Is It Relevant and Does It Work? Reconsidering Literature as Rhetoric.

Noting that for some time, the theory of literature has been supplanted by other disciplines as the major influences on the teaching of English in the secondary schools, this paper challenges the assumptions underlying two major principles for selecting and teaching literature: the social relevance of its subject matter and its immediate impact on students. The paper notes that both these criteria espouse a Platonic view of criticism, which regards literature and literary response in terms of its rhetorical effects rather than its aesthetic structure. It then offers analyses of two works, Ernest Hemingway's "The Killers" and Robert Bolt's "A Man for All Seasons," as examples of how "content and feeling" approaches to literature can misconstrue literary meaning, affect the role of the teacher, and influence educational policy. Finally, the paper suggests an alternative approach that argues for the critical response and the perception of literary form as the basis for literary experience and curriculum design. (FL)
IS IT RELEVANT AND DOES IT WORK?

RECONSIDERING LITERATURE AS RHETORIC

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This paper challenges the assumptions underlying two major principles for selecting and teaching literature at the senior level: the social relevance of its subject matter and its immediate impact on students. Both these criteria espouse a Platonic view of criticism, which regards literature and literary response in terms of its rhetorical effects rather than its aesthetic structure. Through the example of Bolt's *A Man for All Seasons* and Hemingway's "The Killers," we are shown how content—and feeling—approaches to literature can misconstrue literary meaning, affect the role of the teacher, and influence educational policy. An alternative approach is suggested, which argues for the critical response and the perception of literary form as the basis for literary experience and curriculum design.
For the past two decades, the theory of literature seems to have been supplanted by other disciplines as the major influence on the teaching of English in the schools. With the advent of ESL, LAC, back to the basics, and education for life, the principles of sociology and psycholinguistics have provided the guidelines for Language Arts. Yet these forms of knowledge can only overtly eclipse literary theory in defining a philosophy of literature education, for even if they are never alluded to, it is our ideas about literature that are still the prime determinants of our pedagogical techniques and our perception of our role in the profession, even if at present they comprise only the hidden curriculum of the English classroom.

Once literature as the identifiable content of English Studies is forced underground, once we accede to the demands of other subjects without regard to the requisites of our own, the climate surrounding the place of literature in the curriculum begins to resemble that of ancient Greece, when Plato banished the poets from his Republic. My paper will reflect on some ramifications of this situation. In the first section, I shall outline the aspects of Plato's literary theory which I believe are applicable today; in sections two and three I shall apply two Platonic fallacies to the teaching of specific works; finally, I shall suggest some implications for educational policy of the issues I have raised.

I. Platonic Literary Theory - Then and Now

It has been said that in the philosophy of literature one is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. My own view is that we can have it both ways, that is, the aesthetic integrity of Aristotle and the moral seriousness of Plato if we ascribe social value to the disinterested literary experience.
However, in order to defend such a position, we must opt for a theory of literature which acknowledges literature as an art form first, and this turns on an Aristotelian, not Platonic conception of literature.

Plato's literary theory advances the argument that a work of literature, or poetry (I shall use these terms interchangeably to signify a fictive structure of the imagination) is ultimately a form of rhetoric rather than an aesthetic structure existing for its own sake. It took Aristotle's Poetics, the Romantic notion of organic unity, and twentieth-century formalist theories of literature to guarantee the autonomous nature of literary art. But Plato values poetry not in terms of what it is, but rather what it says and does. For him poetry has functional value only: it is useful to society only insofar as it can tell us something about reality or move us to virtuous action. He regards poetry, first, as it relates to the world or life or experience; second, as it pertains to the psychology of the respondent. Another way of putting it is to say that the criteria for the moral, social, or educational value of literature are its proximity to truth on the one hand and to goodness on the other. Within this framework beauty tends to be the poor cousin of the Platonic triumvirate.

We may well ask what the foregoing has to do with the present state of teaching literature. I see Plato's two false premises for evaluating literature as forerunners to what Northrop Frye calls the centrifugal and centripetal fallacies, that is, the tendency to judge the worth of literature within the context of either the "real" world or our own feelings.

