
ABSTRACT
Ways in which children learn about race and form attitudes towards groups other than their own are described and the processes underlying the development of racial awareness and racial attitudes are delineated. The first three sections of the paper discuss the age at which racial attitudes begin to form, the developmental antecedents of racial attitudes from infancy through age 3 years, and the measurement and meaning of racial awareness. The major portion of the document discusses various social and psychological factors underlying the development of racial attitudes. The factors discussed include direct instruction, reinforcement, personality characteristics of parents and children, child rearing techniques, cognitive aspects and perceptual components of racial attitudes, socialization, and the relative salience of racial cues in contrast to other cues such as gender and age. The concluding section of the paper explores parallels between the acquisition of racial and other attitudes and offers a conceptualization of racial attitude development involving eight overlapping steps through which children progress during the first 10 years of life. (Author/R8)
DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S RACIAL AWARENESS
AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES

by
Phyllis A. Katz
Institute for Research on Social Problems
Boulder, Colorado


Paper prepared for the ERIC Clearinghouse on Elementary and Early Childhood Education.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY Phyllis A. Katz TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)"
DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S RACIAL AWARENESS AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES

Phyllis A. Katz, Ph.D.

People come in many varieties. They vary physically in height, weight, body type, facial features, skin color, hair color, eye color, and gender, just to mention a few. At a non-physical level, they vary in temperament, disposition, language, political, cultural, and religious beliefs. Many of these variations are quite apparent to children. What also becomes apparent to them in the course of development is that our society places much more importance on some of these dimensions than others. For reasons that are not entirely clear, racial and gender cues have been chosen as particularly significant ways of categorizing people.

Many beliefs about groups classified along these lines have emerged over the centuries. These beliefs are transmitted from one generation to another with such astounding efficiency that our educational institutions might have much to learn from the process. It is not too difficult to find nine-year olds who cannot read or subtract; it is virtually impossible, however, to discover children of the same age who do not know about gender or racial stereotypes.

This chapter will attempt to describe the ways in which children learn about race and form attitudes towards groups other than their own. The processes underlying this development of racial awareness and attitudes during the first ten years of life will be delineated.

How do children develop attitudes? Folk wisdom tells us that the tree grows as the twig is bent. This notion seems particularly appropriate when considering the issue of intergroup attitude development. As Allport (1954) has suggested, early negative attitudes may be "caught, rather than taught", and once caught may be most intransigent to change. The relative imperviousness of adult prejudice to the effects of conflicting evidence and experience strongly suggests that predispositions acquired at early developmental levels may form the irrational but potent foundation for racism.
Because there is general agreement that basic attitudes are learned in childhood, there has been a great deal of interest exhibited by social scientists in the ontogeny of intergroup attitudes. Since there have been comprehensive reviews of some of this empirical research by Proshansky (1966), Katz (1976), and Balch & Paulsen (1979), this chapter will not attempt to duplicate those reviews, but rather will focus upon the basic developmental trends obtained in earlier research. It will also delineate the major theoretical viewpoints that have been offered to account for the origins of prejudice. In doing so, it will draw heavily on the present author's earlier review (Katz, 1976).

I. WHEN DO RACIAL ATTITUDES BEGIN FORMING?

The age at which children begin to acquire racial attitudes has been a question of continuing interest. Evidence available suggests that by three or four years of age many children make differential responses to skin color and other racial cues. The dawning of racial awareness follows what many believe to be a period of color-blindness. It should be noted that this latter belief, thought widely held, appears dubious and has no empirical support since no studies have been reported with children younger than three.

There appears to be general agreement that ethnic attitudes begin to take shape and are observable during the nursery school years, although some questions exist concerning the generality of early stated preferences. According to many theorists (e.g., Goodman, 1952), the development of ethnic attitudes is integrally related to the establishment of a child's self-identity. It is typically assumed that the child must necessarily learn about which groups he/she does and does not belong to as part of the self-discovery process. At about the same time, positive and negative feelings come to be associated with various groups. In summarizing the empirical work in this area through 1965, Proshansky (1966) concludes that racial awareness: (a) appears at about three years of age in both Black and White children; (b) increases rapidly for the next several years; and (c) is pretty well established by the time children enter first grade. Although there is some disagreement in the literature as to whether White or
Black children achieve racial awareness earlier, the preponderance of evidence seems to indicate that minority children are more sensitive to racial cues and more precocious with regard to them.

In a classic study of young children's attitudes in a Northeastern urban community, Goodman (1952) studied 103 Black and White children. One of the unique features of this frequently cited study is that the investigator made intensive observations of both the children and their families over the course of a full year. Consequently, she was able to study responses that might not have been evident to an observer who knew the children less well. According to Goodman, racial awareness was not only present at age three and four (although there was some variability along this dimension), but 25 percent of the children at age four were already expressing strongly entrenched race-related values. White children never expressed a wish to be like a Black child, whereas Black children exhibited a great deal of denial and conflict about their evaluations of blackness. For some of the children the words were there even though the feelings were still to come, as in the case of one little four-year old who made the haunting comment, "The people that are white, they can go up. The people that are brown, they have to go down".

One of the interesting findings reported was the discrepancy that appeared to exist between what Goodman referred to as the children's "precocious raciality" and their parents' beliefs that their children were relatively unaware of race. Another extensive and more recent study of preschool children in the Northeast was conducted by Porter (1971). A sizable proportion of three-year old children in this sample also exhibited preferences based on racial cues, and these responses increased markedly between three and five years of age.

The presence of racial awareness in children as young as three suggests that its antecedents must have come at an earlier age - perhaps in nonverbal form. Although we do not adequately understand the parameters, some theories that have been offered will be discussed in the next section.
II. WHAT ARE THE DEVELOPMENTAL FORERUNNERS OF RACIAL ATTITUDES?: THE FIRST THREE YEARS

There is a perceptual prerequisite involved in learning any category system. Prior to being able to define a social group, the child must be able to discriminate between groups and learn which cues are relevant for group inclusion or exclusion. Learning about people is analogous to all early concept formation. For instance, the category "cow" is defined (for young children) by the sound it makes, which is different from sounds other animals make. During early language development young children receive considerable training of this kind, and parents reward correct classification responses. When the child correctly verbalizes "meow" to the pussy cat pictures and "bow wow" to the puppy, parents express their pleasure. Thus, it may be that both this extensive practice with classification skills and the associated reinforcement may generalize and increase a child's predisposition for categorizing people.

Because of the perceptual prerequisite young children's initial classifications are based upon cues which are easily discernible. This is undoubtedly why both gender and race are learned about so early. It also accounts in part for why religion and nationality cues are learned at much later stages. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the absence of clear perceptual cues for classifying certain ethnic groups has occasionally led governments to add them. In Nazi Germany, Jews were forced to wear Stars of David so that they could be more easily identified. In Truffaut's movie, "The Last Metro", a story based in German-occupied Paris in 1942, a Nazi radio announcer decries the fact that it is so difficult to tell who is Jewish. "Wouldn't it be nice", he asks, "if they just all had blue skin?" The cues for learning about race are, unlike religion, more readily apparent to a young child.

The reason so little is known about the development of racial awareness during the first three years of life is that virtually no studies have been conducted with children below three. This state of affairs was noted in the present writer's earlier review (Katz, 1976) and remains essentially true five years later. Consequently, discussions concerning the development of racial perception during the first three years of life will be
necessarily speculative. Such speculation may be important to engage in, however, for at least two reasons. First, it may serve to stimulate needed research. The second reason stems from the repeated finding that a sizable proportion of three-year olds and most four-year old children do exhibit awareness of racial cues. If this is indeed the case, then, it is clear that the developmental processes underlying this development must have taken place during the earlier period.

When early studies on nursery school children's racial awareness were first published (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1947; Goodman, 1952), considerable surprise was expressed at the fact that young children even noticed skin color differences. Indeed, many people still believe that children, in Rousseau-like innocence, are color-blind with respect to people. The present author has encountered several school administrators who believed that assessment of grade-school children's racial attitudes would cause them to suddenly pay attention to race for the first time.

Such beliefs are clearly not supported by the evidence. Upon reflection, they are somewhat peculiar. Very young infants are obviously capable of distinguishing color cues in inanimate objects (Fagan, 1974; Gaines, 1971). Why, then, should people be exempted from this perceptual process? A study by the present author and her students conducted with three-day old infants (Rose, Katz, Birke & Rossman, 1977) found not only that facial-like configurations of varying hues were discriminated, but that infants preferred high contrast stimuli. Thus, they followed a white face against a brown background and a brown face against a white background more actively than they followed a white face against a pink background. It may be that in very early infancy, anything that visually stands out becomes a compelling stimulus. Newborns seem to be sensitive to color cues, figure-ground contrast, border illumination discrepancies, and configurational details as well. So much for color-blindness!

That children by age three should employ skin color cues as a basis for person classification, therefore, should not be surprising. Much of a child's early cognitive training employs the teaching of colors and their use as classification devices. What
may be more surprising, however, is that nursery school children exhibit differential evaluative responses to different skin colors. White children clearly prefer the color "white" in both non-human and human pictures, and until relatively recently, young black children also exhibited pro-white bias.

There are two theories that have been proposed to account for these phenomena, an earlier one by Allport (1954) and a more recent view postulated by Williams and his colleagues (Williams, 1972; Williams & Morland, 1976).

