A study examined whether the Career Intern Program (CIP) can be replicated in new sites at reasonable cost within a reasonable period of time. (The CIP is an alternative high school designed to enable disadvantaged and alienated dropouts or potential dropouts to earn regular high school diplomas, to prepare them for meaningful employment or postsecondary education, and to facilitate their transition from school to work by providing instruction, counseling, hands-on career exposure, diagnosis/assessment, and climate.) To determine the replicability of CIP, three new sites were compared to the original site in Philadelphia. The comparison focused on whether the program, as implemented in the new sites, remains the same as the prototype program in terms of goals and practices; whether any changes instituted at new sites are improvements; whether the new implementation system is more effective than the usual developer-public school linkages; and whether the overall dissemination/implementation process is efficient. After completing their investigation, evaluators concluded that implementation in the new sites demonstrates the replicability of the program. Recommendations were made concerning community involvement and funding guidelines. (Related reports evaluating other aspects of CIP are available separately through ERIC—see note.) (NN)
STUDY OF THE CAREER INTERN PROGRAM

Final Report
Task A: Implementation

Peter G. Treadway
Nelly-P. Stromquist
David M. Fetterman
Classie M. Foat
G. Kasten Tallmadge

May 1981

Prepared for the
National Institute of Education

RMC Research Corporation
Mountain View, California
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to Contract No. 400-78-0021 with the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Education. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Institute position or policy, and no official endorsement by the sponsor should be inferred.
CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................... v
PREFACE ................................................................. vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................. xi

I. Introduction ........................................................... 1
II. What Happened in the Demonstration .............................. 5
III. Evaluation Questions and Findings ............................... 43
IV. Factors that Affected CIP Implementation .................... 57
V. Discussion of CIP Implementation ................................ 103
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations .............................. 117

REFERENCES ............................................................. 125
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Staff Terminations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Comparison of Regular School Term Attendance Rates With Summer Months Attendance</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Intern Retention at the Four Replication Sites and Overall</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Reasons Interns Gave For Their Terminations</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Site Enrollment by Cohort and Pre-CIP Status</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Youth Statistics Across Various Points in the Enrollment Process by Site and Cohort</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>CIP Enrollment as Proportion of Youth Passing the Pretest</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>OIC/A Technical Assistance by Program Area and Frequency</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Decisions Necessary to Start CIPs</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work conducted for Task A of the Study of the Career Intern Program could not have been concluded without the active cooperation and assistance of many individuals. The authors would like to express gratitude to:

the staff members and interns of the four CIPs, who graciously allowed us to observe their work even when they were burdened by the much more important demands of making the program operate;

the replication staff of OIC/A, who shared with us not only the formal documentation of implementation but also their many insights about how the CIPs were evolving;

the many local officials in the replication sites, who took time from their pressing other duties to give us their perspectives;

the members of our Advisory Panel, whose critiques of our research plans and reports were of great value as we proceeded with the study;

the federal program officers at NIE and DOL, who both facilitated our work logistically and gave us necessary glimpses into the intricate workings of federal sponsorship of innovative social programs; and

our intrepid secretary, Terri Jaber, who fashioned this report from our various scrawls and maintained our morale from day to day.

While our debts to all these people are great, the responsibility for this report rests with us.
PREFACE

This report presents RMC's findings and conclusions about the implementation of an ambitious youth program, the Career Intern Program (CIP). Analyzing CIP implementation has been but one facet of a comprehensive evaluation of the demonstration of the program in four local sites. The total evaluation comprises three other tasks as well: an assessment of enrollee outcomes, an analysis of relationships between CIP operations and youth outcomes, and a comparison of the CIP with other programs designed to attack the high unemployment and unemployability of economically disadvantaged young people. Descriptions and findings of these other tasks are presented in other reports. An overall evaluation summary also combines the major findings of all tasks and discusses their interrelationships. The reader is therefore cautioned that a complete picture of the CIP demonstration cannot be realized from this report alone; the entire set of final reports must be taken together for that complete view.

Two questions need to be answered to clarify the context of this report. First, why study implementation? Since the "proof of the pudding" is to be found in the results of the CIPs in the new sites, why not just look at outcomes in some scientifically respectable manner and report how well the young people involved do on salient measures? Second (assuming a satisfactory answer to the first question), since the researchers' approach and selection of foci influence the findings and conclusions, what is the frame of reference from which the research has been carried out, and through what methods? The answers to these questions will aid the reader in determining the worth of the assessment.

Why study implementation?

Assessing the implementation of a program such as the CIP is an intricate, sensitive, and expensive process. Six twoperson visits to each of four sites for a week or more each time, plus innumerable telephone calls and three years of expensive researchers' time, have been devoted to studying the CIPs' implementation. A focus on participants' outcomes alone would have greatly reduced the taxpayers' cost for evaluation. What justification is there for expending these dear resources?

One reason to study implementation is to verify that the program being evaluated is in fact there. Provus (1971) was among the earlier writers to point out that evaluations based exclusively on outcome assessment had no empirical basis for concluding that outcomes devolved from projects, for no description of the projects existed. Provus' call to document that a program exists before concluding it did or did not lead to certain results has been reiterated frequently in the years since, for instance by Charters and Jones in 1973. But only recently has the advice clearly begun to
affect social-program assessment practices. Recent trends in federally sponsored program-evaluation planning, epitomized by Wholey's (1979) prescription for "evaluability assessment," suggest that the idea of verifying that the program is in fact operating has finally taken firm root.

Documenting program operation could, of course, be done just prior to and during the course of conducting an outcome evaluation. It could even trigger a summative evaluation. So why bother to study the whole implementation process? The answer is that information derived from studying implementation can be used to give program operators and sponsors critical management data and to improve implementation. While RMC's study was not designed to be formative, information from RMC was occasionally used formatively.

There are dangers in researchers getting involved in even an indirect way in program administration. A sure way to lose the confidence of program staff members is to be perceived as the "spies" of the sponsors or of the higher levels of the operating agency. If the implementors' confidence is lost, so is the possibility of getting more than a superficial and staged view of program operations. Another possibility is that the researchers will "take sides," or come to be seen as doing so. If the researchers are perceived as having been coopted or as taking an advocacy role for one group, they will be neither listened nor talked to by the other groups. As Pressman (1975) notes, "locals" (those who implement programs), and "donors" (those who sponsor, monitor, and evaluate programs) often have stereotyped images of one another that cause major antagonisms to develop. For researchers to become identified with one group is to limit their relationship with the other.

Regardless of these and other dangers inherent in using implementation research for formative-evaluation purposes, we feel it is impossible to prevent the use of data about implementation in operational decision making. At the least, implementors are going to know that sometime, somehow the research data will be given to sponsors. It also would be very naive to think sponsors will not use data from any source to make decisions. So the researcher may as well admit to the fact and deal with it openly. Operators also are usually very eager (i.e., anxious) to know what researchers' opinions, findings, "facts," and conclusions are so as to prepare for their impact or to adjust their program, or both. Since it is inevitable their data will be revealed eventually, we feel researchers should share them with appropriate cautions about tentativeness, limited perspective, and so on; as the research proceeds. If that doesn't solve all problems, at least it uncocks anxiety-provoking mystery and lets everyone know the researcher is not taking sides. It also leads, we have found, to greater clarity of data, as all actors have the opportunity to react to the researchers' interpretations.

A third reason to study implementation is to contribute to the improvement of future implementation practices in general. There is
a variety of theory about the dynamics of program and policy implement-
ment. Descriptions of actual cases are good for testing these theories. If one theory is supported by real events while others are not, then analytic and predictive power accrue to that theory. The experience of one program implementor, if known to others, can alert them to many salient issues, and provide examples of ways to or not to deal with situations. This is not to say that one person's methods for gaining, say, parent support will work for all others. Contextual factors are too strong to allow such a simple relationship. But, in general, we stand on the shoulders of those who went before, as Descartes and Einstein both said, and knowing their experiences can help us to advance, or at least not to repeat their mistakes.

Our study of CIP implementation is justified therefore because it can verify that the program is actually operating (or not), because information about implementation can be useful in making program decisions (and will be used no matter how we try to avoid it), and because future program implementation practices can be improved by it. If one accepts this rationale, the next point of interest is the perspective from which our study of implementation proceeds. Only if our frame of reference and our choices of foci are understood will our material be useful to readers.

Researchers' perspective

There are three salient aspects of the frame of reference from which RMC has approached assessing the implementation of the four CIP projects. First, we believe the purpose of implementation is to get the program "up and running" in the most efficient manner possible. This is a logically based conception. It simply does not make sense for one to try to install a program at all in any manner other than that which will make it fully operational in the shortest possible time with the least amount of difficulty at the lowest cost. This bias toward efficient, effective implementation pushes us as researchers to judge positively those events, processes, and tactics that enhance implementation. While our bias is, we believe, shared widely, it should be noted that it has the potential for making us inadequately sensitive to the benefits of some events that appear in the short run to block or slow down the realization of full implementation. Recognizing this, we try in our efforts not to come to hasty conclusions nor to neglect any data sources or implementors' points of view.

Second, on the basis of our own experience and the findings of others in the field, we accept and strongly support the notion that local contextual conditions affect program implementation critically. Following from this position, we believe it is in the best interests of effecting full program operation to expect implementors of model programs to tailor or adapt specific program structures or procedures in a new implementation site, in order to make them function as intended in their new context. Organizational
arrangements and implementation practices that succeed in an original site will not necessarily (or even probably) succeed in an adopting site. As contexts differ, so must forms and practices.

This is not to say that we disagree with the concept of program or model replication. Indeed we feel it is important for new sites to replicate the functions of the original program. We believe the functions performed by the original program are responsible for the original success, and that instituting these functions in new sites will lead to success there. However, we do not equate function with specific structures or processes. Structures and processes evolve in a place because they serve to accomplish a particular purpose—such as establishing and maintaining productive relationships with other community agencies—and they are therefore idiosyncratic at least somewhat to the time and place in which they are operating. Structures and processes to accomplish the same function in a different time and place will be best configured so as to fit the situation. The purpose—to implement a function—remains the same, but the specific way to do it changes according to the constraints and opportunities of the context.

This orientation to contextually based modi operandi leads us to reject the notion that research should focus on "fidelity," that is, the extent to which program adopters replicate specific ways of doing things. Rather, we look for evidence that program functions have been appropriately established, in any way that works in the new site. To accomplish this, we analyze the original practices and structures in terms of their functions so we can assess the degree to which the functions have been implemented by new program users.

Finally, we are aware, acutely, of our own limitations. As researchers we enter the lists with a mandate far greater than we can possibly fulfill. "Go out there," we are told, "and find the truth." Yet there is a multitude of truths. Each actor in the implementation process sees events in a particular way, shaped by personal and organizational perspectives and agendas. It is therefore likely, if not inevitable, that what we present is only partially "the truth." We try to be objective, we solicit everyone's perceptions, we employ a variety of methods, we come from various disciplines, and we try to stay alert to our own and others' biases. Still, what we describe, and how, and what we conclude are limited by our approach, our access to data, and our resources, not to mention by the willingness of our respondents to respond. Therefore, we acknowledge that what follows in this report is our best estimation of the truth. Nevertheless, we feel it is a useful one, and, as objective a portrayal and analysis as the conditions of the endeavor and the state of our craft permit.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Large numbers of youth dropping out of school and high rates of youth unemployment, especially severe among poor and minority youth, have prompted policy makers to support the development of programs designed to enable young people to graduate from secondary school and increase their career awareness and career-planning skills. Ultimately, this policy aims to increase the employability of young people and thereby improve their prospects for productive and satisfying lives.

One program created in response to this policy is the Career Intern Program (CIP). Conceived, developed, and tested in the early and middle 1970s by Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America (OIC/A), the CIP is an alternative high school program for dropouts and students at high risk of dropping out. In its developmental site, Philadelphia, the CIP provided disadvantaged youth with motivating academic instruction to enable them to complete high school and with career-orientation activities to ease their transition from school to work or further education.

Evaluation of the CIP in Philadelphia found it had a significant positive impact on young people's academic achievement and post-secondary experience. Therefore, in December 1977, four local affiliates of OIC/A began replicating the CIP under the Department of Labor's (DOL) authority through the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA, P.L. 95-98). The National Institute of Education (NIE) managed the demonstration under an Interagency Agreement (DOL 99-8-795-07-2) with DOL.

The purposes of the demonstration were to see if the CIP was replicable in new sites at reasonable cost within a reasonable period of time, and to determine whether the same success achieved in Philadelphia could be realized in the new sites. RMC Research Corporation (RMC) was retained by NIE to study the sites' implementations and determine answers to these questions.

This report presents RMC's findings relative to the first of four tasks involved in the evaluation. This task, Task A, was intended to answer the basic question, "Can the CIP be replicated in new sites at reasonable cost within a reasonable period of time?" Though no explicit stipulations were made by the federal agencies (DOL and NIE) or by the developer/disseminator (OIC/A) involved in the demonstration, the limits of "reasonable" cost and time are at least implicit in the amounts of money and time granted for the demonstration. OIC/A and the four local OICs were granted $5,684,000 over a 33-month period to conduct the program.

To focus the Task A effort, NIE asked that four aspects of the demonstration be specifically investigated. Three of these were presented as subquestions of Task A: Does the program, as implemented in the four new sites, remain the same as the prototype
program in terms of goals and practices? Are changes instituted in the new sites, if any, improvements in the program?, and Is the process of implementation through the OIC system more effective than through the "usual developer-public school linkages"? The fourth issue to be addressed in Task A was the efficacy of the overall dissemination/implementation process.

Information relevant to Task A was collected primarily through a series of visits to each site. Analysis of this information led RMC to conclude that the attempts to replicate the CIP did effect full implementation in three sites. That is, in three of the four sites, we observed that instruction was individualized for each intern, appropriate counseling was being provided, inter were attending suitable work-exposure placements, a positive, supportive program climate was present, and other program functions were being accomplished. The criteria by which these judgments were made were developed from the intended CIP functions described—or implicit—in the program description supplied by the CIP's developers, OIC/A.

Of course, this is not to say that implementation always proceeded easily. There were serious problems, eventually overcome, in getting the CIP started in three sites, due to school-district and teacher-union hesitancy about the program. Adequate staffs were difficult to attract and hold with the time and salaries available, especially at the site-leadership level. Employers were not as willing as had been expected to have youth observers in their work sites. Internal communications and coordination sometimes broke down. There were at any given time, areas in which each CIP could improve. Staffing was weak in some areas; curricula needed to be expanded and modified; ties with business, industry, and the community required further development; program climate needed to mature; and counseling programs needed further refinement. However, OIC/A and the sites addressed these problems with vigor and imagination as implementation proceeded, leading to the overall conclusion that the CIP was implemented.

Of course, the CIPs have not uniformly operated as duplicates of the prototype. The sites differ from the original in demographic characteristics, in established community institutions, in resources, and in many other ways. Such differences require a new program to adapt in order to fit in. Thus, changes have been made in some CIP practices to accommodate local situations. However, the new sites retained their commitment to the program goals and practices. Furthermore, there have been concrete examples of young lives redirected toward higher achievement, greater social responsibility, and enhanced personal satisfaction. The CIP's replicability, in terms of its fundamental functions, has been solidly demonstrated in three sites.

For the most part, specific changes in practices introduced to facilitate processes—for instance, revisions in record-keeping procedures—have generally been adaptive and consonant with program
goals. Some changes in practices forced by events in the implementation process or by locally imposed constraints were less adaptive, but resulting problems were addressed and resolved constructively. Overall, changes that were made contributed to the success of the implementation effort. They have neither constituted departures from CIP goals nor led to continuing failures to accomplish CIP functions. As adaptive responses to constraints in the new sites, the changes may be regarded as improvements. Without them further progress in implementation would have been virtually precluded. Assessment of whether such changes have led to the same or even more desirable outcomes than were realized in Philadelphia must wait on collection of additional outcome data and analysis of specific process-to-outcome relationships.

The successful implementation of the CIP in three new sites indicates the OIC system is a viable diffusion mechanism. This is hardly surprising given the effectiveness the OIC system has demonstrated in its training and development programs over the past two decades. Whether this OIC-based process of implementation has been more effective than would have been accomplished through the "usual developer-public school linkages" cannot be empirically demonstrated at this point, since no attempt to disseminate the CIP through these "usual" channels occurred. While the OIC system was not very experienced in dealing with school districts prior to the CIP demonstration, this has changed. Moreover, there are several characteristics of the OIC system that suggest it has certain advantages over the usual linkages. For one, the pervasive OIC ethos and commitment to self-help give OIC personnel a common motivation to work toward shared goals. Second, the OIC system is more accustomed to working collaboratively than the traditional educational diffusion structure. Third, the OIC system "owns" the CIP; that is, as the program's developer, OIC feels a great commitment to see it succeed. Fourth, the OIC system is perceived by the target population as an ally, as an organization of, by, and for the people it seeks to serve. This is less true of the "usual" educational system: Thus, the OIC system should enjoy greater access to potential CIP participants. Fifth, the OIC system has strong linkages with employers that have been used to good advantage in the demonstration. These factors imply an advantage for the OIC system for implementing a program like the CIP. This theoretical advantage for the OIC system and OIC's success in the implementation have led RMC to the conclusion that the OIC system probably is more effective for disseminating the CIP than the "usual" channels would be. It is virtually certain that the OIC system is no less effective.

In addition to addressing the specific questions posed by Task A, RMC has also analyzed the overall dissemination/implementation process of the CIP. The CIP demonstration has corroborated the findings and conclusions of earlier studies of implementation. Insufficient time for planning, preparation, and training, and lack of coordination with the schedules of community institutions had negative effects on implementation. Complex management and communications arrangements and ambiguously defined implementation
roles confused and delayed operations. The specific skills and knowledge required to disseminate alternative educational programs are different from those needed to develop them. The application of obtrusive evaluation designs to developing programs impeded implementation and reduced the interest of potential participants. Differential perceptions of expectations resulted in tensions among implementors.

Clearer, shared understanding of the dissemination/implementation process among all actors in the CIP demonstration would probably have prevented or reduced some of the problems encountered. The legislatively imposed deadline for reporting the results of YEDPA demonstration projects to Congress put a severe burden on implementation. To meet the schedule, much initial planning and coordinating with local school districts had to be radically abbreviated. The impact of this initial condition was felt for long afterward. Nevertheless, because of the unflagging efforts of OIC/A, the local OICs, and the CIP staffs, the CIPs in three sites did become viable.

The professional judgment of the evaluation team, at the end of our Task A studies, is that implementation in the new sites demonstrated the replicability of the program. Many problems that beset the implementation process, though they slowed the achievement of full operational status, need not recur in future federally sponsored programs of this sort if sufficient time is allowed for start-up planning and if the experiences of this and other, similar programs are taken into account. Other problems could not have been avoided and will continue to affect demonstration and dissemination efforts because they will arise from the milieu in which programs will undoubtedly be attempted. Adaptation of programs continues to be necessary on an ad hoc basis, but usually can be accomplished without serious repercussions to program goals or functions. Finally, continuity of appropriate program leadership is necessary both to complete implementation and to maintain program quality over time.

Even granting that some ad hoc fiddling and muddling through will be necessary in future attempts to introduce exemplary programs to new sites, the findings of this study have led to some recommendations for policies about demonstration efforts.

First, and most fundamentally, policy makers and program planners should be aware of and sensitive to the exigencies and dynamics of program implementation in the "real world" when they formulate solutions to social problems. Translating an innovative approach to societal needs into a working program is not a linear engineering task, even with a moderately specific program model to guide the effort. A simple technological orientation to implementation leads to unrealistic expectations and virtually guarantees that major problems will arise. A more complex, broadly focused frame of reference is needed at the policy-making and program-planning levels to foresee and account for the complexities and
discontinuities of program implementation. Otherwise, the familiar cycle of grand promises followed by non-existent, partial, or temporary realization of goals will result. Only to the extent to which they take into account the complex, dynamic nature of implementation will policy objectives and program concepts be efficiently and fully achieved. This general recommendation subsumes a number of specific issues. Sufficient lead time must be granted for analyzing the program's fit into proposed new contexts and for negotiating and coordinating with existing agencies. Funding must be adequate to pay program staff members comparably to similar positions in other agencies. Program personnel with strong technical and interpersonal skills are required. Evaluation plans must be developed that do not impinge on program operations. While there is no such thing as hassle-free implementation, policy and planning significantly affect the ease with which it can be accomplished.

Second, OIC/A, and by extrapolation, other qualified community-based organizations (CBOs) should continue to be involved in program development and dissemination. The advantages cited above for organizations such as the OIC system undoubtedly enhanced the implementation of the CIP. These factors, coupled with the proven technical competence of many CBOs in a wide range of endeavors, suggest a high potential for using CBOs as instruments of social improvement.

Third, legislation and policy should give guidance to program implementors and adopting sites about the extent and duration of federal subsidization of programs. It is reasonable to expect that federal support for programs such as the CIP will not be indefinitely extended. It is sure that local support for such programs will not materialize until the programs have shown superior results and until the availability of federal support is curtailed. In the CIP demonstration, however, the absence of "sunset" provisions in legislation and policy both reduced the incentive for implementors and adopting localities to think about transferring the financial burden of programs to non-federal sources and created uncertainty about the future that affected operations. This is not a recommendation for legislation to specify exact phasing formulae for withdrawal of support or precise cut-off dates, as such specifics should be based on characteristics of individual programs, their implementation plans, and the characteristics of adopting communities. Rather, it is a call for legislators and other policy makers to clarify their intentions regarding continuation of federal support so they may be considered in adoption decisions and implementation plans.
I. INTRODUCTION

Youth unemployment, particularly of minority and economically disadvantaged young people who have not completed high school, is a major social problem in the United States. A variety of programs have been advanced to address both youth unemployment and the high incidence of dropping out of school. One of the most successful to date has been the Career Intern Program (CIP), developed and tested in Philadelphia by Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America, Inc. (OIC/A) from 1972 to 1976. In Philadelphia, the CIP achieved notable success in enabling dropouts and potential dropouts to graduate from high school and make effective transitions to productive, stable employment or further technical or academic education.

The CIP is an alternative educational program for young people who have dropped out of high school or are at high risk of dropping out. The program maintains a strong career orientation in all its activities. The curriculum is infused with career information and applications of academic skills to work settings; counseling is predicated on participants' career aspirations; field trips and extended observation placements in work sites are regular parts of the CIP. The CIP is small—no more than 200 youth enrolled at a time—so classes and counseling loads can be small, allowing intensive individualization of participants' programs. The CIP's small size and career focus are intended to accomplish the twin objectives of motivating participants to succeed and assuring they acquire the basic skills and career-decision-making savvy to realize their career goals.

Under authorization of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA, PL 95-93), the Department of Labor (DOL) and the National Institute of Education (NIE) entered into an Interagency Agreement late in 1977 to test the replicability of the CIP and to find out if the same beneficial outcomes could be achieved in new sites. Subsequently, NIE contracted with OIC/A, and OIC/A subcontracted with local OIC affiliates in four sites across the country to implement the CIP.

To study the effectiveness of the CIP in the new sites, NIE awarded a contract to RMC Research Corporation's Learning Systems Division in Mountain View, California, in April 1978. RMC's charge has been to undertake four tasks:

- assess the sites' implementation of the CIP;
- determine the effects of the CIP as implemented in the new sites and compare the effects with those achieved in Philadelphia;
- analyze the program to determine causal relationships among program components and effects; and
• compare the CIP with other youth programs in aspects relevant to policymaking.

The sites selected for the CIP replication were inner-city regions of three major metropolitan areas and one small (population 32,000) city. The geographical locations of the sites included the east, midwest, and northwest sections of the nation. The main economic activity at three sites is manufacturing, while at the other there is a high proportion of retailing and professional activity. The similarity and variability afforded by these four sites were felt to provide a reasonable test of how the CIP model might operate in various contexts.

Objectives of this Report

This report presents RMC's findings and conclusions about the process of disseminating and implementing the CIP. Recommendations reflecting what occurred during implementation are directed at both the Congress and the executive agencies involved in this demonstration, DOL and NIE. Only Task A is covered by this report. Separate reports address Tasks B, C, and D.

The central question addressed in the study of the dissemination and implementation of the CIP has been, "Can the CIP be replicated in new sites at reasonable cost within a reasonable time?" This is a broad question; it entails many nuances and leads to a number of possible approaches. In addressing this overall question, the approach taken was to use three subquestions as focusing or organizing points: (a) Do the CIPs in the new sites remain the same as the prototype in terms of goals and practices? (b) Are changes in the goals and practices in the new sites, if any, improvements in terms of the overarching goal of helping disadvantaged youth finish their education and make the transition from school to work? and (c) Is the process of implementation through the OIC system more effective than through other possible systems, such as the traditional developer-public school linkages? Simultaneously, the study has tried to maintain a broad perspective on the dissemination/implementation process as a whole, and findings, conclusions, and recommendations about that process are also presented.

Not surprisingly, hard and fast answers to some questions have not been reached. However, the findings do lead to several conclusions about the demonstration effort that we feel are solidly founded, and to recommendations that we feel ought to enhance similar efforts in the future.

Report Organization.

The body of this report begins with descriptions of the implementation process at the national and site levels. Our findings,
conclusions, discussion, and recommendations follow in Chapters III through VI.

**Background**

The OIC system is a national network of skills-training and employment-development agencies with a central headquarters in Philadelphia. Though the OIC system is formally constituted as a confederation of locally independent community-based organizations, there is a strong sense of self-identification as a single entity. The system was founded by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, who conceived the first OIC in Philadelphia in response to an employment conflict with Philadelphia employers. This conflict—which became overt because a local bakery would not hire blacks—led to a boycott of the bakery’s products in 1959. The boycott led to the realization that if significant improvements were to be made in employment opportunities for blacks, there would have to be concentrated efforts both in skills training and in development of relationships with employers. From this beginning, Sullivan fashioned the OIC concept in 1964 as an organization to provide occupational training and to enlist support from employers. OIC’s motto—We Help Ourselves—summarizes the philosophy of the system, and explains a great deal of OIC’s success and growth, for Sullivan and his associates mobilized the black community’s untapped pride and productive potential to provide the drive behind the system, largely through black churches.

Since its beginning, the OIC system has been very successful in meeting both its primary goals. Its occupational training programs, supported in large part by the U.S. Department of Labor, have taught thousands of economically disadvantaged persons the skills of a wide variety of trades. Massive inroads have been made with employers by recruiting business executives to serve on OIC boards and committees. Further, the competence of OIC graduates placed in private-sector jobs has established and maintained OIC’s reputation as a good source of trained personnel for business and industry. The OIC system now includes more than 150 Local OICs and an international division providing training and consultation in many third- and fourth-world countries. There are also a training division to provide technical assistance and staff development services to the local OICs and a special-programs division, which sponsors development and trial of new programs, one of which was the Career Intern Program.

The Career Intern Program grew out of OIC/A’s concern that its programs, successful as they were at training and placing adults, did not extend far enough down the age ladder to effect systemic changes in the economic/social system. Thus, the original goals for the CIP were both to provide a specific service to young people and to demonstrate a model that could alter the paradigm of secondary education.
The impetus for the CIP demonstration developed from the combination of four factors. First, the original CIP proved to be very successful in helping young people in Philadelphia complete their schooling and move into post-secondary careers or further training. Second, the 1977 YEDPA legislation authorized the Department of Labor to conduct new-site demonstrations of proven approaches. YEDPA was enacted just after the end of the original CIP's evaluation. Third, DOL held a high opinion of the OIC system, based on OIC's successful training and employment programs for disadvantaged adults for more than a decade. Finally, the National Institute of Education was eager to participate in the demonstration by assuming the lead federal role. NIE had not only played a major role in the development and initial evaluation of the CIP, but also had ongoing interests in alternative approaches to secondary education and in career education. The confluence of these factors created an ideal foundation for the demonstration project.
II. WHAT HAPPENED IN THE DEMONSTRATION

This chapter describes the CIP and the events leading up to and during the demonstration project. Some terms should be introduced here so the reader will be sure of the meanings we intend to convey. Components and personnel roles in the CIP are frequently discussed in terms of what their "function" is. The specific meaning of this widely construed word in this context is "the intended operational purpose" of the component or role. For example, it is the function of the school-coordinator (role) in the CIP to interact with the school district on the CIP's behalf. Such issues as making sure the machinery is set up for recording credits CIP interns earn on their official transcripts so they can be counted for graduation fall into the purview of the school coordinator's role. Generally, the school coordinator functions as a logistics and communications facilitator between the CIP and the schools. It is an extremely important function. When we refer to how well the school coordinator's function is being fulfilled or achieved or met, or when we refer to how a CIP component functions, we mean to convey how well or adequately the role's or component's purposes are being fulfilled or accomplished.

From this definition of "function," it is virtually self-evident that we define full implementation as the state when the CIP as a whole, and consequently each of its constituent components separately, is functioning appropriately—or as it is intended—so far as can be determined on the basis of observation by people who know and understand the CIP concept and basic design. To a certain extent this is an elitist definition—only those who "really know" can say whether or not the CIP is operating as it should—but it is necessary because that is true. The CIP in full implementation has a palpable distinctiveness that sets it apart from other programs, and yet is largely indescribable because it includes a feeling-state induced by the overall affect or climate of the program. We have referred to it among ourselves as "CIP-ness." One knows when CIP-ness is present or active more or less (as corny or extreme as it sounds) as one knows when one is in the midst of warm and close family, or perhaps more appropriately, when one is in the presence of professional associates who regard each other highly and are engaged in accomplishing a mutually valued goal. This is a rather high standard to hold for an educational program, but it is definitely a critical characteristic of a fully implemented CIP, and explicitly stated in the design.

The ultimate goal for the CIP demonstration of course is to determine if the programs in the four sites were functioning appropriately as shown by successful participant outcomes. But before that can happen, the CIP itself must be working—functioning—properly. In our judgment, that is the case if two things are true. First, the component parts of the CIP—instruction, counseling, and so on—must be fulfilling their functions individually and in a coordinated manner so their interdependencies are supported. For
instance, instructors and counselors may be performing their independent interactions with interns well, but unless they also communicate among themselves about interns' individual needs and characteristics, they will not be able to deal consistently and cohesively with "the whole person." Second, that affective quality—climate—defined above as "CIP-ness" should permeate the program. The lack of it indicates something is amiss.

An important point about "functions" is that they refer to purposes to be fulfilled, not ways to fulfill them. That is, what is important about a function is getting it done, not following a particular form or set of activities that got it done in another place or time. Since contexts differ, so must, often, means to ends. So long as a particular method leads to fulfilling the necessary function, and does not interfere with other functions, we consider it appropriate. The purpose of replication, in this perspective, is to implement the same functions, not necessarily the same structures or processes. Adaptations to structures or processes that serve to implement the function are judged to be positive. Therefore, no premium or inherent value accrues to replication of specific methods.

In the following description, the reader will also encounter the terms "mechanics of the component" or "mechanical operation." This is to distinguish between the procedural or structural or logistical aspects of CIP components and the "climate" or affect defined earlier. This dichotomy is somewhat akin to the difference between the "letter of the law" and the "spirit of the law," or between "form" and "substance." When used, the term "mechanics" usually refers to situations in which apparently or logically appropriate behaviors are observed to be occurring or the right structure to have been established, but they lack the right affect and generally do not appear to be functioning fully, even though all the right things appear, on the surface, to be happening.

A final two terms in this report require definition: "mature" and "stable." "Mature" and "maturity" as used here are meant to denote full implementation. That is, we saw the CIPs overall and individual components of the CIPs progress through, or back and forth between, different levels of apparent operational effectiveness, ranging from virtually no activity to implement a function through "mechanical operation" to full implementation. Partly this was a result of time, partly of other factors, such as leadership. In assessing CIP operations, we defined them as mature when the program reached a state of full functioning in all the most critical components, i.e., when the climate was positive, when instruction was appropriate to the interns, and so on. Mature does not mean "ripe" or "on the cusp of decline or senescence." It refers to realization of program goals for operation.

