to understand evaluation they may become more suspicious rather than less, or least initially. But the choice is between making decisions with the best information that evaluation has to offer, or to use no evaluation at all. There may be instances when the conflict among publics is so severe or the choices so bad that evaluation may be rejected as an alternative, but this will not be a common choice.

Neither, of course, is there any guarantee that once the evaluation plan is accepted it will remain acceptable. Situations, circumstances, persons, perceptions, and understandings change. But once it is accepted, rejection of the evaluation without a very good reason leaves the group in a weak position to persuade others to their point of view.
The Evaluator as Negotiator

This suggests that especially where there is reason to believe that audiences have, or perceive that they have, different interests in a project and its outcome, the first task of the evaluator is to work with these perceptions (often dispelling misperceptions) and negotiate a satisfactory design of a study for all parties. Evaluators concerned with involving audiences in the evaluation, such as Cronbach and Stake, would probably agree though neither of them would have proposed the process suggested here.

Cronbach, Ambron, Dornbush, Hess, Hornik, Phillips, Walker, and Weiner (in press), however, clearly refer to the negotiation process. They advance the role of the evaluator as educator, and illustrate the variety of roles this may entail. Included is a reference to negotiation in which the evaluator is responsible for "provoking discussion . . . and if possible, accommodation" (chap. 2).

Where there is conflict, an analysis of the role of the evaluator shows that, especially in the initial phases of evaluation plan development, it is much like that of the industrial negotiations facilitator-fact finder (abbreviated as the NF³ role). Consider these aspects that suggest that the negotiator who is trying to bring the various sides together is in a role similar to that of the evaluator who is trying to design an evaluation which will be pleasing to and "owned" by a diverse group:

1. Both situations are characterized by including persons with common as well as disparate interests. In the case of labor and management, both are better off if the business succeeds. Similarly, the parties to a social policy are trying to solve a social problem and both are better off if the problem is solved. At the same time, in both labor-management and evaluation, the parties involved are likely to have different views in such matters as: where the resources come from, how they are used, and what their effects, intentional and unintentional, may be.

2. Both situations are often politicized, in that the persons who are at the table making the decisions must report back to and represent larger groups on whose behalf they are negotiating. They win status in terms of how well they negotiate for their side.

3. The resources are never enough to accomplish everything that everyone wants.

4. There is a timeliness to the decision-making. In the case of labor-management, there is the possibility of a strike if progress
is not rapid enough. In the case of evaluating social policy, there is usually impending or expiring legislation for authorization and or funding. A certain orchestration of effort is needed in order to carry legislation over the political hurdles of first, authorization, then yearly funding, and, finally, reauthorization and continued funding. If evaluation is to contribute to the discussions of public policy, it must be timely in relation to these steps in our democratic process.

The similarity of the two situations suggests that the experience of business and labor may be useful to evaluators. Evaluation already uses many models, some borrowed from other fields (see for example, Worthen & Sanders, 1973). Using analogies from other fields gives one a running start rather than building a model de novo. The labor management negotiator role is such a useful analogy.

One of the most helpful analyses of the labor negotiation process was developed by Walton and McKersie (1965). Drawing on the thinking of other social scientists, they suggest that negotiations consist of a series of four subprocesses: The first subprocess is distributive bargaining; its function is to resolve pure conflicts of interest. The second, integrative bargaining, functions to find common or complementary interests and solve problems confronting both parties. The third subprocess is attitudinal structuring, and its functions are to influence the attitudes of the participants toward each other and to affect the basic bonds that relate the two parties they represent. A fourth subprocess, intragroup organizational bargaining, has the function of achieving consensus within each of the interacting groups (p. 4).

Let me take up these subprocesses in a different order, placing integrative bargaining first and distributive bargaining last. For the evaluator, the major goal is to find those aspects about which there is common agreement as to what is important to study, and how to study it. The larger this common core, the further the resources of the study can be stretched, and the more likely the results will be commonly useful and acceptable to all the parties. Thus, for the evaluator, integrative bargaining is the prime tool. (It is worth noting that this is true also for many who practice and teach collective negotiations. Insofar as possible they try to move as much as possible from distributive bargaining positions—where one person wins, the other loses—to the integrative bargaining situation where either they both win, or losses are minimized.)
Because integrative bargaining can take place mainly if there are certain attitudes on the part of the parties involved, attitudinal structuring becomes the second of the subprocesses of special importance to the evaluator.

Integrative bargaining potential exists "when the nature of a problem permits solutions which benefit both parties or at least when the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices by the other" (Walton & McKersie, p. 5). As they describe integrative bargaining, it consists of identifying the problem, searching for alternative solutions and delineating their consequences, and preference ordering the solutions in order to select a course of action. This seems straightforward enough. They note, however, that the way in which the problem is defined is critical, and that redefinition takes place throughout the process. Those participating in the process must have access to information as well as the language to communicate it, which is essential to problem definition and solution. The language problem is especially crucial in dealing with different publics with different backgrounds. Whether the evaluator can summon forth the motivation from the parties involved to try to find common ground will depend on the skills of the evaluator as well as of those negotiating. The development of trust and a supportive climate is important to this process. A supportive climate is marked by encouragement and freedom to behave spontaneously without fear of sanctions. Communication is free and open among all the participants, not just within the teams (see Figure 1).

There is much more to the analysis of each of the processes within integrative bargaining in the model presented by Walton and McKersie. Integrative bargaining and each of the other subprocesses are developed in chapters devoted to describing them in theoretical model form first. Each theory chapter is followed by a chapter on tactics (what occurs when information and shared meanings are low, when they are high, etc.) Although the theory and practice of collective negotiations is discussed in detail, we are merely trying to sketch enough here to demonstrate the model's relevance to the evaluation process.

The second subprocess, attitudinal structuring, is important for two reasons: (1) to ensure that objectivity as defined by Bahm (1971) (or see Krathwohl, 1980) is accepted as a goal of investigation by all parties, and (2) to insure that all parties (especially the sponsor) agree that the viewpoints of each interested and affected party is important to the determination of a
Communication is free within Party and Opponent teams, only chief spokesman $P_1$ and $O_1$ communicate across team boundaries.

All possible communication channels are open among six participants forming one problem-solving group.

satisfactory evaluation plan, to its acceptance, and ultimately to a solution of the underlying social or educational problem. These two attitudes are critical to the development of an evaluation plan that is viewed as beneficial to all parties, the results of which will be used in the setting of policy.

Before one can get to work on these, however, there are certain basic attitudes that must be worked with within the group to facilitate negotiation: (1) the motivational orientation and action tendency toward the others (e.g., competitive, individualistic, or cooperative), (2) beliefs about the legitimacy of others, (3) the level of trust in conducting affairs, and (4) degree of friendliness. Walton and McKersie analyze these four attitude dimensions and the relationship patterns they engender.

The third subprocess, *intraorganizational bargaining*, takes place throughout the negotiations to ensure that persons representing a group’s point of view are in tune with the decision makers and leaders of that group, or can persuade them to their point of view. Thus, the reconciliation process that takes place at the central bargaining table must also take place within each of the groups represented at that table to make sure there is understanding and agreement on the nature of the problem, the difficulties of solution, the trade-offs that are necessary, and the value of the proposed evaluation in the final solution.

Like the follow-through stroke of a tennis swing or a golf drive, this most important facet of evaluation is frequently ignored, yet it is essential to achieving the evaluation’s goals. Though one may settle the problems among those who are negotiating, unless those agreements can be made to stick with members of the constituency, little will have been gained. It is clear that while evaluators cannot take an active role in these negotiations, they must ensure that they take place, perhaps often lending helpful advice.

There may remain issues that cannot be settled by integrative bargaining, where the parties cannot find a common ground.

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3To say that all parties’ views are important is overly simplistic. Sponsors and others are going to assess them, in part, in terms of their potential political leverage on the final decision. But what is of concern here is a respect on the part of those involved in the negotiations for persons and viewpoints of antagonists as well as of proponents. Considering the frequent inaccuracy of estimates of political leverage, often due to unforeseen events, this respectful attitude is the one most likely conducive to long-range positive solutions.
These will have to be subject to the fourth subprocess, *distributive bargaining*, where the evaluator distributes the resources of the evaluation in such a way as to, for example, investigate aspects of interest to only one party. The evaluator will want to gain agreement among the parties involved that in their perceptions, such arbitrary actions were necessary and that these action choices as well as the distribution of resources were fair and unbiased decisions. While many of Walton and McKersie's examples deal with hourly pay examples, their distributive bargaining principles are adaptable to evaluation problems.

The NF³ role of the evaluator, once the design is set and the negotiators for the audiences have made responsible peace with each other and within their own camps, turns then from a negotiations-facilitator to a fact-finding role, carrying out what is commonly considered the technical side of the evaluation.

Walton and McKersie's theory appears to be a classic theory in negotiations literature. Readers wishing to put that theory in larger and more modern perspective may wish to refer to Thomas (1976). Thomas helpfully diagrams, for example, the relationship of integrative and distributive bargaining to assertive and cooperative behavior (see Figure 2).

Many questions remain to be answered regarding the NF³ role by this brief overview. As one example, consider whether the evaluator’s beneficial prejudices regarding what constitutes an acceptable evaluation could result in his/her being perceived as unwilling to consider the beneficial prejudices of other interested parties. Some evaluators might indeed give that impression. This is one of many places where negotiation training for evaluators who will be engaging in conflict-laden evaluations will be invaluable.

Perhaps this is enough to suggest that there is food for thought in the NF³ model, and that the process of establishing the evaluation design is a crucial one which may well be subjected to this kind of negotiation, and, therefore, may benefit from the Walton and McKersie kind of analysis.

What is proposed may seem a dreamy ideal for many of us who have had to accept what is handed to us by a sponsor. Indeed, there will be many situations where it is unrealistic. In addition, often the parties are not in sufficient basic disagreement that such an elaborate process is necessary. Nevertheless, there are probably a surprising number of conflict situations where such a process would increase the attractiveness of the evaluation and
Figure 2

Note. Adapted from K. Thomas "Conflict and Conflict Management" in M.D. Dunnette Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Copyright 1976 by Rand McNally College Publishing Co. Used with permission of the publisher.
make it much more politically viable. Indeed, most of our large social engineering projects are of this nature, for even if there is agreement on the benefits, which there often isn’t, the relation of cost to benefit is nearly always an area of disagreement, especially when viewed in the larger matrix of opportunity costs. Negotiation would be most helpful in determining the appropriate benefits and costs to be included in the evaluation and how to describe them so they may be compared fairly to other opportune uses of the funds.

Conflict may exist even when the parties do not really have differences. They often think they do, and the evaluation is viewed in this light. Negotiation makes clear to the parties involved where they have similar points of view with respect to the project on hand, and where they really differ, it isolates the points of difference so that they can become the subject of work, and the problem more easily resolved.

**SUMMARY**

Values are involved in every evaluation; the problem is to ensure that they are beneficial values, beneficially applied, and so perceived by the sponsor and relevant audiences. We can agree on such values as objectivity as one that is beneficial and applies throughout an evaluation, but that is not enough to specify the nature of the evaluation in a way that makes it universally acceptable to all audiences. Meta-evaluation literature deals with a part of this problem, particularly from the standpoint of eliminating obvious bias and creating conditions where biasing pressures are removed. A number of other helpful suggestions can be derived from this literature. But the fact remains that working from the side of increasing technical perfection will not alone suffice.

The problem is to ensure that the most beneficial values are involved and choices are made beneficially in the perception of the audiences involved. The fact that what is viewed as beneficial by one person or group may not be so viewed by another, makes clear the difficulty of trying to get evaluations accepted and used when we concentrate solely on the technical aspects. The technical aspects can be resolved in any number of reasonably satisfactory ways, but each is likely to be viewed as only partially satisfactory because of the inevitable trade-offs involved.
in evaluation design, because the determination of what is beneficial must be validated by the persons involved, and when audiences disagree on what is beneficial, there must be negotiation to reach an agreement on how the evaluation can be made most mutually beneficial. It is only as this aspect of evaluation is understood and resolved by the parties interested in it that the evaluation will be perceived as acceptable and extensively used by them in the decision-making process.

This appears to require that, in addition to technical skill, the evaluator must either acquire or work with someone who has negotiation skills. The model of the negotiations facilitator-fact finder (NF² role) seems to provide a very useful model of the kind of negotiations involved. In addition, there is a considerable body of literature that analyzes and describes the labor-management negotiation process. While it does not assure successful negotiations, it is clear that considerable knowledge has been obtained about what makes negotiations succeed and considerable skill has been developed in the use of this knowledge. When employed by evaluators, it should assist them in the development of evaluation plans that will better succeed and that will increase the evaluators' usefulness in the process of construction of social policy.

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Commentary: Evaluation Symposium

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Eva Baker has taken an historical look at the development of evaluation in its present reincarnation, at least, over the past 12 or 15 years. Ernest House has looked at the ethical presuppositions (and perhaps the political science involvement of evaluation). Dave Krathwohl has written a long and detailed paper looking at the professional practices of evaluation from the point of view of their value content.

Baker's paper stressed the marked contrasts that we have seen in the development of evaluation. A highly optimistic early phase of evaluation embraced a relatively monolithic set of values and a relatively unanimous commitment to what it was hoped would be the successful improvement of the school system. This was a relatively closed system approach characterized by the feeling that you were evaluating an educational system which you could treat as a social scientist treats any suitable experimental object.

This was then succeeded, she points out, by an intervening period of growing skepticism stimulated in part by the Coleman studies; but eventually we arrived at a third, open system phase, where the enormous difficulties in handling pupils in a real school environment, a real learning environment, began to demand and got a very powerful recognition in terms of the methodology of evaluation. We began to see pluralism and diversity, with a kind of local option and local preference approach becoming increasingly acceptable. Loose designs and the notion of multiple reporting were legitimated in this third phase. (In the earlier phase, of course, they would have been seen as not meeting the criteria, standards, or values of evaluation as a discipline.)

House's paper is an extremely detailed examination of a number of the underlying value assumptions that manifest themselves in particular approaches to evaluation design. He sees audiences as having prima facie equal rights to attention to their
concerns in the evaluation report. He treats the impacts on different clienteles of the program being evaluated as having equal or variable importance as representing another value choice. He unpacked a number of key value premises of democracy or a liberal society and looked at the way in which these impact on an evaluation design. He sees an intimate connection between the value system of the society and that of the evaluation design itself; in a sense this is a social relativist approach but one that involves a great deal of looking at current theories about the political body.

Krathwohl's paper went after an exhaustive analysis of the many places, in the course of serious program evaluation, where values are invoked or manifest, even if not explicitly recognized. He began by addressing the idea of the value-free position and the difficulties with this that have emerged in the change in point of view that has taken place as we become increasingly skeptical about the possibility or desirability of the value-free position. He stressed later in the paper the possibility of spending more time looking at some relatively novel models of the way in which values enter into evaluation. He was particularly interested in Walton and McKersie's study of the negotiator facilitator-fact-finder model, the complex combination of roles which they argue is necessary in order to understand the role of the negotiator. Krathwohl argues we might well see something useful there for those of us looking at the methodology of evaluation.

During the course of the panel discussion there was a certain amount of disagreement between the chair and the paper presenters. It can be summarized by saying that, to me, all of the presenters were still showing a kind of covert incestuousness with the doctrine of value-free social science from which they, at the manifest level, were dissociating themselves. The sign of that is the recurrent theme turning up in one form or another in each of the papers that the value choice that they recognized was crucial in evaluation, was in some sense an arbitrary, free, nonlogical, not scientifically constrained choice.

I argue that that seems to me to be giving away the entire game. It must be the case that you can show that it is a rational inference to the value conclusion, or else you have stopped doing behavioral or social science activities and moved into a domain of dressing up what is ultimately a matter of taste or opinion. That is a posture which I do not feel is compatible with the notion of professionalism in evaluation.

The underlying theme of a great deal of the discussion in the
three papers—the theme that value choices are in some sense transcendent of logic—is one I still feel is wrong.

Let me illustrate with a section from Krathwohl’s paper.

... those who have thought seriously about science realize scientists must make many choices. Not all such choices are automatically and completely determined by the logic of the steps of the ‘scientific method.’ They involve judgment, judgments such as what is important and what is not... these judgments involve the weighing of various factors and deciding what is best in the situation to attain some kind of goal.

For me this situation is much simpler. That sort of weighing of factors, the giving of the reasons, is precisely the logic of evaluation. It is the logic of the steps in which you do this that force you to the conclusion, the final evaluation. So, instead of saying as he does—“not all such choices are completely determined by the logic of the steps of the scientific method,” I would say that they are, but that there are various types of logic of these steps, and the ones that are oriented towards an evaluative conclusion require a different kind of logic. In other words, I completely reject the idea that there is some kind of non-rational component in evaluative argument. Evaluators are simply (if you want to talk this way) scientists trying to determine the answer to a particular kind of question. The search for truth is there, but it is the truth about the merit of something or other, not the truth about the weight of something or other.

There is no difference between decision-oriented and conclusion-oriented research. That, in other words, is another example of the hangover from the value-free social science days. We do not want to jump out of the frying pan of that position into the fire of a position in which we say science is not value-free but the logic of the considerations doesn’t determine the values. The logic of the considerations determines the values. That is why it is still science and not value-free.

House shows his sympathy for this by saying that he feels that one couldn’t quite go so far as to see the activities within evaluation as scientific. He then explained this a bit by saying because it is unlike these other areas in the social sciences, it isn’t so much an empirical matter. But, I would argue, that is just the simplistic, empiricist view of what the social sciences are. If you look at what happens in economics, sociology, and psychology,
you find large areas there where very strong evaluative conclusions are achieved, for example, about the relative merits of certain experimental designs. And these are done in a perfectly rational, perfectly objective way. They do lead to evaluative conclusions. But they are not any the less scientific for that.

The question is whether evaluation must be justified upon the basis of the values of the society in which it is conducted. I think absolutely not. I don't care about the values of the society in which it is conducted any more than a physicist does. One might as well say the charge on the electron must be determined ultimately by the values of the society in which it exists. Not a bit. The merit of a program is the merit of a program whether anybody recognizes it or not. (We might not even be able to find it. We may need help in order to get implementation with respect to the values but we've got to separate the politics of implementation from the objective task of the evaluation.) So I have, regretably, this recidivist tendency to think that all these things are matters of fact. Values are one type of fact. We have got to be careful about the degree to which we suggest that when it comes to evaluating things we're into judgment, we're into transcending the logic of the steps of the scientific method. If we are, then we are in trouble, and I do not want us to be in that kind of trouble.
In a survey of the recent literature in the history of education, published in 1977 in Volume IV of the *Review of Research in Education* (Clifford, 1977), I took pains to include doctoral dissertations as well as published books and journal articles. I argued that dissertations suggest important facts about a research field and where it is going. Not only do the better dissertations provide a preview of coming articles and books, but together they indicate the interests and preoccupations of those who influence historical understanding not by what they, themselves, publish but by what they teach to prospective historians of education and to other students in schools and colleges of education. The stability and conservatism of a field, as well as its revision, may be charted.

Insight into emerging trends in a discipline may also be gotten by studying the annual program of scholarly and professional meetings. The author of a 1974 dissertation on school development in Boston before Horace Mann (Weber, 1974) remarks thus on the 1968 AERA symposium on “Urban Education: Needs and Opportunities for Further Research:”

These AERA papers reflected the sense of urgency and optimism of a new breed of educational historian. Theirs would be a history that would go beyond the official celebration of the march of education and democracy. Their sympathies would not be with school professionals and enlightened humanitarian leaders but instead with the poor and powerless. It would be a useful history that would highlight the cycles and continuities which bound the contemporary crisis of American education with its urban past. Their task for the immediate future would be nothing less than the forging of a comprehensive urban model of American educational history. (pp. 117-118)
An urban model for the historiography of American education did emerge, demonstrated not only by the case studies of individual cities (Lazerson, 1971; Kaestle, 1973; Ravitch, 1974; Schultz, 1973; Troen, 1975) but by David Tyack's influential synthesis, *The One Best System* (1974). The urban model introduces an urban bias, assuming that America is a nation of cities and that public schooling originated and developed in an insistent urban context even when most school children were not urban dwellers.

The sarcastic reactions of Jesse Lemisch to the program booklet of the 1974 meeting of the American Historical Association will illustrate the direction of my remarks about bias in this paper. Lemisch (1975) asked himself:

What New Directions, what New Trends, would be on display...? Session 105 sent my already overloaded heart into an exquisitely arrhythmical pounding: “New Trends in Historical Editing,” to be chaired by the executive director of the National Historical Publications Commission! And the papers were to be about Blacks and Women!! Great Hera, I thought, the sixties were not for nought: vencimos!!! And yet, my sensitive antennae seemed to detect a special message in the paper titles: “The Papers of Distinguished Black Americans,” “The Papers of Distinguished American Women.” To move into these areas, even if belatedly, was all to the good; but the focus was still, as it had been in the past, on the great and distinguished, seeming to exclude those who were not great, not distinguished. (p. 60)

If written history is to be something other than what Voltaire once described it—“a set of tricks played by the living upon the dead”—then historians and their audiences must recognize two sets of facts about the historian’s product. First there is the fact that the historian “knows” better and lives more easily in his own present than in another’s past. Hence, historical scholarship may tell us as much about historians and their own times as about the period which they are attempting to recreate. The personal experiences of the historian may introduce whole new subjects and approaches, as when historians of Southern and Eastern European lineage began to write immigration history (Higham, 1962). The movement of women and racial minorities closer to the mainstream of the history profession will have important repercussions for political and economic as well as social and cultural historiography. Much of today’s history of education is written, consciously or unconsciously, out of dis-
appointment with contemporary American public education, especially with urban schools. Add to this such "presentist" influences as the civil rights movement and its after effects, the women's movement, anti-war protest, the reassertion of a vigorous social science on the American political Left (Unger, 1967), and the appeal of sociological functionalism. It is for such reasons that Marc Bloch once remarked that "the past is, by definition, a datum which nothing in the future will change. But the knowledge of the past is something progressive which is constantly transforming and perfecting itself." However much I flinch at the optimism of Bloch's usage of "progressive" and "perfecting," his characterization of historiography as always subject to revising, partly under the influence of the present, is widely understood by historians, if not by their lay readership.

A second fact about historical scholarship which deserves attention is that it is shaped both by what is included and what is excluded; by errors of commission and by errors of omission. The products of historical research depend upon judgments, ordinarily implicit, "about what is, could be, or should be known. They entail definitions of the area, purpose and value of study" (Silver, 1977a, p. 57). Areas of investigation and of neglect in historical research are created and perpetuated by its reigning assumptions. In the historiography of education these include three related assumptions that have the status of operational principles; all are, in my view, substantially invalid and responsible for glaring omissions in the historical record.

What is thought and written and said about education is an acceptable representation of what education is and does. This first assumption is so patently absurd, when so baldly stated, that it may be surprising that education has been so long satisfied with its dominance by a kind of intellectual history. Even before intellectual history came into its present popularity—mostly following World War II and challenging the reign of political, diplomatic, and military treatment—the history of education was primarily the history of educational thought, and a history of educational thought more concerned with the articulation than with the genesis of ideas. Yet, as Berthoff (1960) has succinctly stated it, "Although the ideas of a particular epoch, as part of the reality of that time, can never be left out of the account, they seldom serve as an adequate or accurate picture of that reality itself" (p. 496). Even new fields of historical investigations, such as women's history, can become skewed in their interpretations by looking overly-long at what has been thought
about gender. The nineteenth century’s prescriptive literature concerning women does not disclose, except by indirection, the discrepancies between what “society” (i.e., certain men) expected of women and women’s actual behavior. Sicherman (1976) notes that, “By concentrating on what women actually did rather than how they have been defined, historians have found that women acted in more varied ways than the stereotypes suggest and that they exercised considerable autonomy” (p. 470).

When Barbara Finkelstein (1970) studied a large sample of the pedagogical literature of nineteenth-century America, she found that the most detailed treatments “... revolved not around the efforts of the typical nineteenth century pedagogue, but around the thought and work of pedagogical pioneers here and abroad” (p. 5). To have relied upon this literature to understand teacher behavior would have been to fall victim to the second assumption of educational historiography: The leaders, the proclaimed “spokesmen” of education are, in fact, the spokesmen of the educational enterprise. Historians are like many social scientists in their willingness to draw conclusions about social realities by analyzing data from the minority at the top. The history of labor is drawn from the papers of union leaders, church history from the bishops, the history of medical education from Welch and Flexner. The way to learn about popular attitudes toward education is not primarily to study the records of school-board members and newspaper editorials. The way to learn about teachers’ values and actions is not primarily to read Catherine Beecher or Henry Barnard or, even, Margaret Haley.

The history of education is solely or essentially the history of dispensing or imparting education. This third assumption means that pedagogical movements, curricular additions and rearrangements, proliferating legislation, and policy formation have dominated the field. Writing of English historiography, Harold Silver (1977b) observes that “relevance to twentieth-century historians of the nineteenth century has meant... a preoccupation with the state:"

Attempts to explain our modern, industrial, state-ordered society have been uppermost in their historical consciousness. (Not... to detract from efforts to understand the growth and importance of the role of government and the state... the fact is that historians have tended to close their eyes to features of social change that have not seemed “relevant” to these efforts. Histor-
ians of education have used the modern industrial state as a
touchstone of relevance. (pp. 10-11)

While liberal historiography has tended to treat the dispensers
of education, especially of public schooling, as the deliverers of
opportunity, radical and romantic historiography conceive them
as the imposers and controllers. In either case, education is some-
thing “DONE TO OTHERS, rather than something SOUGHT
AFTER AND GAINED by people” (Rooke, 1975, p. 27). Histor-
ians of education treat people, as Maxine Greene (1970) has
commented, “as either problems for the educators, beneficiaries
of others’ idealism or enlightenment, or (abstractly) as reservoirs
of democratic possibilities” (p. 5). The pronounced disposition
to place educational history in the context of impersonal social
forces and such mass movements as modernization, bureaucra-
tization, and professionalization further diminishes the persons
whose experience is the stuff of history. Yet, “those who teach
and those who learn are actors in their own right, irreducible
to institutional imperatives and systemic roles”; why not, then,
“begin with the assumption that careful attention to the behavior
and consciousness of groups and individuals is the proper start-
ing point of the construction of new generalizations?” (Gillis,
1977, p. 92). Why not, indeed!

Women’s studies and ethnic studies are signs of a more inclu-
sive effort, something clearly evident by the later 1960s. Histo-
riography had begun to be peopled by the “inarticulate,” the
“under-classes,” the “oppressed.” History is becoming an impor-
tant factor in the consciousness-raising which has marked group
life. A new interest in family experience and the effects of family
on educational and occupational success followed the research
of James Coleman and Christopher Jencks. Writing the history
of childhood has something to do with contemporaneous studies
by lawyers of children’s rights and by philosophers of the ethics
of child-adult relations (Kaestle, nd). The histories of childhood
and family life also indicate something else: an extension of the
historian’s subject matter from the “public” to the “private”
spheres—where ordinary and unexceptional individuals live
their lives and speak their minds.

More than thirty years ago, historians like Caroline Ware
(1940) and Theodore Blegen (1947) urged that the small and
everyday style of ordinary life be recovered historically, so that
larger movements might be understood. When historians re-

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and getting the “inarticulate” to speak were cited. Despite collections of historical essays like Tamara Hareven’s *Anonymous Americans* (1971), there is hardly anything in educational historiography that is “history at the grass roots.”

Robert Louis Stevenson (1881) claimed that “The cruellest lies are often told in silence” (p. 81). Consider the silence (or relative silence) of educational historiography—just as it focuses on schooling—as encompassing three kinds: There is its silence about educational experience and schooling’s outcomes or effects. There is its silence about the concerns and agendas of those who are the agents of institutionalized education. And there is its silence about the patrons, clients, and consumers of education. These omissions do more than leave incomplete the historical account, they probably warp it as well—with, as yet, unknown consequences for informing public policy on education.

The Neglect of Experience

As one historical era has succeeded another, more of the socialization of youth reportedly takes place in the confines of the classroom and its associated spaces; that confining youth in the school accelerated the historical creation of a school culture; as well as subcultures of students and adults, of girl students and boy students, of teachers and administrators. As yet, historians have not applied these concepts as they have other theoretical constructs from social science. There are no histories of classrooms, of which I am aware, and school and college histories (institutional histories) say virtually nothing in a systematic and analytical way about *life in schools*, or about the range of interactions of school experience with family experience and religious experience, with ethnicity, gender, social class, or community. Historians have assumed that policy promotes practice but have barely begun to perceive how practice might affect policy—as in the case of policy on enforcing compulsory school attendance laws.

The majority of children who experienced schooling in the nineteenth century did so in rural and village schools. In 1800, 6 percent of the population of the United States lived in communities defined as urban; by 1900 that proportion approached 40 percent. Throughout the century, however, the largest number of communities designated as urban had populations of
under 5,000 (US Bureau of Census, 1960). Indeed, as the population axis moved west and south—with the settling of Kansas, Illinois, Oklahoma, the Wisconsin and Oregon territories—it is possible to conjecture that more Americans lived more relentlessly isolated rural lives than had been the case in compact and village-oriented colonial New England. While Massachusetts in the mid-nineteenth century may not be representative of other regions or of the century as a whole, data analyzed by Kaestle and Vinovskis (1978) show the children of rural residents achieved consistently higher school attendance rates than did urban children. If educational history writ large was being made by an emerging urban school model and in the most urbanized and industrialized states, it is nonetheless very probable that most nineteenth-century Americans had their personal school histories shaped by rural life and rural values. That the greatest proportion of American teachers taught first, or exclusively, in rural schools seems certain. A bias toward rural life was expressed by many vocal educators born in the nineteenth century (Bullough, 1973).

More attention to the documents of human experience may challenge, at least for the period before 1870 or so, the urban-education thesis that is already beginning to wilt a bit. Local histories that look at neglected periods, such as the early nineteenth century (Gordon, 1974; Weber, 1974), tend to show more widespread school activity than once was believed to exist, and sometimes important changes. Thus, Weber (1974) found in Boston, in the period 1800 to 1820—"a time not particularly noted for its urban growth or social reform"—a significant enlargement of common schooling by the opening of public schools to females, blacks, and poor whites. He finds the causes less connected with the uniqueness of urban life, and more dependent upon the presence and individual actions of educational elites. Local elites, often a handful of individuals, emerge again and again in the personal-history literature as school promoters and decision makers.

The Omission of 'the Workers'

The story of schooling is not just that of the promoters and decision makers, but also of teachers and students, of those who sent their children and those who did not. Each group undoubtedly had a related but different view of its meaning and consequences, and their sometimes varying perspectives on the educa-
tional past need identification and airing. In the historiography, the silence of teachers is particularly striking (Clifford, 1975). Pedagogical theory and popular conceptions of teacher qualifications saw the person of the teacher as the critical element in colonial and republican American schooling. Yet historiography ignores them as people and, when it considers teachers at all, treats them as stereotypes: ineffective men and passive and rather pitiful spinsters, dragged reluctantly into semi-professional status by the vigor and imagination of a professionalized elite. A teacher is promoted into the history of education if he (rarely she) had been promoted out of the classroom by a subsequent and "more relevant" career as administrator, lecturer on education, author of schoolbooks, system-builder, or educational journalist.

Teachers have long been the agents of public school systems, charged with translating often vaguely-stated educational objectives into the habits of mind and action of their students, which the times called developing "virtuous and responsible character." In the first three centuries of American educational experience, teachers were also the initiators and carriers of a system of entrepreneurial schooling which made literate, and somewhat sophisticated and skilled, millions of Americans. They did this by advertising their willingness to take in pupils by outfitting a school and rounding up subscribers, by foregoing a living wage to keep afloat an unendowed and debt-ridden college. If "bureaucratization" of education is today much-decried, even by teacher organizations, there is some reason to think that their predecessors in the nation's classrooms might have welcomed it. Bureaucracy would have spared them the painful, anxious experience so commonly revealed in the voluminous teacher authored personal literature of the nineteenth century: that of trying to collect the agreed-upon payment for their services. I have argued elsewhere (Clifford, 1978b) that the low pay and peripatetic nature of teaching itself enhanced the spread of schooling.

Recent local studies (Gitelman, 1974; Thernstrom, 1964-1973), primarily of northeastern cities, report that schooling was not strongly correlated with occupational and social mobility much before the present century. This generalization would have to be qualified if these historians had looked at teachers as workers—i.e., if they had looked at women's work. Enrolling in the teaching force represented upward social mobility for quite large numbers of Americans since the early nineteenth...
Women teachers as wage earners frequently contributed to education as a growth industry by using their wages to buy further schooling for themselves and augment family income to permit additional schooling for their siblings. A study (Hareven, 1975) of working-class families in Manchester, New Hampshire in the early twentieth century found that daughters employed in factories contributed a larger proportion (95 percent) of their earnings to their families than did sons (83 percent). The rather early appearance of women from working-class and immigrant backgrounds as public-school teachers should also be examined as a check upon the facile assumptions that factors of class and ethnicity alienated many Americans from the growing public-school sector.

A few historians of education are beginning to look at women teachers who extended their sphere—as into work with the freedmen behind the Union lines or into teacher organizing. But women's consciousness could be changed radically merely by leaving the family circle and entering such “acceptable” female occupations as factory work, dress making, or teaching. Numerous teacher diaries and letters show a rising spirit of independence and, sometimes, contentiousness among the farmer's daughter turned schoolma'am. Twenty-year old Jane Conine teaching in Perry, New York in 1855, wrote the following to a sister removed to Sauk County, Wisconsin:

I intend to be differently situated if I live, & teach another season. I don't know whether the dist(ric) like me or not, & I dont care much. I do the best I can, & if they want to find fall the(y) may. (a privilege which people in general .nprove.). I never felt so independant in any thing I ever attempted, as in teaching. They wanted me in our school, but I told them plainly that I never would attempt to govern children that wer not governed at home. That is I would not go into such a school if I knew it but if I was once in, I presume I should Usu(r)pe my authority. The second week of school, one of my little girls told me that her mother said, if I punished her she woulAke her out I never had (met?) her dear ma but I ventured, to send her word to this effect, that I governed my own school, & further more if her children need punishing she might expect that they would get it. They are here today & I don't borrow any trouble about their future appear-ance. (Conine, 1974, pp. 162-163)

The unequal pay and limited career opportunities of female
teachers, the arduous and frequently unfulfilling nature of their duties, were often compensated for by the growing self-confidence, freedom, and opportunity to forge new life-long friendships and associations (Bernard & Vinovskis, 1977; Clifford, 1978a; Smith-Rosenberg, 1975). A spinster teacher group emerged as did a larger sense of sorority, a network of assistance in locating better teaching positions and, perhaps, a yet to be described "teacher subculture"—something that might have given more shape to the pedagogical art than did the successive pedagogical theories with which earlier historians were long preoccupied.

Omission of the Clients' Views

Given the fact that the consumption of schooling was voluntary for the greater part of America's educational past, the elements going into the family's decision to provide or withhold schooling from children and youth are surprisingly little studied; only recently has this source of distortion begun to be remedied, largely by research that analyzes quantifiable data on school consumption patterns. Qualitative sources—the personal-history literature—suggest the important role which siblings once played in the decision. This was to change, however, with lower mortality rates, smaller family size, the disappearance of the rate bill under fuller tax assumption of public school costs, and the growth of scholarship and loan arrangements in higher education. These, when added to the proliferation of legal, economic and social compulsion of school attendance, together virtually eliminated the sibling role.

Family motivations and expectations of education are undoubtedly complex and variable. While some parents framed choices by utilitarian values, others responded to factors of relative status or "conspicuous consumption." When Esther Dunn was a high school student in Portland, Maine in 1907, she recalled that

I took Greek and it was a great cross to me. No one I knew took Greek. There were four others in the class; three were sons of doctors and obviously were heading for the same profession. They would need Greek for medical terms and prescriptions. There was one girl besides myself, the daughter of a minister. She and I, with the sudden intimacy born of misery, compared notes on the first day. Her father had forced her to take Greek.
too. Our common experience of parental tyranny made the pre-
dicament more bearable.

While Father did not know Greek, he could not have lived in
New England among lawyers and judges without feeling its
prestige. (1945, p. 49)

A commonplace presumption is that providing education is
something the family does for its offspring. That schools might
also have been something parents did for themselves should be
considered—even though quite prosaic motivations are often
buried in historical obscurity. Parents in early-modern England
and France who sent their sons off to boarding schools were,
according to school officials, also doing something for them-
seises: purchasing extended relief from their children's tiresome
or troubling company. The faculty at pious Harvard complained
of the same phenomenon in the later seventeenth century. More
universally, and more important for the diffusion of public
schooling, was the fact that the local district school offered day-
time child care for nineteenth-century women whose domestic
duties had not been appreciably lightened by the marvels of
technology and invention. More women in households remained
"producers" than became "consumers." Such an interpretation
suggests a symbiotic relationship between home and school.

In a recent article, however, Carl Kaestle (1978) uses school
records, especially school-committee reports, and educational
tracts to reveal "constant contention" between home and school,
family and teacher. Much of this conflict stemmed from disa-
greements over school discipline—school trustees and teachers
attributing much of the need of discipline to parental neglect
of good home training. He appears to attribute the conflict as
following immediately from two phenomena: related to larger
social change: first, the attempt to expand the teacher's authority
into areas of parental privilege and, second, denigration of a
body of parents whose class and ethnic attributes were thought
to make them unfit properly to socialize their children. My own
research to date, primarily relying upon letters and diaries
reveals more consensus than conflict, and a greater personal
overlap and identification of school functionaries (teachers and
trustees) with community residents. Kaestle and I agree, how-
ever, on the powerful presence of shared goals and upon the fact
that the family was not a "passive element in the history of edu-
cation." Moreover, we concur in the need to open "a window on
a world of family attitudes and behavior quite independent of
child rearing literature and the opinions of professional educators” (Kaestle, 1978, p. 16).

A recent article on women’s education prior to the Civil War (Vinovskis & Bernard, 1978) contends that the failure to know the educational experience of most women is “due primarily to historians’ reliance on literate sources such as diaries, personal letters, and the observations of contemporary writers . . .” (pp. 856-857). Except for the authors of biography, however, I would contend that diaries and personal letters have been woefully underutilized among the historian’s bank of literary sources. There are, of course, some who would contend that, by current social science standards, all such material must be used only if it is in sufficient volume to be quantified and treated statistically; it is, otherwise, “memorabilia” and not historical source material. The recent visibility of “quanto-history” provoked E. P. Thompson (1966) to protest:

At a certain point one ceases to defend a certain view of history; one must defend history itself. A quantitative methodology must not be allowed to remain uncriticized which obliterates (as “literary” or as “atypical”) whole categories of evidence. (p. 280)

As no more myself than an interested reader of quantitative studies of the history of education, I fall back upon the comforting words of Stephen Thernstrom, perhaps the most influential of the American practitioners of the new urban history of numbers and coefficients. Writing of descriptive materials, he argues that they fulfill at least these functions: (1) providing information essential to arranging harder data in meaningful categories; (2) yielding hints of patterns to be explored through statistical analysis; and (3) assisting in the interpretation of relationships that appear in the statistical data by suggesting the underlying mechanisms. He concludes:

Most important, it is only through such evidence that the investigator may begin to understand the perceptions and emotions of the people he is dealing with. The austerely objective facts uncovered by empirical social research influence the course of history as they are filtered through the consciousness of obstinately subjective human beings. (Thernstrom, 1971, p. 371)

Because they share a common interest in bringing the lives and times of the masses of ordinary people into the historian’s consciousness, the quantifiers and the users of more subjective
documents may indeed collaborate in potentially valuable ways; there might well already be models for future research in the history of education in the creative work of David Allmendinger, Carl Kaestle, and Maris Vinovskis. The easier enterprise will be that of broadening the historian's essentially literary approaches by including more diverse documents in the data base. Nancy Cott (1977), for example, tries to reproduce the lives and experiences of not-notable women of the early nineteenth century by adding one hundred diaries as well as personal correspondences to the more traditionally exploited normative literature of sermons, conduct books, and women's magazines. Charlotte Erickson (1972) employs extracts from many individuals' previously-unpublished letters in Invisib le Immigrants. Slave narratives and black autobiographies are getting extensive use, and have generated reference aids and expanded the discussions of methodological issues (Blassingame, 1973, 1975; Brignano, 1974; Butterfield, 1974; Feldstein, 1971). James L. Roark (1977) uses the personal papers of 160 former slave owners "to capture reality as the planters knew it." One of the still-too infrequent uses of personal papers in the history of education is David Allmendinger's searching after the "silent people" of higher education, the students, and the effect of their presence upon their institutions, in Paupers and Scholars (1975). Historians, however, still underutilize autobiography and other personal-history writing, and most of the theoretical works and dissertations are being produced in departments of literature rather than history—and, least of all, by education department historians.

One concern of this monograph is identifying how the methods of the discipline shape the view of education which emerges from the research. Therefore, before concluding this brief on behalf of an unprecedented greater use of personal documents, three characteristics of this body of material must be mentioned. First, it is vast. Counting only that small part which is in print and the much greater part which remains in manuscript form and is accessible to the public in libraries and historical societies, is to speak of a reservoir in which many historians can be drowned. Second, it is difficult material to work with. Manuscripts are housed in hundreds of libraries, and to sample across regions is costly and time-consuming; to do less, however, is to perpetuate the pronounced northeastern bias of the historiography of American education or to contribute strictly local or regional alternatives. The logistics of locating materials differ markedly from the archival research done to produce biography; names are
essentially unimportant and identities immaterial, except that the research logic steers one away from spending much time with the papers of well-known persons. The standard reference works (Kaplan, 1962; Mathews, 1974; National Union Catalogue) are not organized to enhance the feasibility of research on “anonymous Americans.” Whether using reference works or a library’s own catalogue, such “locators” as “education” and “schooling” are inadequate to reach all of the dimensions of perspective, experience, and practice that are relevant to educational history. The subjects around which catalogues were traditionally built—political history, local history, biography, and genealogy—do not facilitate doing such new social history as the history of childhood, women’s history, ethnic relations, occupational life. To use the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota requires a working knowledge of several foreign languages. With manuscripts there are other difficulties inherent in the nature of the materials themselves: they are fragile, faded, often barely legible. They, like their counterparts in print, frequently have a high dross rate: stunning revelations and valuable information are often buried in stupifying trivia.

Third, while personal history documents do exist for a more broadly representative population than might be supposed, they do contain sampling biases of their own. Lawrence Veysey once remarked to me that autobiography be considered suspect because its authors might be drawn disproportionately from inordinately smug and self-satisfied individualists. If so, there remains a great amount of autobiographical writing in many diaries and journals, not intended to provide moral lessons to other readers. Local elites are far better represented, in print or in preserved manuscripts, than are persons at or near the bottom of the social and economic scale. People who were functionally illiterate did not write letters, and those whose literacy was marginal wrote little beyond a few receipts, the vital statistics laboriously recorded in their Bibles, and a few letters—often composed in times of personal crisis. The growing body of demographic research on geographic mobility in the United States also demonstrates a positive correlation between stability of residence in a community and economic position as measured by taxes paid and property holdings. Local and regional historical societies, better able to gather the records of long-established residents and families, will better sample the more eco-
nomically and socially secure as well. Nonetheless, sheer accident, family relationships, and the desire to preserve the historical record of some social movements have together preserved elements of the experiences of many among the truly obscure and anonymous of the American past.

A charge to the several symposia on "Values Imposed by the Disciplines . . ." is to explore how the conclusions of research might affect education: as by creating a particular view of education, or by limiting the usefulness of its knowledge for the formulation of educational policy and the guidance of educational practice.

With respect to historical research on education it has been claimed (Greer, 1972) that liberal historiography produced a rosy view of American public education, that obscured its chronic failures and perpetuated an unjust system. More recently (Ravitch, 1978) it has been argued that radical and pessimistic conclusions drawn from revisionist historical research are undermining efforts to improve public education. That a view of the educational past can ramify beyond the historians' community is argued by Weber (1974):

"The belief in the flexibility of a pre-modern free educational market colors contemporary discussions about alternative futures for public schools. Proposals for educational vouchers and for a deschooled society rely upon images of an educational free market and beliefs about what growing up used to be like. If projections of the future are continuations of our sense of the past, then what in fact did happen makes a difference" (p. 40)

On what bases can such attributions of influence to historiography be laid? Without intending to belittle the historian's efforts in the slightest, I admit myself profoundly unconvinced that the "lesson of history"—whether it be optimistic or pessimistic, liberal or radical—will itself cause or influence to be caused one or another kind of public policy respecting education. I base my skepticism upon two sets of observations: one specific to the enterprise of historical studies in education and the second to the effects of educational research writ large.

First is the limited range of direct exposure to the historiography of education. Doctoral studies in the history of education have never bulked large in American universities. A study of doctorates (Moore, 1960) awarded in education during the
period 1956–1958 found the combined fields of history and philosophy of education ranked 18th in number of degrees, representing 2.8 percent of all education doctorates. A questionnaire study (Medlyn, 1965) of 63 universities projecting doctorates to be awarded in 1965 reported 50 to be awarded in history and philosophy, compared to 111 in educational psychology and 222 in school administration. A more recent study (Ott, 1977) did not list history of education as a field, but reported that doctorates in social foundations were about 2.4 percent of the 35,489 doctorates awarded in education in the period 1971 through 1974–75. Advanced degree students in other professional specializations in education get whatever exposure they have to historical fact and interpretation in some often uncertain melange called social foundations of education. The same may be said of most first-degree or first-credential students; and, with the recent coming to domination of the crass anti-intellectualism of performance-based teacher education programs, their exposure to humanistic studies has virtually disappeared. (Even the best monographs on educational history seldom penetrate very deeply into the larger historical profession, into American social science, or become the bed-time reading of the American power elite. Should historians' work become known and quoted, I think it is because it "fits" a prevailing or emerging view or policy imperative.)

This brings me to my second set of reasons to doubt the influence of historical research in forming educational policy and practice. For AERA's Second Handbook of Research on Teaching, I attempted an historical analysis of the impact of educational research upon school practice across the curriculum (Clifford, 1973). More recently, for the National Academy of Education, I reconstructed an intensive case study of vocabulary research, which did influence educational thought, textbook construction, and pedagogy in a variety of school subjects (Clifford, 1978c). If they did not convince others, these efforts convinced me, at least, that educational research ordinarily had little or no influence upon the behavior of educational practitioners or those who make policy for schools and that, where impact can be demonstrated, it is because of characteristics of the political or ideological or sociological context in which education is then operating more than the characteristics of the research itself. Knowledge, scientific or otherwise, is one among the lesser pressures operating upon that vast, costly, and alternately sensi-
tive and resistant enterprise that is institutionalized education. Research impact is facilitated when the research substantiates existing opinion, confirms experience, or legitimates some already-agreed upon change.

This paper started with the proposition that a given piece of historical research often provides glimpses into the particular worries of the historian's own times. It concludes with the proposition that audience or readership reaction to historical research is also a gauge of the temper of the times.

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Values Imposed by History: Implications for Educational Research and Development Policy—
“A Limited Assignment”

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The Poet Wonders Whether the Course of History is a Progress, a Drama, a Retrogression, a Cycle, an Undulation, a Vortex, a Right-or-Left-Handed Spiral, a Mere Continuum, or What Have You. Certain Evidence is Brought Forward, but of an Ambiguous and Inconclusive Nature.

John Barth
The Sot-Weed Factor, 1960, p. 679

Given the opportunity to aggrandize the history of education, I shall instead display some modesty about the implications of our discipline for educational research and policy making.

Each age, in the words of Frederick Jackson Turner, writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in its own time. Which is to say that the values imposed on history by the historian are probably more germane for our purposes than the values imposed by history. The evidence doesn’t speak for itself. It speaks only through the historian. It is he who decides which evidence to give the floor and the order of preference. And in his selection and arrangement of the evidence, the historian is guided by his knowledge, his training, his personality, his convictions, and the prevailing cultural or intellectual climate.

