Desegregation in Big City School Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Three Approaches

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This paper compares the desegregation process in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Detroit, Michigan, and St. Louis, Missouri. Issues discussed include: (1) federal funding and regulations; (2) the role of the State government; and (3) the relationship between the school districts and the State and Federal governments. The third issue is treated in terms of the ingroup/outgroup syndrome. Different definitions of desegregation used by each school district are outlined and each city's choice of either a city or metropolitan desegregation plan is discussed. Various approaches to community planning are described and areas for future research are suggested.

(APM)
DESEGREGATION IN BIG CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE APPROACHES

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Introduction

After reviewing the desegregation experience of three big city school systems -- Detroit, Milwaukee, and St. Louis -- I am prepared to repeat the assertion that "school desegregation has been the best thing that has happened to public education in this century in the United States" (Willie 1978:viii).

In a chapter entitled "Education, Inequality, and the Meritocracy," Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis begin with the adage that "the humanity of a nation ... can be gauged by the character of its prisons" (Bowles and Gintis 1976:102). In other words, the real measure of the compassion of a people is how they deal with those among them who are in captivity. Bowles and Gintis further believe that the quality of the educational process also is an indicator of the humanity of a community because, they say, "in the initiation of youth, a society reveals its highest aspirations" (Bowles and Gintis 1976:102). These case studies of urban education systems reveal that in providing court-ordered equality of opportunity for the minority, a community also tends to enhance the quality of education available to the majority. Thus, all benefit together.

In Milwaukee, for example, a new grade configuration was embraced that clustered grades 6, 7, and 8 in the same schools; innovative instructional approaches, enrichment programs, and other options were placed in specialty schools and in magnet schools; interdistrict cooperation was facilitated between city and suburban systems; there was staff participa-
tion in human relations training and community participation in educational planning. All of this, because the Milwaukee board was ordered by the court to formulate plans to eliminate every form of segregation in the public schools.

St. Louis and Detroit school systems had similar experiences: old schools were closed; magnet schools were opened; the feeder pattern between different levels of schools was re-arranged; curriculum changes and new learning experiences were introduced, in the process of implementing the court mandate to desegregate. Urban education had become moribund in this country before court action renewed its vitality by requiring greater public support to meet the needs of a pluralistic student body. Many had given up on city school systems.

The state aid at the rate of $12 million a year that Milwaukee received enabled it to carry through on educational innovations that, the school board and its administrators believed, were necessary to properly implement a racial balance plan. According to its Deputy Superintendent, the state statute that provided these funds probably would not have come into existence if Milwaukee schools had not been under the threat of a court order to desegregate. Neither would millions of dollars of grant funds from the Emergency School Aid Act of the federal government have been awarded to Milwaukee, Detroit, St. Louis, and other cities if the constitutional requirement to desegregate public school education had not been ordered. In what is seen by some as a liability in essence
is an asset: to repeat, school desegregation is one of the best things that has happened in recent years in this nation. For public education, it is a cause for celebration rather than condemnation.

Nevertheless, it is new; it is different; it is enormous. For these reasons, it presents many difficulties. The areas of common agreement between chief school administrators are focused on first. Then the differences in the assessments of the desegregation experience for big city schools are presented. Finally, the implications of this analysis for future research is presented.

Robert Mertz, Arthur Jefferson, and David Bennett agree that the key to effective school desegregation is improved education. Jefferson has summarized the matter very well in his statement that "educators ought to be devoting energy toward issues of quality education rather than preparing materials, briefs and other aspects of litigation" (Jefferson 1980:4). There is a hint in these remarks that most urban school systems could have avoided litigation if they had attempted earlier some form of accommodation to the educational needs and demands of minorities.

Since court findings have been overwhelmingly against school systems in most desegregation cases, one wonders why school boards have continued to squander the limited funds available for education in continuous litigation by appealing court orders to desegregate. My own belief is that denial of the reality of that which is present or will inevitably come to
pass is irrational. Ruminating on this matter, I conclude that the resistance largely has been in the tradition of the white supremacist or the macho man. For some it will be as difficult to accept this judgment as it is for the WASP or the macho man to acknowledge defeat. The parallel between the assertion of white supremacy, male superiority, and school board invincibility is worthy of pondering. Both assertions, of course, are in error (Schrag 1971) (Lyon 1977).