We recall that Plato's metaphysics relegates both the worlds of experience and representational art to the realm of Becoming. They are both aspects of illusion: life is only an imitation of Reality, and art, an imitation of that
imitation. Within this frame of reference literature bears a direct relationship to life, one that virtually eliminates any discrepancy between conventional distinctions between illusion and reality. For example, Plato objects to drama on the ground that the emotions we experience at a play will be transferred to similar situations in our own lives. Our personal identification with, say, Oedipus will be so complete that, were we to be faced with the kind of adversity Oedipus encountered, instead of exercising self-control, we would succumb to passion, as he did. To maintain that we can tell the difference between appearance and reality is only self-deception, contends Plato, for he believed that few are capable of reflecting that to enter into another's feelings must have an effect on our own: the emotions of pity our sympathy has strengthened will not be easy to restrain when we are suffering ourselves.

The result, according to him, would be a weakening of character in the respondent. So, for Plato, the hero of a tragedy is simply an examplar, which influences the audience for good or evil, depending upon whether the character's actions are deemed right or wrong.

Plato goes on to illustrate this principle with respect to comedy. Laughing at the bufooneries of clowns, antics we would be ashamed to indulge in ourselves, he says,

waters the growth of passions which should be allowed to wither away and sets them up in control, although the goodness and happiness of our lives depend on their being held in subjection.

What Plato is assuming, then, is essentially a behaviouristic relationship between the dramatic performance and the respondent, who interacts with it through osmosis: we absorb the literary model by soaking it up through our pores and only through our pores.
I said earlier that Aristotelian criticism, and indeed the mainstream of literary theory since then, has proven Plato to be operating on a naive psychology of response. We do know the difference between appearance and reality. Consider Sir Philip Sidney's rhetorical question in his Defense of Poetry:

What child is there, that, coming to a play and seeing Thebes written in great letters upon an old door believe that it is Thebes?7

We know that, while literature is a verbal discipline, it is also an art form along with music, sculpture, and painting, and that any kind of knowledge it imparts is dictated by its aesthetic or literary context. In short, moral relationships in art differ from those in life. There is no one-on-one identification between literature and life, as Plato thought there was. Literature gives us a kind of imaginative truth which refracts rather than reflects the world of ordinary experience. We estimate its social value not on the basis of Plato's mirror image, which views it as thrice removed from reality, but on Shelley's, which, as he says in his Defense of Poetry "makes beautiful that which is distorted."6

If thus far we are agreed, what, then, is the connection between our more enlightened philosophy of literature, my reservations about Plato's aesthetic theory and the present state of English Studies? My position is this: while traditionally we have appealed to the artistic element in literature to justify its inclusion in the curriculum, we now seem to be losing faith in the educational value of literary experience as such. We need to be reminded of Northrop Frye's directive in On Teaching Literature to teach "the structure of literature, and the content by means of the structure, so that the content can be seen to have some reason in the structure for existing."7
Because of current pressures, both within and outside our discipline, I see us slipping back (or being pushed back) into Plato's reductionist criteria for evaluating literature. Instead of viewing literature as an organic whole or as a total form, we seem to fall either into the centrifugal fallacy by assessing its truth to life, or the centripetal one by looking to its potential for behavioural modification. This is literature as "persuasive rhetoric," literature used to support argument or lead to a course of action, as opposed to "ornamental rhetoric," which exists for its own sake and moves to stasis or contemplation. If we regard literature primarily as persuasive rhetoric, then we can do no better in defending it than Plato did; we cannot really justify its place in the curriculum without cutting and pasting it to conform to whatever educational ethos happens to prevail, even if it means banishing literature altogether.

The temptation to fight rhetoric with rhetoric is very strong in our present milieu, which in many respects resembles Plato's oral culture more than it does Aristotle's more literate one. We could go so far as to say that the fine line between convention and reality has all but disappeared in a society where the television coverage of Oscar night can be summarized in the next morning's newspaper this way:

Scenario for an outlandish movie. The president, a former movie star, is the subject of an assassination attempt. The alleged would-be assassin, on being apprehended, reportedly tells police he was motivated by love for a movie actress and by one of the films in which she appeared, a film about a nut case who attempts to assassinate a politician. Due to the attempt, the Academy Awards are postponed for one day, but on the following evening, in a prerecorded welcome, the president says, "Film reveals that people everywhere share common dreams and emotions." Later in the show, the actor who played the character said to have inspired the alleged assassin is honored with the best actor award and thanks his director, the same director who helmed the film.
reputed to have influenced the alleged assassin. The president is meanwhile said to be watching the proceedings happily from his hospital bed.