"Stable" and "stability" are closely akin to "mature" and "maturity," but they commonly refer to a single component or characteristic, as, for instance, in reporting that the CIP staff had
become stable. This implies not a situation of rigid stasis, but a lack of rapid or random change. Neither "stable" nor "mature" are intended to convey the idea of stagnation. Mature, stable programs continue to adapt, evolve, and otherwise change. Intentionally, programs must be constantly emergent in response to changes in their clients' needs or the environment or other factors. Maturity and stability imply that such change is thoughtful, adaptive, and progressive and has goals and a rationale.

With these definitions explained, we turn to describing the CIP and what happened in the demonstration. Following the brief background information about how the CIP was expected generally to operate, demonstration events are described at the national level first. The four site descriptions are presented after the national-level description because the demonstration was conceived and begun at the national level several months before the actual implementation sites became involved.

The CIP: An Overview

The CIP is an alternative secondary-education program with a strong career orientation. It has three basic goals. It seeks to provide academic instruction that will enable dropouts or potential dropouts to meet local high-school graduation criteria. At the same time, it adds to the academic curriculum a special focus on career issues, both by "infusing" career-related content and references into the academic subjects and by providing individual and group instruction and counseling on career issues, career-planning activities, and work-site exposure. These activities are designed to acquaint interns with the world of work, its opportunities and constraints, and the avenues into career fields. Finally, the CIP attempts to instill interns with the motivation to apply the skills and knowledge they acquire in the program in making successful transitions to post-secondary careers, formal education, or technical/vocational training likely to enhance their continued personal, professional, and economic growth and satisfaction. Interns' attitudinal change is expected to result from the CIP's supportive personal attention, from the understanding of career issues interns acquire, and from the success interns experience in completing the program. Post-graduation contact is maintained for a year or more to provide moral support for continued accomplishment.

The "treatment" interns receive in the CIP is comprehensive, as implied by one of the OIC system's explicit mottoes: "Deal with the whole person." Thus, the program staff is to be concerned with the whole of an intern's situation—not just academic progress, but issues at home, needs for social services or income-producing jobs, and so on. This treatment can be described in terms of five "components:" instruction, counseling, "Hands-On" (career exposure), diagnosis/assessment, and climate. In practice the components should be experienced by interns as interrelated aspects or facets of a cohesive, comprehensive program.
Instruction comprises the CIP's cognitive learning activities, mostly classroom based but also including field trips and independent research and other types of activities. CIP instruction is to be individualized in terms of strategies for learning, materials used, pace, and other characteristics. It should be "tailored" to the needs, interests, and style of each intern. To accomplish this level of individualization, CIP instructors are expected to use a variety of techniques appropriate to each intern. Class sizes are limited to 15 interns.

Counseling is provided in whatever areas an intern needs, ranging from academic issues such as planning courses of study to meet graduation requirements to intimate personal issues such as family relationships or drug use. Counseling may entail referral to outside social-service agencies for special needs as well as in-house sessions. Individual counseling is to be conducted formally every two weeks, and on an as-needed basis whenever an intern wishes. Group counseling is also held regularly. Counselors' case loads are not to exceed 35 interns.

Career planning is a major focus of counseling, of course, but the career area is approached through a combination of instruction, counseling, and first-hand exposure. The Career Counseling Seminar (CCS) is a class required of all interns in the first term of their program. The CCS is taught jointly by instructors, counselors, and career developers. An intern completes the CCS requirement by preparing in-depth research reports about two career fields. An individual Career Development Plan (CDP) is developed by each intern with a counselor upon beginning the program and is used throughout the intern's tenure as an assessment and planning tool. The CDP is reviewed regularly in individual counseling sessions, and in assessment meetings with parents.

The "Hands-On" component provides interns with exposure to real work situations. Interns go on two two-week Hands-Ons after they complete CCS requirements. The Hands-On providers may have interns just observe what happens at a work station, "shadow" regular employees, or actually do some work. The intent is to show the intern what work really consists of in some field of interest. Interns write reports describing their experience and reactions after completing their Hands-Ons. Finding providers for Hands-Ons is primarily the responsibility of career developers.

Diagnosis/assessment comprises a variety of activities, related by their common purposes of ascertaining interns' needs, determining how well interns are doing, and planning interventions to meet problems. Formal diagnoses are conducted by instructors and counselors when an intern enters the CIP to plan the intern's program. Assessment occurs periodically through mid- and end-of-term reports and in conferences, meetings with parents, and regular staff meetings called "disposition conferences." These meetings provide a forum for all staff members to discuss interns. By bringing together the whole professional staff, information about interns can be shared.
and plans made on the basis of complete knowledge of all aspects of interns' progress. Of course confidentiality is observed about sensitive matters an intern does not want disclosed widely. The function of continuous diagnosis/assessment is to assure that interns' progress is closely monitored and their needs met.

The final treatment component is the elusive "climate." As mentioned earlier, climate consists of that barely specifiable but palpable and influential feeling within the program. Tye (1974, p. 20) gives a definition of climate that captures its essence.

When an individual visits a school for the first time, he develops, almost immediately, a feeling about that school. This feeling is shaped by what he views. The hallways are empty, or they are bubbling with noise. Students sit quietly at desks, or they move about in various informal arrangements. Expressions are solemn, or there are smiles and laughter. Voices are shrill, threatening, and defensive, or they are soft, supporting, and questioning. Room and hallway environments are stark, or there is a profusion of children's work, exhibits, and plant and animal life. These factors and many more give each school a personality, a spirit, a culture. While it is not always definable, it is always discernible.

The appropriate climate for the mature, fully implemented CIP is purposeful, caring, motivating, stable; and nurturing. The climate's functions are to demonstrate the program's concern and support for interns and to motivate interns' attendance and determination to complete the program and succeed in post-graduation experiences.

Effecting the kind of climate needed for the CIP to be successful is of the utmost importance, for without it the program can at best achieve a state of mechanical operation, of form without substance. In RMC's study of the CIPs, it became clear that program leadership, staff attitudes, and influences from outside were all critically important factors affecting the establishment and maintenance of climate.

The five treatment components make up the portion of the CIP that has direct impact on interns. To implement the treatment functions, there are several program components we have labeled "enabling," as they create the foundation on which the treatment is built. Briefly, they consist of the staff qualifications and roles, the curriculum, facilities, materials and supplies, and the CIP's relations with the school, the teachers' union, and the community in general. In the demonstration, important enabling components
also were an intern-recruitment mechanism, funds, and the local-OIC, OIC/A, and federal-agency roles. The functioning of each of these components affects how well the CIP's explicit treatment can be implemented. They each must therefore fulfill their intended functions adequately for full implementation to be achieved.

There are also several global characteristics of the CIP that are important. The overall small size of the program—no more than 200 interns enrolled at one time—and the high ratios of professionals to interns—class sizes limited to 15, counselor caseloads limited to 35—are designed to provide maximum individual attention for each intern. There is an expectation that CIP staff members will transcend the role boundaries implied by their respective titles, taking personal interest in interns and assuming more than just professional responsibility for them. CIP staff members are to be empathetic supporters and role models as well as professional service providers. Extensive coordination and communication are expected among staff members to assure consistent interaction between intern and program. The supportive, motivating, climate expected to be present for the interns is predicated on the same kind of climate existing within the staff. To effect this climate, staff members must not only individually bring competence, empathy, and commitment to the program but also must learn to work effectively and cohesively as a team. The prevailing attitude must be one of a family working together, or, as the OIC motto has it, of "We Help Ourselves."

This overview describes, broadly, the CIP as it operated in its original site. Its success there prompted the demonstration project, which we now describe, beginning with events at the national level.

Events in the CIP Demonstration: National Level

The 1977 segment of the national-level description should be read before the site descriptions. From that point on, there is no appreciable benefit to reading the remaining national-level and the four site descriptions in any particular order.

1977: Planning and Preparation

The concept of disseminating the CIP took hold firmly after HEW's Education Division's Joint Dissemination Review Panel approved the CIP as a validated exemplary program in June 1977. The potential for dissemination had been realized earlier when the Philadelphia data were reported, but JDRP approval certified the program and made it eligible to compete for federal dissemination funds available through several Education Division offices. However, the YEDPA legislation was also about to pass, and it authorized a much larger pool of demonstration money than the Education Division had. OIC/A also had strong connections with DOL through its years of operating...
successful adult-training programs. OIC/A and NIE decided to solicit DOL's support for a demonstration.

Originally, a five-year effort was proposed, but the YEDPA authorization was limited to two years, with a strong probability for at least a third. NIE's second proposal to DOL, dated 20 August 1977, was revised for a two-year project. This proposal became the basis for an Interagency Agreement under which DOL transferred $5 million to NIE for implementation and evaluation. Detailed planning was to begin 1 October, sites were to start implementation 1 December, and interns were to be enrolled and active by January 1978. The sites would operate for two years, through December 1979, and the research results would be reported by May 1980. Four million dollars were to go to OIC/A and the demonstration sites; NIE would keep one million for management and to fund an independent evaluation.

Negotiations about specific provisions of the Interagency Agreement delayed its formal enactment until 3 November, in turn putting off some early detailed planning. However, OIC/A had gone ahead with locating suitable sites. In mid-September, OIC/A issued a general notice to the OIC system about the proposed project. Local OICs were sent a "feasibility study" to complete about needs and resources in the community and their capability to implement a CIF. Feasibility studies were reviewed after a 14 October deadline for their return, and OIC/A identified the four best candidates. Site visits to the four confirmed their selection, and the sites were told to submit detailed budgets for implementation and to start thinking about staffing and other start-up issues. Nothing would be official until OIC/A got a legal grant from NIE, however.

When the Interagency Agreement was signed on 3 November, NIE began processing OIC/A's grant. OIC/A told the sites to begin identifying specific staff members, making arrangements to lease buildings, and so on. On 8 December NIE gave OIC/A a grant. On 15 December OIC/A and the four local OICs signed subcontracts. The sites could now make commitments to staff members and for buildings and supplies. They also were expected to begin recruitment efforts that would obtain 150 interns and 150 control students by the end of January 1978, seven weeks later. The first training and orientation sessions were scheduled for the weeks of 19 and 26 December, by which time the sites were to have full staffs assembled. Thus, though formal planning and start-up activities had been delayed by two and one-half months (1 October to 15 December), the deadline for enrolling young people into an operational program was not similarly rescheduled.

OIC/A conducted one-week training programs for three sites the week of 19 December and for the fourth the week of 26 December. Basic orientation to the ethos of the OIC system and to the philosophy, goals, structure, and operation of the CIF opened the training. The latter part of training focused on more specific issues, such as instructional and counseling methods, recruitment, and administra-
tive procedures. The CIP design and processes were presented both as orientation to philosophy and as illustrations of how to implement. Most CIP staff members recalled the training as motivating and comprehensive, but also as fairly general and too full of information for it all to be absorbed. At the end of the training sessions the site staffs began work in their schools or in temporary quarters recruiting potential interns and preparing for their enrollments, while preparations of the buildings were completed.

1978: Start-Up and Early Operation

In the first few months, the major focus of attention for the national-level actors was how the CIPs were getting along in implementation. In the beginning, OIC/A kept in close telephone contact with the sites and frequently visited them. NIE and DOL began site visits in about the fourth month of the demonstration, a practice NIE continued on a roughly semiannual cycle. DOL visited the sites less frequently. As the sites got going, OIC/A's communication frequency was gradually reduced to weekly telephone contact and approximately quarterly visits, except when particular issues created a need for closer contact. Progress reports were submitted monthly by the sites to OIC/A, by OIC/A to NIE, and by NIE to DOL.

These routine monitoring and technical assistance events were constant throughout the demonstration period. The focus of description turns now to the exceptional events, those that occurred as unexpected issues arose in implementation and had to be addressed. There were three such issues in 1978: getting school-district collaboration, reactivating the original CIP in Philadelphia, and recruiting enough youth for the demonstration.

All the sites had submitted letters of support from their school districts in their feasibility studies. However, in three sites working out formal, legal approval and detailed arrangements for CIP-LEA interaction became bogged down. In one site, teacher-union resistance was a major factor. The union perceived the CIP as a threat to the number of jobs for its members in the public schools from which CIP interns would transfer.

In April all the sites met with OIC/A at the national OIC annual convention. OIC/A announced a 26 April deadline for the sites to get formal agreements with the school boards. This deadline was moved to 12 May, with a threat of subcontract cancellation if not met: OIC/A started reviewing possible alternate sites. One site got an agreement on 10 May, after OIC/A had intervened directly with LEA officials. For the other two sites, the deadline was moved to 15 June and then to 16 July as complicated negotiations continued, both times with "absolute" termination clauses. Again, after direct action by OIC/A, the two sites received agreements on 9 and 14 July, respectively.
Throughout this period there were constant meetings and development of "options positions." The involved sites' morale was strongly affected, and consequently so was progress in implementation, especially in the one site in which the first cohort could not be enrolled until official LEA approval was granted. As the issue was settled in each site by direct OIC/A-LEA contact, the sites felt a mixture of relieved gratitude, that OIC/A had been able to arrange solutions and some resentment that OIC/A had intruded in local affairs and "made deals" the local staff had to live with thereafter. However, it is clear that without the OIC/A interventions, implementation would have been further delayed or even cancelled.

The second issue was the reactivation of the Philadelphia prototype CIP, which the school district had eliminated along with all Philadelphia's other alternative schools because of local budget cutbacks. OIC/A felt very strongly that the original CIP should be reopened to serve as an inspiration and a technical resource to the sites. On 24 August, OIC/A submitted to NIE a formal proposal to reopen the Philadelphia CIP. DOL was basically neutral about the necessity of opening the prototype but agreed to provide funds ($375,000) if NIE would manage it as part of the demonstration project. An amendment to the Interagency Agreement would be drawn up if NIE agreed. In the end, however, NIE decided it did not have the staff to accept this additional aspect of the demonstration, and the research agenda could be completed without the original CIP operating. In a letter to DOL dated 3 November, NIE declined to get involved. This issue did not affect implementation in the four sites appreciably, but it did engage the national-level actors in a timeconsuming process that was only indirectly relevant to their primary mission for two and a half months.

The third issue demanding the attention of the national-level actors in 1978 was the difficulty the sites had in recruiting enough applicants to fill both the treatment and control groups. This was a persistent problem, lasting through the entire year. Recruitment problems had surfaced immediately when implementation began. None of the sites was able to get 150 interns and 150 controls for the first cohort scheduled in January. The first site to enroll interns did so without an agreement with the LEA. This first group of 30 interns started attending on 23 February. The second site to begin serving interns had obtained LEA approval. Its first cohort of 73 enrolled on 20 March. The third site also enrolled its first cohort, with 56 interns, without LEA approval, on 17 April. The fourth site waited for the LEA agreement, and enrolled its first group, of 23, on 5 June. There were no first-cohort control groups at any of the sites, because NIE had not selected an evaluation contractor in time for pretesting of applicants.

Second, third, and fourth cohorts were expected to enroll in all sites in June/July 1978, November 1978, and January 1979 respectively, according to an OIC/A-proposed schedule approved by NIE on 28 April. All four sites continued to experience recruiting difficulties, however. This and other problems resulted in only
one site being able to enroll a cohort (of 54 interns) in July. The other three sites enrolled second cohorts (of 60, 46, and 68 interns) in October, after DOL and NIE had waived the requirement for controls on 17 October because there were so few applicants.

Immediately after enrollment of the delayed, control-less second cohorts in October, the on-going review of recruitment was sharply intensified. DOL, NIE, and OIC/A held many meetings and telephone exchanges. Alternative research designs were considered, with OIC/A strongly suggesting that a comparison-group design replace the control-group approach. RMC was consulted about possible effects on the evaluation. DOL, OIC/A, and RMC communicated directly about these issues and were reprimanded by NIE for "this type of management." OIC/A expressed impatience at the demonstration's "rigid mandates." Position papers and memoranda were generated by all actors.

The discussions continued until DOL issued a directive to NIE that approved collapsing the last two cohorts into one with 90 interns and 90 controls. This cohort was to be in place in each site by 31 January 1979. Four days later, DOL amended the directive to specify 45 controls, but told RMC and OIC/A by telephone that 50 controls would be required. On 11 December, NIE wrote DOL that any control group of less than 70 would be unacceptable. On 14 December, DOL told NIE 55 would be the control-group size. After a final meeting with DOL on 18 December, NIE wrote OIC/A on 19 December that 90 treatment- and 55 control-group members would be required. OIC/A relayed this final determination to the sites.

In the sites, the CIP staffs waited anxiously for all the national-level actors to come to a decision. The issue had consumed major attention since the LEA-agreement question had been resolved in July, and was the nearly exclusive focus of discussion during the last quarter of the year. Morale, and consequently implementation, suffered as much from the uncertainty of the situation as from the low interest in the CIPs demonstrated by youth in the sites. At the national level, the issue generated both confusion and less-than-happy relationships.

With the final resolution of 19 December, the sites, with OIC/A's encouragement and assistance, redoubled their recruitment efforts. Many potential interns had already been recruited, of course, and RMC's pretesting procedures has been modified to enable testing in smaller groups. RMC had also been instructed to form comparison groups in addition to control groups. By the end of January 1979, all sites had met the 90/55 quota.

1979: Continuing Operation

With initial implementation problems behind them, the sites continued their program implementation and operation. In one site, the original director had been removed in December 1978. The OIC/A deputy project director moved to the site to get operations on
track. He stayed one and a half months, assisted occasionally by OIC/A colleagues, until a new local CIP director was hired and oriented. This intervention was generally credited with saving the CIP in that site. The schedule of site visits and monthly reporting was maintained. OIC/A brought all the site directors together for management meetings about quarterly, and NIE, DOL, and RMC continued to visit the sites as before. At the end of May 1979, the OIC/A project director left for another position. His deputy was made acting director until a replacement was named in August.

The major non-routine issue in 1979 concerned extending the demonstration period. This possibility had been first raised by the evaluation advisory panel in November 1978. Immediately after the panel had raised the issue, OIC/A suggested it in a letter to NIE on 22 November 1978. NIE and DOL shelved the question until after the 31 January 1979 deadline for enrolling the combined last cohort.

On 28 February OIC/A formally requested an 18-month extension so OIC could meet its "obligation to DOL...[to serve] a total of 1,200 to 1,600 interns during the demonstration period," and to strengthen the reliability of the evaluation. NIE forwarded the request to DOL and asked OIC/A for further documentation. In April, NIE told OIC/A the issue was being considered but additional details were needed. In mid-May, a decision was expected "in two weeks," according to NIE's monthly report. However, in June DOL requested and NIE submitted a paper discussing the potential research benefits of an extension. Generally, NIE favored it because the evaluation findings would be more reliable if they were based on a longer time period. On 5 July DOL wrote NIE that it had "decided to refund three CIP sites" and the evaluation, contingent on receipt by 27 July of workable "corrective action plans" from the sites to resolve problems with low intern attendance and retention, staff turnover, and insufficient community involvement. The fourth site's possible extension would be decided after a program review in October.

OIC/A, after meeting with NIE and DOL, submitted corrective action plans and other details on 31 July. After reviewing the plans during August, DOL confirmed the extension for the three sites. NIE requested stronger management components for the plans from OIC/A. New school-district agreements for the extension period were submitted. NIE and DOL decided new cohorts for the extension period should be enrolled in January 1980. The cohorts would have 100 interns and 75 controls. Staggered intake of interns began in October, to eliminate attrition between application and enrollment. At the end of October, DOL visited the fourth site and found it acceptable. On 5 November, DOL officially authorized NIE to extend all sites for nine, rather than the requested 18, months. DOL asked NIE to prepare an amendment to the Interagency Agreement and budgets to cover the extension.
1980: Extension

Routine activities continued. Two of the original OIC/A team members resigned in January and were replaced in February. This left only one person on the OIC/A team who had been familiar with the prototype CIP and had participated in the demonstration from the beginning. In April, NIE reassigned its two original CIP team members and assigned two new program officers to the demonstration.

Two major issues dominated the extension period. The first was finalization of the extension agreement. Though the extension was approved in November 1979, final details and paperwork had to be completed before a legal transfer of money could occur. OIC/A's expenditures for the first grant period had to be reviewed so a final cost statement could be prepared, and a new grant document had to be prepared for the extension. In addition, DOL and NIE had to resolve a dispute over the allowability of some $60,000 NIE had spent before the original grant period's books could be closed and a new grant completed. These procedures took until May. In June, funds were released. They were the first money received by OIC/A and the sites since December 1979, except for a "partial payment of the advance request,...[which] was quickly spent." During the funding hiatus the sites and OIC/A had kept the CIPs open by borrowing money from commercial credit institutions, at prevailing interest rates (over 20% at that time), and from other sources. The CIPs reported complete stoppage of ordering instructional and other materials and there were weekly doubts about meeting the CIP payrolls.

The second major issue concerned continuation of the CIPs after the end of the demonstration period in September. OIC/A prepared lists of possible sources for the sites, but suggested that they approach local and state level agencies, as money at the federal level was very scarce. All the sites submitted a number of proposals to various agencies, including local CETA prime sponsors and state labor and education agencies, but there were few hopeful signs from these possible sources as the end of the demonstration period approached.

Unexpectedly, at the May meeting of the evaluation advisory panel, DOL raised the possibility that it could provide up to half the money the CIPs needed for the next year on a matching basis. This suggestion ultimately led to DOL agreeing to supply its portion before the sites obtained commitments from other sources. At the end of September 1980, DOL granted each site approximately half of their projected 1980-81 budgets, with the expectation the sites would either generate their portions as the year progressed, or reduce their programs so as to serve 140 interns during the 1980-81 school year.
Summary

The national-level actors in the CIP demonstration dealt with a wide variety of both routine and unanticipated issues. Naturally, the exceptional issues stood out because they demanded extraordinary efforts. All the issues (excepting the reactivation of the original CIP) affected the sites' implementations to greater or lesser degrees. The site descriptions that follow illuminate these effects.

Implementation in Site A

Site A's city is a medium-size (500,000) urban center of a metropolitan area with a population of about a million and a half. The area's economy is relatively diverse, though there is a larger concentration of aerospace technology and manufacturing firms. Seventeen percent of the population is minority, consisting of blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans. The pool of youth for whom the CIP could be considered an attractive alternative was more diverse than in the original site. The city has a long tradition of supporting alternative schools, of which there were about a dozen at the secondary level when the CIP was introduced. The total secondary school enrollment in the city was about 17,200, with a reported 6% dropout rate. The secondary alternative-schools enrollment was 1,250 students. The dropout rate for the alternative schools was just over 40%. The OIC's feasibility study contained local-government data showing 55,000 economically disadvantaged youth in the metropolitan area, of whom 12,800 resided in the proposed CIP-recruitment area.

The OIC presented strong organizational capability and community support in its feasibility study. Especially salient was the LEA's tradition of support for alternative education, which lead Site A to obtain the earliest and least difficult school-board approval. A project director was appointed from among the OIC leadership as soon as OIC/A got the grant from NIE. The director and her assistant, called the program manager (a position unique to Site A that was created to provide day to day management of operational matters) proceeded to finalize a lease on an unused, self-contained portion of a parochial school, to work out logistical details with the LEA, and to recruit a staff. OIC/A conducted initial training the week of 19 December 1977. By then, Site A had hired almost all the management and career-counseling personnel by recruiting from within the OIC. Instructors generally were recruited from other sources, because of certification requirements, and joined the staff in January 1978. In February 1978, the LEA provided two curriculum consultants to work at the CIP and the school-coordinator role was assumed by an LEA alternative-school program manager. School-district approval was officially given on 27 February 1978, clearing the way for the CIP to open. Under the conditions of the approval, the CIP was made an
integral part of the school system whereas the Philadelphia prototype and the other three sites remained independent entities. This arrangement made it easier for students to transfer into and out of the CIP than at the other sites. It also caused feeder schools to lose attendance-based state monies when students transferred out to attend the CIP. This latter factor dampened feeder-school principals' enthusiasm for cooperating fully in CIP recruitment efforts.

The school district also provided the CIP with a list of over 3,200 school dropouts as a base from which to begin recruiting. Of course, not all 3,200 were eligible for the CIP or still in the area. After reviewing the list, only 600 were found to be still in the area. Recruitment efforts aimed at these dropouts yielded 14 interns. Other interns for the first cohort of 73 were recruited by the CIP staff through churches, community agencies, and the OIC, and by street canvassing and knocking on doors. The recruiting experience gained in these first months made the CIP staff feel they would be more effective in recruitment for the expected June cohort.

The first cohort enrolled on 20 March 1978. A month later, NIE, DOL, and OIC/A visited Site A. The NIE site-visit report noted that generally the CIP was progressing very well.

Recruiting began for the second cohort in May, the same month a parents' advisory group was formed. The LEA again provided leads and assistance, but difficulties arose because of competition for youth from other DOL programs and the disincentive for feeder schools of losing attendance-based aid if students transferred to the CIP. The approach of summer also disinclined young people from considering the CIP. By July, 68 applicants were ready to enroll, and all were invited to do so after consultations with OIC/A, NIE, DOL, and RMC led to waiving the control-group requirement for this cohort. Fifty-four accepted the invitation and entered on 24 July.

RMC conducted its first formal data-collection visit to Site A in August 1978 (an informal, "get acquainted" visit had been made with OIC/A in June). Observations supported the earlier NIE opinion that things were going well. The changes that had been made to the staffing pattern were assessed as having contributed to the CIP's good relationship with the LEA. Instructional and counseling procedures conformed to the design, though an adaptation to the staffing pattern had been made whereby interns got all their instruction from a small team of instructors. This was called a "core" approach. Staff and intern morale were high, though there had been 11 staff replacements (for various reasons, including reassignment to other local OIC roles, career advancement, and lack of certification) and intern attendance appeared low. Recruitment was acknowledged to have been a problem earlier, but the staff saw no problems ahead in attracting enough potential interns to form treatment and control groups for the next cohorts. RMC's general conclusions were that the CIP was functioning well, especially for so soon after start-up, and that the future looked bright. There were plans to bring in a team from the local OIC to deal exclusively with recruitment.
An NIE site-visit report at the end of August 1978 noted that recruitment was a problem, that staff-training plans were weak, and that staff attrition had affected interns' morale. Attendance was low, though interns and staff members present seemed "happy to be here." Statistics compiled at the end of October revealed that of 127 interns brought into the CIP in Cohorts I and II, eight had graduated (in August), 73 remained, and 28 had terminated.

Throughout the last part of 1978, the emphasis was on recruitment. A team brought in from the OIC was continually contacting likely prospects, while the national level deliberations about combining Cohorts III and IV were proceeding. When the decision to enroll a final cohort of 90 interns and 55 controls by 31 January 1979 was made, Site A had 43 interns who had been pretested by RMC and were ready to bring in. By the end of January, they had met their quota with 88 admitted to the CIP and 55 assigned to be controls. At the end of January, 148 interns were in the program.

RMC's second data-collection visit to Site A, in February 1979, revealed that while the program's components were mechanically in place and interns perceived the CIP as a good place to be, intern attendance was low and sporadic, and staff morale problems were surfacing. Staff members complained about such issues as low salaries, but their greatest concerns centered on the director's management style, which the staff members perceived as being distant, rigid, and insensitive to professional (educational) standards of autonomy for teachers. Five more staff had resigned, including the second program manager. While he had not been highly regarded professionally by instructors because of his lack of educational experience, he had been personally liked. His loss contributed to the general morale problem. Furthermore, the team of LEA curriculum consultants had been explicitly isolated, and the LEA team members were unhappy and frustrated.

A staff committee to establish policies and procedures was instituted in March 1979. It recommended an Intern Code of Conduct and a Dress Code in April which led to strong intern feelings against the program and to a brief and generally ineffective boycott by interns. More serious difficulties broke out when RMC's interim report was issued in late March. Although that report contained both positive and negative information about Site A, only portions interpreted by the CIP staff as negative were relayed to them. Staff morale plummeted and the CIP director felt obliged to resign. She also retired from the OIC entirely. There was much concern about the future and implementation was at a standstill. Enrollment had dropped from 148 at the end of January, to 80 interns at the end of April.

When RMC next visited at the end of April 1979 there was, understandably, fierce resentment expressed by the CIP staff. An afternoon-long meeting between the staff and the researchers helped to confront the issue, but confidence was restored only gradually.
Operation was perfunctory in regard to program mechanics, and the CIP's climate was very negative.

A new director was appointed late in May 1979, and he began major efforts to recoup interns who had dropped out and to develop a strong summer program. A new counseling supervisor was brought in from the OIC in June to complete the management team, which now consisted of the second director, the third program manager, and the third counseling supervisor. However, in August the program manager resigned, and, in September, was followed by the director. The counseling supervisor was then named director, and he filled the program manager and counseling supervisor positions from within the CIP staff.

During the summer of 1979 discussions about extending the demonstration were underway at the national level, so Site A began once again to recruit, though on an informal basis. At the end of September there were 91 potential interns awaiting testing.

In December 1979 RMC visited Site A for the fourth official data collection period. The low enrollment made the CIP seem almost empty and the climate was depressed. Despite the earnest efforts of the director and program manager, staff and intern morale were very low. The staff seemed barely interested in their work; most confided they were looking for jobs. There was hope though that the large number of interns who were expected to enroll for the extension period would give new life to the program. However, staff members reported major communications problems with the director, who was felt to be autocratic and insufficiently experienced in alternative education.

When the site was given authorization to enroll a new cohort, testing began immediately. By 27 February 1980, 102 applicants had been assigned to the CIP, but only 78 actually enrolled. This brought the intern population to 99. More interns were subsequently taken in, but they were not counted as part of the official treatment group. These "administrative admits" brought enrollment to 99 in April. In March, the fourth program manager resigned, and was replaced by an outside person.

When RMC visited again at the end of April, the increased size of the student body had improved the climate somewhat. However, staff morale was as low as before, and there were many complaints about the director's leadership. The counseling supervisor and the director could barely disguise their disagreements. Staff members also criticized the OIC for treating the CIP as a "training" program, rather than allowing it to be a school. For its part, the OIC had stretched its credit rating to the limit to provide operating funds for the CIP, and admittedly was holding up some purchases, because the grant money for the extension had not yet been released by DOL and NIE.
In May 1980, plans were made for a summer program that would take maximum advantage of good weather. During a break between the end of the school year and the beginning of the summer program, the staff held a number of training workshops. On 21 July, the first summer session opened with 61 interns, 25 of whom had enrolled just for the summer to get high school credits not available in the public schools. Two interns graduated on 25 July in OIC ceremonies. The second summer session began on 11 August.

RMC's sixth visit occurred the last week of the second summer session, 25-29 August. By actual count, attendance ranged from 21 to 31 interns, of 67 enrolled. There was little coordination observed between instructors and counselors, and open arguments erupted between staff members. The CIP leadership was criticized by staff members in both departments. The counseling supervisor had recently resigned and the announced resignations of the director and program manager were to take effect at the end of August and early in September, respectively. The extensive turnover had left very few staff members who had ever been trained or even formally oriented about the CIP design by OIC/A, and orientation materials prepared by OIC/A had not been used by the CIP. Disposition conferences and the Career Counseling Seminar had been cancelled for the summer, with discussion of not reinstating the CCS in the fall. The program was in disarray.

When the third CIP director resigned, the OIC appointed the director of adult programs to be interim acting director. This person had formerly been the director of one of the other demonstration CIPs. Though he has had little time to devote to the CIP (with 23 programs to oversee at the OIC), he has taken major steps to reorganize it. The size of the CIP has been reduced to a maximum of 40 interns, for the time being, and basic CIP training has been conducted for the staff. A new (sixth) program manager has been hired to run the program's daily operations, under the close supervision of the interim director. The reduced staff has been told to communicate and cooperate. The success of these measures will be determined over the next few months.