Allport has suggested (1954) that children negatively evaluate other-race individuals as one instance of a general fear of strange and unfamiliar things. Fear of the strange may be elicited by inanimate objects, unexpected occurrences, and, perhaps, people who look very different to the child. Allport further suggests that visible differences between people may imply other real differences to the child as well. This latter possibility is in accordance with cognitive-developmental theory as well (e.g., Piaget). Allport's notions were vividly brought home to the present writer when she visited a foundling home in a remote part of China several years ago. The children in the home had not had any exposure to Caucasians, and when the group walked in, several of the children between six and twelve months became obviously fearful, avoided us, and began to cry. Since this reaction was not elicited by other unfamiliar Chinese adults, it was clear that more than simple "stranger anxiety" was involved.

Although the possibilities suggested by this view are intriguing, no systematic work with young children deriving from Allport's theory has been conducted. Thus, even assuming the validity of the "strange person" phenomenon, we do not know whether or how this earlier fear relates to subsequent attitude development. Similarly, the age when such events would have maximal developmental impact is not known. Whether such fear develops at all would seem to depend upon happenstance occurrences, and thus, could not readily account for the relatively systematic effects we see later in development. Allport's reasoning suggests a modification technique which has not always been successful. It could be argued that fear of the strange might be reduced by early and frequent inter-
racial contact. Although several studies suggest that increasing familiarity may also increase liking for previously unfamiliar stimuli (Zajonc, et al., 1971; Cantor, 1972), anecdotal evidence suggests occasions when the opposite may be true, particularly with prolonged exposure. The rearing of upper-class Southern White children by Black women did not apparently inoculate them against negative racial attitudes.

Williams has posited an even more far-reaching theory. His position suggests that early racial preferences of Whites (and some Blacks) reflect primitive feelings about day and night. In a recent excellent review of work in the area, Williams & Morland (1976) argue that the development of the concept of race is inextricably bound up with the symbolism associated with color usage. This argument is based upon several pieces of evidence. First, the color names "black" and "white" are the most frequently encountered color terms in almost all known languages (Hays, Margolis, Naroll & Perkins, 1972). Secondly, considerable cross-cultural research has demonstrated that the color "white" is associated with positive attributes in most cultures and the color "black" with negative ones. Williams & Morland go on to suggest that such affective connotations generalize to skin color cues. A basic question that needs to be addressed, however, has to do with the origin of these very common linguistic patterns. These investigators speculate that pro-white bias originates from a basic human tendency to prefer light over darkness. Darkness, it is argued, is intrinsically aversive because it elicits visual disorientation which leads to dark avoidance in both humans and non-human primates. Because of this, darkness comes to be associated with fear, whereas lightness is associated with fear-reduction. Generalization of these trends is presumed to occur along many dimensions including language, color, and race. Thus, it is argued that preference for lightness over darkness may be the developmental forerunner of white skin preference. The cultural factors (i.e., language connotations, lower status associated with dark skin, etc.) merely serve to reinforce these initial tendencies.

Ontogenetically, this fascinating theory implies that there should be a relation between a young child's fear of the dark and the subsequent negativity of his or her
subsequent attitudes towards Blacks. In the only empirical effort to test this notion to date (Boswell & Williams, 1975), a modest correlation (r = .40) was found between white-black color bias in 37 five-year olds, and their mothers' reports about their aversive responses to darkness. Further work in this area is clearly warranted and needed.

To summarize, by the age of three, many children already exhibit some awareness of racial cues, although the processes underlying this development are not well investigated or understood. Children are capable of making the requisite perceptual differentiation based upon skin color (and possibly on the basis of facial features as well) quite early in life, but whether racial concepts are indeed formed seems quite dependent upon specific experiential factors such as whether the child lives in a predominantly racially homogeneous or heterogeneous environment. Two theoretical viewpoints have been offered to account for differential evaluations of racial groups. Allport has suggested that fear of the unfamiliar underlies much of a child's response to people of other races. In contrast, Williams has argued that all children begin life with a preference for light colors and an aversion to darkness, a tendency that continues in white children but is counteracted by other factors in minority children.

III. RACIAL AWARENESS — ITS MEASUREMENT AND ITS MEANING

As noted above, children are capable of making subtle and sophisticated distinctions in the world around them. Thus, what may be unusual is not that children can and do perceptually distinguish brown and white skins but that such distinctions have already taken on evaluative components by the preschool period.

In order to understand the ramifications of early racial awareness, it becomes necessary to attend to how it is actually measured in young children. By far, the most frequently employed task has been the use of doll choices. This preference task, originally employed by Clark & Clark in 1947, initially seems quite straightforward. The child is asked to choose the nice doll, the pretty one, etc., from pairs of black and white dolls. The seeming simplicity of the task may have accounted for its ready acceptance, and consequent historical significance in the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Edu-
cation of Topeka, Kansas Supreme Court decision, which barred segregation in the schools partially on the basis of the Clarks' results.

Closer examination, however, reveals a number of methodological problems associated with choice instruments of this type. In most studies the dolls differ not only in skin color cues but in eye color and hair color as well, i.e., white dolls have blonde hair and blue eyes, whereas black dolls have brown hair and brown eyes. Thus, it is not clear what cues might be accounting for the earlier-obtained preference for white dolls. Kircher & Furby (1971), for example, found that both skin color and hair type could be significant determinants of young children's preferences for pictures. Moreover, a more recent study that held hair and eye color constant (Katz & Zalk, 1974) found no preference for a doll's skin color.

Some additional problems with the use of this technique concern its psychometric properties. Reliability data has not yet been presented, despite its wide usage, and it is quite conceivable that children of this age might give very different responses to the same questions a second time. Furthermore, no validity data for this task have been presented. Problems of reliability and validity are not, of course, unique to doll choice measures of racial attitudes but are applicable to a wide range of measures. Investigators employing adults are somewhat more cognizant of these issues, whereas early investigators utilizing young children have not been. Studies of children have generally assumed that a one-to-one correspondence exists between responses to the index and other behavior in the absence of supporting evidence. Interestingly, the few studies that have attempted to assess task performance and how nursery school children actually behave with regard to children of differing groups have not obtained positive findings. Stevenson & Stevenson (1960) have maintained, for example, that nursery school children do not exhibit same-race play preferences. The previously referred to study by Porter (1971) also noted that play patterns were unrelated to doll preferences, and Hraba & Grant (1970) found no relation between doll task performance and stated friendship choices. Thus, the possibility exists that nursery school children, when confronted by a racial choice, may simply be responding in a way they feel an adult (who is often White) expects
them to. Because of these varied problems, it is difficult to know how best to interpret such a measure. Despite this, however, the technique has been used in numerous studies.

Over the past ten years there have been several studies that have contradicted the Clark's earlier findings that Black children exhibit strong preferences for White dolls (Hraba & Grant, 1970; Datcher, Savage & Checkosky, 1973; Fox & Jordan, 1973; Katz & Zalk, 1974; Butler, Cunningham, Keck & Nordquist, 1970; Brigham & Weissbach, 1972). It is tempting to attribute such changes in children's responses to societal changes that have occurred over the past decade. The importance of the civil rights movement and Black people's developing pride in their blackness are certainly factors. Moreover, the positive exposures given to Black people by the media should not be underestimated as a potentially significant parameter for changing attitudes of children.

There are several problems with the societal change interpretation, however. For one thing the results have not been completely unambiguous. Other studies (e.g., Morland, 1966; Greenwald & Oppenheim, 1968; Asher & Allen, 1969; McAdoo, 1970; Spencer & Horowitz, 1973; Williams, Best, Boswell, Mattson & Graves, 1975) have, in fact, replicated the earlier findings regarding white doll preferences. The work of Williams and his colleagues, using a picture preference test rather than a doll preference, has more consistently found that white figures are associated with positive adjectives and black figures associated with negative ones (Renninger & Williams, 1966; Williams & Roberson, 1967; Williams, Best, Boswell, Mattson & Graves, 1975). This has been true for both Black and White children at the preschool level. How, then, can one reconcile these seeming contradictions?

One possibility that follows from the methodological problems discussed above is that discrepant results may simply be reflecting the lack of reliability of the doll measure. Most investigators working with young children seem unwilling, however, to abandon the technique and continue to attribute some conceptual meaning to children's preferences. It is interesting to note, however, that older minority group children more strongly express preferences for blackness (McAdoo, 1977). Thus, the trend may be very real, but the preschool measures may be insufficiently sensitive to it.
A second possible explanation is that there may be geographic variations in children's attitudes. Interestingly, much of the work reporting more positive attitudes towards black dolls and pictures has occurred in large urban centers (e.g., Hraba & Grant, 1970; Fox & Jordan, 1973), whereas the older attitudes appear to be more prevalent in the South and in smaller towns (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1947; Morland, 1966; Stevenson & Stewart, 1958). It might be fruitful, therefore, to conduct geographical comparisons utilizing the same instrument. Another interesting difference that emerges between studies showing no preference and those that do is that the former often use Black testers. This may again tell us something about the young child's degree of sophistication in that he or she may well be giving what appears to be the socially desirable response.