Part I

Federal Government

The educators in Detroit, Milwaukee, and St. Louis all agree that effective school desegregation at the local level requires assistance from state and federal levels. And they all agree that such has not been forthcoming in the amount and kind and way that could maximize the desegregation effort.

Title I

From the federal government, funds for schools that have a disproportionately high number of children of low-income families are appreciated by local school systems. But all cities have been critical of the inflexible criteria under which these Title I funds may be used.

The main contention is that Title I funds should follow such students into the receiving schools in which they are enrolled as part of a desegregation plan. Robert Wentz stated one of the tragic consequences of the present federal policy when he observed that "some parents who believe in desegrega-
tion are put in the position of saying that they do not want their child moved out of a Title I school because [one] may not yet the help [one] needs if [one] is moved" (Wentz 1980:6). Moreover, he said that Title I regulations that identify schools as eligible for funding, in part, because of neighborhood demographics reward communities for containing their poor in certain residential areas. He said that we should have learned from the "infamous Pruitt-Igoe," -- the high rise, low income housing experiment in St. Louis -- that such containment "intensifies ... segregative conditions" (Wentz 1980:7). Containment was a bankrupt policy for public housing that is being repeated in the provision of federal aid for public schooling and should be changed.

ESAA

There was concern also for the way in which federal funds from the Emergency School Aid Act are made available. David Bennett of Milwaukee consolidated the remarks of his colleagues from St. Louis and Detroit in his statement that the shifting and new priorities of E.S.A.A. leave former programs "without federal support and no local or state means to pick up the financial burden of these programs." Also he and others were critical of the funding timetable of E.S.A.A. In the past, funds for some programs were not released until after the school year had begun. In Bennett's words, "that has created unbelievable problems in terms of staffing and meeting program objectives" (Bennett 1980:9). With this conclusion, others would
agree. Bennett called for the redesign of federal funding along the lines of block grants as a way of guaranteeing continuity in program support.

Rules and Regulations

The third common concern about assistance derived from the federal government had to do with contradictory regulations and guidelines in which the various programs, orders, and decrees are packages. The judicial and executive branches of federal government often promulgate different definitions of desegregation. Funds derived from federal sources may be expended in transportation for students in vocation and special education but not for the purpose of achieving desegregated education.

Bennett cautioned, however, that complaining is not enough. He said that part of the blame for these contradictions lies with educators. He observed that the education community might be able to influence federal government and get the more wanton contradictions changed, if it were organized.

While the big city school superintendents were annoyed with the way that some school desegregation programs were administered by the federal government, they expressed a modest and tempered appreciation that the federal level had made some financial response.

State Government

The most vehement negative reaction was reserved for state governments that by and large have abandoned local leaders in their struggle with desegregation. Of Missouri, Robert Wentz
said "we have a definite lack of strong direction on desegregation in the areas of policy and legislation at the state level" (Wentz 1980:1). He described the state as not initiating any action to comply with desegregation needs or mandates but merely responding. Missouri offers no fiscal support to cities for desegregation. In Michigan, Arthur Jefferson said the state has promulgated guidelines with respect to racial isolation but that they "are without any clout." Jefferson's view is that "there is a vacuum at state level for school districts, administrators, and boards who might want to do something progressive such as ... living up to constitutional responsibility [to desegregate public education]" (Jefferson 1980:1). David Bennett who believes that "Wisconsin ... has demonstrated an enlightened approach ... by providing additional state aid for students assigned or transferred within a school system when this movement has a racial balancing effect ... and special aid ... to minority students transferring to suburban school systems and nonminority students transferring from the suburbs to minority city schools" calls this approach "a refreshing contradiction" to most states. He concurred in the criticisms voiced by his colleagues that most "state governments have had a less-than-admirable ... history in meeting the needs of urban school districts that have come under desegregation orders" (Bennett 1980:3).