The best defense against this kind of swamping of the critical consciousness is not to meet it on its own terms, but to set up what McLuhan calls an "anti-environment", an aesthetic preserve, if you will, that will enable us to become aware of the premises of our social and cultural assumptions.

McLuhan is too often regarded as just an observer of the electric revolution. Yet in his preface to Understanding Media he gives us an antidote to tribal passivity.

As our proliferating techniques have created the whole series of new environments, men have become aware of the arts an "anti-environments" or "counter-environments" that provide us with the means of perceiving the environment itself. For, as Edward T. Hall has explained in The Silent Language, men are never aware of the ground rules of their environmental systems or cultures. Today technologies and their consequent environments succeed each other so rapidly that one environment makes us aware of the next. Technologies begin to perform the function of art in making us aware of the psychic and social consequences of technology.

Art as anti-environment becomes more than ever a means of training perception and judgment.

Literature as art can make whole the fragmented nature of the television image, which according to McLuhan, determines the cultural bias of the educational establishment. If this is so, then it seems crucial that our educational bureaucrats be among the first to be sensitized to the noxious consequences of erroneous theories of literature that reduce it to rhetoric. In the next two sections I hope to outline how these fallacies can cause literary meaning to be misconstrued, and thereby become false premises for evaluating curriculum, determining the role of the teacher, and ultimately influencing government policy for English Studies.
II. The Centrifugal Fallacy

To illustrate how the centrifugal fallacy operates in an English classroom, let us use a play that often appears on the senior high school curriculum, Robert Bolt's *A Man for All Seasons*. How does the centrifugalist define the "meaning" of this work? Primarily by reducing it to extra-literary terms, usually some historical, moral, or social analogue, which seems easier to come to grips with than dramatic structure. The problem with this approach is not just that literature becomes subject to the laws of other disciplines, but that because our expertise in those disciplines is usually less than in our own, we tend to "translate" the literary work into some preconceived intellectual paradigm, into what we know or think we know about its ideational content. Here a little learning becomes a dangerous thing because without close attention to the text our personal biases cloud our judgment.

A few years ago, when I was teaching high school English, I was commended by my principal, a Catholic priest, for including Bolt's play in my course of studies. It was, he thought, a most appropriate choice for today's teenagers, who, engulfed in a world of moral relativism, sorely needed a prototype of transcendent values. At that time I was conducting a curriculum experiment in "Values and Literary Criticism" with my thesis supervisor, who is an unabashed utilitarian. His view of the play was the antithesis of that expressed by the principal; viz, it could be psychologically unhealthy for young people to view martyrs as heroes, for altruism can set up unrealistic ethical expectations that instill needless guilt about the level of students' own morality, as well as preclude the possibility of compromise in solving moral issues in daily life.
If we think that both these responses are needlessly one-dimensional, we are right. But the premises upon which they are founded are precisely those faulty notions about the theory of literature and the psychology of response that prompt us to evaluate our curriculum in terms of the kind of social values we deem relevant, such as nationalism and feminism. When the questions we ask about the works on our courses are primarily aimed at whether they are written by Canadians, or project a contemporary image of women, we are operating on the sociological prejudice that literature functions only as a role model. This assumption turns on a Platonic definition of literature and psychology of response, that is, that literature is a reflection of life or a representation of truth that we accept uncritically. Within such a context literature is thought to be either an escape from, or an extension of, our environment, as noted by Priscilla Galloway in her recent book, What’s Wrong with High School English? It’s sexist, un-Canadian, outdated. Because of the simplistic response Galloway, perhaps rightly, presumes is operating in our classrooms, literature can only be a kind of counter-indoctrination, not the means of conscious life. And so the solution she proposes, which is to provide modern, Canadian, and feminist images with which students can fuse, is really a perpetuation of the problem — their inability to respond with detachment. It is this same presumption that literary response forever remains mired in the superficially precritical that accounts for the continued assaults on the teaching of The Merchant of Venice and Oliver Twist as racist.