Although the whole issue of minority choices is not without controversy (cf. Williams & Morland, 1979; Banks, et al., 1979), the preponderance of evidence seems to this writer to suggest a growing shift towards greater minority self-esteem and positive racial identification, both historically (Butler, 1976) and ontogenetically (McAdoo, 1977). Young black preschool children in most recent studies now show either no bias or a same-race preference in choice tasks.

It should be noted that although responses of Black children have changed, the responses of young White children have not. They never express preferences to be a member of any racial group but their own. Moreover, a multitude of studies have shown that children as young as three to four have strong positive associations to both the color and the racial group labeled "white" and negative ones to "black" in its abstract and skin color designations (Greenwald & Oppenheim, 1968; Asher & Allen, 1969; Hraba & Grant, 1970; Fox & Jordan, 1973; Stevenson & Stewart, 1958; Renninger & Williams, 1966; Morland, 1966, 1972; Hardin, 1977; Williams, Boswell & Best, 1975). Although it is generally assumed that skin color is the most salient cue for differentiating race, two rather interesting recent studies looked at the role of other physiognomic cues. One conducted by Sorce (1979) found the physiognomic features were more salient than skin color and that White children were more aware of hair features than skin color. This
latter finding is particularly interesting since most doll choice tasks vary both skin, hair, and sometimes eye color simultaneously. Thus, a brown-skinned, brown-eyed, and brown-haired doll is usually paired with a pink-skinned, blue-eyed, blonde-haired one. A study by Kaiz & Zalk (1974) which varied only skin color within male and/or female doll pairs (all dolls had brown hair and eyes) did not, in fact, find clear-cut preferences for white dolls. It was suggested in that study, therefore, that children may, like the proverbial "gentlemen", simply prefer blondes. A study by LaCoste (1978) with three- to four-year old White children found that they were able to classify facial features for Blacks and Whites even when differential skin color cues were absent. As in the previously mentioned study, hair differences were particularly salient.

A final problem arises with regard to the theoretical relation of all preschool measures to subsequent attitude development. It is clear that all children ultimately exhibit some degree of racial awareness. It is equally clear, however, that not all children develop negative intergroup attitudes. What, then, is the relationship (if any) between these earlier expressed preferences and later feelings and behaviors? Do children who exhibit early awareness develop different attitudes than those who manifest it later? Is intensity of awareness related to strength of later attitudes? Unfortunately, there seems to be no evidence on these issues. We know that racial awareness may be a necessary condition for attitude development, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. A longitudinal study is very much needed to clarify these theoretical issues.

IV. MECHANISMS UNDERLYING RACIAL ATTITUDE DEVELOPMENT

A number of theoretical formulations have been posited regarding the acquisition of racial attitudes. Interestingly, most of these formulations have been generated by work with adults, and extrapolations to children have been made primarily on a theoretical, rather than an empirical basis. Although all investigators in this area pay lip service to the belief that attitudes are complex and multiply determined, most theorists have, in fact, focused upon a single determinant. This section will delineate some of the major variables that have been discussed in relation to attitude acquisition.
A. Direct Instruction

In contrast to Allport's belief about prejudice being caught rather than taught, the song from *South Pacific* expresses the notion that, "you have to be carefully taught". This latter belief may be the most commonly accepted view, both by the general public and by a number of social scientists. Why are children prejudiced? Obviously, it is argued, their parents are. If parents are, they will consequently transmit such feelings to children.

Although the variable of parental instruction has considerable common sense appeal, evidence supporting this view is scanty and inconsistent. An early study by Harris, Gough & Martin (1950), for example, suggests that there may be positive but relatively small correlations between elementary school children's racial attitudes and those of their parents. Mosher & Scodel (1960) obtained a relation between the social distance scores of 12-year olds and ethnic attitudes of mothers. On the other hand, Radke-Yarrow, Trager & Miller (1952) found that kindergarten and first-grade White children often displayed negative reactions to Blacks even when their parents held more liberal attitudes. Other studies have also found no relationship to parental attitudes with either young children (Bird, Monachesi & Burdick, 1952; Frenkel-Brunswik & Havel, 1953; Pushkin, 1967) or adolescents (Byrne, 1965). With regard to this latter study, it may be argued that the impact of parental attitudes would not be expected to be as salient during adolescence since many additional factors - such as peer group feelings, school experiences, type and variety of interracial encounters - have influenced earlier attitudes. If this is the case, however, then the importance of parental attitudes may have been very much overemphasized. If negative parental training can indeed be counteracted so readily, the implications for modification research are considerable.

The developmental relationship between the attitudes of children and their parents appears to be a complex one that cannot readily be disentangled without longitudinal data. The expectation that direct instruction from parents is involved has not received much empirical support. Moreover, the mechanisms underlying attitude transmission have not
been well delineated. Besides direct instruction, other variables to be considered in the parent-child relationship include observational learning and modeling (e.g., Liebert, Sobol & Copemann, 1972). The specific timing of instruction may also be of significance. It might well be, for example, that certain early types of training leave an indelible impression, whereas later types of negative exposures are more readily changed. It is clear, however, that there is far from a one-to-one relationship between parental attitudes and what their children's will be.

B. **Reinforcement Components**

The mechanism of reinforcement has frequently been offered as an explanation of how children learn prejudice. According to this view, either peers or adults in the child's environment are seen as positively rewarding the expression of negative attitudes. The rather complex responses subsumed under the attitude construct would probably not typically be acquired under conditions of consistent reinforcement, since the communications themselves are often ambivalent (cf. Katz, Glass & Cohen, 1973) and thus may lead to inconsistent reinforcement. Thus, for example, if first-grader Jane (White) asks her mother if she can invite her friend Lotus (Black) for lunch, the mother may say yes but use a slightly different tone of voice than Jane is accustomed to. When Jane asks her mother whether she may go to Lotus' house the following week, the mother may well say no, while using many circumlocutions and rationalizations. The message, then, that often gets transmitted to the child is a confusing one with mixed overtones.

Nevertheless, despite the complexity of both the communication and the reinforcement contingencies, the possibility exists that certain basic components of racial attitudes can best be understood in reinforcement terms. The early learning involved in the affective aspects of attitudes may well fall into this category.

The most active proponent of a reinforcement view has been Williams, whose theory was discussed in the previous section (since it is particularly relevant to early development). It can be recalled that Williams and his colleagues suggest that all children develop a positive bias toward light colors because of our diurnal rhythm and
consequent aversion to darkness. This is reflected in the language of most cultures, which contain positive associations to the color "white" and negative ones to the color "black". This reinforces the child's initial predilections in this area, which generalize to skin color cues. Finally, the pervasive racist attitudes within our society further serve to reinforce such connections for White children. Minority group children, according to Williams, begin life with the same preferences for brightness, but positive associations to darker colors (due to contact with dark-skinned adults) soon come into play to counteract these earlier tendencies. Although Williams does not specifically discuss it, the other side of the coin should be equally true, i.e., to the extent that Black children have negative experiences with White racism, they should begin to devalue both the color "white" and the racial group.

Williams and his colleagues and students have conducted a number of studies with preschool and young grade school children which have demonstrated that (a) colors are evaluated in accordance with the theory, particularly by majority group children, and (b) these associations do generalize to pictures of people. Two measures have been frequently used to assess these trends. The first is the Color Meaning Test (Williams & Roberson, 1967) which consists of pairs of objects or animals alike in all respects but color. The other instrument is the Preschool Racial Attitude Measure - PRAM (Williams, Best, Boswell, Mattson, & Graves, 1975) which assesses children's associations of positive and negative adjectives to pairs of child and adult figures varying in skin color.

One of the interesting implications of this position is that if associations are formed by reinforcement, these same associations should be modifiable when the reinforcement contingencies are changed, and indeed, evidence has been offered to support this view. Interestingly, when the present author reviewed literature pertinent to attitude modification in 1974, she noted the paucity of such studies conducted with young children. This state of affairs was also noted by Proshansky (1966) in an earlier review and by Balch & Paulsen (1979) who more recently discussed some of the historical trends. Over the past decade, however, there has been a proliferation of attitude change studies.
These have used a variety of techniques including increasing interracial contact at the preschool level (e.g., Palmer, 1977; Goldstein, Koopman & Goldstein, 1979), positive television portrayals of minorities (Goldberg & Corn, 1979), increasing multicultural experiences (Blackwell, et al., 1976), perceptual differentiation techniques (Katz & Zalk, 1978), and attempting to change pro-White/anti-Black bias by negatively reinforcing traditional responses and/or positively reinforcing pro-Black/anti-White responses (Williams & Edwards, 1969; MrAdoo, 1970; Shanahan, 1972; Spencer & Horowitz, 1973; Traynham, 1974; Chamberlin-Robinson, 1977). In general, most techniques have been associated with some degree of success. Reinforcement procedures have worked at the preschool level, although their long-term effectiveness remains to be ascertained (Balch & Paulsen, 1979).

The relationship between children's responses to racial cues and reinforcement processes has been studied in other types of experimental paradigms, such as putting one type of cue against another. Doke & Risley (1972), for example, attempted to assess the relative importance of race and sex as discriminative cues in the behavior of Black preschool and grade school children. They showed subjects pictures of a White boy and a Black girl and taught them to press a different button to each one. Other pictures of Black girls and White boys were then presented, and generalization on the button-pressing was obtained. A transfer task was then introduced in which subjects were shown slides of Black boys and White girls. The question raised was whether the earlier discrimination was learned on the basis of skin color or gender cues. It was found that younger children generalized along the sex dimension, whereas older children (aged 9 to 12) generalized on the basis of race. The finding with young children corroborates the previously cited study by Katz & Zalk (1974) with regard to preschool children's doll preferences in that gender cues were more salient than skin color.