In the parent field of history, there are an ever-increasing number of books on the subject “What is History,” and there are historians who make such theorizing the speciality in their academic careers.¹ In our specialization of history of education,

¹There is really a vast literature here. I have found most helpful: Kracauer, 1969, Lakatos 1968, Stern, 1956, Tillinghast, 1972."
we have had an extraordinary outpouring recently of articles in the historiography of the field, of the review-of-the-literature sort (Church, 1971; Clifford, 1976; Cohen, 1978; Sloan, 1973; Tyack, 1970). But we don’t do much theorizing about the nature of history or the nature of historical knowledge. I am not really inclined to be very introspective about history. But the subject of this monograph is but the latest phase of a venerable debate that goes back to the beginnings of our specialty. In any event, the question posed for us has a historical dimension, which I intend to elucidate. Those who are not professional historians may find this method of approach to a problem illuminating. My colleagues in history of education may also find this exercise useful. A discipline which refuses to remember its past will not realize when it is being silly, or repetitious, or additive, or integrative, or transformational, or what. Inadvertently, I see that I make some other points. Thus, by instinct and training I am opposed to presentist history; i.e., to history dealing directly with contemporary issues, or to doing history with present problems or present policy-making foremost in mind. (I don’t like my peaceful reading and writing disturbed by angry survivors from the past, era telling me what actually happened—“No need for all that research, Cohen, I’ll tell you how it was.”) Nevertheless, here I am, trying to create a “usable past” for those concerned with the implications of history for present policy-making. It is not my intention here to give a full survey of the development of American educational historiography or to deal with every outstanding historian of education. One has to make some choices. Which is to say there are other stories one might tell—another point of this paper.

The more I read the more it seems to me that ideas endlessly repeat previous patterns. Like John Morley, I am strongly tempted to believe that in the important matters of speculation no question, and hardly any answer, is altogether new. In its relatively brief career as a discipline, history of education has offered different meanings to different historians. The questions that have agitated our guild, that have caused the most rivalry and contentiousness, have been precisely about the degree to which historians of education should be detached from or engaged with the educational or social problems of the day; i.e., questions about what used to be called the “function” of history in a pro-

But see Butts, 1974, Greene, 1967, Silver 1977a, 1977b
The mode of treating the field took form at the beginning of the century when the pioneer historians of education were reacting against the then-dominant textbooks—essentially histories of European educational philosophy (see Cohen, 1976). "Scientific history" was the formative orthodoxy of our earliest professional historians of American education—Edwin Grant Dexter and Richard G. Boone. For example, Dexter's *History of Education in the United States* was 656 pages of densely packed "facts." His concern with "facts" was quite deliberate: "The most crying need of the student of our educational history is a considerable mass of definite fact upon which to base his own generalizations" (Dexter, 1904, p. IV).

Dexter's view reigned supreme until Professor Henry Suzzallo of Teachers College laid down the guideline for a revised history of education a few years later. Reflecting a widely shared view in teacher-education circles, Suzzallo dismissed Dexter's notion of history of education as not "functional" in the professional training program, i.e., it was irrelevant and useless. Suzzallo called upon historians of education to place their emphasis on relevance to present problems of educational practice, "the most pertinent to an understanding of the present educational system," the better (Burnham & Suzzallo, 1908, p. 53). This is where Ellwood Cubberley would subsequently make his contribution. Cubberley's *Public Education in the United States* breaks with the history of Dexter and joins up with the tradition of the "new" history of James Harvey Robinson. History of education, as hitherto written, Cubberley said, "had little relation to present-day problems in education," and had "failed to function in orienting the prospective teacher." Cubberley presented his own history as an "interpretation" of American educational history dealing with the "larger problems of present-day education in the light of their historical development." Cubberley deliberately aimed to inspire and guide. He wanted his readers "to see the educational service . . . as a great national institution evolved by democracy to help it solve its many perplexing problems" (Cubberley, 1919, p. VII)

Cubberley's *Public Education in the United States* was enormously popular: Cubberley's notion of the function of history of education would dominate the field for several decades, but never without challenge. In the 1920s, a new generation of his-
torians of education, trained largely by Paul Monroe of Teachers College, Columbia, returned to the older ideal of scientific objectivity, of historical detachment, and struck back at Cubberley as well as the educationalists who were demanding that history of education be more “functional.” Frederic Eby (1927) of the University of Texas dismissed the functionalist argument as “an apprenticeship, normal-training ideal.” Others like Edgar Knight of North Carolina University and Harry Good of Ohio State argued that history was already functional—it shakes up old prejudices, enlarges horizons, provides perspective, and sheds light on the origins of current problems, and thus contributes to our understanding of these problems, if not to their solution (Wesley, 1933). In the 1930s this concept of the “function” of history of education would be severely tested.

The demand that history of education be less “academic” and more relevant to present problems and partisan to boot received enormous impetus during the Depression years from the “social reconstructionists” in education and the “progressives” in the field of history. The social reconstructionists regarded the schools as general headquarters for the new social order, with teachers out in the front lines. But if teachers were to be politicized, teacher-training would have to be transformed; the disciplines bearing on education would have to become more self-consciously ideological. The reconstructionists found allies among progressive historians led by Charles Beard, whose notion of the “new” history was as a form of social or political action (Crowe, 1966; Higham, Krieger, & Gilbert, 1965). Many in the field of education were excited at what seemed to them a chance to affect the course of history. The school would assume a leading role in building the new social order. The teaching profession would assume responsibility for molding the minds of the young. But if teachers were to play their role in social reconstruction, teacher-training would have to be transformed; imbued with the social point of view. The subject-centered specialists, the discipline-oriented faculty were put down firmly by social reconstructionists. Historians of education were singled out for censure (Kilpatrick, 1932; Rugg, 1947, 1952). The historians of education

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1Frederic Readler recalled that the Depression made it impossible to remain silent and we spoke out. It was a good time to be alive. Give me the 30’s (Bowers, 1969, p. 141).
defended themselves forcefully. Edward Reisner, Monroe’s successor at Teachers College, complained against the use of history for purposes of indoctrination, against history in the service of “immediate utilitarian ends.” He pointed out that the values of history are long-term values. History, properly conceived, “aims not at direct action but at stimulating, sharpening, and regulating thinking” (Reisner, 1944). Robert Ulich of Harvard (1936) quoted Santayana: “Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Stuart Noble of the University of Missouri referred caustically to certain thinkers who would obligate educators to visualize the requirements of a future state of society and set the schools to the task of creating the new social order. Such a proposal, he observed “is virtually without precedent in this country” (Noble, 1928, p. 380). In Eby and Arrowood’s The Development of American Education, the social reconstructionists were indirectly told off: “The authors have no new and peculiar point of view to offer, no special thesis to propound. They prefer to explain educational movements by letting history tell its own story” (Eby & Arrowood, 1943, p. VIII).

But the question of the “function” of the history of education refused to die. seemingly settled in one decade, it erupted in another. In the 1940s and 1950s social foundations of education, that unique curricular innovation born at Teachers College, Columbia was brought to maturity at the University of Illinois School of Education. In the late ‘40s the University of Illinois foundations group formulated a theory of the professional curriculum which “fused” or “integrated” the disciplines—philosophy, sociology, comparative education, and history—in the service of contemporary problems and policy-making in education. Philosophy of education, sociology of education, and comparative education seemed eager to enlist; history of education was recalcitrant, although more deeply and bitterly divided than ever before. To Archibald Anderson, the historian of education at the School of Education at the University of Illinois, the continued study of history of education as an “academic” subject was suicidal. To Anderson the survival of history of education as a specialty depended on its becoming a handmaiden to the “foundations” and the present-problems approach (Anderson, 1949). John S. Brubacher, Halleck Professor of Philosophy and History of Education at Yale agreed. If “we can dig out segments of educational history cut to size,” Brubacher said, then history’s contribution would not only be welcome, but sought after. “Of
course.” Brubacher said, “there will be some who have an antiquarian interest in the past as the past, but they are not likely to be many among professional students of education. Such students will have an interest in history . . . because it illuminates the contemporary problems with which they have to deal” (Anderson, 1947; Anderson, et al. 1951, pp. 72–73). Brubacher was unable to impose his canons of the craft of history upon his contemporaries. The historian, observed Stanford’s Edgar Wesley, believes that knowledge of the past will help us understand the present—but he knows that his primary job is to explain the past. In any event, Wesley (1944) continues, history is only a guide, not a taskmaster; it can only suggest, it cannot command. Newton Edwards of the University of Chicago also opposed any tendency to subordinate history to present problems. To Edwards history was a way of knowing, not of doing. “History is developmental. It is concerned with the interrelationships of human experience and institutions. It seeks a comprehensive understanding of a total culture within a given time and place.” From history one may gain “insight” into the problems of one’s own time. But if history is to achieve this purpose, it must be regarded “as a seamless web” (Edwards, 1949, pp. 70–74). Stuart Noble was both blunter and more emphatic. He thought it “neither necessary or desirable” to teach history of education “with the motive of relevancy to current problems” (Noble, 1949, pp. 78–79). Professor Good called for a strict policy of commitment to the discipline, rather than to the educational practitioner: “history of education is history. And since educational history is history, it has the same overall functions as history” (Williams, 1953, pp. 121–122). To Lawrence Cremin, 1951, 1953) representing the newest generation of historians of education, the function of history was to provide “insight” and “wisdom.”

R. Freeman Butts of Teachers College, the most outstanding historian and the most sophisticated theoretician among the historians of education in the 1940s and 1950s, tried to stake out a middle position between the problems-centered approach and the problems-be-damned, we study history for its own sake approach. The history of education, Butts observed, has been taught in a chronological way that has failed to translate the past to the present, and failed to indicate the meaning of historical generalizations for the present. Much of this emphasis, he said, stemmed from an overly academic view of historical research that borrowed its methods from the physical sciences.
and was concerned only with facts for their own sake to the exclusion of their meaning for present problems (Butts, 1947; Butts & Cremin, 1953). Now the problem was how to reconcile facts and meaning; facts and interpretation; facts and exegesis. Butts tried to find a balance. The historian would have to admit his bias—in Butts' case—the "frankly critical, experimental, and progressive" attitude. But the craft imposes certain restrictions on the historian. He cannot alter or shape his material as he pleases. His "frame of reference" or ideological commitment must not interfere with the historian's ideal of objectivity; pertinent and relevant evidence should not willfully be overlooked or mutilated in order to fit what the writer would like to find. History of education would then contribute both to the solution of the major problems confronting American education and to American social and intellectual history. While expressing a "great regard for intellectual achievement and scholarship," Butts (1939) held that "if academic scholarship is the only concern the teachers college loses touch with the realities of education and society." Academic discipline and professional concern must go hand in hand. Butts (1957) asked:

Shall universities be centres of purely intellectual concerns or shall they point the way to social responsibility? Shall they be devotees of the "life of the mind" or advocates of social and public service? Shall they be ivory towers or watch towers? . . . What is the life of the mind without service, and what is service without the life of the mind? . . .

Butts was unique because he believed that history mattered so much. Butts was convinced that the way we viewed the past had consequences for the way we acted on present problems—or on present policy. That is, it was important to have the "right" view of the past if we were to act intelligently in the present. And Butts also cared intensely about objectivity and scholarly integrity. This is brought out clearly in Butts' (1950) The American Tradition in Religion and Education (see especially pp. X-XIII). Butts discovered in our colonial history the "authentic" meaning of the wall of separation between church and state—the wall was high and impregnable. In his generally favorable review of the book, Professor William Brickman of NYU, rare in our guild for his humor and wit, noted wryly that despite Butts' meticulous exposure of his personal bias, Butts had no difficulty
in proving what he conceived to be a desirable tradition even before he began. Then the multilingual Brickman (1950, p. 440) commented, \textit{se non e vero, e molto bene travato} ("Even if it isn't true, it's very well done).

In the end, most historians of education in the '50s, bowing to the dominant climate in schools of education, as I can testify, followed the problems-oriented approach in their teaching and writing.

In 1957 I came under the simultaneous influence of two different styles of history: one proceeding from Lawrence Cremin, the other from R. Freeman Butts. Their approaches were almost diametrically opposed. Professor Cremin was my major advisor, but I took courses with and TA'd for both Cremin and Butts for several years, 1957-59. Cremin chaired my doctoral committee, and Butts served on the committee. But I think that what I came to believe regarding history and history of education came not only from what I was explicitly taught, but from what I absorbed from the Zeitgeist and filtered through a filament of age, predisposition, and chance encounters.

The late '50s were, in the words of one historian of the period, a sober time, "wary of utopias, fed up with romantic heroism... and disenchanted with schemes for the salvation of the world" (Stromberg, 1975, p. 3). The general mood was one of retreat from ideologies and illusions. One of the books which greatly impressed some of us at Teachers College was Daniel Bell's (1960) \textit{The End of Ideology}. We were also reading the novels, poems, and plays of Eliot, Camus, Pinter, and Beckett. In theory of history we were influenced by Karl Popper's \textit{The Poverty of Historicism}, and especially Reinhold Niebuhr's \textit{The Irony of American History}. We also were very much influenced by Jacques Barzun's mordant \textit{The House of Intellect}. The intellectual class, wrote Barzun, which ought always to remain independent, has been seduced by "philanthropy," i.e., social crusading. We agreed. The style my friends and I appreciated and tried to cultivate was irony, ambiguity, detachment, and distance; overwhelming involvement in creeds or issues, commit-

\footnote{"One finds at the end of the fifties," Bell (1960) wrote, \textit{a disconcerting casualty... In the West... among the intellectuals, the old passions are spent. The new generation with no meaningful memory of the old debates, and no secure tradition to build upon, finds itself seeking new purposes within a framework of political society that has rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chthonic vision" (pp. 393ff).}
ment, passion, offended our sensibilities. We preferred history which was characterized by complexity and unintended consequence, rather than neat cause and effect relations. We thought of ourselves, the few of us in history (and philosophy) who had come under Cremin's wing, as defenders of intellectual history. Cremin used to argue in opposition to the problems approach, that it was too easy to lose the sense of historical continuity and to leave out important historical sequences. Cremin preferred the "ivory tower" to the "watchtower." We agreed. We thought activism, i.e., the reigning problems-policy approach, the natural enemy of the intellect; that activism involved an inevitable infringement on our independence of thought. We were not too upset then when in the late 1950s the roof caved in on progressivism in American education.

The "crisis" in education centered on academic standards, the role of subject-matter content in education, and eventually the role of the professional schools and departments of education in the training of teachers. Educational Wastelands, by Arthur Bestor, a historian at the University of Illinois, had the strongest impact. We paid particular attention to Bestor's views on history of education. The college of education, Bestor charged, sets up its own history courses. Torn from its context of general historical change, such a course "may easily become the kind of distorted history which presents the past as a mournful catalogue of errors, redeemed by some few feeble gropings toward that perfection of wisdom which the present generation . . . alone possesses."

The integrity of the disciplines, Bestor declared, must be inviolate; philosophy of education must be taught philosophically; the history of education, historically (Bestor, 1953, p. 145ff: pp 251-252).

All of this struck a very responsive chord in a handful of us. Perhaps our glee at the discrediting of foundations of education and problems-centered history of education by Bestor and the others was a form of defense mechanism which Anna Freud calls "identification with the aggressor." Perhaps it was our way of working out some of the oedipal-type problems which inevitably surface between graduate students and their mentors and institutions. In any event, we picked our cues from Cremin rather for the debate then going on in the parent field of history over presentation and standards in the writing of history, see White (1949) and Frankel (1955).

This is a too-neglected subject. Loewenberg has some interesting things to say in his 1966 article on "emotional problems of graduate education" and in his 1975 article on the graduate years.
than Butts. We wanted to become more like the *fraternal*-seem-
ing Cremin (that is, our idealized, distorted notion of Cremin),
as against (our equally distorted notion of) the more *paternal-
seeming* Butts. Or maybe it was simply the revolt of one gener-
ation against the authority of its predecessors or "parents." Cremin
we considered one of our generation, our older brother. Butts
represented the older generation, our father; we defied the "old
man."

Our department at Teachers College—Social and Philosophi-
cal Foundations of Education—was almost exclusively problems-
oriented. For example, Cremin did a course entitled "History of
Education in American Culture." The first half of the semester
comprised a "Survey of American Educational History, 1600–
Present"; the second half was devoted to the "Historical Treat-
ment of Some Representative Contemporary Problems," i.e.,
"Church, State, and School", "Conflicting Approaches to the
Educational Program"; "Conflicting Values of Teacher Educa-
tion," "Academic Freedom," and "Equality of Educational
Opportunity." Then, Cremin also did a course on "Readings in
Contemporary Educational Policy," more problems of educa-
tion, including now, besides the above-named, problems of
segregation, juvenile delinquency, and urban education. Then
there was the big "foundations" course, "Education and So-
ciety," which Cremin also taught and which in one semester
covered the following problems: segregation and public educa-
tion, religion and public education; public and private schools;
centralization and education; academic freedom; the teaching
profession; the scope of the curriculum; elite versus universal
education; schools and cultural values; schools and manpower;
the school in the metropolis; and education, nationalism, and
internationalism! As I leaf through the yellow pages of my course
outlines and notes and bibliographies from 20
years ago and
come across these "problems" of education, these old expressions
of passion, and remember the countless days spent reading Henry
Ehler, *Crucial Issues in Education*, and Leo Pfeffer's 800-page
*Church, State and Freedom*; and Benjamin Fine, *1,000,000
Delinquents*; and Allen Heely, *Why the Private School?*; and
Sidney Hook, *Heresy Yes, Conspiracy No*; and Myron Lieber-
nan's *Education as a Profession*, all must reading, I wonder
what was it all about.

Some of us graduate students wanted to get away from what
we thought of as a meretricious professionalism consuming our
energies in a vain effort to exploit history to find solutions to the current “problems” of education. We had a very definite, if rarely publicly articulated, idea of the model of a historian: our Ranke’s Historian, seeking to reconstruct the past “wie es eigentlich gewesen” (as it actually was). At my final oral exam for the doctorate in 1963, Professor Butts asked me what I was really up to in my dissertation, what was my “interest.” I actually quoted Ranke. Professor Butts gave me a funny look but let me pass. We thought this emphasis on contemporary problems was a violation of the canons of how a historian behaves; furthermore, we thought the moral passions it aroused were gauche, culturally out of style. To friends who scoffed that we wanted to withdraw into the ivory tower, we replied—give us the highest one possible.

By the late ’50s even Professor Butts must have been having second thoughts about the “watchtower” position. The balance Butts sought to maintain between intellectual rigor and commitment to a particular “frame of reference of things deemed necessary and desirable” was too fragile, too difficult to keep taut. Responsibility to the world of scholarship seemed inevitably to take a backseat to ideological commitment.” Butts could see firsthand that things weren’t quite working out the way he had hoped. Butts became more and more disgusted with relevance-seeking graduate students who were full of passion for problem-solving and social reform and cavalier towards scholarship. He was devastating at final oral exams for graduate students in foundations in the late ’50s. Butts coldly flunked students who confidently proclaimed the “right” answers to the issues of the times, but who didn’t respect scholarship in general or history in particular. In the meantime Cremin was more and more moving away from the problems and foundations approach, but needed a push to make the final break. The story is now pretty well known (see Cohen, 1976, pp. 322-325).

It remained for Bernard Bailyn, the Harvard historian, in 1960 to finally state publicly what some of us had been thinking. Bailyn put historians of education down hard. Uninterested in the past, except as the “seedbed” of present issues, “they lost the
understanding of origins and of growth which history alone can provide.” To these historians “the past was simply the present writ small.” Then the crowning insult. For all their writings on education, still the role of education in American history is obscure. “We have almost no historical leverage on the problems of American education!” (Bailyn, 1960, p. 4; Storr, et al., 1957, p. 2). The publication of Bailyn’s *Education in the Forming of American Society* was our declaration of independence. We were finally able to repudiate the emphasis on contemporary problems of education. For some of us in schools of education the early ’60s were the beginning of a new era. We were finally able to renounce the requirement that our work be immediately relevant and provide clear directions for dealing with problems and dilemmas of contemporary education.

The reaction to Bailyn and Cremin, however, was not long in coming. We had hardly had a chance to leisurely cultivate the wonders of our historical garden “wie es gewesen.” When in the latter part of the ’60s a “new” history of education emerged! This latest revisionist movement is associated with the names of some of our younger colleagues such as Michael Katz and Clarence Karier. They have been much influenced by the New Left. In their writings, these latest revisionists hurled anathemas at the tepid history of their predecessors, assaulted our pro-the-rise-of-the-public-school bias, and challenged us to devote our energies to the urgent and pressing policy questions of the present, namely the radical reconstruction of school and society. Karier’s notion of the function of history of education was “to connect with and add meaning to our present world” (Karier, Violas, & Spring, 1973, p. 5). History, Michael Katz states, should “contribute . . . significantly to both historical understanding and contemporary reform” (Katz, 1969, 1973). Anyone familiar with the history of American education could be forgiven the feeling of *deja vu*, the feeling we had passed this way before.

Revisionists like Karier, Katz, Joel Spring, and others have contributed enormously to the vitality of our discipline in the past decade. They have contributed to the de-mythologizing of our educational history. They have called attention to some of the invidious practices and some of the invidious consequences of schooling—the “irony of school reform.” They have provided powerful impetus to examination of the relation of education to wealth, power, and status; they have broken new ground in their study of the relation between education and social and occupational stratification, and finally they have aroused fresh
interest in the writing and reading (and talking about) history of education (Greene, 1973; Kaestle, 1972; Lazeron, 1973; Sloan, 1972, p. 245-247). But more recently they in turn have been criticized, revised; with them too the critical reaction was not long in coming. The revisionists have been criticized for tendentiousness, presentism, imposing modern patterns of thought upon the minds of a different era, tethering history of education to a special vision of school and society, and so on (Ravitch, 1977). But all this is current events. He who runs may read both pro-revisionists and anti-revisionists (as well as the ambivalent) in our recent literature.

From many quarters in education, there are efforts to better grasp the experience we now live through by understanding how it all came to pass. But a reliable guide to the past is needed. Perhaps some historians of education might like to apply. Perhaps others would like to draft historians of education into service. But here is the problem. We are highly individualistic. Our speciality is marked by considerable factual turmoil. We are divided especially on that traditional problem—whether history should be detached from or engaged in the social struggles of our own day. Furthermore, there are almost as many kinds of history as there are historians; no general agreement prevails among us. We find ourselves lacking a systematic interpretation acceptable to any large number of us. There is a bewildering diversity of historical writing. There is no consensus or synthesis: There are only insights, a rivalry of insights. And it is unlikely that this situation will change greatly in the foreseeable future. One must conclude that history, in the words of Donald Warren, has only a “limited assignment” (Warren, 1978, pp. 17-20).

But if history has “a limited assignment,” as Don Warren has put it, and as I think to be the case, still it is a real assignment. Even if one doesn’t believe “past is prologue,” still history is at least loosely prophetic and loosely prescriptive. “History,” as Norman Cousins put it, “is a vast early warning system.” History does not, strictly speaking, teach us what to do, but it does suggest what is not likely to happen, what not to expect. In this sense we can learn from the past. (Ah, the “lesson” of history). For example, it seems to me that history is anti-utopian. This is the one “lesson” applicable to contemporary educational policymaking I can find. It is a corrective to those with grandiose expectations. Perhaps the conventional wisdom of our educational policy-makers—their credo of unlimited hope—can be tempered by the historian’s qualified pessimism; leading thus
to more realistic expectations and less frustration. The curse of illusion and wishful thinking is that they soon give way to disillusion and despair. If we did not expect our schools to be so omnipotent, we would not be nearly so disillusioned by their failures. (The small comfort for hard times of, ah, historical "perspective.") In any event, for policy-makers, we obviously offer a wide variety of choices among histories and historians. But history increases the range of choices, without telling us what we ought to choose. (Ah, historical "insight" and "wisdom.") To some, history becomes a tool for the furtherance of pre-established purpose and point of view. It seems wiser to regard history as a stimulus to contemplation and reflection—as a source of questions as much as, or more than, a source of answers. Thus, when some of our colleagues in education pursue narrow positivistic inquiry, history may remain the most humanizing of the disciplines. Time will tell.

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Values Imposed on Education by History

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This paper begins with a confession. I wish I had not agreed to write it. Upon an unhurried look, the questions posed by the sponsors of this monograph appear vague and sometimes misleading, covering assumptions and implications with which I disagree. Therefore, these remarks begin with what I take to be the assumptions in the questions posed by the monograph organizers.

Those assumptions, it appears to me, may be stated in the following way: (1) There exists a unified discipline of history governed by a clear set of theoretical and methodological assumptions. (2) That discipline contains a distinctive set of values which can be separated from the values of the academic community at large and from those which motivate educators. (3) Distinct differences exist between the discipline of history and research and policy in education, including the history of education. (4) The distinctive influence of disciplinary values and of the political and ideological presuppositions of historians are somehow harmful to educational research and practice. And (5) the discipline of history, magically stripped of its biases, can be of some positive use in educational research and policy.

The place to begin is with the discipline of history. As a field of study, the subject matter and methodological repertoire of academic history have altered dramatically within the last two decades. For example, none of the nearly forty applications recently submitted to the N.E.H. history panel could be considered traditional by disciplinary standards. None of them proposed studies of political, diplomatic, or military history in the conventional sense. Those few applications concerned with politics sought to integrate political processes with social structure, social change, or main currents in intellectual and cultural life. Only two applications proposed biographies, and both were conceived as important excursions into social and cultural topics. Probably a majority of applications proposed to quantify at least some data, or to use data already quantified, and the research
teams included not only people trained in history, but anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and psychiatrists. In short, the discipline as it was conceived professionally until not long ago, and as it still is conceived by people unfamiliar with recent work, does not exist.

However, these observations do not imply that a unified set of ideas or a methodological and theoretical consensus has emerged. Indeed, to return to the example of the N.E.H. applications, in very few cases did consensus exist among the reviewers of proposals, and sharp differences of opinion about matters of substance and method separated experts in the field who commented upon the same project. This lack of consensus underscores the diversity that exists among professional historians. The field is rent by sharp divisions over the proper subject matter of history, acceptable sources of data, the validity of alternative methodologies, theoretical models, and political orientations. It would be hard to find consensus among card-carrying historians on any aspect of their discipline other than the dreadful job situation.

This lack of consensus should not be deplored, for the ferment within the field makes academic history especially exciting at the present moment. Historians are asking questions previously thought impossible to answer, utilizing methods developed in other disciplines, and making both substantive and methodological contributions to social research and social theory.

One of the healthiest consequences of the centrifugal tendency of historical research has been the dismantling of the wall that for many years separated the history done in history departments from the history of education, primarily written within schools of education. That division reflected the gulf which began to grow between schools of education and the rest of university campuses in the early twentieth century when professors of education mounted a concerted drive for autonomy. Their drive on university campuses culminated in the creation of independent schools of education. These schools sought self-sufficiency through the creation of a science based upon a survey of the occupational divisions in the exploding public educational bureaucracy. In these circumstances the academic study of education became increasingly divorced both from theory and from the work in academic disciplines.

In this setting history was written by professors of education with minimal historical training. The purpose of their work was less to advance scholarship than to provide inspiration for edu-
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cators-in-training. The history of education was to show how the public school idea triumphed over its many enemies; this history would thereby instill in educators-to-be the notion that they inherited a fragile and precious charge, fragile because public education always had its enemies, precious because public education was the very cornerstone of democracy. History written this way was evolutionary in character, the story of the victory and establishment of a system that emerged from seeds planted in the Colonial era and cultivated by men of humanitarian and democratic vision throughout the centuries.

By and large, the historiography of education did not reflect contemporary historical scholarship. Indeed, it was not very good history and it was, from snobbishness to be sure but also with considerable justification, looked upon with disfavor by the members of history departments. Given its reputation, an ambitious graduate student or assistant professor would hesitate to identify himself or herself with the history of education, and he or she would be right. For an identification with the field would do a career little good.

Generally, this situation has ended. Graduate students within history departments work on topics in the history of education. History of education courses frequently are cross-listed. Intellectual and social historians often write about education, and historians of education branch out into the history of the family, social structure, culture, and ideas. The History of Education Quarterly has become a respected academic journal, and books that deal with the history of education are often assigned in regular history courses.

The history of education has emerged as a serious and respected branch of general historical scholarship for a variety of reasons. Certainly, in the years after the Second World War, schools of education seriously began a process of upgrading, which included an attempt to move closer to the rest of the university communities of which they were a part. Enlightened deans sometimes furthered this process by appointing scholars who had not previously been identified with education. For example, at Harvard Francis Keppel's appointment of Bernard Bailyn and Israel Scheffler to teach the history and philosophy of education, respectively, has had an enormous impact upon both fields.

In addition to the desire of schools of education to improve their work and status, the intellectual and political climate of the time encouraged academics to look seriously at educational
affairs. These were, after all, the years in which the theory of education as human capital became prominent and, in the wake of Sputnik, American education suddenly was viewed as a rusty weapon in the Cold War. Added to these factors was the re-awakened interest of historians in intellectual, social, and cultural themes. This movement away from traditional subject matter led many historians quite naturally to education, which they recognized played a critical, albeit dimly understood and inadequately documented, role in the stories they wished to tell.

Finally, the social, political, and moral concerns of the 1960's gave an immense boost to the re-direction of historical scholarship already underway. Reflecting the widespread concern with social reform and civil rights, many historians attempted to shed the elite, white male bias that long had dominated the profession, and to focus instead on the history of ordinary people and of minorities, the vast majority of the population excluded from conventional historical sources. These historians sought not only to change the focus of historical scholarship, but to provide an historical account that made comprehensible the conflicts, contradictions, and inequities of contemporary America. None of the conventional themes of American history—the expansion of humanitarian concern for the poor, the triumph of democracy, and the benevolent character of American foreign policy—made sense to young historians nurtured on Civil Rights struggles, frustrated by the intractability of poverty, urban blight and the ineffective, custodial quality of social institutions, and appalled by the Vietnam War.

The critical historiography that resulted when young historians began to publish in the 1960's was very much a product of its times. But so is all written history. And this is the point I wish to stress. Value free history, like value free social science, is a myth. Each generation re-writes history, said Charles Beard, according to the questions uppermost in its mind. Any segment of the past, no matter how narrowly defined, consists of a multiplicity of events whose mere narration, even if it were possible, would produce a formless string of trivia. Therefore, the essence of historical scholarship is selection and interpretation. It is the questions asked by historians that determine the type of evidence sought and selected. The interpretation of that evidence almost never is unambiguous, and the historian's point of view inevitably shapes the construction which it is given.

These remarks are not meant to justify an extreme relativism.
Scholarly and moral obligations rest as heavily upon historians as upon any researchers. One must ask historians never to say that which they know to be untrue, not to suppress evidence which damages their case, but to search thoroughly, to obey rules of logic, and to use tools such as quantification properly. But these boundaries leave ample scope for imagination and interpretation and for the framing of questions that reflect the concerns of the moment.

The question underlying a good deal of the most interesting history of education written since the 1960’s might be put this way: How did we acquire the system of education whose insensitivities, inadequacies, and biases have been documented so mercilessly in recent years?

The answers given to that question have varied. Historians constructing a critical version of the past have had different orientations. Some have written social, others intellectual history. That is, some have concentrated on the origins, role, and operation of institutions, others primarily on the genesis of ideas. The political points of view underlying the work have varied as well, from anarchist, to socialist, to left liberal. More than that, the quality of the work has varied, and these historians have been sharply critical of each other.

The easiest task has been to demolish myths, to expose the weaknesses at the heart of conventional interpretations of the history of education. Nor has it been difficult to show the historiographical neglect of various factors and influences upon educational development. Harder has been the reconstruction of a sophisticated and subtle new story, and here very difficult theoretical and methodological problems remain. Some of the most pressing are: the conceptualization and application of class as a historical concept; the delineation of the relative role of class and ethnicity; the discrimination between the influence of various socializing agencies at different points in time; the measurement of the results of education for individuals, families, and society. These, it must be stressed, are topics currently of central concern to American historiography more generally.

The attempt to provide a critical version of the educational past has called forth a counter-attack which attempts to buttress a variant of a more traditional and benign historical view. In this way the history of education is experiencing the same type of divisions current in other areas of history, such as American foreign policy. As of yet, the new conservatism or, as I like to call
it, the apologist case, has not been very effective. It has shown weaknesses in specific works, which are widely acknowledged—
even by those politically sympathetic—to be inadequate. But it
has not shaken the foundations of a critical view of the past or
substituted convincing new interpretations. My own view is that
it cannot.

Predictably, the debate has left the scholarly level. With the
publication of Diane Ravitch's recent book (The Revisionists
Revised) it has become pure politics. For in this book Ravitch
launches an assault on the group she terms radical revisionists.
Because that assault rests on distortions, omissions, and falsifica-
tions—points which I document elsewhere—it is a polemic, and
it has moved the debate about the field out of the academy.

Ravitch, and many others, feel that the critical history of
education written in the last several years has had a disastrous
impact upon educational policy and upon people in the field.
Their point is that by arguing that education does not matter
historians have sapped the will to action and eroded the morale
of educators.

That argument may be answered in different ways. First, it is
a distortion of the work criticized. Historians have not argued
that education does not matter. They have stressed that its actual
results have been different from its official goals, that public
education has contributed more to the reproduction than to the
alteration of social structure. Second, the argument carries the
imagination that historians should not tell the truth as they see it.
If the legitimacy of public institutions requires myths that cannot
withstand scrutiny, then so be it. The dangers for academic
freedom in this view are apparent. Third, all that the apologists
can offer is to kill the messenger who brings bad news. By con-
trast, the critical historians have an important contribution to
make to the current situation, and it is to this that I wish to turn
briefly.

A critical version of history offers school people, first, the
capacity to comprehend their own experience, to understand the
reasons for the apathy, hostility, and even violence which they
confront. By clarifying the sources of their failures and frustra-
tions, a critical version of history allows school people to direct
their anger where it properly belongs, away from themselves
and toward the system of structured inequality of which they
and their students are mutual victims. Critical history, in short,
can help them to survive their daily lives with their sanity and dignity intact.

Once it is realized that public education always has reinforced rather than altered social structure and helped to legitimate inequality, then it becomes possible to refocus questions of equity in education in a way at once realistic, yet not quiescent. Realism, it should be stressed, must be a component of any theory or plan of action. For the history of American education can be told as a story of implausible expectations whose predictable failure led to recurrent periods of cynicism, apathy, or despair during which the most popular reform has been financial retrenchment and when, by and large, the inequities in the system have been left to flourish unchecked.

Realistic expectations should not lead to apathy. Rather, by eliminating false optimism, they permit the evaluation of reform by different and more appropriate standards. For the measure no longer solely is success. The question is not only whether racism or the effects of social class have been eliminated. Rather, the issue is whether we have made the effort itself. The standard, that is, is political and moral, not sociological. The inequities of the system reveal a contradiction between structure and the democratic values which this society alleges to profess. If it is believed that the organization and conduct of public education systematically violates democratic values and human rights, then the struggle must continue. For to abandon the effort is to permit inequity to spread without opposition and to admit the hollowness of our ideals.

By focusing on the contradictions between the organization of public education and the values on which it is supposed to rest, critical history highlights the most dynamic source of educational change. For the forces most powerfully affecting schools do not flow from educational planning or policy. Nor have they ever. Rather, the sources of change, past and present, rest in the contradictions between the schools and the social order. For example, consider three of the most powerful sources of educational change today: the contradiction between unequal education and democratic values: the continued production of highly skilled workers in a stagnant job market; and the demand for obedient acceptance of diminished expectations confronted by a crisis of legitimacy.

Not only does this point of view mean that an understanding
of the sources of educational change must be historical; it also means that notions of educational change—either descriptive or prescriptive—must be grounded in an analysis of conflict. Any model which portrays a calm, rational, evolutionary adaptation of new policies to altered circumstances will fail to comprehend the nature of past educational development and will provide an inadequate perspective from which to launch new efforts. Finally, a focus on conflict and a realistic assessment of the social role of public education pose an important question:

Why have Americans since the early nineteenth century turned to formal education to resolve the most important conflicts or contradictions within their social order? The answer is especially urgent since that habit persists despite more than a century of evidence that education is not adequate to the tasks which it has been assigned.

Only through an historical analysis can the peculiar American faith in education be understood. But not through any analysis; for the apologist case perpetuates the myths upon which naive faith or unrealistic expectations rest. Rather, what is needed is an analysis that shows the stake which successive generations of affluent Americans have had in obscuring the roots of social problems. This analysis is one contribution which a critical approach to the past has begun to offer.
Commentary: History Symposium

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Holgrave, the daguerreotypist in Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The House of Seven Gables*, remarks that "the world owes all its onward impulses to men ill at ease." Whether or not this is always the case; the degree of unease marking the field of history of education has intensified our sense of the problematic with respect to American education. It has made scholars, practitioners, and even policy-makers reexamine their assumptions with regard to schools and the roles they have played in the social order. Questions have been posed about the promise of the schools when it comes to socialization and mobility. Attention has been directed towards those who have been benefited and those who have clearly failed—or who have been failed, left out, excluded. More and more observers have been moved to ponder the degree to which the educational system has sustained the democratic ethos. Certain observers have been provoked to the assertion that the system has, from the start, perpetuated and rationalized the inequities of a stratified society. Attending to the range of points of view now finding expression in the historical domain, educators cannot but be sharply aware that there are multiple conflicting interpretations among equally qualified scholars. We are made to realize, more than ever before, that history is indeed a dialogue involving human beings living in the present and the record of what is known about the past.

History, we are reminded by the historians contributing to this monograph, cannot be conceived as a rendering of objectively existent "fact." for all the yearnings of turn-of-the-century thinkers. It is an explicitly interpretive undertaking. The methodologies vary: certain historians use largely quantitative methods; others venture into phenomenological sociology; ethnmethodology, one or another brand of structuralism; still others find a paradigm in pragmatism or transactionalism. The protocols and the constructs utilized are as important to hold in mind as are
the judgments with regard to what actually happened, the presumed reasons for it happening, and the assumed or demonstrated consequences for actual human lives. One of the significant insights to be drawn from this monograph has to do with the necessity for methodological self-consciousness, not to speak of the capacity to reflect on perspective and vantage point.

Professors Cohen, Katz, and Clifford appear to agree on the urgency of making perspectival sense of educational phenomena, and not solely for academic reasons. They agree on the need to draw from a range of disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities. They agree as well on the need to widen the scope of educational history, to read the term “education” broadly enough to include the numerous institutions that educate. All three would apparently want to reach beyond the schools and investigate the impacts of state agencies, say, as well as families, of law courts, churches, the ubiquitous media. Indeed, one of the exciting consequences of current historical research is that the world has opened up in all sorts of unexpected ways. Teachers and students of history are enabled to examine phenomena from multiple standpoints and therefore to “see” much more. They can “listen” to the sound of once unheard human voices, conceptualize tensions and conflicts for too long ignored or obscured.

All three participants appear to be troubled by the discrepancies between our conceived educational ideals and the actuality of what has happened in our schools or in the lives of those who have been affected by the schools. Sol Cohen, tracing the history of this discipline, suggests that a core problem preoccupying educators in the first half of the century was the problem of whether the inquirer ought to respect scholarly detachment and academic values or respond to contemporary problems. In the days of the New Deal progressives and the social reconstructionists, the issue was acute; a sense of either or emerged as reform-minded historians tried to make the history of education serve their critical (and political) ends. Michael Katz asserts that, by now, the walls have come down between academic history and history of education. Academic historians are, in fact, much interested in educational history. There exists no purely formalist history, and “house history” is hard to find. There may be somewhat less agreement on Professor Katz’s other point: that, wherever history is done today, it is done (without apology) with reference to the problems of the time.

In any case, Professor Cohen’s detailed account of factually
oriented history, the Cubberly revolution, and the various twists and turns of academicism and reformism sheds considerable light on the ways in which history of education has been continually in search of itself. The question of whether the history of history of education has been correlative with the history of general history remains to some degree open. Did the consensus history of the Eisenhower years evoke a response among educational historians? What of the iconoclastic history that followed after? Does the new revisionism in political and economic history correlate with revisionism in educational history? In what sense is revisionism a function of particular moments in the life of a culture? Professor Cohen expresses intense opposition to what he conceives to be utopianism and to the sources that have led to utopianism in educational thought. He objects particularly to excessive promises: he insists upon a finite possibility. And it is noteworthy that, at the end, he calls for an emancipation from the "tyranny of the ideal," thus breaking firmly with the myth-heavy and inspirational history of time past. Sol Cohen justifiably sees himself as someone who has chosen the rigorous approach to educational history; and there is a kind of paradox in the fact that that approach (at least as Michael Katz sees it) is now being challenged for its "formalism."

As a self-identified critical historian, Professor Katz still has his eyes fixed upon the ways in which the old myths and promises masked the schools' service to the capitalist system. In his own fashion, he too has been trying to break with the "tyranny of the ideal:" but, to him, the ideal has been used as a means of mystification, and the "tyranny" has been almost literal. Presenting some of his current thinking, he brings up another issue that deserves careful attention by his colleagues: the matter of class analysis and the related matter of ethnicity as potential perspectives. This raises the question of what we learn when we treat people in the aggregate and what we learn when we try to understand people as individuals. The study of human beings in groups or classes, whether from a Marxist or any other point of view, clearly leads to interesting disclosures; but we need to be particularly critical and attentive with respect to the criteria and the first principles of such investigation. The social reality made visible by class analysis is, again, very much a function of the methodology chosen, as it is of the interpretive vantage point.

Michael Katz appears still to be fundamentally concerned with promoting awareness of the continuing legitimation of what
he considers to be an inequitable social structure. As he says, the implausible expectations, the inevitable frustrations, and the ongoing mystifications make it necessary to keep struggling against erosions of human rights. I must admit that this is an area in which my interests mesh with his, in the sense that we are both concerned with finding out how to promote a critical consciousness among those interested in contemporary education. It occurs to me, however, that he may be oversimplifying the question when he remarks that a critical understanding of history will make a teacher feel "sane." Those who teach in certain New York City schools have to cope with a considerable degree of violence, for instance; and I am not convinced that a critical understanding of the roots of that violence is sufficient to enable a sensitive (or even a revolutionary) teacher to survive. We have a good deal of thinking to do with respect to what constitutes an effective and significant mode of emancipatory education. We both, I am sure, want to see some transformation of the consciousness of teachers, even as we want to see some transformation of the situations in which they do their work. What kind of pedagogy can be developed in the peculiarly potent institutions Michael Katz describes? Is there space enough or opportunity enough to create the kinds of classroom experiences that might permit persons to escape mystification, to break with domination? And, in any case, can this be done in the schools?

Much depends, of course, upon the actualities of domination, upon the ways in which "oppression" is experienced and perceived. It is interesting to see the way in which Professor Clifford's research responds to what Michael Katz is saying. After all, we cannot know whether the critical historian's claims are justified until people are aroused from speechlessness, until we can hear the voices of parents and children and neighborhood people and classroom teachers as well. It seems to me to be fundamentally important to hear from those we understand to be the beneficiaries of education as well as the planners and administrators. It is important to consult those affected whenever we think in terms of determinism and manipulation; and, if we believe that persons do not realize when they are being manipulated, we need to face what that signifies as well. Not only do we have to ask how persons understand that their freedoms are being eroded, that they are being submerged; we have to ask how persons themselves can be empowered to detect and overcome such submergence. To what degree have the success values that have
Commentary

dominated this society been internalized? The consumerism, the management ethos? What has been the situation of the silent ones, the forgotten ones? Is it possible for them to say? Has it been possible for them to see?

Geraldine Clifford, of course, has sought out individual statements, diaries, letters, the great wealth of materials that may enable us to know how it was with women, immigrants, various kinds of strangers, various kinds of unknown practitioners. Probing biography, doing a kind of phenomenological history, Clifford has joined with others in making it possible for us to look through many alternative perspectives and to extend what has been taken for granted as historical reality. There remains, of course, the problem of personal statement, of the validity of diaries and occasional jottings. We need to remember, however, how long we accepted a kind of one-dimensional history of education: a history of the visible and the articulate, a history written largely by white males and about white males. History “from the ground up” will become increasingly important (and increasingly accurate) in the domain of education; new ways of validation will be invented as new perspectives open.

I would say, in conclusion, that the history of education may well have more to offer the educational researcher than ever before—more to offer because of the diverse methodologies being used, the diverse constructs being made available. It is not only a question of the researcher developing some historical perspective upon what he/she is doing. It is a question of becoming more reflective, more self-conscious with respect to the matter of interpretation. To consult history of education today is to become acutely aware of the significance of vantage point and the schemata used in sense-making. It is to become inescapably sensitive to value commitments and to the need to distinguish between authentic value commitments and what might be merely ideological bias. Historians are convinced that they can bring to educational research some of the illumination associated with the humanities, even as they can nurture a mode of self-reflectiveness, a consciousness of a dimension of human experience too long obscured by scientism and positivism. The very restlessness in the field, the ongoing dialogue, may bring a kind of vitality into educational research. The concreteness of the educational world may become the focus of the researcher’s attention once again as he/she begins to feel somewhat “ill at ease.”
Emerging Philosophical and Ideological Issues in the Politics of Education

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Twenty years of research in the politics of education indicate that the source of philosophical and ideological issues addressed by it is not to be found in research contributions. Such issues emerge from expanding political controversies about education in the pragmatic world of education's political order (Iannaccone & Cistone, 1974, pp. 5-7). Most of the research in the politics of education has resulted from efforts to provide solutions to pragmatic problems in such controversies; some of it has attempted to understand these problems, and that portion of the research primarily concerned with the development or testing of scientific theory is the smallest proportion.

But more important for this paper, the research in the politics of education displays two separate bodies of literature produced by two distinguishable, invisible colleges of researchers; each addresses different research questions with conflicting assumptions about the nature of educational governance, especially the relationship of senior governmental units, e.g., legislature, to local governmental units, e.g., the L.E.A. of municipal governments. Most significant, this diversity reflects contradictory political philosophies and ideologies which have coexisted in a pragmatic mixture as the dominant American political paradigm for most of this century. That mixture is composed of conceptual elements of hierarchical and anti-hierarchical political philosophies. The hierarchical philosophy is particularly indebted to the successes of the municipal reform movement around the turn of this century. The anti-hierarchical reflects the older federal tradition in American political philosophy. The mixture of opposing principles was achieved sometimes by compromises of conceptual components in each philosophy and often by distinctions being made between political spheres and policy issues considered appropriate to one or the other philosophy. Dwight Waldo described this twentieth century political ideology saying,
In essence, this new theory or philosophy of government was a reinterpretation of the meaning of democracy for America, one for the new, urban America. It sought to attain the values of equality and freedom for citizens by making government strong and efficient (Waldo, 1955, pp. 19-20).

It was an attempt to achieve Jeffersonian ends by Hamiltonian means. Excessive emphasis on either at the expense of the other tends to set into motion political conflicts to redress the balance.

Research in the politics of education was largely stimulated by the increasing political controversies about education since the late 1950s. These growing conflicts owe much of their birth and continued expansion to the efforts of central governmental branches at national and state levels to improve the contributions of public education to the solution of social problems of mid-century America and the reactions produced by those efforts.

One body of research in the politics of education tends to address questions about the impact of national and state policies concerned with changing schools, especially their delivery systems. The researchers who have produced the bulk of this literature may be seen as primarily concerned with policy research and evaluation. Burlingame, in a recent review of policy impact studies, describes their orientation as "the rational-systems analysis approach" (Burlingame, 1977, p. 237). This view assumes that "educational systems operated as rational systems with tight linkages among inputs, conversion processes, and outputs, with operant feedback mechanisms" (Burlingame, 1977, p. 266). Understandably, given this frame of reference resistance to central governmental programs or attempts to renegotiate policy outputs of national or state governments by school subunits, professional constituencies, or local lay groups are often perceived as organizational or governance pathologies.

Conversely, the other major body of research in the politics of education has tended to view political controversies arising from reactions by professional and lay groups, especially at the local district level, as natural responses of semi-independent sub-units and constituencies in a federal governmental order. Rather than an hierarchical rational organization, this group of researchers views public education and American government as a negotiated order. They see its character as a relationship among multiple organizations and families of governments which share through bargaining in policy development. This
view of public educational governmental relations at national, state, local, and within local districts sees it as a subset of general American government described by Kaufman as follows:

Relations among the levels of government thus fall into no simple, symmetrical pattern. They are more like a tangled web of rubber bands—intricate, elastic, capable of accommodating all sorts of pressures yet retaining their shape, under the tension of many forces and counter-forces, and very taut much of the time (Kaufman, 1963, p. 32).