But let us return to A Man for All Seasons. How do we define literary meaning without committing the centrifugal fallacy? Am I suggesting that it
would be incorrect, for example, to study the play in terms of Bolt's "Preface", in which he outlines his individual brand of existentialism? Not if we resist substituting the play's philosophical context for the play. There is an important difference between regarding the play as a statement of Bolt's existentialism, and as an exploration of it. We should beware of facile interpretations which define the theme as "the importance of being true to one's principles", by counterposing More and "the adamantine sense of self" Bolt attributes to him with the crassly "opportunistic" Common Man. Admittedly, the play is an indictment of crude pragmatism, with its adulation of common sense, convenience and expediency, as personified by Richard Rich, who betrays More for his own advancement. But the Common Man is much closer to More than we would like to admit. If we study the play through its literary structure, we cannot reduce it to anything so neat as "Spiritual values are better than temporal values." Rather we would say that, for example, the land and water imagery "figures forth" the subtle interdependence of the spiritual or transcendent, and the natural or rational dimensions of the human condition.

The association of land metaphors with earthly, immovable, and invariable elements, such as law and security, on the one hand, and water metaphors with the fluidity and precariousness of spiritual concerns, on the other, furnishes the symbolic framework for viewing More and the Common Man. Both More and the Common Man have an aversion to water; that is, they are both trying to square the rational with the transcendent through a search for the self. The reciprocal relationship between More and the Common Man can be established by observing that they are both survivors; they will serve two masters if they can, neither
wants to be a martyr, and both have an "adamantine sense of self". That one finds it in the words of an oath and the other in his own survival is not to equate the saint with the machiavel, but rather to identify the apprehension of God with self-knowledge. This is neither a reinforcement of the narrow definition of Christian altruism espoused by my former high school principal nor the pragmatism of my thesis supervisor, but a richly complex synthesis of the two: a "figuring forth" of the attempt to overcome the alienation in becoming fully human. The essentially ineffable nature of such a notion resists any prescriptive transcription of literary content. We can only glimpse its fullness through the tension of literary form, through the delineation of its dianoia or theme by means of its mythos or structure. When the result challenges the passive acceptance of conventional morality, as it does in this case, literary criticism can be said to be a subversive activity.

III. The Centripetal Fallacy

Both Platonic fallacies under discussion turn on an uncritical, or at least, pre-critical, response. If the centrifugal fallacy errs by viewing literature in terms of what it seems to say, then the centripetal one does so by how we think it makes us feel. They both evaluate literature according to its effects rather than to what it is, what Frye calls "an alien structure of the imagination, set over against us, strange in its conventions and often in its values." The function of the teacher of literature is of course to aid in breaking down its impersonality, but by confronting it first on its own ground. This requires scrutiny of the literary object as something which has educational value not because of any moral or social dicta it may reinforce.
or countervail (as is the case with the centrifugal fallacy) or because of any feeling of pleasure and pain that it may arouse (as is the case with the centripetal one), but because of the joy of experiencing names, characters and events that eternally recur in the same form. Thus it is in literary response that we enjoy the aesthetic pleasure that Aristotle says accompanies all learning acts.  

The most common cause of the centripetal fallacy is the theory of art as a warm bath, the mistaken notion that literature should turn us into nice people by making us feel good. It springs from the same naivété about the relationship between literature and life that made Plato get it all wrong. At its core is the blurring of convention and reality that impels us to view fictional characters as real people and fictional events as real life. This inadequate definition of literature gives rise to the belief that aesthetic pleasure is real feeling rather than the unique blending of intellect and emotion that go to make up the domain of the imaginative. When applied to the classroom, the centripetal fallacy shows up as an emphasis on motivational tricks to "turn kids on" to literature, and, conversely, as the excision of works that are thought to be outdated or devoid of emotional impact. An example of the latter is Ernest Hemingway's short story, "The Killers".

"The Killers" is a work of literature in which intensity of feeling is co-terminous with recognition of its formal perfection. Yet often students never get the chance to become familiar with this aspect of the story because teachers may decide that, say, in a post-Godfather era students would not "identify" with Hemingway's understatement of gangland terror. Admittedly, students rarely like the piece on a first reading. They complain that nothing happens, that Nick and George are bland characters, and that the ending falls
flat. Usually the more perceptive and honest members of a class will propose that the story's "greatness" as a "classic" perhaps has something to do with Hemingway's reputation as a stylist, but that in the end, style can't make up for a story that begins to pall as soon as we find out that Ole isn't coming to the diner. It may have worked in its time, but the theme, which probably is related to the passing from innocence to experience, just doesn't come off in the 1980's.