Another approach relevant to the reinforcement aspects of children's racial attitudes is concerned with the differential reward values associated with individuals of different races. The experimental paradigm employed by Katz, Henchy & Allen (1968) demonstrates this paradigm: Children participated in a rote-memory learning task.
and received verbal approval from either a White or Black male examiner. In this particular study persons of the same race were found to be the most effective reinforcers (although it should be noted that some complicated interactions were obtained). With younger children an examiner of another race may be more effective as a reinforcer (e.g., Katz, 1973). Not only are adults of different races associated with differential social reinforcement, but other evidence with young children suggests that peers are also associated with such patterns (Coates, Arnstein & Jordan, 1973).

Investigations pertinent to children's learning behavior with same- or other-race adults (reviewed by Sattler, 1973) suggest that a wide variety of parameters are associated with how effective a reinforcing person is to a child. It is interesting to note that such investigations are generally categorized under the rubric of "race of examiner" effect as if it were primarily the objective characteristics of the adult, rather than the child's learned patterns that account for observed behavior differences. It is the view of the present author that this misplaced emphasis has had the effect of confusing rather than clarifying the complex patterns of results obtained. Attention has not been paid, for example, to such questions as whether a relationship exists between a child's racial attitudes and the differential reinforcing value of adults. Moreover, when adults are well-matched on other relevant variables, as was done by Yando, Zigler & Gates (1971), some of the "racial" effects washed out. It is clear from the bewildering array of findings obtained with regard to "race of examiner" effects in children that considerably more theoretical delineation and better studies are required before unambiguous predictions can be generated.

C. Personality Factors and Child-Rearing Techniques

Perhaps the most widely known theoretical treatment of prejudice is the one that attributes negative intergroup attitudes to an authoritarian personality structure (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950). This work represents one of social science's major attempts to understand the roots of prejudice. The theory assumes that prejudice in children is generated by harsh and rigid parents. The child is viewed as having to continually submit to arbitrary and often severe parental authority. Because of the parents' uncompromising natures, the resultant hostility of the child is never
permitted direct expression. Accordingly, as a defense mechanism, the child identifies with the frustrating authority figures, tends to idealize them, and displaces his or her aggressions toward out-group persons.

One of the major tenets of this theory is that prejudice serves a particular function for the individual and is integrally related to other aspects of his or her personality. The authoritarian-personality type is viewed as a basically insecure person who represses impulses, views life as threatening, and perceives social relationships in terms of power. Some behavioral consequences of this syndrome are: rigidity, a tendency toward stereotyped thinking, an avoidance of introspection, and excessive moralism. The authoritarian person idealizes "toughness", has contempt for "weakness", and perceives the world in sharply defined categories of black or white, right or wrong, good or bad. For the authoritarian personality, there is very little gray in the world.

The original formulations concerning the authoritarian personality were based upon an anonymous anti-Semitism scale administered to 100 college students. The eight women who scored highest and the eight who scored lowest were then given depth interviews and projective tests. It could be argued that such a far-reaching theory was initially formulated on relatively little evidence. Nevertheless, this approach has had considerable theoretical impact and heuristic value. It has also generated a lot of controversy with regard to the adequacy of research purporting to document its suppositions (cf. Christie, 1954). The adult research with regard to this position is discussed in more detail by Ashmore & Del Boca (1976). This section, then, will only discuss evidence with children.

The most convincing study with regard to the relationship between authoritarian parents and ethnocentrism in children was the previously cited work conducted by Harris, et al., (1950). Attitude questionnaires were given to 240 fourth-, fifth-, sixth-grade children and their parents, and positive correlations were obtained between the two sets of measures. More intensive investigation of the extreme groups demonstrated a strong relationship between maternal beliefs about child rearing and the degree of prejudice in children. The mothers of high-prejudiced subjects stressed the value of
obedience, preferred quiet children to noisy ones, and discouraged sex-play in their children, often by the use of physical punishment. This pattern contrasted with the more permissive practices of the mothers of low-prejudiced children. Thus, the picture that emerges from this study is in accordance with the authoritarian personality theory. Several other studies have found similar results (e.g., Lyle & Levitt, 1955; Hart, 1957; Weatherley, 1963).

A continuing problem in evaluating this research, however, has to do with the confounding of authoritarianism scores with other variables that may explain the above-cited trends equally well. As noted by several investigators (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Proshansky, 1966), both intelligence and educational level are negatively related to authoritarian personality tendencies. Each of these, in turn, is related to socioeconomic level. This latter variable, in and of itself, could readily account for differences in parental beliefs about child-rearing practices. Thus, in the Harris, et al., study, the high-prejudiced children may well have come from lower socioeconomic families where values might be expected to more closely approximate the "authoritarian" type. Without such essential controls, it is impossible to ascertain whether differences are to be attributed to parental personality or to sociocultural factors. Moreover, as other investigators (Epstein & Komorita, 1965; Proshansky, 1966) have noted, children of authoritarian parents may have acquired their attitudes via direct instruction rather than the particular disciplinary techniques they were exposed to.

In summary, research with regard to the authoritarian personality has provided some provocative work in this area but is difficult to interpret. It should be pointed out that even if this research were not surrounded by methodological ambiguity, it would still be a somewhat disheartening theory from the point of view of attitude change. If the authoritarian viewpoint is correct, it follows that authoritarian parents would have to change first in order for their children to become more tolerant.

Even if one does not subscribe wholeheartedly to the theory of the authoritarian personality, one may still postulate that particular types of parental behavior and/or personality factors serve to instill negative racial attitudes. A study by Tabachnick
(1962) attempted to test the hypothesis initially set forth by Allport (1954) that racial prejudice in children was an expression of frustration. According to this theory, individuals (both children and adults) who are unhappy with themselves or maladjusted should exhibit a tendency to take out such dissatisfaction on others who are more socially vulnerable.

Tabachnick tested 300 White fifth-grade children, employing the direct questionnaire measure of attitudes towards Blacks previously used by Gough and his associates (1950). Satisfaction with self was assessed by means of "objective frustration" by classifying children as underachievers, overachievers, or normal. This classification was based upon the obtained discrepancy between the child's grades and his/her IQ scores. Those children classified as underachievers by means of this rating scale were considered to be the most frustrated group. Findings revealed small (but in some instances, statistically significant) correlations between prejudice scores and self-reports of satisfaction. Thus, children who scored higher on the prejudice scale tended also to report more dissatisfaction with themselves. The highest correlation reported, however, was -.27. In terms of predictability, then, approximately 9 percent of the variability in prejudice scores could be accounted for by knowing the children's ratings of self-satisfaction. No significant relationships were obtained between degree of achievement (the investigator's objective frustration measure) and racial attitudes. Thus, it appears that personality measures may be related to attitudes but certainly not to the degree that some theorists have contended.

The study by Tabachnick is instructive because it demonstrates some of the pitfalls frequently encountered in attempts to assess theory in this area. The correlational format of the study is typical of such investigations, and it, of course, precludes saying anything about the particular nature of the relationship between personality and attitudinal variables. Even if the correlations were high (which they weren't), we would not know whether the self-dissatisfaction anteceded or succeeded the development of racial attitudes or whether some additional but unmeasured variables accounted for the concurrent development of racial prejudice and unhappiness. An additional difficulty
in interpreting such findings is the reliance upon a direct questionnaire measure of attitudes whose validity has not been established. It would appear that social scientists sometimes try to chase butterflies with meat axes.

An example of a somewhat better controlled study with children was conducted by Epstein & Komorita (1965). These investigators attempted to assess the effects of the child's perceptions of parental discipline and particular stimulus characteristics of an out-group upon social distance scores. Social distance responses were obtained in response to pictures that were systematically varied along two dimensions: social class (determined by the relative shabbiness of the clothes and surrounding environment) and race (White vs. Oriental). The target pictures were introduced to the sample (White middle-class children from the third to the eighth grades) as a fictitious group called Piraneans. The major finding of the study was a curvilinear relationship between perceived parental permissiveness and social distance scores made to out-groups.

This finding is an interesting one, which in some ways contradicts authoritarianism theory. The children who appeared to be least prejudiced were those who perceived their parents as being either very permissive or very punitive. Those who perceived their parents as exhibiting an intermediate degree of permissiveness (one is tempted to say middle America) expressed the greatest social distance towards out-groups. Most theoretical positions that stress childrearing and defense mechanism components of social attitudes would generate the prediction that children whose parents are least permissive should have stronger negative attitudes towards out-groups. Such parental rigidity is, indeed, supposed to provide the motivating force behind the projection and displacement towards out-groups involved in prejudice. The study clearly does not support this expectation.