Site A began implementing the CIP under auspicious conditions, relatively. The LEA was eager to cooperate and quickly gave approval and logistical help. The program achieved a fairly full implementation status in just a few months. However, extensive staff turnover (56 resignations, terminations, or transfers from the 22 staff positions) made program continuity most difficult to maintain. The leaders of the CIP and the professional staff members, especially the instructors, never jelled into an effective team, and their differences became progressively more salient, leading to an eventual deterioration of operations. The close of the demonstration found the interim director trying to invigorate the program by reducing its size and conducting intensive training. By the end of the demonstration period, 293 interns had been enrolled, 58 had graduated, and 17 remained in the CIP.
Implementation in Site B

Site B is located in an inner-city area of one of the nation's largest cities. The area is plagued by familiar social problems—drugs, prostitution, arson, blight, gangs, little economic opportunity, and high unemployment. Youth unemployment stood, officially, at 57% when the CIP was started. Actual rates were probably a good deal higher. The population is ethnically diverse—black, Puerto Rican, Castillian Spanish, Italian, and eastern-European Jewish. As little as ten years ago, the area was relatively prosperous, but decay has been rapid. "White flight" has significantly altered the population.

The catchment area for Site B's CIP was estimated to have 22,000 economically disadvantaged, secondary-age youth. While the metropolitan average drop-out rate was estimated at 10%, the high school in the area to be served had a 24% drop-out rate for the previous year. Seventy-five percent of the area's population had not completed high school. No alternative schools existed in the area (though referrals to five schools outside the area could be made), and the proposed feeder school was seriously overcrowded. Median family income in the area was just above $5,600 per year. According to the Site B feasibility study, area residents were eager to have the CIP.

Early in December 1977, almost all of a prospective CIP staff were identified. These staff members began work with the initial training from OIC/A starting 19 December. By the end of January, the CIP building had been renovated—through the local OIC's contribution of $120,000 not reimbursed from demonstration funds—and the LEA superintendent had unofficially endorsed the program. Some intake testing had also been conducted. However, when the CIP began making detailed logistical arrangements with the feeder school principal, the teachers' union began to object because of previous disputes with the school. The school board had also delayed approval, the critical issues being CIP staff certification, awarding credit to CIP interns, and the teachers' union resistance.

The union gave its sanction to the CIP in March 1978, under an agreement whereby the CIP would employ three union members (a condition never enforced) and recruit from a different feeder school than originally proposed. Though the superintendent's office had not yet given official approval, the CIP initiated operations under the assumption that, once the CIP staff completed the certification process, approval was a mere formality whose outcome was assured. On 17 April 1978, the first Site B cohort of 56 interns began attending.

Though the first cohort was enrolled, getting LEA approval required another two and a half months. Not only did all the bureaucratic procedures for staff and curriculum certification have to be followed, but the LEA also underwent a change of superintendents.
and other high officials. After the new superintendent was installed, final agreement was reached on 9 July. However, this required direct intervention from OIC/A with the new superintendent in addition to the constant efforts of the local OIC.

In mid-October, Site B enrolled its second cohort, consisting of 60 interns and no controls. The decision to enroll all 60 without controls was made after consultations with the national-level actors, and with the understanding that control groups would be created for later cohorts. Recruitment was turning out to be a much more difficult task than had been anticipated—a condition that prevailed at the other sites as well. Site B started negotiating with a second feeder school to prepare for the later cohorts.

RMC's first data-collection visit to Site B, in late October, revealed that the CIP was doing well, especially considering the earlier troubles getting permission to start up. Staff members were well qualified and had had appropriate prior experience. Turnover was limited to two professionals, both of whom had left for higher paying jobs with the LEA. A large resource center/library had been started with a wide variety of materials, largely focused on post-secondary education and careers. Instruction and counseling were being conducted in accord with the design. Morale was high and the climate positive. Good relations existed with the LEA and the local OIC. The Community Advisory Council had not been activated, because the director wanted to concentrate on internal program development first. He had plans to convene the Council shortly. Of the 56 interns in the first cohort, 41 were still at the CIP. With the second cohort, this made an intern population of 101, with attendance averaging about 75%. In short, the program looked good.

The director was concerned, at RMC's first visit, about the possibility of recruiting adequate numbers of applicants for the treatment and control groups. He initiated relationships with an additional feeder school. This enabled Site B to recruit more than enough interns to meet the 31 January 1979 deadline for 90 interns and 55 controls, although the entire staff and some interns had to help. The new cohort consisted of 106 interns and 60 controls.

During the three months between RMC's first and second site visits, two math teachers and an aide left the CIP for higher paying jobs at the OIC. This continued the pattern of losing some staff members to better paid positions.

The influx of the 106 new interns in January had effects that were apparent at the time of RMC's second visit in February 1979. Some classes had to be held in a nearby community center because the CIP building was too small for the almost 200 interns enrolled. Counselors could not see interns as often as they liked, both because there were so many interns and because the new interns required extra attention in the beginning. In addition, recent staff losses made it necessary for counselors to fill in in the classrooms. Local OIC requisition procedures were affecting the
CIP's acquisition of instructional materials. It was also proving
difficult to find enough Hands-On placements, a problem aggravated
by a lack of good public transportation near the CIP.

Despite these problems, the CIP was generally going very well.
Program functions were clearly being performed. The staff had
modified or dropped many of the OIC/A-provided "learning packets"
developed in the prototype, replacing them with materials they had
developed or identified themselves. Staff and intern morale were
high, and interns were very vocal in their positive feelings about
the CIP.

In late February 1979, Site B held its first formal graduation
ceremonies. Fourteen graduates were added to the eight who had
completed the program earlier. A formal Parent-Teachers Association
was formed in March. However, attendance began to decline. To
combat this problem the CIP instituted a twice-daily attendance
check and a policy of rewarding high attendance with field trips.
Nevertheless, the problem persisted throughout the demonstration,
without responding to any of the several tactics employed.

On the third visit to Site B, in April 1979, staff members
complained about low salaries; excessive workloads; lack of time for
thoughtful planning, program development, and getting to know
interns well; lack of vacation time between sessions to recuperate
from the heavy demands of the CIP; and uncontrollable vandalism to
the facility. The director was aware of all these problems. He had
requested OIC and OIC/A help with the vandalism problem, in the form
of money to hire a night guard, but lack of funds prevented hiring a
guard. The time pressure of the demonstration made workloads heavy,
and intersession breaks were inevitably brief. Attempts to estab-
lish a procedure for getting substitute teachers easily from the LEA
had not borne fruit. The necessity for interns to travel between
the two CIP buildings to attend different classes raised the likeli-
hood of truancy. There were also strained relations between the
counselors and the counseling supervisor. However, program func-
tions appeared to be performed adequately, if with less positive
affect than earlier. Interns still strongly endorsed the CIP.

In June 1979, the CIP graduated another 35 interns. 14 (40%) of
whom were accepted into colleges. As a result, the CIP director was
approached by a number of other schools and by parents who wanted to
send students not succeeding in the public schools to the CIP.
Though LEA policies precluded transfers to the CIP from other than
the designated feeder schools, this confirmation of community
visibility and interest was welcome news.

At the end of November. RMC visited the CIP a fourth time. The
situation was much as it had been in April. Staff morale had
improved, but still suffered from the same problems, except that the
counseling supervisor had resigned and been replaced with a very
popular and competent member of the original counseling staff. This
had made a noticeable difference in counseling operations, but it
had not alleviated problems of too much work at too little pay with too little time. Members of the staff were showing signs of the familiar "burn-out" phenomenon. Nevertheless, program functions were being fulfilled and climate was positive, on balance. The approval of the extension and the site's success in having already identified the 75 new enrollees necessary for the extension had relieved short-term anxieties about the future. (Site B was required to have only 75 interns for the extension because of the size of its facility.)

In February 1980, the CIP graduated another eight interns, bringing the total to 61 graduates. Ninety-five percent of the 188 interns enrolled after intake of the final cohort were still active, though attendance still hovered at about 60%. It was still difficult to procure Hands-On placements and to find time for visiting interns' homes, but the basic CIP functions were strong. Staff and intern morale had risen, and program climate was positive. Then, in April, the director announced his intention to resign, for career advancement.

The resignation of the director, whom interns and staff consistently credited as the most important factor in getting and keeping the CIP running, was a severe blow. Added to the approaching end of the demonstration period, his imminent departure created much anxiety about the CIP's future. When RMC visited Site B next, at the beginning of May 1980, a major difference could be perceived. Hands-On activities and home visits had increased; more staff time was available because recruiting had stopped and the new interns were finally settled in their courses. Other functions—instruction, counseling—were operating. But 42 interns had left since the last site visit (22%) and there was high anxiety about the implications of the director's resignation. The CIP participants knew the OIC had plans to appoint an acting director, but no one knew when. The attitude toward the CIP was very positive, but uncertainty dampened the overall climate.

The director was aware his leaving was causing a problem, and he had real regrets that this was so. However, he also could not refuse the opportunity he had been offered, and he knew that it was not good for a program to depend too heavily on one individual. He thought the CIP was strong enough to survive his departure, though there would be trauma and a new director would have to be very capable to maintain operations and to put his or her imprint on the program. The director knew he was leaving a program that enjoyed good relations with the schools and was regarded as a positive asset in the community. Operations were basically strong, and morale, apart from the issue of his leaving, was high, though the question of continuation beyond September loomed in everyone's mind.

The deputy OIC executive director took over temporarily when the original director left and an interim acting director was assigned half-time after a short period. This gave the local OIC adequate time to recruit a permanent CIP director while still
keeping the program operating. The imminent end of the demonstration period also played some part in delaying the hiring of a permanent director until the CIP's future was more clearly perceived. While deferring the appointment of a second director was unquestionably reasonable from the OIC's perspective, the lack of a permanent director and of information about the search for one caused concern and reduced attendance by both some interns and some staff members.

During the three months between RMC's fifth and sixth visits to Site B, operational mechanics were maintained, but program climate began to deteriorate. In addition to the impermanent, part-time leadership, the uncertainty of continuation beyond September contributed to the climate's decline. On the last site visit, in August 1980, RMC found that, while the staff itself had maintained open communications between the instructional and counseling departments, there was significant distance between the interim director and the other staff members. This had lowered morale and taken away some of the spirit of the program. Intern attendance was down to about 60% of the summer enrollment (smaller than regular school-year enrollment), by RMC's count on site. Good relations continued to exist with the LEA and the community, however, and there were solid plans to continue the CIP's operation, provided funding would be found. It was even planned to expand the CIP into several more locations in Site B's metropolitan area.

On 25 August, a new permanent CIP director was brought into the program. This appointment was welcomed by the staff for its potential to reinvigorate the program. In September 1980, DOL promised about 60% of the funds needed for continuing the CIP at full capacity through the 1980-81 school year. In addition, the CETA prime sponsor provided funds for implementing new sites in the city. On balance, the Site B CIP was performing its functions well mechanically at the end of the demonstration period, but the three-month absence of strong, stable leadership had had major repercussions. The potential for Site B to regain fully functioning status surely existed, but had not yet been realized.

An overview of CIP implementation in Site B shows that 297 interns enrolled, 69 graduated, and about 124 remained in the program. Staff turnover has been quite low in comparison to other YEDPA programs. The site went through a difficult period in the early months, but by about ten months after start-up appeared to have effected a fully functional program. The resignation of the original director in April 1980, and the subsequent inability to appoint a permanent successor, led to deterioration of the CIP's climate, low intern attendance, and eventually to less adequate mechanical functioning. Resolution of the funding question, at least for the 1980-81 school year, allowed the OIC to appoint a full-time director, which augured well for regaining full implementation.
Implementation in Site C

Site C is in a small city of approximately 32,000 residents. In the 1950's there was a migration to the suburbs, leaving the city proper with large numbers of black families and older whites. Today, the suburbs around the city have a population of 85,000, and the county (all of which makes up the CIP catchment area) has over 220,000 residents.

Although there are blocks of low- and middle-income families scattered throughout the city, the better-off families reside mostly on the south side. The poorer section of the city, which occupies much of the northern area, has well maintained single-family dwellings with some substandard housing and very few houses that are boarded up. Economically, the city depends heavily on one major company that provides jobs for 22,000 persons. According to a study by the local planning agency, adult unemployment for the county is low. But in the city itself, adult unemployment is 32% and youth unemployment reaches 80%.

Interest in the CIP in Site C began as early as February 1975, when the executive director of the local OIC visited the Philadelphia prototype, accompanied by three LEA officials: the superintendent, the coordinator of federal programs, and the assistant coordinator for personnel. According to her, "everybody was impressed." LEA interest in the CIP was so great after the visit that school officials called her "at least every three months" to find out when the program could be implemented in their city.

When OIC/A officially announced in September 1977 that funds might be available for program replication, the local OIC responded immediately. LEA officials helped significantly in the preparation of the feasibility study, giving the OIC a letter from the superintendent promising to support the CIP, and an analysis of the potential-intern population. The study indicated that the LEA, which had only one high school (with a 23.8% dropout rate) had identified 144 in-school students and 400 dropouts as potential CIP interns. There were no other alternative schools in the area, but there were two programs providing part-time jobs to encourage youth to stay in school. The feasibility study also stated that the "teachers' union supports an alternative learning environment and it is expected that they will sign off on certain conditions in their contract with the school district to allow the CIP program [to operate]". It was not indicated whether this expectation was based on direct contact with the union.

The local OIC was informed on December 1 that its proposal had been accepted. OIC/A also asked for a staff to be assembled for training in mid-December. In the first week of December, the OIC
contacted the teachers' union to announce the CIP staff openings and discuss other CIP matters. In a two-week period, approximately 400 persons applied for the 22 positions advertised. The staff the OIC executive director was able to assemble on such short notice was nearly complete, but the leadership did not meet all OIC/A's criteria. The appointed director, in fact, had not applied for the directorship, but for the counseling supervisor's role. He did have, however, a master's degree in education and had implemented a small program for a boys' school. The instructional supervisor did not have any supervisory experience. The counseling supervisor had no supervisory experience, but did have a master's degree, counseling experience in community mental health, and extensive community contacts. Of the 20 staff members hired by the time of the OIC/A training, about half had been working at the local OIC. The staff was trained in a nearby city by OIC/A personnel on 19-23 December.

Although the feasibility study identified a building for the CIP, the facility needed extensive remodeling to meet the fire code. It was an old four-floor house with small rooms and narrow stairs. The remodeling created small offices for the administrative and counseling staff. The classrooms were spread over the three upper stories of the building, while the Resource Center was in the basement.

The CIP staff moved into the building on 22 February 1978. On the next day, the first cohort of 30 interns (of 38 invited; there were no controls) entered the CIP. All 30 were actual dropouts, as arrangements for enrolling in-school youth had not been finalized with the LEA. At that time the building had neither student nor faculty lounges. Renovations on three rooms involved considerable delays, so they were not usable in the early months.

As the CIP staff entered into discussions with school administrators about recruiting details, the local teachers' union balked at the plans and protested. Concerned that the teachers' union would make trouble, the high school principal and counselors became very reluctant to help the CIP. On 20 March, the LEA superintendent officially informed the CIP that LEA collaboration was suspended as a result of union pressure.

The teachers' union felt their contract with the LEA gave them a monopoly on providing educational services, and thereby authority over hiring and other personnel practices of any agency delivering instructional services in the city. The main demands of the teachers' union were that they would have to participate in any CIP-LEA agreement and that the CIP would have to hire all instructors and counselors from union ranks in accordance with the seniority of available personnel. (This was a step back from the original union position: that all members of the OIC join the union.)
The local OIC was given until 26 April by OIC/A to secure a formal agreement with the board of education, or face contract termination. As the problem with the teachers' union continued, the deadline was extended successively to 12 May, 15 June, and 16 July. Eventually OIC/A's project director negotiated personally with the high school principal and the president of the teachers' union on 10 July 1978. The outcome was an agreement by which the CIP would hire one union instructor for every 25 students referred by the school and employ an additional union staff member in the capacity of school coordinator. All union members were to be paid by the CIP, but at their LEA rates, which were about 40% above the CIP salary scale. The agreement made the CIP an alternative program within the district. This meant that the interns would get their diplomas through the high school and that the LEA would count CIP interns as part of its enrollment. As a consequence, the LEA could claim ADA funds from the state for students being served by the CIP.

During the several months of negotiations leading to school board and union agreement to cooperate with the CIP, the staff was operating with the initial cohort, completing curriculum materials, and making contacts for Hands-On placements. Renovations to the building were continuing. Recruiting arrangements were also being made with three additional school districts. When the LEA approval became official on 13 July, recruiting began again. Even with the LEA cooperating, however, finding enough applicants was problematic. In October, NIE and DOL granted Site C permission to enroll a second cohort without controls. Immediately, 46 new interns were taken into the program. Thirty-six of the new interns came from the original school district, and 10 from one of the new districts.

RMC made its first data-collection visit at the end of October 1978. Instruction was being conducted as specified in the CIP design, and staff members liked the learning-packet format. Revisions to the prototype-CIP curriculum content had been made to conform to state and local graduation criteria. Counselors had an average caseload of 20 interns. Interns were positive about the program, especially in comparison to their former high schools.

Many staff members, however, were less enthusiastic. For one thing, the director was perceived as inadequate by staff members because he did not communicate well with them or inspire them. He was seen as ineffectual, indecisive, and overwhelmed by his responsibilities. Moreover, some confusion existed within the staff about the roles of CIP administrators. The Career Counseling Department had been split by the director into two separate units—counseling and career development. The director had also assumed some of the counseling supervisor's duties and restricted the supervisor to dealing with just the counseling activities, not the career-related ones. There were also two persons functioning as school-liaison officers. One—in charge of CIP dealings with the original LEA—was appointed to the CIP by the LEA in accord with the CIP-LEA-union agreement. The other was the original CIP school-liaison. Her
duties were to deal with the new LEAs the CIP was recruiting as feeder schools.

The appointment of four LEA personnel to the CIP—three instructors and the school coordinator who dealt only with the original LEA—also created difficulties. The arrangement for the LEA personnel to be paid at significantly higher rates than the regular CIP staff members, for the same work, caused resentment. The regular and LEA staff members did not generally communicate or coordinate well, though there were instances of cooperation. Moreover, the regular CIP staff members felt the LEA was not being as helpful as it should have been. Finally, the LEA-appointed school coordinator, who became the teachers' union president the next year, expressed that his avowed interest was in keeping a close watch on the CIP to make sure it did not take jobs away from union members.

Morale was also affected by what several staff members perceived as OIC/A intrusion into local CIP operations, especially with regard to having unionized LEA personnel work in the CIP. However, without this "concession" it is highly probable the CIP would have been closed down altogether. These staff members also felt NIE and DOL had exerted excessive pressure, through OIC/A, to get the LEA and union approvals and to recruit. They considered, too, that the federal agencies had been ambiguous about cohort entry dates. Delays between recruitment and authorization for intake had caused, in the staff's view, the loss of a "significant number of interns."

In sum, RMC found most aspects of treatment to be mechanically in place at the end of October 1978. However, staff morale had been affected by a number of events and issues over the preceding months and site leadership was tentative at best. This resulted in a program climate that was less positive than it should have been. Nevertheless, interns' perceptions of the program were positive, especially in comparison to what they had experienced in their pre-CIP school environments.

During November, December, and January, the major emphasis was on recruiting for the third cohort under the pressure of the 31 January 1979 deadline for 90 interns and 55 controls. With the addition of three new school districts throughout the county from which to recruit, Site C was able to meet the deadline. This was accomplished by the voluntary extra time put in by the entire staff. In the first week of February, 95 new interns were enrolled.

During this same period, however, the OIC and OIC/A realized that radical action had to be taken in regard to CIP leadership. The director was proving inadequate to the directorship's responsibilities. With OIC/A's endorsement, the OIC executive director temporarily relieved the CIP director of his duties and took on his responsibilities herself. The CIP director was given the title "Administrative Intern," and continued to work in the program. The OIC executive director delegated leadership duties to the department supervisors and the school liaison officer. These three persons
managed the CIP's daily operation until the beginning of March, when the original director was reinstated on a probationary basis.

RMC's second visit to Site C occurred at the end of February 1979. The influx of new interns had made the CIP facility very crowded, and renovations were still not complete. Instruction had assumed a more traditional look with emphasis on lecturing and textbooks. There was very little individualized attention. Instructors said this was because of the large number of interns, though class sizes were observed to be the same as on the previous visit. In the counseling unit, most activity was centered around the paperwork and planning involved in processing the new interns into the program. Counselors were frustrated that they could spend little time individually with interns, getting to know them. Hands-On placements were also difficult to find. Disposition conferences had been suspended in November—due to recruiting activities, but there were plans to begin holding them again soon.

Staff attitudes toward the interns remained positive, but staff morale about the program itself was low. The ambiguity in the leadership situation was confusing. Some staff members felt the program needed administrative autonomy and that the old director should be given greater authority. Others felt both the old director and the instructional supervisor lacked managerial and communication skills and that this was the source of the CIP's problems. There was also dissatisfaction about incomplete renovation work, overcrowdedness, lack of supplies, and low salaries. Confusion about LEA course requirements and credits had delayed giving interns grades and credits for the previous semester.

Intern behavior reflected the low morale and confusion of the staff. Interns did not attend classes. Derogatory graffiti were scrawled on lavatory walls. Interns congregated on the stairs and groused. Occasional fights broke out. Nevertheless, interns still compared the CIP favorably to their old high schools and were hopefully optimistic.

On 2 March 1979, the original director was reinstated on a provisional basis. His first monthly report discussed problems with both the instructional supervisor and the LEA school coordinator. The supervisor, he said, was not "able to deal with staff" effectively and this was the source of instructional problems. He had advised the supervisor verbally and in writing to address these problems. The LEA school coordinator told the director he was at the CIP to give advice. This was not how the director perceived the coordinator's role, and he planned to correct this misunderstanding.

However, the original director was no more effective during his probationary period than he had been earlier. A review of the program by the OIC board's liaison to the CIP led to the director's permanent resignation at the end of March. The OIC board asked the member who had conducted the review to take over as interim director until a permanent replacement could be found.
The third RMC visit, in May 1979, occurred a month after the interim director had taken over. Recruitment for a new permanent director had yielded two finalists, both of whom were adequately qualified and attractive candidates. During RMC's visit, final selection interviews were underway, with OIC/A participating.

In the CIP, intern absenteeism and attitudes reflected earlier difficulties. At an assembly to start the day one morning, 24 interns showed up, of an official enrollment of about 110. Class attendance ranged from five to nine, while class rosters showed from ten to 20 students officially enrolled. Counselors were doing little but the paperwork required by the sending school districts. Instruction was perfunctory. Some instructors were missing due to long-term illnesses or plain absenteeism. No disposition conferences had been held since October, and there was little coordination among staff members.

However, staff morale was on the rise. All staff members were impressed by the skill and style of the interim director. He had held staff meetings to get communications started. He had instituted new procedures to encourage and document attendance. A sense of direction and purpose was evident. Steps had been taken to replace or find substitutes for staff members who had resigned or were absent or on leave. A first group of 10 interns had just graduated. OIC/A had recently given a training workshop that had been well received. Though the CIP was not functioning well, it was showing an upward trend.

A new director was hired on 14 May 1979. She was an experienced secondary teacher who had worked with disadvantaged young people. She also had a strong, outgoing personality and a vision for the program. Her first actions were to find out as much as possible about program operations and problems by observing and interviewing staff members individually and in groups. She developed specific plans of action to address the various issues confronting the CIP. These included regular departmental and whole-staff meetings, informal staff lunches every Thursday, refinements on the interim director's initiatives on attendance and retention, organizing the site Advisory Council, and cementing relations with the LEAs. Within two weeks of the new director's arrival, the ineffectual instructional supervisor resigned and a search for a new one was started. Other staff slots were also filled and substitutes were hired to fill in for the instructors on medical leave.

The staff responded positively to the new director. Though they remained somewhat skeptical of her ability to improve things—because they had heard such promises before—the staff members reported feeling that if there was any chance, the new director would be able to capitalize on it. The new director's inclusive, democratic leadership style was credited by staff members as giving them feelings of purpose and ownership.
At this time negotiations were proceeding about the extension of the demonstration. While the other sites were told they could expect to be extended, a decision about Site C was held off pending an October program review by DOL. DOL visited at the end of June to take a preliminary look at the program. The CIP staff and interns felt the visitors showed little interest in their programs. They stayed two hours and left without requesting any information they had not already received through OIC/A. The director stated, in her June 1979 monthly report, "We have made many changes and worked very hard. It was frustrating to all of us to not have the opportunity to demonstrate our gains. The visit left us with an empty feeling and an idea that perhaps DOL had already decided our fate," though this was not the fact.

During the summer and early fall of 1979, therefore, Site C was under great pressure to get the program up to par. One of the instructors was promoted to instructional supervisor on 25 June. He immediately began organizing an instructional planning and record-keeping system. He also instituted staff training sessions on a number of topics. Extra-curricular activities were organized to motivate interns, and part-time summer jobs were made available through an arrangement with the CETA prime sponsor. To qualify for summer jobs, interns had to maintain high attendance. New student and staff conduct policies were promulgated by the director. All staff vacancies were filled. In general, the period leading up to the October DOL review was one of intense revision, reform, and upgrading of operations, including frequent contact with OIC/A for consultation and training. A review of the CIP's building occupancy permit in September disclosed that, by fire department standards, the facility was unacceptable for more than 130 persons. With plans to recruit a new cohort when DOL's approval for an extension was granted, the old building would be inadequate. A search was begun for a new building. One was found and renovated in October, and the CIP moved there immediately. Recruitment was also begun on the assumption the October review would be positive.

On 30 October 1979 DOL paid its long-awaited visit to Site C, and found the program acceptably improved. Immediate recruitment for a new cohort of 100 interns and 75 controls began. Agreements were in force with five LEAs now, and the staff anticipated an easier time getting enough applicants. In addition the approval from DOL, the new building, and the months of reform activities had boosted staff morale and optimism.

RMC visited again in December 1979. Enrollment was down to 49, but attendance was up. The new building was a definite improvement. The most striking aspect was that it was all on one floor, instead of four, so building management and intern monitoring were much easier. A lounge was also available, so interns could congregate...
without blocking halls and staircases. Instruction showed the characteristics of the CIP design. The counseling staff was involved in recruitment virtually full-time, but there was no alternative if a new cohort was to be enrolled. Staff morale was high. More clarity about policies and staff roles had contributed greatly to this. So did the director’s open manner of communicating and her insistence on coordination among staff members. There were still some problems, but they seemed very minor compared to those of the first year.

Recruitment for the extension-period cohort was going slowly, as the LEAs were proving reluctant to refer in-school youth and the school coordinator refused to deal with any LEAs but the original, where he was still officially employed. Lists of actual dropouts provided by the LEAs had not led to many recruits. The original LEA was also requiring a burdensome re-examination of CIP staff certification. However, the LEA was being very helpful about supplying substitutes, lunches for interns, and excess furniture and instructional materials. The local OIC, satisfied with the new CIP director’s performance, was giving the CIP more autonomy.

In January and February 1980, Site C enrolled 62 new interns, and a control group of 29 was established. Though these numbers were lower than DOL had stipulated for the extension, DOL and NIE accepted them. Attendance was high and there were 98 interns enrolled. Some intern behavior problems had surfaced, because, felt the director, the new interns were younger and more immature than the old interns. The CIP and the OIC had requested the LEA to begin paying half the school coordinator’s salary, as they felt he was not performing CIP duties more than half-time. Money also became a problem in the early months of 1980 because DOL and NIE had not yet released extension funds to OIC/A.

In April 1980 RMC visited Site C for the fifth time. Just over 100 interns were enrolled and attendance was reported above 70%. Generally instruction was observed to be appropriately individualized. However, the LEA-supplied instructors were felt to be less sensitive to interns, causing friction. The counseling department was very heavily involved with paperwork for internal purposes and to meet the reporting requirements of the five sending LEAs. As a result, there was little time for actual counseling. The new instructional supervisor was felt by the counselors to be insensitive to interns and not supportive of “humanistic” approaches. There was evidence of staff “burn-out” in the complaints staff members had about “management’s” high expectations, delays in funding, consequent insufficient supplies, low pay, lack of adequate vacation time, and other issues. The climate was not generally as positive as it had been in December, though it was nowhere near as depressed as a year earlier. Nevertheless, the CIP appeared to be
functioning adequately with allowance for the pressures of no funding since December and tiredness among the staff members.

As the end of the demonstration drew near, the CIP and OIC directors prepared proposals for continuation funding and submitted them to the U.S. Department of Education, state agencies, and various foundations. When RMC visited last in August 1980, no responses had yet been received, but the OIC executive director was optimistic about one to the state employment-development office and about the possibility of matching funds from DOL.

During RMC's final visit, the CIP was winding down its summer program. Consequently, operations were atypical. There was a reduced number of interns attending and the atmosphere was more informal than during the normal school year. In addition, a major staffing transition was taking place. The director, instructional supervisor, and reading specialist were leaving for new employment. One staff member's spouse had recently been transferred to another city, so she was leaving. Three aides paid by CETA funds were leaving because their funding was about to expire. One part-time aide who was an intern was graduating. And three LEA teachers assigned to the CIP were being recalled to the public high school. Though the staff members not leaving were maintaining an optimistic outlook, there were some disruptions of normal procedures evident and real concern among the staff members and interns about the CIP's future.

The OIC responded to the simultaneous departure of so many staff members by concentrating first on the leadership positions. Before they had left, replacements were named for the director and the instructional supervisor. Recruitment was going on for the other positions. The new instructional supervisor was promoted from within the CIP ranks. The new director was the manager of another OIC program assigned temporarily at first, and later as permanent director.

Reports received by RMC from Site C following the last site visit indicated that the potential for a serious relapse occasioned by the resignations in August 1980 was averted. The new director introduced new discipline and attendance policies in September. Departed support staff members were replaced with OIC trainees. New extra-curricular and counseling activities were introduced for the interns. Intern attendance was reported to be high, and CIP morale, treatment functions, and climate were likewise reported to be in good shape. In September, DOL did provide Site C with about 60% of the funds needed to operate the CIP through the 1980-81 school year. The CIP enrolled 78 interns for the year's first term.

Thus Site C's CIP experienced a very traumatic history. Inadequate leadership and difficulties with the LEA and teachers' union in the beginning had resulted in a weak program through
the first 14 or 15 months. Two vibrant, experienced leaders had turned the situation around in a few months, and the program was close to achieving full implementation. As the demonstration period came to a close, a large number of staff members left, creating the potential for serious slippage. However, the OIC was able to find replacements for the departing staff, especially the leadership, quickly and a transition was accomplished without major disruption. The latest reports from Site C indicate continued progress. During the 33 months of the demonstration, Site C had enrolled 233 interns, and graduated 40.

Implementation in Site D

Site D is in a large urban center with 1,500,000 residents. The greater metropolitan area has a population of 4.35 million. The majority of the city's population is black, representing every socioeconomic level. The city's economy is heavily dependent on manufacturing. Unemployment is high among the 16-22 year old group, averaging 26% for the entire city and rising to 56% in the inner city.

The area the OIC picked for the CIP is an inner-city neighborhood characterized by high population density, poverty, and an array of social problems. Housing conditions range from standard to substandard. There are several boarded-up homes throughout the neighborhood. The area is one of the "toughest" parts of the city--often referred to as the "DMZ" (for demilitarized zone). Gang wars and struggles for power between pimps and drug dealers erupted in bursts of urban terrorism during the sixties. Today much of the overt and arbitrary violence has diminished, but illicit activities remain firmly rooted in the area and periodically produce waves of violence. Many young people know or associate with gang members, if they are not actually in the gangs. Youth spend much of their leisure time swapping stories about "gang happenings" such as shoot-outs, brawls, looting, and so on.

The feasibility study prepared by the OIC reports a city-wide average high-school dropout rate of 14.8%. In the LEA regions the CIP was to serve, the student population of 47,974 was 95% black, very similar to the case in the prototype site. Strong support for the CIP was inferred from a recent LEA publication promoting the concept of alternative education with a "world-of-work" orientation, as well as from a letter of goodwill from the superintendent.