This second body of research developed countercurrently during the 1960s and has centered on what it sees as natural change processes in educational politics and political adjustments in school systems confronting changing social conditions. It has tended to focus upon the political functions and mechanisms of educational governments “managing conflict and settling disputes between contesting coalitions over matters of public importance... when public controversy about education increases” (Iannaccone, 1977, pp. 255-256).

Unfortunately, neither of these invisible colleges has paid enough attention to the contributions of the other. Both are products of the increasing political conflicts in education’s political order. Since the basic philosophical and ideological issues which emerge in the politics of education arise from the political order, attention needs to be given to where things stand in the political context of educational governance and policy. This is an awkward time for both educators and public school policy makers. The political philosophy expressed in the recent tax revolts has altered dramatically and, as yet, unpredictably the economic context for public education. There are also clear signs of rapid and still uncompleted changes in major social, organizational, and political factors affecting the schools. Not only is the changing policy context complicated and confusing, but the frustrations and tensions generated by these changes are becoming high enough to prompt hasty and sometimes inappropriate responses from citizens’ groups, educators, and policy makers alike.

Local school officials trying to cope with rapid change report that corrosive tension and conflict surround problems related to labor relations, racial and social integration, and public participation in school governance, as well as the shifting programatic
and fiscal demands being placed on the schools. These officials frequently see national and state level policy makers as insensitive to real needs or as overbearing and arbitrary in their demands. Meanwhile, legislators, legislative staff members, and administrative bureaucrats seeking to guide the schools through this difficult period report reactions ranging from optimism to dismay at what they see as the response (or, lack of response) by local schools to recent legislative initiatives. All agree, however, that national and state legislation intended to affect the operation as well as the outcomes of schooling exist. We are in the midst of an era of pervasive and increasing political controversies about the public schools generally and specifically in almost, if not every, aspect of them including their mission, structure of governance, instructional delivery systems, and fundamental ideology.

The politics of education research of the last two decades indicates that these recent political conflicts about education are similar to those of the period of circa 1890–1912 when the present dominant political ideology was reshaped.

For the second time within a century we are experiencing a revolution in the politics of education... The first of these revolutions restructured American educational government as the municipal reform took control of urban school systems away from city political machines and their neighborhood subunits. The second, which has been developing for some two decades, displays a similar propensity and potential for transforming the structures of educational government again (Iannaccone, 1977, p. 277).

Callahan and Button, describing the changing concepts of the chief school administrator as a reflection of the early twentieth century municipal reform movement, noted that these changes occurred in a climate of loss of credibility about education and all government services, and a developing tax-saving ideology (Callahan & Button, 1964). The problems which triggered the educational political conflicts both then and now have their roots in the cities. Joseph M. Rice's urban assessment of the schools in the 1890's, the Coleman Report of that era, shocked people by its indictment of both the lack of quality and equality within the existing system. Rice's analysis focused attention on political machine intervention in the schools. His exposés fed the flames of reform ideology. The mounting political con-
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Conflicts around education tended to center attention upon the fundamental tensions of the very warp and woof of education in America. These latent tensions are fundamentally unresolvable in American education because they are educational aspects of basic tensions in government itself. The powder keg of all governments in all societies is the tension between the few who govern and the many. In American democracy this tension periodically emerges as value priorities in choices of different emphases on the democratic values of liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The basic tension between the few and the many emerges in several ways in American educational politics. It may be seen in the competition between education for all children and the desire of each family to assure the best education for its own children, a struggle between elite and egalitarian educational values. A second aspect is reflected in the conflicts between administration and teachers within the professional system. Among laymen concerned with schools at the local level, a third aspect surfaces in the political conflicts between the neighborhood clients of the schools and the school district lay elites, who influence boards and central office staff. A fourth expression of the basic tension may be seen in the issues of the relative power of professionals and lay citizens over educational decisions. Any continuous pursuit of these conflicts to their logical end would destroy the public school system, just as continuous mounting conflict between the few and the many in any society will destroy its government.

The substitution of conflicts replacing more fundamental issues with less basic ones is the single most remarkable achievement of the municipal reform. That displacement appeared to resolve recurrent issues in education. At least it continued them for some fifty years. A new emerging political philosophy refocused political conflicts around a new set of ideological issues. A substitution of conflicts based on a different set of assumptions is the surest way to transmute political conflicts and turn existing political alignments inside out. The ultimate political acts are the struggles over defining the public policy issues about which conflicts are fought and the structure of the institutions for channeling them. As one consequence, the municipal reform's doctrines became, until recently, the fundamental policy assumptions of educational governance.

The emergent political philosophy of that era was appropriate to a new national leadership in an emerging urban, industrial,
and increasingly professionally oriented society. The municipal reform movement was manned by financial and professional leaders including superintendents, who as Hays has noted, "deplored the decentralized ward system in large part because it empowered members of the lower and lower middle classes (many of whom were immigrants)" (Hays, 1964, p. 163). Tyack even more forcefully makes the same point:

Underlying much of the reform movement was an elitist assumption that prosperous, native born Protestant Anglo-Saxons were superior to other groups and thus should determine the curriculum and the allocation of jobs. It was the mission of schools to imbue children of the immigrants and the poor with uniformly WASP ideals (Tyack, 1969, p. 35).

A fundamental change in the nature of the issues in the politics of education (or any other political realm) will place an intolerable stress upon the old governance structures which channel conflicts. Either they must be restructured consistent with an emergent political philosophy or ideology, or else the new conflicts must be displaced by ones compatible with the old political philosophy.

The municipal reform's political myth in education rests upon three major doctrinal tenets and their operational corollaries. All three had the manifest purpose of destroying the political corruption of the urban boss system and its impact on education. Their latent consequences play no small part in the renewed spread of political controversy over education. Briefly the three major tenets are: the separation of public service from politics; the view of the community as unitary; and the belief in professionalism. The separation of politics and education was seen as necessary for order, efficiency, and effectiveness in the delivery of educational services. The non-party, small school board elected at large was one corollary of this separation. It centralized the governmental structure and representational system of the local district. The myth of separation rested upon the belief that politics and education ought to be separated. The mechanisms carrying out the belief provided the appearance of evidence that politics and education were separated. The perception of fact thereby supporting the belief in the "ought to be." The belief in the apolitical nature of education is held tenaciously to this day by many school people as well as other citizens.
It was argued that there existed a single unitary community of citywide interests (Salisbury, 1967, p. 408-424). A proper city manifests no social change or economic cleavages, at least none should be allowed to surface politically. These threaten the tranquility of this idealized unitary community. All special interests, according to this perception, ought to be subordinated to this single community interest. Programs too were viewed as unitary, and the "melting pot" philosophy became the dominant thrust in curriculum. The reformer's mandate was to implement an elite education system for all. The needs and values of ethnic or class neighborhoods different from the dominant ones were ignored or considered to be hostile to good education.

The reform needed a new professional doctrine. That was found in the belief in professional neutral competency, the belief that professionals operating as technical experts in their public service area make decisions which are value free and apolitical. The belief favored professional influence over lay control. Professionals were now designated as the proper individuals to determine educational operations. Scientific management evolved as a buffer ideology against a variety of value systems. A scientific approach to problem solving assumed the validity of the results as long as the methodology was sound and the experts were qualified to interpret the data. Those who commanded technical knowledge under these circumstances eventually control the system.

By the 1920s, the major outlines of the political revolution in education was in place. Obviously, it did not eliminate or suppress politics in education. What it did was substitute a different, nonparty, elite interest group politics for that which had existed. The myth is not apolitical. The reform's doctrine is a thoroughgoing apologia for power of the strong bureaucratic state. The educational political myth is a correlate of a more general political myth. Implicit in the municipal reform's philosophy is the assumption that all political powers are (or, could be) integrated into a single, monolithic, smooth running unit which, like a giant machine, would ensure realization of the public good if the parts were just maintained in proper working order. The heart of the political philosophy of the reform is a centralizing ideology which justifies experts in bureaucracies as the governors of the society. However incomplete the political philosophy, it served well for half a century.
The Function of the Political Myth

MacIvar argues that political myths or belief systems about the nature and proper functions of government, especially the myth of authority, form the web which holds the political system together (MacIvar, 1965). Dahl's analysis of New Haven politics is based on a recognition that belief in the "American Creed" specifies the basic rules of political participation (Dahl, 1961). Edleman emphasized that the output of political symbols is one of governments' major products (Edleman, 1970). Cobb and Elder see the development of value laden "condensation symbols" as a prerequisite for effective public policy formation (Cobb & Elder, 1972). And James Q. Wilson (1973) has found the creation of ideological or symbolic policy to be a critical element in urban politics (Wilson, 1973). Santi Romano, the Italian political theorist, early in this century concluded that at bottom, governance is a complex of norms (Romano, 1951). Public policy so viewed represents the authoritative articulation of societal beliefs which operate to guide the action of individuals, groups, and governmental units. That is, in the political arena beliefs become normative for the citizens of the political or governmental unit represented, specifying both the immediate actions and the underlying attitudes expected of them. These normative beliefs in politics represent the central elements in the development of legitimacy for governmental actions.

Two quite distinct approaches referring to different functions of ideology can be found in the literature on public policy formation. The first, illustrated by the works of Edleman, Schattschneider, Lindblom, Apter, and Cobb and Elder, views ideology within the political process and examines the role of ideology in creating conflict and consensus among members of a society (Apter, 1965; Cobb & Elder, 1972; Edleman, 1970; Lindblom, 1968; Schattschneider, 1960). This view stresses the role of ideologies in legitimatizing governmental control. It highlights the emergence of philosophical and ideological issues through the articulation and exportation of beliefs about education by central governmental bodies. A second approach, reflected in the

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1 They may be called the political paradigm to emphasize their existent configuration as a guiding way to think about governance. The term, myth, emphasizes the historical origins and developments, while the term ideology emphasizes their advocacy stance, their ought flavor.
works of Selznick, Schatzman and Bucher, and Carlson, emphasizes the importance of ideology within various agencies and organizations responsible for implementing policy (Carlson, 1962; Schatzman & Bucher, 1964; Selznick, 1966). This second approach emphasizes that existing normative beliefs must be adjusted through new ideological policy developments, or else established norms from the past will become powerful barriers to the acceptance and implementation of new policies. Taken together, these two approaches indicate that ideologies form the basis for policy development and implementation by creating and interpreting the tension between what is and what ought to be in society. An ideology, as suggested by Mitchell and Badarak, links the is and the ought by providing both a "definition of the situation" which explains why things are the way they are, and a "definition of the social project" which describes how they can be changed (Mitchell & Badarak, 1977).

A major function of a dominant political paradigm is its guidance in distinguishing what sorts of policy issues should be considered political and which apolitical. This distinction is an essential component in the myth of authority. Only a few of the many issues which concern various groups in a society can command the attention of a significant portion of that society at any given time. Similarly, distributions of most stakes, economic and social goods and services of every sort, and the development of consensus on values goes on without commanding the attention of a large proportion of that society. Those emerging value issues and distributions which engage the attention of a significant proportion of the society generate controversies large enough to find their way to representative public bodies designed to deal with such conflicts. To occupy such attention specific ideological issues and distribution questions must overcome two hurdles. They must evoke the contribution of time and energy of a rather large number of persons in organized activities to influence others. They must overcome the inertia of culturally determined beliefs by which they have been previously defined as apolitical, because either they are deemed to be fundamentally inappropriate for determination by such public bodies, or they are viewed as controversies previously settled and therefore not to be reopened. Issues which successfully surmount these barriers in the politics of education are the critical emerging ideological ones. In the process of surmounting the barriers of established belief, they lose their private or settled, apolitical character and
acquire a public character. They become what the Romans called *res publica*, public matters, public affairs.

**Politics** is the conduct of public affairs. This definition refers to the essence of the political act, the struggle of men and groups to secure the authoritative support of the government (of the state) for their values, above all the delegated power of the state to their organizations for the conduct of apolitical affairs. Politics is the management of conflicts about the allocation of value and distribution of resources including all the activities seeking to influence the identification, definition, and conduct of such allocations. It is the conflict of conflicts shaping those which are considered apolitical. It effectively relegates other matters to private groups and organizations. Sometimes they are specialized groups, quasi-governmental organizations, or administrative units commonly thought to be apolitical. In fact, however, the vast bulk of the day-to-day allocation of values and distribution of resources in a society is done by these organizations. In the process they contain, restrict, localize, and limit the scope of social conflicts around such activities. Thus, reduction of the scale of conflicts is one of the functions and normal consequences of the existence of these social mechanisms. So, for example, Schattschneider points out,

One party systems... have been notoriously useful instruments for the limitation of conflict and depression of political participation. This tends to be equally true of measures designed to set up nonpartisan government or measures designed to take important public business out of politics altogether (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 12).

In this process, matters which would otherwise be *res publica* lose their public character. They become apolitical. Privatization of conflict in educational politics is exactly what the structures of educational government resulting from the municipal reform and its political ideology support. Consequently, the politics of education have traditionally been the low visibility politics of informal agreement and consensus-building among educational interest groups. It has conferred special advantages on the insider.

It is the politics of the sacred, rural rather than secular, urban community; a politics of the priesthood rather than the hustings. The two genres of politics are different in kind. The politics of
the hustings are visible and thrive on conflict and its resolution. The colorful kaleidoscope and cacaphonic calliope of the campaign is its milieu. The politics of the priesthood are hidden and shrouded in mystery. They subsist on the informal development of consensus prior to public debate. The whisper campaign and the etiquette of gossip are its social climates. The one functions best when confronted with a well-organized loyal opposition; the other, avoiding confrontations, has produced educational politics devoid of a loyal opposition, lacking the power of self-criticism, and amenable to the influence of minorities, particularly the educational professionals, until recently (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1967, p. 161).

All organizations, including special governments as in American education, tend to maximize different value preferences from those of the general society. The more insulated they are from general widespread controversies of the society the greater the degree of divergence of value preference displayed by them in their decisions. That divergence does not continue endlessly without check from the larger society. Their authority for allocating values and distributing resources arises from a sort of benign neglect or direct legal authorization, often a combination of both. Implicit in their de facto or de jure exercise of authority is the assumption that their actions will not visibly clash with the dominant political beliefs of the society. When that exercised authority is perceived as a misuse, it provokes controversies which spill over the banks of the channels which have previously contained its privatized conflicts. The more prolonged and widespread these controversies become, the more they command the attention of larger and larger proportions of the society. They come to be viewed as requiring the attention of political branches of government. In so doing, they lose their private character and once more become res publica. Persisted in long enough, such will disturb the dominant political paradigm, first by c. to its logical extreme and then by challenging it. At least this is what happened in the politics of education during the last two decades.

The Recent Politicization of Education

Three recent political events carried the municipal reform's doctrines toward their logical extreme producing a disequilibrium in the balance of federal and hierarchical philosophies. Subsequent policy initiatives by state and national governments
further disturbed the coexisting relations between the federal and bureaucratic political values. This extension of the myth to its logical extreme was a major factor in producing a second revolutionary spread of political controversy in education in this century. The three events are the Supreme Court’s desegregation decision of 1954, Sputnik’s aftermath in education (1957), and the New York City teachers’ strike of 1960.

By deciding that separate is not equal, the court carried the unitary community doctrine to its logical conclusion. The political conflicts which have followed desegregation efforts often find supporters of that doctrine in opposition to its implications. The resulting ideological imbalance or cognitive dissonance, if continued, is likely to lead to the development of a new cognitive frame of reference, a new political paradigm because of the demise of one of the crucial ideological tenets of the reform. The post-Sputnik demand for quality education for all pupils further challenged the unitary community doctrine in its operational melting pot education goal. The demand for more science and math, and for higher academic achievement, may have produced its greatest effects in the stress it placed upon the system to standardize education toward elitism. Modern testing programs owe much to Sputnik. The consequent shift of policy evaluation to educational output considerations and the research evidence on continued inequality, has challenged belief in the system’s capacity to deliver on its early reform promises to balance the competing values of the few and the many in one system. The 1960 strike and the continued growth of teacher organizations in conflict with administrators combines to react against the professional component of the myth as it operationally developed, but to reaffirm its conceptual principles. The reform’s doctrine of professionalism functions as part of the apologia for teacher power. The professional ideological base of the teacher movement is consistent with the doctrine of neutral competency and its correlate of faith in the technical expertise of teachers against administrative and board claims. The labor contract in education is even now in process of carrying the bureaucratization of schools to its logical conclusion. These events and their attendant national and state policy consequences led to a significant increase in centralizing educational policy efforts at national and state governmental levels during the 1960s.

The 1960s also set into motion a flood of policy studies which on the one hand reflected the growing centralist policy thrust
in American educational governance, and on the other provided conceptual models to support that political philosophy. The role of systems analysis in education during the last two decades is akin to that of scientific management in the first quarter of the century. The one, however, helped the development of a new political paradigm, the other sped up its demise. The Coleman report of 1966 is perhaps the best known example of the type (Coleman, et al., 1966). It illustrates the thrust of the centralizing hierarchical political philosophy and the neglect of the federal principles existing in educational governance. The Coleman study was undertaken in response to a provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requiring a survey of the “lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions” (Coleman, et al., 1966, p. iii). Hence, this study was grounded in the thrust for a societal integration oriented educational reform which had earlier sparked the Brown decisions.

"It is not surprising, therefore, that this study emphasized the importance of educational opportunity on future life chances for pupils, and documented the extent to which there are serious inequalities in American schools affecting large numbers of pupils. It was surprising to Coleman and his colleagues, however, that to a large extent “School to school variations in achievement . . . are much smaller than individual variations within the school” (Coleman, et al., 1966, p. 296). Coleman further found that, though small, there were significant positive effects on the achievement of minority pupils when they were educated in integrated schools while there were no significant achievement losses for white pupils in the same schools. In the climate of its day, the Coleman report appeared to provide powerful support for a policy strategy of strong centralized intervention into school operations. By emphasizing the importance of where and with whom students attend school rather than the nature of the program or school characteristics they encounter there, the Coleman report was interpreted to mean that policy makers could achieve important social goals with little or no risk to educational ones. These and other Coleman findings initially supported the growing confidence of national and state policy makers that they

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This finding has been common to most studies since Joseph Mayer Rice's work during the 1890's.
could rapidly secure educational improvement through strong governmental action.

In the final analysis, the Coleman research transformed student achievement from a problem into a mystery; if achievement is family controlled why was it declining? If school controlled, what school characteristics are responsible? Clearly, the missing factor in Coleman's work was its almost total neglect of how local schools actually work. This important research effort does not help us to understand why some schools implement and others resist new programs. It does not help to illuminate the dynamics of the district, the school, or the classroom and does not explain why the attributes of pupils' classmates seem to have a stronger affect on their achievement than those of their teachers (Coleman, et al., 1966, p. 302: 316–318). In brief, it ignored the effects of the federal principle at work in the governance of education, not only in the formal constitutional arrangement between national and state governments but, precisely because it is a pervasive political myth, in the policy adjustments at every organizational level of the schools.

The strong centralized intervention strategy of the 1960s, perhaps the high water mark of municipal reform philosophy, founded on two critical factors, however. First, in addition to the continuing national concern over educational achievement sparked by the successful Russian satellite launching, it was soon discovered that—contrary to expectations—pupil achievement was not stable but had begun to decline. Secondly, policy makers began to recognize that the gap between making policy and implementing it was widening (Iannaccone, 1972, pp. 198–203). Reports that huge investments in a wide range of centrally planned new programs, ranging from Project Follow Through to pre-packaged "teacher proof" curricula, were not enhancing student achievement soon became a national embarrassment.

However strong the adoption by Americans of elements of the municipal reform's ideology, that never was the equivalent of a Constitutional Amendment. Its development into a dominant political philosophy was pragmatic and incremental. Schattschneider described its development; "While we were thinking about something else a new government was created in the United States, so easily and so quietly that most of us were wholly unaware of what was going on" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. vii). Because it emerged pragmatically, its logical implications, while powerful in shaping American political ideas, did
not repeal federalism with its opposing philosophical values. In fact, the municipal reform’s ideology and structures of government have coexisted through most of this century with federal structures and ideologies. That coexistence and the tensions between the centralizing policy assumptions of the reform and the decentralizing policy assumptions of federalism is the field of forces on which national and state policy initiatives in education have played their part.

Policy is not simply made by one unit and implemented by another. Instead, policy is the overall result of ongoing interactions between different sub-structures, each with limited powers and divergent interests. Legislative policy (state or national) is only one of the many policy thrusts aimed at local school operations. There are two aspects of the interaction between state and local level governance structures which are critical in any interpretation of legislative policy impact. One is the degree of independence found in local school districts, and the other is a split within the local district between the school board/central office level and the principal/teacher/student level of decision making.

Only the political concept of sovereignty seems strong enough to express the degree to which local authority structures are independent of state level policy processes in education. Political citizenship by residents of local school districts is tremendously vital and effective. (Ask any school board member who has participated in a careless school boundary change, school building closing, or a school desegregation planning process.) Moreover, the election of school board members in this country actually pre-dates the election of state legislators or governors. Thus, before there were any state constitutions, local school boards were at work organizing and monitoring the delivery of educational services. These school boards have traditionally believed that local schools create and sustain local communities. These factors have created and been sustained by the “religion of localism” which sees sovereign control of school governance as lodged in the local district board. “Dual sovereignty” is the brute fact in school governance which must be understood to realistically appraise legislative policy effects.

The problem of dual sovereignty in education is further complicated by the extent to which individual school sites are structurally and politically disconnected from the control and authority of school boards and central office managers. The school site
is the basic unit of educational program development, the focus of loyalty for students and their parents, an expression of neighborhood identity and culture, and frequently a major social center providing opportunities for entertainment or enrichment. These factors, combined with structural reinforcement through PTA and various advisory group structures organized by school sites, have meant that control over school site operations through school board policy decisions and/or central administration planning, budgeting, or evaluation activities is in many ways just as problematic as is control over districts by state level structures.

Nearly a decade after the Coleman study was begun, the Rand Corporation undertook a series of studies which were motivated by the concern that, "the 'decade of reform' that began with ESEA in 1964 has not fulfilled its expectations, and questions... about... the most appropriate and effective federal role in improving education" (Berman, et al., 1973-78. Vol. VIII, p. 1). This concern with the effectiveness of centralized intervention in schools led the Rand researchers to begin looking at the school organizational characteristics which differentiate between adoption and effective implementation of new programs. Their primary findings distinguish between schools where implementation was substantial and those where adoption occurred but changes were superficial and non-existent. They documented the importance of school district commitment to change and of organizational climate factors at the school site "for a project to be effectively implemented and to take root" (Berman, et al., 1973-78. Vol. VIII, p. 33). They make explicit the need to understand and be aware of variations in factors affecting local school climate and operational processes (Berman, et al., 1973-78. Vol. VIII, p. 44). Implicit but still unexplored in the Rand studies is the importance of local school governance—i.e., the organization and distribution of authority and power—as a major factor controlling the fate of legislative policy initiatives.

Policy Control over the Multiple Structures

The ideology of the municipal reform fostered a hierarchical cascade model of political control. This model assumes that policy decisions flow from legislature to state department, to local board, to central office, to school site. Each intervening structure is believed to be guided by goals sent from above and by specific conditions found at lower levels in the cascade. This
model did not expect citizens or client groups to be involved in the actual operation of government. Rather, inspired by progressive and municipal reform theories of a unitary community, the model rejects any citizen involvement outside the electoral processes which select the representatives to make and implement policy, as “undue influence” or “special interests.” The success of the municipal reform movement in the first two decades of this century in changing the structures, procedures, and ideology of school governance undermined citizen influence at the site level. It dissolved the school site attendance area as a political unit and produced a political wasteland at the building level for most of this century. Only with the emergence of the “maximum feasible participation” concept in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was this myth fully and directly challenged and the political organization of public service clients and ordinary citizens made a matter of public policy.

The insulation of the school from the direct impact of client and citizen policy concerns seemed appropriate to a “melting pot” theory of education aimed at Americanizing the children of immigrants, but it has been vigorously and to some extent successfully challenged by those who complain bitterly that, in Cavello’s words, “we were becoming Americans by learning how to be ashamed of our parents” (quoted in Silberman, 1970, p. 58).

One important by-product of the cascade mythology of policy control was its support for professional influence over policy. At each level in the policy system, the cascade framework expected policy goals to be referred to education professionals for interpretation and application. Numerous research studies have documented the tendency for education policy to be initiated by professional groups at each level of governance. Nor is the finding that school administrators play important political functions in mobilizing support for the schools unexpected. Such findings do, however, clearly indicate that the policy flow is not simply hierarchical but represents the outcome of complex interactions among interdependent but separate structures of power and authority. It is this complex interaction process which explains the Rand study findings regarding local influence over policy and which accounts for much of the mystery of achievement plaguing the Coleman study.

In the last decade, the cascade policy model has collapsed almost completely. Not only have state level policy makers recognized their limited influence over school site operations, but district and site level citizen and client groups, revitalized school
boards, and reorganized state department of education professionals have all shown an increased determination to establish direct links to site level operations.

We are for the second time in a hundred years experiencing a revolution in the politics of education which has already reached dramatically into the internal power balances of the school. It has significantly modified the doctrines of educational governance which dominated policy making for over half a century. Even now it is reaching into issues concerned with the structural nature of educational government in the United States. Political ideology and organization of structures are challenged together. As Schattschneider saw, "all forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 71).

Politicization of an apolitical area usually results when: (1) The system of decision making grounded on the dominant political paradigm of an era becomes subjected to critical controversy; and (2) Other aspects of the society, especially ones which that system is supposed to serve, have changed enough so that the appropriateness of the established service is challenged. A redefinition of the public interest is then underway. It must, however, first erode the established political ideology. It is precisely the ideological vacuum produced by the erosion of the municipal reform's cultural definition of education's mission, the melting pot curriculum goal, which has placed an impossible strain on the present school's organization at the service delivery point and at each of its governance levels. Since the fundamental illusion of the dominant myth in the politics of education is losing its adequacy, the traditional terms of the relationship between experts and clients are subject to complete renegotiation. Equally basic, the future political paradigm from whence both such relationships and the appropriate technology will be developed is not yet clear, let alone established. The foundation of criterion statements for the future politics of education is still in an early emergent state.

The strongest hint of future policy development lies in the relatively recent redefinition of cultural pluralism in recent legislation and judicial decisions. The redefinition appears to be changing the meaning and philosophical significance of the term individualized education. Throughout this century that term has referred to an instructional means by which to carry out the
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Melting pot curriculum. It is emerging as an educational end. If that educational goal grows in significance, it will redefine the educational mission, require the redesigning of the school's delivery organization, and the restructuring of the governance system itself.

Strong theory and empirical work on the generic relations between education, philosophy, and political ideology is what is needed to predict usefully the course of the future continuing politicization of education. Unfortunately, these are missing. Theoretical and empirical work on the politics of education has a history of less than two decades of development. The fact reflects both the previous power of the educational political paradigm, which prevented its earlier development and its recent erosion. What is clear, however, is that the emerging philosophical and ideological ideas of greatest moment to the politics of education will result less from technical research findings and conclusions than from issues of basic social value choices about American governance and educational mission; these issues are filtering through the hearts and minds of citizens at the grass roots more than being made by planners in Washington or state capitols.

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Values Imposed by Political Science: Implications for Educational Research and Development

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An examination of the relationship of values embedded in political science to the scientific study of education is not a straightforward exercise because neither political science nor education, as areas of inquiry, yield ready answers and the linkage between them is neither strong nor obvious. To begin with, political scientists are not sure what phenomena their variety of social science should include or exclude. Some political scientists attribute this uncertainty to the antiquity of the discipline, and the persistence over time of systems of thought derived from the past. The term "political" and its cognates come from the Greek word for city-state, polis, and in effect, the Greeks were the first to differentiate the political from other aspects of individual and collective existence. They created political science as a conscious activity and addressed the problems inherent in the duality of the individual and the state. They were the first to debate seriously that baffling and recurring problem in political study—the relationship of "what is" to "what ought to be."

The anomaly in political science today is that, while the range of disciplinary concerns is very broad, much inquiry has become narrowly specialized. In retrospect, past decades can be characterized by some dominant trend or value orientation, but this is difficult to do with regard to the current situation in which the values and research preoccupations of some political scientists are held in low esteem, or virtually ignored, by others—and vice versa. To confront the purpose of this monograph, we must first ask: "If political science is the answer, what's the question?" In other words, "What exactly are political scientists doing?" "Which and whose values are significant?" "If there is any impact on educational research, is it related to the content, the level, or the intent of a particular kind of political science inquiry? Or is it related to some other purpose besides research?"
THE DISCIPLINE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Difficulties in defining the discipline of political science derive from the problematical and contentious meanings of both the noun "science" and the adjective "political." If "science" is broadly construed as "knowledge," then it can be argued that, over many centuries of experience and study, much has been learned about things political. If "science" is narrowly construed as only "knowledge of a certain type obtained and legitimized according to the canons of a specified methodology," then today's political science has very modest dimensions. Although political scientists fall along a continuum between these extreme interpretations of what constitutes knowledge, Waldo (1975), finds that they are united by "a great deal of agreement at the commonsense level about what constitutes the stuff of the 'political' and a belief that the enterprise to which they address themselves is of central importance to human life, collective and individual."

The prestigious group of scholars that prepared the report on political science in a 1967–1969 survey of the behavioral and social sciences were able to agree on this authoritative definition:

Politics, then, refers to the activities of individuals and groups, from the family to the international organization, as they engage in collective decisions. Although we usually think of politics as involving competing or conflicting leaders, factions, or parties that seek to occupy governing positions in the public arena in order to shape public policies, politics is also found in the government of private associations, business firms, labor unions, churches, and universities (Elau & March, 1969, p. 14).

In the first chapter of the report, which is entitled "What Political Science Is About," the major subtopics are: power, institutions, policy processes, functions, ideologies and movements, international relations, and political behavior.

The self-conscious emergence of political science as one of today's behavioral and social science disciplines dates from the late 1800's, and the movement reflects important features of the American political experience.¹ The founding of the School of Political Science at Columbia University in 1880 is often cited as an important birthdate of the discipline. The first generation

¹Sources for the history of political science include: Waldo (1975, pp. 18–80); Jensen (1969, pp. 1–28); Sorauf (1985); and Somit and Tanenhaus (1967).
of political scientists was inspired by dreams of a comprehensive science of man and based an interpretation of the evolution of governmental forms upon historical research. Many leaders were trained in the historical-comparative approach of the German universities and their broad interdisciplinary proclivities are well exemplified by Herbert Baxter Adams, a member of the founding faculty of the Johns Hopkins University. He taught economics to Thorstein Veblen, sociology to Albion Small, history to Frederick Jackson Turner, and political science to Arthur Bentley, Woodrow Wilson, the Willoughby brothers, and John Dewey. Scholars from the other disciplines, especially such early sociologists as Max Weber, Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, and Emile Durkheim exhibited considerable interest in political institutions and behavior.

The first decades of the 1900's saw a rapid decline in historical analyses of the development of institutions in favor of description and evaluation of contemporary institutions. Much of research tended to be legalistic in character, based on readily accessible official sources and records. Another important change was that activist political scientists became concerned with the stresses on the American political system that were generated by runaway capitalism, massive immigration, and urbanization. They sought to bring their knowledge to bear on the governmental problems of the day and were often found in organizations independent of the universities, especially bureaus of governmental research. The themes of Progressivism—civil service reform, education for citizenship and public affairs, electoral reforms, and reconstruction of municipal government dominated an increasingly specialized field.

Jensen states that World War I "convulsed" the discipline and induced a radical rethinking of the nature of politics:

The utopian, crusading reform impulse of the Progressive era disintegrated, forcing a more realistic and sober appraisal of the necessity for careful analysis...the optimistic belief in the inevitability of progress through gradual social evolution collapsed. True understanding of the irrationality of man and the power of government action for good or evil emerged as the proper goals for the research work of political scientists (Jensen, 1969, p. 3).

Charles Merriam was the dominant figure of the period between
the two World Wars, and under his leadership the University of Chicago became noted for its efforts to stress the "science" in political science and to put such inquiry into the service of democratic principles. Moreover, the influence of the other "rising" disciplines, especially psychology and social psychology, as well as the use of quantitative methods, is apparent in the studies undertaken of public opinion and political leadership.

World War II altered world and national situations in ways too numerous to catalogue, and it also created new problems, opportunities, and responses from the political science profession. For example, the study of international politics was tremendously stimulated; more contact with foreign scholars made the discipline more cosmopolitan; the upsurge in computer technology contributed to the scope and sophistication of data analysis; and public administration began to be recognized and organized as a disciplinary subfield (Waldo, 1975, pp. 50-53).

Perhaps the most "value-laden" change following World War II was the intensification in political science of a "harder, sharper" scientism, with its inquiry focus on observable behavior. Sorauf (1965, p. 15) states that this behavioral movement was a logical and direct extension of the Chicago movement during the pre-war years; however, it brought greater concern with such matters as the individual and group behavior that goes on within political institutions, rigorous and systematic empirical analysis, new categories and concepts from the other behavioral sciences, and problems of theory-construction.2,

Behavioralism was strongly, even fiercely, resisted by many in the profession. Some judged it to be a repudiation of a valuable heritage; others thought it inappropriate for the study of "the political" or irrelevant for dealing with pressing issues, especially those interested in the promotion of democratic citizenship. A fuller treatment of differences between the "behavioralists" and the "traditionalists" is provided in a subsequent section comparing normative and empirical theory, but it is important to note that one effect of the controversy was sharpened conflict over methodological principles. According to Elau (1977a, p. 6) even today "there is an exaggerated, almost pathological concern with methodology, ranging from the banal, technical to sublime epistemological disquisitions."

2Other discussions of the "behavioralist" articles of faith are found in Jensen (1969), Somit and Tanenhaus (1967. Ch. XII), and Waldo (1975, pp. 60-62).
VALUES IMPOSED BY POLITICAL SCIENCE

By the mid 1960's the behavioralists had not entirely recon-structured political science but they had won "qualified victory" and greatly altered the intellectual map of the discipline. Perhaps the most obvious contrast with the past was their employment of a new vocabulary which incorporated terms and techniques borrowed from other disciplines and their use of sophisticated quantitative methods. Somit and Tanenhaus, however, regard the increased attention to analytic theory as the most compelling change from earlier periods. David Easton's seminal work, The Political System, published in 1953, was a highly influential landmark. Critical of what he saw as the persistent tendency of traditional political scientists to turn to history and philosophy and of behaviorally-oriented researchers to undertake theoretically sterile forms of fact-finding, Easton proposed that the two groups adopt a common focus on the political system. His proposal was influential but not universally accepted. However, it is generally agreed that political scientists presently show greater theoretical sensitivity and sophistication than in earlier periods.

The recent preoccupation with theory has not tended to convergence, according to G. David Garson. He writes:

Rather than adopt a systematically multifaceted orientation that incorporates the many strands of our discipline's past, most political scientists remain disposed to select one or another orientation as the most nearly correct framework... the tendency to neglect the history of thought within our discipline reinforces the growth of political science through accretion in which the shifting of basic premises, questions, and terms occurs largely without explicit or even conscious consideration (Garson, 1978, pp. 11, 43).

The most recent development in political science, which followed upon the social turbulence of the late 60's and early 70's and had its origins in the New Left and the Counterculture, has been termed "Postbehavioral." Adherents of the movement argue that political science should be concerned with values, with issues of justice and equality, with political activism. They regard the ambition to make political science a "genuine" science as conducive to research that is inconsequential and morally insensitive. Waldo suggests that the postbehavioral movement may prove to be a temporary aberration or "perhaps a new balance
of forces will emerge, a rearrangement of professional ends and means, motives and techniques, in which science is cultivated less for its own sake and used more in a conscious effort to realize preferred values” (Waldo, 1975, p. 115). Other clues suggest, however, that fragmented values and effort are endemic to political science. The situation today may not be very different from what it was in 1951 when the American Political Science Association published Goals for Political Science, a document which Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, p. 188) state “managed to face in all directions on all issues.” Thoughtful commentators on the state of American political science today virtually all conclude that, after a century in the making, the discipline lacks a clear sense of identity. Political scientists are still trying to agree on whether or how scientific inquiry can advance their knowledge of “the political.”

THE VALUES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

We turn now to the problem of discerning and dealing with the impact that value commitments attached to political science might have on inquiry concerning education. On this subject some eminent scholars in politics and education, on at least one notable occasion, demonstrated a ready capacity to talk past each other. They were attending the Research Workshop on Politics of Education, sponsored by the Committee on Basic Research in Education (COBRE) of the National Research Council, whose proceedings were published in the book entitled State, School, and Politics (Kirst, 1972). In this volume it is not difficult to find a value position in political science to fit every bias or research predilection in educational research for which such a linkage was sought!

In a brief presentation, it is clearly impossible to characterize the full range of political science preoccupations, with their differing priorities, approaches, and often acrimonious attackers and defenders. Even if one selects only a few aspects for illustrative purposes, one cannot do justice to the richness of intellectual resources in the relevant literature. What is offered here is a sample of a few issues in political science—hardly more than

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2Recent assessments of the state of political science show great diversity in points of view. See Almond and Genco (1977); Elau (1977b); and Wahlke (1979).
VALUES IMPOSED BY POLITICAL SCIENCE

vignettes—that were selected because of their diversity, their continuing importance, and their tendency to cut across the disciplinary subfields, as well as the contrasts in underlying value assumptions which they exhibit.

The topics are of two types: the first relates to intra-disciplinary research concerns in political science and treats (1) empirical theory and normative theory; (2) the individual and the political system; and (3) policy process and policy impact. The second relates to public-oriented activities and includes (1) civic education; (2) education for the public service; and (3) policy study and guidance. The discussion of each subtopic includes a brief comment on its value implications for educational research and development and a concluding section summarizes the overall prospects for interchange between the two domains of inquiry.

Intra-Disciplinary Issues

Empirical Theory and Normative Theory: According to Wolin, "a theory is preceded by, and is a working out of, a decision to study political life in one way rather than another. . . . A theory is a complex way of organizing, seeing, explaining, and altering the world, and each theory presupposes a notion of what is plausible and what is required for the theory to be accepted as true" (Wolin, 1968, p. 322). Theories developed at different times have involved diverse notions of the "plausible:" for example, Aristotle relied on reason and observation, Machiavelli on the facts of history, Hobbes on geometrical axioms, Locke on natural laws and common sense, today's behavioralist political scientists on verifiable hypotheses. Perhaps the most significant break which contemporary empirical theorists have made with political science tradition is their insistence that "what is" must be separated from what "ought to be." The difference is between descriptive and explanatory statements about observed political phenomena and prescriptive statements about what should be done to achieve desirable political objectives.

Some of the early behavioralists admonished that "facts" must be completely isolated from "values" because the subjective quality of values makes them inaccessible to scientific modes of inquiry. This austere position has generally been relaxed into an attitude which holds instead that empiricists should clarify political values and "examine their implications, consequences, and risks" (Brecht, 1968). Further, the researcher's choices of problems
and methods are not regarded as value-neutral, but are justified on their worth in advancing a scientific undertaking, rather than on their potential for advancing preferred courses of action.

Behavioralists in political science follow other tenets familiar in philosophy of science: inquiry should proceed from carefully developed formulations which yield “operationalizable” hypotheses which can be tested against empirical data; findings should be based on quantifiable data, since only quantification can make possible the discovery and precise statement of relationships and regularities; depending on the scope of phenomena under study, theory may be classed as “low-level,” “middle-level,” or “general.” Easton states that the growth areas of empirical theory have been at the middle-level—relating, for example, to parties, leadership, administrative behavior, representation, community power structure, consensus, and conflict (Easton, 1968, p. 293). Progress toward the ultimate objective of building “general theory” has been notably slow.

The critics of the behavioralists resist the classification of theory as either “empirical” or “normative,” because they regard both the traditional brand of political theory and their own contemporary formulations as consisting of “a subtle blend of empirical observation and theoretical speculation” (Wolin, 1968, p. 328). They are perhaps reacting to the behavioralist view that political theorists are out of touch with contemporary realities and devote themselves to antiquarian studies of the past. However, one can usefully distinguish “normative theory” from “empirical theory” on several grounds: its broad scope, and vision, its “soft” criteria for valid knowledge and, particularly, its prescriptive purposes.

Furthermore, according to Spragens, “political theories are like pearls; they are not produced without an irritant” (Spragens, 1976, p. 20). In other words, they are an attempt to deal with real and urgent problems, genuine predicaments, or perceptions of disorder in the body politic. Spragens has set forth what he calls the “logic-in-use” of the political theorist. His first task is to make a careful diagnosis of the political malfunction he has per-

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1 The sub-field of political science which is now called “political theory” and sometimes “political philosophy” is the preserve of those referred to here as “normative” theorists.

2 The following summary draws on Spragens, 1976, especially Chapters 1 and 6
Values Imposed by Political Science

ceived, a complex logical and empirical exercise which typically yields divergent conclusions among theorists. A complicating factor is that diagnoses of social ills are scattered about in the various social sciences and the political theorist must judge which evidence and arguments outside his own discipline are most persuasive. Since his diagnosis tends to be critical about prevailing values or political institutions, it is likely to be labeled as "radical" or "subversive" by non-theorists.

The normative theorist next considers what the political world would look like if the problem or predicament were dealt with as effectively as possible, trying to envision a political order that doesn't actually exist. Then follows his prescriptions as to what political actions would, in the theorist's view, realize this ideal order. The normative theory formulation process has been defined as "an attempt truly to know the nature of political things and the right, or the good, political order" (Strauss, 1959), p. 12). It is a form of inquiry that makes recommendations, sets standards, and deals with political obligations, responsibilities, and ideals. Wolin says that political theory has been powerfully influenced by the hope of providing knowledge for action, and it remains a durable underpinning of the discipline (Wolin, 1968, p. 328).

It goes without saying that educational research, as an offspring of the behavioral movement, is committed to the values of empirical rather than normative theory. Researchers in the relatively new field of politics of education have followed the lead of "middle-of-the-road" behavioralists in political science. While there is no lack of analyses of the parlous state of education by scholars of other disciplines, only a few contemporary political scientists of stature have treated the subject with the form of moral exposition, speculation, and prescription that qualifies as normative political theory. This departs from the precedents of past political thought when, for example, Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau pondered the mutual relationships of politics and education. Minar (1971) states that political science could indeed contribute to educational research and development by reexamining these durable questions:

What is the impact of education in formal and informal senses on the capacity of a society to sustain political association? What can, must, or should a society do or not do to shape education to its socio-political ends? ... (Political science) may, as it has in the past, explore current paradigms and their manifestations in action; it may also turn some energy to the search for new goals, values, and modes of organization and activity.

The Individual and the Political System: The behavioralist movement in political science brought changes not only in the theoretical orientation of the discipline, but also a shift on the part of some researchers from the study of large scale structures, such as nations, bureaucracies, or parties, to the study of individuals and small groups. Attention was directed to political personality and motivations, political attitudes and perceptions, political roles and behavior. The change in focus aligned political science more closely with the other behavioral sciences, especially psychology. The large amount of individual and aggregate data which was made available through random sample surveys and other public accounts was easily manipulable by the modern computer and facilitated more objective modes of analysis (Elau & March, 1969, p. 6).

At the same time, many political scientists have continued to concentrate on "macropolitics" in which the subjects of analysis are political structures, processes, and interactions. Sorauf applies the term "micropolitics" to the study of individuals and their efforts to influence political systems and says it is like a close view of the trees in a forest. "Macropolitics" is the aerial view of the whole forest, the entire political system as it copes with both the behavior of individuals and the aggregations of individuals within it (Sorauf, 1965, p. 38). The model which he uses to convey the relationships between the individual and the system appears in Figure 1. This model also illustrates the other components of the system: i.e. aggregating organizations, elections, decision-making institutions, and other external systems.

Research interest in the political behavior of the individual person has flowed in several directions, intermingling with that of various other social science disciplines. Political socialization, which became an important sub-field in the 50's and 60's, studies civic knowledge and attitudes as these are influenced by indoctrination or associated with participation in public affairs. The literature on political socialization is very extensive. Edgar Litt (1972)
relationships between citizens and their governments may be conceived in one of two modes: the citizen as the independent variable who initiates or otherwise affects public policies, which are treated as dependent variables; or conversely, the citizen as the dependent variable who is shaped or manipulated by political forces, treated as the independent variables. An example of the former mode is the formulation of David Easton (1965) that the effects of individual political socialization contribute to or may undermine the support of the constitutional system and the wider political community. The manipulator view is typically taken by critics of established political systems, and the state's provision or control of schooling is interpreted as a principal tool for obtaining a docile citizenry. Through the efforts of researchers in comparative politics and education, political socialization research has broadened its scope by conducting cross-national studies, but it has yet to develop a strong conceptual base. Major deterrents are those of sorting out the complex pattern of influences that contribute to an individual's political learning and of mounting the needed longitudinal studies. There is considerable agreement at present that the inquiry problems are more complicated and intractable than they were thought to be during the first waves of enthusiasm for the subject.

Another current of research interest traces an individual's political behavior to psychological and personality variables as well as to the social characteristics of his milieu. The theories of Freud have received little favor from political scientists but they have accepted the concept of the "authoritarian personality" and its relationship to an individual's preference for certain political structures and leadership styles. Some researchers have related personality characteristics such as anomie, pessimism, and alienation to a conservative political ideology. An increasing number of inquiries are now made concerning the behavioral styles of political officials, executives, legislators, judges, and administrators. Elau and March state that the study of these elites is most fruitful when it pays attention to the ways in which the environment impinges on their decision-making activities.

attaches a selected bibliography to his article "Sustaining Public Commitment Among the Young: Experimental Political Learning." An extensive review of the literature is included in Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen (1975). See also Brauen and Harman (1977).

*Weiler (1972) calls this a "neutral" conception of political socialization which is "stability-oriented" to system maintenance.
Political Communicators & Socializers:
Sources of Political Information, Goals, Attitudes, etc.

Aggregating Organizations (Parties, Elites, Interest Groups)

Elections

Other Channels

Decision-Making Institutions

Relations with Other Political Systems

Public Policy
Laws, Treaties, Opinions, Orders, Ordinances, Resolutions, etc.

Figure 1. The Political System

VALUES IMPOSED BY POLITICAL SCIENCE

For instance, the “roles” rather than the attitudes of American legislators vis-à-vis significant others with whom they come into daily contact—fellow legislators, constituents, lobbyists, party leaders, and so on—have been the basis for analysis in several studies (Elau & March, 1979, p. 28).

A third type of research about individual political behavior is voting and public opinion studies. These have expanded to such a degree that they represent “behavioralism” to many political scientists and “political science” to many scholars in other fields and in the general public perception. In comparison with other areas of political science inquiry, this subfield has enjoyed unparalleled opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration, collecting and sharing of data, research facilities, and special training programs. Rigorous criteria for research concerning political opinions and attitudes derive principally from survey methodology: representative sampling, maximal reliability and potential for replication, and statistical manipulation of precise, relatively narrow forms of evidence about individual characteristics and decisions. Whatever may prove to be its limitations as a breakthrough toward a “genuine” science of politics, Waldo states that the accomplishments of such research have been substantial: “New levels of predictability have been reached; a deeper, more comprehensive knowledge of political motivation has been attained, and a greater understanding of the relation of political and economic variables has been gained” (Waldo, 1975, pp. 69–70).

Proponents of a political systems approach have a number of reservations about the theoretical pay-off of studies focused on the political behavior of individuals. They question the tendency to slice reality into such small segments and to treat political processes as the aggregation of individual actions. Political systems have overarching functions; for example, they exert authority upon individuals in order to foster social stability, restrain violence, adjudicate disputes, and enforce society's laws. By studying systems in all their complexity as operating wholes rather than after they are divided into components and examined...

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8 The “classic” work is Wahlke, Elau, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1962).
9 Before World War II articles on public opinion, voting, and elections constituted only 4% of the total published in general American political science journals. By 1971 they had tripled in quantity and represented 15% of total, the largest category of empirical studies (Waldo, 1975, p. 84).
“part by part,” researchers of this persuasion hope to gain knowledge that might otherwise be missed (Van Dyke, 1967, p. 161).