In view of the pervasive quality of most personality variables, it would be quite surprising to find that they were not related to social attitudes in some way. Nevertheless, the insistence by some theorists (e.g., Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950) that racial attitudes in children are to be understood primarily as an outgrowth of emotional maladjustment does not seem warranted on the basis of the data available. Personality factors
seem to be only tangentially related to racial attitudes or related in ways that go contrary to existing theory. Although it may be more comforting to think that highly prejudiced children must be emotionally disturbed in some way (and some undoubtedly are), the empirical evidence does not support this view unless one is willing to assume that prejudice and emotional disturbance are synonymous. Studies that measure the two constructs separately have not found that they are not highly related to one another. Large number of children express racial prejudice but do not seem to be maladjusted in other areas.

D. Cognitive Aspects of Racial Attitudes

While the bulk of the evidence concerned with attitudinal antecedents has focused upon emotional determinants, some investigations of the cognitive correlates of attitudes have also been conducted and will be reviewed in this section. There are at least two ways in which cognitive components of attitudes have been conceptualized. One approach has been to view the cognitive aspects as the resultant expression of more primary & deep-rooted personality variables. A second position has approached cognitive aspects as developmental determinants of attitudes. Until fairly recently the first approach has been the more common one.

Concern with the thought processes underlying attitudes is not a new one. Allport, in his most comprehensive and scholarly treatment of the topic (1954), suggests that the major problem in prejudice is, in fact, a thought problem. The prejudiced individual displays what Allport calls "overcategorization" in that he or she assumes that all people placed within a class behave in the same way and exhibit the same traits. Such overcategorization is relatively impervious to new information that may logically contradict this belief. Thus, according to Allport, prejudice is not easily reversible.

The approach that regards this type of thinking as the outgrowth of personality factors (e.g., authoritarian theory) tends to conceptualize it as disordered and the result of rigid, moralistic upbringing. According to this position, children raised in excessively strict homes acquire a tendency to "jump the gun". They categorize prematurely, overgeneralize, and resist changing categories once they are formed. Two
studies are generally cited to support this position. The first one was conducted by Frenkel-Brunswik in 1948. In this investigation high- and low-prejudice groups of children (determined by scores obtained on the California E scale) were asked to look at a series of pictures in which a cat was gradually transformed into a dog. The child's task was to label each picture. High-prejudice subjects were found to change their verbal responses more slowly from one category to another than did less prejudiced subjects, thus, supporting the theoretical expectation. The possibility exists, however, that the problem exhibited by the high-prejudice subjects was perceptual rather than cognitive -- i.e., they may not have perceived the discrepant cues as readily.

A second study conducted by Kutner (1958) does not have this interpretive problem. Kutner employed 60 seven-year old White children, dichotomized on the basis of racial attitude scores. They were given a series of conceptual tasks, which included exercises in syllogistic reasoning, critical thinking, and other types of problem solving. The major finding was that the high-prejudice youngsters were defective in reasoning ability when contrasted with their age mates. Furthermore, they were found to be more intolerant of ambiguity, thus, providing some support for the position outlined above. Interestingly, some of the same children were observed again when they were 16 years of age, and some of the earlier obtained differences were still present (Kutner & Gordon, 1964). This latter study is one of the very few longitudinal follow-ups ever done in this area, and as such, is irudable. Nevertheless, the differences between the groups might be explained more parsimoniously on the basis of obtained significant differences in intelligence test scores. It could be that high-prejudice children did not reason as well because they were less bright. Thus, there may well be differences in the cognitive styles of high- and low-prejudice children, but whether these can be attributed primarily to child-rearing practices or to other factors such as intelligence or socioeconomic status has yet to be determined.

As noted above, a second view is possible with regard to the role of cognitive factors that is more in accordance with cognitive-developmental theory. Within this approach, cognitive processes are considered significant in the acquisition of attitudes
in their own right and are not conceptualized as a mere outgrowth of emotional problems. The work of the major developmental theorists (e.g., Werner, Piaget) suggests some interesting parallels between the thought processes of the young child and those of the prejudiced person described by Allport. The person who assumes that because two people are alike in one respect (e.g., blackness), they must be alike in other attributes (e.g., intelligence) is exhibiting what Piaget has labeled "transductive reasoning". According to Piaget (1928, 1951), such generalizations from the particular to the particular are characteristic of the reasoning processes of three- and four-year old children. In some respects this type of reasoning also resembles what Werner (1948) calls syncretic thought - a type of process in which a stimulus configuration is considered as changed in its entirety when only a minor component changes. Such thinking is frequently observed in young children.

What this developmental position suggests, then, is that there is a time in a child's life when the seemingly distorted reasoning processes associated with prejudicial attitudes are quite normal. These thought processes are characteristic of early levels of maturation. In fact, racial awareness apparently begins its development in the context of both transductive reasoning and syncretic thought - i.e., in the early preschool years. Such developmental concordance may be more than coincidence. At the very least it suggests that the processes of categorization in young children be investigated much more closely than has been done.

There is no good reason to believe that children's cognitions about people differ in kind from the maturational level exhibited in other areas of thought. A child who has difficulty, for example, in solving problems with neutral geometric stimuli that involve classification along two dimensions (e.g., Parker & Day, 1971) should have equal difficulty categorizing a person simultaneously in terms of gender and race. If a child cannot understand the relationship between subordinate and superordinate classes with regard to inanimate objects (e.g., as in Piaget's experimental bead tasks), we should not assume that he or she will place an individual who looks somewhat different in the same category with self.
A number of other investigators have proposed that cognitive components are central to any understanding of racial attitude acquisition. Some support for this previously espoused position that racial attitudes are related to other cognitive measures has recently been offered by Semaj (1980), who found significant relations between racial attitudes and Piagetian tasks.

Another interesting recent study by Clark, Hocevar & Dembo (1980) reports findings relevant to how children (between two-and-a-half and ten-and-a-half years of age) understand the origins of racial differences. These investigators found that children's reasoning about race followed a developmental hierarchy. Six levels were obtained in the types of explanations offered with regard to skin color causality. These included: (a) lack of comprehension; (b) reference to supernatural powers; (c) arbitrary causality; (d) inaccurate physical explanations; (e) accurate physical attribution without accompanying explanation; (f) accurate physical attribution and explanation but without reference to genetics; and (g) genetic explanation. No child in the study gave a genetically relevant response. These investigators also found, in accordance with Semaj (1980) and Katz (1976), that children's level of reasoning about skin color was related to their scores on physical conservation tasks, again pointing to the importance of the cognitive context of attitude development. Some subtleties concerning the expression of children's white preferences were also found in the Clark study as a function of race of examiner. This result substantiated earlier findings by the present author and her colleagues (Katz, Sohn & Zalk, 1975; Katz & Zalk, 1974, 1978), pointing to the complexities involved in the measurement of racial attitudes, even with young children.

A somewhat different cognitive orientation has been proposed by Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, 1969, 1973, 1979; Tajfel & Billig, 1974). In concentrating on the role played by cognitive variables in the determination of intergroup behavior, this latter investigator has looked at the consequences of group categorization. Tajfel argues that classifications of people into nationalities or racial groups are discontinuous and that this gives rise to a tendency to exaggerate the differences between the classes on any given continuous dimension and minimize the differences within each of the classes.
Tajfel & Wilkes (1963) conducted a study using straight lines of varying length to demonstrate this phenomenon. Three groups of subjects were shown eight lines varying in length and asked to estimate the length of each. When one group was asked to label the four shorter lines "A" and the four longer ones "B", they, in fact, exaggerated the difference in length between the "boundary" items much more so than did a group with either no labels or one which associated the letter with the lines in alternation sequence. Similar trends have been found for social stimuli as well (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel, Sheikh & Gardner, 1964). In other studies the relationship of this phenomenon to social groups has been demonstrated. When school children are divided into labeled groups, even on the basis of arbitrary and meaningless criteria, they tend to value others in their group more positively than those in the out-group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974).

Tajfel has clearly tapped an important underlying dimension of social categorization relevant to both gender and racial categorization. Much of his work, however, has been conducted with older children and adults. His results, however, are very similar to those obtained in studies with younger children conducted by the present author and colleagues, although we have preferred to discuss the phenomenon as perceptual rather than cognitive and thus will be discussed in the next section.

E. Perceptual Components of Racial Attitudes

It is commonly agreed among most investigators that perceptual differentiation of groups may be the most basic prerequisite to the development of hostile intergroup attitudes. An interesting recent study conducted with congenitally blind children in South Africa (Bhana, 1977), however, suggests that in some instances visibility may not even be a necessary precondition for prejudice to occur. In South Africa the political salience of race questions may actually overcome the need for vision since White children who were blind were found to hold negative attitudes towards Blacks. In most cases, however, visibility is usually a necessary condition. In accordance with the previously mentioned views of Piaget, Allport suggests that visible differences between people real differences to the child; he goes on to suggest that this may be the perceptual foundation upon which subsequent attitudes are based.

One perceptual theory previously alluded to is Allport's (1954) postulation regarding fear of the unfamiliar. Allport's reasoning suggests that if interracial con-
tact occurs at an early age, it should decrease strangeness and thus hinder the development of consequent negative attitudes. A study by Cantor (1972) (based upon the Zajonc, et al., 1971, "mere exposure" hypothesis) suggests that familiarity with other-race faces may be positively related to children's attitudes. There are, however, a number of problems with the "strangeness" explanation including the rather rapid habituation that children display towards strangers.