The OIC was able to assemble an almost complete staff through its own personnel office. The counseling and instructional supervisors were transferred from existing OIC programs, while the remaining staff members were recruited through resumes on file from people who had previously applied to the OIC. However, a CIP director could not be found by the OIC before the OIC/A training conducted the week following Christmas 1977. Shortly after the OIC/A training, one of the OIC/A trainers was hired to be the CIP
director. She had not had supervisory experience nor had she worked in an educational institution, but she was a native of the Site D city. A school coordinator was not hired until June 1978. He was an ex-LEA counselor who knew the school system, including the proposed feeder schools, well. The need to have someone with this background was the reason for the delay in hiring a school coordinator.

Following the OIC/A training, the staff was temporarily put to work in an OIC building. There they prepared and refined the curriculum, using the OIC/A prototype materials and LEA high-school graduation requirements. In mid-April they moved to the unused parochial school the OIC had leased and renovated for the CIP. The local OIC executive director and the CIP director attempted to secure a resolution from the LEA during this period. The local school board official they first contacted had not been informed of the CIP by the superintendent. He thus was first made aware of the program by a phone call in which the CIP simply announced its presence in the district. The local board official complained about not having been approached earlier or asked to assist in the development of curriculum to meet accreditation requirements. NIE's deadline (26 April 1978) passed and no resolution had been obtained. OIC/A requested and received an extension from NIE. The local LEA administrators were sympathetic to the notion of the program, however, and OIC/A met directly with the board on 5 May. This meeting led to securing a school board resolution on 10 May 1978.

With the way cleared to opening the CIP, first-cohort interns were pretested on 24 May and received an orientation on 20 May and 1 June 1978. Classes began the following week. There were 23 treatment students and no control students. Although the LEA approval allowed the CIP to recruit in three schools, all interns had been out of school prior to enrolling in the CIP. The CIP had begun contacting the schools, but access and cooperation were limited because the schools were closing for summer vacation. Recruitment thus had to focus on non-school sources. The entire staff canvassed the neighborhoods around the CIP door to door and many contacts were made with churches and social-service agencies. Two significant factors affecting recruitment were reported to have been competition from other youth programs and reluctance to get involved with "yet another" federal program that might disappear as suddenly as it had appeared.

By late September it was clear Site D would not be able to recruit enough applicants to form treatment and control groups for the second cohort. Permission was sought and received from NIE to enroll all interested applicants, and on 16 October 1978, Site D enrolled 68 interns. Again, all were dropouts; none had transferred from the LEA schools. Also in October, the CIP schedule was changed so classes were 90 minutes long, rather than 50. This change assured that interns would have adequate "seat time" to meet LEA graduation requirements, but it made the school day run from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Attendance and staff morale were affected.
RMC conducted its first data-collection visit to Site D in November 1978. Two things were immediately evident. First, intern attendance was low. Ninety-one interns had enrolled in June and October, but RMC observed that no more than 25 were present at any given time. Through one afternoon, no more than nine interns were seen in the building. At the same time, Site D's official monthly progress report for November 1978 indicated that 47 interns were still enrolled.

Second, there was extreme factionalism among the staff members. The director had isolated herself in her office, and administered the program by memoranda stating policies on every issue that came up, policies she developed by herself or in consultation with only the instructional supervisor. The director was also frequently out of the building to attend meetings at the OIC or to make contacts in the community. The director would not communicate with staff members directly, insisting they "go through the channels," which meant through the supervisors. However, only the instructional supervisor enjoyed the director's confidence. The counseling supervisor was not involved in decision making, but became merely a conduit for the director's memos.

The instructional supervisor took advantage of this situation to reinforce her own status and power. There was virtually no organized communication between the instructional and counseling staffs, and the instructional supervisor had interposed herself between the director and the counseling supervisor.

The non-management staff members were divided by the leadership situation into two main groups: those who tried to be "on the good side" of the instructional supervisor by agreeing with her positions and opinions, and those who tried to oppose her. There was also a small group of staff members who isolated themselves individually, trying to do their work with minimal contact with either camp. Staff morale was very low, program climate was abysmal, and there was no group cohesiveness. There was some attempt by staff members to perform their functions, and instruction had the mechanical appearance of the CIP design. However, the low intern attendance meant little actual instruction or counseling was going on.

This situation was caused by a combination of leadership behavior and the qualifications and experience of the leaders. Leadership behavior was divisive as described above. Furthermore, none of the three leaders had appropriate training or experience for their roles. The director had no supervisory experience and was not trained or experienced as an educational administrator. Furthermore, though she had grown up and gone to college in Site D's city, she had not resided there for several years, and was therefore not in close touch with the community. The instructional supervisor had not had experience in schools. She had been a training planner and manager at the OIC, but was not familiar with the activities or climate of a school. The counseling supervisor had a masters degree.
in guidance and counseling and had worked as a counseling specialist at the OIC for two and a half years, without supervisory responsibilities. She was younger and less experienced than the counselors and career developers under her, and some of them resented her getting the supervisor's job. She was not appointed to the role until after the initial training, though she had been transferred to the counseling staff of the CIP, and she was not assertive toward the instructional supervisor, who was a very domineering person.

Finally, the OIC executive director stated that he preferred to "manage by exception." Thus he did not closely monitor or support the CIP's development and only became aware of the situation there when reports of problems reached him. He wanted to let things "sort themselves out" without his involvement. The problems with CIP leadership thus became very large before the OIC became involved.

OIC/A became aware of the CIP's situation through the monthly reports showing attendance problems and through frequent visits. In December 1978, OIC/A finally prevailed on the OIC to remove the director and instructional supervisor. When that was done, the OIC/A deputy demonstration director moved to Site L to take personal control of the CIP. He instituted major changes in procedures, insisted on staff communication and coordination, and began an intensive training program for the staff. He also negotiated with the school district a revised CIP schedule that permitted 50-minute classes to be reinstated. On his discovery that the school coordinator had been misinstructed about applicant qualifications—and therefore also the schools—he reoriented the coordinator and negotiated new arrangements with the schools. The OIC/A deputy remained in Site D for one and one half months and was instrumental in finding a new director, who joined the CIP on 12 March 1979. The site staff unequivocally credited him with saving the program.

The changes begun by OIC/A were evident at RMC's second site visit, in February 1979. The new instructional supervisor had come from the instructors' ranks. She had been strongly endorsed by her peers and had extensive experience in education. She worked well with the staff and was perceived as a good resource person and leader. The counseling supervisor was more active in managing the counseling unit. Though her unassertive manner and feelings of relative inexperience kept her from establishing strong leadership, she was perceived as a good coordinator and worked with the interim (OIC/A) director and the instructional supervisor to develop staff cohesion.

As a result of these significant changes the program was making rapid progress in implementation. Staff morale was very high. Intern attendance was averaging close to 70%. Program climate was positive, caring, and supportive. The massive recruiting campaign of December and January to meet the deadline for 90 interns and 55 controls by 31 January 1979 had resulted in the enrollment of 77 new interns. Finally the staff had enough work to keep busy. The
new arrangements with the LEA had led to this cohort being about equally divided between dropouts and transfers from other schools.

In mid-March the new director joined the CIP. She had been an active educational administrator in the area for a number of years. She knew what she wanted the CIP to be and she had extensive community contacts. Her leadership style was inclusive and democratic. She shared and delegated authority as much as possible to reinforce staff ownership and commitment. When RMC visited next, in May 1979, the improvements noted in February had continued to strengthen the program. The effects of higher staff morale and more coordinated operations had brought about marked differences in intern attitudes as well. Unfortunately, many of the new interns enrolled in January had begun to leave the CIP. In the pressure of recruitment to meet the DOL January deadline, an OIC/A report to DOL later stated, "the sites relaxed normal screening procedures... [leading to] a disproportionate number of interns...who are probably not ideal candidates for the program" (OIC/A memo to DOL, 31 July 1979). This characterization evidently applied to the new interns' motivation to attend, and was reflected in enrollment and attendance rates throughout 1979. As interns dropped out, they were not deleted from the official enrollment number on which attendance rates were based, leading to progressively lower reported average attendance. The director had insisted on firm intern conduct and dress standards and the active interns had accepted them. As a whole, the active interns seemed more mature about and committed to career goals. They took the CIP and their own activities more seriously.

A different relationship with the LEA had also emerged. The interim (OIC/A) director had renegotiated several points in the arrangement with the LEA, and the new director had extended the relationship considerably by maintaining frequent contact with the LEA regional assistant superintendent. The director felt the LEA had been very generous in offering substantive assistance, such as access to LEA resources. Overall, at the May 1979 visit, the CIP appeared well on the road to full recovery from the operational nadir of December 1978.

Over the summer of 1979 the CIP ran a reduced program to accommodate interns' needs for summer jobs. Arrangements were made with several summer youth programs that allowed interns to attend the CIP in the morning and work in the afternoon. In September, the CIP reopened at the same time as the public schools.

RMC visited again in December 1979, after approval of the extension of the demonstration through September 1980. Though there had been high attrition as described earlier, about 65 interns from the first three cohorts were still active, staff and intern morale were high, program climate was very positive, and the program was functioning very well. The staff enthusiastically endorsed the new director. Her leadership was firmly established and her style
was compatible with staff members' expectations. Though a few staff members expressed the wish that the director would reduce the amount of time she spent away from the CIP, this comment was made in a wistful, not dissatisfied, manner. These staff members also recognized that the director's role involved much contact in the community and many meetings at the OIC.

There was little anxiety about recruiting enough applicants for the extension-period treatment and control groups. Under a new school coordinator, recruitment was very organized and systematic, and relations with the feeder schools had progressed to the point where CIP teams were allowed to set up booths on campus and to make announcements on the schools' PA systems telling students where they could talk to CIP recruiters. The CIP was also receiving strong public endorsements from influential community leaders, and informal community networks were spreading the message that the CIP was a good place to enroll. Thus, in December 1979, the Site D CIP was fully functional and eager to proceed with a new cohort during the extension period. The only persistent problem related to staff turnover as higher salaries in school districts continued to attract instructors away from the CIP.

In February 1980, Site D officially enrolled 130 new interns for the extension period. (Actually, the new interns had been brought in gradually throughout November, December, and January.) RMC visited a month later and found the program in full operation. Attendance was at 70%, where it stabilized with only minor fluctuations for the rest of the demonstration. Staff members had continued to move on to better paying positions, but well qualified people were found to replace them usually fairly soon. As new staff members came in they sometimes complained about the lack of resources, but they seemed to accept this as an endemic situation in social-service programs. Staff morale remained high. Plans called for continuing beyond the September 1980 end of the demonstration and proposals had been submitted to the CETA prime sponsor, a foundation, and the state. An official parent group had been activated, and parents were seen actively seeking to assist in the program, especially by keeping pressure on interns to attend.

RMC's final visit in August 1980 found much the same situation, though the enrollment was down because many interns did not want to go to school during the summer. There was every expectation that funding would be found for continuation, though the foundation had declined and no responses had yet been received to the other proposals. Both interns and staff members were enthusiastic and working hard. One of the "old" staff members commented, "It's smooth sailing now," as she recalled the first year and a half of the CIP. Staff members had plans for trying new approaches to the summer program to raise enrollment, such as a work-study arrangement. There continued to be dissatisfaction with the salary schedule and the CIP calendar. School personnel went the reasoning, need more vacation than two weeks a year to recover from the stress of working with youth, particularly youth with the kinds of problems...
CIP interns bring to the program. The LEA regional assistant superintendent also commented that she just did not know how the CIP could get people to work for the salaries they paid, which she felt were 10 to 15 percent lower than LEA salaries for a much shorter work year. "But they do, and it's a credit to their dedication," the official concluded.

The CIP in Site D had a tumultuous beginning year, ending with the dismissal of the original leadership and with the program on the verge of collapse. Direct intervention from OIC/A, however, turned the situation around and a new director was found. Under her leadership the CIP achieved full operation within a few months, and maintained it through the demonstration period. Over the 33 month period, 318 interns enrolled, 58 graduated, and approximately 70 remain in the program.
III. EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS

The process evaluation of CIP implementation has had two broad purposes, promulgated by NIE's Request for Proposals (RFP) in January 1978. The first purpose was to document and analyze the CIP's implementation in order to understand what happened in this particular demonstration program. The second was to add to the general knowledge base about youth-program implementation. In regard to the process of CIP implementation, NIE specifically asked, "What happens to the program; does [it] remain the same in goals and practices; what accounts for the changes or adaptations, for the fidelity to the original; are the changes improvements; implementation more effective through a system such as OIC... than through the normal developer/public school linkages?" (NIE, 1978, p. 7). These questions are addressed directly in this chapter.

In addition, when the CIP demonstration was extended at the end of 1979 for an additional nine months, RMC's study was also extended. The scope of work for RMC's extension added some further specific questions about the CIP's implementation. RMC was "to study implementation of a more stabilized program... should also focus on support to the replication sites by OIC/A and NIE" (NIE, 1980, p. 1). Another question was "whether or not the multi-service approach can appeal to youth in a way that a single approach cannot" (ibid). The manner in which the CIPs established and maintained "inter-institutional linkages" in their communities was to be examined. Finally, NIE wanted to learn "how to convince local programs of the utility and payoff of information" (ibid, p. 2) about or from another program, especially how lessons learned in one program could be used to "improve existing programs" (ibid). These specific additions to Task A's scope were designed to take advantage of the fact that, after two years of implementation in the sites, RMC was presumably observing fully operating and mature, rather than developing, programs. Though this presumption was not consistently true, these questions were able to be at least partially addressed.

With respect to the second general purpose of learning more about youth-program implementation, NIE wanted the study to "contribute to knowledge about implementation in systems that differ in power relationships, political considerations, incentives for change, and other variables believed important in the literature on educational change" (ibid). This intent to augment general knowledge about program implementation is consistent with the objectives of DOL's YEDPA Knowledge Development Plan (Office of Youth Programs, 1977) and the Congressional mandate in the YEDPA legislation "to test the relative efficacy of the different ways of dealing with these problems in different local contexts" (P.L. 95-93, Sec. 321).

The ultimate goal of fully understanding youth-program implementation will require systematic review of the findings about the great variety of YEDPA-sponsored projects. Such a synthesis far
exceeds the present study's scope. However, we feel the findings about implementation presented in this report will contribute to DOL's present program to synthesize YEDPA research as it accumulates.

Approach to the Task A Concerns

The research called for in Task A is primarily qualitative. That is, the major concerns are not about numbers of young people served by the CIPs in the new sites or about evidence of higher employment among CIP graduates. Although these are extremely important factors and are among the indicators of CIP success, the foci of Task A are the nature of the implementation process; the issues involved in getting the CIPs operating; the status of the four CIPs through a 33-month, federally supported implementation period; and the efficacy of the OIC system as a dissemination agency.

The approach to studying these topics has been to regard CIP implementation at each of the four sites as a case study, and then to extract an amalgam of the four local cases. This amalgam is the focus of this report. The findings reported in this chapter are based on the descriptions in Chapter II of events in the four sites and at the national level. To conserve space and readers' time and interest, the findings are not supported in this chapter with specific documentation.

An additional relevant point to be made before the findings are presented is that not all of RMC's findings or conclusions are presented below. This chapter focuses explicitly on the specific questions and issues posed in NIE's original and extension scopes of work. The next chapter presents additional findings, specifically about issues and events that arose during implementation but were not anticipated in the evaluators' charge from NIE. In almost all respects RMC considers these issues to be as important as those originally assigned. To get a full picture of what RMC has learned, therefore, readers should review both this chapter and the one following.

Findings

RMC's general response to the global concern about the extent of CIP implementation is that the sites were able, in most cases, to implement program structures and operating procedures that facilitated accomplishment of the functions in the CIP design. This finding, however, is mitigated by the inability of at least one site to develop maturity and stability in program operations. The strong positive climate that is supposed to permeate and characterize the CIP and the close coordination and communication that are intended to exist among the CIP's organizational units so they can
operate as a team in addressing participants' needs as "whole persons" were never enduringly realized in this site.

This is not to say that the CIP was not fully implemented in the sites. Indeed, three sites appeared, at various times, to have achieved the goal of setting up a program that not only exhibited the mechanical characteristics intended by the design but also embodied the spirit of the program: motivating, cohesive, and uplifting to the disadvantaged youth enrolled. The fourth site was well on its way to achieving this status when its leaders departed for more secure positions at the end of the demonstration period. This finding accentuates the fragility of the program, especially, RMC believes, with regard to the extreme importance of CIP leadership. Had there been continuity of strong, resourceful, motivating leadership in the CIP sites throughout the demonstration, RMC has little doubt that the programs would have stabilized and matured, even in the face of the many difficulties imposed from outside the program by contractual factors and events at the national and local levels. This conclusion is supported by RMC's observations of the sites at six different times.

When CIP leadership was appropriate, the programs moved toward, or were characterized by, efficient, coordinated operations and communication; high morale; high attendance and retention; and positive climate. When appropriate leadership was absent, procedures became confused, coordination lapsed, morale declined, truancy and attrition increased, and the climate deteriorated. While factors other than leadership alone—competition for youth from other programs, evaluation requirements that frustrated operations, delays in funding, for instance—affect the CIPs, the sites weathered the effects of these events better with strong leadership. Thus, RMC finds that CIP implementation during the demonstration period and the program's "replicability" in general have been successfully demonstrated, under conditions of appropriate site leadership. Further, RMC believes that if appropriate leadership were immediately available to each site, there would soon be four fully functioning CIPs operating. However, we should caution that "appropriate" leadership appears to be a very difficult commodity to obtain.

When the CIP is functioning at or near its full potential, goals and practices in the new sites remain consistent with those in the prototype. Inevitably, since most CIP goals are stated in terms of participant outcomes that are not yet fully known, it is possible at this point only to say whether the sites subscribed to the goals and manifested philosophies and activities congruent with them. Given the nature of the goals—e.g., enable young people to graduate from high school—it is easy to report that all sites remained committed to them. It is also clear that all sites accepted the philosophical underpinnings of the CIP, such as the importance of individualized instruction and intensive counseling.
With regard to practices, the same finding generally applies. Instruction and counseling have been individualized. Site leadership has coordinated planning and actions between instructional and counseling units so interns get consistent treatment. Hands-On experiences have been provided in the fields interns requested, and interns reported their experiences to be motivating and informative. Curricula have been developed combining elements of the OIC/A provided curriculum from the prototype CIP with local and state graduation requirements. With respect to the CIP's career orientation, the sites have not uniformly infused a great deal of career related content into the academic curriculum, but this area showed steady improvement as the sites gained experience. Site Advisory Councils were late to begin functioning, but when activated, these committees contributed their knowledge of, and contacts in, the communities to help support the programs.

Of course, local adaptations to specific practices are common. An accepted tenet of implementation "craft knowledge" is that new sites implementing programs developed elsewhere must adapt practices to fit their contexts, regardless of official rhetoric about "replication." Therefore, practices of the CIP have been assessed in terms of the functions they are intended to serve, rather than in terms of fidelity to specific forms in the prototype. Dealing with functions both serves the needs of the evaluation by delineating the most important aspect of a practice--what it is supposed to accomplish--and recognizes the needs of program implementors to adjust practices to the constraints and opportunities in a site.

In general, the new sites operated programs consistent with the goals and practices of the CIP design. What changes were made were intended to expedite program functions through application of a new idea or format or through accommodating contextual conditions that made it difficult to accomplish the function in the same way as in the original program. One example of adaptively changing a practice to incorporate a new approach occurred when one site changed the format of the staff "disposition conferences." In the original CIP, the entire staff participated in these meetings for all interns. The change, instituted in one site and later disseminated to the others, involved holding disposition conferences so that only the staff members associated with an intern participated, instead of all staff members. This relieved about two-thirds of the CIP professional staff members from attending each "dispo," while maintaining the necessary coordination among the staff members who dealt with each intern. An example of a change initiated to accommodate a CIP's local context was when one site divided the responsibilities of the school coordinator role among several other positions, in response to the school districts' insistence on negotiating with different people about different aspects of the program.

The reasons for adapting original CIP practices related to finding more efficient ways to perform program functions or to contextual conditions. On the other hand, factors that promoted
fidelity to original practices included lack of alternative, equally effective ways of accomplishing functions, the centralized nature of the demonstration structure, the fact that the CIP's were new organizations, and, we suspect, the OIC ethos. The structure of the demonstration, with the sites operating as subcontractors to OIC/A, required that any proposed changes to practices had to be approved in advance by OIC/A. OIC/A was reluctant to grant such approval without explicit exposition of a rationale, and it had both the inclination and the power to enforce site adherence to the CIP design. The fact that the CIPs were new organizations established specifically to implement a particular program model meant that there were no competing internal agendas. This is a fundamentally different situation than trying to introduce a new program into an extant organization. Finally, even if an alternative approach to some function had appeared likely to be more efficient, and even if OIC/A had been permissive about changes to the design, the ethos of OIC is so strong that an alternative approach probably could not have been effected if it went against the grain of that ethos. For instance, it is very time consuming for CIP staff members to devote such extensive effort to coordination between instructors and counselors. It could be argued that reducing the time spent in coordination and planning meetings would release more time for such activities as visiting interns' homes, and this argument would probably be correct. However, a major tenet of OIC's philosophy is to "deal with the whole person," and to do so requires extensive collaboration. Therefore, no suggestion about reducing coordination activities would be very likely to receive serious consideration. It would violate too basic a principle about how the CIP should deal with interns.

The adaptations to practice that occurred in the fully functioning programs came from either a desire to make procedures more efficient or to accommodate a contextual requirement, and then only if they did not appear to be contradictory to basic CIP and OIC philosophical tenets. Primarily because of these conditions, most changes made did constitute improvements to the program. The change to the procedures for disposition conferences illustrates this point. Efficiency was served and staff members were released from attending meetings mostly irrelevant to their responsibilities. Furthermore, there was no conflict with the OIC mandate to deal with the whole person. In effect, the strength of the OIC philosophy and the demonstrated effectiveness of most CIP procedures mitigated against making conscious changes that could detract from operations when the CIP was fully functioning. Of course, when a site was not functioning appropriately, changes were sometimes made, or occurred unintentionally, that did not represent improvements. This occurred, however, only when operational status was below par, often as a result of ineffective site leadership. The net effect was that the CIP design was strengthened by the 33 months of the demonstration period, as would be expected when more experience is gained in running a program in a wider variety of contexts.
In regard to the NIE's question about the effectiveness of the OIC system as a dissemination and implementation mechanism, RMC found that, in general, the OIC system proved to be a quite capable vehicle for disseminating the CIP, once it realized the inherent pitfalls of implementation and acquired some trial-and-error experience. In the sites, however, implementation problems arose as a result of local contextual conditions and the limited availability of appropriate program leadership. RMC believes that this finding points to a need for increased awareness at the local OIC level about such issues involved in implementing an alternative educational program as carefully cultivating the collaboration of other local agencies and obtaining strong, knowledgeable program managers. This conclusion is based on RMC interviews with local OIC leaders, who revealed a certain initial lack of awareness about the difficulties and requirements of implementing a program like the CIP.

Given the traditional emphasis of the OIC system on adult vocational training, this naivete is certainly not surprising. It should also be pointed out that the pressures of the rapid start-up schedule, the unfortunate timing of start-up (relative to LEA schedules), and the unrealistic salaries the project could afford all had inevitable major impacts on the local OICs' abilities to marshall local support and collaboration and to recruit effective CIP leaders. In sum, RMC feels the OIC system did a creditable job of implementing the CIP under extremely trying circumstances, and that, with more realistic time schedules, adequate funding for personnel, and more complete orientation of local OIC officials, the OIC system (and presumably other similar community-based organizations) offers a very strong capability for the implementation of youth programs.

In its question about OIC viability as a mechanism for program implementation, NIE asked for an assessment of OIC capability "in comparison to...the usual developer/public school linkages" (NIE, 1978, p. 7). However, there was no dissemination of the CIP through the "usual...linkages" with which to compare the OIC system's experiences. A study of the dissemination and implementation, through those linkages, of the Experience-Based Career Education programs (which are very similar to the CIP) is underway for NIE, but it has not yet been concluded. The same is true of a study of Follow Through dissemination through the National Diffusion Network.

On the basis of previous research, by RMC and others, we have concluded though that, overall, the OIC system is equally as effective as the "usual...linkages" for disseminating programs like the CIP, and, in cases where OIC felt the motivation of ownership as an additional incentive, would probably be more effective. This assessment is based on the observation that important characteristics of the OIC system--the ethos, shared goals, strong local reputation with both the client population and community agencies and employers--tend to enhance implementation. It also assumes that adequate time and resources would be available in future
efforts, and that the 1977-80 demonstration has been a significant learning experience for the OIC system.

A final finding about the OIC experience in disseminating and implementing the CIP is that no single theoretical model of dissemination/implementation in the literature was clearly supported by the demonstration, though such ideas as the necessity for local negotiations and adaptation were. This finding most likely resulted from the fact that models assume that initial conditions will be favorable (e.g., there will be adequate time for planning and establishment of collaborative links in the community), whereas the CIP demonstration did not enjoy such conditions. In any event, no model reliably predicted the events in the CIP demonstration.

The first question raised in the scope of work for the study's extension concerned "support to the replication sites by OIC/A and NIE." The role of NIE in the demonstration did not include support activities officially, such as technical assistance or training. Moreover, since the sites contracted with OIC/A, NIE had no official direct link to them, even as a funding agent or monitor. NIE's "support" to the sites was therefore very limited and informal. Of course, NIE did visit the sites approximately three times a year to observe the programs, and comments from CIP personnel suggest that NIE personnel were generous in providing moral support in the form of encouragement and informal comments or suggestions. NIE's main role in the demonstration, however, was in relation to OIC/A and DOL, often as an intermediary. While there were some disagreements between OIC/A and NIE over particular issues (e.g., control groups), NIE was most usually supportive of OIC/A's efforts and offered to render any assistance it could.

OIC/A's role in relation to the sites was, of course, very extensive. Officially, OIC/A served as contract manager to the sites, technical assistant, trainer, program developer, liaison to NIE and DOL, and program monitor. In the beginning of the demonstration and through the first year and several months, the sites reported both strong encouragement and strong pressure from OIC/A to get the CIP operating. There was some site dissatisfaction with OIC/A's training and assistance because the site staffs felt it lacked sufficient specificity. However, this is a common complaint from program adopters, and RMC believes it developed from the sites' desire to have all CIP procedures clearly and concretely spelled out. The more discretion adopters have in implementing a new program--i.e., behaving in new ways--the less sure they are that they are "doing it right." Therefore, adopters typically want very specific directions as to what to do and how to do it. In a case such as the CIP demonstration, however, there must be flexibility for the sites to adapt to contextual conditions. RMC feels the gap between the specificity desired by the sites and the flexibility needed for accommodating contextual conditions created most of the basis for the sites' occasional feelings that training was insufficiently detailed.
About April 1979, OIC/A began to take a less visibly active role in local site operations. By then the initial training had been largely completed and the sites knew what needed to be done to complete implementation. Therefore, OIC/A wanted the site directors to assume more responsibility for operations. This was also the time the original OIC/A project director, who had a stronger inclination toward direct intervention in the sites than his successors, resigned.

In general, RMC feels that OIC/A provided strong support for the sites throughout the demonstration. There were instances, especially early in the demonstration period, of conflict between OIC/A and particular sites. These arose from the natural conflict between OIC/A's desire to get the CIPs implemented quickly—heightened by the federal agencies' frequent inquiries about the sites' status—and the sites' inability to proceed faster than local agencies and other conditions would permit. In a sense then, these conflicts were somewhat programmed into the situation. The conflicts that did arise, moreover, appeared to be relatively minor compared to the special services OIC/A rendered to the sites at critical times.

In the three sites that had difficulty obtaining agreements with LEAs, resolutions were achieved within a week after OIC/A's direct interventions with the school districts. In the site where the original CIP director proved to be unsatisfactory, an OIC/A staff member took direct control of the CIP, got it back on the right track, and stayed at the site until a new local director was recruited. At the national level, OIC/A negotiated the issues of cohort size and entry dates and of the extension with NIE and DOL. OIC/A also assisted in obtaining interim funding for the CIPs occasionally, after the local OICs had exhausted their resources during the hiatus in funding from DOL and NIE through the first half of the extension period.

During the last six months of the demonstration, OIC/A researched potential continuation funding sources for the CIPs and helped them prepare proposals. Finally, OIC/A negotiated the matching funds arrangement with DOL under which the sites are now operating. OIC/A's performance in these matters convinced RMC that, without their leadership and support, the CIP sites would not have been able to operate. Therefore, regardless of some site dissatisfaction with OIC/A in the early stages of the demonstration, it is clear that OIC/A's involvement in and on behalf of the CIPs was largely responsible for the success of the demonstration.

The extension scope of work also directed RMC to determine if the CIP's "multi-service approach" was a significant factor in appealing to youth, as opposed to a program that provides only one service. A detailed response to this question is contained in the report from Task C (Fetterman, 1981), an examination and analysis of the relationships among CIP features and internal outcomes. However,
Our summary conclusion is that the multi-service approach is an important reason for the CIP's appeal.

It is difficult to say whether the CIP's multi-service approach per se has much to do with initially attracting potential interns to the program. On the one hand, interns became interested in the CIP for what are expressed as fairly simple reasons, the two most prominent being the opportunity to accelerate high school completion and the availability of an alternative to regular schools. These and other reasons interns cited as attracting them to the CIP appear undimensional; they do not explicitly identify the "multi-service" approach as such. On the other hand, the provision of several, mutually reinforcing services—academic instruction, personal and career counseling, work exposure—is the hallmark of the CIP in general. When an intern mentions a feature such as accelerated graduation as the reason for being drawn to the CIP, this answer implicitly verifies the attractiveness of the multi-service approach, because without providing a variety of services—"dealing with the whole person"—the CIP would not be able to function in such a way as to hasten graduation. In essence, since the CIP's components are so interdependent and integrated, being attracted by or to one feature is the same as to all. The feature that first captures the prospect's interest would not exist independently.

In any event, whether it is the multi-service approach itself or merely one CIP feature that first appeals to youth becomes immaterial once a young person gets to know something about the program. When asked what they think of the CIP and how they experience it, interns consistently gave multiple positive remarks. They talked of getting individual attention, of studying at their own levels and pace, of getting out into the community to see what jobs are like, of having help in finding part-time jobs and support services, of having guest speakers, and of several more factors. It is clear that all of the factors they mention are important to them. While no interns said to RMC (or would be likely to) that it was the "multi-service approach" that attracted them to the CIP or kept them there, many did say something like the following comment made by an intern:

They try to deal with you, deal with you in a way on your level. Not only try to check out your problems in school, but they deal with your home problems too. They try to see what the problem is or the reason why you're messin' up in school or whatever it is.

Comments such as these, repeated scores of times in conversations with interns, confirm that the CIP's multi-service approach is a major reason why the program appeals to young people and why interns stay with the CIP until they graduate.
However, it is also interesting in this regard to note that relatively few young people in the CIP demonstration sites became interested enough in the CIP to submit applications, compared to the large numbers of unemployed youth reported to exist. For instance, the feasibility study for one site (in the middle of the range of the four sites) reported a pool of 12,835 eligible youth in the proposed catchment area. Yet this site enrolled only 293 interns (about 2%) during the demonstration period and had, as did all the sites, substantial difficulties attracting potential interns. Just why such a seemingly small proportion of young people apparently eligible for the CIP applied is a major unanswered question. Ostensibly the CIP would be of great value to these young people, so there is little reason to suspect they stayed away because of deficiencies in the program design or goals. This leaves the possibilities that the CIP staffs did not adequately present the program to area youth or that young people did not really believe the messages they heard about it. Data from some interviews with interns and with community people suggest that many youth and their parents have become inured to the promises of new federally-sponsored programs, because so many such programs have come and gone with so few discernible effects. Moreover, at the end of the demonstration period, the CIPs had waiting lists of potential interns. This suggests that many people were waiting for some results or to see if the programs survived before expressing direct interest. In sum, however, RMC did not explore the issue of the CIP’s appeal with youth not in the program, so we are not able to state why so few of the many presumably eligible young people failed to apply. The responses of those who did enroll make it clear that the CIP’s multi-service approach was a significant factor in their enthusiasm for the program.