The three types of individual-oriented research summarized above—political socialization, analysis of psychological and personality characteristics, public opinion and voting studies—show how the study of human nature became a part of political science inquiry. Because of the common concern of educational researchers with learning processes, affective behaviors, and personality variables, and especially because of their acceptance of the same behavioralistic research criteria and techniques, including polls, they already have a good basis for evaluating the implications of these political science undertakings, which are closely tied to reality and human values, seeking to explain how people feel and act in everyday life.

By contrast, the macropolitics orientation is highly abstract, and encompasses the workings of large-scale political institutions and processes. These lie outside the purview of most educational researchers, who might profit from gaining a better understanding of systems analysis as a research framework, taking into account the conservative stance that is associated with concentration on systems, or aspects of systems, that are already in place. It would counter the “liberal” inclination of those educational researchers who concentrate exclusively on the study of human development, growth, and change.

Policy Processes and Policy Impact: The representation of the political system in Figure 1 shows “Political Communicators and Socializers” as a source of information, goals, and attitudes of the individual citizen. It shows also that among these communicators are the “aggregating organizations” which consist of political parties, a vast array of interest groups, or governing elites. They may exert influence either through elections or “other channels,” such as seeking to persuade elected or appointed decision-makers in the legislatures or the executive branches or bringing grievances to the courts. The actions of individuals and groups power the political system (and its complex of subsystems) and are the “policy processes” which generate public programs and authoritative policy in all its myriad expressions, from presidential jawboning of labor leaders to the levying of fines from jay-walkers.

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11 For a critique of systems theory in the educational literature, see Wirt and Kirst (1975), Part III.
12 The policy process may also have negative expressions in the sense that government officials may refuse or fail to respond to environmental needs and
“Policy impact” is the Janus-like concept, not explicit on Figure 1, which refers to the eventual effects that the implementation, or non-implementation, of policies have both on individuals or groups and also on the policy system itself.

The systems model incorporates “policy processes” and “policy impact” as integral components of political action; however, public policy-making is so vast an area of inquiry that researchers have tended to divide it up, concentrating on various delimited aspects of the whole. The divisive effects of specialization are apparent with regard to the singling-out of “policy processes” as a focus of inquiry. The effect of the behavioralist movement turned many political scientists from the study of the formal properties of political institutions (legislatures, bureaucracies, courts) and of “policy contents” (i.e., agriculture, labor, foreign affairs, welfare, natural resources, education, etc.) to the study of processes which presumably might offer more possibility of generalizing across institutional and policy content areas. Institutional studies were viewed as static, and content studies were suspect because they are likely to spread the resources of the discipline thinly, requiring a political scientist to become an expert in his content specialty (Ranney, 1968, pp. 9-13).

Policy process analysts have explored a broad range of topics. The focus on the internal operations of the government has produced studies of intergovernmental relations and of the workings of the courts, the national and state legislatures, administrative agencies, city councils, the presidency, and the handling of such events as the Cuban missile crisis. Researchers have explored and adopted concepts from organization theory and wrestled with what Fesler calls the unsolved “built-in antithesis” of decision-making processes (Fesler, 1975, pp. 120-121).13

Process-oriented research also extends to the “aggregating organizations:” parties, elites, and especially interest groups.

challenges For a seminal analysis of nondecisions in the political system see Bachrach and Baratz (1962, pp. 947-952).

13 Fesler points out that decision-making is done by human beings and its study entails concern with the psychological aspects of the decisional behavior. On the other hand, the aspiration is to make policy decision-making rational, and preferably impersonal. The problem was reflected in the study of public administration: “We could not be against scientific methods, themes, or models any more than we could be against human beings finding happiness in their work place, despite assertedly repressive organizational climates” (Fesler. 1975, pp. 120-121).
Important theorists such as Bentley, Gross, Herring, Key, Latham, and Truman were responsible for advancing the highly influential view that interest groups were not contrary to the public interest, as they had often been perceived. Instead, through their interactions and conflicts public policies might appropriately be delineated. Group theory was regarded as a useful framework for presenting "the great mass of empirical, historical, and descriptive materials that political science has accumulated about the 'realities' of political organizations," and it provided a modern expression of democracy, since through participation in interest groups, the ordinary citizens may find representation."\[^{14}\]

Carson evaluates as follows the values associated with group theory and its elaboration as "pluralism," which emphasized political entrepreneurship:

American politics was defended, at least implicitly, as a benign system in which no one group could dominate. Both emphasized the eufunctions of fragmentation, the legitimacy of the contest of interest, the multiplicity and wise distribution of political resources, and the pervasiveness of the bargaining process. (The theory) represented an empirical and pragmatic orientation to the study of politics that fueled bitter debates between normative theorists and traditional institutionalists on the one hand and the newer empirical theorists and behaviorists on the other (Carson, 1978, p. 23).

Critics of group theory claimed that it had redefined democracy to emphasize procedural rather than substantive criteria, and that its conservative bias was out of touch with the civil rights and antiwar movements that swept across academia in the 1960's and 1970's. The perception of social crisis moved some political scientists to greater concern with normative theory; others embraced various empirical alternatives to group theory and pluralism: such as choice and exchange theories of politics, theories of political change, and a revived theory of elites. Each of these has some distinctive implications for the policy process; for example: social choice and exchange theories utilize concepts from economics and posit "political man" as a rational, utility-

\[^{14}\]Avery Leiserson, quoted in Carson (1978, p. 71). Carson's study documents the development and decline of interest group theory and is based, among other sources, on a review of all the articles in the American Political Science Review, from 1906 to 1973.
maximizing decision maker. Theories of political change provide a rationale for greater participation in American politics of previously unorganized and disadvantaged groups, and for greater decentralization of government operations. The return to elite theory brought a resurrection of interest in social class and stratification research and claims that interest group liberalism had exacerbated the crisis in public authority during the 1960's by the delegation of decision-making powers to various groups (see Garson, 1978, Chapters 4 and 5).

The 1960's and 1970's also brought the criticism that political scientists had been so concerned with "policy-processes"—how policies are made—that they had neglected to study "policy-impact”—who receives what benefits from the policy process (Hawley, 1977, p. 319). "Post behavioral" political scientists charged that the efforts to gain an understanding of the pluralist process of American politics had become irrelevant to the most pressing political problems of the day and had led to a tendency to sanctify the process. They pointed out that contemporary events make it clear that the system was flawed, but that it was possible to detect and correct these flaws by concentrating on the policies produced by the system and especially their consequences on the lives of the persons affected. A great deal of policy-impact research was initiated by economists, lawyers, sociologists, engineers, educationalists, accountants, stimulated in large part by the requirements for program evaluation that accomplished the Great Society social legislation, and by the subsequent skepticism of the Nixon and Ford administrations about the value and efficacy of these programs. Quantitative methodology for analyzing costs and benefits was adopted from economics. With only a few exceptions, political scientists have not carried out policy impact research, since it typically requires skills in social and psychological measurement that they have not cultivated. Hawley, among others, regrets this state of affairs, and he encourages greater attention to issues that go beyond questions of who governs and how governors behave to the straightforward question, "So what?" He states that "political theories are less robust and more fragile than they could be. . . . Inattention to political

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This development has important interdisciplinary implications for education, since theories and research relating to social class and stratification are an important preoccupation of educational sociologists. See Karabel and Halsey (1977, pp. 1-88).
outcomes limits importantly the contributions that political scientists can make to a more just society, whatever one's definition might be of justice" (Hawley, 1977, p. 320).

Lowi, on the other hand, argues that political science has very little to learn from modern economics and behavioral sociology and psychology and that there are dangers in borrowing prematurely and uncritically from other disciplines. He writes:

Yes, political scientists should be interested in 'impact analysis'; but the impacts for which political scientists can claim some analytic expertise are impacts back on the political system rather than forward toward 'elements of the social process.' (Emphasis added.) . . . How will the different types of policy and coercion affect the capacity of a government, the next time around to make timely decisions? How will current policies affect the access of all people to the political system and the capacity of all people for defense against bad policies? All of these are macropolitical questions. A micropolitical and an interdisciplinary approach to these questions actually means neglect of the questions. And we will neglect these questions only to the peril of the discipline of political science itself (Lowi, 1975, p. 273).

The conflicting views of political scientists concerning the values of pursuing studies of policy processes and policy impact are particularly cogent to educational researchers whose specialty is the politics of education or the evaluation of educational programs. Most of the research in politics of education has been process-oriented, and the results are questioned not only by Hawley, who is quoted above, but even more emphatically by Harmon Zeigler, one of the most productive of political scientists who study education. He states:

Unless it is possible to link the findings of the highest quality of research concerning the political control of education to the product of that control, the classroom student, then the major benefits of the research are lost. And from the standpoint of educational scholarship, the research represents little more than an academic experience (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974, pp. 9-10).

16Of relatively recent origin in educational research, this group now numbers a few hundred persons, a number of whom belong to a special interest group of the American Educational Research Association. Collections of recent writings and bibliographies in the field are included in Scribner (1977), and Mosher and Wagoner (1978). See also the volumes on politics of education published in the Lexington series by D. C. Heath and Company and by the Teachers College Press.
William L. Boyd concedes that the study of educational politics has almost completely failed to link its concern with such matters, for example, as school board and superintendent relationships to the differences such matters make for what happens to children in the classroom. But he argues that a great deal more is at stake in the operation of the public education system, including the issue of what set of ethnocultural values the schools shall promote (Boyd, 1978, p. 263).

These echoing notes of related controversy in educational research conclude our brief discussion of three intra-disciplinary issues in political science. We turn now to another major sector of political science: its public-oriented activities.

Public-Oriented Activities

"Public-oriented" is the designation used by Waldo to characterize the "outward-looking, applied, activist, or service" activities and responsibilities of political scientists, a term which is perhaps less judgmental than "extra-scientific," which Somit and Tanenhaus applied to such activities in their history of the development of the discipline. The semantic distinction pertains to both the mixed heritage of contemporary political service and to sharp cleavages of opinion concerning what place, if any, "public-oriented" activities should have in the discipline. Some political scientists regard them as beyond, or at least only marginal to, a scientific purpose; others go so far as to judge them "futile, wasteful, annoying, or even embarrassing" to a scientific enterprise (Waldo, 1975, p. 69). To other political scientists, public-oriented activities and obligations are the heart of the discipline. They believe that the political scientist has civic responsibilities in addition to those of conducting research in politics and that the roles of scholar and private citizen should not be divorced. As long as it was obvious to all right-thinking men that democracy was the best and highest form of government, the possible contradictions in espousing the pursuit of truth, active participation in civic affairs, and the propagation of democratic values could escape notice. Not until after World War II did a sizable segment of the profession begin to question the compatibility of these objectives (Somit & Tanenhaus, 1967,

17 This discussion draws on the summaries of both Waldo (1975, pp. 62-70) and Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, Chapters IV, VII, X, XIII, and pp. 207-208).
As the behavioralist movement gained ground, cleavage along scientist/activist lines became much more pronounced. However, "public-oriented" activities continue to engage the energies of significant numbers of political scientists, and this long-standing commitment is not likely to be drastically diminished. The kinds of activity are themselves somewhat diverse in purpose, appeal, and relevance to educational research and development.

Civic Education: The involvement of political scientists in the education of future citizens is their most extensive public-oriented activity, if one considers that about 75% of all political scientists work in educational institutions and 60% report that teaching is their primary work (National Science Foundation, 1971). This does not include their indirect influence on precollegiate education through teacher training and preparation of, or advising on the preparation of, curricula.

In response to criticisms that such teaching is ideologically biased toward a middle-class view of the American experience, or a crude form of mind manipulation, or inappropriate for a social science discipline, efforts have been made to make citizenship education more realistic and analytical. The view of Somit and Tanenhaus is that diverse and powerful forces bear upon the provision of civic training. Appeals to those who provide financial support to colleges and universities place much weight on the presumed relationship between higher education and intelligent democratic citizenship. Required undergraduate courses in American government are the bread-and-butter offerings of political science departments (Somit & Tanenhaus, 1967, pp. 207-208).

Civic education has significant implications for educational research and development, not only because of its scope and purpose, but also because of the manifest and unresolved value conflicts and inquiry problems it has engendered. For example, what will be the impact of many studies, including those of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, which have provided good evidence that "teaching citizenship" in the customary manner neither produces lasting knowledge nor improves civic morality? Somit and Tanenhaus offer this comment:

Education for democratic citizenship and better minds for better politics will henceforth have to be defended not by the cannoneering of moral pronouncements but by the small fire of demon-
strated results. Whether this position can be held by this means is an open question (Somit & Tanenhaus, 1967, p. 199).

**Education for Public Service:** In contrast to the political science offerings directed to civic education, those designed, directly or indirectly, to provide knowledge and perhaps an ethos of responsibility for those entering, or already employed in, the public service tend to be more advanced and specialized in character. The clienteles may include professionals pursuing careers that will have a special relation to the political realm, such as law or journalism; persons who aspire to elective office or to provide staff assistance to elected officials; and especially those who will serve as appointed employees or officials in government service. The movement to "professionalize" the latter group derives from the reform period of the early 1900's, when well-trained administrators were seen as deterrents to the graft and mismanagement that had become a hallmark of city-hall politics. ¹⁸

The expansion of formal education for the public service took place outside the confines of a strictly political science orientation, and recently, even outside of departments of political science in a number of new and independent schools of public affairs. The tendency for public administration to become a satellite of political science reflects significant differences in values. At the outset, the view was that the norm for public administration should be the pursuit of economy and efficiency for purposes determined elsewhere. This narrow conception lost credence, as public administrators were required to deal with the complicated demands of a series of crises: wars, depressions, urban growth and decline, environmental blight, energy shortages and so on. The pragmatic concerns of both practitioners and public service educators left little time or energy for research or theory

¹⁸It should be noted that appointive officials who are products of training programs in public administration are vastly outnumbered by the public officials who attain managerial posts after training and experience in their respective professions. In fact, one of the distinctive characteristics of government today is the employment of professionals of almost every variety at every level and their indispensable role in the determination of public policy. They may never have studied—or wanted to study—political science or public administration and the professional values they bring to public administration are "anti-politics," at least in rhetoric. A recent review of the influence of professionalism in the public service is found in two symposia in *Public Administration Review* (1977, 37, 631-686; and 1978, 38, 105-150).
development about administration. Moreover, many persons in the field were committed to achieving social reform, and they were skeptical that the moral and ethical problems that face society are amenable to study by scientific modes of inquiry. They found much of the behaviorally-based research produced by political scientists to be irrelevant and unreal, but increasingly adopted the concepts and research findings of other disciplines, especially those of economics, business administration, sociology, and social psychology, which were more pertinent to their needs and interests. However, educational programs for public service have yet to offer a fully satisfactory synthesis of theory and practice. Fesler asks:

Was public administration receiving infusions of insights, theories, typologies, and methods that would strengthen its quality and raise its status? Or was it being slowly nibbled to death? The answer was not clear then and it is not clear now (Fesler, 1975, p. 117).

Fesler's query and conclusion about the effects of interdisciplinary borrowing on public administration will sound familiar to those who have noted similar effects on education. They will also find that the tasks of educating persons for the public service proceed within a context of rather diffuse values, but with one very strong source of consensus: the focus on the distinctive nature and obligations of public service, broadly conceived. By contrast, teachers, professors of education, and educational researchers are, in general, remarkably unconcerned and uninformed about the setting of their own brand of public service, preferring to pursue their professional lives as much as possible in isolation from the realities of educational governance. Even educational administrators, whose work resembles that of the generalist public administrators in many basic respects, maintain an arms-length posture from them; and the research and training programs for educational leaders rely more on content from business administration and sociology than from political science. Given the current erosion of public confidence in, and support for, all its governmental institutions and leaders, it appears that the need to develop appropriate educational programs for public servants is not limited to the occupations linked by tradition to political science. Is this not also an inquiry task for the educational profession?
VALUES IMPOSED BY POLITICAL SCIENCE

Policy Study and Guidance: In political science today one finds disagreement about the relative importance of the "study" of policy processes and content and the appropriateness of offering "guidance" to public policy-makers, especially when both functions are combined as a "public-oriented" professional activity. In general, political scientists have become cautious and almost invisible in giving policy advice, especially when compared to the economists. Harold Lasswell's vision of political science as a grand "policy science" which would join the philosophical examination of goals with the practical professional tasks of providing guidance to men of power has been difficult to realize, given the complexity of the research problems, the diversity of approaches, and the limited research resources of the discipline. University institutes of government or public administration and research offices of governmental agencies have performed much useful, but atheoretical "policy research;" however, it does not meet the scientific standards of today's behaviorally-oriented political scientists. The recent surge of activity in "policy studies" and "policy analysis," which was stimulated by pressures to evaluate policy-outcomes, has been directed to applying social science perspectives to understand and helping to solve important social and political problems, but the interdisciplinary involvements have raised questions as to whether the political science perspective has been lost in the shuffle (Nagel, 1975, p. xi).

Moreover, in spite of their activist traditions, many political scientists are troubled by the same dilemmas that educational researchers encounter when they undertake to combine the roles of social scientist and policy advisor. Henry M. Levin states as follows the case for maintaining the independence of the research enterprise:

I think it can be demonstrated that there are some natural differences between the educational policy process and the educational research process that may lead to conflicts between the apparent needs of the former and the contributions of the latter. I have also argued that these differences are intrinsic to the processes... and that there should be a tension between educational policy and research. They represent two different cultures with different requirements. The former is restrictive and decision-oriented with an emphasis on the short run. The latter is much less restrictive and can provide the types of information needed for moulding a more visionary world of the future... That is,
a relatively independent educational research activity is more likely to provide a healthy challenge to prevailing and destructive dogmas than one which is completely controlled by the State and its ministerial apparatus (Levin, 1978, pp. 165–166).

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**
**IMPLICATIONS OF THE VALUES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**

In the foregoing discussion, I have first emphasized what I think are some basic reasons why it is not easy to cross the lines between political science and educational research. The first is that political science is a many-sided, compartmented discipline whose strata of value orientations have been laid down over a long period of time. One needs to examine them with all the care that a geologist gives to the study of the formations and chemical make-up of rocks. Geologists may also be able to utilize topographical maps, but generalized views about political science can be very misleading. Thus the main section of my analysis tries to avoid this hazard by providing some “rock samples” from the soil of political science, instead of trying to map the whole terrain.

The second difficulty in linking political science and educational research is that the activities and commitments of political scientists diverge into two sets: one deals with intra-disciplinary research concerns and the other with extra-disciplinary public-oriented concerns. My sampling of three areas of intra-disciplinary activity shows that these specialized interests are associated with conflicting value orientations that all too often lead to animosity and isolation among political scientists.

For example, the normative and the empirical theorists differ fundamentally on the role that analysis of values should have in the discipline. The worth of several innovative lines of investigation concerning the political behavior of individuals is contested by those who regard the analysis of political systems as more conducive to the theoretical pay-off. Activists in the discipline criticize the relevancy of the research of colleagues who concentrate on the study of the processes of public policymaking rather than on the impact of policy on the lives of individuals. There has been widespread acceptance in political science of the values
and methods of behavioralism which characterize most contemporary social science research. At the same time pockets of resistance hold out against the most exacting criteria of "scientism."

A similar situation exists with regard to three different types of public-oriented activities of political science: civic education, education for the public service, and policy study and guidance. The appropriate objectives, scope, and efficacy are in each instance subjects of extensive debate. In addition, I have suggested how these fragmented sets of research and service efforts would have differential value implications for educational research and development.

One might next inquire, "Does it matter?" "What, if any, is the likelihood of exchange between the domains?" The answers to these questions are mixed: it does and should matter. Recent past history indicates, however, that the linkages between the two fields of inquiry are likely to be limited to a few sub-specialties. This prediction runs counter to the fact that the domains of education and political life have a shared heritage. In each domain there is a long history of intellectual exploration of such basic values as justice, equality, and freedom and of the appropriate relations of the two domains in realizing these values. Distinctive values and institutions are associated in each domain with the American experience. The history, organization, and control of public education in the United States are inseparable from the development of other governmental institutions in the United States. Both domains display the basic tension that arises from attempts to accomplish competing goals that are difficult to reconcile. In other words, in both education and political life one can identify related philosophical, scientific, and activist goals.

When we narrow the focus to the discipline of political science and the research enterprise in education today, the commonalities tend to vanish. True, each espouses behavioralism and interdisciplinary collaboration; but educational research draws heavily from psychology, sociology, the natural sciences, and the humanistic disciplines, while political science still has its strongest affiliations with law, economics, and political sociology. Crosswalks between political science and educational research and development have been few and fragile for some time. There is good evidence that educational research and development have recently been more influenced by the work and the values of economists and lawyers than it has by that of the political scientists.
One reason for the schism between political science and educational research is that many political scientists tend to regard education as a "content area," which like that of the other governmental service areas, offers a limited potential for building general theories about political phenomena. They have also been dissuaded from the study of the governing structures and policymaking processes in education by the barriers which past political events and the professional aspirations of educators erected between educational enterprises and the other public services. An "antigovernment" posture, or at least rhetoric, characterizes many educators, including the researchers and their colleagues in the general social science research community.

The relatively few political scientists who study educational governance and policymaking are oriented to empirical theory and neither they, nor the other varieties of educational researchers, place much value on the kind of normative theory that many political scientists espouse. Such intellectual activity is reserved to the educational philosophers or to various kinds of critics outside the profession. Instead, in educational research, as in political science, small-scale empirical studies tend to pile up. There seems to be a pervasive belief that it is impossible to examine admittedly important questions in a scientifically meaningful way and that it is somehow useful to study narrow, if uninspired, questions. The retreat to both technical concerns and extensive specialization in both areas impedes fruitful interdisciplinary exchanges.

Can one then entertain a reasonable expectation that, with the appropriate allowances for their interdisciplinary biases, political science inquiry and public-oriented activities could, in some way, enrich educational research and development? About the only areas of potential pay-off appear to be those in which political scientists have already made some incursions. The first is political socialization, a learning process in which the research interests of political scientists, psychologists, and educators converge. School teachers and administrators, as well as political science professors themselves, have also a practical stake in utilizing valid research findings to improve their programs of civic education. The results of recent political socialization inquiry have yet to meet early expectations, but the phenomena under study require longer periods of time for observation and analysis. Research designs are now more complex, taking into account affective as well as cognitive and social influences; and, with the collection of cross-national data, inquiry can be expected to shed
the value constraints that arise from focusing exclusively on the American political and social milieu.

The other possible marriage of research interests is that of policy studies in education. It brings together the concerns of educators, economists, and lawyers and, ironically, those of the research sector of political science that has made the most decided split with the parent discipline. Like many in educational research, these colleagues who study public affairs are responding to pressures from policymakers and the public to bring scientifically-derived knowledge to bear on real-life problems. They are also engaged both in providing policy guidance and in training cadres of professionals who can advance “policy science” objectives. These facets of activity, in one way or another, can be found on the agenda of the National Institute of Education and other activist elements of the educational research and development system.

Public affairs scholars are of course faced with the hazards and the limitations that attend all forms of “decision-oriented” inquiry. Vestiges of the normative goals of political philosophy infuse their missions, as we were reminded by David W. Minar in the paper he presented at the 1971 AERA conference not long before his death. The vision which this valued colleague had of the worth of bringing political science and education into productive collaboration was never dimmed by technicalities. He said:

Certainty will continue to elude us, that we must learn to live experimentally with a complex world, even as we try to design policy for education and politics that will take account of the human potential for freedom, equality and dignity (Minar, 1971, p. 8).

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VALUES IMPOSED BY POLITICAL SCIENCE


Neo-Conservatism and National School Policy*

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NATIONAL REFORM AND FRUSTRATION

Reform and Resistance

The surge of national policy during the 1960s to reform long-standing human needs has had consequences not yet fully plumbed. But also during this period complaints arose against programs responding to these needs, often from groups of power and status who felt challenged. Addison’s aphorism captures the situation well: “When men are easy in their circumstances, they are naturally enemies to innovation.” City halls denounced new community-based poverty programs which were creating alternative bases of political power. Industrialists and labor union leaders complained that environmental policies imposed higher costs on them, meaning higher prices for consumers, fewer jobs for workers, or both. Professions like medicine and education cried out against a new burden of regulations interfering with their traditional services.

Many persons had entered into the 1960s reform with zeal, if not naivete, only to find that national policy reforms weren’t “working.” Civil rights advocates, “poverty warriors,” compensatory education champions, and many others found to their surprise that a national mosaic of local public and private interests did not change immediately upon hearing the trumpet call of reform. Entrenched urban politicians turned out to be intractable, school teachers and administrators didn’t do what they were supposed to, white supremacists rejected the invitation to cleanse their souls of racism in the River Jordan, and welfare

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agencies would not become more sensitive and humane. All these recalcitrants bore testament to a Newtonian law of social dynamics, namely those whose power is once set in operation do not change without the application of considerable external force.

For many champions of urgent reform, their programs didn’t seem to increase academic achievement among the young, desegregate Northern schools, increase the pool of skilled workers, improve the amount and quality of health care, build more low-cost housing, jack up the income level of the very poor, and so on. For many, change or improvement meant immediately, almost in the fundamentalist’s sense of creating the world in six days. There was the money, there were the dedicated public servants striding forth under St. Paul’s call to “fight the good fight,” and there was the certain knowledge of how to change the world tomorrow. But somehow it did not seem to work quickly.

The capacity for dealing with frustration is limited in all of us. Faced with it, some buckle down for the long battle. Many Washington bureaucrats today were young recruits of the 1960s, committed to the long struggle, seeking small gains rather than great victories. Others faced with this resistance to reform threw up their hands and rejected the total system. The radical solution, as always, charges that no change is possible without totally revamping the entire structure, in this case the capitalist system.

The Neo-Conservative Reaction

Yet others withdrew to redefine the issues and recalculate the strategy. Among these appeared a group of dissatisfied intellectuals, mostly from academia and corporations, who adopted the label of “neo-conservatives” (Steinfels, 1979). In the pages of their journals—The Public Interest, Commentary, Fortune, Wall Street Journal—they exhorted the nation to withdraw from this national policy effort which they regarded as a “failure.” Rather, reliance was to be had upon private and voluntary decision-making systems, like the marketplace, or upon decentralized government. And we should stop increasing unrealistically popular expectations about improving the quality of life through national policy. All these constitute a failure perspective when applied to any national government evaluation.

While not all neo-conservatives abided by all tenets of what I will discuss, each contributed a piece to this viewpoint. They
included political scientists and sociologists like Edward Banfield, Daniel Bell, James Coleman, Nathan Glazer, Samuel Huntington, Daniel Moynihan, Robert Nisbet, Aaron Wildavsky, and James Wilson. These are major intellectual talents, another clutch of the "best and brightest." Given the sensitivity of intellectual circles to elite signals, these men are widely heard among policy makers and academics.

What were they signalling? For the neo-conservative, Americans expect too much of government as a machine for dealing with human needs. At its crudest level, this is translated by California Governor Jerry Brown into the notion that "small (or less) is better." While Brown's budget has not decreased nor is it balanced, he still calls for a national balanced budget, and many like the cut of his cant. But he can be easily dismissed as simply another man who wants to be president—a highly sophisticated form of sado-masochism.

Yet he does touch on a central theme of the neo-conservative view of society and government. The argument is that political leaders in the 1960s artificially stimulated popular expectations about what Washington could do for them (Wildavsky, 1973). When the government couldn't deliver, which these critics believe, then distrust of government ensued, thereby weakening one of the essential ingredients for a stable government and society. The remedy is to fall back on the use of private decision-making arenas, particularly the market place. At worst, one should devolve such decisions to state and local governments which, being closer to the people, are more responsive to their needs.

Hence the neo-conservative stance boils down to two propositions: national policy efforts don't work and they are dangerous to other values in the society. In short, national government can't and shouldn't do the job of addressing human needs. "Can't" is an argument of efficiency and "shouldn't" is one of philosophy, and it is on these two themes that the rest of this analysis proceeds. For if the empirical evidence of inefficiency is substantiated by the facts, and if the philosophy is analytically rigorous, then neo-conservatism does indeed have a case.

I focus on this group because, through their access to national media and the influence of their names, they have become important in defining the "failure" of this national policy effort. I also do so because they represent an intriguing new skirmish in the old effort in this nation to equalize life opportunities. And
NEO-CONSERVATISM AND NATIONAL SCHOOL POLICY

I further do so because new but less publicized scholarly research increasingly is challenging the neo-conservative position. That is particularly important today when many Americans are seized by a lack of confidence in government or with what they think government is doing. But what is happening, whether government efforts "fail" or not, depends upon what part of reality one reports and when it is reported—as we will see.

To give such analysis some focus, my major discussion will treat education policy. This is no mean subject. That policy involves the largest expenditure of state and local governments, it causes the largest number of exercises of public preferences through referenda (on school financing), and it involves the most numerous local government in the nation. Further, federal policy in the last twenty years has played a much larger role. It is important in financial assistance to all local schools (paying about 8 percent of those costs) and in special education programs for many groups. It is also a powerful stimulus to a desegregation effort seeking to redress the historical inequality of educational resources. If the propositions of the neo-conservative are valid, they should be tested by a major policy effort involving many governments and much money. School policy provides that test.

THE EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT AND EDUCATION

When we look back on the taxes that our ancestors have paid to educate a nation, it was shocking for many to hear in the mid-60s that schools did not independently influence citizens' knowledge and life earnings, separate from one's status or family background. The Coleman report made that judgment based upon data collected from the largest sample of its kind to that point. Contrary to the traditional belief that there were great differences between school resources of white and black schools, the differences were found to be slight. Contrary to the traditional belief that the more resources were applied to schools the greater was the educational quality, Coleman found the influence of resources to be of much less, if any, importance, compared with the child's sense of controlling his or her destiny; that quality seemed rooted in the child's family training. At Harvard, where these data were analyzed in even finer detail over the ensuing years (Mosteller & Moynihan, 1972) one professor proclaimed to a colleague at the first news of these findings, "Schools don't matter, and money doesn't make a difference."
Do Schools Create Learning and Do Federal Efforts Help?

That Coleman report, and its successor by Jencks (1972) generated more criticism for shortcomings in research design than maybe any other social science study in our history (Aaron, 1978, Chap. 3; Levine & Bane, 1975; Luecke & McGinn, 1975). But what is important here is to review the research since Coleman to see if schooling does contribute to learning—do schools matter?—and if that learning contributes to greater earnings. Hyman et al. (1975) recently reported the use of polling evidence from 1949–1971 to discover what different age groups know cognitively. They confirmed the traditional view that education does create learning, more education does create more learning, and more learning does create a desire for more learning, one of the important “enduring effects” of education.

If that is so, if the greater the education the greater the academic achievement, how to account for the recent publicity about declining test scores? It depends upon what you are comparing with what. For example, a review of the achievement levels of earlier generations with the present one must show that more persons of a total age group are being educated and achieving more learning today than ever before. After all, at any earlier period, fewer children of a given age group attended schools, so that age group as a whole at that time must have had lower achievement rates compared to any later group.

Scholars at the University of Indiana (Tuinman et al., 1974) have shown this logical case to be supported empirically in their recent review of the voluminous research literature on the subject. Longitudinal studies are rare, because there are few easily accessible and comparable records of student results. When Indiana sixth-graders from 1944 and 1976 were compared on eight reading tests, the 1976 pupils did better on four, equalled them on two, and did less well on two (Fay & Farr, 1978). Indeed, the even longer historical analysis by Diane Ravitch (1978) presents extensive evidence sharply contradicting those who see modern schools as ineffective, destructive, or anarchic. Thus the usual ahistoricity of too many social scientists confounds the current discussion of the effectiveness of schools. We don’t ask a major question of such criticisms of effectiveness—compared to whom and when?

We can see the difference that more education made, particularly when federal resources are brought to bear. Brookings
Institution studies (Aaron, 1978; Levitan & Taggart, 1976; Orfield, 1978) show that national policies in education, and in other areas of human needs, have had a large effect which is just now beginning to emerge with a clearer view of the law's actual (not purported) purposes, with more rigorous research designs, and with more time for the policy to work. As others have shown (Salamon, 1976; Pettigrew, 1971; Pettigrew et al., 1973), current policy analysis has seriously underestimated the time necessary to achieve change in a complex system; hence T1 and T2 analyses lack long enough time lines.

As a result, the spate of 1960s research on national school policy effects were at first pessimistic. But with time and less quick research, we are seeing differential effects. We know much more now (Aaron, 1978, pp. 82-83) about such questions as: what kinds of educational practices make a difference in increasing learning for what kinds of students? For example, reducing class size will cost more than it is worth; teacher salaries will stay high under this condition, but the learning increase is not much greater. Further, learning is directly related to the amount of time required, while the curriculum that is selected will affect what is learned. Too, experienced teachers help some kinds of students less than new teachers, bigger classes have the same effect as do smaller classes, but not for all. These findings suggest the dynamic context of learning in which teacher, student background, subject matter, and classroom milieu interact. It is a pattern of differences, not monolithic similarity, and different policies can achieve different results. It is not the case, therefore, that "Nothing works, so don't try anything."

Much of this pedagogical knowledge came from federal program innovations and their evaluations. Compensatory education has been a key here. Early reports of its early use in misapplied forms discovered it had no impact. But as the evidence accumulated, as educators began exchanging information on effective techniques for using such moneys, the evaluations began to report important gains. DHEW surveys (1977, p. 2; Wolf, 1977, pp. 112-13) reported that disadvantaged children, who were receiving Title I funds for compensatory education, had achieved above normal gains compared to other disadvantaged children lacking such support. Thus, in California in 1971-72, 62 percent of the assisted children gained more than their group's norm; in Colorado 4 of 5 pupils gained better than their norm, while the other fifth doubled its norm. So, as evaluation instruments
became more reliable and the resources were applied more consistently, there was much less doubt that compensatory education could significantly raise the learning rates of the disadvantaged. All of this, of course, comes from the federal stimulus and not from local—certainly not from private—forces.

**Does Education Affect Earnings and Do Federal Efforts Help?**

Did such effort affect the educated person's income, that is, did learning affect earnings? We went through a spell a few years ago of hearing that more education does not significantly increase one's life earnings. Rather, Jencks argued (1972) that "luck" played a larger role in who did well financially than did schooling. But if people did not benefit from more education, that result surely is not that clear in more recent analyses.

For example, the Bureau of the Census (1974) finds that blacks have pursued schooling earnestly. Black males with a high-school diploma doubled between 1960–73. As to earnings, drop-out nonwhites in 1960 earned 15 percent less than high-school graduates (20 percent less by 1970). But nonwhites with a college degree earned 28 percent more than those with just a high-school degree in 1960: by 1970 this gap was 65 percent. As a result, the racial gap in earnings has narrowed sharply; the nonwhite, high-school graduate of 1960 earned only 43 percent of his white counterpart, but by 1970 he was up to 76 percent and still rising.

As for citizens other than minorities, more sophisticated models of the ties among education, expenditures, and earnings have shown close relationships. A huge sample of American families studied over time showed that a doubling of school expenditures every year brought an annual increase of 10 percent in educational attainment and a 14 percent increase in future hourly wage rates (Akin & Garfinkel, 1974). In short, what generations of Americans with limited education had known was confirmed—more schooling not only increased learning and receptivity to learning, but income as well.

In this finding, the federal government played a major role by innovative funding, by increasingly thorough evaluation of what works for whom under what conditions, and by barring economic discrimination. The last was especially important. Levin recently reported (1978) not simply the closing racial gap in the education and earnings of the two races. But when the 1964 Civil Rights Act appeared, there was a sharp jump, both
in education and earnings for blacks, unlike that of any decade preceding. As long as employers raise educational requirements as a substitute for expending their own capital for evaluating applicants, then more education for more people—whether job relevant or not—creates an ever larger pool of persons eligible for jobs that bring higher earnings.

Does Desegregation "Work"?

If the debate over whether schooling increases learning and earnings took place mostly among social scientists, a greater debate has engulfed the American people themselves over another educational issue—desegregation. We are in the paradoxical position that a large majority of our people want school desegregation but don’t want busing to be used to do it, as a close study of poll data shows (Orfield, 1978, pp. 108–18). Yet, as all know who have worked to ease the problems of desegregation, almost no desegregation occurs without busing. Given the ethnic enclaves and the increasing minority population in the central city, how one is to desegregate without moving some children is unclear. Note that Americans aren’t against busing per se; after all, 52 percent of all students use these vehicles to get to school. This contradiction not only highlights the difficulties of federal programs. It also points to the failure of local and national leaders to clarify the issues and facts surrounding this controversy.

The Misuse of Research. This policy conflict has generated research which has itself been controversial. It has produced a popular view that desegregation costs outweigh its benefits; presidents, a majority of Congress currently, most elected officials, and millions of citizens are of this mind. For some who share the neo-conservative approach, the policy is typical of all the worst in national policy efforts; the costs are deemed not worth the effort, although typically little estimation is made of the costs if the effort is not made. Yet there is another view, also based on research, which finds a positive net value in the program and which points to workable desegregation techniques. Those using research against desegregation too often selectively review the findings (Hawley, 1979; Crain & Mahard, 1979). For example, less than half the studies of desegregation effects have even been published, and even the latter are usually ignored. Further, the methodological qualities of most studies are ignored by critics, so that all studies are thrown in the same hat and
added up. Curiously, the weak methodological studies tend to produce weak findings about the program's effects. These are the ones which look at only one year for results (usually the first, disruptive year) and not over time. These weaker studies rarely employ adequate control groups to distinguish whether an effect is really at work. These studies also use measures not consistent over the times and groups studied, which acts to understate real relationships and usually results in small or null findings. And these studies too often do not use valid measures of the factors being analyzed.

Such research criticizing desegregation effects also employs unrealistic expectations about such effects. Some critics conclude that the racial gap in achievement that is removed by desegregation is too small to make a difference. But specialists working with school systems know that it is unrealistic to expect that desegregation alone will accomplish major change. Rather it requires changes in personnel attitudes, curricula, administrative sensitivities, and so on. Some critics judge the program a failure because minorities still tend to cluster together socially; but to expect otherwise is unrealistic. It certainly happens in other, nonracial situations based on boy-girl preferences, neighborhood of origin, ethnic backgrounds, etc. Moreover, the strongest research shows desegregation leads to more interracial friendship than before it took place, and that school personnel can facilitate this result.

Desegregation Effects. But, based upon more rigorous research than that criticized just now, what can be said about the effects of desegregation when studied over time? Here is the best and most recent that social scientists can tell us, using aggregate data, rigorous methodology, and a longitudinal approach, about what happens under desegregation (Hawley, 1978; Crain & Mahard, 1979):

1. White academic achievement is not adversely affected.
2. Black achievement is greater in a majority-white school, particularly in the North; no difference is found in the South where segregation has operated longer.
3. The earlier that desegregation begins, the greater are the positive results for black achievement; much of the research showing negative effects has dealt with high-school blacks already affected by a long history of unequal educational resources.
4. Mandatory desegregation produces more positive effects for black achievement than does the voluntary kind, especially in the North. That is because, once compelled, school officials are more likely to plan to make the program effective.

5. There is more community peace over the matter, as well as more academic gains, if the community leaders back it, if school leaders plan for it, and if school principals believe in and work for it. Without these ingredients, school resources are dispersed amid political battles by the adults.

6. Busing for desegregation adds about 2 percent to the costs of schooling, not some much larger fraction, as the public believes. And one can bus a minority of the students in ways which will desegregate a huge majority of all students in a system. A federal judge in St. Louis in May 1980 ordered the busing of only 7,500 of 65,000 students to achieve racial balance.

7. By 1970, Northern, not Southern, schools were heavily segregated. In just four years, 1968–72, the proportion of blacks in predominantly white schools rose from 19 to 44 percent in the South, but increased from 27.6 to 29.1 percent in the North. The regional gap continues to this very day. In racial matters, we should talk about “Down North” (Orfield, 1978, p. 57).

"White Flight" Effects. And in light of all the publicity about “white flight,” what do more recent studies show (Rossell, 1979)?

1. Whites have been fleeing to the suburbs decades before desegregation; however, with desegregation the rate increases in the first year of implementation, but only if whites are sent to black schools or the district is over 35 percent black. Even this loss may be made up in later years if the system is less than 35 percent black.

2. Interracial contact increases most in schools with the greatest white flight, those above 35 percent black, an effect found even ten years later.

3. There is less white flight if desegregation is done all at once, rather than being phased in.

4. There is less white flight if desegregation is metropolitan wide, than if it is only in the central city. There is strong evidence (Cataldo et al, 1978) of accommodation by both
races in Florida to metro-desegregation and of major reduction in fears of busing.

5. Voluntary plans desegregate very little, and thus cause less white flight.

6. White flight accelerates if the desegregation movement is of whites to black schools, but not the reverse, although this is less true if the minority school is Asian or Latin.

7. The more negative the newspaper coverage before desegregation, the greater the white flight, and vice versa.

8. And most remarkably, protest subsides very soon after the buses roll. In the South, where there has been the most desegregation—a remarkable reversal in a decade—whites heavily support desegregation and busing after the experience, despite their earlier hostility.

Also scattered among the spate of rigorous research are other findings contrary to the popular view. Thus, only a small fraction of students has abandoned the public schools in the South—about 5 percent—and because these are the most bitter foes of the policy, their absence is probably beneficial for the public schools. Or note the finding (Davis, 1973, p. 268) from 555 desegregated districts, that attending one's neighborhood school has little effect, positive or negative, on school achievement or social climate; we may have romanticized the advantages of such schools. Or the finding that riding the bus is safer than walking to school. Incidentally, there is no law that compels busing of any child. This is only a convenience available to students who wish it; thus "forced busing" is a polemical code word for conflict, not a descriptive statement of the law.

The Continuing Dilemma. In great depth, Orfield (1978) has investigated the history and conflict over school desegregation, the record of over two decades of the American experience with this policy. Orfield reminds us that the issue raised in the Brown case 25 years ago, and reiterated by courts ever since, has had little to do with this academic achievement question. The latter question was only raised for the first time by the Coleman Report (1962), and much research has since been incorrectly focused there. However, the courts then and now have insisted that the major overriding issue is that discrimination denies minorities certain rights guaranteed under the Constitution. That issue goes to the nature of whether we will have a racially separate society, with resources distributed unequally. How we can
achieve reallocation of such resources is the issue currently facing
courts and schools. And on this issue there is a large body of
pragmatic advice based on long experience about how to do it
(Smith et al., 1973; Dentler & Scott, forthcoming).

But there remains the unhappiness of the white citizens op-
posed to busing. They are caught up in a continuing dilemma,
as shown by their support of desegregation but not busing. The
"white flight" for reasons of desegregation is not as great as some
believe, and those remaining behind are adapting much more
than the prior furor would have led one to predict. There seems
to be a "reverse Chicken Little" phenomenon at work here, for
whites find the sky does not fall in when the buses roll. In the
South, 72 percent of white parents in 1959 objected to their
children going to school with even a few blacks, but in 1975,
the figure was only 15 percent; earlier, 83 percent had objected
if the schools were half black, but by 1975 the figure had dropped
dramatically to 38 percent (Orfield, 1978, p. 109). So the dilemma
shows surprising signs of yielding when experience compels
whites to contribute to a desegregated education. In much of
this, then, there is evidence of a national thrust—spurred by the
courts to be sure—which will have lasting effects on the racial
nature of our society.

Evaluation of the Efficiency Argument

In the foregoing there has obviously not been time for a full
laying out of the methodological and empirical problems raised
by research on the issue. I have sought only to sketch the outline
of the argument against that neo-conservative element which
believes that non-national and private forces are better mechan-
isms for resolving—or even defining—school problems. The
truth of the matter is pretty blunt. Without national government
aid, there would have been no effort to begin redressing the in-
equities in the educational opportunities in this nation. Such
extra effort was not there in the past because the political power
and will were not there to make it. Now that the alteration has
begun, there are impressive changes underway, beneath the
popular impressions of what is going on, in compensatory educa-
tion, desegregation, and increased earnings through education
for minorities.

It is not all working perfectly, of course. There are limitations
and delays, disappointments and failures. The expectations of
the newly educated are *not* always met in better earnings. There are not enough resources made available for these human needs, and the political and legal obstacles are still large. But there is enough evidence at hand to make clear that these national policy strategies are quite capable of beginning to make a massive change in educational resources, academic achievements, and life earnings for those once lacking them. And nothing proposed through private means comes even close to the beginnings I have here touched upon.

One may note all this and still ask whether the neo-conservative case may be stronger for other policy areas than education. But a review of the social programs of the last decade by Levitan and Taggart (1976) provides evidence that "the feds" have been much more effective than critics charge. In the areas of income support, health care, low-income housing, manpower programs, civil rights actions, and community organization, programs of the 1960s have achieved much of their real—as against their publicized—aims. Indeed, the critics often complained about federal policies being too efficient when it came to limiting their own activities which had nurtured longstanding social problems. The reaction to implementation of Title X on sexism in university life is evident to any reader.

Furthermore, a massive realignment of both political parties has taken place, such that the presidents of both have been committed to this enlarged federal role. Campaign rhetoric may call for decentralization, but little occurs under Democrats or Republicans; the number and dollar value of federal grants-in-aid to states and localities continue to grow. Moreover, the American people accept this expanded role, unlike the neo-conservative claim. I have noted earlier that there is the massive support for school desegregation but not busing. We hear much of public skepticism of government, but it is not new. Rather, it is a trait running through our history from the Constitutional convention of 1787 to the current Proposition 13.

However, polls are curious instruments, which must be used very carefully to tap a complex public view. For example, at the peak of the Watergate scandal in 1973, a survey showed Americans overwhelmingly believing that Washington should ensure a minimum standard of living, that the federal government can be run efficiently and is essential for national "momentum," and that the best government is not one that governs least (Aaron, 1978, p. 161). Moreover, recent Louis Harris polls over the last fifteen years found not merely less prejudice among
whites and great white acceptance of racial integration, but also more openness to school desegregation than that program's critics have asserted (Newsweek, 1979). Thus, while 85 percent of whites still oppose busing, 56 percent of white parents who went through it found it "very satisfactory," 39 percent reported no complaints from their children about it, and two-thirds doubted their children would suffer.

It is recent evidence such as this, merely sketched here, which leads me to the view that neo-conservative critics of national school policy efforts may well be misreading what American citizens desire. And that brings us to the second basic theme of this viewpoint, that such government action is undesirable.

THE DESIRABILITY ARGUMENT

The Limits and Dangers of National Government

In part the reaction against federal policy stems from a general sense that some areas of private life cannot be affected by government. They would agree with Samuel Johnson: "How small of all that human hearts endure That part which kings or laws Can cause or cure." But it is more than such political passivism that they object to. More, they complain that by creating unreal expectations of what people are entitled to, the government's capacity to resolve human conflicts will be overloaded, and then the basic unity of the nation will be rent asunder by the resulting group conflict.

Here are the fears of one neo-conservative, writing about The Revolution of Rising Entitlements. The recent turning to government for one's rights he says, has recently

. . . been unfolding in a peculiarly destructive way in the United States. Just about all grievances now get dumped in the lap of government while the voluntary associations that once furthered the claims of different groups are withering. . . .

. . . the ultimate problem presented by the revolution of rising entitlements is not that it will cost a lot of money—though it will certainly do that. What is potentially more dangerous is the threat that the revolution presents to our political system. It threatens to overload the system, to confront it with far more grievances than legislators and judges know how to cope with. What makes this threat especially devastating is the absence, thus far, of any agreed upon rules for settling the differences between all the contending interest groups (Bell, 1975, pp. 76, 78)
National unity and consensus thus have greater claim than those who allegedly threaten it by seeking to have their needs met. Southern protests over civil rights and campus demonstrations over Vietnam are seen as the kind of collective violence typical of this “revolution of entitlements.” What the view does more, though, is to assume that it is a new or major threat.

But this violence of the 1960s was extremely limited in comparison with other eras in our past, and yet we survived. The violence of public authorities against the least powerful is one page of that history, as in the cases of Indians and blacks. Violence over trade unionism was the way the pages of our industrial history were written; as recently as 1979, there was shooting along Route 40 in Ohio and parts east over union conflict. Moreover, city riots have studded our history, including the greatest in history, Irish workingmen in New York City against the Civil War draft. Levy’s study (1969) of 150 years of political violence makes it clear that such protests were not sporadic but continuous; more, they were not undermining but ultimately healing.