It is possible that a systematic exploration of other factors involved in the perceptual categorization of ethnic groups may well increase our understanding of the attitude acquisition process. As was the case with cognitive parameters, perceptual factors may be viewed either as an outcome or an antecedent of the socialization process. That perceptual outcomes differ as a function of attitudes has been demonstrated in adults. Highly prejudiced individuals perceive persons of another race differently than do less prejudiced individuals (e.g., Engel, 1958; Pettigrew, Allport & Barnett, 1958; Reynolds & Toch, 1965; Iverson & Schwab, 1967), suggesting that particular perceptual styles may accompany the presence of prejudiced attitudes. This also has ramifications for eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1979). Findings with adults, however, tell us nothing about a number of important issues including the causal sequence of attitudinal and perceptual processes, the age at which the two intertwine, and the developmental course of their interaction.

The present author and her colleagues have conducted a series of interrelated studies with urban children aimed at gathering such information within a developmental context. The theoretical rationale underlying these studies assumes that the perceptual and linguistic parameters involved in group differentiation are of considerable importance in attitude acquisition. This view holds that perceptual differentiation is a function of (a) the observed stimulus characteristics associated with individuals (i.e., their distinguishing cues), and (b) the particular labels and evaluative statements applied by peers and adults to groups. With regard to this latter factor, theories of learning (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950) suggest that labels and perceptions influence each other in significant ways. The association of distinctive labels to different
ethnic groups would be expected to facilitate discrimination between groups (this has been referred to as acquired distinctiveness of cues). In contrast, the continued use of the same name for all members within a group would be expected to reduce the capacity for differentiating among individual members. (This phenomenon is called acquired equivalence of cues.) Each of these processes has implications for subsequent attitude development because it may either facilitate or impede the learning of other responses (such as stereotypes) to groups.

The research to be described addressed itself to a number of issues including: (a) the relationship of differentiation ability to maturational level, (b) the effects of labels on person-perception, (c) the types of visual cues children use in differentiating people at various developmental levels, and (d) the relationship between attitudes and person-perception.

The first study was conducted with 192 nursery school and kindergarten children (Katz, 1973a) and assessed the hypothesis that differences between members of another group are more difficult to discriminate than differences within one's own group. Black and White subjects at two preschool age levels were given a two-choice discrimination learning task that utilized drawings of faces varying in shade. They were asked to pretend that they were space explorers and to select the "moon person" they were to bring back to earth. Children were randomly assigned to one of three groups in which they viewed either black, white, or green faces. Either the lighter or darker member of each pair was reinforced by a marble. The prediction was made that subjects would more readily learn to discriminate pairs of faces of their own race than those of another. The green-face condition was included as a control for the effects of possible unfamiliarity of other-race stimuli. If the presumed difficulty of learning to discriminate other-race stimuli was due simply to unfamiliarity, green faces and other-race faces should be equally difficult to discriminate. If, on the other hand, the predicted lack of discriminability was attributable to the continued use of the same label, then other-race and green faces should elicit differential learning patterns. This, in fact, was what was found. Children at both age levels took more trials to learn a discrimin-
ation based on shade cues with faces of another race than their own. This was not true when green faces were used, however, suggesting that the labeling process was the important factor. Black children generally showed superior performance on all learning tasks, and younger children of both races learned more quickly when tested by an examiner of another race. These latter two findings suggest that color cues have differential salience, based upon the age and racial group of the children. It would appear that by the age of three, children already reveal sophisticated differential perceptual patterns associated with racial cues.

As a follow-up to this study the same children were subsequently administered a doll preference task (Katz & Zalk, 1974). In contrast to the type of stimult typically used in doll choice tasks, which gives S's a choice between blonde, blue-eyed White dolls and dark-haired, brown-eyed Black dolls, the present study utilized four dolls that differed only in skin color and gender cues. Male and female dolls with brown hair and brown eyes were used. As in the Clark & Clark (1947) procedure, children were asked to tell the experimenter (either a Black or White female), which they thought was the good doll, the naughty doll, the one they liked best, etc. Results with regard to racial preferences were not in accord with those reported by earlier investigators (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1947; Morland, 1966; Asher & Allen, 1969). The strong preference for White dolls previously obtained was not found in this study. Preferences were based more on gender cues than on racial ones, suggesting that racial cues may not be as salient as other types of person characteristics for young children.

In another study (Katz, Sohn & Zalk, 1975) the developmental relationship between attitudes and perceptual factors was assessed in second-, fourth-, and sixth-grade youngsters from two racially integrated New York City public schools. Subjects were classified into high- or low-prejudice conditions on the basis of scores obtained on a multiple-choice projective instrument, consisting of slides depicting ambiguous interracial situations. Subjects were asked to select, for example, which of several children was instigating an aggressive act, was winning a prize or trophy, was being scolded by a teacher, etc. In the perceptual task children were asked to judge the similarity of
pairs of faces that systematically varied along a number of dimensions including color, shade, type of facial expression, type of hair, and shape of eyebrows. A factorial design was employed that varied grade level, race of child (Black or White), race of examiner (Black or White), prejudice level, and type of slide.

The clearest finding to emerge was the high-prejudice children viewed racial cues (i.e., color and shade) as more distinctive than did low-prejudice children. This occurred with all age and racial groups. In contrast, however, other types of cues (e.g., presence of eyeglasses, facial expression) elicited more similar judgments from high-prejudice children viewing other-race faces. These findings are in accordance with the theoretical expectations originally advanced, but the trends were more pronounced for White than for Black children.

In the previous study predictions about perception were made on the basis of labeling experiences that occurred many years before we saw the children. In the last study to be described in this section (Katz & Seavey, 1973), the theoretical rationale concerning language and person perception was tested directly by manipulating the labeling experiences children received. Eighty second- and sixth-grade children were randomly assigned to one of four label conditions in conjunction with two purple and two green faces (one each either smiling or frowning). One group was taught to associate a common name with each color pair — i.e., the two green faces had the same name, and the two purple faces another. A second group was taught to associate common labels on the basis of facial expression — i.e., the two smiling faces had the same name, and the two frowning ones another. A third group learned to associate a distinctive label with each of the four faces. Finally, the control group viewed the stimuli for the same number of trials but without labels. Following the labeling training the children were asked to judge the similarity of all possible pairs of the four faces. As was true for all the studies described in this section, the race of both the child and the examiner was varied.

As in the previously cited studies, results with regard to the White children were in accord with predictions. A significant interaction was found among race of subject, label condition, and type of stimulus-pair observed. For White children labels...
that grouped stimuli on the basis of color cues augmented perceptual differentiation of color cues, whereas labels associated with facial expression enhanced the distinctiveness of expression differences. The association of four different names for each of the four faces affected the perception of color and expression cues equally. Thus, the particular types of labels used modified the subsequent perception of facial cues for White children. In contrast, however, color cues were perceived as salient by Black children even in the absence of labels, and labeling training did not significantly alter their subsequent perception.

Thus, in almost all of the studies conducted in this research program, predictions were confirmed for White children but not for Black children. The question may be raised, therefore, of why this disparity exists. There are several possible explanations. The first is that White society does not permit Blacks to "forget" color, even if they wished to. In all studies color cues, even "nonmeaningful" ones such as purple and green, appeared to have greater salience for Black children. Despite this increased attention to color, however, Black grade school students judged shade variations within their own race as not being an important basis for perceptual distinctiveness. This contrasts with earlier work (e.g., Freeman, Armor, Ross & Pettigrew, 1966) suggesting that a strong positive valence within the Black community was placed upon being light-skinned. Thus, this latter trend may well be reflecting recent strides made by Blacks in their struggle for equality and dignity. Recent Black political ideology stresses the importance of Blackness as a force for unity and pride. Thus, the ignoring of subtle color gradations by contemporary Black children that may have been important to their parents in earlier years, suggests that things may indeed by changing for minority group self-perceptions. Although perceptual factors may well play an important role in the development of Black children's attitudes towards themselves and other groups, alternative theoretical positions to the one described here may be required to delineate their development.

Since the most severe societal problems have been associated with White racism, however, it is interesting to note that the perceptual concomitants of White children's racial attitudes, although varied and complex, do tend to follow a somewhat predictable
course, which can be summarized as follows. Preschool children make distinctions on the basis of racial cues, although these may not be quite as salient as earlier work has implied when appropriate controls are included. An acquired equivalence of cues phenomenon that permits children to more readily distinguish faces of their own race than those of another race appears to be operative by four years of age. This relative discriminative difficulty may well be reflecting the fact that once individuals come to be categorized into a group, it is their defining characteristic (in this case color) that becomes the most salient feature, whereas other cues are attended to less. Perception of facial cues can be very much influenced by the labeling process, as was indicated by the way white children responded to faces linguistically categorized by either color or expression. Moreover, attitudes of white grade school children are related to their perceptions of people. Black and white faces alike in all respects but color were viewed as exceedingly different from one another by high-prejudice youngsters. Other individual differences between black faces was seen by high-prejudice children as a much less salient basis for differentiating two black faces than two white faces. Thus, contrary to the notion that children are "color-blind", these results suggest that for white children with negative racial attitudes, color, in fact, blinds.

It would appear that perceptual mechanisms may well play an important role in the development and maintenance of prejudice. Experimental manipulations of these patterns can apparently reduce negative attitudes both on a short-term (Katz, 1973) and long-term (Katz & Zalk, 1978) basis. Thus, such patterns are not irrevocable in children. As long as adult society magnifies the differences between racial groups and deindividuates members of minority groups, however, it is laying a firm perceptual basis for the maintenance of prejudice.