"Inter-institutional linkages" was a third aspect of the CIP programs NIE asked RMC to investigate during the extension, especially in regard to how the CIPs established and maintained viable ties to their community contacts. Strong inter-institutional linkages are essential to the CIP’s functioning. Permission from the school district must be obtained to operate at all, and cooperation from high schools is vital to recruitment. Links with employers are necessary so interns can be provided their Hands-On experiences. Collaboration from social-service agencies allows referral of interns who need resources or assistance the CIP cannot provide, such as day care for interns’ children. Community support of a more general nature is also highly desirable for ensuring the program will survive from year to year.

The CIP design contains an advisory body, the CIP Advisory Council, composed of representatives from a broad spectrum of the community. A full-time staff member, the school coordinator, handles matters between the CIP and the LEA. The director is expected to devote substantial time and effort to community contact, and career developers are to maintain and expand linkages to community employers. The local OIC’s established reputation and community contacts were also expected to be fully utilized by the CIP.
During the CIP demonstration, the major method for establishing and maintaining linkages to the community was personal contact by staff members, especially the directors, counselors, and career developers. The OICs were very instrumental in beginning the process of establishing linkages by virtue of their already active community support. Throughout the demonstration period, the CIP staffs augmented the OIC’s initial community ties by continually calling on new people and agencies to acquaint them with the program and explore the possibilities of enlisting their support and involvement, particularly with regard to providing Hands-On opportunities and social services for the interns. The formal Advisory Councils intended to advise the CIP and develop community links generally were not brought into active involvement until about halfway through the demonstration, though they may have been formally constituted earlier. The Advisory Councils did not play as large a role as the CIP design might lead one to believe they would. For the most part, the lack of early involvement was due to the higher priority assigned to getting internal CIP operations functioning adequately.

Finally, in the extension period, RMC was asked to pay particular attention to whatever the CIP demonstration could show about convincing local programs of the utility and payoff of information from or about other programs. This question, though of central importance for planning dissemination and implementation efforts, was not directly addressable by the CIP demonstration. Primarily this is because the CIP demonstration involved only one program being disseminated to only four new sites. However, while acknowledging the limitations of the sample size, we feel we can make some responses to the issue on the basis of how the CIP experience and the results of other studies of dissemination correlate. Perhaps the most basic of the factors that enhance new-program use of information is the documented success of the other program. If there is credible “proof” that a program (or a particular part of a program, such as a procedure for scheduling interns into classes) has been uncommonly effective, new sites are more likely to model their activities on it.

A second factor enhancing use of information is its source. Implementors will ascribe more credibility to information received from people who have actually used a procedure or implemented a program and who hold positions comparable to theirs in another site. For instance, instructors will accept information more readily from those who actually used an instructional method than from, say, a curriculum theorist who designed but never had to apply the method in question. The shared experience creates a bond between the new and the old users. The new user values the knowledge and opinion of someone who has faced the same implementation task in the same kind of context with the same sort of clients and accomplished it successfully.

Third, to the extent possible, information about practices is better received if it is specific and pragmatic. This applies
particularly in the beginning stages of implementation when the new user is presented with a vast panoply of unfamiliar tasks. The less ambiguous information is, the more certain the user can be of doing the "right" thing. As users get more familiar with new procedures by using them over time, they become more self-confident about their activities. Then information can be imparted in a more general format but, in the beginning, specificity is a great comfort. Specificity of course is more easily possible in describing discrete tasks or methods (e.g., a method for presenting a lesson) that are internal to the program than for more general tasks more sensitive to external conditions (e.g., getting school-board approval of the curriculum). Therefore, the level of detail of information must be based on analyses of both the task involved and the task's relation to the context.

Finally, the more similar a method of imparting information is to the situation in which it is to be applied, the more likely it is the information will be used appropriately. For instance, having new users actually develop and present a lesson is a more effective way to train someone to teach than giving a lecture. Case studies or simulations in which the new user must go through real planning steps are, therefore, better approaches to training than methods that involve only transmittal of cognitive information. To the extent possible, imparting information should involve the new user in actively practicing its application. These points about convincing new users of information of its "utility and payoff" are neither newly discovered or unique to the CIP demonstration, but field observations at the four CIP sites strongly confirmed them.

Summary

The findings presented here address CIP-implementation questions posed by NIE's evaluation design. Full implementation of the CIP was achieved in three sites at various points and for different lengths of time. Nearly full implementation was achieved at the fourth site.

Achieving fully functional CIP operation took a very great effort, made greater by such external conditions as the imposition of a demanding evaluation design while the programs were still starting up and local LEA reluctance to collaborate. Maintaining a stable, mature CIP proved to be nearly as difficult, and the quality and stability of site leadership was critical. When effective leaders departed, the CIPs temporarily deteriorated.

Overall, the goals and functions of the CIP design were strongly maintained in the fully implemented sites, while local adaptations to increase task efficiency or to accommodate contextual factors were made to specific original-site methods as situations warranted. The shared values and goals of the OIC system, close monitoring by OIC/A, and the proven appropriateness of CIP functions all played roles in maintaining the basic fidelity to the program model.
No single comprehensive theory of program dissemination and/or implementation was "proven" to be more correct than any other by the CIP demonstration. The OIC system demonstrated its effectiveness as a dissemination/implementation mechanism, in major part because of its credibility in the host communities and OIC/A's ability to intervene on critical occasions. NIE and OIC/A provided strong support for the sites, though NIE's was more general and distant because it had no official direct role in the sites. The multi-service approach represented by the CIP was found to be very attractive to interns, though it was certainly not the only reason they enrolled. CIP linkages with the host communities began from a foundation of established local OIC support and the personal resource networks of staff members. The CIPs built upon this foundation primarily, through expanding their personal contacts. Finally the CIP demonstration reinforced four prevalent notions about gaining new users' acceptance of information: proven effectiveness, role identification between new users and "messengers," the greatest possible degree of specificity, and training that simulates application of information all help to convince new users of the information's utility and benefits.

These responses to NIE's evaluation questions constitute only part of FMC's findings. There were also a number of issues and factors that affected implementation. The next chapter discusses these issues.
IV. FACTORS THAT AFFECTED CIP IMPLEMENTATION

Chapter III, "Evaluation Questions and Findings," presented RMC's responses to the various evaluation questions posed by NIE for the study. Those findings, however, by no means cover all that was important in the demonstration. In this chapter, additional factors that affected implementation are described. We feel these factors deserve attention because each represents an obstacle or issue that had to be addressed by the sites before full implementation could be achieved. As such, these issues must be raised for consideration in assessing the results of implementation and in using the CIP experience to guide further development of policy and strategies for youth programs. In effect, this chapter pursues the question, "Now that it has been shown that the CIP can be implemented, what were the important variables that affected the implementation process and how were they addressed?" Light shed on this question will be useful for the general knowledge-development objective stated by NIE as well as for potential adopters of the CIP.

The factors included in this discussion are: leadership, time and timing, staff turnover, intern attendance and retention, recruitment, relationships with local school districts, with teachers' unions, and with other community agencies, evaluation requirements, technical assistance and training, replication and adaptation, and the demonstration's structural arrangements. We have not attempted to order these issues by their importance or by the size of their effects on implementation. All were of significant dimensions, though some (e.g., leadership) represent thornier problems than others. Even so, each affected the demonstration powerfully enough that we believe it warrants particular attention.

There is also considerable overlap among the issues; many affected each other, and their interaction at times made them seem extricably interwoven. In the discussions below we have tried to focus on those attributes that most singularly define a factor, but the reader will be strongly impressed by the interrelationships.

Leadership

Strong leadership has been identified as one of the key requisites for successful CIP implementation. The primary leader, of course, is the CIP director. It is important, therefore, to consider the skills, abilities, and personal characteristics that appear to be associated with success in that job.

Perhaps the best way to define the characteristics required of a successful director is to begin by enumerating the functions that he or she must fulfill. Within the CIP building itself, the director must supervise both the instructional and counseling components of the program. With the assistance of both local and national OICs, he/she must recruit, hire, train, and review the performance
of the professional staff. To do so, he/she must thoroughly understand the performance requirements of each job. These functions also entail the ability to establish and maintain comprehensive personnel information files.

The unique nature of the CIP makes these leadership functions both more critical to the success of the operation and more demanding on the director than their counterparts in regular high schools. Unlike the average high school principal, the director is highly accountable for what goes on in the classroom and in student counseling sessions. He/she must make sure that instructors and counselors not only perform up to the established standards of their professions, but also that they are:

- sensitive to the special needs of the target group;
- able to gain the trust and respect of interns;
- able to convince interns that they can improve their life chances; and
- able to motivate interns to work toward that end.

The director must work with staff members who show deficiencies in any of these areas and replace those who are unwilling or unable to adopt appropriate behavior patterns.

Because both instructors and counselors routinely deal with very difficult populations, they operate under considerable stress. The director must be readily accessible to them and must understand the difficulties inherent in their jobs. He/she must take time to counsel and reassure them. When called upon to mediate disputes within the staff or between staff members and interns, he/she must be scrupulously open and fair. He/she must be able to make and back up tough decisions firmly but without being, or giving the impression of being, arbitrary.

The director must also understand, care about, and interact with the interns. Just as it was the impersonal and uncaring nature of the regular school experience that drove many of the CIP participants to seek an alternative, it is the personally aware and caring attitude at all levels of the CIP that is one of the program's most important keys to success. The director must both personify this attitude and ensure that the other staff members exhibit it.

Because the CIPs are so small, the director must also get involved in many mundane housekeeping and other duties. He/she has to worry about the lunch program, certification of the facility, break-ins and thefts, and equipment and building maintenance. On a less routine level, he/she also bears responsibility for all budgetary and fiscal matters (usually with assistance from the local OIC).
CIP directors also have many responsibilities that entail interactions with outside agencies. Initially they must "sell" the CIP to administrators in the local school district and to the local school board. They must convince these individuals of the value of the program and must negotiate with them regarding cooperative working relationships. Failure to complete these negotiations successfully will, at the least, seriously impair the program's ability to recruit adequate numbers of students—and there may very well be even more serious consequences.

In all probability, it will also be necessary to negotiate with teacher organizations/ unions. The result of these negotiations must leave the CIP free to hire energetic, sensitive instructors and counselors with whom the interns will be able to relate and who will provide appropriate role models. If the CIP is compelled to hire unemployed union teachers from the top of the seniority list, the chances of the program succeeding are substantially reduced.

Experience suggests that negotiations with both the school district and the teacher organization are likely to be difficult. Both groups may (at least initially) perceive the CIP as an intruder attempting to take over part of their turf. The director must, therefore, be a convincing presenter of the facts and a skillful salesperson. He or she must also be persistent in working out the details of the cooperative relationships and in obtaining binding written agreements so that there are no surprises on either side as program implementation unfolds.

The career component of the CIP also requires that the program have good working relationships with local business and industry. While another member of the CIP staff bears primary responsibility for this function, the director must also play an active role, particularly in initiating, but also in maintaining these relationships. The stature associated with the director's position will open doors not accessible to others—but he or she must have the know-how to capitalize on the initial openings or they may be permanently lost.

It follows from what has been said thus far that the director must have all of the administrative expertise of a regular school principal plus a quite extensive repertoire of additional skills. He or she must also have personal characteristics that inspire the respect of staff, students, and various community groups including especially the local school district and industry. All of these characteristics may be essential to the viability of any particular CIP. At least it is clear that a CIP has far less chance of survival with a marginal director than does a regular high school. The infrastructure provided by long established tradition serves to guarantee the viability of regular schools. Such institutions (the word itself is significant) serve more docile and accepting target groups and can afford to be substantially more impersonal and less responsive than a CIP where identifying and meeting student needs are paramount.
Time and Timing

The effects of time (duration) and timing on the CIP demonstration were immense. A brief review of the schedule of events illustrates this point. The YEDPA legislation was enacted in August 1977. In September, OIC/A made its first tentative contacts with local OICs, telling them of the strong possibility of a demonstration program and suggesting they should prepare to respond to the opportunity if it eventuated. However, no specific or concrete promises could be made, as DOL and NIE had not yet reached agreement. In early November, the DOL-NIE Interagency Agreement was signed, setting the formal operation into progress. Meanwhile, OIC/A, still not able to offer specific assurances that anything would come of it, requested local OICs to submit information about their qualifications to be demonstration sites. After DOL and NIE had reached agreement, and the money to operate the demonstration had been allocated to NIE from DOL, NIE was able to enter into a contract with OIC/A on 8 December 1977. Only then could OIC/A negotiate subcontracts with the four local OICs that demonstrated the highest capabilities to adopt the CIP. The OIC/A-local OIC contracts became effective 15 December 1977.

The DOL-NIE agreement stipulated that the CIPs were to begin serving students in January 1978. Thus, the local OICs had, formally, seven weeks at the most to accomplish a vast array of planning and preparation tasks—staff recruitment and training, intern recruitment, selection and preparation of a facility, acquisition of materials, review and coordination of the CIP curriculum to integrate it with that of the local LEA, and securing LEA and teachers' union permissions to operate. OIC/A had to plan and deliver start-up training and technical assistance and coordination in the same time frame. Not surprisingly, the severe schedule created an atmosphere of high pressure and anxiety for all the OIC actors. Inevitably, decisions were made in haste and preparations were not as thorough as the complexity and delicacy of the demonstration warranted. This beginning had persistent effects.

Two findings relate to the time allowed for various dissemination and implementation activities. First, adequate time was not allowed for OIC/A and the sites to conduct careful planning and preparation prior to full-scale operation. Several activities were either not accomplished at all or done hurriedly and incompletely because the sites were expected to start serving interns within seven weeks of signing their contracts. This shortage of time severely affected many activities, such as staff hiring and training, intern recruitment, materials procurement, and curriculum review. The two most critically deleterious effects of the compressed time frame were not obtaining LEA agreements prior to initiating operations and being restricted to a small pool of potential staff members. The sites were not truly ready to begin operation when the first interns arrived.
Second, not enough time was allowed for program operations to stabilize before formal evaluation was imposed on the CIPs. The CIPs were exposed to visitors—from NIE, DOL, RMC, and OIC/A—asking questions and observing activities before the staff members had had a chance to become familiar and comfortable with their tasks, with the CIP design and procedures, and with each other. The visits were very unnerving, anxiety-provoking, and probably unfair to both the sites and the evaluation.

This is not to say that the early stages of the demonstration should have been closed to inquiry. On the contrary, there are many issues of importance to be investigated during the early stages of implementation, from initial decision making about adoption through planning and preparation into operation. However, such investigation could have been designed to be less disruptive to implementation progress by, for instance, including a research/documentation component in the implementation designs.

These points about too little time being allowed for planning, preparation, and pre-evaluation operation raise the question about how much time should have been granted the sites. A specific recommendation about this issue should, however, be empirically based on study of an implementation in which more appropriate strategies were used. In short, the CIP implementation demonstrates that adequate time was not allowed, but does not give clear, specific guidance as to how much time ought to be allowed. In addition, such a recommendation would vary in relation to many factors—program complexity, degree of dependence on actors outside the program, and others. Generally, though, we believe that if the CIPs had been granted a period of about one semester for planning and program preparation and one semester of pilot operation, evaluation could have then proceeded without significantly interfering with operations, except for the control-group issue.

Relative to timing, the calendars of other relevant programs or institutions in the replication-site communities were not adequately considered in planning the demonstration. As one example, staff members for the CIPs were hurriedly recruited at a time when the regular school year was in progress, which restricted the pool of available instructional personnel to those who had recently moved to the area, had not been able to find positions in the public schools, or were otherwise not employed. Consequently, some candidates accepted for CIP positions were not adequately qualified. Another effect of the bad timing of CIP start-up was that the public schools from which interns were to be recruited were not geared up to provide student transcripts to the CIPs or to allow CIP recruiters on campus. Such collaborative activities, essential to running the CIP, simply were not planned into the schools' agendas, and could not be on such short notice. The time of year—shortly after Christmas and during the public schools' semester break—was a further hindrance since grades for the first semester and schedules for the second were in preparation.
The time and timing of the implementation schedule were thus far from optimal for facilitating the demonstration. Not enough time was allotted for the crucial tasks of planning and preparation, nor for pre-evaluation operations (a "shakedown" period). In consequence, tasks were done incompletely or even neglected, decisions were made hastily and prematurely, and a sense of crisis pervaded the CIP sites. Naturally, these occurrences were detrimental. Even OIC/A, which has a justified reputation for quickly developing and installing new programs, was unable to counteract the impact of too little time for judicious preparation until after a substantial amount of schedule slippage had occurred. Similarly, the mismatch between the CIP implementation schedule and the calendars of other institutions in the four communities—primarily the school systems—hindered implementation. In future implementation efforts, allowance of sufficient preparation time and coordination with other agencies' schedules will strongly enhance prospects for success.

Staff Turnover Rates of CIP Sites

Staff turnover provides one measure of the stability of a program. Turnover is particularly significant in the CIP because of the importance of continuity in the program. The development of fully functioning CIP components requires basic continuity of both policies and personnel. Growth of strong personal relationships between staff members and interns promotes intern attendance and requires continuity in the staff. This discussion presents and compares staff turnover rates across the four sites. Reasons for both voluntary and involuntary departures are presented. The sites' variation in turnover rates relates to implementation success.

Site A had a turnover rate of 226%; Sites B, C, and D had roughly equivalent rates: 89% in Site B; 100% in Site C; and 83% in Site D. The turnover rate for each of the sites was calculated in the following manner. Although the original CIP design calls for 23 staff positions, some remained unfilled at specific sites because of low enrollments, because qualified people could not be found, or because a site organized its staff roles differently. Therefore, only those positions that were fairly consistently filled throughout the demonstration period were counted. Thus Sites A and B had bases of 19 positions; Site C, 22; and Site D, 18. The number of individuals who departed from a site was divided by these bases to yield the turnover rate. (Internal promotions were not considered in the calculation to avoid an inflated turnover rate. Internal promotions were often used to prevent departures of desired staff or to fill vacancies at supervisory levels. Moreover, only management and professional staff positions—including instructional aides—were considered, not clerical or maintenance roles.) The specific statistics of staff departures and the reasons for the departures are presented below for each site (also see Table 1, page 63).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>VOLUNTARY</th>
<th>IN VOLUNTARY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better Working Conditions or Career Advancement</td>
<td>Dislike other staff, interns, or CIP philosophy</td>
<td>Frustrated with Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Sites</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Site A

Nineteen of the 43 staff departures in Site A (44%) were self-initiated. Of these, 58% (11 of 19) left the program for career advancement opportunities or better working conditions. Ten of these individuals were instructors or counselors. Better work schedules and fringe benefits in the local school system represented the most powerful attractions to staff members.

Four staff members who left the program voluntarily departed because they disliked working with other members of the staff or with the interns or because they were uncomfortable with the CIP's methods. The remaining four voluntarily departing staff members left due to "frustration" with the program's management. Two of these reported that they felt the CIP managers were incompetent or arbitrary, one left because of difficulties with local OIC administration and staff members, and one left because of a perceived lack of prospects for professional advancement.

Twenty-four of the Site A staff turnovers were involuntary terminations by the CIP or the OIC. Nineteen of those terminated involuntarily were dismissed for job-related reasons. Eight of those had held management positions, eight were counselors or instructors, and three were instructional aides.

Site B

In Site B there were 17 staff turnovers. Fourteen were voluntary. Thirteen of these voluntary departures (11 professionals and two managers) left the program for career advancement opportunities or better working conditions. The majority of these individuals went into the private sector, citing higher salaries and greater opportunities for advancement as the reasons for departure. Only one individual elected to leave the program because of an incompatibility between his and the program's philosophies.

Three members of the Site B staff were involuntarily terminated. All three were professionals. Site B was unique in having no managers involuntarily dismissed.

Site C

There were 22 staff departures at Site C, of which 16 were voluntary. Eight of the voluntary departures (all either instructors or counselors) were to pursue career advancement opportunities or for better working conditions. Five individuals who left the program voluntarily departed because they were frustrated with

1Job-related reasons include failure to perform job duties to the satisfaction of higher management, inability to acquire needed credentials, and resistance to CIP goals and philosophy.
management or other staff members. Three were management-level personnel who left the program for the following stated reasons: local OIC management, lack of support, unresponsiveness, and an unwritten policy of no internal promotions. The remaining two (non-management) people who left out of frustration cited unresponsive, weak, and inconsistent program management and uncooperative staff as their reason for departing. Two of the remaining three voluntary terminations were the result of attitudinal or philosophical incompatibilities with the program. The last departure was for a planned retirement.

Six individuals were involuntarily terminated, four of them (of whom two were management-level) for job-related reasons. Two individuals were forced to leave because of conflicting personal obligations.

**Site D**

In Site D, nine of the 15 staff departures were self-initiated. Seven individuals left the program for better working conditions or career advancement opportunities. All of these were either instructors or counselors. The lure of additional money, promotional opportunities, better hours, and better fringe benefits in the local schools and in private-industry training programs were reported most frequently as the bases for voluntary departures.

One of the remaining voluntary departures was due to disagreement with the CIP's philosophy. The other grew out of frustration with "unresponsive management."

Six staff members were involuntarily terminated, five of them for job-related reasons. Three individuals so terminated were management level. Weak managerial or administrative skills, poor interpersonal skills, and counter-productive communication skills were cited as the bases for these terminations. One non-management person was terminated for poor attendance, and the other for failure to meet LEA certification requirements. The sixth involuntary departure was for personal reasons that conflicted with CIP employment.

**Across Sites**

Summed across the four sites, there were 97 terminations, 58 voluntary and 39 involuntary. Thirty-nine (67%) of the voluntary terminations were for reasons of career advancement or obtaining better working conditions. Over half (10/19) of the rest of those who departed voluntarily cited frustration or conflicts with management as the reason for their leaving, while eight people left because they had major difficulties with other staff members, interns, or the CIP approach. By job category, six (10%) of the voluntary staff departures were of managers, and 52 (90%) of professional staff members.
Of the 39 involuntary terminations, almost 80% (31) were dismissals for job-related reasons. The remaining eight were for medical or personal reasons, such as a spouse's transfer to another city. By job category, 13 (33%) of the involuntary terminations were of managers, and 26 (67%) were of professionals.

Discussion

The statistics about staff turnover and its causes in the CIP sites correlate fairly well with RMC's general assessments about implementation of the four programs. Site A's difficulties in maintaining operations after an initial fast start are reflected in its overall high turnover. More striking, however, is the statistic that 61% of all staff dismissals (19/31) for job-related reasons occurred at Site A, comprising eight (62%) terminations of management personnel and 11 (61%) of professionals. Another aspect of this high incidence of involuntary management-level dismissals in Site A is that they occurred throughout the demonstration period. In contrast, the involuntary terminations of managers in Sites C (two dismissals) and D (three dismissals) occurred within a short period and represented "channings of the guard." In both sites, these management-level reorganizations were shortly followed by noticeable improvements in CIP operations. The lack of any involuntary dismissals of managers and of voluntary departures due to frustration with management in Site B, reflect, we feel, that site's steadier and earlier achievement of fully functioning status. Finally, in this regard it is relevant that the involuntary dismissals represent turnover rates at the management and staff levels of 267% and 59% respectively at Site A, zero and 19% at Site B, 50% and 11% at Site C, and 75% and 14% at Site D.

The most prevalent reason for staff terminations in the CIP demonstration was voluntary departure to obtain better working conditions or for career advancement. Forty percent of all staff departures were in this category (67% of voluntary departures). This high incidence of staff members leaving for better jobs raises the question of the CIP's ability to compete for available personnel. RMC site visitors heard complaints about salaries, hours, lack of vacation time, insufficient supplies, and lack of advancement potential from overwhelming majorities of the professional staff members in all four sites. These complaints were almost always made by way of comparison to positions in LEAs, and they were frequently accompanied by announcements that the staff member was looking for alternative employment.

Attrition from the CIP staffs for better jobs raises a serious issue. Without continuity in staffing it is difficult either to implement program functions or to provide stability for interns. Yet the financial resources available to OIC/A made it impossible to offer prospective staff members salaries or instructional resources comparable to equivalent roles in other institutions. Certain OIC policies exacerbated this basic disadvantage for the CIPs. For instance, CIP staff members were expected to work all year (with a
two-week vacation), instead of a ten-month academic year with summer and holiday vacations. For teachers contemplating a choice between public-school and CIP employment, the prospect of less money for substantially more work and less vacation time must be regarded as a disincentive.

Comments from CIP staff members, both still at the CIPS and already departed, also suggest that a latent function of the CIP is to serve as a training ground for teachers and counselors whose prior experience was not sufficient to secure them other positions. Many staff members reported that they either were working at the CIP as a holding action until a position with more competitive compensation opened up or were accumulating experience that would qualify them for other positions. The people who took such routes are by no means crass or opportunistic. For the most part, the new positions to which they went still involved them in providing valuable needed services to disadvantaged youth. An example was a CIP counselor who moved on to direct an industrial counseling-and-training program for a manufacturing company on the basis of CIP experience. This person reported that the position had previously been open but required more experience than he had. He took a job at the CIP to augment his experience, and left for the private-sector job after a few months. In another case, an instructor who loved the work, liked the interns, got along well with peers and management, and was a good teacher left the CIP because, as he said, he "simply could not afford to stay." He moved to a higher-paying job in a school system that would not have hired him without his CIP experience.

These cases are not atypical: They represent a meaningful proportion of the staff members who left the CIPS voluntarily. Emphatically, it is not the case that staff members who left for better jobs did so after manipulating the CIP for their own benefit. Rather, their departures were pragmatic. Their new positions offered them similar opportunities to "do good," but also gave them more competitive compensation at the same time. The issue of professional compensation and working conditions adequate to recruit and keep good people is a serious one that affects many social programs as it has the CIPs.

Staff turnover in the CIP sites correlates with 
MC's assessment of implementation, especially with regard to management-level terminations. This has implications for requirements of prospective staff members that should be fully considered in future programming. So, too, does the evident impact of non-competitive compensation and fringe benefits for professional personnel in programs like the CIP. The prevailing approach of lower salaries for social-service programs may in fact be ultimately more costly because it detracts from implementation by propagating staff instability. These issues warrant attention from policy makers and program designers.
Attendance

Intern attendance in the CIPs was a persistent problem common to all four sites. The prototype CIP was reported as having achieved an average 70% attendance rate during its evaluation period. This was, therefore, the level expected by OIC/A for the new sites. Both site records and RMC's site visits, however, reveal that this rate was very difficult to achieve and maintain.

Beyond that observation, site reports of attendance are not used for this discussion except in relation to summer-attendance trends. Different attendance procedures were used at different sites and within sites over time, making the consistency, accuracy, and comparability of statistics suspect. What follows is therefore based on attendance data collected directly by RMC during site visits.

In the sites RMC noted a consistent relationship between program functioning and attendance. When a site was experiencing operational difficulties (due to any number of factors—low staff morale, poor climate, low intra-staff coordination, leadership problems), intern attendance declined. When a site was fully operational (functions mechanically in place and positive climate), attendance rose, though there was a lag between a site's beginning to improve and increased attendance. This relationship was consistent enough to lead RMC to conclude there is a causal relationship between fully functioning operation and attendance. Such a conclusion is supported by logic, theory, and other research. Briefly, sound operations within a positive environment encourage participant attendance.

Nevertheless, attendance even in the fully functioning CIPs did not consistently match the criteria set on the basis of the Philadelphia experience. This raises the questions of: why?, and was the 70% expected attendance a reasonable standard?

Our observation of the CIP demonstration has led to some insights we feel help explain low intern attendance. One factor, we believe, was the method of accounting. When an intern entered the program, he or she became part of the enrollment base immediately (i.e., the denominator of the ratio used to compute attendance rates was increased by one for each new intern as soon as he or she entered). But if an intern left the program, there was a lag between when he or she stopped coming and when he or she was subtracted from the enrollment base. This time lag reflected the CIP's efforts to get the intern to return and the time it took for the termination to be processed. Thus, a departed intern remained as part of the enrollment base for some period (ranging from several days to several months) even though he or she had ceased being active in the program. This discrepancy between immediate addition to the enrollment base upon entry and delayed subtraction from it upon actual departure depressed the percentage reported.
Two other factors we feel were important were the length of time the CIP's had been operating and the implementation difficulties the sites experienced. In the original site, the CIP had been operating for more than two years before evaluation, and therefore the public reporting of attendance statistics, began. The program was stable and had a positive climate throughout the period the interns in the prototype attended. This would motivate steadier attendance by new entrants from the beginning, as interns already there modeled and encouraged high attendance for newcomers. Also, counselors had adequate opportunity and practiced procedures to deal with interns regularly, and the CIP was a stable, supportive place to be. The tumult of the four replication CIP's implementation did not offer these characteristics consistently.

Another significant contributor to low attendance rates is closely related. There were no pressures to recruit interns at the original site (it was over-subscribed with volunteers) while the need to "get more kids" was almost a life-or-death matter at most of the replication sites. High-risk students were screened out at the prototype site while the replication sites had no such luxury. They enrolled students that were marginal and were reluctant to terminate them even though their attendance was sporadic.

It must also, of course, be kept in mind that the CIP's target population consists primarily of notoriously poor school attenders. While a goal of 70% attendance may seem discouragingly low, in most cases it represents a dramatic change in behavior over pre-CIP patterns.

The discussion of attendance to this point has been based on RMC's direct observations during site visits. The following discussion of attendance during the summer session draws on trends in attendance data reported by the sites. As stated earlier, the absolute values of the numbers in particular, and even the apparent trends over time, need to be interpreted cautiously.

Table 2 provides a breakdown of the regular school year's and summer months' attendance rates reported by the four sites over the 18 months from January 1979 through June 1980. With the exception of Site A, the attendance rates of the interns were lower during the summer months than they were for the regular school term. For Site D, the drop in the attendance during the summer months, when compared with the other sites, was quite drastic--attendance dropped by approximately 19%.
Table 2

Comparison of Regular School Term Attendance Rates With Summer Months Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary reason reported by the sites for the drop in attendance during the summer months was the intern's need for summer work. The staff responded to this need by arranging for summer jobs for all interns who wanted them. Two other sites made arrangements for part-time summer employment through the CETA program. Project staff indicated, however, that the travel time to and from work made it quite difficult for interns to attend the CIP as well. To solve that problem, instructional schedules were modified to accommodate the staggered work hours. Intern attendance was believed to have been enhanced by the procedure, but not to the level expected.

That interns were not accustomed to attending school in the summer was another reason reported as contributing to their poor summer-school attendance. Several sites responded to this problem by increasing the number of educational and cultural field trips during the summer months and making participation in them contingent on good attendance. Again, attendance was improved, though not to the 70% standard.

It was mentioned earlier that Site A's attendance did not drop during the summer months as did the other sites. Perhaps one reason is that Site A was able to make arrangements with its CETA program--at least during the 1979 summer term--to provide on-site summer employment for the CIP youths. This arrangement appears to have reduced problems with travel time to work and conflicting school and work schedules.

In summary, during the course of site visits to the four CIPs, RMC observed that intern attendance reached the 70% standard extrapolated from the Philadelphia experience only when program operations were fully implemented. This was true, moreover, only when the enrollment base used to calculate the attendance percentage represented youth who were actively participating in the program, not those who simply were admitted hurriedly in response to pressures to meet enrollment quotas imposed from outside. The implication is clear that participation in the CIP and similar programs is strongly dependent on both the program's operational efficacy and an appropriate match between program and enrollees.
Retention

Table 3 presents enrollment, termination, graduation, and retention-rate data for each of the four cohorts at each of the four sites. The reader is cautioned that the data appear more precise than they actually are. The enrollment dates, particularly for Cohorts I and II, differed from site to site. The terminations were tallied at different times for different sites and cohorts. The length of time between enrollment and the dates when terminations were counted also varied across sites and cohorts. Finally, the numbers themselves are not totally reliable. Different data sources, such as the sites' own monthly reports to OIC, NIE's site visit reports, OIC/A's reports to NIE, and RMC's own observations were rarely in agreement. Site records were incomplete and often not up to date. In some cases interns were kept on the books long after they had dropped out or should have been terminated for poor attendance.