Instead of a source of fear, then, the violence of the 1960s may be seen as functional (albeit painful), by alerting nonviolent citizens and their governors to critical needs that had to be met. It was not all that threatening to the national fabric, either, because surprisingly little was required to “cool out” the urban rioters. This result suggests the system’s ability to govern, not to be ungovernable, as some charge (Bell & Held, 1972).

What then, asks the neo-conservative, is to be done to reduce the disruptive tendencies to violence and the failure to adjust group conflict? People must stop asking for so much and doing so in the rhetoric of incitement. That only makes government “unworkable.” Rather, social needs must be met by improving the economy’s capacity to produce goods and jobs, and by making the government more capable of shaping a consensus again. Students need a curriculum emphasizing national values such as civil liberty, which they now do not get or little appreciate. As Huntington asserted, “What is needed . . . is a greater degree of moderation in democracy.” Reliance upon democratic government means citizens away from reliance upon private, voluntary organizations upon which a healthy society is based. Chief among these organizations is the market place, with its ability to help reallocate resources if necessary—and some neo-conservatives aren’t certain even that is as important as other social goals (Nisbet, 1974). If government there must be, it should be more limited, emphasizing state and local governments as more...
reflective of the community. In short, democracy has limits, and so we must ignore some groups' needs, no matter how pressing (Public Interest, 1974).

The Challenge to Neo-Conservatism

One can raise many questions about this philosophical diagnosis and prescription. The failure of market mechanisms precipitating the Great Depression fifty years ago and stagflation today, the inability of the oil industry to regulate consumer use of energy or to control its prices, the inability of industries to curb dangerous environmental practices or of local governments to meet new policy needs which exceed their resources—there is indeed much that could be said against this prescription of neo-conservatives. After all, it was the failure of this market mechanism which gave rise in the first place to the inequalities that many Americans knew in the past, and to the need for national policies. Health care, a traditional private sector service, shows how little was provided without governmental assistance; it continues to show a private greediness if not checked.

But ultimately we must understand that any market mechanism has an inherent bias. By definition, it favors only those who have the resources to operate in it; bluntly, it is a highly inequitarian system. Dollars count there, and the skewed distribution of dollars in our society throughout history is familiar to all. Of course, in a society with a growing national government, dollars can still count, but ultimately votes also count. And while not even these resources are distributed equally in the political system, there are more people with them than without them, unlike the market-place decisional forum.

Protecting the consumer, the worker, the ill of all classes, and those who must share the same environment—in these areas the market has historically shown little concern. Nor has it done so for large numbers of our society—women and minorities. Therefore, reducing “overload” as neo-conservatives call for—deregulation in short—is, as Etzioni (p. 621) has pointed out, a strategy “to favor status, privilege, and economic criteria over social justice and social values.” And in that case, would not the frustrations of those who are ill-favored create even greater tensions and bitterness, precipitating even more of that national disruption which the neo-conservatives see as the fatal outcome of the existing trends?

As for the reliance upon state-local governments, as one with
some familiarity in the politics of these units, I see this strategy as achieving but little of the change needed to meet that discontent. Despite all the traditional talk of states as "laboratories of democracy," and despite the fact that some national programs did originate there, local units are not very good instruments of reform. Noting exceptions in what I now say, it has been my experience and reading of the literature of such units that they, unlike the federal government, are less accountable to the electorate because of invisible officials and limited popular turnout, are more subject to special interests, and hence are more open to corruption and favoritism (Elazar, 1972; Jacob & Vines, 1976). The overall quality of the elected and appointed officials is less, too, in simple but vital matters like competency, honesty, and intelligence.

This neo-conservative call of "back to local government" is in reality a call to return to control by those large corporate, union, professional, and other collections of capital and expertise which have led to many of the very problems with which the federal government now has to deal. In fact, the neo-conservative cast of mind has serious doubts that equality is very important, particularly if it deprives such collectivities of what they already have—position, power, income, status (Nisbet, 1976; Glazer, 1975).

Buried in these writings lies a model of democracy which neo-conservatives fear is now being abused (Glazer 1975, 1978). But the model has serious conceptual problems. First, their argument assumes that there is an empirical basis for the conceptual separation between national vs. state-local governments. Fut, history and scholarship point to an incredibly complex intermingling of these units because group interests cross such jurisdictional boundaries (Elazar, 1972; Wirt, 1970, 1974; Wright, 1978). Second, they conceive local demands to be homogeneous and in opposition to federal action, when those demands are actually quite varied and often conflicting. In reality, the federal role is more often to judge between competing demands of local groups for limited resources than it is one of forcing something down the throats of all local folk.

Third, the major assumption of neo-conservatism is that there is only one valid model of democracy. In this model, citizens directly make public policy appropriate for the ends of their local area. But, it is charged, this popular will is being frustrated in Washington. However, most if not all federal innovations
have sprung from popular pressure from some aggrieved local constituency. That is, federal policy can be traced as much to redressing the ills of one frustrated local group as it can be to frustrating "local will" itself. The singular democratic model of the neo-conservatives ignores the complex practice of American political history, which shows quite well that we lack any such agreed-upon model. You will look long and hard in the Constitution and political history to find any such model as they urge.

Finally, while not explicit, their model assumes that public policy for a nation should spring from our fears: fear of new groups rising to power; fear of challenges to the professionals' control of public power; fear of mixing status and racial groups; fear of equality; and just the simple fear that things are changing, that "the time is out of joint" and something must be done "to set it right." But many of us prefer to seek policy which responds not to fears but to aspirations for a better life. And our history has judged harshly those who do otherwise.

ON THE USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

What Should Social Science Be?

This brief excursion into the tide of neo-conservatism accompanying the rise of policy makers reluctant to do anything may have led the reader to confusion. If social scientists disagree among themselves, how can the layperson rely upon them for clear advice on problem solving? As Aaron (1978, p. 159) recently quipped about this confusion: "What is an ordinary member of the tribe to do when the witch doctors disagree?" Well, no one said you should rely on them. After all, social science research is not a way of gathering all the evidence in favor of a policy goal and putting it in the form of statistics which clearly show the one way to proceed. We leave that to lawyers who get paid well for case-making. Rather, social science seeks to explain the causation which links one phenomenon to another. It is not simply noting differences in reality, but seeking to explain what accounts for that difference (Kerlinger, 1977).

Some would have such social science be pragmatic, dedicated to something called "problem solving," with a high "payoff" in action or money terms, getting "a bigger bang for the research buck," as it were. But good research does not know what the answers are until the work is done, and then the answers may
not have much utility in applied terms. For example, the search-
ers for the causes of crime are dedicated to uncovering elements
seemingly associated with the rise or fall of crime, not to recom-
mending what should therefore be done. What if, as is the case,
we find that the most associated crime factor seems to be the
number of young people aged 15-24? Do you pragmatically then
prove anything about a policy designed to lower crime? Do you
reduce that age cohort?

Others urge social science to be "relevant." I saw enough of
that call to last a lifetime in the "time of trouble" at Berkeley
and elsewhere. Relevance became defined then, and even now
by many, as that research which showed how people were
"oppressed" under a capitalistic system. Traditional social science
was accused of being in the employ, or for the benefit, of the
"oppressors," so none of their counter-revolutionary nonsense
was to be countenanced.

The problem with using relevance as a criterion for judging
social science research is the question that must be answered
first: Who determines what is relevant? If one goes that route,
it then becomes a question of power, not of applied reason, in
getting research agendas and interpreting results. If you're not a
good Marxist you can't get into certain university departments,
or if you are then you can't get into others, or if not a good
pluralist into yet others, and so on. And because power combina-
tions will necessarily reshuffle over time, the relevance search
becomes only a fad, not a lasting contribution to knowledge.

It is in this complexity that social science can be misused. Then
we get experts on the stand arguing differently on the results of
desegregation, before congressional committees on the linkage
between crime and gun control, before city councils on the best
location for low-cost housing, and any position where knowledge
and research are used in an adversary fashion. Then you are
seeing social scientists who have stripped away all complexity
to focus upon one strand, the one which happens to fit their
values.

Research as a Conservative Force

And the curious result, as Aaron (1978, pp. 155-59) recently
pointed out, is that social science research produces a conserva-
tive effect. The liberal scholars who participated in the Great
Society social programs would seem to belie this conclusion, but experience shows it to be true even if paradoxical. It begins with policy makers looking for simple, clear answers to clamoring policy pressures upon them. Social scientists are then given resources to study what that simple answer should be. They find instead complexity and puzzling, often conflicting, interpretations of phenomena, and hence they produce differing but unresolved and untested bases for policy actions. It takes time to resolve such intellectual puzzles, but the call to action continues. So social science, lacking a focused view of social life, ends up leaving policy makers uninformed, filled with results showing more what will not work than what will. Judges and legislators faced with such confusion then fall back upon what already exists in policy, rather than changing policy. That is, only overwhelmingly compelling evidence can move most policy makers, dedicated as they are to maintaining the existing allocation of resources. But social scientists have little of that certainty to give them. The result is that policy stays the same, unless political pressures generate change. Thus, there is little evidence that the programs of the Great Society in schools, poverty, jobs, income, and so on came into being after carefully conducted research. In these cases, as with much reform in the United States, social science did not lay the groundwork on which policy makers acted. Rather, action proceeded in the direction of the greatest force exerted upon the official. Or, in the case of judges, in the direction which their own values took them when they could muster enough votes among the bench (Rist & Anson, 1977).

But in time, social science can demonstrate what effects were created by this policy action, and hence can more soundly speculate about which strategies in the future are more likely to create desired objectives. For example, the research findings on desegregation sketched earlier are now getting voluminous. Gone are the days of the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Coleman report was everywhere used as evidence for governments at all levels not to do anything. For a long time it was so used, even though social scientists had found that report flawed methodologically. Evidence of meaningful gains from compensatory education are emerging also so that those who claim "you can't throw money at a problem" are simply wrong. It depends on how much you throw, on how you throw it, and on who catches it.
But for other areas of social policy, the evidence is not clear, probably because the theory is still shaky and the evidence conflicting. The uncertain results of national policies toward unemployment and inflation have been demonstrated all too painfully. However, welfare policy research is now showing long-term results of poverty policies and the relative efficacy of certain policies (Akin & Garfinkel, 1974; Haveman, 1977; Paglin, 1980).

"The Proper Study of Mankind"

So the field is one of considerable turbulence, in which social science, first exposed to the heady delights of being once thought important, has now descended to a more realistic level. That level is one of expanding more fully our knowledge of the complexity of relationships in the political and economic world of social life.

Has social science then no uses for the policy world? I think clearly it has (Wirt, 1980). Its chief use remains still the power of the negative hypothesis, that is, the ability to test whether causal propositions stand up. It is rather like the story attributed to Michelangelo. He was once asked how he had carved that magnificent statue of David, the embodiment of masculine grace, power, and beauty. He is alleged to have said, "I just chipped away all the unnecessary pieces until only David was left." The use of the negative hypothesis is much like that, showing that some propositions are not supported empirically, thereby chipping away to the true but still unclear understanding of social life. That is not the same as showing what "works" or as "proving" a proposition. It is through this process of removing the unsupportable from discussion of public life that public policy is enriched. But it is a laborious process, indeed, often couched in terms and techniques mysterious to the policymaker.

The neo-conservative approach to the meaning of social life should thus be rejected on two grounds. It does not demonstrate empirically what it claims existentially. And its philosophy would lead us into a kind of libertarian permissiveness which traditional conservatism would reject out of hand. Such a moral system is really reactionary, not conservative, because it rejects the important moral teachings of our past and seeks to reintroduce long-discredited social arrangements. A central message to these moral teachings, which ultimately join the traditional conservative and liberal, was recently phrased concisely, "that it is only
by concern, care and compassion for others that we may survive
and progress as individuals and as societies" (Fairlie, 1979).

We must remember that when God asked Cain, "Where is thy
brother Abel?", Cain replied callously, "Am I my brother’s
keeper?" One of the major moral distinctions of western civiliza-
tion is between those who answer yes or no. Modern conserva-
tives and liberals have answered in the affirmative, although
disagreeing on the methods for this care. But those who reject
that responsibility for instruments that will not provide that care
stand opposed to a central theme of the experience and value
system of American history. So neo-conservatism will be no more
than a temporary reaction against the naive hopes underlying
Great Society programs to provide care for our citizens. No mat-
ter how difficult it will be to find answers, the future will con-
tinue a positive response to that ancient query outside of Eden.

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NEO-CONSERVATISM AND NATIONAL SCHOOL POLICY


Commentary: Political Science Symposium

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In light of the marked diversity of focus and themes in the three preceding papers, there seems little point to strain to give them an appearance of being congruent or cumulative. Indeed, one might realistically accept the multiple and disparate foci of the papers as a reflection of comparable characteristics of the discipline itself. Therefore, rather than attempt to summarize each of these three quite different papers, it might be more helpful for me to highlight selectively a few key points emerging from the papers and the panel-audience discussions that followed.

The broad conclusion shared by the three presenters was that political science has not been, nor is it likely to be, a major, direct, or continuous contributor to educational research. There is considerable irony in that conclusion because civic education animated the early development of the discipline of political science. Also, civic education, when cast in the form of introductory courses on American government, comprises the bread-and-butter part of the course offerings of many departments of political science. On a more grandiose scale, education for effective citizenship presumably lies at the heart of the maintenance of regimes and the inculcation and durability of key political values and behaviors. Nonetheless, the concern of political science in any systematic, theoretical, or scientific way with the content and practice of civic education has generally been thin and inconstant.

What are some of the reasons for the tenuous connection between political science and educational research? One explanation might lie in the limited expertise political science brings to bear on the attempt to validate one normative value as against another. Another explanation relates to the fact that on the empirical dimension political science has been a very adaptive user, at times quite inventively, of methodologies from sister social science disciplines rather than a developer of new methodologies for its own use or for adaptive borrowing by other disciplines. And as one of the papers has observed, political science...
has been allied closest to law and economics, whereas educational research has connected more to psychology, sociology, and the humanistic disciplines. Even when educational research has made significant contact with law and economics, the linkage has tended to be direct, not mediated through political science.

There are a few specialty fields in which historically and at present there is a greater connectedness between political science and educational research. Political socialization studies in which political scientists have a stake have contributed to the inquiry into the learning process, albeit with a set of concerns different from those of the educational psychologists. Policy studies have also included the substantive area of educational policy within its enlarging scope of concerns and analyses.

It is in the last-named category, that of public policy studies, that perhaps the discipline's linkage to educational research will be strengthened in the future. As the field of education becomes increasingly recognized as one of policy making and politics (as distinct from an arena of professionalism and neutral bureaucratic rule-making), the need for political science approaches and analyses should become much more evident. The discipline's greater contribution to educational research should come about both directly and indirectly through policy research and, whatever the mix, the result should be to rekindle a shared interest among educational analysts and political scientists in the mutual relevance of each other's core concerns.

The effects on educational policymaking of an intensified application of analytic political and policy approaches to educational problems should be visibly positive. Nonetheless, formidable constraints remain—especially in a policy area like education characterized by multiple, conflicting, and ambiguous objectives—which work against any rapid or full translation of research findings into public policy. Let me underscore this comment by a relevant digression that graphically demonstrates the non-self-executing character of social science research that bears directly on policy concerns.

As it happens, I came to the symposium directing this monograph directly from participating in a three-day conference elsewhere on the subject of the declining health of the American major political parties. The consensus of that conference was that political parties as meaningful and influential organizations were in process of erosion. Considerable discussion was focused
on the attempts after 1968 to democratize the Democratic party as one of the big factors contributing to the erosion of parties. Should this cause-and-effect relationship have been a surprise?

Surely one would have thought that the discipline’s knowledge about political parties might have played a determinative role in estimating the effects of internal reform of the parties on their organizational effectiveness. Judging by what was said around the conference table, however, it appeared that the discipline’s wisdom on the subject was not widely known and, even when known, was accorded far less than decisive weight. In this instance, the neglect of social science expertise was costly, because on the one side many of the actual effects of the “reforms” were just about the opposite of what was hoped for or intended and on the other side the knowledge base of political science could have forewarned of these perverse effects.

The context for these party changes, you will recall, was the savage shambles of the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago (e.g., riots, massive police actions). A “clean-up” of the party was subsequently held to be imperative; otherwise, went the dire prediction, there would be large-scale defection and/or insurgency. The party and the party system could be saved, concluded the argument, only if the Democratic party (i.e., the nation’s majority party) was extensively democratized in its structure and operations. The broad proposition was that the internal democratization of the parties would strengthen them organizationally. The convention role of the party organization would also be strengthened and the convention would be the meaningful site of choice of the national presidential nominee. Another hoped-for effect, in turn, would be a reduction or at least no further expansion of the number of states holding presidential primaries. on the argument that cleansing the party would take the steam out of the movement to have increasingly populistic forms of representation and influence. The same argument led to the expectation that party reform would reduce interest in having a national presidential primary.

The actual results have gone strongly in the opposite direction. The parties as ongoing organizations have been greatly weakened. The convention’s role has become one of ratifying decisions made earlier by the party electorates in state presidential primaries. The number of states holding state presidential primaries has increased, and over three-quarters of the convention delegates are now selected through such primaries. And although
there does not seem to be any rising support for the idea of a national presidential primary per se, if we were to opt for direct popular election of the president (another "democratizing reform" under current consideration), then renewed pressure for the national presidential primary would likely not be far behind.

In commenting at this length upon the variety of unintended and undesired consequences of this major reform effort, I suppose one could conclude even more gloomily than my three conferees in this section about the relevance or the impact of social science analysis on the world of policy making. Perhaps the readiest analogy in the education field is the projected introduction of the voucher system. Whichever way you look at the proposed voucher "reform"—whether as promise or threat—it surely represents no less fundamental a change in the education world's values and operations than major party changes suggest for the political world. And, instructively, the popular context for promoting vouchers exhibits much the same kind of simplistic tunnel vision that characterized the advocacy of party reform. The probable (and predictable) consequences of a broad adoption of the voucher plan are not well framed by the simple notion of market incentives and behavior that are often voiced by its supporters. There is an active agenda for social science disciplines, then, in fleshing out the more complicated range of behaviors of education's major participant groups for a more realistic depiction of the variety of effects the voucher system might actually produce. It would still remain uncertain how much effect this social science knowledge would have on the fate of the voucher proposal—as the preceding example of party reform suggests—but the obligation to develop and disseminate such knowledge for the potential use of policy makers nonetheless remains substantial.
The Influence of Psychology on Education

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What Bowen saw was how the qualities that save us in one way destroy us in another...

Howard Moss, reviewing the works of Elizabeth Bowen, The New Yorker, February 5, 1979

Introduction

The purpose of this monograph is to address the question of how the values inherent in the various social sciences have influenced, either blatantly or subtly, for good or for ill, educational thought and practice. We are also asked to consider the implications of that influence for educational research and development policy. That is a tall order, and for a variety of reasons.

First, it is by no means clear what values do inhere within each of the social sciences. Indeed, until not so long ago the popular belief was that all of the sciences, social and otherwise, were value-free, except of course for their explicit dedication to the search for truth. Scientists were supposed to be solely concerned with the "ises" of the world, leaving to others the "oughts" and the values from which they are derived. We realize today that such a view is terribly naive, but the notion that social scientists are purveyors of values that have not been heretofore acknowledged is still new enough to generate a lively discussion all by itself.

Second, there is the problem of discerning the influence of those values, which we will temporarily assume to exist, within educational contexts, which are themselves extremely complex. It is hard enough merely to describe what goes on in schools without considering how things got to be the way they are. And "influence" is, after all, such a vague term. Think how far down the chain of causality it must lie; far below making, molding, shaping, fixing, and lots of other hands-on activity.
Third, it is extremely difficult to detect the subtle emanations that radiate from concealed or at least unacknowledged values within the social sciences—powers that shape, albeit indirectly, the form of our educational enterprise. And even if detected, we would still face the mind-boggling task of trying to figure out what implications that value-laden field of force might contain for educational research and development policy, which in itself is hard to characterize.

No wonder the planners of the symposia had us go at the task in groups the size of suicide squads! The wonder is that so many of us were foolhardy enough to join up! Still, having accepted the gambit, there is always the counter ploy of trying to cut the task down to size. Each of us, I suspect, will seek to accomplish that end in a different way. I shall do so, first, by lopping off the implications-for-policy part of the question and leave that to others more accustomed than I to thinking in policy terms. Next I will broaden the focus on values to include other aspects of what might be called “our educational world-view.” Initially this may appear as though I am making my job more difficult, whereas I see it as easing things a bit.

I wish to avoid too narrow a focus stems from what I know to be true about the complexity or, more bluntly, the messiness of the phenomena in question. To say something about the way in which psychology has influenced education surely requires touching upon the values that permeate our educational endeavors. But where values stop and attitudes, interests, knowledge, purpose, or some other way of talking about our outlook on things begin, I find impossible to say. So I beg off worrying too much about such distinctions as I seek an answer to the broader issue: How has our educational outlook and practice (values included) been modified by what we today speak of as the discipline of psychology? That, as I see it, is the question.

One additional remark about my modus operandi is required. This has to do with the level of abstraction at which I wish to pitch my remarks. Unfortunately, at least for a person setting out to do what I propose, psychology as we know it today is far from being a unified science. Consequently, if we set about looking for specific do's and don'ts or other kinds of concrete educational advice that might be considered psychological in nature, we discover that there is not one but several intellectual provinces into which our search will take us. Moreover, if we actually
undertake such an exploration we also quickly discover that not only are the sources of potential influence multiple but the messages that emanate from competing centers of influence—the lessons to be learned, if we can draw upon the pedagogical side of our topic for a metaphor—are often contradictory in content.

Think, for example, of the educational implications that flow from a Skinnerian perspective on the one hand and a Freudian perspective on the other. Certainly each of these schools of thought may be said to have influenced educational practice, but they have done so in ways that are often diametrically opposed. How, then, are we to average out such contradictions in a discussion of how psychology in general has left its mark on our educational landscape?

One strategy, but not the one I shall adopt, would be to deal with the contradictions head on, trying where possible to assess which of two or more competing views has won the largest number of converts within the educational community. The outcome of such an effort would be akin to a popularity poll that might show, for example, Piagetian thought to have a strong following among educators interested in early childhood but to be relatively uninfluential as we ascend the educational ladder. As useful as such an analysis might be for certain purposes, it would not address the broader question with which the monograph is faced. Moreover, if we become immersed in the squabbles and divided allegiances that characterize psychology at the level of doctrinal dispute, we will be led to the rather unsavory conclusion that psychology's chief influence has been to generate confusion among those who turn to it for guidance! Though I believe there is something to be said for such a summing up, it is far too glib. Besides, such an extreme judgment is belied by what we know to be true about the consumption of psychological information by educational practitioners. "If psychologists have nothing to peddle but confusion," a critic of the idea might ask, "why then do educators keep coming back for more?" The question itself demands that we look elsewhere for a starting place.

The strategy which I shall take, therefore, is to seek a level of discourse that transcends as much as possible the differences that separate one psychological school of thought from another. The hedge in such an undertaking lies in the phrase "as much as possible" for it turns out that there is no level of discourse, or at
least none that I have been able to reach, at which doctrinal disputes do not in some measure intrude. Nonetheless, it is possible to rise above a lot of the more contentious bickering to a height at which some of the similarities among competing points of view begin to emerge. It is at such a height, or so I shall contend, that the overall influence of psychology on education can be most fruitfully discussed.

Outward Manifestations of Psychology’s Influence

From this somewhat distant perspective the three most obvious manifestations of psychology’s impact on educational thought and practice are, as I view them: (1) the inclusion of psychology as a subject to be studied by teachers in training; (2) the prominence of educational testing in our schools and colleges; and (3) the provision of special “psychological services,” such as those provided by guidance counselors, as a supplement to the purely instructional mission of our schools. There are other visible signs, such as the operation of an educational research enterprise, largely external to the schools themselves but allegedly serving them, which draws heavily on psychology for sustenance, both substantively and methodologically. But if our concern were solely with whether or not this branch of the social sciences has intruded at all into educational affairs, ticking off of my initial trio of effects—teacher training courses, testing, and school-based specialists—should be enough to dispel all doubt.

Yet these overt manifestations of psychology’s presence within our educational enterprise tell us little about what we really want to know, which is how that presence has altered our educational thinking and doing in ways that are not so easily seen and, therefore, not clearly understood. Toting up the number of credit hours earned by teachers in psychology courses will not answer that question; nor will a financial accounting of the millions of dollars spent annually on testing; nor an up-to-the-minute headcount of all the credentialled workers within our schools who deliver services thought to be psychological, as opposed to educational, in kind. Our deeper question calls for something more akin to the act of mind-reading than to the conduct of any sort of statistical survey. And the “mind” in this instance comprises the collective thoughts, feelings, hopes, expectations, and values (let’s not forget them!) of the educational
community as formed by psychology through training courses, tests, the advice of experts, and in more indirect ways as well.

Inward Manifestations of Psychology's Influence

Yet as we undertake our act of clairvoyance we need not forget completely the more obvious evidence of psychology's influence, for the framework I shall employ in the process contains a kind of layered symmetry. Paralleling the three outward signs that have been mentioned—courses, tests, and psychological services—I posit three inward manifestations of psychology's influence. To these I attach the labels: professionalism, scientism, and individualism.

The match between inner and outer is by no means perfect, to say the least, and it may even be a bit misleading. I certainly do not wish to suggest, for example, that the study of psychology can be credited with making teachers professionals; or that educational testing is the only activity through which a scientific attitude permeates our educational doings; or that educators have come to their present view of the individual by virtue of all those psychological specialists on the school's payroll. Nothing that simple should be deduced from my symmetrical design.

Nonetheless, I do believe that there are rough connections between the parallel layers of my scheme, making it possible for the outer manifestations of influence to serve more or less as symbols of the three inner sets of change on which I shall focus the balance of my remarks. Imagine, if you will, a teacher with a psychology textbook in hand, a computer print-out displaying a scattergram of the IQ scores of a freshman class plotted against achievement, and a counselor conducting a case study conference. This image provides a picture of the three divisions within my central thesis: that psychology, through the writings and teachings of its many practitioners has been a contributing force—one among many sources of influence—in the emergence of a professional, scientific, and individualistic outlook among educators.

My choice of adjectives may sound as though I am setting out to praise all that psychology has done for education because the first two, "professional" and "scientific," stand for qualities that are highly valued in our society at large, while the third, "individualistic," is a term many educators would willingly
accept as descriptive of their own outlook if the word were broadly interpreted as bespeaking a concern for the individual learner. Actually I have no intention of using this occasion for universal praise, for though the perspective from which these three qualities are seen as good is one that I myself adopt on most occasions, my enthusiasm for such a view is not without reservation.

To be more explicit, I am not certain that the spirit of professionalism to be found among today’s educators is an unalloyed virtue. I have a good deal of uneasiness about the conception of science that deflects many of our educational research efforts and encourages us to turn up our noses at most other forms of knowledge. I am not even sure that our individualistic orientations, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of each of us, is entirely free of elements that might serve to retard the advance of our educational vision. In short, though these three qualities are customarily applauded, I see their manifestations within an educational context as being, at best, mixed blessings. In trying to explain why I hold such views I shall probably overlook the positive side of the mix more than the goal of a balanced treatment would dictate. My defense of any imbalance that may appear on the negative side is simply that this half of the argument is relatively neglected in most discussions of what psychology can do or has done for the field of education. But while I shall not be laying garlands at the feet of Psychology, neither am I out to hurl brickbats. As a matter of fact the desire to dispense either praise or blame strikes me as an inappropriate attitude with which to approach the topic at hand. What is wanted, at least at the start, is a suspension of judgment, a calm neutrality, an attitude of detached concern.

Psychology’s Contribution to Professionalism.

The attitude that I seek for myself in setting about the work to be done provides a perfect entry into a discussion of the first of my three sub-topics. For it is in essence the posture of the professional that is epitomized in the phrase “detached concern”—a phrase that will repay a closer look.

The reason for the professional’s desire to remain detached in an emotional sense from the object of his study is fairly easy to understand. He seeks clear vision. He wants to see things as they are, not as he might wish or fear them to be. Figuretively speak-
ing, he doesn't want his glasses steamed by the heat of his own passion. Among the many things he must learn, by no means the least important is to remain cool and dispassionate in situations that might ordinarily arouse strong feelings in those without his training. (Sociologist Erving Goffman uses the term "role distancing" to describe the phenomenon.) The failure to achieve this degree of detachment is usually considered a disqualification for the professional role. Thus the surgeon whose hands tremble with fear or whose eyes brim with tears of compassion at the sight of human suffering is usually thought to be unfit for his work. So is the policeman who cannot control his rage. We even look askance, for that matter, at the medievalist who is so intent on proving his point that he overlooks contrary evidence. He has not yet sufficiently uncoupled the parts of his being variously depicted by those ancient dichotomies of thought and feeling, cognition and affect, reason and passion, the head and the heart.

Yet we also know from experience that the uncoupling can go too far, sometimes with disastrous results. This occurred most dramatically during World War II when certain physicians within Nazi Germany committed unforgivable acts of inhumanity and brutality upon concentration camp victims. And all done in the name of science. That's detachment, all right, detachment with a vengeance. All detachment and no concern.

But extreme cases such as these, though they quickly make the point that detachment has its limits, do so at cost. For they tempt us to draw the conclusion that it is only in such bizarre instances that the limits can be drawn. They further imply that the only dimension of separation is internal—a suppression of emotionality with respect to the object of professional scrutiny. Both conclusions are wrong.

Well within the scope of the ordinary can be found many instances of professional detachment that seem to exceed that which is necessary for clarity of vision. The mere fact, for example, that committees for the protection of human subjects have become commonplace in research facilities and universities throughout the land testifies to the ever-present danger of detachment overtaking its partner, concern. Strictures on the treatment of animals, though less severe than those protecting humans, provide additional examples of the formal braking mechanisms required to keep this tendency in check.

And there is an additional form of detachment which, though not necessarily the result of the first kind of distancing whose
objective is clarity of vision, is often a component of the overall stance of professionalism. This is the kind of social encapsulation that separates and protects the world of the professional from intrusion by "outsiders." This process of the professional's setting himself apart is accomplished by the organization of special guilds and societies whose membership is carefully restricted and guarded, by the adoption of a specialized vocabulary that forms, as it were, a secret language, and in some instances by the wearing of badges and insignia, even complete uniforms, that denote one's professional standing. Customarily the goal of this protective detachment is not simply to isolate the professional from others but to elevate him as well.

Whether or not this second form of detachment is totally self-serving as far as professionals themselves are concerned or whether it also serves to benefit non-professionals are questions that need not detain us here. All we need acknowledge is that here too there exist limits of propriety and concern for others that are easily transgressed. Our individual experience with professional snobbery in its many forms should be sufficient to convince us that this is so.

And what has all this to do with the influence of psychology on education? The thrust of my argument is that the study of psychology by teachers helps to develop a professional attitude with all of its attendant benefits and risks. Indeed, I would contend that psychology is the chief contributor to the professionalization of teachers. It accomplishes this by providing teachers with a semi-technical vocabulary for describing their world (e.g., "hyperactive" replaces "fidgety," the pupil who cannot yet reason abstractly is described as being at the stage of "concrete operations") and by encouraging them to view that world in the detached manner I have described. As a body of teachings, psychology seeks to make the teacher more objective and analytic than he was before undertaking such study.

An interesting question is whether the attainment of that goal entails any added risk for teachers that it may not have for psychologists themselves. In other works, do teachers require any different balance in the proportion of detachment and concern, or however we might wish to describe our ancient duality, than might any other professional group? This question, which no longer seems to be asked by today's teachers of teachers, was once uppermost in the minds of those who were among the pioneers in introducing teachers to the study of psychology.
William James, for example, had a keen sense of the problem though he was not entirely consistent in his solution to it. He clearly understood the importance of preserving and protecting the artistic and intuitive components of the teacher's orientation to his work. He saw the threat to those aspects of the teacher's outlook posed by admonitions to become more scientific and to learn more and more about psychology. He warned teachers against being hoodwinked by psychologists and others who portrayed teaching as being more complex than it truly was and who promised teachers more help via the study of psychology than such study could deliver.

At the same time James himself went on to suggest that the study of psychology may provide the teacher with a perspective on his work—an analytic view—co-equal in significance with the intuitive perspective that is his natural way of looking at things. The combination of these two "angles of vision" yields, according to James, a stereoscopic view, enabling teachers "while handling (the pupil) with all (their) concrete tact and divination, to be able at the same time, to represent to (themselves) the curious inner working of his mental machine."

The metaphor of the stereoscope was timely in James's day and must surely have been persuasive to his audience. But it tends to gloss a little too quickly over the issue that initially aroused his misgivings. That issue, as I see it, was whether the analytic and the intuitive perspectives are indeed neutral and cooperative partners, like the left and right eyes, and whether teachers might have some special need for the intuitive that is not shared by psychologists.

John Dewey and Josiah Royce, writing at about the same time as James, expressed similar concerns. Each emphasized the importance of the teacher's capacity to respond sympathetically and in what Royce referred to as "a loving way" to his pupils. Dewey spoke of the teacher's native tact and skill as being an intuitive power that derives mainly from sympathy. He saw this as being a natural endowment that is present to some degree in most of us. In this sense, Dewey proclaimed, we are all born to be educators, like parents, as we are not born to be engineers, sculptors, or whatever.

Dewey's likening educators to parents helps to bring the issue into sharper focus, for it is relatively easy to see that excessive professionalism among parents with respect to their interactions with their own children would be undesirable. Now if teachers
are somehow more akin to parents in their orientation toward their pupils than are other professions with respect to the object of their professional concern, the threat of excessive professionalism among teachers becomes more obvious.

It is difficult to talk about too much professionalism in teaching without sounding as though the goal of such talk was somehow to keep teachers in their place, to assure that as a group they remain, to use Nathan Glazer’s cutting phrase, “a minor profession.” Actually my caveat, if heeded, might have quite the opposite effect, for it is a warning against the kind of professional tententiousness that is easily detected and that winds up lowering rather than heightening our opinion of all who seek its shelter.

Psychology’s Contribution to Scientism.

In introducing the second of my sub-topics, scientism, I used the testing movement as a symbol of the intrusion of a very special sort of scientific thinking into educational affairs. In so doing I asked us to keep in mind as a mental picture of that intrusion a computer printout displaying a scatterdiagram of IQ plotted against achievement for a class of college freshmen. Actually it was unfair of me to single out achievement testing and the much-maligned IQ to bear the brunt of the criticism. In fact, the target of my concern is much broader than the entire tests-and-measurements movements, though that movement is certainly a major outgrowth of the mix of attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions that comprise the true subject of the remarks to follow.

The attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions to which I refer have to do not with psychology per se but, rather, with the larger scientific enterprise of which psychology is a part. It has been chiefly through the teachings of psychologists, I contend, that educators have had contact with that larger enterprise. In short, psychology has been the major conduit through which scientific notions of a particular kind have been passed along to educational practitioners. I do not mean that teachers and administrators have never been introduced to any other branch of science, for certainly somewhere in their school experience almost all of them have. But until very recently psychology was the sole subject through which the scientific spirit was explicitly focused on educational affairs.

Educators have doubtless gained much from this infusion of scientific attitudes and expectations into their work. It has played
a part in the routing of misguided beliefs. It has provided a firmer base for practices that, prior to receiving scientific endorsement, had no other support than custom or tradition or, even worse, the defense that they simply "felt right." It has cleared the air of complacency and smugness, replacing them with healthy doubt and skepticism. It has strengthened the habit of seeking evidence in support of belief. It has sparked curiosity. For these and other reasons too numerous to mention, educators can well be thankful for the scientific lessons taught them by psychologists.

At the same time, the scientific worldview received by educators from their psychological mentors contained elements of dubious worth, if not genuine harm. Consider, for example, the model of the scientific method that, implicitly or explicitly, was held up for educators to emulate. How did real scientists work? In two ways, we were told: either by experimentation or correlation. In the first instance laboratory constraints were to hold everything constant but X and Y, the dependent and independent variable. In the second, the naturalistic condition, the co-variation of X and Y, was statistically manipulated to tease out, so to speak, the true relationship. In either case the steps to be taken were clearly and somewhat rigidly prescribed in advance: definition of terms, statement of hypotheses, description of measuring instruments, data-collection procedures, ... I need hardly go on, any graduate student can complete the litany. This was the scientific method, which, if properly followed, was guaranteed to deliver truth to those who obeyed its strictures.

In addition to yielding very little in the way of solid knowledge that had educational consequences, an adherence to this rigid conception of how science proceeds had other consequences. It gave to the knowledge that was produced, whatever its usefulness, an exalted status. This was true scientific knowledge, certified as such by the methods employed in its procurement. In comparison with this all other forms of knowing, including common sense, were thought to pale in significance; no matter that what was learned had little to say about how education might proceed. The gain was worth it for it pushed back irrevocably the boundaries of ignorance. The epistemological conclusion was obvious: scientists truly know, all others only think they do.

The consequences of this set of beliefs for educational practitioners can only be surmised. At the very least one might suspect that it did very little to bolster their confidence in what they were
doing. The teacher’s knowledge of his pupils, his best guess, for example, as to which pedagogical strategy will work and which will not, though backed by years of experience, must be advanced apologetically because it is unscientific.

In addition to being presented as epistemologically superior, scientific knowledge is also awarded an ontological status that is seldom questioned. Science, in short, reifies. It legislates reality. This too is a lesson psychology teaches.

The operation of this reification process within the field of education is interesting to observe. We seldom talk today about a child’s will. Why? Because science (read psychology) has taught us that there is no such thing. But we do talk about intelligence and in doing so often sound as though it were as tangible as a bowl of suet. Psychology nods its approval. We no longer speak of a child’s temperament; that ghost too has fled the machine. But we do speak of attitudes and values and motives as if we could reach in and pull them out of the psyche like rabbits from a magician’s tophat. Applause, applause from our psychological mentors.

There is, to be sure, a recognition at some level that such psychological terms and constructs are not really real in the same sense as are physical objects. Nobody truly believes that, attitudes, for example, can be weighed and measured in the same sense as can a carload of coal (or do they?). Yet the language in which we discuss such terms—as when we speak of a person having an attitude—and the apparent precision afforded by the techniques of psychological measurement—allowing us to describe Tommy as possessing so many units more of some quality than does Billy—encourages us to forget that apples and aptitudes are ontologically distinguishable.

Finally, there is the vision of the future that science, as transmitted through psychology, holds out to the educational practitioner. It is a vision at once optimistic and pessimistic, depending, I suppose, on one’s point of view. Optimistically it promises a future in which all or nearly all of our educational problems are solved. No one quite comes out and says that, of course, but it is built into the logic of cumulative advance that underlies our understanding of how science works. Though the phrase is not used as facilely today as it was around the turn of the century, “a science of education” is still the best way of referring to what is sought. It is a utopian vision.

Pessimistically, the vision of our educational future delivered by science contains Orwellian overtones of mechanization and
control. This is so because science is portrayed as advancing through a process of reductionism, breaking larger units down into smaller and smaller parts. With respect to teaching, for example, this means sub-dividing the total act into a finite number of parts or skills and then proceeding to determine how each skill can be taught or developed. This process is epitomized in the competency-based or performance-based teacher education programs about which we have lately heard so much.

On the face of it this process of proceeding "scientifically" to attack educational issues, such as how to prepare teachers, looks so sensible that one might wonder how any objections to it can be raised. Breaking big problems into little ones, concentrating on observables, seeking generalizations of an "if-then" variety—all of these steps seem so logically compelling. Besides, that is the way real scientists work, isn't it? Only slowly is the world at large beginning to realize that the answer to the last question is an emphatic "No." A question that many educators seem not yet to have entertained is whether that model—even if real scientists do indeed behave the way our study of psychology has led us to believe they do—still represents the best way to proceed in thinking about and clarifying educational issues.

One of the troubles with the brand of scientism that seems to dominate our educational outlook today is that its focus is more technological than scientific. It is more concerned with what works than with why things work as they do. It seeks control rather than understanding. It is awed by gadgetry and gimmicks. Teaching, in this view, is seen as a bag of tricks potentially learnable by us all. To speak of teaching as being rooted in a special kind of moral relationship between the teacher and the taught is to elicit a look of wonder if not disdain on the technologist's face.

There are signs that this naive— I am tempted to say "old fashioned"—view of how science works and how our educational outlook might benefit from an infusion of the scientific spirit is beginning to change. The old Thorndikean dream of discovering the laws of learning from which teaching principles would be deductively revealed, for example, is no longer as alive as it was even two or three decades ago. Interpretation, understanding, and explanation are beginning to be sought in place of the older goals of prediction and control. A scientific spirit is still very much alive in educational circles, as seen in the burgeoning educational research enterprise, but signs of greater sophistication and of a newly found humility abound.
Psychology's Contribution to Individualism.

The proliferation of psychological specialists within our schools was offered as the manifest symbol of the third of the three sets of changes in our educational outlook that seem to have resulted, in part at least, from the emergence of psychology as an intellectual discipline. The change itself was described as an increase in individualism. Of the three terms used as labels for the changes being discussed, "individualism" strikes me as being least accurate, yet I have not yet found a better single word substitute. Consequently "individualism" will have to do for the time being, though this warning should caution against a superficial interpretation of the meaning intended.

In essence, what I am concerned with is the emphasis on the individual that permeates psychological thought. Though psychology is by no means blind to the external forces that impinge upon man the actor, it is the actor himself, not the field of force surrounding him, that is at the fovea of the discipline's vision. The ultimate unit of analysis, even when studied in the aggregate, is the single organism, the smallest value that N can take, one solitary person.

Radical behaviorism aside, it is the "inner facts," the psychic machinery contained within the single organism, that interests psychologists most. Thus most of the key concepts with which they work refer in one way or another to these interior "parts." Motives, needs, values, interests, attitudes, are but a few of the terms used to describe these psychic furnishings, furnishings that may be worked upon by external events, made larger, smaller, stronger, weaker, but that remain the most proximate causes of the individual's action. Thus when called upon to explain why a person behaved as he did or to predict how an individual will behave, the psychologist typically makes use of such "mentalistic" terms in his explanation or prediction. Moreover, psychological explanations commonly terminate when a satisfactory configuration of these "interior constructs" has been posited.

Though the explanatory concepts used by the psychologist may differ in both detail and dynamics from those employed by the man in the street, there is, nonetheless, something commonsensical about the overall strategy of seeking to explain action by attempting to describe the psychological state of the individual. It is the way even non-professionals go about the business of everyday life. Small wonder, then, that such a strategy would appeal to educators, most of whose working hours
are spent in face-to-face situations with groups of individuals whose actions are often enigmatic, not downright frustrating and annoying. In promising to help the teacher (and the administrator as well!) to better understand the individual child, psychology holds out to educators an apple whose golden beauty would tempt Eve. How sweet it would be if, as William James predicted back in 1892, psychology would one day enable teachers truly to see the inner workings of their pupils’ mental machines! Think how many pedagogical puzzles and petty annoyances would disappear.

There is a sense, then, in which the psychological and the pedagogical perspectives fit hand in glove. Teachers want to know more about what makes individuals tick, psychology offers to tell them. Surely this complementarity of need and purpose goes a long way toward explaining the popularity of the study of psychology by teachers. It also largely explains why psychological specialists of one sort or another have become commonplace in our schools. Most of these specialists profess to be experts in understanding individuals and, to a lesser extent, in helping individuals overcome “psychological difficulties” of relatively minor sorts (i.e., degrees of severity not thought to require institutionalization or treatment by specialists who have had lengthier training and allegedly possess “greater” expertise).

This emphasis within psychology on the individual includes a recognition that each person is a unique configuration of psychological attributes, a never-to-be repeated conjoining of psychic and organic stuff. That too is a view that jibes well with the pedagogical perspective. Indeed most classroom teachers, who typically have a relatively prolonged and intimate acquaintance with individual students, hardly need be reminded that each person is unique. That uniqueness poses one of the most vexing educational questions: how to tailor instruction to fit the individual in a setting in which a large number of individuals vie for pedagogical attention. The problem, in verb form, is how to individualize instruction. Here too, through the development of so-called diagnostic tests of various kinds, psychology offers a helping hand to the educator who seeks the goal of individualization.

Perhaps my own training as a psychologist plus my experience as a teacher provide blocks to a clear vision of this topic: I confess to having had difficulty at first seeing anything at all wrong with the notion of trying to gain a psychological understanding of individual students and with the pedagogical goal of trying to fit
instructional strategies to individual uniqueness. Here surely is one set of contributions to education for which psychology comes off smelling like a rose. It may even be a contribution of sufficient worth to permit us to forgive and forget those excesses of professionalism and the constraints of scientism of which I have already spoken. Or so I thought initially.

But my mind began to change somewhat as I pondered some of John Dewey's early misgivings about excessive individualization within progressive schools, and thought as well of the clutter of I'm-for-me books that are bestsellers these days. As my thoughts turned in this direction I also remembered a complaint Merle Curti once made about William James's spirit of individualism, an observation I had almost forgotten. Though none of these thoughts have succeeded in changing my mind entirely, they have raised doubts where there were none, or almost none, before.

For Dewey the goals of education were fundamentally and even radically social. He saw education as a force, indeed the only nonviolent force, that would ultimately transform society. It would accomplish this by instilling within the citizenry, beginning with its very youngest members, a sense of community and social purpose. "As the material of genuine development is that of human contacts and associations, so the end, the value that is the criterion and directing guide of educational work, is social," is the way he put it. Or again, "The educational end and the ultimate test of the value of what is learned is its use and application in carrying on and improving the common life of all."

We do not have to agree with Dewey's exact words to concede that he has a point. Education does and should serve social purposes as well as individual ones. But psychology, with its focus on the person as the ultimate unit of analysis, does not seem capable of generating, by its own internal dynamics, a sense of the social. Yes, psychologists recognize the importance of interpersonal relations, that is clear. But in doing so the focus is almost invariably on the effect of those relationships on the individual's development. Though we may look outside the individual for formative influences it is typically with an eye to better understanding the person.

Are there signs that our society today is becoming excessively individualized, overly narcissistic, too wrapped up in ourselves? Several social critics have said so recently and I am inclined to agree. Certainly there is enough evidence out there, from crime statistics to the self-help craze, to make a strong case.

It would be a grievous error, in my judgment, to blame
psychology for the excesses to which I have alluded. At the same time one cannot help but wonder if at least part of the problem might be traceable to an educational outlook and set of practices that at least has psychological backing. Having visited a few classrooms that boasted one or another of the latest schemes for individualizing instruction, I am not at all sanguine about the answer to that question. In each class there sat twenty-five or thirty students almost literally rubbing elbows yet each wrapped in a cocoon of privacy similar to that observed in the reading room of the public library. I suspect they emerge from those cocoons from time to time and when they do perhaps they all join hands in some circle game that instills in them a spirit of social solidarity. There is always the hope that twenty minutes of P.E. will undo whatever hours of working alone have done, I suppose. But save, perhaps, for some skimpy evidence that shows positive gains on achievement measures, I suspect that we have not the foggiest notion of what the current emphasis on individualized instruction truly does to those who experience it. Yet from a purely logical, or should we say psychological, point of view it does seem to make such very good sense. For, after all, each individual is unique, is he not? And our schools are committed to serving each individual, right? Ergo.

There is a final aspect of psychology's contribution to the individualization of education that was brought to my mind, as I mentioned, by remembering something that Merle Curti once said about William James. In discussing James' contribution to education Curti, writing in 1938, complained about James' apparent insensitivity to social class and to the problems of the poor within our country. He also accused James of being too enamoured of the spirit of rugged individualism so prominent in his day. Curti blamed this oversight on James's privileged upbringing. To understand why James overlooked the poor, so Curti's argument went, just look at the New England celebrities with which he and his family hobnobbed.