F. Socialization and Salience of Racial Attitudes

There are two additional issues that merit consideration regarding the development of racial attitudes. The first has to do with who transmits information about race to the child. The second has to do with the relative salience of racial as opposed to other person cues.
With regard to the first issue, commonsense notions strongly suggest that parents are the primary socializers, but research has not substantiated this supposition (Radke-Yarrow, Trager & Miller, 1952; Bird, M ofach & Burdick, 1952; Frenkel-Brunswik & Havel, 1953; Byrne, 1965; Pushkin, 1967). As was the case with gender stereotypes, an increasing body of work is pointing to the importance of television (Greenberg, 1972; Barry & Sheikh, 1977; Zuckerman, Singer & Singer, 1980) and books (Zimet, 1976; Wirtenberg, 1978) as important sources of information. Even though things have changed over the past decade, a recent report of the Commission on Civil Rights (1979) suggests that race and sex stereotyping on television continues. The President's Commission on Mental Health suggests that inadequate representation of minority groups assists in the stereotyping process. Finally, the role of peers is probably significant as well, and recent work with biracial learning teams (Slavin & Madden, 1979; Devries, et al., 1978) suggests the potency of peer behavior.

In reviewing some of the earlier work on preschool racial awareness, it sometimes appears that young children are quite bigoted. Recently, however, a number of investigators have begun to question whether race is really that salient, or whether our assessment techniques (i.e., forced-choice questions) may have exaggerated their importance to children. Data to date seems to suggest that they may not be as salient as previously thought. In open-ended interviews race does not seem to be spontaneously mentioned very often by children (Lerner & Buehrig, 1975; Semaj, 1981). In the only study conducted with two-and-a-half year olds (Boswell, cited in Williams & Morland, 1976) children chose black and white toys with equal frequency and did not associate positive adjectives with white toys unless a forced-choice was given. Generally speaking, racial cues appear to be less important to children than gender (Katz & Zalk, 1974; Van Parys, 1981), cleanliness (Epstein, Krupat & Obudho, 1976), physical attractiveness (Langlois & Stephan, 1977), or age (Van Parys, 1981).

ATTITUDE ACQUISITION: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS

This chapter has attempted to review some of the more prominent theoretical positions that have been offered to account for how children acquire negative intergroup attitudes.
The literature suggests a number of important trends. To summarize, relatively young children exhibit awareness of racial cues, although the salience of earlier obtained evaluations and racial preferences may have been attributable to both the particular measurement technique employed and other methodological problems. The most obvious determinant of prejudice would seem to be parental attitudes, although the evidence regarding the importance of direct instruction is not overpowering. Reinforcement may play a role, particularly with regard to learning the cultural and linguistic connotations of color cues, which generalize in turn to skin color. Personality variables and child-rearing techniques have received considerable theoretical and empirical attention as sources of racial prejudice, but the empirical findings are inconclusive and are fraught with methodological ambiguity. Moreover, facts such as these typically lie beyond the province of social science modification, and thus, such theories generate little change research. Investigations pertinent to the cognitive and perceptual components of children's prejudice are more recent but appear more promising in terms of the consistency of positive findings and their potential applicability to attitude change.

Clearly, the child is not split up neatly into the learning, personality, cognitive, and perceptual components our organization might imply; all of these areas are interrelated. Nevertheless, focus on some of these components may well have more pay-off than others. It is the contention of the present author that some of the directions taken in earlier research may well have led us into conceptual deadends. If most preschool children show pro-white bias, for example, it makes little sense to consider such bias the outgrowth of maladaptive personality structures. If the perceptual and cognitive roots of prejudice are present in all young children, the statistically abnormal individual may well be the one whose negative attitudes are stifled. Considerably more theoretical and empirical attention to the normal developmental context in which attitude acquisition takes place appears to be needed. It is the view of the present writer that particular emphasis be given to the perceptual, cognitive, and reinforcement parameters underlying the early development of attitudes and the interrelationships...
that exist among these factors.

Almost all theorists in this area have used terms such as "complex", "multifaceted", and "multiply determined" to describe the ontogenesis of racial attitudes, but they have usually not applied these concepts in their own research efforts. We will, however, not develop a comprehensive understanding of how children acquire racial attitudes until more than lip service is paid to the multiplicity of concomitants. The last section of the chapter will attempt to theoretically integrate some of the diverse findings summarized above within a developmental context.

A. Parallels between the Acquisition of Racial and Other Attitudes

It seems parsimonious to begin this discussion with the assumption that a child's percepts and concepts about people follow the same rules as their perceptions and cognitions about other kinds of stimuli. The rules governing the effects of reinforcement should not differ whether the content of the learning concerns proper table manners or who might be welcomed as a friend. Interestingly, however, psychologists have preferred to study the processes of concept formation, perception, and learning in children by observing their reactions to relatively neutral stimuli. Those interested in racial attitudes, on the other hand, have often investigated attitudes as if they existed apart from other ongoing processes in the child. Attitudes about others neither exist nor develop in a vacuum.

The most obvious parallel to racial attitude acquisition in young children is the constellation of responses involved in sex-role learning. There are both important similarities as well as differences between the two that will be considered below. One similarity is the age at which such learning is exhibited. There is evidence that by the age of three, children have the rudiments of both race and gender awareness. This suggests that in both cases important events must have occurred prior to three years of age. Because of the relative absence of data on children younger than three with regard to racial awareness development, the following account is necessarily speculative, although it will draw upon evidence pertinent to acquisition of neutral concepts where relevant.
Evidence of person variability is available to the child as soon as he/she can use his/her senses. While it would not be expected that very young children would cognitively organize such variability, differential responding by infants and toddlers to gender cues has been demonstrated (e.g., Lewis, 1972; Lewis & Brooks, 1975; Jacklin & Maccoby, 1978). The process by which this occurs is not entirely clear. A number of gender cues, however, are probably used at varying points in the first two years. Voice pitch is undoubtedly a significant one. It has been found, for example, that young infants condition more quickly to high-pitched than low-pitched voices (Wolff, 1963; Blehar, 1980). This suggests not only a perceptual skill, but perhaps also an innate adaptive mechanism that enables the infant to readily seek out those persons (typically female) who are the sources of primary reinforcement. It would be of interest to see whether infants whose primary caretaker is male (admittedly rare) may come to exhibit a preference for low-pitched voices.

Other distinctions which are probably salient relatively early in life include olfactory, tactile, and visual cues. In the olfactory area women's cosmetics are perfumed. There are also systematic differences in handling of infants by male and female adults. Although considerable within-gender variability exists in the manner that infants are picked up and held, men often exhibit more initial awkwardness and discomfort. Visual cues are apparent in a number of ways. Height differences between male and female adults may be observable to the infant at various phases of development, perhaps beginning when the child becomes locomotory. Before this time, adults bend towards infants in cribs and so systematic height differences might not be easily visible to the child. It is possible, however, that even during these early months an infant might notice different vantage points as a result of being picked up by a male or female, i.e., they are typically held higher by a male. Systematic differences in dress and/or hair style may also be apparent. At a proximal level skin contact with a male or female is also a differential experience. One does not usually feel stubble on mommy's face. Thus, in all sense modalities gender cues are potentially discriminative, although this salience may not be pronounced during the first year. Perhaps the most significant
gender cue, however, has to do with differential availability: mommy (or a female substitute) is there; daddy is usually not.

Parents are delighted to discover that their child's first words usually include "mommy" and/or "daddy". The child's correct use of these nouns, together with their incorrect generalization to other adults shows that children clearly have rudimentary gender concepts by the time they can speak. While the use of the word "daddy" to a strange male adult might be embarrassing to a parent, the fact that it is almost never used in conjunction with a strange female adult suggests that although the child's concepts are rudimentary, they are already accurate by about 18 months of age.

A point to keep in mind at this juncture is that concepts are defined by both positive and negative instances, both by logical necessity and pedagogical practice with young children. It is difficult to imagine a parent explaining the concept "dog" to a young child without some mention of a cat. Indeed, it may be for this reason that opposites are the most frequent and most rapid responses elicited by a word association task. Juxtaposition of what is and what is not a member of a particular category is included in the definition process itself. When the concept in question refers to groups of persons, the juxtaposition of positive and negative instances may embody the seeds of future conflict at a later stage of development. This is particularly true when concepts are dichotomous rather than continuous in nature, like male-female or black-white.

There are certain concepts about people that all young children must learn during the course of development. The distinction between self and other may well be the earliest. Many global theories of child development (e.g., Freud and Piaget) have stressed the importance of this distinction. The child's concepts about himself/herself, however, become more finely differentiated as he/she develops and learns about others. Concepts about others may be based upon a variety of cues, but early ones will invariably include those based upon gender, age, kinship, and race. Of these, gender may well be the earliest.
As noted above, information about gender is continually given to the child from birth, both directly and indirectly. Another important person concept is age, particularly the distinction between children and adults. Although initially based upon size perceptions, this concept may later become elaborated on the basis of differential behavior prerogatives. Concepts about racial groups probably enter a somewhat later stage, and their introduction may well be more variable, particularly for nonminority youngsters. Categorization on the basis of religion and nationality are also variable and would be expected to occur at an even later age because they are not easily associated with highly visible types of cues. A major similarity between racial and gender awareness development is that much of the basic perceptual and cognitive processes are completed for both by the time the child is ready to enter school. Children realize that both of these dimensions are significant within our society for person classification. Moreover, they can readily utilize these cues to accurately classify themselves, other children, and adults.