Despite all these problems, the trends and larger differences that can be seen in Table 3 are thought to be meaningful. Moreover, they tend to confirm inferences drawn from other data sources. Perhaps most noticeable is the substantially higher retention rate observed at Site B relative to the other sites. This finding parallels that reported elsewhere with regard to staff turnover. Site B had the lowest staff turnover rate, the fewest staff terminations for incompetence, and no involuntary terminations of management-level staff. Site B was also among the first to attain full operational status and the site that maintained that level of performance longest.

At Site D, there is a very noticeable trend for retention rates to improve for each successive cohort. This finding is consistent with the sequence of events at that site. The original director and instructional supervisor were dismissed. There was a marked improvement in both climate and operations as a result of OIC/A's interventions. Then, following the installation of a new director and instructional supervisor, full operational status was achieved and the program matured.

The third finding that is quite clearly shown in Table 3 is that intern retention was significantly poorer at Site A than at the other sites. This finding is again consonant with the fact that Site A experienced great difficulty in finding suitable personnel for all levels of positions within the CIP. Three directors left and there were more staff and management terminations for reasons of incompetence than at any other site. Site A also had the highest overall staff turnover rate.

An attempt was made to compile a list of reasons that interns terminated at each site by contacting the interns directly. At the time of this writing, only second and third cohort interns have been
Table 3

Intern Retention at the Four Replication Sites and Overall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Enrolled</th>
<th>Terminated</th>
<th>Graduated</th>
<th>Retention Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>48&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>72&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>38&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>73&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>61&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>60&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across Sites</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>As of 12/79
<sup>b</sup>As of 5/80
<sup>c</sup>As of 9/80
contacted and our success rate in making contacts has been relatively low. At Site A, for example, there were 110 total terminations in the second and third cohorts but we were able to contact only 78. For the other sites, our success rates were as follows: Site B, 51 of 55; Site C, 17 of 102; and Site D, 37 of 109.

The termination statistics compiled from contacting the interns are presented in Table 4. They are not particularly informative, although a few interesting relationships do emerge. When the number of voluntary terminations is expressed as a percentage of the sum of voluntary and involuntary terminations, Site B has the lowest figure (69%). Thus, not only did Site B have the lowest termination rate, it also had the smallest percentage of total terminations that were voluntary.

Site C had the highest percentage of voluntary terminations (94%); however, the largest number of them were for the positive reason of accepting employment. Site A had the largest number of interns who returned to the regular high school. This finding, however, may relate more to the ease with which such transfers could be made at Site A (where the CIP was an integral part of the school system) than to a difference in the attractiveness of the CIP vis-à-vis the feeder school.

"Personal reasons" was the factor most often cited as associated with terminations. This finding is somewhat misleading, however, as many interns who gave that reason were described by the sites as having been involuntary terminated for reasons of poor attendance and disruptive behavior. While personal reasons may well have been responsible for attendance and behavior problems, the resulting terminations were not always actively sought by the interns. Some of the supposedly voluntary terminations for personal reasons are known to have been involuntary terminations for poor attendance and a substantial proportion of them are suspected to fall into that classification.

Staff members at all four sites reported that poor attendance was the primary reason for terminations. While all four sites had a policy to terminate interns after a specified number of days absent, adherence to that policy varied both from site to site and from time to time. Not surprisingly, when the policy was strictly enforced, the number of terminations went up and the retention rate went down. At Site C, the adoption of a policy to terminate interns after 15 consecutive absences (the previous policy was to terminate interns only at the end of each semester) had a substantial impact on retention statistics. While the intent was to improve attendance rates (which, of course, it appeared to do since poor attenders were removed from the attendance base) another (undesirable) outcome was to increase the number of terminations (see Table 2, second versus third cohort terminations).

All of these figures must be interpreted very cautiously. Policy changes regarding terminations may have dramatic impacts
Table 4
Reasons Interns Gave For Their Terminations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Involuntary Terminations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor Behavior</td>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td>Incarcerated</td>
<td>Health/Medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>Problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Family Moved</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voluntary Terminations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to Regular H.S.</td>
<td>Personal Reasons</td>
<td>Took Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on retention and attendance statistics without having any detectable impact on attendance behavior. In other words, the numbers can be manipulated so as to give misleading impressions as to what is really happening. Unfortunately, during the periods between site visits, RMC had no choice but to rely on data provided by secondary sources.

Another (presumably real) influence that affected both attendance and retention rates was the pre-CIP status of the interns. Termination statistics as well as interviews with CIP counselors point to the fact that students who had dropped out of school prior to enrolling were less likely than those who were "potential dropouts" to remain in the program or to return after truancy or withdrawal from the program. In Table 3 this relationship is best seen at Site D where all of the enrollees in the first and second cohorts were actual dropouts and where the retention rates were very low. (Note: All first cohort interns at Site C were also actual dropouts. Why their retention rate was so high is not clear—perhaps simply because interns who were no longer active had not been officially terminated.)

Interviews with CIP interns and staff members revealed distinct differences in needs and orientations between potential and actual dropouts. Not surprisingly, the latter group had greater needs for child care services and for income-producing jobs than the former. The inability of the CIP to meet all of these needs was probably the reason for some terminations "for personal reasons."

Two other factors are thought to have contributed to low retention rates. The first of these relates to the expansion of several CIP catchment areas beyond the original single feeder school. In Site C, for example, five separate school districts were ultimately included—each with different requirements for graduation. Not only did this situation add to the confusion associated with determining each intern's course requirements (some unfortunate errors were made), but it absorbed many hours of counselors' time that might otherwise have been spent in intern-retaining counseling activities.

The second "other" factor pertains to the uncertainty of CIP funding. As was mentioned earlier, this uncertainty affected staff morale and stimulated the investigation of other job opportunities. Interns were affected in a similar manner. They worried about whether the CIP would be around long enough for them to graduate. They were also, of course, affected by the tensions they observed in the staff.

A classic example is the ingenious solution to the dilemma that attendance rates go down whenever retention rates go up (and vice-versa). This solution entailed keeping poor attenders on the books as enrolled but calculating attendance rates for only those enrollees who were "regular" attenders.
The prototype CIP reported a 70% retention rate for the evaluation period. This goal does not seem unreasonable. It was nearly attained at Site B and might have been had the facility not been overcrowded and had the pressures for meeting enrollment quotas been reduced to allow for slightly higher admission standards.

The other three sites were not close to the 70% rate but they shared the Site B problems mentioned above, plus major staffing inadequacies, less favorable recruiting situations, and other obstacles discussed throughout this report. RMC believes that a well-staffed CIP that has not been forced to enroll unsuitable students and that is not under the threat of imminent cessation of funding should be able to attain a 70% retention rate.

**Recruitment**

The process of recruitment and the enrollment of specified numbers of interns were not anticipated to be problems in the implementation. First, by contractual agreement with NIE, OIC/A accepted the responsibility to "arrange for the provision of CIP services to 150-200 participants at each project site annually." Second, the feasibility studies of all four sites claimed large pools of youths 16 to 21 years old, high dropout rates in the communities, and (in three sites) extremely high youth unemployment. Third, the model description of the school coordinator's role conveyed the impression that this person would get the needed "potential dropouts" by simply asking "feeder" high schools for referrals. The actual dropouts would similarly be obtained from either LEA dropout lists or from referrals from community groups. When recruitment started, however, serious problems arose.

The LEAs were found to be much more willing to refer "actual" than "potential" dropouts. LEAs, however, used varying criteria for deciding that students had dropped out. Some used a criterion of consecutive absences, while others looked at cumulative absences over a given period of time or defined as dropouts those who failed to re-register for the next term. For these reasons, LEAs produced dropout lists at different points during the school year, and these lists varied in precision depending on their recency.

The lists of actual dropouts produced by the LEAs were of limited use to the CIPs. The addresses were often incorrect or old, and many telephone numbers were no longer in service. In addition, after contacting the youths, reviewing their transcripts, and administering entry tests, the number of actual CIP enrollees obtained from dropout lists was very small. Site A began with a list of 3,200 names; 500 of these met minimum credit and age requirements; and only 14 eventually enrolled. Site C received a list of 357 actual dropouts, which produced 23 enrollees. Site D got lists containing 1,063 and 397 actual dropouts; these resulted in an enrollment of 22 and 63, respectively. Many of the actual dropouts came from word-of-mouth referrals, by community agencies and local groups and churches. To recruit these youth, the CIPs had to
resort to personal contact and on-the-street solicitation. This approach necessarily involved many staff members. To canvass neighborhoods, staff members often recruited in parks, taking time away from their regular duties. In addition, CIP staffs soon realized that many youth eligible for the CIP were not interested in the program.

The procurement of "potential" dropouts proved even more difficult, although some sites experienced more trouble than others. Three major problems emerged with recruiting potential dropouts. The first was a definitional problem. As no formal definition of a potential dropout exists, identification of students falling into this category was typically left to the discretion of school counselors. The criteria they used were by no means uniform and included poor attendance patterns, low grades, few credits accumulated toward graduation, and disciplinary and personal problems. Perhaps for this reason, the identification of potential dropouts by school staffs was a slow process. Further, counselors seemed reluctant to label students as potential dropouts, and the number identified was thus much smaller than had been originally expected.

The second problem was that high school staff members—particularly at the beginning of the demonstration—were very reluctant to take students out of the high school and give them to the CIP. For some high school personnel, referring students to the CIP was tantamount to admitting the public school was not meeting the needs of those students. Other high school personnel were simply afraid of losing students and thus having instructors laid off in their district. Still other school personnel, particularly counselors, had doubts about the effectiveness of the CIP as an alternative program.

A third problem causing youth-identification problems was the lack of synchronism between the CIP and feeder-school calendars. Recruitment for the first cohort took place in the beginning and middle of the second school semester and towards the end of the academic year. Recruitment for the second cohort took place in the summertime. Neither time was suitable because LEA personnel generally do not identify actual dropouts until September and potential dropouts until several months after the academic year begins. The third recruitment in December and January coincided with the closing of the first school semester; hence, it was easier to identify the potential dropouts.

Enrollment data encompassing three consecutive cohorts at the four sites (Table 5) indicate that the number of youth enrolled was significantly lower than the 150 expected for the first cohort. The enrollment data also show the percentages of potential dropouts in the initial cohorts. It can be observed that, over time, the LEAs became more willing to refer potential dropouts, but the absolute numbers of referrals remained small. The only exception to this trend occurred in Site B, where the main feeder school was willing to refer potential dropouts mainly because it was overcrowded by legal standards.
Table 5
Site Enrollment by Cohort and Pre-CIP Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Enrolled</th>
<th>Actual Dropouts</th>
<th>Potential Dropouts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>47\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Data were obtainable for only 47 of the 73 interns who enrolled in Cohort I in Site A.
The demand by DOL and NIE that all sites produce the same number of interns sec. unreasonable to Site C, and caused much distress there. In contrast to the other three sites, which had large LEAs (including two of the largest in the nation), the selected feeder high school in Site C had a student population of 1400, including approximately 150 potential dropouts (Feasibility Study, Site C).

As recruitment pressures by the federal agencies began to be felt with the second cohort—which was the first cohort used in the evaluation—the sites became aware of the critical role in recruitment played by the school coordinator. It was only then that two of the sites proceeded to fill this position.

Recruitment difficulties in the sites also brought the awareness that the one feeder school referred to in the feasibility studies would not produce a sufficient number of youth referrals. Consequently, all sites had to expand their catchment areas. In the three large sites, this resulted in CIP contacts with several high schools in the community. In Site C, which had LEAs with one high school each, the CIP had to establish agreements with five LEAs. As noted in the Site C description, this extended relationship resulted in the CIP having to satisfy the curricular and other criteria of five different districts.

The CIP staffs were limited in what they could do to obtain large numbers of youth referrals from the LEAs. Cooperation from the LEA was affected by the level of perceived threat the new program posed to the LEA. The number of potential dropouts, further, was a function of LEA size.

The LEA administration in Site A felt no competition from the CIP. In fact, it quickly adopted it as one of its many alternative high schools. The fact that the CIP was given the status of an alternative school rather than an alternative program affiliated with any of the feeder schools, however, placed the CIP in direct competition with other high schools for students. In addition, these schools had little incentive to cooperate. The ADA produced by the CIP did not go to the schools, but to the district's general fund. The Site B CIP did not encounter resistance because, as noted, the main feeder high school—a gigantic one even by urban standards—was overcrowded. The principal was anxious to reduce student-body size. Recruitment problems emerged in this very propitious situation not because the LEA was uncooperative but because the Site B director had established stringent selection criteria for CIP enrollees. Aware that the program would last only two years and that its success would be judged largely in terms of the number of graduates, he decided only to accept potential dropouts with at least 10 credits (of the 18 needed) toward graduation. This requirement eliminated many potential dropouts; further, some high school counselors saw this as an attempt to "cream" students—i.e., take only the students who were making acceptable progress anyway.
In Site C, where the teachers' union expected layoffs due to declining enrollment, the identification of potential dropouts became a protracted activity (under the guise of following "a proper procedure"). The LEA referred only very small numbers of the most hopeless students.

In Site D, there were great LEA referral problems because of confusion about the status of the CIP within the district and also due to the minimum reading level that CIP recruiters wanted potential dropouts to have. Once it was made clear to LEA administrators that ninth-grade students could be referred and that they would remain on the high school rolls while being served by the CIP, cooperation increased. Moreover, a key school administrator was very sympathetic to the CIP concept. Through her influences, CIP recruiters were allowed to carry out open recruitment on the campuses of several high schools. This meant that some students who were not potential dropouts could elect to enroll in the CIP.

In addition to the problem created by the small numbers of potential dropouts referred to the CIP, many eligible youth chose not to enroll. Under other circumstances, the decision might have been to serve the few interested youths and wait for the reputation of the program to spread within the area. Unfortunately, however, the sites' obligation to meet enrollment quotas made recruitment an issue intimately associated with program survival and one to which a great deal of CIP staff attention was given at each intake period.

The problem of recruitment—i.e., getting the "numbers"—was ultimately solved by getting students with lower qualifications and by expanding the network of cooperating high schools and LEAs. This approach brought with it large amounts of paperwork for counselors (due to different reporting procedures and curricula to consider), problems of intern attendance and retention, difficulties with course offerings, and reduced staff morale.

As we consider the recruitment issue, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the program's disseminators contributed to recruitment difficulties by not providing the sites with more and better training on recruitment strategies and practices.

Reconstruction of recruitment events in the prototype site revealed that recruitment had been very difficult there too in the early years of program development. Site staff recalled that the CIP had relied on one feeder school only when it operated on an open-entry basis and had no pre-set enrollment quotas. By the time the evaluation design had created a need to have discrete entries (cohorts) the program had already established referral agreements with "at least seven different high schools in the city." Further, the school coordinator had the support of "a team of two to three paraprofessionals" in the recruitment effort.
Given this information, why was recruitment not depicted as a critical activity when the program was described to the new implementors? Two main reasons can be offered.

When asked the above questions, OIC/A disseminators said they knew recruitment would be difficult. In fact, they remembered "it took about a year in the prototype to set up a recruitment system." The disseminators also claimed they accepted the recruitment targets—and the evaluation features as well—because they could either "accept the opportunity to work under a federal grant, even if the time frame given to us was short and unrealistic," or "wait forever." If this perception was valid, OIC/A had little choice but to underplay the difficulties of recruitment.

The second reason was that OIC/A hoped and believed that the recruitment knowledge it had acquired during its four years with the CIP could be packaged and transmitted to the replication sites through materials and training. OIC/A expected "an extraordinary degree of support and understanding," particularly from the local OIC, but discovered that establishing new CIPs became a "whole new process" for the sites.

Unlike the prototype CIP, which had operated two years in the community prior to its demonstration status and had had ample time to establish its reputation and demonstrate success by graduating interns, the replication sites had to operate with a very compressed start-up stage before beginning to enroll interns. Recruiting the specified numbers turned out to be a major problem. Recruitment pressures in turn, "accompanied" as they were by threats to terminate funding if the goals were not achieved, affected program operations. All staff members were called upon to participate in recruiting activities. Thus key treatment components such as instruction and counseling suffered. The credibility of at least one site was brought into question and staff morale was severely depressed as a result.

Relations with the LEAs

As in the case of recruitment, no significant difficulties had been anticipated in establishing cooperative working relationships with the LEAs. In its request for a feasibility study, OIC/A had asked for a statement of support from the Board of Education as well as information about enrollment, curriculum, and personnel practices in the LEA. All of the sites were able to comply with these requests.

The sites soon learned, however, that dealing with the LEAs was complex. There were various State and local requirements about teacher and counselor certification that had to be met. The CIP curriculum had to be reviewed by LEA officials to determine if it met established high school graduation requirements. Further, agreement had to be reached on the definitions and procedures to identify "actual" and "potential" dropouts.
Reaching 'specific--though by no means comprehensive and
definitive--agreements with the local boards took months of negotia-
tions: two and a half months after receiving the OIC/A contract at
Site A, five months at Site D, and seven months at Sites B and C.
Approval of credit award took even longer.

In Site A, the understanding with the LEA was facilitated by
the long-standing reputation of the local OIC and the resourcefulness
of its leadership in maintaining the initiative in negotiations
with the LEA. The agreement was also facilitated by the LEA's
extensive experience with alternative schools. It had about 25
alternative programs, of which 13 operated at the secondary level.
When the LEA was informed of the proposal to institute the CIP, it
decided to absorb it as an additional independent alternative school
within the system.

In Site D neither LEA officials nor CIP administrators had a
clear idea of what had to be accomplished. The LEA in Site D had a
number of alternative programs but they all functioned within
schools, not independently in separate buildings as did the CIP. As
a result, much confusion arose among school officials as to how the
CIP would operate and how approval of curriculum and staff certifi-
cation were to be achieved. The inexperience of the LEA in dealing
with an independent alternative school was compounded by the CIP
director's inexperience in dealing with the school system. A formal
agreement was signed by school authorities and the local OIC in May
1978, but only after OIC/A intervened directly in the negotiations
by conferring with the district. A consistent set of procedures for
transactions between the main feeder school and the CIP was not
achieved, however, until December 1978, when OIC/A took over the CIP
directly.

In Sites B and C, the delay in securing LEA agreements was due
to opposition from the teachers unions. In these two sites, agree-
ments were not reached except by OIC/A's direct involvement with the
LEAs and unions. Interestingly, the opposition had diverse causes.
In Site B, the union did not want the CIP to draw from the feeder
school selected in the feasibility study because the union was not
on good terms with the school principal. So the CIP had to search
for a different high school. In addition, the local superintendent
was about to retire and did not want to make agreements that would
bind his successor. Accordingly, the CIP and OIC/A had to wait
until the new superintendent was inaugurated, in June 1978. In Site
C, teacher union opposition stemmed from fear of potential teacher
layoffs.

Thus, in three sites, LEA agreements were not easy to obtain
and CIP administrators had little leverage in shaping them. It is
probably not coincidental that achieving an LEA agreement was
relatively easy and timely only with the district that had long
experience with alternative high schools.
School authorities in Site A wanted to play a major role in the management and leadership of the CIP. A compromise resulted in position and role changes in the CIP staffing design. An LEA official in charge of several alternative schools in the district was given the role of liaison between the CIP and the LEA. The independence of the school-coordinator role was thus diminished by cooptation into the working structure of the LEA. In addition, the LEA appointed two curriculum specialists to work in the CIP to augment and monitor the curriculum, to see that requirements for granting a high school diploma were met, and to keep attendance records. The presence of LEA staff in the program was initially perceived as damaging by the CIP director because they conveyed "the LEA line." However, as the demonstration proceeded and the CIP and the LEA became more accustomed to each other, their relationship became progressively stronger and more positive. At the end of the demonstration period, the LEA was supportive of the CIP concept, if somewhat concerned about how program operations were evolving.

In Site C, the LEA agreement—negotiated in conjunction with the union—forced the CIP to accept a union leader as the school coordinator and union teachers in the proportion of one teacher for every 25 students referred from the high school. The consequences of this proviso were that the CIP had to pay three teachers at union rates and employ staff it had not selected. Not surprisingly, one of the instructors was an individual who never identified with the CIP concept. The person appointed as school coordinator expressed his allegiance primarily to the original feeder school district and refused to perform a coordinating function with other districts as they were added to the catchment area.

Across all sites, the CIPs had to conform to LEA requirements about teacher certification. Since three CIPs had hired some uncertified instructors, efforts had to be made during the early implementation of the CIP to get credentials for them. This meant locating teacher credentialing programs and releasing CIP instructors so they could attend classes, placing extra burdens on the staff members already certified. Later, as CIP staff members left and were replaced, only credentialled instructors were hired. This meant that one of the desired program characteristics—the use of dedicated, dynamic, and inexpensive, though possibly uncredentialled, teachers—could not be realized in the replication sites as it had been in the prototype.

Curriculum requirements and procedures imposed by the LEAs in all four sites affected the intended career-infused curriculum of the CIP. OIC/A had developed educational materials (learners' packets) in the areas of English, math, science, social science, and career counseling. The purpose of these packets was to enable instruction to be individualized and to infuse academic subjects with content from the world of work. Except for the Career Counseling Seminar, CIP instructors soon abandoned the use of the OIC/A packets. Finding them "not clear," "boring for the interns," and "inapplicable to local conditions" were reasons cited for not using
the packets. But an important reason for the replacement of OIC/A packets, as time went by, was that CIP instructors had to offer courses whose content matched LEA requirements.

However, while CIP instructors had to develop courses that met with LEA curriculum guidelines, the LEAs were at times unsure of what their own course contents and sequences were. In Site C, CIP staff members spent considerable time talking to counselors from the various high schools trying to obtain specific information about their course descriptions. Further, information conveyed over the phone was not always correct, as was discovered when high school counselors denied credit for some coursework they had previously accepted.

By the end of the demonstration, the major problems that existed between the CIPs and the LEAs had been solved. While youth referrals continued to be low, they were being produced more regularly and in increasing numbers as the demonstration drew to an end. The LEAs were also giving the CIPs in-kind support that was helping program implementation--lunches, some textbooks and furniture, the use of gym facilities, and transportation in some cases--as they had from the beginning. More critically, all CIP courses had been approved and credit was being granted for them.

The cooperation the CIPs received from the LEAs must be weighed against the benefits the LEAs drew from the CIP. As a program with full external funding, the CIP represented no financial burden to the LEA. It asked for and received limited in-kind support from the LEA. It should be noted that most of the in-kind LEA contributions represented little cost: lunch programs are subsidized by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and books and furniture were excess. At the same time, the CIP enabled the LEA to claim ADA state funds for youths actually served by the CIP.

Even under these propitious financial conditions, the LEAs still retarded program implementation by referring few potential dropouts and by allowing the CIP limited capability to offer a different curriculum. These circumstances demonstrate that financial considerations are not the only issues affecting LEA readiness to collaborate with alternative programs. Making the CIP dependent on locally-raised funds would lead to an even greater LEA impact on program implementation.

Relations with the Teachers' Unions

The teachers' unions affected implementation strongly in only two of the four sites. In Site D, where the LEA has a stable student enrollment, the union was not a factor in implementing the CIP. In Site A the union affected implementation only mildly, mainly by requesting that all CIP instructors be credentialled. It did not demand that they be union members, however, nor did it take an active interest in the CIP once the credentialling question was settled.
In Sites B and C, on the other hand, union impact on implementation was strong. In Site B, the teachers' union demanded that the feeder school selected in the feasibility study be replaced by one approved by the union. A second union demand—that the entire OIC staff be unionized—was resolved by a meeting with the union leadership. The union softened this demand to requiring that union staff be employed for 25% of the CIP enrollment. Curiously, the union never enforced the final agreement.

In Site C—where the union had suffered teacher layoffs due to declining enrollment, and anticipated additional personnel reductions in the future—the demand that CIP instructors be unionized was strong and persistent. The teachers' union blocked LEA approval of the CIP until the union was satisfied. The compromise reached between the union and the CIP took months of negotiation and the direct intervention of OIC/A. The compromise, which forced the CIP to hire three union members, also affected staff morale, caused budget problems, and limited the recruitment of potential dropouts.

The impact of the teachers' unions on program implementation was significant when the union decided to intervene. On the other hand, its effects were felt mainly in the initial implementation stages of the CIP. It is still open to question what the effects of larger CIP enrollments might be on union reactions.

**Relations with the Community**

Alternative programs such as the CIP need substantial community support and cooperation. Cooperation is essential in order to facilitate the identification of prospective interns, the procurement of Hands-On experiences, and the placement of CIP graduates in college, job-training programs, or jobs.

In general, the four CIP sites have attained these three community-dependent implementation outcomes. Although it is not possible to describe actual levels of community support, it is clear that this support emerged and helped program implementation. It is also clear that the local OICs initially, and the CIP staffs, especially the directors and career developers, worked very hard to achieve this result.

In examining the community relationships that the CIPs were able to develop during the 33 months of the demonstration, a distinction must be made between formal and informal linkages. The term formal linkage refers to cooperation that takes place in an arranged manner, under explicit rules for cooperation. Informal linkages, in contrast, are those conducted on a one-to-one and frequently ad hoc basis (e.g., between an individual and his/her contact in another organization). The level of cooperation produced by these informal linkages developed through casual, ongoing interactions. (The term "informal" does not imply that these contacts were serendipitous, just that they occurred outside...
any formalized group structure. The CIP design relies heavily on such contacts, especially to provide Hands-On placements.)

The plan of the demonstration effort called for the CIPs to develop formal linkages with the community through the creation of Advisory Councils—groups of citizens representing various agencies and organizations in the local community. It was anticipated that these councils would provide the CIPs with access to community resources and give them credibility. Because of pressures associated with recruitment and in-house implementation activities, however, CIP directors gave low priority to the formation of the Advisory Councils in the first months. One council was set up in October 1978; all the sites had operating councils, at least nominally, by May 1979.

The Advisory Councils were reported to be engaged in recruiting youth, disseminating knowledge about the CIP in the community, and identifying local sources of such needed resources as Hands-On placements. It appears that their impact in those areas was significant in only two sites. In one site the Council met monthly, but did not lead to any specific implementation outcomes. In another site, the council met only three times, and informally disbanded itself when its members felt they had no impact, specifically in regard to recommendations they made about the LEA role. In a third site, the director did not call regular meetings. Instead, the council was occasionally asked to provide assistance or guidance on particular issues, which it usually was able and willing to provide. In the final site, the Advisory Council both met regularly and led to substantial members of Hands-On placements. It may be significant that this site's council was initially formed from members of the local OI's advisory committees.

While formal community linkages as embodied by the Advisory Councils were largely pro forma and made little distinct contribution to implementation in three sites, informal linkages played a strong and critical role in all sites. Daily communications by site directors and, particularly, by counselors and career developers with various community contacts resulted in the procurement of diverse types of support for CIP interns.

Counselors developed and used contacts with a variety of such agencies as the Department of Social Services, the Bureau of Child Welfare, probation departments and juvenile courts, drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers, and non-profit organizations such as Educational Talent Search and Centro de la Raza. These contacts supplied the CIP with both referrals of prospective interns and support for those enrolled. Support included assistance in housing, child care, medical care, procurement of food stamps, and YEDPA Youth-Incentive-Entitlement stipends for school attendance. Given the needs of the youth in the CIPs, this support was vital. RMC interviews with CIP counselors indicated that approximately one-third of the interns needed and received some sort of support.
Career developers compiled lists of employers willing to provide Hands-On experiences. The extent of these lists varied depending on the experience and initiative of the career developers and the employment opportunities available in the community. But across the four sites, career developers were able to provide interns with Hands-On experiences in either their first- or second-choice fields. A categorization by occupation of the interns' Hands-On experiences shows that 41% of them were in professional occupations, 28% in service, 11% in clerical, 7% each in craftsmen-ship and operative positions, 3% in sales, and 2% in managerial occupations. This diversity of Hands-On choices required an extensive network of employers. Judging from the sites' ability to match most of the interns' choices, it can be concluded that career developers obtained adequate community support.

The informal linkages established by CIP staff members were also helpful in the identification of out-of-school youth. Although referrals from various agencies were few in number, they were constant and increasing during the demonstration period. Compared to other employment and training programs, the CIP was able to recruit a relatively large number of out-of-school youth, an average of 44% (through the first three cohorts). Entitlement's recruitment, in contrast, succeeded in enrolling only 7% out-of-school youth (Ball, Diaz, Leiman, Mandel, & McNutt, 1979, p. 63). In establishing informal linkages, it is evident that the CIP's affiliation with a well-known and respected CBO in the community was an important factor. Both counselors and career developers generally attributed their network of contacts to their own efforts and resourcefulness. These attributes were obviously very important. But observations of the counselors and career developers, particularly as they established contacts over the telephone, showed that these staff members introduced the CIP as part of the local OIC and constantly underscored their affiliation with OIC when explaining the objectives of the program. Moreover, since many career developers had worked before at the local OIC, they brought to the CIP inventories of community support they gained through their OIC experience.

RMC interviews with individuals from various public agencies and private-sector Hands-On providers revealed that from their perspective, the affiliation of the CIP with the local OIC had lent credibility to the program. Being able to link the CIP to a stable, known organization was important for many of these individuals.

While CIP success in recruiting out-of-school youth was influenced by factors such as the recruiters' ability, the recruitment strategies used, and the alternative nature of the program, it is demonstrable that the CIP's affiliation with OIC was an essential ingredient. Information about unemployed, out-of-school youth in the community was transmitted through casual and diffuse networks of individuals belonging to a common ethnic group. The ability to
reach youth and convince them to join the CIP was enhanced by the local OIC's reputation in the community for helping disadvantaged individuals obtain training and jobs.

That the perception of OIC as a service organization was a major factor in the development of informal linkages with the community can also be inferred from the creation of "administrative admissions" in the sites. According to the evaluation design, the programs were to admit youth who met the entrance criteria (i.e., passing the test, being between 16 and 21 years of age, being assigned to the treatment group). However, the sites discovered that these criteria were often too stringent to allow them to demonstrate a service orientation.

Several parents demanded that their children be "served" by the program, and, in one site, even threatened to boycott recruitment. In consequence, the CIPs had to create a new category of interns—the administrative admissions. These were youth who did not meet the official entry criteria or did not apply at the right time but whose parents wanted them in the program. According to local OIC officials and CIP staff members, these parents demanded service from the CIP because they knew OIC as a service organization. Failure to accede to these demands could have caused major political and community-relations problems for the OICs.

The number of administrative admissions varied from site to site. In Site B, which had the largest number of demands for administrative admissions, these youth numbered 43 for the third and fourth cohorts, a group one-fifth as large as the regular treatment group.

In summary, the community relations established by the CIPs at the formal level did not contribute much to CIP implementation in two sites, and in only one were formal linkages really important. Community relations developed through informal linkages, in contrast, were very helpful to implementation. Program affiliation with a community-based organization such as the OIC was a major factor in promoting the development of informal linkages.

Overall, the programs served extended communities. The notion that each CIP would serve mainly its immediate neighborhood proved untenable, because not youth nor employers nor sources of support existed in sufficient numbers in any one given neighborhood. Nonetheless, community support was necessary for the CIP, and it emerged in sufficient quantity.

The existence of waiting lists of youth seeking admission into the CIP—both during the demonstration period and as it came to an end—are additional indicators of grass-roots support for the program. These waiting lists averaged 50 youths per site in August 1980. The numbers were small in an absolute sense, but they might be considered large for a group of young persons who have essentially been turned off by formal schooling.
The Impact of the Evaluation Design

From its inception, the CIP demonstration included an independent evaluation component. Not surprisingly, a number of evaluation concerns affected implementation activities powerfully.