Wisconsin is out front and should be commended for what it has done. Other states interested in peaceful desegregation and quality urban education should take note of the ini-
tivities and actions of this state's response to the constitutional requirement to desegregate.

It is fair to say that effective school desegregation plans are expensive and cannot be accomplished in big cities without financial help from outside the district. This is the opinion of the Deputy Superintendent of Schools in Milwaukee. His opinion was formed on the basis of what happened in that city as a result of liberal state aid. It is my belief that his opinion can be generalized to the level of a proposition or principle in policy analysis and that it applies to most city systems.

The Ingroup/Outgroup Syndrome

The areas of agreement between the administrators of big-city school systems fit neatly into the Ingroup/Outgroup Syndrome. In this syndrome, the actions of Ingroup members are judged by their intentions and those of Outgroup members by their consequences. In policy analysis the Ingroup/Outgroup syndrome is manifested by the Ingroup's inclination to study the strengths of its own members and the weaknesses of others. Obviously, the good intentions of Ingroup agencies or individuals may have contributed to good or bad effects. It is a folk axiom that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Likewise, the bad outcomes of Outgroup agencies or individuals may have been unintended or unanticipated and initiated toward a good purpose. Thus, to focus only on intentions or strengths when analyzing one's own kind and to consider only consequences
and weaknesses in an examination of others is to ignore the principle of mutuality and to commit the error of particularism, which are characteristic of the Ingroup/Outgroup syndrome.

Excepting Milwaukee, the administrators of city school systems included in this discussion extolled the strengths and good intentions of the local folk -- the Ingroup -- and excoriated the actions of state and federal governments -- the Outgroup. The St. Louis Superintendent, for example, said that his Board of Education stood together publicly, would not yield to pressure groups, worked with a committee of 14 citizens, and was very supportive of the school system staff. Moreover, he said the committee of 14 floundered for only about two weeks, then found its direction, and now its members are experts who could be of great assistance to other cities going through desegregation planning. The Board of Education, the committee of 14 citizens, and the school system staff may be classified as the Ingroup. Clearly, their virtues were extolled and their vices, if any, were unmentioned.

The state and federal governments -- the Outgroup -- were portrayed by the Superintendent as aloof from the desegregation process or without strong commitment to it, providing little or inappropriate fiscal support, and issuing confusing and contradictory regulations. Clearly the vices of state and federal governments were mentioned and their virtues, if any, muted.

The analysis of the Detroit Superintendent of Schools was similar to that of the chief administrator in St. Louis.

The truth that is analyzed by the Ingroup/Outgroup syn-
drome always is a truth that is partial. In the area of de-
segregated education, a partial truth may contribute to dis-
tortion and interfere with the search for a proper solution. 
For example, Ingroup/Outgroup syndrome tends to desensitize the 
Ingroup, the local community, to recognizing the possible exis-
tence of complicity and mutuality between local, state and 
federal levels in resisting school desegregation. Remember that 
in St. Louis, the federal court order that defined a desegre-
gated school as 30 to 50 percent black, although the citywide 
black school-age population was 77 percent, was approved and 
recommended by local leaders. This definition facilitated 
the desegregation of all of the city's white students but left 
many of the blacks in racially isolated schools. Despite the 
laudable compliments about the local Ingroup, the federal court 
definition of a desegregated school that was included in the 
court order was clear and presented evidence of complicity and 
mutuality between local and federal levels in limiting desegre-
gation.

Moreover, the Ingroup/Outgroup syndrome, by putting down 
the Outgroup causes it to be defensive, causes it to engage 
in self-justification. Governments, like individuals, when 
their survival is threatened or their esteem demeaned "often 
cannot afford to take the chances required by innovative action" 
(Gardner 1963:52). Such groups take few initiatives and become 
preoccupied with strategies for protection. Thus, the Deputy 
Superintendent of Schools for Milwaukee is on target when he 
praises the State of Wisconsin for its limited support for 


local school systems that must deal with desegregation. Such praise enhances the esteem of the state and may encourage it to do more.