Viewed from today's vantage point there is something mildly amusing, even nostalgic about Curti's impatience, recalling as it does the radicalism of the Depression years. Curti seems to be chiding James for not possessing in his day a perspective that was common when Curti himself was writing. I believe historians call that "presentism." Not a very fair thing to do. At the same time, while dismissing Curti's criticism as unfair, I could not help wondering if he might not have a point after all, though not the one he thought he was making.
Perhaps it was not James's social isolation from the hoi polloi that blinded him to poverty and other social ills. (If indeed he was so blinded. I am not enough of a Jamesian scholar to confirm or refute Curti's charge.) Perhaps it was his psychological perspective with its focus on the individual that restricted his vision. Perhaps by the very nature of the enterprise in which they are engaged, psychologists are particularly vulnerable to that age-old affliction of being unable to see the woods for the trees.

If there is even a grain of truth in that speculation, and I suspect there is, it behooves us to think more carefully than we have to date about how the individualism implicit in a psychological perspective may act as a set of blinders, shutting out a broader vision of those social, cultural, and historical forces that impinge on educational affairs. Is psychological awareness, in other words, purchased at the price of social consciousness?

No sooner do I frame the question in this way than I begin to have feelings of uneasiness, for it has become very fashionable these days to take pot-shots at what a certain group of acid-tongued critics like to refer to as "mainstream social science." By that term they usually mean those research and scholarly traditions that have gained ascendancy in each of the disciplines within the social sciences, psychology of course being one of them. Though the specific charges vary from one critic to another and at times are quite confused, the major complaint seems to be that the dominant perspective within the social sciences as a whole is one that serves to justify and stabilize the status quo. Though I concede that there is some merit to this argument, I find most of its expressions too simplistic in view and too strident in tone to win my support. Consequently, I would be disappointed if these remarks about the influence of psychology on education were counted among that number. I close in the embrace of the attitude I sought at the start: detached concern.

Ambiguity, paradox, contradiction, these, as I see it, are the qualities that a close inspection of the human condition almost invariably yields. And this includes psychology's "gifts" to education. Professionalism? An uneasy truce between thought and feeling. Scientism? A path to truth that is too straight and narrow. Individualism? A concern for the particularized Other that threatens to blind its adherents to broader social realities. Mixed blessings. Mixed blessings, all. Elizabeth Bowen was right in what she saw: the qualities that save us in one way destroy us in another.
Social Assumptions as a Context for Science: Some Reflections on Psychology and Education*

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I must begin by confessing some discomfort with the announced topic of the symposium leading to this monograph. We are asked to address the question of values imposed by our discipline and particularly the limits such values might place on our research and its application to education. For this question, we as psychologists seem to me the people least qualified to respond fruitfully. To the extent that we are embedded within our discipline and contributing to it, we are likely to be the people with the most difficulty in standing back and seeing it in perspective. More important, even if we could abstract ourselves from our discipline for the sake of this exercise, we might be addressing the wrong question if we focused exclusively on the values imposed by psychology rather than the general societal values that psychology reflects. No discipline operates outside the system of beliefs and assumptions that characterize its historical time and place, and this is particularly true of those areas of inquiry that are concerned with human and social events. As psychologists, therefore, we are less likely to suggest radically new conceptions of human possibility than to refine and sharpen those conceptions that are already present in society. What I propose to do in this paper is to reflect on the values and assumptions that American psychology seems to have absorbed from the general cultural context in which it has operated, and then to examine the ways in which these assumptions have shaped our research and thinking about education. I will develop the argument first in the context of developmental psychology, as this branch of psychology has been, up to now, most intimately connected with education. I will then consider whether my characterization of the

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discipline and its impact on education is sensible for differential psychology and for learning psychology, two other branches of psychology that have also had important interactions with education.

Two Assumptions and Their Impact on the Psychology of Education

I think that two fundamental assumptions have governed the intellectual development of Western psychology, especially developmental psychology. They are these:

The biological assumption. It has been a major assumption of Western psychology that explanations of human behavior are going to be primarily biological rather than social. Psychology has been far more concerned with characterizing the nature of the human organism—on the assumption that its characteristics as a species are determinative—than with characterizing the organism's environment, particularly its social environment or culture. Furthermore, when we have as psychologists attended to environment, we have adopted a biologist's view. We have assumed that environment changes only over very long time periods and that the organism has had many generations in which to adapt to the environment, so that organism and environment are now close to optimal for each other. As a result, we have been interested largely in something we call "natural" environments, rather than in "designed" or "artificial" environments. This means that "culture," that aspect of the environment that is made by people, has never been well analyzed.

The individualist assumption. We have in American psychology assumed that differences between people can best be understood as individual rather than as social differences. This is part and parcel, I think, of the dominant American belief that individual people, not groups of people, "make it" or fail to make it. Individualism has been the classic American frontier assumption, but it has been in some measure shared by all European societies that value individual achievement. In psychology, the individualist assumption has turned our attention toward a compelling interest in individual differences and has created a hundred year history of attempts to describe and account for differences between individuals. Like the biological assumption, the individualist assumption has led us away from an interest in describing culture or accounting for its influence on individual performance and capability. Even when we have, as in the post World War II
period, attempted to account for certain differences in observed capabilities in terms of socially mediated opportunities to learn, we have had very weak conceptions of the social environment with which to work.

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Together, these two fundamental assumptions, the biological and the individualist, have shaped American developmental psychology, particularly as it bears on education, in some distinct ways. Let me first name these directions, and then give some examples that illustrate my meaning.

a. An emphasis on "respecting" the course of children's development rather than shaping it.

b. A nearly complete absence of a theory of the environment—particularly the social environment—so that in educational research we have either no description of the actual events of the classroom or the family learning environment (instead using general cover terms such as "open classroom" or "poor family") or a theory-free attempt to describe every detail with no notion of which aspects of the interactions are important enough to warrant attention.

c. A mistrust of instruction as being capable of deeply influencing human development.

Respecting Children's Development

Child psychology has had a profound and continuing influence on the philosophy and practice of education, beginning with the Child Study Movement at the beginning of this century. With some exceptions—to be noted—child psychology has been fundamentally concerned with plotting the course of "normal" or "natural" development. As has been widely noted by others (Aries, 1962) the conception of childhood as a distinct period in the life of the human being is a relatively new one. The study of children as such is tied to that conception. I think it is probable that interest in the science of childhood derives from observation of the terrible conditions in which children of the factories and the mines lived during the height of the industrial revolution. A "reformist" thrust in politics supported efforts to define children as special individuals whose rhythms and needs were distinct from those of adults, and who therefore needed special
protection—in the form of laws restricting child labor and the provision of institutions that would be conducive to the healthy growth and development of children.

But what was "healthy growth and development?" One might imagine a psychology of child development emerging in response to this question that was devoted to examining various kinds of environments in which children might grow up, specifying both the characteristics of the environments and their effects on children. To do this would have required a point of view that was profoundly unethnocentric and open to varieties of social organizations and social expectations. The turn of the century and the Progressive Era in America was not such a time. Instead, it was a time in which social and moral development, along with physical and intellectual development, were conceived of in biological, and specifically Darwinian, terms. Child psychology responded in kind, with massive efforts to describe and chart what was viewed as "natural" child development. For several decades, child development research was concerned with plotting the course of physical development, charting the schedule of motor skill development, describing normal or typical social behavior for an age group, and characterizing intellectual development as a function of age.

This is still the dominant activity in child development research—at least according to developmental psychology texts. And it is certainly the dominant view of developmental psychology offered to educators. Shirely’s famous descriptions, complete with drawings, of physical development of the infant and young child are still reprinted in child development texts today. Gesell’s characterizations of the child from birth to six months, or from five to ten years, are still with us today, although tempered by a more explicit understanding of how development may vary in pace and the extent to which "norms" are statistical rather than absolute concepts. Even our research on intellectual and social development has a biological cast, attuned to "natural stages" of development. The Piagetian influence highlights, but does not really create, this emphasis. We were doing it anyway. We may quarrel over age norms, but we are fundamentally fascinated with finding universals in human behavior. We seek sequences of development that are to be found in all cultures and in all social groups—even if the specific ages at which certain capabilities and characteristic performances emerge may be different.

The impact of this "natural stages" point of view on education
can be seen most clearly in our emphasis—only now beginning to soften—on "readiness" for schooling and learning, and in discussions of how to adapt schooling and teaching to the child's stage of development. For a long time, educators, supported by child development psychologists, believed that children had to "ready" for school, or for the demands of a particular grade in school. Readiness could be tested, but couldn't be taught. Children had to mature; the process couldn't be hurried. Waiting for readiness was the wisest and most humane thing to do. Readers today may chuckle at this characterization, confident that we have now moved beyond it to "preparing" children for school rather than waiting for readiness. But we are not really far beyond the readiness conception in most of our thinking about education. Consider, for example, the books on Piaget for educators—a standard part of the preparation and inservice training of teachers. Almost all of these books are built around a characterization of the Piagetian stages of intellectual development: sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational... etc.

What is a teacher to make of this information, if not that until a certain point—roughly, that is, a certain age—children will not be able to fully understand certain concepts or acquire certain skills. If children have difficulty, then perhaps they are not yet "in" the required stage. Best to wait: things will be easier later.

Consider also our continuing resistance to acceleration and our willingness to group "gifted" children with slow learners of various kinds as if they too were "handicapped" by being different from the age-norm. Most states now mandate special programs for the gifted—by which they mean children with IQ's in the far right-hand of the normal distribution. What do most educators do with the special funds that come their way for children who are identified as gifted? They offer "enrichment" which is, by definition, designed to give the very intelligent more information or more skill but at their "normal" grade level. What is not done, except in very rare cases, is to offer these children an accelerated instructional program. They are not taught algebra in sixth grade, even though—as Julian Stanley's (Stanley, George, & Solano, 1977; Stanley, Keating, & Fox, 1974) work has demonstrated—many could easily learn it; they are not seriously taught writing, or science or history, or anything systematic. I do not wish in these few pages, to make any specific proposals for what the gifted should be taught, or even to comment on whether our definition of gifted is sensible at all. What
I want to do is simply to call our attention to the rather remarkable fact that we are all acquiescing so easily to a program that assumes that "normal" age-levels for various subject matters exist and that children will be unhappy and society ill-served if they are violated. Surely this, too, bespeaks our continued belief in a natural sequence and timing of development, a belief that psychology has probably not imposed on education, but which can be defended by reference to much of the literature in developmental psychology.

No Theory of the Environment

We have, of course, had a profoundly "environmentalist" phase in developmental psychology, a period in which we believed that education could profoundly alter the capabilities of at least some children. The 1960's saw massive intervention programs designed to change the course of human development by building more favorable environments, particularly for those who were functioning poorly in the standard social institutions—especially schools—of the time. This movement was spearheaded and given theoretical impetus in great part by developmental psychologists, with much reference to Joseph McVicker Hunt's landmark 1961 book, *Intelligence and Experience*. For a brief period, environment reigned supreme in child development theory. The most profound expression of the "environmentalist" thrust was the design and development of a great variety of plans for early childhood and even infancy education, all designed to overcome the disadvantages of social environments that were seen as producing an inability to function well in our schools.

At first glance this interventionist period suggests a less biological and more environmental interpretation of developmental psychology than I have proposed. Yet even at the height of our "environmentalism" some curious facts could be noted. First, we never really believed that "good" environments (i.e., those of the upper or otherwise dominant social classes) could be improved upon. We only sought to bring "bad" environments up to par. We tried to match the environment of what we considered to be the "good" or "effective" middle class home. If this could not be done fully or well in schools then we could at least try to approximate it, or we could try to intervene in the actual home rearing of the child through special home-based programs. Few psychologists suggested that there might be something better
for children's development than the middle class home; that we
ought to be seeking something different from the relatively un-
structured but highly interactive environment of the middle class
home. While this was surely ethnocentric, I think it reflected
not so much a belief that the American middle class home was
"better," but that it was natural, an evolved form of interaction
with children that could not be improved upon but only imitated.

Second, our interventions were all designed to improve indi-
vidual performance by direct influence of the teacher or other
representative of the intervention program on the individual
child or his family. We never worked very seriously on the possi-
bilities for reorganizing schools along lines that would rely more
heavily on cooperation or on responsibility of children for each
other's socialization and learning. Our continuing assumption
that individual effort and individual capacity were the central
factors in educational achievement is highlighted by occasional
commentaries on education, child rearing, and motivation in
other cultures. In 1970, Urie Bronfenbrenner's book, Two
Worlds of Childhood, contrasted the environments—home and
school—in which Soviet and American children grew up. Bron-
fenbrenner described a Soviet environment in which an extended
social support system for academic achievement and school de-
portment helped to insure that virtually all Soviet children
learned the school's curriculum and behaved in ways that their
larger society considered acceptable for children. Although it
now seems likely that Bronfenbrenner's portrayal of Soviet social-
ization and education was overdrawn and idealized, the book
nevertheless served to highlight, by contrast, the almost purely
individualistic stance of American educational practice. At about
the same time, studies began to appear that suggested that cer-
tain American ethnic groups were more motivated by coopera-
tion, or by competition between groups, than by individual
competition (e.g. Madsen & Shapiro, 1970; see also earlier work
by Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Curiously, these groups tended to be
the very ones that often did poorly in American schools. But these
cues were picked up only very slowly. Only quite recently, for
example, have sustained experiments in organizing learning
around group rather than individual outcomes been carried out
as in the team games programs developed at Johns Hopkins
(Slavin, 1978). It is still far from clear that approaches of this
kind can really take root in the individualist social environment
of American education.

It is probably not accidental that a book on Soviet child rearing
remains our sharpest statement—through contrast—of the individualist assumption that underlies our educational and psychological theory. In recent years a spate of translations, together with some opportunities for scholarly exchange with Soviet scholars, has made significant portions of Soviet developmental and cognitive psychology available to English language readers. As one reads Soviet psychology, one becomes increasingly struck with a thread that permeates it all and which distinguishes it from American psychology. The first thing one notes is that pedagogy and psychology are much more intimately joined in the Soviet Union than here. There is virtually no developmental psychology that is not in some sense concerned with education; and educational or pedagogical institutes house substantial components of Soviet psychology. The second thing that becomes apparent is that this joining of education and psychology is probably not an accident or an institutional convenience. Instead, it reflects a fundamental Soviet view about the importance of culture and social influence on the development of the individual. In a recent review of translations of works by Vigotsky and other Soviet psychologists, the philosopher Stephen Toulmin (1978) suggests that Soviet psychology has been concerned from its beginnings with the way in which historical and cultural factors enter the individual’s consciousness, so that biological and cultural factors are inevitably intertwined in the process of development. “This being so,” Toulmin says, “it should be evident that Vigotsky’s and Luria’s quotations from the Marxist fathers, and their respectful references to Marx and Engels as foreshadowing their views about ‘inner consciousness,’ represent something more than hagiography or political lip service.” Instead the general frame provided by a “historical materialist” philosophy provides the impetus for a study of development that assumes the possibility of profoundly influencing human nature through social organization. It is not surprising, given such a starting point, that education would be of central interest to Soviet psychology and that the individual would be studied as a member of a culture rather than as an individual standing apart.

The Mistrust of Instruction

It is striking that despite its sustained interest in education as affecting the welfare of children, developmental psychology has produced very little research on instruction. In fact, efforts
to improve intellectual functioning through instruction, as for example in the many studies of the late 1960's and early 1970's concerned with teaching Piagetian tasks, are typically discounted by "mainstream" developmental psychology commentators as producing only superficial changes that do not affect underlying competence. This mistrust of instruction is neatly in keeping with the biological assumption I have been emphasizing throughout this paper. From the biological perspective, there is a clear and sharp difference to be drawn between natural environments and contrived or "artificial" environments; and instruction falls clearly into the latter category. If there is some natural course of development, and instruction is "artificial," then little of importance is to be learned about the human organism by studying its response to instruction. Instruction is at best of technological interest—something that can produce momentary changes in the state of the organism but no profound differences in its structure or competence.

Developmental psychologists who read this paper will undoubtedly object that there is no necessary choice to be made between biological factors and instruction, that it is interaction between organism and environment that shapes the course of development. I agree; but I would suggest that despite much discussion of interaction by American psychologists there has been little serious investigation of the construct. Some years ago, Ann Anastasi, in her essay "Heredity, Environment, and the Question 'How?'" (Anastasi, 1958) pointed out that we have not studied how the interaction between biological and experiential (presumably including instructional) determinants of development works. Hunt, in Intelligence and Experience, did lay out a truly interactionist view of development and his subsequent work on infant development has systematically explored what an "instructional" environment for infants might be and do. But in the years immediately following Intelligence and Experience many psychologists followed the "interventionist" lead without attending to Hunt's notions of how effective intervention would depend upon as well as influence biological aspects of development. The effect was a kind of interventionist fad, not capable of sustaining itself once it became clear that instruction could not by itself perform miracles of social renewal. It was as if by adopting a strongly interventionist view and (temporarily) putting aside questions of biological constraints we almost insured that less than perfect successes would be interpreted by many as a failure of instruction and a vindication of the traditional biological
assumptions about development. Although many developmental psychologists remain committed to the possibility of building effective interventions, for many the experience of the sixties and early seventies has strengthened the mistrust of instruction. In any case, it is only under assumptions that allow for either the predominance of biological factors or the predominance of environment and instruction, but not their serious interaction, that we could have witnessed the large swings of opinion between hereditarian and environmental points of view that have characterized psychological thinking about education.

OTHER BRANCHES OF PSYCHOLOGY

I have focused up to this point on developmental psychology, whose connections with education have always been close, and where the impact of the biological assumption, in particular, has been especially evident. Let me turn now to a brief consideration of two other major branches of psychology which have also had, at one point or another in their history, important relationships with education. These are differential psychology and mainstream experimental or learning psychology.

Differential Psychology

In a sense differential psychology came into being in response to the practical problems of education. The need for a means of separating the intellectually disabled from the educational mainstream gave birth to the original Binet tests; and the subsequent group tests flourished in large part because growing school enrollment and an interest in rationalizing management and instructional practices led American schools to enthusiastically adopt tests as a basis for grouping and evaluation of students. For several decades differential psychology, or psychometrics, was one of the dominant and intellectually strongest branches of educational psychology. The influence of differential psychology has been great. Not only have its products—tests—been widely used in schools, but to a large extent our ways of thinking about individual differences have been shaped by the constructs of differential psychology.

Differential psychology is strongly rooted in biological assumptions about the origin of individual differences. Intelligence was assumed by the earliest differential psychologists to be essentially a matter of heredity, and the original intelligence tests
were conceived as being instruments for detecting extremes of intelligence—both extreme weakness and extreme strength—regardless of experiential opportunities and circumstances. While it was recognized that exceptional ability would need proper nurturing and that extreme educational neglect could mask talent, it was not assumed in these early years that any amount of instruction or environmental change could fundamentally alter the native endowment. Terman’s (1925) discussion of genius as well as retardation make this clear. The tests, in his view, were to be instruments in a great talent search, by which the most able, regardless of social circumstance, would be found and offered the best possible education.

The individualist assumption, too, was virtually built into the entire differential psychology movement. The search was for individual talent to be nurtured; for individual difficulties to be treated in special ways, as in classes for the retarded. While intelligence tests were associated with a massive movement toward systematic grouping of students, and an approach to teaching that many today would criticize as not oriented enough to individuals, it is a mistake to see the movement toward homogeneous grouping in schools as a turn away from individualism. Rather it represented a manageable compromise with the enormous diversity among individuals. If every student could not be taught individually, at least the range of ability in any one class could be reduced, thus allowing an approximation to teaching matched to individual capacities. Differential psychology shares with developmental psychology a mistrust of the power of instruction and a tendency to want to “respect” rather than to shape human capacities. On the assumption, common until very recently, that talents were largely fixed at birth, instruction could not be expected to create or modify individual differences. Instead instruction could be adapted to individual differences. And, finally, since environment was assumed to play a relatively small role in the development of human capacities, differential psychology paid even less systematic attention than did developmental psychology to the character and functioning of social environments.

Learning Psychology

We have seen that both developmental and differential psychology, the two branches of the discipline that have had a sustained interaction with and influence upon education for
several generations, are both individualist and biological in their assumptions. This has created a situation in which the branches of psychology with the strongest direct ties to education have fundamentally doubted the power of the educational process to profoundly influence human development. The basic message conveyed by developmental and differential psychology to educators has been that one can time instruction optimally to the natural course of development, and one can describe and adapt to talents and abilities; but one cannot expect to do much to really change the course of development or modify abilities. That has not been a comforting message for educators, especially in a society that values being productive and producing change, for it makes educators essentially guardians of childhood, not shapers of adults. Perhaps that is why practicing educators have often found psychology not very helpful; they have had to turn elsewhere than to psychology, by and large, to find justification for and technical assistance in their task of instruction and direct teaching.

Ironically perhaps, there is another branch of psychology whose assumption and concerns would be much more congenial to those who view their task as teaching and shaping development; but one which has, curiously, had much less impact on educational thinking. I refer to learning psychology, which has never shared the distrust of instruction and environmental effects that has characterized developmental and differential psychology. Learning psychology has in its various forms sought to explore the effects of environmental arrangements—practice, reward, simple juxtaposition, etc.—on the capabilities of individuals. Although laws of learning general to the species have been sought, there has been relatively little explicit interest in biological factors, much more willingness than in developmental or differential psychology to focus on the ways in which short-term interventions could influence capacity.

For various reasons—perhaps more concerned with the sociology of science and the social structure of our universities than with anything inherent in the discipline of psychology—learning psychology has not had the kind of continuous involvement with education that has characterized developmental and differential psychology. There have been two periods of direct involvement of learning psychologists in questions of education. The first was relatively early in the history of the discipline and is perhaps best represented by the work of Edward L. Thorndike. Thorn-
dike proposed that knowledge could be analyzed as collections of bonds, and these bonds taught through a process of practice which would have the effect of stamping in the correct associations. There is little doubt in Thorndike’s writing about the power of instruction to influence learning, or about the ways in which fundamental theories of learning, developed in the psychology laboratory, might be applied to the design of instruction. In fact, Thorndike himself (1922) devoted considerable effort to the analysis of a particular subject-matter, arithmetic, and the design of textbooks that would reflect that analysis.

Following Thorndike there was a long period in which learning psychologists paid little attention to education and exerted almost no influence on it. The early 1960’s, however, saw a second wave of participation by learning psychologists in educational design and intervention. This wave was spurred by radical behaviorism, in the person of Skinner and his students. Even more extreme than early associationism in its claim for the power of instructional interventions, the Skinnerian group spawned two strands of educational application. One was programmed instruction, a movement in instructional design in which detailed attention to the presentation and sequencing of information, coupled with controlled active responding, was expected to produce relatively error-free and efficient learning of carefully analyzed subject matters. The second was “behavior modification,” a family of procedures for systematically applying principles of reinforcement in the classroom so as to “shape” positive and learning-oriented behaviors and “extinguish” antisocial or nonproductive behaviors.

Although behavior modification has become a standard part of the curriculum in educational psychology, it seems to have been widely adopted in educational practice only in the fields of special education and, occasionally, compensatory education. In these settings, where the practical difficulties of managing the day to day activities of the classroom are great, and where the routine motivation for learning seems so often to fail, there has been considerable and growing interest in the use of reinforcement techniques to improve both classroom behavior and attention to learning tasks. That the adoption of behavior modification practices should have been largely in classes for the very difficult to teach, those labelled as “different” and thought to be in some sense “abnormal,” seems entirely in keeping with a predominant belief system in which normal children are expected
to progress along normal courses of development, without either need for or great expectations for elaborate systems of instruction.

The impact of programmed instruction on educational practice is harder to assess. To some extent, the general principles of programmed instruction seem to have permeated the general field of instructional design while losing their distinct tie to learning psychology. Practices such as defining objectives in terms of observable behaviors, using tests to place students within a sequence of objectives, providing for mastery before moving students on to new levels of the curriculum and the like are all consonant with and to a large extent derived from the programmed instruction movement. However, appreciation among educators for the fine points of instructional design seems to be rather minimal, in my experience. This seems to be at least partly due to a belief that details of teaching and instruction are not as important as a general environment suited to children and their growth. Children are expected to learn from almost any kind of instruction, a widespread belief which I believe derives from the basically biological orientation that education, along with developmental and differential psychology, has adopted.

When experimental psychology turned to questions of cognitive processing, beginning approximately in the mid 1960's, one of the effects was to drop—at least temporarily—the traditional interest in learning and its concomitant, instruction. Attention shifted to describing the mental processes that underlay performance of a variety of tasks—ranging from the most simple basic tasks of the laboratory to, more recently, complex intellectual problems. As the description of cognitive processes became more complex, attention to learning—or the processes by which changes in competence might come about—was reduced. The effect was to make cognitive psychology very difficult to apply to instruction—because it has no plan for how to influence performance, or even any strong descriptions of how changes took place. Now, however, questions of how cognitive learning occurs and what conditions foster it are beginning to become core questions for some cognitive psychologists. We still do not have a cognitive psychology of learning, and thus cannot yet have one of instruction, but the need for developing such a theory is now recognized in many quarters, and I think that in five years we will have not one but several fruitfully competing theories of the cognitive processes underlying the acquisition of new competence. We can thus look forward to a much richer base for a cognitive theory of instruction.
THE PRESENT MOMENT: WHERE ARE WE?

My basic argument in this paper has been that throughout most of the period during which psychology and the practice and philosophy of education have interacted, the interaction has been dominated by developmental and differential psychology. As a source of dominant theory for education, these two branches of psychology have had some peculiar characteristics. Most important, neither has believed very strongly in the power of the educational enterprise—especially directed instruction—to seriously affect the capabilities of children; and neither has offered any substantial help to educators in thinking about how to design environments that would optimize learning. Developmental psychology, adopting a strong child advocacy position, has offered a theory of natural development which was better at suggesting ways of not interfering with development than ways of actively promoting it. While the influence of child psychology has surely been a humanizing one on the schools, the movement as a whole has never been very helpful in suggesting how human capacities might be developed to levels beyond those traditionally considered normal or natural. Differential psychology, too, has offered help in describing and classifying children, but in its origins it saw education as capable of adapting to children’s capabilities—by offering more or demanding less—but not of creating capabilities. As long as the society was comfortable with schools geared to particular classes of society and to high dropout rates or low achievements for large segments of the population, this set of beliefs and philosophy were perhaps adequate and comfortable.

However, for some time now, our agenda for education has been shifting. We are attending now to formerly invisible segments of the population. We are seeking levels of competence in literacy and in mathematics for all of our people that only a century ago were comfortably reserved for a relatively small and elite group. As our aspirations for education increase, we are developing increased concern for the question of how to modify what would be the “normal,” but now socially unacceptable, course of development for some children. To the extent that this agenda remains an active one for education, education is going to have to give up its pervasive belief in biological determinants and natural courses of development and seek more active influence over its charges. Or put the other way, only to the extent that education comes to trust more fully in the possibilities for chang-
ing human capability and through deliberate efforts at improving environments for learning will it be able to successfully address the challenge of increased educational standards for larger segments of the population.

What can we expect for psychology, as the traditional base discipline of education, as this shift in social goals and social assumptions takes hold? It would not be unreasonable to expect a lessening of the influence of traditional developmental psychology on education and an increased influence of learning psychology, which has more faith in the power of instruction and, for the moment, more ideas to offer about how to design instruction. Indeed psychologists themselves, those committed to the study and practical improvement of education, are finding themselves increasingly involved in questions of learning and direct instruction. This shift within psychology can be noted among that loose grouping of psychologists who call some part of their work "instructional psychology." Even within developmental psychology, an increasing interest in instruction and environment can be noted. Many developmental psychologists remain committed to the educational improvement activities so characteristic of the field a decade ago. But few now believe that simple copying of the middle class home environment is likely to do the job of substantially improving the performance of children from poor-prognosis populations. Designed or "artificial" environments are thus of greater interest. At the same time, with increased interest in the social ecology of development (see, e.g., Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1979) we may be at last on the verge of an American interactionist psychology, one in which we needn’t swing between extremes of environmentalism and purely biological determinism.

I am, in short, predicting a rather fundamental shift in the underlying assumptions of the branches of psychology that have been closest to education. The prediction is rooted in a sense that the social assumptions of the entire society are changing. Whereas in 1920 only a few "dreamers," such as Walter Lippman, believed that human capabilities were not fully laid down at birth, today very few people deny a powerful role for the environment in shaping the expression of native endowment. Although it was once considered enough to offer instruction to those who would and could benefit from it, it is today considered necessary to strive for successful instruction even of reluctant and hard-to-teach students. Although it was once alright to tolerate
substantial amounts of functional illiteracy in our population, we are today engaged in a struggle to raise everyone's level of literacy to levels undreamed of a century ago. Social goals and social assumptions are shifting, and psychology's assumptions will shift in response. As a result psychology's contributions to the science of education are likely to develop in directions that might surprise those whose predictions are shaped by the psychology of the past.

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Psychology shifts its emphases from time to time, and these shifts are reflected in its impact upon education. These undulations are as puzzling to psychologists as to those who come under psychology’s influence. Are they inherent in the development of psychology as a natural science, or do they reflect changes in the general social climate in which all social sciences are imbedded? The purpose of this part of the monograph is to examine psychology’s influence upon education, particularly as it is affected by psychology’s contemporary value orientation. The effects upon education may be adverse as well as beneficial.

Both the participants from psychology accepted this dilemma, best summarized in Jackson’s quotation from Elizabeth Bowen: “The qualities that save us in one way destroy us in another.” The thesis-antithesis approach ultimately has to be resolved by some sort of Hegelian synthesis, if psychology and education are to have a congenial and profitable relationship.

Jackson chooses to base his discussion on his answers to the general question: “How has our educational outlook and practice (values included) been modified by what we today speak of as the discipline of psychology?” He makes a good case that psychology’s influence is evident in three directions: first, in the inclusion of psychology as a subject to be studied by teachers in training; second, in the prominence given to educational testing; and, third, in the place that is held in the schools by psychological services. (Educational research incorporates psychology also, but the relationship there is of a special kind.)

The “inner” consequences of these three influences have been notable. Psychology courses have developed a professional vocabulary and outlook, educational testing has produced a scientism, and psychological services have reinforced the emphasis upon the individual. These three (professionalism, scientism, and individualism) are mixed blessings, giving substance to the quotation of salvation and destruction by the same set of qualities. Jackson’s paper presents an insightful consideration of these
benefits and risks. While the impression is somewhat iconoclastic, he believes that ambiguity, paradox, and contradiction are qualities inherent in the human condition. The advice to psychologists and educators is to embrace an attitude of detached concern.

Resnick also believes that psychology has been a mixed blessing for education. She does not blame psychology, because it has chosen to accept the basic assumptions of the wider intellectual culture, the assumption of the biological basis for growth and development, on the one hand, and the individualist assumption on the other. In her critique of individualism she joins hands with Jackson.

Resnick also sees three chief directions imposed by psychology on education. Because they are set in the context of psychological development, they are not the same three that Jackson recognized. Hers are: first, an emphasis upon “respecting” the course of children’s development rather than “shaping” it; second, absence of a theory of the environment, especially the social environment; and, third, a mistrust of instruction as a potential instrument of change. The first point reflects the recurrent interest in maturational levels or “readiness.” The second tends toward the conception of middle class values as “natural” and good, without a careful theory about the complex interactions within the environment, how the environment acts, and how it can be modified to the advantage of all. The third point is that instruction is not taken seriously as contributing to development because it is thought of as of technological interest only, and because it is “artificial” and contrived. However, the possibility has to be carefully considered that instruction may produce profound differences in structure and competence.

These negative influences of psychology appear to be weakening, especially in cognitive psychology and more serious interest in thinking. Hence Resnick’s discussion ends on a more optimistic note than Jackson’s.

The authors have each produced thoughtful papers, intriguing because of their unexpectedness, their self-criticisms of the discipline to which they adhere, and their fresh, even though disturbing, insights. Each of them cries out for elaboration, and each falls short of the Hegelian synthesis upon which the case must ultimately rest. It must be remembered that Hegel’s triads kept on going. That is, a synthesis, once achieved, soon was directed into a new set of opposites (thesis and antithesis) that
had to be synthesized again. That may be what Jackson has in mind in saying that we have to be prepared for uncertainty because it is rooted in the nature of things. Still, as practical people, we must act, and we have to act upon the probabilities as we understand them now.

The principle of complementarity in physics is not a principle of contradictions. Instead, two assertions may be quite independent, and both true at once, even if not demonstrable at the same time. As Niels Bohr put it, the opposite of any profound assertion that we make may also, in some sense, be true. It would be an easy way out to say that everybody is right by way of the principle of complementarity, but the either-or view—of one pole as right, the other pole as wrong—is not the correct one.

I have a distaste for extreme views, and I much prefer the possibility of changes in their relative weights to advocating the discard of one view in favor of another. Science is not a debating society in which one side of an argument has to win over the other. It is, instead, a search for communicable information that has a high probability of being true and useful. I suppose that Jackson would agree with this view. Take the issue of individualism versus social responsibility and loyalty to social values. This is surely not an either-or matter. Resnick is concrete in citing Bronfenbrenner’s contrast between the USA and the USSR in this respect. She shows that social values make a difference in how schooling is interpreted, but she does not go on to analyze the price that is paid by going too far in either direction.

I am convinced that the mind has a body, and a rejection of some regularities in biological development would be counterproductive. There is no point, for example, in rejecting a readiness concept, even though readiness is modifiable. Readiness for any given activity is a product of biological maturation, prior experience, motivation, and opportunity. All are involved, as is clearly shown by the linguistic abilities of children.

Also, there is nothing inherently wrong in educational measurement. Intelligence tests and achievement tests can be improperly constructed and can be improperly used and interpreted. There are, however, empirical issues involved, and promising ideas such as culture-free (or culture-fair) tests have not actually yielded results differing as much from the standard tests as had been hoped by those who were extreme environmentalists.

The middle-class bias that has been clearly present must not be used as a cliche. “Middle-class” has been overworked to deny
values such as pride in workmanship, which belong to the artisan and farm-worker as much as to the middle class. Furthermore, the bad environments that middle-class homes provide (too much time in drinking and card-playing and television viewing and golf-playing) are overlooked by fantasying that middle-class families sit around the living room reading good literature, reciting poetry, and listening to classical music, when not going together to church. Intellectual snobbery may be taught in the schools to some extent, with an emphasis upon class-related language, and rules of "proper" conduct, but calling everything in the way of knowledge and skill learning and problem-solving, "middle class," may in some instances be to throw up a smoke screen to conceal poor teaching.

The issues involved in individual growth versus socialization are by no means resolved by damning one and praising the other. Man is inherently a social animal, and to learn to go to some trouble and to make some sacrifices for the good of the group is essential, as well as to recognize the satisfactions that come from a sense of being at home in a group and "belonging." But to assume that psychological services do not recognize this is to deny the efforts—in sociometry, for example—to locate the isolates and to consider how they can improve their social identifications.

So, in conclusion, I believe the reader can be instructed by the wise things that have been said in each of the papers, but can exercise judgment in arriving at his or her own conclusions about how much to accept and how much to reject, in order to arrive at a balanced synthesis.
SOCIOLOGY
Sociological Arrogance

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ON THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY

In the beginning, the earth was without form and void
all was darkness and chaos
And the Lord said “Let there be sociology”
Sociologists shall be created in my own image
and He counseled them to eat freely of the tree of knowledge
To August, thou shalt be positive
To Karl, thou shalt not make for yourself graven images
To Emile, thou shalt not commit psychology
To Max, thou shalt have no other god before science
All should honor their fathers and mothers
And books begat footnotes, and footnotes begat ibids, and ibids, op cits and op cits, loco cits
And soon there was a swollen multitude of sociologists
and the world was still in darkness and chaos.

Russell R. Dynes (1973)

In these cutting lines, Russell Dynes pokes at the dark underside of the sprawling sociological enterprise to expose its grandiose aspirations and fantasies; its vain, pompous rhetoric; and, perhaps, its pathetic destiny.

In pensive moments I have sometimes puzzled over the pretensions of my discipline, and have come to the melancholy conclusion that some form of arrogance is inherent in its mission. Perhaps arrogance is a generic quality of the social sciences, and indeed of scholarship, but I think there are some unique historical roots in sociology that can help us better comprehend the value system of this discipline.

In this paper I address what I think of as two types of “sociological arrogance.” One type of arrogance I call “heroic” sociology. It is rooted in moral orthodoxies and finds expression in the narcissistic rhetoric of indignation directed toward the unvirtuous members of this planet. The second type of arrogance appears, on the surface, to be more anomic in form, for it feeds upon the pretensions of value-neutral objectivity. I dub it “voyeurism.”
HISTORICAL SOURCES OF SOCIOLOGICAL ARROGANCE

Heroic sociology is associated with the radical philosophical tradition. Voyeurism is more endearing to the liberals. But both forms of arrogance owe a debt to the philosophical conservatives, which is where my story begins.

The Conservative Tradition

August Compte, the so-called father of sociology, set the tone. Sociology, he decided, deals with matters more complex and more specific than the physical or biological sciences. From these characteristics he innocently projected an awesome triumph: sociology, he proclaimed, had been catapulted to the very pinnacle of the scientific hierarchy, the “queen of the sciences.” While this beguiling myth seems absurd today, it continues to symbolize the lofty images that many sociologists still have of their mission. For Compte, as for many of today’s practitioners, sociology was a kind of religious philosophy (see Dynes, 1974). He had set out to found a new religion promising salvation for humankind (Coser, 1971). Convinced of the overriding authority of science to guide human affairs, he found insufferable the conceit of ordinary people who resumed that they could hold opinions on matters of scientific fact, or who dared inquire into matters above their qualifications. As it turned out, Compte was merely expressing what came to be an article of conservative faith, that through science people could learn to comprehend their world, and eventually predict and even control human affairs. Science could overcome the tendency to blindly drift into the apocalypse.

Focal Values of Conservatism

At its core conservatism represented a quixotic, broad-scale attack on modernism. As Nisbet (1966; 1968) describes so well, this translated into a vain effort to defend the traditions of medieval society, with its pluralistic centers of authority, localism and loyalty to family and church. Urbanization and industrialization were seen as threats to social solidarity. The conservative associated urbanism with the breakdown of traditional morality. Compte was only one of the many sociologists for whom the restoration of the community was a matter of moral urgency.

Behind this nostalgia for local centers of authority were two
moral thrusts. First was a fear of disorder, based on a deep-seated distrust of the human being's insatiable desires, which presumably could be held in check only by external social control. As Nisbet (1968) notes, for Durkheim the appeal of the division of labor was that interdependence forced people to restrain their impulses.

But secondly, these sociologists were concerned with the implications of industrialization. For one thing, there was a shocking degradation of the working class, which was being dislocated. The conservatives were as concerned about the humane implications as the liberals (Nisbet, 1968). In addition, they were disturbed by the selfishness and inauthenticity of the emerging society—egoism, naked self-interest, and the callousness of contractual forms of relations based on crass cash payment. Identification with the “underdog” and distaste for calloused selfishness and exploitation have become generic features of the discipline.

Evil was deemed to be inherent in the evolution of large scale social organization. It was clear to these sociologists that it was up to them to wield their pens against the overwhelming thrust of change in what was to be a futile effort to preserve the social order. In setting themselves apart from, and wistfully above the trends of the times, they established a model for the self-righteous moral indignation of today. And at the same time, they did something else of equal importance. They spread the delusion that, notwithstanding these moral concerns, the neutral tools of science could be used to understand the perennial philosophical and moral concerns which were the natural outgrowth of evolution.

Precedents

Thus, the conservatives set a precedent for self-righteous moral indignation and they also left a legacy of flattering and seductive visions about the long-range capacity of scientific sociology to understand and save the world. In so doing they anticipated what were to become the two major forms of arrogance: (a) the narcissistic rhetoric of moral orthodoxy and (b) the pretentious myth of value-neutral objectivity.

The Moral Orthodoxy of Heroic Sociology: The Radical Heritage

Exaltation of traditional values is the legacy of conservatism. The manipulation of power is the contribution of the radicals.
The radicals viewed modern society as a product of force, and they regarded the distribution of power as its central property. From the positivism of physical science, the radicals borrowed the assumption that people are things or subjects that can be manipulated. Since moral values change when one group conquers another, values are of subsidiary importance. They feared authority as embodied in the state and large bureaucracies, but (in contrast to the conservatives who admired pluralistic, locally based centers of authority) they placed their faith in centralized political power. Acutely aware of the disparities between authority and power, the radicals were confirmed cynics who expressed profound disbelief and distrust in the sincerity of those in control of society, and indeed of anyone to whom their attention turned.

From this tradition, sociologists were imbued with a grossly inflated estimate of their ability, and their mission, to transform the world through political action; they developed an ambivalent sense of awe and fascination with power. But most important, the radicals cultivated self-righteous moral indignation to a high art. The fierce interpersonal competition for smug moral superiority within sociology is characteristic of a polarized society (see Corwin, 1971). It takes the form of a potlatch, a "moral oneupmanship" in which each person tries to express more self-righteous indignation and is more sharply critical, than his peers. It is the principal incentive behind heroic sociology. Moral indignation is especially evident in the writings of the "new sociologists," but it is certainly not confined to those on the political left.

Moral Orthodoxy as a Part of Sociologists' Role

The moralistic sociologists have urged colleagues to exert more influence on social policy (for example see Becker, 1967; Gouldner, 1968; Etzioni, 1968; Grove, 1970). They call for research that not only describes poverty, for example, but also helps to eliminate it. It is their position that sociologists should go beyond merely studying problems and even beyond evaluating the effectiveness of existing policies, and take upon themselves more responsibility for making policy.

The moralists are not merely saying that sociologists should be better citizens, that any citizen should be more active in social issues. They are arguing that social scientists have a special responsibility to participate in the policy process, a responsibility that transcends their citizen role. Indeed, they argue that
sociologists are obliged to participate in policy issues as part of their roles as social scientists. By implication, contribution to policy should be reflected in the social scientist's prestige and rewarded in other ways, and failure to contribute to policy should be treated as a form of deviance.

That those sociologists who take this position tend to be liberals rather than reactionaries, on the side of the poor rather than the rich, in favor of democracy rather than fascism, makes their position appealing indeed to members of this predominantly liberal discipline.

Sources of Moral Orthodoxy

The conservative and radical postures, then, converged in bizarre ways and together provided a firm footing for self-righteousness which has spread throughout the discipline today. These developments cannot simply be written off as the intellectual's historic "distrust of secular official authority," or as a vain, nostalgic quest for the sacred qualities of life, as Shils (1960) would have us believe. There are some uniquely contemporary aspects of moral orthodoxy that cannot be explained so simply.

Separation of Knowing and Feeling. Bendix (1970) attributes it to the "distrust of reason," or a reaction to what MacLeish (1961) referred to as the separation of knowledge from feeling. According to Bendix, human beings attempt to overcome their alienation through a radical commitment to action and an equally radical "subjectivism," that is, rejection of the rational objective characteristics of science.

Excessive Specialization. However, a person's inability to reconcile a rational approach with his/her feelings deals only with the psychology of radical orthodoxy. Their are other, more fundamental structural explanations. I think that one important consideration is that science has become isolated from other intellectual currents. Snow (1964) referred to the increasing polarization of intellectual life in the western world, and y Gasset (1960) before him lamented the increasing narrowness of fields of science which were producing progressive isolation among the separate branches of science. Holton (1960) considers the need to restore reciprocal contact of science and intellectual traditions to be the most critical challenge today before scientists and other scholars.

Formalization. Finally, in addition to specialization, there is
another structural basis of moral orthodoxy. Barzun (1959) refers to the tension between scholarship—which draws upon and is constrained by an established body of knowledge, and creativity—which requires the risk of breaking away from established fact and paradigms. The formalization of research in this normative sense tends to reinforce standardization that otherwise has evolved within established academic professional organizations and large universities.

The net effect of these different forces is intellectual sterility and ethical perversion. The moralists are attempting to redirect sociology toward the larger intellectual and philosophical issues as well as the moral issues that stirred Compte and the other conservatives.

Objectivity As A Form of Voyeurism: Legacy of the Liberals

But the arrogance of moral orthodoxy is matched by the absurd conceit in the doctrine of value-neutral objectivity. The prime values for the liberal—individual autonomy and reason (Nisbet, 1968)—found their ultimate expression in this notion. Gouldner (1963) has attacked it as a shameless assertion that the sociologist has been chosen to stand above the subjects s/he studies, as though somehow sociologists can avoid the repressive constraints that apply to others. This voyeuristic posture has been firmly implanted throughout the liberal tradition.

The virulent controversies stirred by this idea over the years, in each new generation of sociologists, it seems, represent one of the intriguing features in the culture of this discipline. One cannot understand the value system of sociology without confronting the amazing resiliency of this myth in the face of its tireless detractors. On the surface of it, as Gouldner (1963) has observed, it is probably a logically unassailable idea, but nonetheless absurd. But if so, why and how does the idea persist?

I believe that despite its superficial absurdity, the objective posture prevails because it is a viable and useful response to anomie—that is, deep-seated alienation within the discipline. To be more precise, objectivity is a product of at least three forces: (a) the social status of sociologists; (b) the dehumanizing aspects of structural analysis; and ultimately (c) “sociological ambivalence,” i.e. cultural contradictions associated with the cultural pluralism of the discipline.
Social Status and Value-Neutral Objectivity

First, consider, how the social status of sociologists might contribute to their aloof ambivalence. I have already commented upon the conservatives' sense of alienation in the wake of modernization, and of course radical sociology was borne by unattached, alienated intelligentsia sympathetic to the lower classes. But the middle class liberals were also afflicted. I think that the preoccupation of this discipline with stratification (occupational status and social mobility) somehow reflects the fact that sociologists have seldom felt fully accepted or appreciated by the middle class. At the same time, they have had to reconcile their own middle-class aspirations with their proclaimed sympathy for the underdog. These conflicting forces have inspired a detached ambivalence toward the society. In addition, as Gouldner notes, sociologists share the admiration of the middle class for useful knowledge. Utility often takes precedence over moral judgments, and thus contributes to the moral ambivalence characteristic of voyeurism.

Structural Analysis and Value-Neutral Objectivity

However, I think that certain characteristics of the discipline itself are an even more important source of the objective posture than the status aspirations of sociologists. In the academic division of labor, sociology is a discipline fully committed to the study of social structures. The conservative commitment to the primacy of the society over the individual—historically, logically, and ethically—has become an integral part of the discipline. This idea that the sources of human motivation and conduct lie in alien forces external to the individual is difficult to reconcile with the predominantly humanistic liberal slant of the discipline. Liberal sociologists are perpetually haunted by their claim that the society is more than a mechanical aggregate of individuals, that it is an organic entity, with its own laws and a life of its own apart from the people who constitute its members (Blau, 1975). This reduces the individual to little more than a subject of a coercive society, a mere fantasy. For example, Durkheim

1This continues to be a recurrent issue. For example see Agger's (1978) recent book, A Little White Lie. He criticizes the institutional approach, saying that institutions, not individuals, are the fantasy.
Ronald G. Corwin

took the deepest states of the individual—religious faith and suicidal impulses, for instance—and explained them in terms of what lies outside the individual, namely community and tradition. And Simmel took testy pleasure in demonstrating that intimate relationships such as friendship, loyalty, love, and gratitude are dictated by the internal dynamics of their own social structure. As Gouldner (1970) has put it, sociologists have invented a grotesque world made by people but no longer subject to their control. But structural analysis is nonetheless the heart of this discipline.

Sociological Ambivalence and Value-Neutral Objectivity

These last comments suggest a more fundamental process: namely, that value-neutral objectivity is an ambivalent response to the cultural contradictions within sociology. Voyeuristic detachment is a way of coping with virtually paralyzing cross pressures from legitimate but conflicting norms, perspectives, and loyalties. Merton (1976) uses the term "sociological ambivalence" in reference to incompatible norms assigned to social positions. Clearly, sociology is not immune: the cross pressures from conflicting images of sociology hold sociologists in check, in a kind of social suspension or paralysis which finds expression as value neutral objectivity. Objectivity, then, is not equivalent to complacent, moral indifference (Weber, 1949). Sociologists are no more dispassionate and disinterested than the average voyeur. Objectivity emanates from moral contradictions inherent in the cultural pluralism of the discipline itself. The roots of these contradictions go back to the conflicting traditions that have shaped the discipline. As Nisbet (1968, p. 17) muses, "The paradox of sociology is that it falls in the mainstream of modernism in its objectives, and political and scientific values of its principals figures. However, its essential concepts (community, authority, tradition, the sacred, alienation, hierarchy) and its implicit perspectives place it much closer to philosophical conservatism."