The Interagency Agreement between DOL and NIE specified that there would be at least four cohorts per site and that control groups would be formed for at least two of them. It was further specified that the control groups would be of sufficient size "to detect educationally as well as statistically significant differences" (DOL, 1973, p. 12). As NIE signed its agreement with OIC/A and, later, as OIC/A signed subcontracts with the local OICs, the evaluation requirement became more specific: The local OICs would be responsible for four cohorts; and the first cohort would consist of 150 youth in the treatment group and 150 in the control group, with experimental and control membership in subsequent cohorts to be determined by OIC/A and NIE" (OIC/A, 1977, p. 8).

The evaluation design was formalized in April and May 1978, as NIE and RMC held planning meetings after award of the evaluation contract to RMC. In its proposal RMC had noted, "If our interpretation of the RFP is correct, the second cohort will begin the program about the first of June 1978. The third cohort will begin about the first of September 1978, and the fourth cohort about the first of January 1979" (RMC, 1978, p. 65). These dates coincided fairly well with the dates stated by NIE in a 26 April 1978 telephone conversation with OIC/A and confirmed in a memo two days later: second cohort--June/July, third cohort--November, and fourth cohort--January 1979. The same memo, written in response to questions from the sites and OIC/A, also stated that the second cohorts would have a minimum of 45 interns at each site.

The first-cohort specifications in the OIC/A-local OIC subcontracts were never enforced. Rather, the sites operated with the tacit understanding that the first cohort was a "try out" and no enrollment targets applied to it, because LEA agreements had not been attained and no evaluator had yet been selected. The problems the sites had in recruitment also contributed to letting this contractual stipulation go.

As June 1978 approached, DOL and NIE began to put pressure on the sites to recruit second cohorts with both treatment and control groups. The sites were told they should produce groups large enough to produce "statistically significant results," or they put their CIPs in jeopardy of cancellation.
Under this threat, the CIPs continued to recruit. When groups of 15 or more applicants were available, they were tested by RMC. Tentative assignments to treatment and control groups were made for all applicants who met the fifth-grade reading level requirement but no applicants were informed of their status. The plan was that they would be notified as soon as treatment and control group quotas were met.

Ultimately, the sites could not fill the quotas for both treatment and control groups, and they were allowed to enroll all the applicants who met the CIP entry requirements. Control groups were abandoned for the second cohort. However, not all of the youth invited to enroll in the CIP were still available. The long period of uncertainty had led many of them to embark on alternative courses of action. The loss of these potential interns, of course, exacerbated the problem that all sites were having meeting their enrollment quotas.

In addition, the sites started feeling the negative effects of forming control groups. Depicting the CIP as a "social experiment" was detrimental in a number of ways. First, it added to the uncertainties applicants faced in seeking CIP enrollment, for they had to accept the possibility of being assigned by lottery to a control group. Second, it placed the local OICs in the awkward position of advertising a special service and then denying it to the youth assigned to the control group. With reputations as service organizations, the local OICs had a very hard time accepting this feature of the evaluation. According to the local OIC administrators and, in particular, the CIP staffs, the requirement to have control groups made it "difficult to sell" the program to youth, their parents, some community segments, and the LEA. The effect of this combination of circumstances—enrollment quotas, lengthy waiting periods between recruitment and enrollment, control groups, and difficulties in getting LEA approvals—was such that only one site was able to enroll a second cohort—without a control group—by the end of July 1978. The other three sites' second cohorts enrolled in October, after DOL and NIE had waived the control-group requirement.

For the third cohort, specific enrollment quotas of 90 youths in the treatment group and 55 in the control group were set by NIE and DOL. This third cohort was authorized to take the place of the originally planned third and fourth cohorts after an involved review of the recruitment situation by all parties. The deadline for having the cohort assembled was set at 31 January 1979. This decision was announced to OIC/A and the sites in mid-December 1978. Thereafter, until the quotas were met, recruitment efforts overshadowed any other program activity. In this instance, evaluation concerns clearly affected implementation. In fact, to the sites, it almost seemed that the evaluation was taking priority over the implementation.
However, some steps were taken during the recruitment of the third cohort to minimize the impact of the evaluation on program implementation. Two recommendations expressed by the evaluation Advisory Panel were responsible for some of the changes. The first recommendation stated that "data collection for evaluation purposes should be synchronized and coordinated in order to minimize any adverse effects on the implementation of the program." The second recommendation—in response to assertions by CIP directors that the uncertainties about cohort initiation and testing had curtailed the number of CIP enrollees—asked that "interview, testing, and entry be compacted into a minimal period."

RMC responded to the recommendations by testing applicants on demand. Furthermore, within 24 hours of being tested, applicants were notified as to whether they had (a) failed to meet the entry requirements, (b) been assigned to the control group, or (c) been accepted into the program. Unfortunately, cohort start-up dates could not be specified as it was not clear when the enrollment quotas would be met. Long delays again took their toll.

While other factors also shaped youths' personal choices about enrolling, it is virtually certain that the evaluation requirements had a negative impact on enrollment. Table 6 shows the proportion of youth who enrolled after having been informed about the program and after taking the test. The data suggest that, for the second cohort (when delays were caused by having to have groups of 15 for testing), the sites were able to test less than half of those contacted. Testing on demand did improve the situation for the third cohort. At all sites, there was a marked increase in the proportion of youth contacted who took the pretest (across sites the percentage improved from 44% to 58%). The improvement in percent pretested appears to have carried over into the percent enrolled. Again, the third-cohort percentages are higher than those of the second cohort at all four sites. What is perhaps equally noteworthy, however, is the fact that the highest enrollment rate was only 42% of the youths contacted. As shown in Table 7, the proportions of youth who enrolled after passing the pretest ranged from 79% to 100% for the second cohort, and from 77% to 84% for the third cohort. Except at Site C, the enrollment rates were higher for the second than for the third cohort. This finding provides further support for the hypothesis that the evaluation affected the implementation since, on the average, interns accepted into the third cohort had to wait longer to enroll than did those admitted to the second cohort.

There is clear evidence that the evaluation design reduced the numbers of interns the CIPs enrolled. This was not its only consequence, however. Implementation of CIP functions was also constrained by the design. The necessity to put extraordinary effort into recruitment made it unavoidable to let other aspects of the program slide. Counseling was especially strongly affected because counselors were unable to spend time counseling interns. Instead, during the recruiting periods, the counselors were out of
Table 6
Youth Statistics Across Various Points in the Enrollment Process by Site and Cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Contacted</th>
<th>Took Pretest</th>
<th>% of those Contacted who took Pretest</th>
<th>% of those Enrolled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Contacted is defined to mean youth who were approached by recruiters in a very direct way. This number includes youth who were reached through individual phone calls, conversations in the streets, interviewed in person, or approached in small groups at their high school. It does not include the large number of youth who learned about the program through the mass media and printed letters.

*b These figures are based on the recruiters' recollections. They probably underestimate actual figures, as a conservative number was chosen.

*c Enrollment figures for the third cohort include both treatment and control youth, under the assumption that members of the control group would have enrolled in CIP in the same proportion as the treatment youth had they been placed in this group. This type of assumption had to be made in order for third cohort enrollment figures to be comparable to those of the first and second cohorts.
Table 7
CIP Enrollment as Proportion of Youth Passing the Pretest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Passed Pretest</th>
<th>Enrolled</th>
<th>Enrollment as Proportion of those Passing Pretest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort I</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort II</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort III</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the CIP building in the streets, schools, and wherever they could find potentially interested young people. Or they were so busy interviewing applicants that they were not available to enrolled interns. Moreover, the protracted deliberations at the national level about enrollment quotas, control groups, and recruitment deadlines were conducted mostly without the site staffs being kept informed. So while they knew decisions that would affect them, that might even lead to their termination, were in process, they did not know the details and were asked to contribute very little. The effect on staff morale was heavy, as revealed by comments made by almost every staff member. The low morale detracted from the sites' ability to develop commitment to the program—many staff members were actively seeking alternative employment to protect themselves if the CIPs were closed down—and teamwork within it.

In summary, it can be said that evaluation issues affected program operations by determining the number of youths to be enrolled, by mandating the creation of unpopular control groups, by arbitrarily setting up the times of cohort initiation, and, more critically, by threatening program termination if the sites could not meet the evaluation requirements. The sites had little power to change these influences.

Training, Technical Assistance, and Other OIC/A Roles

According to the demonstration grant, OIC/A's main role in the implementation of the four CIPs was to serve as disseminator. This meant that OIC/A would provide training and technical assistance, and, in a more general sense, that it would monitor site performance in relation to the prototype.

OIC/A assumed this role under very favorable conditions, including: a staff of four full-time, experienced personnel (all had had direct involvement with the CIP prototype; one as instructor, one as program manager, one as division director, and the last as external evaluator), and adequate funding. It should be noted, however, that none of the OIC/A staff members had had experience disseminating alternative-school programs.

Over the 33 months of the demonstration, OIC/A visited the sites a total of 59 times and held seven group meetings with all CIP directors. Other local CIP staff members also participated in some of these meetings. Each site was visited approximately every two months, though the frequency was higher early in the demonstration and declined over time. During the visits, OIC/A provided CI staff with workshops, assistance on an individualized basis, and feedback on program and role performance. Table 8, based on information supplied by OIC/A, presents the areas covered during site visits, categorized by major program functions.
### Table 8

**OIC/A Technical Assistance by Program Area and Frequency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Covered</th>
<th>No. of Times</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruction</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling (including disposition conferences</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Hands-On</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal procedures (i.e., management, goal</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>setting, team building, scheduling)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with LEA/community</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placement and Follow-Up</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of program/new funding</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number of areas covered exceeds that of visits because more than one area could be treated during a given visit.*

While technical assistance touched on key program functions and was offered on a relatively frequent basis, four unanticipated conditions affected its delivery and quality: time problems, the additional roles OIC/A played in the demonstration, "turf" conflicts between the local OICs and OIC/A, and the need to look for alternative sources of funding prior to the end of the demonstration.

Timing problems affected mainly the provision of training given to the CIP staffs before program operations began. OIC/A had about two months (between requesting the feasibility studies and receiving the NIE grant) to produce descriptive and training materials—in addition to other tasks such as reviewing the various feasibility studies and visiting the demonstration sites. Subsequently, the disseminators had two weeks between signing the contracts with the local OICs and the beginning of CIP operations to carry out the initial training. Since there were four sites, training was brief but intensive, lasting five days per site.

Materials and training programs used by OIC/A to orient and train the new CIP staffs were developed hurriedly and without assistance from outside the original project. Therefore the program was not scrutinized and described from an outsider's perspective. In other program-dissemination efforts, it has been found very useful to have an outsider's viewpoint involved in describing a program and devising training materials for new users, simply because insiders tend to forget that tasks they perform easily now were complex and difficult to learn initially. Insiders tend to describe incompletely how the program operates, how its different components fit together, and how detailed and sequenced training materials should be.
Retrospective reactions by CIP staff to the initial training were mixed. In general, instructors seemed to be more satisfied with the training than supervisors, counselors, or career developers. Individuals in administrative positions, particularly two of the CIP directors, claimed not to have received specific training for their role. Those pleased with the training felt that the CIP philosophy and goals had been communicated very effectively, that the nature of the individualized instruction, personalized counseling, and the overall attitude of special care for each CIP intern that characterized the CIP had been superbly conveyed. These individuals said that after the initial training they felt "a real sense of commitment toward the CIP."

Those who rated the training as insufficient were not critical of the knowledge they had received but said the training had been short and had dealt too much with "general issues." They commented that, while they understood the CIP's goals and philosophy, they were uncertain about roles and procedures. Though all the staff members were given manuals describing the CIP goals and positions, and though instructors received copies of the core curriculum, many felt "overwhelmed by the quantity of materials" and the "speed of training."

From OIC/A's perspective, the lack of specificity in the initial training was necessary to allow the sites to respond to local conditions. However, the uncertainties felt by staffs in at least two sites regarding basic program procedures suggest that more specific, as well as less intensive training, would have been helpful.

It also appears that training was affected by the limited experience OIC/A had had with educational systems. Although the OIC/A staff in charge of CIP dissemination had been involved in the implementation of the prototype and, thus, had intimate knowledge of how the school district operated in Philadelphia, this knowledge was not sufficient. Since school districts are independent of each other and set their own curriculum and graduation requirements, usually following state board guidelines, OIC/A found that dealing with each new LEA called for familiarity with a different set of rules and actors. In consequence, in the initial stages of CIP implementation, OIC/A could offer the sites only limited assistance in providing strategies for dealing with the LEAs. It should be pointed out here that the initial expectations of the replication called for the local OICs and the CIP staffs they hired to deal with the LEAs. However, the local OICs were not familiar enough with their LEAs—having had no extensive collaboration with them previously—to assume this role. Both the local OICs and OIC/A had to learn as they proceeded with implementation.

In addition to its role as provider of technical assistance, OIC/A performed a monitoring role, which involved site visits to determine whether the programs were developing as intended. This duality of roles—the disseminator/trainer on the one hand and the
monitor/auditor on the other--caused both the local OICs and the CIP staffs to be cautious in asking for help for fear that admitting the existence of problems would be construed as an indication of poor performance, and thus affect future funding. As a result, the interaction between OIC/A and its intended technical-assistance recipients never became as open as would have been most beneficial.

Problems of "turf" emerged as the local OICs made it clear to OIC/A that technical assistance should be provided mainly at the request of the sites. In fact, two of the local OIC's rejected for several months OIC/A's several recommendations for program improvement. OIC/A noticed fairly early that there were problems with the leadership provided by the director and the instructional supervisor at Sites C and D. They stated that, "We presented our recommendations to the local OIC, but nothing changed." According to OIC/A staff, "both sites resisted interference and wanted to make their own decisions." In Site C, the leadership of the local OIC did not react because "they were pretty much in control and didn't want outside help." In Site D, the local OIC would not intervene because its leadership preferred to "manage by exception" and to have a "hands-off attitude" toward its programs. The OIC/A staff also believed that their recommendations had little impact because the CIP directors in those sites--whose competence was being questioned by OIC/A--protected themselves by stating that "the OIC/A people don't know anything." The recommendations made by OIC/A regarding leadership changes for Sites C and D were finally accepted in November 1978, but only when OIC/A confronted the local OICs with program-audit reports.

The severity of the problems in Site D led the local OIC to request OIC/A to assume direct control of the CIP. For approximately six weeks, OIC/A retrained the staff members in their roles and responsibilities, dealt with the various procedures problematic to the staff, clarified the relationship between the LEA and the CIP, and helped the site undertake a massive recruitment effort. This intervention constituted the most dramatic display of OIC/A's effectiveness in providing technical assistance.

None of the RMC visits to the sites coincided with OIC/A technical-assistance visits. Therefore, this report relies primarily on CIP staff perceptions in assessing their effectiveness. For reasons that are not clear, many site staff had little or no recollection of the various workshops offered by OIC/A in 1978 and early 1979. However, CIP staff members could recall workshops given in the second half of 1979. They described having had several workshops dealing with concrete issues such as individualized-instruction techniques, disposition conferences, recruitment strategies, and cooperation with the LEA. Staff opinion about these workshops was that they had been "very well organized" and "very helpful."
Beginning in early 1980, partly due to the departure of two key trainers, but mainly due to OIC/A's and the OICs' desires to ensure continued program existence, OIC/A devoted considerable time and effort to identifying new sources of funding and helping the sites develop proposals to secure local support. As Table 8 shows, "extension of program/new funding" represented 18% of the areas covered by OIC/A during site visits. The salience of these topics was particularly high from February to August 1980, the time immediately preceding the end of the CIP demonstration.

While, for a variety of reasons, the technical assistance provided to site staff was imperfect, OIC/A played a crucial role in the implementation by keeping site administrators within the boundaries of the original prototype. This activity was carried by OIC/A mainly through meetings with all site directors and by constant telephone contact. It appears that the directors' meetings were occasions where program implementors checked their understanding of the CIP model against each other's and against the program developers'. These meetings were also occasions for OIC/A to request compliance by site administrators to basic program features and objectives as well as to convey what OIC/A considered acceptable levels of program performance.

Counting on a centralized, easily accessible staff with exclusive responsibilities for CIP implementation was essential to the sites. This is evident from the fact that when major problems emerged in the implementation—particularly in attaining cooperation from the LEAs, carrying out recruitment activities, and obtaining closure on the numbers of participants needed for the demonstration cohorts—site directors resorted to OIC/A for help in finding solutions. Having as disseminators persons who had been directly involved in the implementation of the original program was an additional asset. OIC/A's experience with the prototype gave its comments and suggestions to the sites the added credibility that comes from "having been there."

In the CIP demonstration, technical assistance was adequate to enable program implementation. More technical assistance would have contributed to earlier and probably less difficult attainment of full operational status, but within the constraints of their resources, OIC/A provided major help to the sites. The role of OIC/A as a monitor ensuring that the sites adhered to key program goals and objectives and observed minimum standards of performance contributed substantially to implementation.

Replication/Adaptation

During the early stages of the demonstration, OIC/A was perceived by the sites as adamant in insisting on very close adherence to the CIP design, even though the design was not very specific about many issues. It was written into the local OIC's subcontracts that any proposed changes to the design had to be submitted in writing for OIC/A approval. This contractual specification raised
the possibility that OIC/A could refuse to accept—that is, might rescind or complicate by insisting on reversal—local decisions about how to implement the program. Local autonomy in operations was thus put in jeopardy in the minds of the site staffs, adding to their uncertainty about how to proceed. OIC/A's attitude toward local adaptations seems to have been misperceived by the CIP staffs. It may never have been as strict as the local OICs perceived it. However, local perception of OIC/A insistence created anxiety and hesitation during the early months.

This finding may seem to contradict what we also reported about the broad nature of the CIP design and OIC/A's initial expectation that the local staffs would have to adapt, adjust, refine, and invent specific program aspects. Indeed, in the sites' perceptions it was just this gap between their perception of OIC/A's insistence on fidelity to the program design and the paucity of detailed "how-to" information in the design and in OIC/A's initial training that created much of the confusion. In OIC/A's view, their insistence was directed toward adherence to the CIP's goals and implementation of functions—such as having some mechanism for effective class scheduling—not toward exact duplication of the means used to accomplish them in the original CIP. Unfortunately, the sites, in their anxiousness about "how-to," heard the insistence as applying to specifics, and felt they should have been provided with more details if OIC/A was going to be so adamant about fidelity. It took several months for this misunderstanding to be cleared up, and some resentment surfaced. As OIC/A and the sites began to see more accurately each others' positions and as the site staffs became more confident, these feelings dissipated. Also, OIC/A began giving assistance to the sites on specific issues, not so much to provide answers as to facilitate the sites' own development of resolutions. As time passed, relations between the sites and OIC/A became very positive, and the sites, with OIC/A's assistance, generally effected solutions to many issues that loomed so large in the early months of implementation.

CIP Demonstration Structure

The structure of the CIP demonstration was complex because of the number of agencies participating. This complexity had an effect on implementation, especially with regard to the time and procedures required for making major decisions. A brief review of the structure will illustrate this point.

The Department of Labor, as authorized by YEDPA provisions, transferred funds to the National Institute of Education to disseminate and evaluate the Career Intern Program. NIE contracted with OIC/A, the developers of the prototype, to disseminate and implement the program. The local OICs then became the immediate CIP sponsors through subcontracts with OIC/A. While technically the local OICs served only as liaisons between OIC/A and the CIPs, they also played an influential role in the daily operations of the CIPs by virtue of their budget-administration role.
OIC/A used the local OICs to facilitate the early stages of implementation by having them conduct feasibility studies, select buildings, make initial contacts with LEAs, and so on. OIC/A, however, also assisted the CIPs directly in start-up and operation, for instance, by conducting negotiations with the LEAs. OIC/A had a subcontract clause that allowed direct intervention and assistance as OIC/A saw fit.

NIE also awarded RMC a contract to evaluate the program. The work statement required consideration of all parties concerned in any way with the demonstration effort. Funding and initial decision-making events were studied; evaluation effects were monitored; dissemination strategies, communication networks, and specific interactions at the site level were analyzed. When implementation events had implications for the evaluation, RMC had to be included in decision-making processes.

OIC/A also conducted evaluations of the sites' progress and of the roles of the local OICs in implementing the program. The evaluations were conducted from a monitor's perspective as well as from a technical-assistance/needs-sensing orientation. Information was gathered to ensure that contractual obligations and model specifications were being met. The same information was also used to plan workshops or other assistance.

Finally, the local school districts and other agencies also were included in the demonstration structure. Their collaboration was necessary for the CIPs to operate at all.

The complexity of these arrangements made reaching decisions about some aspects of the demonstration a quite intricate and time-consuming procedure. A case in point was the series of events leading to the final determination of the size and entry date of the third cohort of interns.

The original demonstration plan called for each site to put 300 interns through the CIP in four cohorts. Two cohorts were to have control groups equal in size to the treatment groups. NIE first raised concerns about the sites' ability to recruit enough interns and control groups in August 1978. As the demonstration approached the end of its first formal year— that is, in late fall 1978—it became clear that the sites would not be able to meet either of these objectives. After consultations with OIC/A, the local OICs, and the CIPs, DOL and NIE considered consolidating the third and fourth cohorts, setting the size at 90 interns and 90 control-group members. NIE asked RMC to comment on the effects of such a change on the evaluation's validity and reliability. RMC accepted the plan, but suggested the addition of some comparison groups of youth in similar programs. NIE then took the plan to DOL, which added the stipulation that these final third/fourth cohorts and their controls had to be in place by the end of January 1979, or the site would be terminated. NIE relayed this message to OIC/A in early December,
which sent it on to the CIPs via the local OICs. Massive recruitment drives, involving all staff members and even some interns, began at the sites.

As the sites launched their final recruitment drives, however, OIC/A asked RMC how small the control groups could be and still offer sufficient reliability. RMC responded that control groups of 45 members would be minimally adequate, and OIC/A took this number to NIE and DOL. After lengthy telephone conferences in which NIE suggested control groups of 75, DOL superseded its original directive four days later with one requiring 90 interns and 45 controls. NIE reacted very strongly to DOL's decision. In a letter to DOL six days after the 90/45 directive (11 December 1978), NIE stated it did "not accept, nor...agree with this directive." Further, NIE said that any control-group size of less than 70 was "unacceptable to NIE since it would not allow us to address the issue of impact." Pending resolution of this issue, NIE had not notified OIC/A of the change from 90/90. But OIC/A, RMC, and DOL had had telephone conversations in which the control groups were set at 50. NIE also protested this breach of established communication channels. The issue was finally settled when, on 14 December, DOL instructed NIE to set the control-group size at 55. NIE sent a letter to OIC/A to this effect on 19 December 1978.

By the time the final cohort and control group sizes were disclosed to the sites, recruiting efforts had begun to yield numbers of applicants approaching the target. By 31 January 1979, each site had secured at least 145 applicants, 55 of whom had been assigned control status. The frantic and demoralized nature of this period for the sites was testified to by virtually all staff members in all four sites. This series of events illustrates the cumber-someness of the decision-making apparatus in the demonstration, and its potential and real effects in terms of creating confusion and ambiguity at local levels.

Not only did the structure of the demonstration render decision-making difficult, but it also created a situation in which four agencies--NIE, OIC/A, the local OICs, and RMC--came to have multiple roles. NIE had responsibilities for managing both the operation and evaluation of the overall effort. OIC/A was given the roles of overseeing the demonstration, providing technical assistance, and administering the contracts with the local OICs. The local OICs' roles included getting the CIPs underway and giving assistance as needed, acting as fiscal agents for the CIPs, and monitoring the CIPs as units within their local OIC structures. RMC had a purely evaluative role in theory, but, as the nature of the evaluation impinged on site operations, a role in program operation devolved on RMC soon after the evaluation began. RMC was constantly being questioned by NIE, DOL, and the sites regarding the impact changes in enrollment quotas, admission and testing dates and schedules, etc. would have on the evaluation and whether the design could be modified to accommodate such changes.
The effects of the cumbersome institutional arrangements of the CIP demonstration are impossible to determine precisely. It is also difficult to imagine how they might have been less complicated. However, it is clear there were major effects on sites' implementation activities. At the very least, this issue suggests that, regardless of how intricately different agencies become intertwined in the conduct of a program like the CIP demonstration, unless there are adequate communications involving all actors, the consequences can be extremely negative.
V. DISCUSSION OF CIP IMPLEMENTATION

Over a 33 month period, OIC/A and the four sites brought into operation four alternative high schools. Three sites achieved full implementation of CIP functions. In one of these, the CIP became fully functional shortly after issues of LEA approval were settled, approximately half a year after start-up. This site maintained full implementation until the original director resigned six months before the end of the demonstration. The program faltered briefly as a new director was recruited and installed, and then regained full operation. In another, full implementation was achieved after about a year and a quarter, shortly after the second director was put in charge and after intensive on-site assistance from OIC/A. In this site, the CIP remained fully functional throughout the rest of the demonstration. The last of the three also realized full implementation after installation of a second director, a year and a half after the December 1977 start. The resignations of this second director and the instructional supervisor one month before the end of the demonstration also caused a short retreat from full implementation, but by the end of September 1980 the site was again operational. In the fourth replication site, the CIP got off to a fast start and displayed many characteristics of a fully functioning program by the end of the first year. However, the site was unable to maintain its momentum as personnel problems, especially at the leadership level, emerged. This site never attained full implementation.

The avowed purposes of the demonstration program included showing that the CIP could be implemented in new sites. RMC's findings demonstrate that this was possible. The findings also suggest that many factors—especially the competence of leadership, the availability of sufficient time, and the cooperation of local institutions—affect the feasibility and difficulty of implementation.

Another purpose of the demonstration—implicit, but held by consensus—was to have fully functional CIPs operating in the sites at the end of the demonstration period and beyond, established as permanent institutions in the communities they serve. This purpose was not achieved. It is also clear that the implementation process did not go forward as rapidly or smoothly as originally planned. A variety of events and issues caused delay and disruption in getting the CIPs going and maintaining full operation. It may be helpful for policy-making and knowledge development therefore to examine some of the conditions and assumptions underlying the CIP demonstration, and to try to explain why things did not always go as they were expected. To this end we now focus on the frames of reference—the orientations toward implementation—of the various prime actors in the demonstration, the agendas they held, and the inherent difficulties of collaboration.
Actors' Frames of Reference

In this report, a distinction has been drawn between national-level and site-level actors and activities. This distinction was made in order to describe what happened during the demonstration period. The same distinction is useful for analyzing what happened.

At the national level, OIC/A, NIE, and DOL initially perceived the task of implementation as a technological issue. That is, from the national perspective, implementation was regarded as applying the technology of the CIP in a set of new locales. It was an engineering problem consisting of gathering predetermined resources, organizing them according to a program design, and setting them in motion. The possibilities that the resources might not be obtainable in short order or that obstacles might impose themselves may have been considered in the beginning, but such considerations are not evident in the documents and interview data RMC has collected and reviewed. Perhaps it was assumed that because the OIC system shares, on a national basis, common goals and values about its mission, there would be no difficulty in translating a model based on those shared values and goals into an operating program. Alternatively, it may have been assumed that the power of OIC/A as the head of the system could ensure appropriate behaviors by the local OICs and even other agencies in the selected sites. Or it may have been that a "social-engineering" mind-set is endemic to national social-action agencies and federal government bureaus. Regardless of this orientation's origin, the data strongly suggest that, at the national level, it was assumed that the technology of the CIP could be created and set in operation rapidly and without major difficulties by following a blueprint. Furthermore, this outlook was reinforced by the four sites' feasibility studies, which asserted that local implementation would not be problematic.

As events unfolded in the sites, however, it soon became clear that implementation was not a simple matter of applying technology to a problem. Resources needed to implement the CIP, such as qualified personnel, vacant school buildings, and collaborative school-districts, turned out not to exist or not to be immediately available. Influence with non-OIC agencies v e permission or active support was critical was not, sufficient to assure their immediate participation. Youth interest in the program was lower than expected, and other federal programs and the evaluation design were strong influences on the motivation of young people and their parents to get involved. In short, it soon became evident that setting up the program entailed much more than transferring a technology from one place to another in a brisk and linear sequence. The national-level actors' technological orientation proved to be inadequate as a frame of reference from which to plot implementation. There were too many assumptions in it that failed to account for the effects of time, the local contexts, and the limited or delayed availability of resources. This has not been an uncommon occurrence in federal social-program planning and implementation. (See, for instance, Derthick, 1972, and Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973.)
If the rational-technological frame of reference from which the national-level actors regarded implementation was insufficient in anticipating what was likely to happen in the sites, what would have been a more appropriate way to approach the issue? A good place to start the search for an answer would be in an analysis of the dynamics of the local contexts in which the CIPs were to be set up. In each of the four cities there are a great number of agencies, institutions, organizations, and so on. While power imbalances exist among them, it is generally true that no single group controls all aspects of a community's life. It is certainly true that no community-based organization holds enough power to guarantee compliance to all a new program's anticipated needs by all other groups. Therefore, any new program dependent on cooperation, permission, or support from agencies other than the one sponsoring or implementing it is going to have to negotiate cooperative agreements. Such negotiation requires both time and incentives.

This simple, broad analysis suggests that implementors should know in great detail what power centers need to be included, should have time to establish contacts and build support for needed collaboration, and should have incentives to attract the prospective collaborators. In the case of the CIP, it is the educational interests in the community that are most critical at the outset, but social-service agencies and employers assume increasing importance as the program develops.

The events of the CIP demonstration illustrate that, of the three needs—knowledge of power centers, time, and incentives—only one was adequately addressed by the implementation plan. Because the CIP was fully funded by the federal government, it asked the local school districts for no money. In fact, because the CIP interns would be officially enrolled in the LEAs, it allowed the LEAs to keep their state and federal aid money for those students without providing them with any services. To the extent the CIP attracted youth already out of school, it even added state and federal funds to the district budget for each new enrollee. In addition, the CIP offered the public schools a chance to transfer unmotivated possible dropouts into another agency's responsibility. This worked to reduce overcrowding of the schools and to give the LEA an option for removing "undesirable" or "problem" youths, without fear of being accused of "pushing" them out or failing to serve them. Finally, of course, the CIP addressed an area of great need that the schools recognize but have not resolved. These are powerful incentives.

On the other hand, the time allowed for presenting these incentives to the public schools effectively, letting their benefits become widely known and understood by educational power holders, and working out the details of how this arrangement would operate in practice was insufficient. Inevitably in a situation like this, there are questions to be answered and logistics to plan in detail. For instance, as soon as they heard about the plan to let public-school students (potential dropouts) transfer into the CIPs,
teachers unions naturally had concerns about whether reducing public-school enrollments would concomitantly reduce the number of teachers who would be employed by the LEAs. And, as we have seen, this very issue caused major difficulties in one of the sites. Concerns such as this took time and great effort to resolve through multi-sided negotiations. Meanwhile, the CIPs languished. Of course, time affected other aspects of implementation too. Staffing, getting facilities ready, and preparing curricula are examples. Therefore, time was in too short supply overall and had a major effect. The point here is that, operating from a technological orientation, the national planners did not see the importance of time across a broad spectrum of implementation issues, and therefore stuck to the original implementation timelines even after the initial start-up had been delayed from October to December, 1977.

Likewise, the evidence suggests that the national-level planners/sponsors did not have enough knowledge about the nature of educational systems to anticipate the complexity of setting up the CIPs. This applies both to the process of negotiating collaborative agreements with LEAs and to the requirements of operating an educational program. Regarding the task as an engineering problem, the planners felt giving the sites a blueprint to follow along with materials, specifications, and money would enable them to set up a very complex and fragile educational program in short order. The local OICs, relying on OIC/A's evidence of CIP effectiveness and demonstrated expertise in operating the CIP, accepted the technological-application premise. It should be noted in connection with this point that, until the CIP was offered to them, the local OICs, as adult-training and employment-counseling/placement agencies, had not had enough interaction with school districts or general educational programs to suspect how difficult implementation might be. They had no basis for questioning the approach. For instance, the local OIC's were requested in the feasibility study to obtain letters of general goodwill from school boards or administrators. This request gave the impression that obtaining such letters would fundamentally settle the issue of collaboration. That this was not true became clear as soon as the CIPs began to work out logistical details with their LEAs.