These fairly typical sentiments are sincere, precritical reactions to Hemingway's work. Underlying them, though, is the Platonic definition of literature and literary response we have been examining. The centrifugal fallacy assumes that literature is the attempt to say something about reality through the fictive replication of literary figures like ourselves, while the centripetal fallacy assumes that we will respond to literature, that we will experience pleasure or pain, according to how "true to life" the content and the characters are represented. In "The Killers" these issues are explored through questions at the end of the story.

Nick says, "I'm going to get out of this town."
Does his experience in the story represent a defeat or victory for him in his development toward manhood? Justify your view.

and

Hemingway excludes any author's comment on the significance of the events that he relates; yet he has led the reader to make certain judgments. What are your conclusions regarding the society that is suggested by his story?20

The problem with these questions is that they presume an appreciation of the story that is impossible so long as it has been treated only in terms of its subject matter. Students who don't care about Nick and George, or who regard
as unconvincing the moral judgment Hemingway may be making about America forty years ago are not helped by such exercises, which in the end only exacerbate the circularity of locking students into a content-oriented approach to literature.

The editors of the anthology from which the above questions were taken do not ignore formal issues, but they fail to carry them through. For example, in the second question, students are asked to identify the four stages into which the story is divided. This kind of inquiry can have meaning to the student only if the teacher can connect it to the content questions quoted earlier, and that can happen only if we give up looking at Nick and George as real people or even as the protagonists, and begin to view them as functions of the plot. Once we have made this imaginative leap, we can begin to see that Ole is the real focus, and Nick and George are merely elicitors of information about the character of the killers and the bizarre passivity of Ole's submission to what he has decided is to be his fate. Their spectator personalities become essential to the bizarre nature of the evil being disclosed.

In subsequent readings, questions of character development, suspense, social values, and even moral conflict take on a new dimension as students experience the grotesquerie of the discrepancy between appearance and reality that is woven into the very fabric of the story. Hemingway juxtaposes the illusion of benignity through concrete diction, casual conversation, uneasy humour, and the spare use of metaphor, with the relentless progression towards inevitable death, which we never see. It is only by appreciating the economy of his dramatic method that we realize the full horror of the ending.

There are two unfashionable words in English Studies today - "style" and "structure"; yet it is through the writer's literary art and the creative
process of selection that the emotional power of a work is released. A more familiar expression in the trade today is "shock of recognition", but it is a much-abused phrase. It really refers to that point in the plot where the reader becomes the hero by apprehending the completion of the design. Instead, it has come to mean the narcissistic extension of the status quo into stories about "ordinary people". This is what we do when we ignore literature as an art to be perceived and a discipline to be mastered, and choose curriculum materials on the basis of their social relevance. The centrifugalist rejects "The Killers" because of a preconception that today's students would not be able to "relate" to Nick and George, and substitutes the Judy Blume kinds of ego-massage that seduce them into clichéd moral judgments, while the perpetrator of the centripetal fallacy is committed to teaching methods that "work" even if those methods bypass the literary dimension altogether, never progressing beyond a Pavlovian determinism.

IV. Platonic Fallacies and Educational Policy

Over the years we have seen our role as teachers change from that of guiding students through the universe of imaginative invention, that hypothetical world of the fictive, wondrous in its difference from the mass of imperfect experience, to that of helping them to cope with life as it is handed to them. However laudatory our aims, what we have lost has been the very real social function of literature as an anti-environment. Now we are rather like a psychologist-cum-sociologist, for whom literature is primarily a document of personal or social experience to be manipulated in the classroom to improve the quality of that experience. Again, while the goal is high-minded, it is
misguided and, above all, short-sighted. So long as literary conventions are confused with life, the use of literature, for any reason, however laudatory will be ineffectual because the vantage point for literature as a criticism of life will have virtually disappeared.