2 This contradiction can be seen in the disparity in the rhetoric of sociological theory, with its emphasis on social structures, and the predominant research methods and statistics used in the discipline in which individuals are usually treated as the units of analysis.
Examples of sociological ambivalence abound in the writings on social evolution. Nisbet notes that all that is cherished in society—love, loyalty, honor, friendship—is packed in Tonnies' notion of Gemeinschaft. The Gesellschaft associated with modernism included dehumanized calculating, manipulation, value relativity, exploitation, and other features of social decay. And yet, Tonnies also appreciated the city as a center of science, culture, art, and law. This ambivalence toward urban life continues to be an important trait of sociology.

A similar ambivalence is evident in the work of Durkheim who, while fearing the atomistic drift of the society, nevertheless distrusted the ability of people to regulate themselves (Coser, 1971). He was a political liberal quick to defend the rights of individuals against the state, and yet he believed that society can be held in check only with firm social controls and regulations.

But sociological ambivalence is especially evident in the work of Max Weber, whose life was plagued by a duality: humanistic values and fascination with power. In the words of Bendix (1962, p. 470), Weber took a perverse pride in facing up to the grave threats that jeopardized all he cherished. Weber was impressed with the technical superiority of bureaucracy, which he compared to the invention of machines (Gerth & Mills, 1958, p. 214). And yet he feared that bureaucracy was turning into an iron cage, a monster whose rationalized efficiency threatened to dehumanize its creators. Weber saw that rule by people (democracy) could not be maintained given the increasing dominance of bureaucratic rule. During his career Weber became so seriously preoccupied with this problem of dehumanization that at various periods of his life he was temporarily immobilized by melancholy. produced in part by liberal propensities in conflict with modernization.

This ambivalence was also reflected in his research methods. He espoused a "social action" philosophy based on interpretive understanding of the subjective meanings that individual actors attach to their behavior. The larger entities, he declared, reduce to social actions (Martindale, 1960). But this is not the approach he took in his own research on rationalization. His studies of historical bureaucracies are the epitomy of structural analysis, and only incidentally follow his prescriptions for subjective
meanings. Moreover, while he was cognizant of charisma, he placed little faith in its viability and concentrated instead on traditional and rational forms of authority.

And so, as it turns out, value-neutral objectivity is not neutrality at all. It is a paralysis produced by the cross pressures of deeply felt cultural contradictions. It is only a matter of degree, it seems to me, between the objectivity that Weber espoused and the total immobility that he experienced from melancholy. If so, then the key to understanding the discipline's value system is to be found in the contradictory alternatives available to sociologists, that is the moral dilemmas within the structure of the discipline itself. These dilemmas have been resolved in many different ways. No value within the discipline can be fully understood in isolation. Any attempt to characterize the discipline as a whole in terms of particular values is suspect at best.

THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL ARROGANCE

It should be evident that in either form—the heroism of moral orthodoxy or the voyeurism of anomic objectivity—arrogance has its virtues as well as its liabilities. But before considering what they are, I want to express my faith in the system of sociological ambivalence just described. Just as moral dilemmas sustain objectivity, so the vitality of the discipline as a whole is served by the conflict between objectivity and moral proselytizing. There is a tacit division of moral labor between the two camps which amounts to a set of checks and balances. Each side defends a desirable but incompatible perspective. The resulting tension, the recurrent and often vitriolic attacks from each side, is probably the only way to guarantee the survival of the benefits that each view offers.

3Weber distinguished between value-bound problem choices of the investigator and value-neutral methods of social research. That is, the choice of the subject matter was subject to the scientist's values, but once chosen the scientist was obligated to hold his values in abeyance and was compelled to pursue a line of inquiry regardless of results (Coser, 1971). This idea was fundamentally at odds with the effort of Compte and others to advance a moral system based on science. Science, Weber cautioned, does not bestow the gift of grace of seers and prophets regarding the meaning of universal issues.
The Virtues and Liabilities of Moral Orthodoxy

Moral orthodoxy can be seen as an effort to force a new synthesis between science and humane and intellectual values. The moralists are concerned that with specialization, science has become insulated from other forms of intellectual life. Researchers have become so preoccupied with mundane, immediately practical problems that they have often ignored the broad, significant, and impassioned questions which do not easily lend themselves to researchable questions that can be objectively analyzed; and as a result, sociologists have become utilitarian hand maidsens of commercialization, vocationalism, militarism, and the like. They are chiding us to confront the threat of ethical perversions and intellectual sterility inherent in the preoccupation with short term policy problems.

Some critics have stressed the moral consequences of this narrowly practical side of sociology. For example, Mills (1963) warned that “bureaucratic” social science attempts to standardize and rationalize each phase of sociological inquiry in such a way that sociologists are willing to serve whatever ends their clients have in view. He has a point, but the intellectual consequences are equally important. On this, Mannheim (1963) has voiced a piercing criticism of American sociology. American sociologists, he said, suffer from excessive fear of theories combined with an excessive methodological asceticism. The typical problems that American sociologists study arise from practical necessities of everyday life (juvenile delinquency, poverty, urban affairs, etc.), which are segregated from the social fabric in which they are woven. Scholars, he lamented, specialize in studying particular institutions (such as education), and in becoming preoccupied with the tasks and details of particular situations, lose sight of the whole. By contrast the great sociologists, such as Weber and Marx, tried to see the world as a whole.

However, moral orthodoxy invites the politicalization of the discipline and poses unresolved problems for both teaching and research. The proposal that sociologists must be active in policy issues as part of their roles poses an awesome dilemma. Either liberal sociologists must be prepared to support the same rights and responsibilities for reactionary and tyrannical sociologists, or institutionalized ways must be found to purge such persons from the discipline. The first alternative is difficult to reconcile.
with human rights principles to which most sociologists subscribe, and the second will destroy the cultural pluralism which has been an integral quality of this discipline (for example, see *The American Journal of Sociology*, July 1972).

The proposal to make participation in policy part of the sociologist's role also grossly over-simplifies the function of values in social science. Few sociologists today deny that their work is influenced by values or their own biases. However, values enter into the research and teaching process in different ways at each critical point, for example:

- selection of problems for study (which may include the study of values themselves);
- the underlying assumptions and ethics of the methodologies used;
- the metaphysics of the theories;
- the values implicit in interpreting the data;
- the explicit advocacy of values via policy recommendations and efforts to implement policies.

Values play a different role at each stage. Thus, it is one thing to admit the influence of values on scientific work, as in the selection of problems for study, for example. It is quite another to advocate personal values via policy recommendations made in the name of science. The one is a matter of constrained and subtle influence of values; the other is a matter of unbridled authority to espouse values in the name of science. The adverse effects of the latter posture can be seen in both teaching and research.

**Teaching**

For Mannheim (1949), the ability of the intellectual to transcend political party affiliation in order to comprehend the total situation was the major contribution the intellectual could make to the political process. If one follows John Stewart Mill (1921) and John Dewey (1922), the teacher's responsibility is to confront the student with challenging ideas that are contrary to his own. Weber (1958) too, believed that the professor's primary purpose was to teach students to recognize the "uncommon facts." Indeed, the presentation of alternative viewpoints distinguishes education from indoctrination. Weber was advocating the use of
words to promote contemplative thought rather than as ideological weapons to sway others in partisan wars. Liberal sociologists who in the past have found this to be an agreeable role when faced with a classroom of naive, middle-class youngsters largely from conservative homes, may find it personally more distasteful to present "the other side" to steadfastly liberal and radical students when it is the conservative side that must be presented. As Weber feared, in competition for students, sociologists can be easily tempted to tell their students and their colleagues what they want to hear. Many behavioral scientists, flattered to find that students are listening and agreeing that the social system may be responsible for social problems, will eagerly welcome students as political allies in a hostile society.

Research

Politicalization is also a threat to research. If it is true, as Lane (1966) contends, that political leaders today are freer to use knowledge in their policy decisions, it is also likely that political leaders will seek to politicize research in order to better justify their political actions. If the researcher becomes involved with the significant issues in an applied setting, he is likely to become identified with one side or another of a politically volatile situation. Once researchers have been enlisted in partisan causes, in view of the value implications and indeterminacy of their findings, they will be vulnerable to political attacks (Merton, 1957). The efforts of some social scientists to deliberately use research in the cause of the underdog makes research no less partisan and no less ideological.

But what may be even more important than politicalization is that in the long run heroic sociology has plunged social science squarely into unwieldy issues for which neither prerequisite skills nor resources are yet available. Arrogance threatens to transform the social sciences into the magic fetishes used by buffoons offering to deliver us from all of the sober political problems which the rest of the world has not solved. One must admire the conscientiousness of those sociologists ready to offer quick solutions to urgent social problems. But there is also humor in the smug guilelessness of heroic sociology. Here are intellectual warriors off on quixotic adventures to save the world, brandish-
ing their flimsy knowledge and wholly inadequate tools and undaunted by probable failure.  

Merton (1975, p. 25) observes that “sociology faces a crisis of abundance today partly as a result of an abundance of social crises.” The demand for solutions exceeds the capacity of sociological knowledge and resources. “Oracular sociology,” he cautions, “which promises off-the-cuff instant truths, can lead only to disillusionment.”

There is an underlying problem in the disparity between the behavioral scientist’s authority as an expert and his/her actual competence. Elsewhere Merton (1976) refers to the “indeterminacy of behavioral findings.” In a sense social scientists have been thrust into situations where they are forced to be incompetent. As already noted there is a long tradition of speculation within sociology. So long as sociologists were thought to be impractical, this tradition merely promoted creativity. Sociologists could make reckless proposals based on exaggerated estimates of their superior knowledge without fear of hurting anyone. But the Equal Educational Opportunity Study (1966) and subsequent research by Coleman and others on busing, the Pygmalion study, and the work of Arthur Jensen (1969) are only examples of how the work of competent researchers is now being wisely and unwisely used for policy decisions. When sociologists are wrong today there is more at stake than a null hypothesis, and they can no longer pretend that the work is only part of an academic puzzle.

The Benefits and Costs of Objectivity

Gouldner (1963) wants us to remember the major cost of objectivity; namely, that while value neutrality may appear to be in the interest of professionalism, what it actually does is justify silence about critical issues, and thus is really in the self-interest of status-conscious sociologists.

It is instructive to place the social urgency criteria for engaging in research in the context of Kuhn’s (1962) discussion of science as a problem-solving activity. Science, he thinks, can be paralyzed if its resources are squandered attacking socially important problems for which there is little prospect of solution. “One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.”
However, in a charitable moment, Gouldner (1963) also acknowledges that the myth of objectivity helps sociologists escape from the parochial morality of their tribe, their local culture. Historically it has helped depoliticize universities and protect them from political retaliations and has thus enhanced the autonomy of sociologists from the clutches of society. It is also a protection against the unfair competition of those university professors who would compete for students by pandering to their personal values.

In the final analysis, voyeuristic objectivity is a strategy, and perhaps it is the only viable way to cope with the relationship between fact and value. It is rooted in the perennial philosophical dispute over whether or not feeling and reason can be separated into distinct spheres. When values are fused and confused with facts, ideology is the product. Weber adopted the view of Thomas, that facts and values are distinct: there is no calculus by which value conclusions can be derived from factual premises. For example, there is no scientific way, short of political conflict, by which it can be determined that because black children learn more in integrated schools (if that is true) the schools should, in fact, be desegregated. It is not entirely clear to me that this is an unfortunate situation. Suppose that they do not learn more. Should desegregation efforts then be curtailed? Suppose further that we know that the efforts to desegregate a certain school will subject some children to violence or permanent psychological damage. Can research determine whether or not the costs are worth it?

On the surface of it, the position that empirical findings are influenced by values seems reasonable. The problem with that position is that the relationship between facts and values can operate in both directions. That is, if values influence facts, then surely facts must alter values. And that is indeed the key assumption behind policy research: policy options are to be dictated or at least closely guided by information. The implication is staggering, for it means that the validity of one's values then becomes a function of his/her knowledge. Those persons who have superior knowledge can claim to have priority in influencing policy. The ignorant citizen must defer and comply to better informed social scientists. We have, then, come full circle to the elitism of Comte!

The idea of value neutrality, whether myth or not, serves to protect the integrity of value pluralism. For, with this doctrine, no one need justify values in terms of their scientific basis, and
Ronald G. Corwin

no social scientist can impose his own values on others in the name of science. In this convoluted way, the myth of value-neutral objectivity provides safeguards against what I think is the worst feature of sociological arrogance: the fanatic evangelism of those sociologists determined to impose their own ideologies on others.

The crisis created by the full realization that social science knowledge is influenced by values is only temporary. The situation is perhaps analogous to the shock in the scholarly world when it was realized that probability logic had supplanted absolute forms of logic. But just as scientists learned to live with the probability of factual errors, so we will learn to cope with a science based on a measure of value-conditioned knowledge. Lippman’s (1963) warning is still relevant:

It is only knowledge freely acquired that is disinterested. When, therefore, men whose profession it is to teach and to investigate become the makers of policy, become members of an administration in power, become politicians and leaders of causes, they are committed. Nothing they can say can be relied upon as disinterested. Nothing they can teach can be trusted as scientific. It is impossible to mix the pursuit of knowledge and the exercise of political power and those who have tried it turn out to be very bad politicians or they cease to be scholars.

SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL ARROGANCE

I have chosen to stress the features of the sociological value system discussed here because I think they do have implications for policy makers who wish to make use of sociology or otherwise understand sociologists. Although space does not permit extended consideration here, for the present purposes I will try to underscore some of the main considerations that I think are already implicit in what has been said.

One theme that begs to be addressed more explicitly concerns the precarious and tenuous relationship between the discipline of sociology and social policy. The simple paradigms in which data are supposed to reveal the superiority of one policy alternative over another via some mechanical process are clearly not adequate. It seems worth entertaining the admittedly extreme position that sociologists, qua sociologists, have no business
attempting to influence policy, that is, in any capacity other than that of private citizen. To take any other posture would require far more convincing answers to several questions that I think now exist.

One question is: is it appropriate for sociologists to use the authority of social science to exercise personal influence on policy decisions? If values can influence observations and conclusions, but are not dictated by the facts, then the relationship between research findings and policy implications is far from being self evident. This loose connection between fact and value makes it temptingly easy for anyone to use the shrine of science as a platform from which to foist off personal biases onto a gullible public.

A second question that needs to be answered is: how useful is sociological research for making decisions about policy options? Sociology is a bastard product of two academic traditions—the sciences, and the humanities. As one result, there is a staggering philosophical bias in the discipline, which comes from the humanities side of its parentage. Many sociologists, wondering whether sociology is indeed a science, are still trying to find the meaning of life and do not hesitate to make speculative and creative leaps from pedestrian data. Another result is that the data themselves often yield only indeterminate findings which at best provide a tenuous basis for making policy decisions. Thus the user of sociological knowledge should be suspicious of conclusions that are "reached" from data. It is often more accurate to say that they were inspired by the data. This means, too, that any policy position taken by one sociologist will invite attack from others, and policy makers can get caught in this cross fire.

This philosophical tradition helps explain the ambivalence sociologists have expressed toward the busing controversy. This is a continuation of the issues that troubled early sociologists about sweeping social changes. On the one hand are those sociologists who defend the sanctity of the local neighborhood community and seek primarily to protect the pluralistic groups within it. On the other hand stand those sociologists who are more at home with the larger urban structures that can be created through busing. In addition to the fact that different sociologists take different positions, the history of ambivalence in our discipline makes it easier for particular sociologists to reverse their positions on the issue of whether the local community should take precedence over urbanization. It is not entirely clear what all this controversy has to do with the research findings.
A third question is this: is it feasible for practitioners to use sociological knowledge? Two features of the educators' perspective seem especially incompatible with the sociological tradition: their preference for variables that can be controlled, and their tendency to view the world in psychological terms, which is a legacy of the dominant role that psychology has played in the development of education. Both views can make sociological research on social structures seem irrelevant.

It is important to realize how important structural perspectives are to this discipline. Structuralism may not be the only recognized approach in sociology but the tradition of structuralism is so strong that most sociologists do not feel any need to justify doing research on variables that seem too abstract or beyond the reach of policy makers. I think it is fair to say that sociologists do not share the feelings of many policy makers that one should not "reify" social patterns but should confine research to those variables that can be readily manipulated. It also seems to me that much of the work by sociologists that policy makers have found most useful has been least sociological. For example, in the Equal Educational Opportunity Survey, the sociologist James Coleman resorted to economic variables (school resources) to explain an essentially psychological problem (cognitive test scores). There was little effort in that study to use organizational theory.

Aside from the hazards of using sociology for policy purposes, I have been touching upon another theme, the implications of which have not been fully realized. It is the ambivalence of sociologists toward power and authority. Fascinated with and awed by power, they also fear it. Their ambivalence toward bureaucracy, conflict, and power structures is reflected in at least two ways. For one thing, sociologists have always been ambivalent toward the kind of manipulation and control implicit in policy work. On the one hand, through the generations sociologists have told one another that people cannot be trusted to control themselves and thus must be subject to external controls. But at the same time the idea of manipulation and control is deeply suspect, because it seems to go against the liberal traditions of individualism at the core of the discipline.

In addition, at least since the conflict theorists, sociologists have been painfully aware of the discrepancy between power and authority, between the "is" and "ought," because they have become acutely aware that there are many competing and con-
flitting sources of legitimacy in modern society. Accordingly, they are also suspicious of individuals in positions of authority. They are prone to feel guilty about their neglect of the underdogs, i.e., the subordinates of the policy makers whom they seek to advise. Consequently, the underlying sympathies of sociologists often lie toward movements intended to minimize or undermine the authority of school officials, such as de-schooling, community control, student and teacher strikes, federalism, and the like.

Most sociologists are at heart cynics and distrustful of those in authority. They are seldom willing to believe that things are as they seem, forever looking for the reality behind the scene. At best, they will tend to be ambivalent toward the very policy makers with whom they are attempting to work. Perhaps that is the main implication of sociological arrogance for policy makers.

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Values in Tension: Achievement, Equity, and Pluralism

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INTRODUCTION

Value-related problems have been at the forefront of sociology since its inception; indeed, one central focus of its research has been the values to which individuals adhere, how they are acquired, and their influence in promoting social integration and effecting social change (Simpson, 1954, pp. 74–81). In recent years, no field in sociology has been more embroiled in value-laden controversies than the sociology of education. Twenty years ago this branch of the discipline was “marginal” (Karabel, 1978) and low in prestige (Gross, 1979), but is now among the most dynamic and intellectually respected. Common sources underlie both these changes in prestige and the current value conflicts in the sociology of education. Major developments in conceptualization, analytic procedures, and empirical research on policy-relevant issues involving social and economic inequality—and more specifically on the linkages between systems of educational and social stratification—have stimulated a transformation in the field.

The primary objectives of our presentation here are threefold: (1) to provide a brief overview of the dominant value commitments and conflicts among sociologists, especially sociologists of education; (2) to focus on the evolving theoretical perspectives that have characterized recent sociological research in educational policy; and (3) to review the empirical evidence for the primary sociological theories of educational policy and their implications for educational reform.

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education; and to identify some of the primary sources of these commitments and conflicts; (2) to describe recent theoretical, empirical, and policy developments in the sociology of education leading to these value patterns; and (3) to use awareness of these value involvements as a basis for suggesting strategies of research planning and practice that will better reconcile the demands of science and of citizenship.

At the outset, we feel obligated in a presentation devoted to values in social science and education R and D to be explicit about our own values qua scientists. A quote from a recent paper by Hogan and Emler (1978) summarizes succinctly our position:

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\text{It is necessary to understand once and for all that every point of view in the social sciences, every theoretical model, every hypothesis, will have value implications—because that is the way nature is constructed and the human mind operates. Thus ultimately it is not a question of being careful, of using only operational definitions, of employing an objective data language. The problem of ideology is a problem from which there is no escape—in principle. (p. 350)}
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Hogan and Emler's conclusion is shared by Ladd and Lipset (1975, p. 98), who have conducted more empirical research on the social and political opinions of academicians than anyone else: "There seems to be widespread agreement that, despite some commitment to the goal of 'value freeness' or political neutrality in the discipline, social science is in fact heavily imbued with a distinctive ideological coloration." Further, the most comprehensive survey ever taken of the value and belief systems of sociologists indicates that a sizeable majority of them believe that most sociologists are not "value free" in their work.2

Hogan and Emler (1978) offer two prescriptions for dealing with biases in social science research. First, social scientists should demonstrate to colleagues, students, and laymen "the ubiquity of ideological bias and its inevitability as a condition of life" (p. 530), and concentrate their efforts on a careful analysis of ideological biases and conceptual-analytical alternatives.

1James B. Conant (1952, p. 114) was asserting the same point about natural scientists twenty-five years earlier when he stated the following: "The notion that a scientist is a cool, impartial, detached individual is, of course, absurd."

2Cited in Ladd & Lipset (1975, p. 113)
Stated differently, we social scientists need to recognize and foster pluralism in philosophy, theory, and methodology.

Second, Hogan and Emmer call for “communal inquiry and debate about ideological influences in social science” (p. 533), employing the knowledge and perspectives of fields such as the sociology and psychology of knowledge (Buss, 1975) and intellectual history. We need to make more creative and practical use of the ideas and data provided by these other disciplines on how all knowledge is influenced by the social, historical, and economic climate in which it develops (Stromberg, 1968, p. 2; cited in Buss, 1975).

VALUES OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

Profile of the Value Commitments and Conflicts of Sociologists

Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett C. Ladd, who have studied the political and social orientations of the American professoriate extensively, have found a remarkably stable pattern of results over the past twenty-five years. Some of their most important findings are as follows:

1. Academicians are much more liberal in their attitudes, values, and voting behavior than professionals in other occupational settings.

2. Comparisons of results from a large, nationally representative sample of academicians conducted by Ladd and Lipset in 1977 with similar earlier surveys by them in 1969 and 1975 reveal that faculty did not become more conservative during the eight year span (Ladd & Lipset, 1978, p. 9).

3. The political and social ideologies of faculty vary greatly by discipline according to the following progression from liberal to conservative: social sciences, humanities, natural sciences, law, medicine, business and engineering, and agriculture.

4. Surveys as far back as the 1950s consistently show ideological differences within the social sciences, with sociology...
being the most left-liberal discipline in academia, followed by anthropology, psychology, political science, and economics.

(5) Most social scientists are not "radicals;" however, "there is a much higher proportion of radicals among social scientists than any other group in American society that may be defined by occupational criteria." (Ladd & Lipset, 1975, p. 122). Further, a larger proportion of sociologists are radicals than faculty in any of the other social sciences.

(6) Evidence from several studies (cited in Lipset & Ladd, 1972, pp. 75 and 81-83) indicates that academic "elites" are more left-liberal and activist in their political and social convictions than their less prestigious counterparts. These results hold for the professoriate as a whole and across disciplines, including sociology. Further, Sprehe's national survey of sociologists (1967, p. 305) shows a negative correlation between the amount of research funds a sociologist controls and his her own emphasis on "value freeness."

Despite the left-liberal Weltanschauung of most social scientists, there has been considerable ideological "dissensus" and even intense conflict within most of the disciplines. To a considerable extent these disagreements are consequences of macro-level forces impinging on most social, political, and economic institutions. Social and political events since the end of World War II, international as well as domestic in scope, have produced a series of value-related crises in all social sciences, especially sociology.

By the middle 1960s serious conflict had become evident within the confines of academic social science; vociferous disagreements continued into the 1970s regarding whether social scientists have a "professional responsibility" (Ladd & Lipset, 1975, p. 103) to be both advocates and agents of social change.

They define "radical" in both an attitudinal-value sense ("support for changing the basic constitutional or constituent arrangements of American society and polity" (p. 122)), and according to a behavioral criterion ("voting for left-wing, third party candidates (p. 123)).

Prestige in these studies has been measured in a variety of ways: amount of research funds, degree of participation in professional associations, paid consultants to federal agencies, scholarly productivity, and academic rank.
Values in Sociology of Education

Having provided an overview of the ideological commitments and conflicts among sociologists in general, we now briefly address the following important question: How do the value orientations and ideologies of sociologists of education and social stratification researchers—the two groups of sociologists most concerned with the antecedents and consequences of education and schooling—compare with those of other specialists in the discipline of sociology? Are they more or less liberal in their views than their colleagues in other areas of specialization?

Unfortunately, survey evidence of the type presented above, which distinguishes sociologists from members of the other social science disciplines, is not available. Nevertheless, it is our belief, based on a review of the literature of the past decade, that sociologists of education and social stratification researchers are at least as left-liberal and politically activist as any other segment of the sociological profession. Indeed, Ladd and Lipset's (1975, p. 118) work suggests for us a rationale for hypothesizing that sociologists specializing in education and or stratification may be more critical of the major social and economic arrangements of the societies in which they live than are other specialists. Political scientists and economists—categorized by Ladd and Lipset as in the “institutional” group—are more politically conservative than members of the “behavioral” group, under which sociology, anthropology, and psychology are subsumed. This “behavioral” group deals with what Ladd and Lipset call “inequity” topics.

It is precisely “inequity” topics such as race, socioeconomic origins, ethnicity, and urbanism—the topics Ladd and Lipset associate with the more liberal researchers—which have formed the core of research in the sociology of education and stratification in the past fifteen years. Our working hypothesis regarding the value and belief systems of sociologists of education and social class analysts thus represents a special case of the explanation proferred by Wessler (1973; cited in Ladd & Lipset, 1975, p. 106) to account for the liberalism and political activism of social scientists in general: (1) their subject matter is fundamentally value oriented in nature or closely linked to values; (2) they are constant participants in value-laden settings; (3) they are strongly predisposed to contribute to human needs and welfare. In short, sociologists of education often gravitate to their subdiscipline because of its and their focal concerns with under-
standing the lot of the "underdog" in society, and contributing to a fund of knowledge which might improve his life chances.

**Direct Sources of Value Orientations**

Theoretical and empirical work on interpersonal influences in the past twenty years leads us to the position that the most important sources of the value orientations of sociologists of education (like those of the students they have long studied) are selection-recruitment effects. Ladd and Lipset (1978, p. 9) summarize this position succinctly:

The sources of those variations lie in the fact that the image and role of different academic fields attract sharply varying types of individuals. The liberal arts as a group are much more likely to recruit persons with more idealistic, theoretical, or intellectual views. Such persons apparently are also more critical of the failings of social institutions.

This conclusion is consistent with their earlier thesis regarding the left-liberal orientation and political activism of social scientists (Ladd & Lipset, 1975, pp. 102, 106, and 121) in general, and sociologists in particular (Lipset & Ladd, 1972, pp. 91-92), which they label the "selective ideological recruitment thesis" (p. 91). However, based on their empirical results, they conclude the socializing or influence processes also operate to some extent on sociologists after they enter the discipline and partially explain their being the most social change oriented and politically activist in the academic community.

This selection-influence model employed by Ladd and Lipset is quite similar to that utilized by Feldman and Newcomb (1969). In their critique and synthesis of the findings of more than 600 studies of the "impact" of college environments and subenvironments on the values of students, Feldman and Newcomb, and more recently Feldman and Weiler (1976) conclude that selection effects and environmental effects (both between and within institutions) are of consequence in accounting for differences in the values of college students. The most important influence process operating to explain the change in values of college students was labelled "accentuation;" it is defined at the group level of analysis as the "phenomenon of increases in existing differences among groups or categories of persons" and at the individual
level as the "phenomenon of an increase in emphasis of an already prominent characteristic of an individual" (Feldman & Weiler, 1976, p. 375).

In sum, the literature on interpersonal influences from diverse sources strongly suggests that selection factors are a more important source of value homogeneity or conformity than are "influence" or socializing variables. This generalization seems as applicable to the value homophily of sociologists as it does to that of high school and college peer groups or to work groups in industrial settings. "Birds of a feather do flock together."

**Indirect Sources of Value Orientations**

To assess properly the indirect sources of those values which have been important recent influences on the conduct of education research by sociologists, we need to review first the mechanisms affecting the composition of the education research community.

Several such mechanisms have been particularly significant. First, since the early 1960s, the federal government has increased dramatically the quantity of its sponsorship of educational research, and also its degree of control over the topics investigated. Until the "Great Society" period, most federal support for educational research was conceived of as academic support; the problem areas were proposed by individual investigators, and awards were determined on the recommendation of external review committees. Thereafter, most such federal research has been seen more as "procurement," with the RFP and or the R & D institute the usual operating procedure. The work has been administered since 1971 by a special mission-focused agency, the National Institute of Education (cf. Sproull, Weiner, & Wolf, 1978). The availability of these funds has served to recruit and maintain a cadre of professional educational researchers, particularly persons whose ideologies and skills suit them for research congruent with the priorities of the federal government.

A second mechanism influencing the current composition of the educational research community has been the experiences of many young adults during the turbulence of the 1960s. As Karabel and Halsey (1977) point out, these experiences attracted a disproportionate number of young sociologists as adherents to what might be (somewhat crudely) labelled as the "conflict paradigm" of social theory. In addition, these same events and
movements sensitized additional young professionals to issues of stratification and equity, an awakening which has affected the direction of their research careers in many cases.

Third, and somewhat independent of these two political forces, there has occurred—especially in Europe and England—an intellectual movement questioning the epistemological foundations of the positivist, “hard science” orientations toward educational research. These new views are somewhat diverse, but share enough common elements to be labelled (again crudely) as “interpretative” (Karabel & Halsey, 1977, pp. 44–52) or “constructivist” in orientation. This general movement, as Hurn (1976) and Karabel and Halsey (1977) have noted, has permeated thinking in the sociology of education. Like the adherents of the conflict view, these new sociologists have become an influential minority in academic discussions and research practice.

A fourth circumstance has been the recent rural-to-urban shift of large numbers of Blacks, and the gradual development of their political strength through the civil rights movements and subsequent political mobilization. This movement also had, more than most, moral overtones, and so these additional forces now operate to motivate efforts toward racial equity and desegregation.

These forces, coupled with the increasing technical sophistication and power of social research expertise, have led to a continuing demand by the federal government for social science evidence evaluating the efficacy (and by implication the sincerity) of its efforts to alleviate the disadvantaged statuses of Blacks, most noticeably in education. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the direct and indirect sources of value orientations among sociologists of education.

Coleman (1976a,b) notes that this federal policy has led to the creation of a new “interest group”—the education agency bureaucrats and the research specialists—who now find themselves in mutual dependence, each able to strengthen the situation of the other and thus (indirectly) of themselves. One consequence is the promotion of a viewpoint stressing the value of “objective” research results, and consequently the need to support such research.

"This so-called 'new' sociology of education has been described, by a sympathetic critic (Hurn, 1976, p. 105), as antipositivist, a-historical, and, from a conventional standpoint, more concerned with description than with explanation."
Figure 1
A Heuristic Presentation of the Sources of Values of Educational Researchers

- baby born
- migrations
- affluence

- civil rights movements
- liberation movements
- decline of authority

- computer data banks
- new statistical methods

- liberal reformers
- radical rebuilders
- epistemological constructivists

- demographic & economic

- political

- technical

- intellectual & ideological

- selection

- membership & activities

- accentuation
Each of these influences, and others, have shaped the membership and activity of what can be called the education research community. We believe that the kinds of fundamental orientations under consideration here are formed during the period an individual is being socialized as a researcher, and only seldom changed substantially thereafter (Kuhn, 1971). Thus, improvements to practice are not, we feel, to be sought by attempting mass conversion of the practitioners from one ideology to another.

**SPECIFIC VALUES PREVALENT IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON EDUCATION**

To recapitulate briefly, we have thus far argued that sociologists of education tend to be, both from processes of selective recruitment and from further accentuating mechanisms, substantially more liberal and radical than the majority of citizens, and indeed more left-wing in their political ideologies than many other specialties within social science. We have sought to outline several of the mechanisms through which this selection and accentuation takes place.

In the present section, we seek to define the main themes running through recent research by sociologists of education, especially those themes derived from the general political-ideological value orientations prevalent in the subdiscipline. We will claim that, since about 1965, sociology of education has been dominated by concerns about equal educational opportunity. This is reflected in two prominent research themes: (1) the antecedents, mechanisms, and consequences of various differentiating and stratifying processes in schools and school systems; and (2) the consequences of differential educational patterns for subsequent life-chances, especially for socioeconomic attainments over the life cycle. We will also claim that a new element is now emerging, but is not as yet fully visible.

In making this assertion we are not unaware of other loci of research in the sociology of education in recent years. For example, Meyer (1978) provides an insightful overview of two other developments: (1) studies of the social organization of education which focus on topics such as the process of evaluation and control, linkages between educational innovations and their implementation, and organizational forms which encourage student participation in decision-making processes; (2) macrosociological studies, both comparative and longitudinal, which focus, for example, on the origins and consequences of the recent expansion of national educational systems throughout the world.
In the 1950s, and until about 1965, the major issues in educational research revolved around the best approaches to be used to raise both the minimum and the maximum levels of technical competence of students. Sociologists of education were, during this period, engaged largely in applying the newly developed techniques of quantitative survey analysis to various kinds of sociological variables. In particular, the importance of peer groups and subcultures as sources of influence on the individual was one focal topic. When social class differences were reported, this was seen more as evidence that sociological variables were indeed worthy of consideration—sort of a Durkheimean point—rather than as being an indication of equity or inequity (cf. Clark, 1965). Social consensus existed as to the meaning of equal opportunity, and sociologists saw it as their task to discover the empirical facts, and to document that sociological variables were indeed important. Perhaps the single best example of this style of research in the sociology of education is James Coleman’s work, The Adolescent Society (1961).

During the period beginning in 1964 or 1965, that epoch ended and another began. The Black civil rights movement, using the strategy of persistent litigation coupled with public non-violent protest, gradually accumulated the political power to become a major determinant of federal social policy. This policy, under Lyndon Johnson, focused heavily on the schools as an avenue of social mobility. The movement’s ideology affirmed that equal schooling would lead steadily (and rather painlessly) to an equal, and thus de facto equitable, distribution of socio-economic success. If education research by sociologists in the 1950s focused on the importance of sociological variables and the promotion of subject matter competence, the 1960s and beyond have focused on issues of access, equity, and control over education, and on the real consequences of educational patterns for later life events.

Once again, James Coleman was a central figure. Two works, the Equality of Educational Opportunity report (Coleman, Campbell, et. al., 1966, popularly known as the Coleman Report), and The American Occupational Structure, by Blau and Duncan (1967) define well the transition of interest among sociologists studying schools. Young sociologists beginning their research careers found these to be the “hot” topics. The federal government allocated sizeable resources to various kinds of educational research all linked in one way or another to the idea of
promoting educational opportunity, for all, especially for those Americans who had been "left out" — and especially if they now were organized as a powerful political force." The very meaning of the term, "equality of educational opportunity," became vague. Coleman supplemented the empirical results of the famous 1966 report with an essay (1968) discussing how "opportunity" might better be defined in terms of outcomes achieved rather than resources made available.

Much technical research in education — exploring the pros and cons of differing techniques of instruction — was conducted under the rubric of reaching the "disadvantaged" student. The whole research area of "compensatory" education came into being (Bronfenbrenner, 1975; McDill, McDill and Sprehe, 1969, 1972).

Initially, the emphasis on equalizing educational opportunities took two rather straightforward forms. First, there was the matter of simply placing pupils into schools and classrooms. Second, there was the matter of finding and implementing the improved instructional technologies that would upgrade the achievement of such students. This period was fairly short-lived. Activists and analysts alike quickly began to see that neither of these straightforward lines of action was achieving dramatic or rapid results. Arthur Jensen's provocative 1969 paper in the *Harvard Educational Review* put forth one major, though politically explosive, line of interpretation for the difficulties that had been encountered. Three years later, Christopher Jencks and his colleagues (1972) challenged, in an eloquent and empirically supported critique, the prevailing notion that educational achievement can automatically open the doors to economic achievement.

One derivative theme then became that of opposing the covert, hidden stratagems of resistance to integration by school personnel. This led to concern about community vs. professional control of schools (*Harvard Educational Review*, 1969), about the equity of objective tests as sorting, selecting, and evaluating devices (Gordon, 1975, pp. 91-102), about "Pygmalion" effects (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968), about teacher accountability

"In point of fact, the Congress of the United States in establishing NIE had as one of five main objectives improving the ability of schools to meet their responsibilities to provide equal educational opportunities for students of limited English-speaking ability, women, and students who are socially, economically, or educationally disadvantaged" (National Council on Educational Research, 1978, p. 4).
(Smith, et al., 1972), and about alternative funding policies (e.g., vouchers; cf. Smith, et al., 1972). Again the usually unspoken but nevertheless operative values were those maintaining either that all children are entitled to receive the same school experience, or that all should be expected to profit equally from their educations.

As the civil-rights movement continued its pressure, more and more Black and White students attended schools together. Yet, achievements did not equalize as had been hoped and expected. This in turn led to what has been labelled (we think unfortunately) as the pessimism and backlash of the early 1970s. As evidence mounted that achievement differences were not being erased by the available options, it became fashionable for researchers to conclude that the previous analysis had been oversimplified (St. John, 1975).

About the same time the school's clients came to perceive what they regarded as a major erosion of academic standards, and to demand action from the educators and from the federal establishment. The suspicion arose that the policies of the 1960s had undermined the traditional acculturating function of the school. The monolithic neighborhood school, with its occasionally oppressive but effective transmission of one particular life style, had been replaced by the anomie and conflict of the haphazardly integrated school. Many parents perceived this as a more serious threat than any decline in academic standards, and reacted by taking steps to remove their children from those settings. Once again, a paper by James Coleman best serves to define the recognition of this problem by sociologists of education. In his invited address to the AERA in 1975 (Coleman, 1975), he presented an analysis, subsequently severely criticized but nevertheless influential, in which he argued that the phenomenon of "white flight" was largely neutralizing the original aims of the federal policies of integration, especially integration achieved via busing of children (Coleman et al., 1975). Another indication of these trends is the increase in the numbers and militancy of so-called "Christian schools" (Boggs, 1978). Closely related are organized protests against public schools by parents who perceive an erosion of the moral order centering on "sex education, pornography, evolution, busing and 'decency'" (Page & Clelland, 1978, p. 279).

Coleman's "white flight" paper marks the beginning of the current period of research in the sociology of education. In this
period, the newly relevant values are those of accommodating individual and group differences, of reconciling pluralism and fairness, when this reconciliation must now take place within a single local organization (e.g., the classroom). The cleavages of life style which formerly existed between ethnic groups or communities have, as a result of the social movements of the 1960s, come to be located within neighborhoods, within schools, and even within families (cf. Coleman, 1957). Thus, these smaller social units now are forced to evolve strategems for coping with the dissonance and confusion implied by these cleavages. The whole matter is further complicated by the large number of newly militant life-style groups.

In other words, the various “liberation” movements of the past two decades all have begun by working to tear down formal institutional barriers separating themselves from others in society. In this effort, they have been largely successful. This success has left our society in turn with a variety of new relations, new competitions, and new accommodations to be worked out.

The new challenge facing schools—since they have de facto served as the vanguard institution for many of these integration efforts—is to evolve ways of operating that respect and maintain individual and group differences, and yet do not dissolve into pure passivity. Perhaps the outstanding example of creative and vigorous response to this challenge is the EXCEL program developed and disseminated by Reverend Jesse Jackson. Other movements such as that known as “back to basics,” sensible enough in themselves, are also in part a response to this challenge, and could (if unchecked) cause the further atrophy of the very value-socializing institutions now most effective.

This challenge underlies much recent research and public debate over topics such as teacher accountability, school violence and disciplinary policy, treatment of various groups and themes in curricular materials, the quality of interracial and interethnic relations in desegregated schools, and others.

It also is a large part of the stimulus to a more detailed, micro-level, ethnographically rich style of research investigation. In other words, interest in schools as stratifying agents is, we believe, gradually being supplemented by interest in schools as agents for demonstrating, and teaching, pluralism in daily life. In the last several years, one of the most fashionable sociological perspectives on the school has been that which sees it as a device for selecting, sorting, and stratifying individuals and groups.
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(Kerckhoff, 1976). This is a legitimate point. Schools are also, however, “learning environments” (cf. Boocock, 1979), in which curricular content is presented and hopefully learned. Perhaps most important for the present analysis, they are also institutions producing socialization into particular subcultures and lifestyles. In this respect, they function as an adjunct to or surrogate for the family and informal primary group. Their ability to achieve this acculturation function, to the satisfaction of a newly diverse and divided clientele, is the newest challenge they face, and has not yet been clearly recognized by most observers (but see Ringle, 1978, for a penetrating analysis).

The result of social changes over the past several years has been to mix together, in the most localized settings possible, persons and groups which previously would have had little direct contact. This creates some problems, and also some possibilities. As Cohen, March, and Olsen described it in a classic 1972 paper, out of the “garbage can” of problems, solutions, choices, and interests there often emerge newly created forms of social action. This represents an important new thrust of sociology of education over the next several years, and it is—as was the preceding concern with body-count equity—a topic area in which political and ideological, as well as scientific, values will play a large part. Clearly, a tightrope must be walked, with dangers lying in all directions.

How might we expect this new challenge to affect a subdiscipline populated mainly by “liberals” with a minority of “radicals” added? To the extent that the “liberal” ethos advocates tolerance and respect for the life style of others, there is reason for optimism. Most radicals are less inclined to be tolerant, and indeed some even claim that such tolerance is a disguised and subtle form of repression of ideas. We would hope that the liberal ideology would succeed in being tolerant, but we fear that its real casualty would be the decline of social commitment and attachments to transcendent purposes and ideas or entities. What responses to this challenge are available?

Several possibilities exist. One is essentially the voucher idea, which offers a limited, publicly constrained and monitored, degree of voluntary self-segregation of students into presumably homogeneous schools. A second idea would be the creation of a common, secular-humanist-technical ideology able to embrace all kinds of pupils. This seems to be the implicit goal of some liberal writers. A third option, perhaps less clear than the others
at present, is the evolution of something like a dual citizenship idea as the norm for most persons. That is, such persons would see themselves simultaneously as members of a universalistic, formalized society, and as representatives of a distinctive subcultural tradition. This alternative strikes us as most promising for the long run, but it is not without problems of its own.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The clear implication of this analysis is that values are not only unavoidable, but also are multiple and in tension. This tension can be a source of change and creativity, but it can also lead to bitterness and destruction, and to wasted research efforts. The problem is not how to keep political and ideological and cultural values out of the research and policy oriented studies, but rather how to insure that the values of science—rationality, empirical evidence, formalized and responsible debate, etc.—are promoted and implemented. Stating this differently, the main implication we perceive is that values must be openly accepted, but must be managed by scientific researchers within a scientific style of discussion.

Several strategies for this purpose could be mentioned; we will list a few briefly, mainly to illustrate the kinds of work that we believe should be undertaken vigorously.

First, there is need for abstract, conceptual discussion about the place of values in social science, and of the kinds of values actually held by social scientists. Duncan McRae's book *The Social Function of Social Science* (1976) stands as an outstanding recent example of the conceptual analysis of values in science (see also Foss, 1977). The empirical work of Ladd and Lipset (1973, 1978) cited earlier, and studies such as that of Mitroff and Killman (1978) serve as useful complements to this broad task of conceptual clarification.

Relevant at a more technical level have been numerous advances in the last fifteen to twenty years in management science and decision analysis. At present, the Bayesian paradigm offers a promising approach to the practice of statistical inference (cf. Fennessey, 1977); advances have been made in the formalization of multi-objective utility functions (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), and in the assignment of values (costs) to intangible items such as human life and happiness, etc. (cf. Hapgood, 1979). Computer-assisted techniques—usually involving a simulation model
of some phenomenon—are another newly available tool for ascertaining the implications of one or another policy (Fennessey, 1977). We do not claim that these technical advances can resolve the difficult issues inherent in public policy formation. That would be a naive and arrogant position. We do, however, maintain that application of these techniques can clarify some issues, expedite the resolution of some conflicts, and focus attention on important specific points.

At the social and political level, the question of allocating resources (especially research funds and authority) in a way that will be accepted as legitimate by all affected persons has been addressed in two papers by James Coleman (1976a,b). Coleman’s suggestion is that councils of social advisors be established, composed in a politically representative way, to coordinate the selection of research topics, the allocation of research funds, and the interpretation of research results. This proposal may perhaps turn out to be unworkable or even dangerous. Yet, only by engaging in concrete, large-scale, systematic efforts to design and implement new institutional forms, can we expect to make any progress. Intellectual discussion and debate is a necessary precondition to intelligent change, but it must be accompanied by institutional action. Innovations in operating procedures need to be created, and then analyzed, intellectually and empirically, to see how well they serve in dealing with the prevailing tensions among several important values.

One additional element can be suggested as contributing to the improvement of policy-oriented dialogue among educational researchers—a transformation in the public image of the educational research scientist. Such persons must not be regarded as remote possessors of the objective secrets of the universe, but instead as human beings, with human drives and limitations. Educational researchers, like other applied scientists, must confront the deep and difficult problems they encounter responsibly and honestly. They must see themselves as explorers and reconnaissance agents for the larger society. The technologies they use, and their skill in their craft, are important criteria for judging their reports. Equally important, however, are the personal qualities of vision, integrity, and human sensitivity they manifest to those who listen to them.
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Commentary: Sociology Symposium

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The debate about values and sociology concerns not the values and preferences of individuals but whether the discipline is organized around values, whether certain values are institutionalized within the field. The strong form of the disciplinary perspective says that priorities, interpretations, and omissions are determined by the discipline's values. To put the case another way: sociology, and other disciplines as well, are organized around a core set of values and, with some risk of caricature, these values have something like the quality of a Durkheimian social fact. They have the properties of externality and constraint (early Durkheim); or better (late Durkheim), externality, internality, and constraint. (The weak form simply asserts that values along with many other influences affect scholarly work in sociology.) What is the case for the organization of disciplines around values?

One argument states that sociology is intellectually organized around a core substantive concept: namely, social structure (sometimes known as social organization). According to most sociologists, the concept of structure denotes pattern, stability, form, organization—all words that connote permanence at least through the medium term and perhaps through the long term as well. The idea is that for anything to have a recognizable structure, it must endure long enough for that structure to be recognized and identified. And so by structure, we often refer to things like feudal and capitalist organization, kingship, kinship organization, political regime, bureaucracy—all of which have elements of stability and endurance about them. It is a short, easy, and wrongheaded metaphorical leap from the enumeration of such notions to the idea that a concern with structure is ideologically conservative. Adherents of this line of reasoning can invoke Durkheim who showed how education contributed to the stability of society.

Of course structures must have some stability to be structures. But sociologists have been as much concerned with changes in
structures as with their stability. Sociology is as much the discipline of Marx and Weber, both of whom were profoundly concerned with structural change, as it is of Durkheim. Moreover, Marx and Weber can hardly be placed in the same camp ideologically or politically even though both were seriously concerned about individuals becoming crushed by institutional forces. The argument that sociology is committed to conservative values because of its concern with structure is a one-legged stool. It is factually wrong on its face, and it confuses the values of a discipline with what the discipline is. Sociology is the study of social structures and their changes, just like psychology is the study of individuals and their changes. To say that sociology is built around the value of structuralism is a peculiar kind of truism that trivializes the notion of value. But even if it were so built, that fact would not indicate a commitment to conservatism.

A second argument for the institutionalization of values in the discipline is based upon the fact that social scientists in general and sociologists in particular are arrayed along the leftward side of the left-right political spectrum. But how far can we get explaining the priorities, interpretations, and omissions of the field on the basis of left-right, elite-masses, topdog-underdog, equality-inequality, rich-poor distinctions? To follow this line of reasoning, one has to look for a left-right (or related) side to every research issue. Most sociologists probably hold ideological convictions that support racial equality and are probably at least sympathetic to the moral principles that underlie, for example, the movement toward school integration. What should the common garden variety, pro-minority, liberal white sociologist believe about school desegregation when in a given community there may be substantial division among Blacks about school integration, particularly if it entails busing, and particularly if the schools in general are reputed to be poor in quality. What is the moderate left position on this complex version of the issue? Everyone, of course, wants higher quality schools which means that that issue is not simply one of left and right, and not all Blacks may want school desegregation. Despite the leftward slope of the sociological community, the fact remains that there is substantial range of ideological conviction within that community and more important, scholarly issues simply do not array themselves so cleanly along conventional ideological lines. Note also that sociology, like the other sciences, is a public enterprise; its work is published and members of the scholarly community can examine the work openly. That is no small point:
and surely many of us know of cases where the data reported publicly by investigators ran squarely against their own ideological convictions and were nevertheless duly reported and correctly interpreted.