The principle that David Bennett has followed is important. It is not unlike that which guided and governed the actions of Martin Luther King, Jr. It is the principle of asymmetry in social action. When the structure of evil is ideological (racial segregation certainly meets this criterion), "there must be asymmetry between the form in which evil manifests itself and the form of ... opposition to evil," said Herbert Warren Richardson. He further said that Martin Luther King, Jr. recognized that "to struggle against evil within the system of ideological conflict never solves anything, but simply perpetuates the problem .... This is why so much concerned social action is counter-effective -- because one ideology lives off its opposition to another and thereby strengthens that which it opposes in the very act of opposing it" (Richardson 1968:201-202). For this reason, King considered nonviolence to be an effective asymmetrical way to overcome the evil of violence. In like manner, Bennett and the Milwaukee local school system have used personal contact between local school staff and state representatives and praise to overcome the potential for alienation, apathy, and hostile opposition at the state level regarding the ideological issue of school desegregation. It is enticing to dump on the state and federal governments. This may be the easier thing to do but not the more effective.
Part II

We now turn our attention to areas of disagreements between these three administrators of big-city school systems. Despite similarities in the analyses, there are several significant differences. The more important variations have to do with definitions of desegregation, advocacy of a consolidated city-suburban school system, and involvement of the community in educational planning.

Definitions of Desegregation

In the three cities included in this analysis, St. Louis and Milwaukee have similar definitions of desegregation, one suspects for similar reasons, although their black/white population ratios are different. Seventy-seven percent of the school-age children in St. Louis is black; and 45 percent, in Milwaukee is black. The Hispanic population in both cities is small. Despite these differences in racial ratios, the court order in St. Louis defines a legally desegregated school as one in which blacks are 30 to 50 percent of the student body -- in other words, one in which whites are the majority. In Milwaukee, a school is declared to be legally desegregated if its black student population is 25 to 50 percent. This means that its student body must be majority white. The similarities of the definitions of desegregation indicate the presence of a similar assumption, namely that whites ought to be the majority, if possible, in a school that is legally desegregated. David Bennett confirmed my suspicion regarding the underlying assumption of the court-ordered definition of desegregation when he
said that "people in Milwaukee ... are not comfortable when the top end of the range allows for more than 50 percent of Black and Hispanic students. He acknowledged that some people "contend it is basically racist to say you should have a majority white enrollment in a desegregated school." Yet, he said that other "parents ... raise concerns ... to the school administrator about the future of a school that is more than 50 percent black." He concluded that "this is a very touchy issue and one that is not in any manner resolved" (Bennett 1980:14).

And yet it has been resolved by court order in that several schools will be all-black in St. Louis and these schools "will be in compliance" with the court order, according to Robert Wentz, although not desegregated (Wentz 1980:15). They will not be desegregated because there are not enough whites to go around if they must be a majority in all legally desegregated schools and whites are only 23 percent of the school-age population.

By court order based on a settlement agreement, Milwaukee has "prohibited all-white schools by requiring at least a 25 percent black population in each school" (Bennett 1980:7). Likewise, St. Louis could have prohibited all-black schools but did not. It could have required at least a 20 to 23 percent white population in each school. To do this, St. Louis would have had to face and transcend an inappropriate belief that whites ought to always be the majority in legally desegregated schools.