In addition to the similarities, there are important distinctions between how the concepts about racial cues and other-person characteristics are learned. One important difference has to do with the differential availability of models. Unless the child's family lives in an integrated neighborhood, a child may not have any exposure to a racially different person until he or she enters school except on television. Thus, race concepts will inevitably enter the child's repertoire, but the timing of this will probably depend more upon chance experiential factors than upon direct and continual parental instruction.

Not only are racial concepts different with regard to timing and variability, they differ in two additional respects as well. The first has to do with the person who provides the negative instances of the concept and his or her relation to the child.
As the child learns that he is male or she is female, there is usually an opposite-sexed adult present who provides a continual and complex example of the "other". Similarly with the child-adult concept, a parent or caretaker is present to show how big people look and behave. It becomes difficult for the child to oversimplify the "other" too much because of this continual interaction. This is not the case with racial concepts, however. In this latter instance unless the child grows up in an interracial family, information about race generally comes exclusively from a person who is a member of the same group, and models of the "other" may not be readily available enough to dispel misconceptions. This suggests that the age for integration may have to be much earlier than the school years to have any substantial impact.

A second important difference between the acquisition of race concepts and other person concepts is that evaluative components may be more intrinsically involved in early learning with regard to race. Although most theorists suggest that racial awareness precedes evaluation by several years, evidence pertinent to preschool children does not support this. Few children who are aware of racial cues exhibit such awareness with neutrality. It may take a child quite a few years after he/she knows he/she is a child to be certain that grown-up status is more valuable. Similarly, it may take a male child quite a while after he correctly labels himself a boy to have negative evaluations of girls. The fact that so few White children express the desire to be anything but white is indicative that differential status evaluations must get communicated to children quite early in life.

B. Attitude Acquisition: A Developmental Sequence

Based upon the investigations and theoretical considerations reviewed in this chapter, the acquisition of racial attitudes in children appears to be a complex and multifaceted process. Goodman (1964) has suggested a three-stage theory of attitude development consisting of ethnic awareness (ages 3-4), ethnic orientation (4-7), and then attitudes. The present investigator is of the belief that this is an oversimplified view. There appear to be at least eight overlapping but separable steps in the developmental sequence of racial attitude acquisition, which span approximately ten years of the
child's life. These include the following: (1) early observation of racial cues, (2) formation of rudimentary concepts, (3) conceptual differentiation, (4) recognition of the irrevocability of cues, (5) consolidation of group concepts, (6) perceptual elaboration, (7) cognitive elaboration, and (8) attitude crystallization. These steps are described in more detail below.

1. **Early observation of racial cues.**

As noted earlier, a child's observation of cues associated with another race may be based upon chance environmental events. The specific effects of such observations, however, would be related to the developmental level of the child. Thus, in the first year of life, the presence of such cues may not be particularly salient, whereas later he or she is maturationally capable of processing such cues and demonstrating that difference or novelty is being observed. Without opportunity for such stimulus input, however, the start of this process will be delayed. Little is known about the specific developmental timetable involved here other than that it generally occurs prior to the age of three.

2. **Formation of rudimentary concepts.**

Once the child verbally expresses a differential response to an individual from another group, the chances are good that a label will be supplied by either surrounding adults or siblings. Evaluative components may also be communicated at this time. This may be accomplished either directly - e.g., "And I don't want you to play with him" - or indirectly, through generalization from either: (a) fear of the strange (Allport, 1954), (b) fear of the dark (Williams & Morland, 1976), or (c) already learned connotations to colors such as black and white (Williams, 1964; Stabler, et al., 1969). This stage seems to occur in many but not all children prior to three years of age, and it is generally complete by age four.

3. **Conceptual differentiation.**

Once a group label is provided, the child will encounter additional opportunities to observe positive and negative examples of the concept and receive feedback for his or her responses. Both group boundaries and defining characteristics are probably taught by the utilization of verbal feedback. Is this person a member of
Group X2  Adult responses may be primarily informational (e.g., "Yes, he is Black even though his skin is light, because he has broad lips and very curly hair"), or may contain evaluative components as well (e.g., "Yes, he is Black, and I would rather that you not be too friendly with him"). In terms of concept acquisition, such evaluative responses may actually facilitate learning by providing redundancy of cues.

4. Recognition of the irrevocability of cues.

Kohlberg (1966) has noted that certain person-cues the child must learn about are subject to change over time, while others are not. Thus, they come to the realization that in spite of present size differentials, he or she will become both an older child and an adult. There is growing recognition that one’s status as a child is a temporary one. In contrast, applying this same reasoning to gender differences leads to an erroneous conclusion, since the child must learn that gender is (generally speaking) immutable. This is called “gender constancy” and is usually developed by five or six years of age (Slaby & Frey, 1975). Clinical psychologists have repeatedly discussed the difficulties that young children prior to this age have in believing this. Little girls often believe that they will become boys, and little boys often believe that they will bear children. Early cognitions about racial characteristics may provide similar difficulties for the child. He or she must learn that racial cues, unlike size, do not change with age. This may well be a very complex concept for a young child, particularly because summer vacations and suntans provide continual evidence to the contrary. Since little evidence is available with regard to this factor, the age at which it typically occurs cannot be stated, although Semaj (1980) has obtained "racial constancy" in seven- and eight-year old Black children.

5. Consolidation of group concepts.

It is not until the child can correctly label and identify both positive and negative instances and can recognize the immutable nature of group membership that an accurate concept of a group can be said to exist. When consolidation occurs, the perceptual and the cognitive components of attitudes are functionally interrelated. Where evaluative content was introduced earlier, this too becomes part of the concept.
On the basis of the evidence, the consolidation process typically begins during the latter part of the preschool period—i.e., by about five years of age and may extend over a considerable period of time.

6. Perceptual elaboration.

Once the concepts of "us" and "them" are accurately established in terms of racial cues, subsequent perception of racial cues may be modified. Differences among groups may be accentuated, particularly for children exposed to heavy doses of evaluation, whereas intragroup differences, particularly of other-race people, become diminished. There is some evidence that this occurs in preschool children (Katz, 1973) and that it shows further development throughout the grade school age range (Katz, Johnson & Parker, 1970; Katz, Sohn & Zalk, 1975). Additional evidence (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel, et al., 1971; Billig, 1974) with British grade school children suggests that affective processes inherently favor members of one's in-group, even when this group is defined quite arbitrarily and transiently. The mechanisms underlying this perceptual elaboration facilitate the learning of other differential responses to out-group individuals.


There has been a great deal of vacillation in the literature as to whether a child's early responses to racial cues can properly be called "attitudes." Some investigators have argued that they are, insofar as evaluative components are included. It is the view of the present author that the term "concept attitude" is a more appropriate designation of a young child's responses and that the term "attitude" be reserved for the more complex responses exhibited by older children and adults. The relationship between early concept attitudes and later attitudes is not well understood beyond the rather obvious point that the former may provide a foundation for the latter. The process by which concept attitudes or preferences become racial attitudes is what is meant by cognitive elaboration.

It is clear that a child's school experiences may be extremely important in the elaboration of racial attitudes. The particular experiences (or the lack of them) the child has with other-race children and adults, the attitudes expressed by his teachers...
and peers ... these will all be significant in determining future attitudes and feelings. Continuing research focus on the preschool years may well have obscured the importance of the early grade school years as focal points in attitude transition. Moreover, evidence suggests that attitudes continue to develop and differentiate during the middle childhood years.

8. **Attitude crystallization.**

This phase is comparable to the last stage postulated by Proshansky (1966) and probably occurs during the later grade school years. A study of the development of racial stereotypes (Brigham, 1971) shows an increase in within-group agreement with age after the fourth grade. The effects of cultural conditioning are apparent at this level. It is as if the child has, in effect, come to terms with his attitudes. Consequently, the child probably will not "rethink" them again unless placed in a situation that requires it - i.e., the child's social environment changes markedly. It is necessary to postulate such a stage because of the seeming intransigence of adult attitudes. Though diversity may be beautiful, the child's mind does not remain open indefinitely.
FOOTNOTES

1. Preparation of this chapter was assisted by NICHD Contract No. 1-HD-92820, P. Katz, Principal Investigator.

2. The author would like to express particular gratitude to Carol Hathaway-Clark for her research assistance and to Susie Gulbrandsen for her secretarial and editorial assistance.


Banks, W. C.; McQuater, G. V. & Ross, J. A. On the importance of White preference and the comparative difference of Blacks and others: Reply to Williams and Morland. Psychological Bulletin, 1979, 86, 33-36.


Brigham, J. C. & Weissbach, T. A. The development of racial attitudes. In J. C. Brigham & T. A. Weissbach (Eds.) Racial attitudes in America: Analysis and


Spencer, M. B. & Horowitz, F. D. Effects of systematic social and token reinforcement on the modification of racial and color concept attitudes in black and white preschool children. Developmental Psychology, 1973, 9, 246-254.