What can be done about this state of affairs? First, let us stake out our territory, and then defend it. Let us stop being buffeted about by the relevance-mongers, who insist on subverting our subject to other forms of knowledge. Whether or not we agree with Frye that literature should be the primary verbal discipline, let us not number ourselves among those who would demand "to know why Plato was not right, and why the poets with their outworn modes of thought and their hankering for the fabulous should still have a claim on our attention." Let us become apologists for poetry, like Sidney, Shelley, and Frye, who all confront Plato's challenge by justifying the extrinsic value of literature on the basis of its intrinsic value, who guarantee its moral seriousness by way of its aesthetic integrity.

As new defenders of poetry we can expect that our strongest opponents will not be teachers of other subjects, who understandably vie for equal time and place on the curriculum, but fellow English teachers, professional educationists, and educational bureaucrats who do not accept that, if literature is to have a place in education at all, its twin goals of instruction and delight must be kept in tandem. In their book Patterns of Language (1973) Leslie Stratta et al insist that as English teachers, our primary concern should be "with verbal perceptions and understanding in life and not merely in art" (my emphasis). This wrenching of the aesthetic dimension in literature from its social one, the implication that the operation of the
imagination is some kind of enjoyable but dispensable activity, leads directly to the notion that the arts have no power to transform life. Indeed, Postman and Weingartner in The Soft Revolution contend that our traditional belief in literature's civilizing influence is "by far one of our most amusing superstitions". No less an educator than the Ontario Government, while it does not denigrate literary values as such, diminishes them implicitly by viewing the appreciation or study of literary art as separate from its verbal import. In the Senior English Guidelines, 1977, teachers are directed to encourage the use of language and literature as a means by which the individual can explore personal and societal goals and acquire an understanding of the importance of such qualities as initiative, responsibility, respect, precision, self-discipline, judgement, and integrity in the pursuit of goals.

What is striking about this passage is that the string of "personal and societal goals" cited by the Ministry is no longer assumed to be direct by-products of teaching literature as literature. When educational goals for literature have to be tacked on to what Frye calls "the journey through literature", when it has become obvious that the goal is no longer identified with that journey, then we are dangerously close to throwing out the humanist tradition altogether. It is not surprising that the recent interest in Moral/Values Education in the schools has been coincident with the demise of a liberal approach to knowledge in our curriculum. Perhaps we are already living in the midst of Postman and Weingartner's "amusing superstition".

Once we have renewed our commitment to the study of literature, we will have a unified basis for solving related political and pedagogical issues, not
the least of which is the reigning belief that anyone who can speak the language, however pitifully undertrained, can teach the subject. If Plato was not right, if literature is more than rhetoric, if it does have ontological status greater than an imitation of an imitation, if it is an identifiable content that can be examined objectively, if it does have intrinsic educational value, then let us stop being defensive about using literary critical methods in the classroom. Literary criticism as a dialectical tool for training perception and judgment can supplant literature as a rhetorical football for everything else.

I believe that we can move beyond the reactions against the New Critics and the old philologists to integrate critical approaches with the advances in pedagogical theory that research in sociology and psycholinguistics have heralded. But in throwing out a fossilized methodology for teaching literature, let us not throw out literature. As the perfect fusion of the cognitive and the affective, it is still one of the most powerful anti-environments we have.

Given the semi-oral state of our present culture, it may not be possible to prevent appearance from becoming reality, and vice-versa. To wit, the newspaper account of Oscar night quoted earlier. We have suspended belief in the real through the theatricalization of news events, and suspended disbelief in the imaginary by befriending characters in soap operas. There are those who would say that it is futile even to try to counteract this meshing of fact and fiction. After all, it is the eighties; we live by myth and we learn through image. Yet surely one of the functions of education should be to empower us to choose our myths and create our images, to shape our reality consciously rather than by default merely let it evolve. Do we aim for the autonomous intelligence that can distance itself from the insistent flickerings
of a TV set and still savour the solace of silence, or as the new dean of a small midwestern college has put it, must be capitulate to the world of John Travolta?

Not, of course, to Travolta as an individual, but to the culture, swelling inexorably before our eyes like the green blob in a science fiction movie, that Travolta's persona has been created to represent: the unending thump of disco beat, vinyl, neon, fast food, ear-splitting stereo, precocious sex, assertive pseudo-masculinity validated by paying to ride a mechanical bucking bull in front of the gang at the bar.
FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 338.


11. Ibid., p. x.


21. Ibid., p. 50.