This brief discussion illustrates the effects of the prevailing technological frame of reference from which expectations about implementing the CIP were formed. This orientation might best be characterized as "Seabee thinking," after the famous "can-do" attitude of the U.S. Navy's Construction Battalions in the Second World War. While "Seabee thinking" may have been entirely appropriate for building roads and harbors where blueprints were accurate and the technology was proven, it appears to lack the sensitivity to unpredictable events and problems that is required for planning and implementing social programs.

Our analysis implicitly points to the elements of a more appropriate frame of reference from which to plan social-program implementation. Thorough knowledge of the types of contextual
variables likely to be involved is required. Implementors should also be well aware of the internal requirements of program operation. When collaboration of other agencies is needed for a program to succeed, those charged with implementation should be aware of the dynamics of intergroup relations and should have strong skills in negotiation. Fortunately, OIC/A and the local OICs have such skills, and they got plenty of opportunity to use them as implementation proceeded. The problem lay in not anticipating the need and allowing time for their application prior to program start-up. Expectations about how quickly a program can achieve stability and maturity should be moderate. Anticipating rapid and easy implementation will only lead to frustration. Finally, planners and implementors should expect that adaptations will be necessary to specific program characteristics—though not to major goals and functions—in order to fit the program to its context. For convenience of discussion, we call a frame of reference incorporating these characteristics "sociocultural." Operating from a sociocultural orientation, of course, does not mean granting everyone’s wishes or catering to everyone’s agenda. Attempting to implement an innovative program under those conditions would surely result in either no program or an emasculated one. Rather, proceeding from a sociocultural orientation means to investigate thoroughly all the different potentially interested parties’ concerns and to allow time to negotiate with those parties about the intended actions, involving them in the planning process if possible.

We believe that, had the national-level actors been operating from a sociocultural frame of reference, a different set of assumptions about both the internal development of the CIP and the program’s development of collaborative relationships with other community groups would have shaped the expectations for implementation. A more realistic planning framework would then have guided planning. In turn, we feel, program development would have been smoother in the sites, and the CIPs would have had a much greater chance to become stable, mature programs firmly established in their communities.

**Actors’ Agendas**

Another consequence of the technological orientation of the national-level planners was to impose blinders of a sort on their perspective. Unquestionably, all actors felt a genuine strong motivation to help the targeted youth by providing an alternative, more appropriate avenue to high-school completion and transition to post-secondary careers. However, each actor also had additional priorities that affected how they saw the process of implementation. These priorities obscured recognition and consideration of some of the other actors’ salient concerns. This situation led to misunderstandings about and impatience with the positions and actions of other actors.
The issue of the evaluation design illustrates the differences in agenda priorities. DOL had a "knowledge-development" goal to meet, leading it to insist on a "tight" experimental design to provide "hard" objective data from the demonstration. DOL also was under strong pressure from the YEDPA timeline to get programs going fast so results could be obtained early. This pressure led to an emphasis on "moving money" into the field quickly. The problem was compounded by the severe understaffing of the Office of Youth Programs (approximately a dozen project officers and administrators to expend roughly three-quarters of a billion dollars in three years). The pressure of this enormous programmatic responsibility and a Congressional mandate to complete YEDPA-program evaluations in a short time forced OYP program officers to consider proposals and monitor programs less thoroughly than they probably would have with a more reasonable staffing level. With an average of 20 projects for each program officer, it was simply impossible for DOL to be methodical and vigilant and still meet the legislatively mandated funding and research goals. Inadequate analyses of how evaluation might affect program operation and of the practicability of implementation plans were inevitable consequences. There simply was not time to think it all through thoroughly.

In addition to operating under YEDPA-based pressures to move quickly and to adhere to stringent evaluation requirements, DOL had also "contracted" with NIE to administer the CIP demonstration. DOL therefore felt it could afford to be less concerned about confirming the practicability of operational or implementation expectations for itself. As the premier educational research and development arm of the federal government, it was assumed that NIE would have checked these issues thoroughly before endorsing OIC/A's operational approach and recommending it to DOL. However, there were other items on NIE's agenda, too.

Another part of the problem was that by the time the NIE/DOL interagency agreement was concluded (November 1977), more than a month of the originally projected start-up period had passed. Nevertheless, the agreement's timelines were not adjusted, and OIC/A promised to meet the quota and timeline of the evaluation design. NIE, on the basis of its relationship with the OIC system since 1973, felt no reason to doubt that it could be done.

A major factor underlying NIE's acceptance of what turned out to be unrealistic plans for the demonstration was its desire to expand its work in the area of career education. Also influential in NIE's decision were (a) the availability of a significant portion of DOL's YEDPA budget, which dwarfed NIE's total annual allocation of around 90 million dollars and could greatly augment the scope of NIE's endeavors in this important policy area, and (b) NIE's desire to replicate the success of a program for which it had been responsible over several years. With these incentives of added money and participation in a critical policy area (contingent on concluding an evaluation conforming to DOL's criteria), and with its philosophical agreement with the concept of powerful evaluation designs,
NIE did not raise questions about the impact of the evaluation design on CIP implementation, or about other implementation issues.

From OIC/A's viewpoint, the evaluation design was a price that had to be paid in order to get the funds to demonstrate the replicability of the program. This is not to say that OIC/A was totally negative about the evaluation, for the value of additional demonstrations of the CIP's effectiveness was appreciated. Fundamentally however, OIC/A was already convinced of the program's soundness and wanted to implement it as widely as possible. The CIP demonstration was to be the beginning of a nationwide CIP movement. While it did not feel additional evidence was necessary, OIC/A recognized that it certainly would not hurt. Since the evaluation was one of the conditions for getting support, OIC/A accepted it and made a strong point of ensuring local-OIC cooperation in the evaluation.

The local OICs and CIP staffs had a very different view of the evaluation design. Their highest-priority agenda item was to provide needed services to their communities. Operating a CIP afforded them an opportunity to extend their services to a very needy and underserved population segment. It also afforded a chance to enhance their positions in their communities and in the OIC system as major initiators of positive social-action programs. These considerations made implementing the CIP very attractive. Conforming to the evaluation requirements, though not a popular issue at any time with the local OICs, did not initially appear to be an insuperable obstacle. The size of the group in need was many times the size of projected CIP enrollment in all the sites. While having to deny access to any youth was undesirable, it was expected to be unavoidable in any case, since the CIP was expected to attract many more applicants than could be served. Therefore, random assignment to the program was not a prohibitive feature, until it turned out that there were far fewer applicants than had been expected. When quotas could not be met—at least partially because applicants lost interest when they learned they might be assigned to a control group or because of the time lag between applying and actually enrolling—the local OICs became very distressed about the evaluation. What had seemed a relatively minor shortcoming in the original plan became a major problem. It was hurting not only the CIPs, but it was also doing serious damage to the OICs' reputations among their own constituencies.

These differences in perceptions of the CIP demonstration are indicative of the different agendas, and priorities within agendas, of the actors in the project, notwithstanding their common desire to serve youth. Because of such differences, communication among actors became difficult at times, and relationships became strained. This situation affected the whole implementation process. Moreover, the ultimate result was that each set of actors came to focus on different goals, and to lack appreciation of the priorities and concerns of the other actors.
Inherent Difficulty of Joint Efforts

We have argued that the frame of reference from which the CIP demonstration was planned caused a failure to appreciate fully the complexity of implementation, and that differences among actors' priorities led to occasional disagreements and miscommunication among them. At this point, we would like to consider an additional factor—the generic issue of what Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) termed "the complexity of joint action."

Joint action is any task or process in which two or more entities participate as partners. In the CIP demonstration, DOL, NIE, OIC/A, the local CICs and CIPs, RMC, and other groups had to work in great harmony to effect the desired outcomes. Doing so required that many decisions be agreed to among all the actors. In this discussion, we address the simple probability of an event occurring (getting agreement to implement the CIP in a site) as a function of the number of decisions it was necessary for various actors to make (following the example of Pressman and Wildavsky).

The validity of this approach, of course, is open to some challenge, because it may be rightly pointed out that the decisions were not independent. Once one decision was made, it would influence the outcomes of subsequent deliberations. Thus, it is not wholly realistic to address the question as though determining an overall probability of success were a simple matter of multiplying the independent probabilities of reaching each decision in isolation. However, the result of this approach is illuminating, even if it only serves to demonstrate how high the probability of successfully negotiating each of a sequence of decision points must be in order to have a reasonable chance of attaining the ultimate goal.

To counter at least partially a challenge to the method on the basis of its oversimplification, we have used 95% as the probability that a favorable result would be achieved at each decision point. We have also posited a single decision for each agency involved in each decision, though in fact each agency decision required a number of internal decisions by individuals within the agency.

Our example concerns obtaining the agreements necessary to implement the CIP. This sequence began with OIC/A proposing the idea of the CIP demonstration to NIE and ended with the CIPs working out the logistics of recruiting and enrolling interns from feeder high schools. The chain of decisions necessary is presented in Table 9.
Table 9
Decisions Necessary to Start CIPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Point #</th>
<th>Decision Topic</th>
<th>Deciding Agency(s) &amp; Deadlines Stated in 20 August 1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Response to OIC/A general idea for CIP demonstration and request for details.</td>
<td>NIE, 1 August 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Response to detailed idea and decision to approach DOL.</td>
<td>NIE, 1 August 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Response to general idea of CIP demonstration under YEDPA authority and request for details</td>
<td>DOL, 1 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Response to detailed idea and decision to draw up interagency agreement.</td>
<td>DOL, 1 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Conclusion of formal interagency agreement.</td>
<td>DOL, NIE, 1 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Response to formal OIC/A proposal.</td>
<td>NIE, 1 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Conclusion of grant to OIC/A.</td>
<td>NIE, OIC/A, 1 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Preliminary response to OIC/A approach.</td>
<td>local OIC (LOIC), 1 October 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9, 10</td>
<td>Preliminary response to LOIC approach.</td>
<td>LEA; other local agencies, 1 December 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Response to LOIC feasibility study.</td>
<td>OIC/A, 1 December 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Conclusion of subcontract.</td>
<td>OIC/A, LOIC, 1 December 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 14</td>
<td>Formal agreements between LOIC and local agencies.</td>
<td>LEA school, LEA central/regional administration, LEA teachers union, LEA feeder school, 1 December 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15, 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using 95% as a standard probability for each decision being favorable to CIP implementation, the overall probability of success at the end of the chain is 44% (.95^{16} = .4401). While it can be argued, probably with merit, that some decisions were virtually certain (p = .999) once preceding decisions had been made (e.g., the probability NIE would give OIC/A a grant for the demonstration once NIE and DOL had concluded the Interagency Agreement), this does not consider the time factor. Nor does it allow for the probably much lower probability of other decisions, such as teacher-union collaboration. Even if NIE's grant to OIC/A were 99.44% sure, the incidence with which decisions are made by targeted dates in the federal contracting system is widely considered to be low. Therefore, a 95% probability of both concluding the grant and meeting the original schedule is considered more than reasonable.

This example has, it is hoped, made the point clear. Joint action requiring many decisions by a variety of actors is inherently difficult. There has to be an incredibly-high-average probability of timely, favorable decisions to assure ultimate success.

Discussion Summary

The preceding discussion has explored the causes of the principal differences that RMC feels existed between the actual events of the CIP implementation and the expectations of those who planned the demonstration. Fundamental was the prevailing frame of reference that assumed implementation was a linear, controllable, engineering-type application of a proven technology. This orientation did not encourage the planners to investigate or anticipate the actual nature of the process. Differences in agenda priorities among the several actors led to unclear communication and occasional conflicts once the process was set in motion. Finally, the inherent complexity of joint action of any type was not recognized, so adequate time was not allotted for various implementation tasks.

The success of the CIPs, although by no means complete, was sufficient to demonstrate that the replication was not inherently so difficult it should not have been attempted. In the next section, we suggest, from the admittedly comfortable perspective of hindsight, an approach that would, we feel, not only have led to smoother implementation, but also left a post-demonstration yield of four fully functional CIPs. We recognize that the conditions under which such an approach could have been followed did not exist, and we certainly cannot hold any of the actors responsible for the constraints they faced. What we wish to convey therefore, is not a general plan of action for implementation, but a message to those who make impossible demands on implementors.

A Retrospective Plan for CIP Implementation

Had they been operating from a sociocultural frame of reference, planners of the CIP demonstration might have begun by visualizing the future CIPs in fully functional operation to determine
what characterized their internal operations and their relationships with other entities. From this would have followed a listing of the various events needed to bring a program with those characteristics into existence. Using the list so generated, criteria by which to select the most appropriate sites would be identified. The CIP design itself would be analyzed by persons experienced in disseminating and implementing career-oriented, alternative educational programs in order to determine the kinds of orientation, initial training, and technical-assistance likely to be required. The necessary general steps to enhance LEA acceptance of and support for the CIP would be planned. Optimum initial program size and staff configurations for replicating the CIP would be assessed. A practical implementation calendar and staff- and curriculum-development activities would be designed. Provisions for capitalizing on the lessons learned from similar earlier educational-dissemination efforts (e.g., the dissemination of the Experience-Based Career Education programs) would routinely be built into the CIP replication, perhaps by consulting with those who were involved in other programs. OIC/A would be briefed on the state of the art in educational-program diffusion and implementation.

Once basic strategies were plotted and OIC/A was briefed about important issues in educational dissemination, the demonstration would be publicized throughout the OIC system. The notification materials would contain explicit details about performance expectations for the replication sites and qualifying criteria for interested local OICs. To allow for collecting the necessary data about the pool of potential interns and for gaining solid initial assurances from LEAs, local OICs would be given at least two months to develop their proposals. Proposals from OICs would be required to contain, in addition to documentation of their own capabilities, hard evidence of cooperation from LEAs and estimates of the availability of potential interns. OIC/A would select the responding OICs with the most concrete and practical operational plans, the most highly qualified staffs, and the richest pools of potential applicants, making use of the expertise and advice of NIE and DOL in the process. About a month would be allowed for site selection following receipt of proposals (though the amount of time actually necessary would be greatly influenced by the number of proposals received).

When the adopting sites' commitments to implement the CIP became formalized through agreements with OIC/A, the local OICs would begin hiring staff members, leasing facilities, ordering materials, and working out the necessary logistical procedures with LEAs. The CIP project directors would be hired first, and would take the lead in making arrangements. After consulting with OIC/A to become oriented to the program, the directors would recruit and hire the remaining staff members, oversee any necessary modifications to the CIP facility, and arrange for necessary furnishings and equipment. They would work with LEA personnel to coordinate curricula, establish ground rules for accrediting work experiences, secure
available in-kind support, and lay out student referral and recruitment procedures. Key groups and leaders in the community would be contacted to generate interest and support for the CIP. The directors would have at least two months for this work. During the second month, the instructional and counseling supervisors and the school coordinator would be on board. After two months, the rest of the staff would be hired, and OIC/A would conduct initial training sessions in the sites.

Following initial training from OIC/A, the staff members would start work on their various tasks. The instructional staff would focus on merging the CIP and local curricula so both CIP and LEA criteria could be met and LEA approval obtained. The counseling staff would contribute to the curriculum development to assure that all the relevant career and personal objectives were included. Instructors would peruse instructional materials, adapting the learning packets from OIC/A as necessary. They would also develop course plans and prepare their classrooms.

Simultaneously, the counselors and career developers would develop working procedures for the counseling department. Career developers would begin soliciting support and commitment from local employers for the Hands-On component and for field trips. The school coordinator would talk with LEA administrators, principals, and school counselors to begin recruitment. Other agencies would also be contacted to generate referrals of additional dropouts to the CIP. Site Advisory Councils would be activated.

Informal local networks would be made aware of the impending availability of the CIP. Publicity materials would be circulated and posted in areas where the target youth congregate. The last start-up activity would be selection of a first, small group of interns.

The project director and the instructional and counseling supervisors would oversee all these activities, calling on OIC/A and the local OIC for technical assistance and advice as necessary. So that all of these activities could be accomplished in a rational, well integrated manner, a full school semester would be allocated to the start-up period. The local OIC's role would be to provide logistical help as needed, while DOL and NIE would have minimal, observational roles, perhaps giving help in the area of coordination with other federal programs in the community. Start-up activities would be scheduled to terminate just prior to the beginning of a semester in the local schools. Altogether, the activities between initial staff training and enrollment of the first cohort of interns would be allotted approximately three months, more or less depending on local factors.

Operation would begin with the entry of the first groups of interns at the beginning of a regular school term. The CIP calendar would continue to be coordinated with the LEA's and with the calendars of other programs aimed at the same youth, such as summer CETA.
programs. The first cohort would be deliberately small, no more than fifty interns, so the CIP staff could work through one cycle of the program in relative calm, practicing their operational roles and tasks without the pressure of full enrollment. This would allow thoughtful adjustment and revision of program activities and procedures during the first few months, solidifying staff members' skills and building their confidence. Regular staff meetings and in-service training would be held to facilitate communication and cooperation among staff members, to introduce and reinforce specific CIP techniques, and to continue the development of a team spirit. Recruitment and community outreach would continue, assuring a growing number of CIP applicants and wide awareness of the program in the community.

A second cohort of interns would enter about half a year after the first, again on a schedule coordinated with the LEA calendar to facilitate transfers from the schools and to avoid conflict with local vacation times. Pretesting would be conducted with the second group for outcome evaluation purposes, but other formal evaluation activities would be held off until the third cohort of interns entered the program. By this time the program would be expected to be stable and the staff members comfortable in their duties and well established as a team. Research about the implementation process would be conducted by trained participant-observers present in the sites since the beginning. This would substantially reduce the problems of obtaining representative data about implementation through widely spaced short visits.

Throughout this time, the roles of the various agencies would be the same as during start-up. The CIP staffs would be fully in charge of the programs, with the local OICs giving moral and logistical support and continued access to community groups and leaders. OIC/A would remain available for technical assistance, visiting the sites to observe and give feedback but allowing the sites to control operations unless major problems were evident. DOL and NIE would remain in the background, available to assist if needed but refraining from intruding on the sites unless invited.

Several characteristics stand out in this dissemination/implementation approach. Adequate time and appropriate scheduling are granted to allow the program to mature and become stable. The local program staff is involved in the planning of operations, both to create local ownership and to enable program modifications to fit the context. Leadership at the local level is expected to be outstanding to pull together the complex of people and activities necessary for a smooth beginning and continued progress. Training and assistance from the developers is concrete and timely, and not so directive as to hinder local initiative or create unrealistic expectations. The role each agency plays is consonant with the goal of developing a stable, exemplary program with firm roots in the new community. While studying the early growth and evaluation of the program is important, such study during the formative period is structured as research by a continually present observer—rather
than evaluation visits by outsiders—so it does not itself become a destabilizing factor.

The plan of action proposed above is based on a different set of assumptions and perceptions about the complexity and demands of implementation than were operative in the beginning of the CIP demonstration. We have termed the frame of reference a sociocultural orientation, as opposed to the technological, engineering orientation we feel guided actual planning. We strongly believe a sociocultural view at the outset would have led to a smoother implementation process and would have yielded a greater harvest of mature, permanently established CIPs at the end of the demonstration period.

At the same time, of course, we acknowledge that the likelihood of the CIP's implementation being totally trouble-free is virtually nil, no matter what frame of reference guided planning and implementation. Given the comprehensiveness and complexity of the CIP, the extent of collaboration necessary, the dynamics of intra- and intergroup relationships, and other factors, it would be extremely naive and just plain stupid to assert that the general plan proposed above would have precluded all problems. Moreover, we recognize that the demonstration's planners were faced with constraints imposed by policy—such as the time boundaries of YEDPA—that would have made it almost impossible to follow the schedule proposed in our plan even if the original target dates in 1977 had been met.

Nevertheless, we believe a plan formed from a sociocultural orientation would have more effectively guided implementation. We also are optimistic that empirically based research findings can influence the policies that constrain action, at least somewhat. Therefore, in the final chapter we submit a short list of recommendations for program implementors, planning and sponsoring agencies, and policy makers. It is our belief that positive action on the recommendations would significantly enhance the environment of and procedures for program implementation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The basic thrust of RMC's recommendations is to develop more sensitivity to the realities of implementation in policy making and program planning. We are far from the first to call attention to the gap between policies and planning on the one hand, and implementation on the other. Nor will we be the last by any means. Still, our findings about CIP implementation compel us to add our voice to those already clamoring for bridging that gap. To do so will require both changes in present policies and practices and further research into such areas as leadership characteristics.

The following recommendations are grouped into three sections: policy-related, planning- and implementation-related, and research-related.

Bases for Recommendations

Before listing the recommendations, it may be useful to reiterate briefly RMC's basic conclusions about CIP implementation. This will remind readers of the context from which the recommendations devolved.

Three of the demonstration sites implemented the CIP with basic functional congruence to the program design. The fourth site began well, but leadership problems emerged that prevented full implementation from being achieved. In two of the three successful sites, full implementation was not achieved until after the initial leadership teams were replaced with more competent people. In the one site which attained full implementation under the original director, his departure about six months prior to the end of the demonstration period caused a brief, temporary deterioration of the program. Clearly, the capability of the CIPs' leaders had a major effect on program quality. RMC feels there was a direct relationship between the attainment and maintenance of fully functional operation and the characteristics of project leadership. There were also a number of other factors that strongly affected implementation, notably time, staff salaries, and community relations.

Implementation did not proceed according to initial expectations. We believe this occurred primarily as the result of two factors. First, the original plans for the demonstration were generated from what we have termed a "technological" frame of reference; that is, implementation was initially conceived as a relatively straightforward process of implanting a specified "technology" in new sites, with too little consideration given to the effects of those sites' local contexts. Second, the policy context imposed a grossly unrealistic set of constraints—especially in relation to time and evaluation—on planners and implementors. The technological orientation was founded on, and led to, assumptions about implementation that did not serve the process well. The policy context militated against the feasibility of virtually any plan for implementation which the demonstration's originators might
have designed, regardless of their frame of reference. It demanded too much too soon under any set of circumstances. As a result of the planners' frame of reference and the policy constraints, implementation was delayed and faced a plethora of practical problems.

Despite these inauspicious circumstances, the achievement of full implementation of the CIP in three sites demonstrates that the OIC system (and by extrapolation other CBO systems of similar natures) is a viable mechanism for exemplary-program diffusion. Indeed, the overall demonstration experience stands as a testament to the extraordinary motivation and effort of OIC/A, the local OICs, and the CIP staffs. The extent to which they succeeded in inherently unfavorable circumstances suggests the OIC system would be an almost optimal dissemination vehicle in a propitious context. Not only did the CIPs remain faithful to the goals and practices of the design when they were fully implemented, but the experience of operating the CIP in new sites led to some definite program improvements, and the strength of the CIP design and the OIC ethos prevented long-term adoption of vitiating design changes.

Recommendations

RMC's recommendations are intended to improve the policy and planning contexts for program implementation. While we do not contend their adoption would preclude all implementation problems, we feel it would create much more realistic expectations and favorable circumstances for effecting programs such as the CIP.

Recommendations for Policy

(1) Policy making should be conducted with the realities and exigencies of program implementation fully in mind.

The gap between major policy and program formulation and actual implementation has consistently created sequences of high expectations followed by incompletely achieved goals. This not only results in incomplete program implementation in specific cases but also leads to public skepticism about the efficacy of social programs. Were policies and programs initiated from a perspective informed about the requirements of successful implementation, RMC regards it as highly likely that there would be fewer instances of incomplete or failed translation of concepts into realities. For the good of both specific programs and the cohesion of the polity, policy should be made in awareness of implementation demands.

(2) While timetables are necessary, specific demonstration schedules should allow for the complexities of implementation. Congress should consider this in future authorizing and appropriations legislation for social programs. Executives in program agencies should do the same in planning programs, especially innovative programs.
The implementation of the CIP reinforced previous research findings that programs being tested or disseminated usually need considerable time to become fully operational. An expectation of immediate implementation is unrealistic. If sufficient time is not allowed for early planning and preparation prior to implementation or for the program to mature prior to evaluation, implementation suffers and manifestations of developmental stages run the risk of being interpreted as failures to establish anticipated program features and/or outcomes. Practices which are potentially very effective may thus be cut off prematurely. There is much diversity of opinion in the social-science literature about precisely how much time is "enough," and such factors as a program's complexity and a local setting's receptivity play a major role. The CIP demonstration and other studies RMC and others have conducted, however, lead us to suggest as a rule of thumb that three to six months of pre-operation planning and preparation followed by one "program cycle" of operation (such as a school semester in the case of an educational program) constitute the minimal time within which full implementation can be expected. Moreover, there must be careful coordination with the operating calendars of extant institutions and programs whose cooperation is required for implementation.

(3) Involvement of community-based organizations in the delivery of programs to assist disadvantaged young people should be continued.

The effectiveness of the OIC system in the CIP demonstration provides evidence that community-based organizations, because of their pervasive ethos, their commitment to serve disadvantaged people, their demonstrated skills in program operations, and their relative autonomy, have strong potential for diffusing youth programs. Though the OIC system did not enjoy a complete or fair chance to demonstrate its full capability for disseminating the CIP, the events of the CIP demonstration—especially the success of specific OIC/A interventions—strongly indicate that the OIC system, and probably other CBOs as well, are potent vehicles for transferring successful social innovations to new users.

(4) Congress and executive-branch policy makers need to clarify expectations for transition of experimental and demonstration programs from federal to other support.

Present policies are unclear as to whether successful demonstrations are expected to survive by attracting local-community funding or whether demonstrations that show success will thereby continue to receive federal support. Programs aimed at meeting a multiplicity of needs of disadvantaged youth are expensive by nature. Despite the benefits of these programs, it is doubtful that local communities would be able to assume total funding responsibility. On the other hand, the absence of a firm policy regarding the status of an innovative program after its demonstration phase raises anxieties among program personnel, thereby detracting from operations. The lack of clear policy in this area also causes potential users to hesitate or refrain from adoption.
Recommendations for Planning and Implementation

(1) Planning and implementation should proceed from a frame of reference that recognizes and accounts for the complexity of the implementation process and its dependence on contextual factors.

Assumptions, implicit in the CIP demonstration's planning, that implementation was a linear, technological process and that the implementing agencies could control events unilaterally resulted in delays and frustrations. What we have called a sociocultural orientation, with its more complex and inclusive assumptions, would be a more realistic starting point for planning such a social intervention.

(2) The dissemination of innovative programs should be placed under the management or tutelage of personnel experienced and knowledgeable in dissemination and implementation. This applies both to personnel in federal agencies in charge of administering the dissemination process and to personnel within the organizations carrying out the actual implementation.

The facile assumption that successful program developers will be, ipso facto, proficient program disseminators is not supported by experience. Developing the CIP in Philadelphia did not necessarily enable OIC/A to become expert in the different demands of disseminating it to other communities. Dissemination is qualitatively different from development and entails a correspondingly different repertoire of knowledge and skills.

(3) Whenever possible, roles with potential for confusion or conflicts of interest, such as managing both program implementation and program evaluation, should be assigned to different agencies or different units of a single agency.

Experience gained during the CIP study showed that the assignment of multiple, potentially conflicting roles to a single agency can affect implementation adversely. In addition, the practice could threaten the credibility of evaluations, no matter how impartially they are, in fact, conducted. As a broad guide, RMC suggests that when multiple roles are contemplated for a group, the roles be analyzed for potential conflicts of interest.

(4) Innovative or demonstration programs that are dependent on support from local agencies should involve those agencies in planning and start-up.
Communication begun during the operation stage was too late to allow LEAs to develop understanding and acceptance of the demands the CIP would put on the school system. Furthermore, demonstration schedules should be coordinated with LEA schedules. In the case of the CIP demonstration, a number of problems with the LEAs might have been more quickly resolved if LEA staff members had participated more closely with the local OICs in the various planning activities instead of simply being confronted with a number of requests for permission and assistance.

(5) The allocation of important program resources, such as salaries, should be comparable to that in comparable organizations.

Personnel in an alternative educational program should be paid comparably to their counterparts in the regular school system. Failure to follow this practice produced difficulties for the CIPs in both obtaining and retaining qualified personnel.

(6) When multiple units within an agency are in positions to affect the implementation of a program, serious attempts should be made to coordinate actions among these units.

Two of the CIP demonstration sites had massive competition for recruits from other federal youth programs. Coordination among the various DOL units might have enabled more appropriate planning.

(7) Decision-making processes and communication channels among the various agencies managing or monitoring implementation should be determined prior to the demonstration of a given program, to the extent possible. Procedures for quick responses to immediate needs should be developed before such needs arise.

In the case of the CIP, confusion arose as decisions had to be made and communicated to the sites regarding changes in cohort entry dates, testing procedures, numbers of required interns, and size of control groups. This confusion generated delays, frustration, and erosion of trust among various actors.

Recommendations for Research

(1) Further research needs to be conducted to develop greater understanding of the appeal of programs like the CIP to disadvantaged, often alienated, young people.

Only a small proportion of the documented pool of underemployed and undereducated youth applied to the CIPs. Under present conditions, estimates of probable enrollment tend to exceed actual youth interest and participation. Though incomplete, data from this study suggest that about one of five "potential" dropouts and one of ten "actual" dropouts became interested in joining an academic program, even though it had a career orientation and could accelerate
graduation. Further, entrance requirements such as possessing a minimum number of credits toward graduation and reading on at least fifth-grade level reduced—in some cases substantially—the pool of potential interns.

(2) More creative, less restrictive evaluation approaches need to be developed, validated, and applied to programs like the CIP.

Evaluations with experimental designs, particularly those with randomly selected treatment and control groups, are often incompatible with the implementation of social-service programs. Even in programs of a demonstration nature, the creation of control groups may be detrimental to the avowed purpose of the innovation, to the attitudes of youths assigned to serve as controls, and to the evaluation itself. The possibility of being assigned to a control group was a disincentive to many potential interns, and so made recruitment more difficult. The control-group design created uneasy feelings among the OICs, LEA representatives, and members of the community. Further, the design produced a "negative treatment" for many of the youth in the control groups. These problems, of course, would have been greatly reduced had the program been oversubscribed. It was the fact that vacancies existed in the program while applicants were being assigned to control groups that was primarily to blame for the strong negative reactions.

Emphasis on a minimum number of students in a program, or especially in a control group, is based on the assumption that data have meaning only if analyzed according to established conventions. Innovative approaches should be encouraged—particularly if they show promise of minimizing the conflict between the social-service and research objectives of demonstration programs. Norm-referenced and comparison-group approaches show particular promise for resolving this dilemma.

(3) Knowledge about the dynamics of the planning and implementation of an innovation needs to be increased. Studies of program dissemination and implementation should be designed so these stages are properly observed and not analyzed only retrospectively.

Important events in the early stages of implementation, such as the interaction among the local OICs, the CIP staffs, and the LEAs, could not be observed directly because an evaluator had not yet been selected. Original data on these periods would have made analysis of the dissemination/implementation process more complete. Research components would be relatively easy to build into demonstration programs.

(4) More needs to be known regarding alternative ways to promote local adoption of innovative programs supported by extensive external funding during development and demonstration.
Programs funded by YEDPA operated almost exclusively with federal monies. Even programs that show great promise, such as the CIP, cannot be expected to be totally subsidized by local budgets. It is, then, necessary to explore alternative funding formulae to encourage local adoption of these programs.

(5) Knowledge about the characteristics of program leadership and other factors affecting implementation needs to be augmented.

A large number of factors influenced the course of CIP implementation. Research that would illuminate more distinctly the effects of these factors, individually and in conjunction, would be of major benefit for future policy and program planning. While the CIP demonstration clearly showed that program leadership, time and timing, and other factors had major impacts, the complexity of the study did not enable discrete examination of each variable independent from others.
REFERENCES