The case for the institutionalization of left-liberal political preferences is tortured. (Some, of course, will contend that the sociological community is conservative and elitist.) The best way to make the case is to select examples judiciously and tendentiously. In teaching, however, rather than in research and scholarship, the problem of ideological predilection is not so easily dismissed. Most of us do research in areas that we know well where the ideological landscape is as well known as the landscape of knowledge. When we teach, particularly in general undergraduate courses, we sometimes instruct in areas that we know less well. Here, left-liberal leaning instructors may indeed bias the presentation as much because they do not know the conservative arguments as because they don’t believe in them; and, of course, vice versa with conservative-minded instructors. Again, the institutionalization of political preferences is not really the issue: if any principle is indeed institutionalized, it is that an instructor should not use the lectern as a bully pulpit or as any other kind. Biased presentation is less likely to be a matter of institutionalized leftist values than of poor preparation.

The third case for institutionalized values lying at the heart of the discipline is based upon the idea that sociologists (and others) respond to the Zeitgeist: they are sensitive to values prevailing in the society at particular times and under particular conditions. These values, moreover, do not simply circulate in the air; they have substance not only because they are widespread matters of thought and speculation but because they are also embodied in the sorts of topics that funding agencies, the government particularly, deem worthy of supporting. Everyone is aware, accordingly, that since the Brown decision of 1954, sociologists of education have been preoccupied with questions of social equality as an affirmative policy, and with questions pertaining to the balance between equality and efficiency as principles of public educational policy. Clearly, the work of sociologists has been centralized in this area notoriously infused with values; and few if any sociologists take strong ideological stands supporting the position of inequality, though some indeed argue that maintaining certain inequalities contributes more to economic development in the less developed countries than providing direct aid to the most desperately poor. Cannot the case for institutionalization...
zation be made most convincingly with respect to the temper of the times? The answer is no, and for several reasons.

The temper of the times does not pick out sociology; the preoccupation with equality-efficiency problems is as much characteristic of certain branches of psychology, economics, political science, and history as it is of sociology. All ships go up (or down, depending on one’s point of view) with the tide. The times, particularly through the largesse of granting agencies, may constrain the choice of research problems—narrow the range of problems—at least—but they surely do not govern the variety of approaches taken toward the investigation of problems nor the range of interpretations of findings. Parenthetically, the questions of approach and method have become interesting in recent years because some observers have claimed that certain methods (such as survey research) serve to maintain the status quo, while other methods (more observational in character) show things as they really are, how rotten they are, and how much in need of change. Such contentions are arrant nonsense, of course, but they indicate how far people are willing to go to assert their own values which are conveniently linked to methods of investigation, methods that presumably aim unerringly toward the truth.

The point of all this is to say that sociologists clearly have values, but that their values are diverse. Their own political and ideological predilections lean to the port side, but that does not mean that the substance of their arguments, the interpretation of their data, and the problems they avoid or ignore can be accounted for by this leftward listing. As to the societal forces that shape the larger social agenda, sociologists are no more or less susceptible than others to the value premises underlying that agenda. That is to say, one does not usefully look for the organization and integration of scholarly disciplines around the institutionalization of some set of values. One must distinguish clearly between sociology and sociologists. Only sociologists do and think things. Sociology is a set of ideas that is astonishingly diverse. It would be foolish, by contrast, to assert that the thoughts and activities of sociologists are random. The central question, however, is this: what does determine the nature of their work, its priorities, interpretations, and omissions? Lots of things: the predilections of funding agencies, the temper of the times—and these are not unrelated—as well as personal preference. Beyond those sorts of things there are other important considerations, particularly the state of substantive knowledge.
in subspecialities of a field, the obvious near-term extensions of extant generalizations, and developments in measurement and method, not to mention the availability of large bodies of data subject to continuing reanalysis.

Take a case in point: the burgeoning literature on educational effects and productivity, equality of opportunity, and status attainment. In these overlapping areas, one finds available data sets continually being reanalyzed, growing continuities and discontinuities in the development of the literature, sociologists and economists (primarily) picking over the same data, sharp divergences in approach and method, conflicting interpretations of the same data, ideological attacks and counterattacks, preoccupations with different levels of aggregation with attendant disagreements about where the real problems lie, and so on. Although it appears that this area of inquiry, paramount in the sociology of education over the past decade and a half, is colored by sociologists' adherence to values supporting the dispossessed, such an interpretation could hardly sustain the variety of work and the controversies among workers in this area of educational research. Yet undoubtedly many sociologists working in this area are personally concerned for the plight of the dispossessed and the disadvantaged. It is just too simple to see the complexity and variety of work in this and other areas accounted for largely by commitment to values. And while some of the disputes in the field clearly follow lines of cleavage based on value commitments, they are no more sharply drawn than disputes based upon the appropriateness of the chosen level of aggregation.

In the first instance, scholarly disciplines are organized around cognitively, not evaluatively, defined phenomena, such as the nature of the individual, the nature of organized collectivities, the nature of power, the nature of choice under conditions of scarcity, and so on. Beyond that, disciplines treat those phenomena as problematic in a great variety of ways; and to account for the unity in that variety (which is not the purpose here) one must not fasten too quickly on any single, overly simple explanation such as values. Value controversies flourish within disciplines and across them; they do not define disciplines, nor are they focal points around which disciplines are institutionalized, or worse, determinants of what individual practitioners within disciplines do. Of course, the practitioners have values of their own which are not the values of the discipline; and what they study, interpret, and omit may or may not be attributable to their values.
What is most interesting in all of this business about values is that scholars of differing value persuasions often agree on the facts, and where they don’t, they can agree on what *should* constitute the facts; that is, upon what needs to be known. They often agree on much more than the facts: on method and on conceptual scheme. Differences, then, enter the realm of meaning or interpretation. Others differ markedly in approach and initial conception—indeed in value commitment—and arrive at the same facts and conclusions. This last point is extremely important because it indicates that investigators can understand things—patterns of conduct, sequences of causes, and the like—in a similar fashion even when they approach the world from different perspectives; according to different values, if you will. The superstructure, in short, of which values are a part, may not mean all that much as we try to understand how the world works. It might help to think about Marx and Durkheim whose views about the division of labor were both factually and interpretatively similar in many respects. They differed more than somewhat about what the facts and interpretations meant. One might say that their values differed, but those differences must not be allowed to obscure the fundamental convergences in their thought. Politically, their value differences are perhaps important; sociologically the similarity of their sense of how social structure changed is more important.
The papers printed here were written in response to what was, in effect, a dual challenge. On the one hand, authors were asked to consider the “biases” or “values” which accrued to each of the represented fields of inquiry. On the other hand, the authors were asked to attend to the subject-matter of each discipline, together with the principles, problems, and methods which constituted the discipline, and determined its strengths and limitations.

The charge was dual insofar as the word “values” tends to conjure up an image of the inquirer, or the community of inquirers, with emphasis on personal or subcultural bents, while the remainder of the charge focuses on the far cooler matter of the discipline per se, on inquiry. Each of these possible two charges will bear examination here. First, the matter of “values.”

VALUES

The word “values” tends to conjure up the spectre of social-moral-political-economic preferences and beliefs which may affect the choice of data and the mode of their interpretation, and hence color and limit the scope and warrant of the conclusions to which inquiry leads. Such beliefs and preferences may have three different origins or loci which affect the importance of the preferences to education. We take them up one at a time.

Preferences and beliefs may inhere in the problems and principles elected by an entire community of inquirers over a substantial period of time. The notion of a “primitive” society, which once undergirded much anthropology, is one case in point. It affected the interpretation of anthropological data in ways which protected the status of the anthropologist’s culture.
at the expense of the "primitive" culture under study. (As a case in point, consider the recent high estimates of the aesthetic value of African music and plastic art as against their earlier treatment.) The sociological study of "street corner" society which assumes that a primarily vertical structure of power exercised, sought, and submitted to characterizes all complex societies, will find one story to tell. Another study of the same subject, but "psychologically" oriented, would seek data about the manifest and latent content of that society's members' dreams, and have quite another story to tell. A third study, committed to order and stability as the primary goods of a good society, might well seek data on the behaviors of street society members and the correlations of different behaviors with the roles played, or status achieved, or degree of alienation exhibited in the larger and later society into which they entered. Each of these stories will, in turn, suggest or reinforce different emphases on what is desirable or undesirable about societies, and what should be done about various societies of the young.

A psychology which studies childhood as non-responsible maturant stages toward adulthood will seek one body of data in its study of children and interpret them in one way (data about distance from adulthood, readiness and rate of progress toward adulthood; interpretations which concern themselves almost exclusively with the controls and treatments which best ensure arrival at the goal). A psychology which treats the young as constituted of their own modes of perception, thought, and satisfaction will seek data about these modes and make interpretations which emphasize the well-being and happiness of children as children. That these contrasting inquiries into childhood will suggest different goods and bads in the treatment (including the education) of children, goes without saying.

Insofar as "intrinsic" prejudices of this kind characterize an entire social-behavioral science or a substantial segment of it, it is of the first importance that such preferences and beliefs be inquired after in their own right. The outcome of such inquiry into inquiries cannot be a doing away of all biases; it can, however, serve to provide a critically informed body of inquirers and a forewarned body of consumers of their fruits. It is also unfortunately true that to the extent that such beliefs and prejudices characterize a large and powerful segment of a community of inquirers, such critical inquiry into inquiries is made both difficult and possibly impotent. It is made difficult because it can be carried out only by someone who both knows the field
of inquiry and is separated from it sufficiently to perceive it as
other than himself. Such persons will be rare. But the coexistence
of such men as Ernest Hilgard in psychology, and Robert Merton
and Edward Shils in sociology, gives us evidence of their possi-
bility in our own time. And in an earlier day, James Frazer
overcame profound insularities in the interest of a more informed
anthropology.

The aim of such critical inquiries is, of course, to provide
means for the education of critically informed inquirers whose
critical competence will modulate their practice as inquirers.
If, however, the majority of inquirers in a field whose prejudices
are thereby revealed are also the dispensers of approbation and
reward for inquiries undertaken, doubts about effectiveness must
be entertained.

Preferences and prejudices may arise, second, from the re-
wards and punishments, the sympathies and antipathies, the
internalized attitudes, or the career calculations, of inquirers.
In some instances, such preferences are overt, announced. The
revisionist history which seeks to exhibit the cruelties and injust-
tices wrought in a time and place formerly treated as benign,
is a recent case in point. A rewriting of economic history in terms
of the distribution of goods as against the magnitude of their
production is another. Very recent papers in economics which
marshall data in evidence of the success of centrally controlled,
large-scale enterprises are explicitly concerned to oppose the
neo-conservative rediscovery of the beauty of smallness and the
insights of localism.

Such overt, announced instances of personally originated
rebellious preferences are, it seems to me, salutary on all counts.
Each is a redress of imbalance in its field of inquiry. Each may
constitute a substantial refreshment of inquiry in a field gone
stale (fields of inquiry do go stale) by leading in a new direction
toward outcomes which the leader himself may not anticipate.
And, if announced and overt, the preference is made known to
users of the outcomes of such inquiries as a limit to their scope
and warrant, as well as serving notice of the limited scope and
warrant of the antecedent inquiries.

In other instances of the operation of internalized sympathies
and antipathies, the resulting prejudices are not overt and an-
nounced as such but, instead, are unknown to the inquirer him-
self or held by him as of such unquestionable normality or de-
cency as to require no notice. The long indifference of medical
researchers to the neurologies, physiologies, and pathologies of
sexual satisfaction is one case in point. The Kraft-Ebbingesque treatment of most means toward sexual satisfaction as pathological, "perverted," may be another. Certainly, the paternal condescension of much 19th century English treatment of "colonials" and "coloreds" in histories and social-political commentary is a third. Similar treatment of women by most of us has been with us longer and later. (The biased treatment of women may, however, more properly belong with the third siteing of "values," the siteing which will be treated in a moment.)

Unconscious and self-righteous prejudices harm inquiries as much as prejudices of other sorts. Little or nothing can be done about them, however, short of an impossibly good and practically impossible psychotherapy, or an equally-good and equally-impossible operant reconditioning, or an equally good and impossible liberal education to the habit of self-examination and self-correction of one's intellectual habits.

The third class of guiding preferences arises from attachment of an inquirer's aspirations or loyalties to a prevailing fashion of the times. A case in point is social Darwinism. It arose in the late 19th century from a fusion of biological Darwinism and a rapidly growing entrepreneurial-industrial-acquisitive middle class, a doctrine of righteous competitiveness, the withholding of charity, and a life-boat ethic. Those who fell by the wayside in the course of competition were the relatively unfit, and the fiercer the competition, the more effective the selection of the fittest.

A contrary course was contrary to nature.

This doctrine colored a very large part of the economics, the political science, the history, and even a measure of the nascent sociology of the time. The economics was laissez-faire. The politics embraced social stratification and imperialism. The history was a history of progress through conflict of societies. The nascent sociology sought a developmental classification of societies, such as one passing from savagery through barbarism to civilization. (There were echoes of this triad in the academic, say, Comte's evolution of knowledge from the theological through the metaphysical to the positive, and James Frazer's evolution of folk wisdom from the magical through the religious to the scientific.) Our own unquestioned faith (until ca. 1960) in the exportable blessedness of high technology and democracy constitutes another case in point.

If the prevailing fashion of the time is pervasive, it will, indeed, prevail. The warping of inquiry by the fashionable doctrine...
will be invisible to all but a distanced few, and if noted, will be seen as all but inalterable. Alteration usually requires a stroke of well-timed artfulness (e.g., Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*) or patient waiting on a changing time.

The last point about “values” as so far treated, a point immanent in the examples cited. The differences in outcome of inquiry to which such values lead are differences from inquirer to inquirer, from time to time, or from place to place. Such values do little to determine differences in the outcomes of inquiry in one social science as against another. For example, sociology and psychology, each pursuing inquiries into the origins of durable patterns of human behavior, will do so differently. Sociology will seek social-cultural attributes which shape behavior. Psychology will seek the species-specific attributes which characterize behavior. The one will emphasize differences in behavior attributable to differences in society or culture. The other will seek uniformities (or systematic variations) which are traceable to the nature of the beast. It seems to me unlikely that these differences between sociology and psychology arose from their choice as fields of specialization by two groups of men who exhibited systematically different clusters of prejudices. (I emphasize arose because I am of the view that choice among established fields of inquiry owes something to prior temperamental propensities.)

**SUBJECT-MATTER, PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND METHODS**

**Subject-Matter**

Most subject-matter distinctions among departments of inquiry are themselves products of inquiry. They are not natural joints in nature, recognized by all men at all times as occurring at the same places in the corpus of “nature.” For example, celestial and terrestrial bodies clearly constituted separate and different subject-matters three centuries ago. Terrestrial bodies inevitably came to rest and fell to earth; celestial bodies continued in their regular motion without stop. Clearly such “different” subject-matters required separate investigations, each aimed at its own body of knowledge and theory. The possibility that the human mind could comprehend such diversity in one investigation aimed
at one coherent body of knowledge was more than good sense and courage could bear.

Then, with the appearance of Newton's "Mathematical Principles...", these differences, though still patent, ceased to be cause for a separation of sciences. They became, indeed, entirely trivial. In the light of Newton's conception of universal gravitation, it became not only possible but desirable to conceive the eternal motion of the moon and the ephemeral passage of a sling-thrown missile as differing only in the velocities with which their motions began.

In brief, subject-matters of inquiry are cut off from one another to facilitate inquiry. They may later become one again as the outcomes of inquiry suggest new ordering principles capable of comprehending the previously severed as parts of one whole or variations on common themes. The outcomes of inquiry may also lead to new separations. Inquiry may reveal unsuspected differences among phenomena then treated as constituting a comprehensible whole, and these differences may prove to be recalcitrant to joint treatment in the light of existing ordering conceptions. Discovery of substantial differences in mode of comprehension between right and left cerebral cortices may, as one example, give rise in the near future to a right-cortical cognitive psychology, as well as a left one, each going their separate ways for some time.

The progress of inquiry may also reveal new problems and give rise to new techniques which require or make possible new sciences. Structural semantics, transformational grammar, and the study of artificial intelligences are cases in point among the behavioral sciences.

Separations of subject-matter to facilitate inquiry always exact a price. To the extent that the separations yield more approachable problems, they do so by yielding simpler problems and the problems are made simpler by being made incomplete. Some connections between factors within one subject matter and factors within another are "severed," i.e., ignored.

The social-behavioral sciences are through and through characterized by such severances. It is obvious that what men want and what they are willing to pay for what they want are profoundly affected by what their neighbors want and spend, by their sense of membership in one social group rather than another, and by the hinted connection of what is for sale to other matters (e.g., social acceptability, sexual desirability). In brief,
phenomena called psychological and sociological are deeply entangled with phenomena called economic. Yet, though marketing experts take account of such connections, economics has yet to incorporate them in its models.

It is similarly obvious that what men prize, what rouses their anxieties, what attracts them or repels them, are determined in good part by the society and subculture which nurtured them and by the roles they play in that culture and society. On the other hand, men have always and everywhere banded together to form societies (simple or complex, large or small) and have nurtured cultures which comforted them in sadness, made anxieties bearable, and yielded products which pleased and amused. Culture and society are, then, in this light, expressions of the character of humankind, a matter best known to psychologists and biologists. Yet, to what little extent have psychologists given an account of the rise and character of culture and society, or sociologists and anthropologists provided us with well-warranted accounts of the development and character of personality?

The incompleteness of problems in the social-behavioral sciences is followed, inevitably, by a parallel incompleteness in the knowledge each proffers us. This is a matter of grave importance to any science which not only endeavors to add to our sum of knowledge but undertakes to guide action (e.g., educational psychology, educational sociology, etc.). Each answer they give us, if reached by methods considered sound by the community of inquirers concerned, may be a complete answer to the question as put. And should an actual situation in "real" life (e.g., in a school, a classroom, a transaction between an adult and child) correspond precisely to the particular question put to the subject-matter as defined in that science, the answer would permit a precisely appropriate choice of intervention for solution of the problem, and precisely forecast the consequences of that intervention. But here is the rub. Rarely, indeed, do undesirable states of affairs which we wish to alter correspond to the boundaries which inquirers put between subject-matters or to the distinctions of problems which inquirers pursue.

It follows that reliable guidance of intervention in actual states of affairs requires combination of numerous incomplete answers drawn from a diversity of sciences. The required combination, moreover, is not merely additive. Answers to different questions put to different subject-matters, each such question usually employing its own special terms, require re-cutting.
reshaping, and refitting before they can be fitted to one another—and some needed pieces may be missing. This raises a problem of policy concerning the educational social disciplines to which we must return.

Principles

An explication of principles propounded some twenty years ago (Schwab, 1960) still seems to me adequate. I said (approximately):

Principle of inquiry stands for the notions which initiate and guide the course of a line of research. The biologist who asks, "which virus strain causes distemper?" uses cause as one part of his principle, notions about the taxonomy of micro-organisms and disease as another, and a view of relations of invaders to the body's economy as a third.

A group of notions achieves the status of a principle of inquiry when it succeeds in bounding and analyzing a subject-matter-for-inquiry. Bounding is seen when a primitive physiology conceives an organism as that which (a) stops at the skin; (b) is at "maturity"; (c) is under "normal" conditions. The analytic function of principles consists in identifying the meaning-elements which are to be treated in inquiry into the subject-matter as defined. Thus one physiology treats its organism as consisting of organs and their functions. The principle of another (within a different bounding) conceives the organism as a chemical-energetic system indefinitely interpenetrating an environment. The first physiology is thus commanded to determine what array of organs constitutes the organism and to move, then, to determine the function of each. The second physiology is commanded to identify the chemical-energetic exchanges which take place between the interpenetrating organism and environment, and to determine the chemical-energetic processes by which the organism retains its measure of separable existence from the environment.

The prime service of principles is, then, to provide inquiry with terms in which to couch its questions and a subject to which to address them. By way of question and problem, the principle then determines what shall constitute the data of the inquiry and suggests the procedure which will elicit the required data. Thus our primitive physiologist must know what alterations in the behavior of an organism ensue upon suppression of a part, and
he is instructed to remove an organ and contrast the deprived animal to a normal one.

Finally, the principles of a line of inquiry restrict the form which knowledge of the subject will take by indicating how the data are to be interpreted. Thus our primitive physiology will construct a catalogue of the form, "The Function of Organ X is Y." Similarly, an anthropologist who conceives cultures generally as necessarily serving certain functions, certain needs, of the members of the culture, will seek, in any given culture, the devices (coronations, risky games, circumcision, imposed isolations) which serve these functions or, for conspicuous devices, will try to discover the function they serve. (Also, of course, he will be on the alert to identify previously unnoted cultural functions.)

The number of principles which characterize a science varies from science to science, following, in fact, the Comteian hierarchy. The community of physics has mechanisms for maintaining a virtual unanimity among its members (e.g., the Solvay Conference). Chemistry tends to a similar uniformity. Biology typically tolerates two or three competing principles. The social-behavioral sciences tend toward pluralism to a degree which has earned them in some quarters the title, "methodenstreit." History (assuming for the moment that it is social and a science) is the classical locus of this strife of method. One history may be committed to a doctrine of historical change (progressive, entropic, or cyclic) while another espouses the positivistic recording angel as the ideal historian. It may insist that all existence constitutes a seamless web to be treated entire or choose any of a variety of self-sufficient parts: eras, regions, institutions, or selected classes of men or events. Political science may, similarly, see its subject-matter as controlled by the ebb and flow of power, the successes and failures of persuasive leadership, the quality of decision-making or of conflict resolution.

Problems and Methods

The general sense of "problems" has been adequately treated. They arise in a characteristic form or forms as a consequence of the bounding and analysis of subject-matters by principles. They determine the form which knowledge in a field will possess. They may also arise when methods designed to serve one form of subject matter are directed to the service of generically similar
but specifically other subject matters. Thus, the participant-observer methods of anthropology, designed originally to make an entire culture accessible; may be directed to "subcultures" or to any durable or repetitive human sharing of a set of problems, roles, assets, or circumstances (e.g., the school, the classroom, the doctor-patient or counsellor-client dyad).

"Methods" covers a very broad range of scientists' activities, so broad, indeed, that only specialists in the various sciences under consideration are equipped even to catalogue them, much less discuss them with legitimacy. They include procedures for determining the appropriate statistical treatment for the task at hand, and for determining size and mode of selection for obtaining reasonably adequate samples—these, in the case of the "correlational" inquiries especially, conspicuous in sociology and psychology. They also include such distinctly different matters as the means for obtaining the delicate balance between participation and observation which makes possible the intimate entries into heart and mind which are supposed to characterize classical, cultural anthropology. Methods are, in short, means for determining the best among inevitably second-best data for one's problem (e.g., the sample, not the universe; the word of an informant to an 'alien', not the upbringing to a role as member of a culture). They are the means for collecting the selected data, for processing them and, finally, for interpreting them toward a "conclusion."

The brevity of this treatment of method should not be mistaken as a measure of its relative importance. It is fully the equal of principles in determining the worth and use of the "knowledge" which science supplies. To use an old pair of borrowings from the field of evaluation: the effect of principles in shaping the boundaries and meaning elements of the subject of an inquiry determines the degree of validity of emergent scientific doctrines; method determines the reliability of the statements which constitute these doctrines. The former concerns the extent to which the scientists' questions take account of the richness and complexity of the primal subject matter. The latter concerns the confidence we can put in the answers he obtains.

Just as problems may change their specific characters as methods are brought to bear on specifically different members of a genus of subject matters, so methods may be altered better to fit them to specifically altered subject matters. The ethnography in which the observer rigorously abstains from interven-
tion in the situation under observation (or tries to at any rate), and observes events with the minimum of expectations and hypotheses of which he is capable, is one case in point. It is a radical deviation from the participant and involved mode of observation characteristic of classical anthropology. It may have arisen under the influence of the ethological study of the social behavior of animals other than man—behaviors in which participation and involvement would, if they were possible, "contaminate" the behaviors under observation. However "invisible" ethnography arose, it is ideally suited to the study of behaviors such as those of classroom participants, worker-supervisor, or counsellor-client interactions, which are unstable as compared to long-established cultures, or have no virtual place in them for outsiders, which are, therefore, almost certain to be altered from their usual course by an assertive, alien presence.

It should be noted that when methods are altered better to adapt them to a specifically altered subject-for-inquiry, the knowledge which is generated therefrom is also altered in validity, or reliability or both, and in specific ways which must be understood if that knowledge is to be thoroughly understood and wisely used.

INTERIM SUMMARY

In the foregoing pages we have described a certain ambiguity, and a considerable complexity, in the charge to which our authors responded.

There is, on the one hand, the matter of "values." In our usage, which is one common usage, values consist (a) of things, events, persons, and circumstances sufficiently valued above others that the valuation of them has non-trivial effects on our perceptions, our sense of the possible, plausible, and meaningful, our choice among alternatives, and especially our choice of alternative actions. Values consist (b) of kinds of things, events, circumstances, and persons sufficiently disliked or feared that the fear-dislike similarly affects our thoughts, actions, and passions.

In the course of scientific inquiry, values in this sense have effect at or from three sites. (1) They may have been inserted (usually innocently) in the principles which define a subject-for-inquiry. Examples: a primitive society, an immature adult, sexual perversion (2) They may arise from internalized attitudes or other sources of commitment, such as unresolved problems.
career calculations, or considered moral position, in the inquirer. From there, they can affect the inquirer's choice of specific problems within the genus of problems which characterize his science, or similarly affect his choice and interpretation of data for the solution of chosen problems. Examples: revisionist history; counter-revisionist history; a political science subordinating other concerns to concern for the quality of decision making; another political science concerned primarily with the sources and devices of persuasion; another primarily concerned with the acquisition and exercise of power. (3) They may arise from a union of inquirers' aspirations-fealties-fears with a prevailing fashion of the times. Examples: aspiring middle-class social Darwinism (1860-?); construction of test instruments with maximum power to discriminate among the tested (1905-196?); maximization of evidence for the environmental-circumstantial determination of individual and group differences (1955- ).

Values differences such as these three lead mainly to differences in inquiry from person to person, time to time, or place to place, within a science. They do not appear to weight heavily in determining differences between one member-science and another of a group of related sciences (e.g., the social-behavioral sciences).

Members of a related group of sciences differentiate from one another in virtue of attention to different portions of their common subject matter and in virtue of differing "models" of their chosen subject portion, that is, by differing views of what constitute its meaning-elements. These determinative differences are usually summarizable in a "principle of inquiry," and such a principle often precedes and determines the bounding and heuristic structure of a subject-for-inquiry. Examples: indivisible particle, equable flow of time, social fact, social role, structure-function (whether in physiology or in Talcott Parsons) system, free market, field.

These differences among subjects-for-inquiry lead to differences among social-behavioral sciences in the questions they put and to differences in the terms in which answers are sought. In consequence, different social-behavioral sciences afford views of human behavior which are, severally, not only incomplete but pertain to different facades of the common subject, each often "seen" through quite different organs of perception.

The methods used to select appropriate data, to process and interpret them, have their own potent effect on the usefulness
of the outcomes of inquiry. Where other matters determine what questions are put and what kinds of answers are sought, method determines what confidence we can put in the answers obtained.

The social-behavioral sciences, by contrast to physics and chemistry, accommodate a plurality of principles at any given time. The pluralities of any given science are nevertheless identifiable by generic features as principles of that science and not another. There are, of course, border alliances (e.g., social psychology) but even in these, the parent sciences are identifiable.

Both methods and principles can be modified to fit newly recognized species of subject matter or problem. Such recognitions arise from changing circumstance or the progress of inquiry, or newly pressing human wants and needs.

WHY THE COMPLICATED CHALLENGE?

My wish to participate in issuance of the dual challenge to the authors stands on two legs: (1) the effects of the structured character of inquiry on the knowledge produced and the importance of information about these effects for the informed use of that knowledge—for guidance of future inquiries and for defensible decision in matters of curriculum, instruction, governance, membership and design of schools; therefore (2) the need to know about the "values," selections, and constructions which characterize current inquiries and accumulating knowledge in the fields pertinent to education.

Effects of Inquiry and Their Importance

As we have indicated, the knowledge produced by a line of inquiry is something less than complete knowledge even of the subject-for-inquiry, much less of the whole subject from which the subject-for-inquiry was carved and shaped. Such knowledge is not only incomplete but highly colored by the conceptual structures (principles of inquiry) which regulate the inquiry. Such knowledge is always something less than "knowledge," i.e., certain, sure, worthy of complete confidence. On the scale from mere guess to utter certainty, the outcomes of inquiry lie in the upper-middle region once called good or right opinion.

There is also a crucial connection between two of these characteristics. Were it not for the special coloring of knowledge, the problem of incompleteness could be solved very simply: one
would proceed as in reconstruction of a jigsaw puzzle, noting the broken outlines of one piece of knowledge, looking elsewhere (e.g., in another science) for a piece with complementary irregularities, find it, and fit it to the first piece. One would go on in similar fashion to some desired or affordable degree of completeness. Unhappily, the special coloring forbids such a simple procedure. To drop the metaphor of color for an earlier formulation, different inquiries ask characteristic questions of its subject and seek answers in characteristic terms. The questions asked and the answers obtained are sufficiently different from science to science that combination of their answers requires the devising of intermediate terms through which the terms of each science can be connected, or the devising of a dictionary by which one set of terms can be translated into the other.

Examples are called for. First, the matter of completeness. How far does the memorization of nonsense syllables represent the complexity of human learning? Maze-running? Escape from problem boxes? Pressing the right button at the right time in consequence of reinforcement schedules? Practice in the rigorous application of fixed algorithms to problems in arithmetic?

Examples of differences in the terms used in inquiry. First, a spectacular one from a notoriously spectacular field. “The good mother begins as a discrimination or differentiation of the good and satisfactory nipple. That is, it is differentiated as a pattern of experience, very significantly different from the nipple of anxiety” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 122). “The child finds sucking at its mother’s breast and getting the flow of milk with his mouth very pleasant, and the wish for... repetition of this sensual experience remains with him even when he has satisfied his hunger” (Anna Freud, 1947).

The first of the above derives from questions about durable interrelations of persons as mediated by need and anxiety. The second remarks derive from questions about the durable interrelationships among parts of the psyche as mediated by pleasure, reality, guilt, and shame. Each has something to tell us which the other has not. Their union would be profitable. How is the union to be effected?

Another case of differing terms, this time cutting across fields. “Peer groups... provide a way in which children can learn to become independent of family authority... provide children with experience of egalitarian relationships...” [The school’s]
corridors and classrooms provide a natural and convenient setting for the young to socialize” (Brembeck, 1976). “Problem-solving [in groups] is facilitated by the presence of an effective leader. . . . Success in problem-solving also depends on distribution of ability with a group . . . an outstanding individual. . . .” (Vinacke, 1976).

The first of this pair derives from traditional terms of politics—freedom and authority, self-rule and rule by others (with bias toward “self” and “freedom”). The second derives from the terms of achievement psychology (probably McClellandian). With emphasis on the preconditions and nurturant circumstances of achievement. Each of these statements, too, has something to tell us which the other has not. Their union, too, would be useful. How is the union to be effected?

The Need to be Informed

Active contributors to the educational branches of the social-behavioral sciences are close to the recent literature and to the researches under way in these fields. They are, therefore, logical first-choices to ask about the values and structures characteristic of current and recent research. But their proximity to the relevant literature and activity is not sufficient reason for their knowing the “values” and structure of these activities. Such matters may or may not have been drawn to their attention in the course of training and career. They may or may not be matters of interest.

Consequently, the double desirability of posing this complex challenge to these persons. What they discerned in the challenge, knew about, and considered worth telling, they would tell us. What they did not discern, did not know, or did not consider interesting would map out a field, some part of which would reward exploration by other means or via other persons.

We could not, by such means, make reliable discoveries. We can, nevertheless, take as hints for further inquiry what these papers reveal to us—by what they say, by their emphases and by their omissions. In some cases, something more than a hint is conveyed, especially when what is revealed here is joined with data from other sources. The language choices below will indicate which revelations I consider emphases and which I consider omissions.
Preferences and Prejudices Inherent in a Field of Inquiry

Such preferences (See VALUES,” paragraph 2), because they characterize all or most of a field, are virtually indiscernible, except by an unusually critical or alienated member of the inquiring community. (They may also be challenged from external sources. Art critics might have had much to do with the questioning of “primitive” in reference to African cultures.) Given this character of the situation, we find little reason for urging a program designed to change it. Yet, we have roted time and again, that practicing researchers are remarkably ignorant of past discernments and changes of this kind in their field. It is as if their training began and ended in the modes of inquiry current at the time of their training. How far is this true? Could there not be some attention to a diachronic sampling of inquiries and critical changes in inquiry in the field?

Preferences Supported by Personal Bents and a Prevailing Fashion

(See VALUES,” paragraph 10.) The same conditions dictate a similar conclusion in this case. Consideration of inquiries which are both diachronic and pertain to the field and to a prevailing ideational climate, would be, however, much more difficult and time-consuming. Costs probably outweigh benefits.

Personal Commitments of Some Individuals in a Field

(See “VALUES.” paragraph 6.) The coloring of inquiries by such commitments is widely seen as ranging from the undesirable to the reprehensible—non-objective, value-laden. We nevertheless consider them of no great danger to educational inquiry or practice. We see them, indeed, as both corrective and leading to their own correction. As earlier indicated, they often arise in reaction to long-established emphases or omissions in the field and lead to redress of imbalances. Many purposely-biased colorings of inquiry, moreover, advertise themselves for what they are by their rhetoric of righteous indignation, by vehemence or petulance, and hence serve as correctives without deceiving. Others, written with cool and urbane understatement, are not self-advertising. Correctives operate in such cases as well. The direction of the conclusions drawn, or the selectivity of the data used, are noted by other practitioners in the field who have other
or no biases concerning the particular problem involved. Such notice eventuates in critical reviews of the book or papers in question or the publication of challenging papers displaying other data or different conclusions.

Subject-Matter, Principles, Problems, Methods

With respect to the ambiguity discussed in the beginning (biases in inquiry — biases in inquirers) I found it interesting and pleasing that somewhat more than half the papers dealt with problems of inquiry or with both problems. Moreover, most of the papers which dealt with public issues and private predilections pertained to fields in which such matters (one of them or both) figure as parts of the actual subject-matter (e.g., political science) or are traditional problems in the field of inquiry (e.g., history).

I found it by no means unexpected, but troubling nevertheless, that most of the papers which dealt with structure of inquiry dealt with the structure of its own field and with that structure alone. They explained what was done in the field, or praised what was done in the field, or dealt with tensions among a few of the pluralities of the field, or obliquely apologized for certain characteristics of the field. Only three papers (each in a different field) dealt to some effect with the character of their problems and solutions in relation to the problems and solutions sought in other fields, and none treated such relations as a matter of considerable moment.

I found this profoundly troubling because of the virtual immanence of practice and problems of practice in the education-emphasizing social-behavioral sciences. The outcome of almost any research in physics will eventually emerge in a technology, i.e., contribute to practice. The architectonic science (polities) which determines through the giving or withholding of support, what sciences shall flourish and which go on short rations, knows this about physics. Hence, it gives physicists substantial delay-time for proving their political-economic worth. Sociology as such, and psychology with the same qualification, are more grudgingly given somewhat less delay-time, but given it nevertheless. On the other hand, precisely because a sociology or anthropology or economics or history, as such, exists, educational psychology, educational sociology, and so on, must regularly and speedily justify their existence.
They will so justify their existence (and have it supported) only to the extent that they make a visible, durable contribution to the effect or effectiveness of the practice of education. Such a contribution will be accidental and rare, or perverse, unless means are designed and made real by which the fruits of inquiry in the various educational-hyphenated fields can be related to one another as guides for regulation of practice. (The reasons for this unqualified statement will be found under "Effects of Inquiry and Their Importance.")

There is a closely related, second problem. Too often, practitioners of the various hyphenated social-behavioral sciences choose their problems for inquiry by reference entirely to what is wanting in, or what will be approved by, their parent discipline. They will look to school and classroom as a source of data for such problems (hence occasionally and accidentally give prompt assistance to educational practice). Rarely, however, are school and classroom, teacher and taught, consulted by the hyphenated sciences as determiners of the problems they pursue in inquiry.

How shall we bring about the design of means for relating the fruits of the various fields of inquiry to one another? How shall we obtain greater attention by inquirers to the problems posed by school and classroom and the problems to which teachers and students bear witness? Should we make a concerted effort to modify the training of education-hyphenated practitioners so as to include grasp of relations between their field and other fields? Shall we modify the reward-structure in colleges and departments of education so as to shift greater attention to school and classroom? Shall we train a new species—intermediarists—whose expertise will pertain to the combination and application of diverse lores?

These matters, together with the evidenced historicity of many practitioners of the hyphenated sciences, are the major policy problems brought to light by the exercise in self-scrutiny which this monograph records.

References


Epilog

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The preparation of the papers in this monograph began in the hope that they would increase our understanding of the powers and limits of discipline-based inquiry and of the ways in which values imposed by research conducted from the represented domains of inquiry affect educational research and development. Now that the symposia have been held and the discussions died away, the papers have been presented here for more lasting perusal.

A candid assessment would admit partial success in achieving the purposes originally set out upon. The entire effort reinforced strongly the importance of the basic questions asked. What we learned through the papers and through the discussion during the symposia and the roundtable which followed was that, important as these matters are, they are very difficult for us to plumb, discuss, and resolve. The attempt establishes something of a benchmark, an indication of our present capacity to engage in such dialog, to recognize such matters, and to tease out the implications for research practice and policy in education. As a consequence, it is possible to phrase some new questions, albeit in such a way that the mode of answering them remains somewhat murky.

The papers collectively and without exception confirm the proposition that there are values, of several different and contrasting kinds, imbedded in the disciplines and domains of inquiry represented in this monograph. To be sure, there is rich disagreement as to what those values are and what the implications of value imbeddedness are for educational research and practice. Of course, it could be claimed that recognizing value-imbeddedness is unexceptional since it is so widely recognized in behavioral and social inquiry and, in any case, had the individual authors not themselves subscribed to such a view, they probably would not have consented to prepare a paper. True enough.

What was not expected, however, was the great difficulty
the writers reported in coming to grips with the task they had agreed to address some eight or ten months prior to the 1979 AERA meeting. This should not be interpreted as criticism; it is an acknowledgement of the unfamiliarity of the task and its inherent difficulty. It may, for example, have been too much to expect representatives of a discipline to be able to identify the values imbedded in the domain of which they are practitioners. In retrospect it may have made more sense to have asked proponents of different disciplines to identify the values they see imbedded in disciplines other than their own. This, of course, is hindsight, appropriate for an epilog but faintly unsatisfying from the perspective of the aspirations with which we started. Still, it now seems more clear that insofar as a discipline or domain of inquiry has intrinsic values, it is in a poor position to identify them and powerless to correct them by the exercise of that mode of inquiry.

Had we, in organizing the symposia, asked scholars from one field of inquiry to delve into the values inherent in another, we would have produced a very different product, however, not necessarily a better one. Clearly, several different approaches to an examination of these value questions were possible.

In retrospect, the symposium and roundtable format Koff and I adopted was itself an expression of implicit values. Specifically, we were attempting to avoid unnecessary controversy by asking prominent proponents of the disciplines to discuss what they themselves were committed to and know best rather than inviting cross-disciplinary dart throwing. By adopting the forum of the annual meeting of AERA as a principal element in the approach to explication, we were also in effect saying that this is a matter for public debate and discussion as much as quiet study and analysis. The public format was itself a reflection of the initial concerns, namely the existence and consequences of values in behavioral and social inquiry. The public format was the most practicable approximation of the only means by which there can be resolution of value differences, that is, the willing conversation among those who hold value differences.

The papers confirm the unwitting wisdom of the course set out upon. While it might be possible to maintain that the values inherent in the disciplines are a private matter between the inquirer and his work, that argument solipsizes the problem and leaves us nothing to talk about. The papers taken together make it clear that there are important value differences among and
between the domains of inquiry and that the consequences of those differences are important, not only conceived in terms of the products of such inquiry but its implications for educational policy and practice.

The papers do succeed, then, in bringing our close attention to the matter of values in behavioral and social inquiry. That is a truism, of course. To sharpen it, what they show is that the impact of values can be seen in a variety of ways. There are the values to be found in methodological choices, in the problems to be worked upon, in the structures and principles which guide one discipline as contrasted to another. There are even the particular partisan values of one or another disciplinary proponent.

Sorting this all out is no mean accomplishment. While we can be clear in our own minds that values are present, distinguishing them from other considerations, or between levels of values, turns out to be a difficult task indeed. This leads back to a basic axiological issue, namely, the character of a value in and of itself. Philosophers and others have addressed these matters, to be sure, but it is not apparent that we have learned much from them in behavioral and social inquiry or, perhaps, that what the philosophers have contributed has been all that useful. What the intensive consideration of values in the disciplines and domains represented here leads to, then, is realization of the inattention given to these matters. We have labeled the problem but not explored it thoroughly. The implication is that we must extend our efforts further.

For example, the difficulty in coming to grips with one or another dimension of the values issue (the extent to which, for example, the values could not be found, or that there were differences of opinion as to what they were, or uncertainty as to what to do about the values or the consequences of their existence) is in part symptomatic of a more fundamental realization that the values issues are not themselves resolvable through the application of the tools of discipline-based inquiry. The values may be illuminated. Their consequences may be revealed. The extent to which they nest or not with other values may be explored. But the tools of inquiry of the behavioral and social disciplines are not the tools of value resolution. Such resolution must occur in other ways, according to other procedures, in perhaps different environments and contexts. (In fact, one group of political scientists concerns itself with means by which value differences can be resolved in democratic societies.)
Our attention should be directed, then, to the extent to which we, as scholars, are equipped to address such value considerations, the extent to which competing or merely different value positions among us are capable of being resolved as measured by our own capacities to resolve them. Even more significant (in the larger policy context of educational practice), if we are not equipped to handle such discourse among ourselves as scholars and researchers, how can we hope to be able to address them where our values are different or at odds with those of ultimate clients or practitioners?

This is surely a difficult problem, not the least because it places the research community in a less exalted position, but also because it introduces an element of difficulty that we are not well prepared easily to remove. Two separate questions enter here. One has to do with epistemology, the other with axiology. The claims of formal inquiry (science) rest on, among other things, systematicness and publicness. The epistemological grounding is different from that of direct experience or common sense reality. The basis for arguing competing claims in these two arenas is generally well understood.

In value terms, however, science and common sense reality are equal. The value elements integral to formal inquiry are not more or less firmly grounded than those same elements in the world as we experience it in common. On value terms, there can be no claim to superiority as between the world of sophisticated intellect and the every-day world of the commons. The effect of the recognition of value imbeddedness in behavioral and social inquiry is to acknowledge an essential egalitarian element which will not and ought not to yield merely because of the perhaps demonstrable power and sophistication of the epistemological grounding from science.

The integral presence of values is one thing. The absence of valid claims to greater skill in value resolution is another (with implications within disciplines, between disciplines, and between behavioral and social inquiry and client and practitioner communities). A third matter that suggests itself for future examination is how the values present in behavioral and social inquiry get there.

In part this is an outcome of the gradual evolution of the disciplines as their principles and methods (to adopt the terminology suggested by Schwab) may illustrate. But it is also a matter of the way in which members of the research community are socialized
into their craft. This observation was suggested by a question raised by Michael Kirst during the political science symposium. What it points to is an examination of the operative values that exist in the research training process. To what norms do we expect students to conform? What kinds of advice do we give on the "difficult" questions? When a student proposes, for example, to work on a "hot" or sensitive topic, how often do we give the advice that the dissertation is an exercise, designed to illustrate the range of one's skills, but that students should avoid tackling big issues, not just because they are undoable, but because they might get into difficulty on value grounds or "too great" a personal commitment, or at the expense of "objectivity"? The message, of course, is ambiguous. The advice is good, but it has larger consequences in that students rarely see their mentors (except perhaps in the literature) wrestling with "big" issues or matters of complex value considerations. In fact, they are told, almost in so many words, that dealing with such matters is improper, to be eschewed, or guarded against. A place to look, then, further to explore the nature of value-imbeddedness is in the design and rationale for the training programs from which future researchers spring. What values are operationalized? To what extent are systematic attempts to treat values a part of the curricula? What are the value assumptions underlying the training programs? Where do students become equipped to deal with value issues in a sensitive and warranted fashion?

The outcome of this foray into values imbedded in behavioral and social inquiry is a reinforcement of the concerns which motivated the commissioning of these papers. Those concerns may be seen to rest in at least four areas:

Value compatibilities

To the extent that behavioral or social inquiry is characterized or colored by value considerations, the results of that inquiry will support, as a consequence of that alignment, the value frame thus indicated. That does not mean, of course, that a specific value will be supported in the sense that bias will always be in one way. Still, the values imbedded in the framing of research questions or the use of certain methodologies have the effect of producing knowledge which fits those value parameters rather than others that might be served.
Socialization to research

The integral nature of values to behavioral and social inquiry suggest much more explicit attention to the processes by which we train up new generations of researchers. The relatively narrow perspectives afforded by individual behavioral and social disciplines (see Joseph Schwab's commentary) suggest the wisdom, not only of multi- and inter-disciplinary approaches but also of the significance of clinical medicine and engineering as models on which behavioral and social inquiry might more usefully draw (Ben-David, 1973). Further, the extent to which researchers in the domain of education, expressing values of different kinds in the structure and methodologies with which they work, suggests the requirement that they be better schooled in techniques and issues of value resolution. This, of course, re-raises a perennial problem for the education profession, to wit, the extent to which the attempted professional definition and redefinition of the past four decades mitigates against the kind of broad general background (liberal education, if you will) that, corny as it may sound, plants the seeds which older eras unflinchingly called wisdom. ("Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore, get wisdom.")

The Ability to Make Distinctions

Further attention needs to be directed to devising ways in which we can identify and articulate values inherent or imbedded in behavioral and social disciplines. The papers offer proof of the variety of ways in which values can manifest themselves. They also suggest the difficulty of the recognition process.

For our own information and analysis, scholars and researchers need to be better equipped to recognize the various ways in which values can enter into their work—personal interest, in the principles of the discipline, methodologically, in the choice of research questions and issues, and so on. The development of this capacity and methods of applying it is an important consideration for further development.

Policy Development

Finally, we come to the domain of policy development. Originally, as Koff makes clear in his Preface to this monograph, we
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had hoped, through the papers and the ensuing discussions, to carry the treatment of imbeddedness forward to the point of addressing its policy implications. It became clear that we were getting ahead of ourselves. Until we can understand the phenomenon, we cannot explore fully its implications.

Nevertheless, the prominence of values in behavioral and social inquiry which these papers succeed in underscoring raises serious questions regarding the manner in which research policy is developed for these areas. Presently existing policy models, especially those referencing the structures in terms of which decisions are made, tend to rely heavily on the bio-medical and physical sciences. Heavy dependence is placed on the research peer network.

The values phenomenon, however, suggests the importance of other kinds of peers, namely, those whose values are similar or who are similarly threatened as a consequence of proposed or funded work or mechanisms for undertaking such work. Furthermore, the possibility of a value impact assessment as part of the criteria that individual projects or research programs might have to weigh themselves against raises, simultaneously, intriguing and troublesome questions.

At the very least it would appear important, because of the inherent value dimension, that arenas be created where “willing conversations” can take place concerning value issues in research and the research agenda building process. If Schwab is correct in his belief that the precondition for “willing conversations” is collaboration anticipating agreement, that is, collaboration in a successful outcome profitable to both, then researchers and scholars will be obliged to engage themselves much more substantially than they ever have in the past in dialog with practitioners and with the diversity of client populations being served by the institutions of schooling in our society.

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