Detroit apparently avoided the problem of embracing a
desegregation definition that is considered by some as racist. Whatever the definition, the Superintendent did not emphasize it. Eighty-six percent of Detroit school-age children are in households of black racial and ethnic populations. The Detroit Superintendent of Schools advises a community to "desegregate to the extent that it can" and then "improve educational programs for all students whether or not they are in a desegregated situation" (Jefferson 1980:3). He never raises the issue regarding which race should be the majority in a desegregated school. Although he states that the court has given legitimacy to remedies directed toward "physical movement of students to achieve a desirable racial quota" and that Detroit now transports about 30,000 of its 228,000 students because of the court order whereas previously it transported relatively few, the Superintendent neither defines nor describes a "desirable racial quota" (Jefferson 1980:3). One suspects that Detroit local school officials did not urge the court to define a legally desegregated school as one with a white majority not because only 14 percent of the school-age population is white (actually this racial proportion is not much smaller than that in the St. Louis schools where only 23 percent of the student body is white). One suspects that Detroit did not ask for and receive a court-ordered definition that legally desegregated schools should be majority white because school officials were aware, in the words of Arthur Jefferson, that "there are still too many racist notions embedded in American life" (Jefferson 1980:13). Apparently, Detroit did not wish to contribute
future to this phenomenon in terms of a definition of legal desegregation. The racial ratios in St. Louis and Detroit are similar; but their definitions of desegregation are different. The racial demographics of Milwaukee and St. Louis are different; but their definitions of desegregation are almost the same. It is my guess that race-relations assumptions account for these similarities and differences.

City Versus Metropolitan School System

Regarding metropolitan remedies, the attitudes of Detroit and St. Louis administrators are striking contrasts. These school officials in these two cities have opinions that differ significantly and that are interestingly associated with race. An analysis of their perspectives provides valuable information on race, power, and resources, and demonstrates, in the words of David Bennett, "the enormous complex environment in which desegregation plans must be fashioned" (Bennett 1980:9).

The Superintendent of St. Louis schools believes that eventually planning will begin for a metropolitan school system, involving St. Louis and St. Louis County (Wentz 1980:2). The city is predominantly black and the county is predominantly white. Probably for these reasons, the city of St. Louis was designated as a national education service area in 1967 that was separate from the St. Louis County vocational education service area. Wentz states that if the entire metropolitan area had been consolidated into a single service area in the mid-1960s, program duplication could have been avoided and the student bodies of
the vocational schools now would be integrated. He believes that the city and county service areas were not consolidated a decade and one-half ago "because people did not think beyond the immediate" (Wentz 1980:3). Through consolidation, there would be resources to offer highly sophisticated programs, particularly in the area of technical and vocational education, according to Wentz (Wentz 1980:4).

My belief is that St. Louis city was designated as a separate service area precisely because someone was thinking beyond the immediate. During each ten-year period since 1960, the city's black population has almost doubled. It has not increased substantially in St. Louis County. Consolidation and separation have something to do with the distribution of educational resources. Also consolidation and separation have something to do with the distribution of political power.

Robert Wentz of St. Louis leans toward metropolitan consolidation of city and suburban school systems. But Arthur Jefferson of Detroit has doubts about the efficacy of this solution. Jefferson said that blacks are more concerned about losing power through city-county consolidation than with gaining new resources.

Thus, "many black people," he said, are beginning "to take a second look at metropolitan remedies for school desegregation" (Jefferson 1980:7). These are the reasons why: "In Wayne County, where Detroit is located, you do not see blacks being hired when there are vacancies for school superintendents or principals. The best employment opportunities for blacks are
still in the City of Detroit ... A number of black judges ... have been elected in ... city criminal court, but only one or two ... have been elected to the county circuit court where the election is county-wide ...." The bottom line for Jefferson is that "One does not find blacks in responsible positions of government or in the private sector unless blacks are in the majority" (Jefferson 1980:7). In summary, Jefferson said, that "in many minority communities you have the issue of giving up political power if you move toward a metropolitan desegregation plan. There is the concern that political power which has been gained by concentrations of minorities may be diminished and lost if cities are incorporated into a larger area where the majority would once again be white" (Jefferson 1980:7).

Inevitably, we come to the crucial question in policy analysis: Who is right and who is wrong? Should the advice of Wentz be followed in favor of a consolidated metropolitan school system that may increase educational resources but also will guarantee political control of the systems by whites? Or should the doubts of Jefferson be embraced that would continue most urban school systems as they are with boundaries that are coterminous with city limits and thus maintain the limited educational resources of the cities but gain, in many instances, political control over their distribution by black and Hispanic populations that are a majority? The answer to the question whether or not a metropolitan remedy should be supported turns, in part, on principle and, in part, on self-interest.
Unfortunately, some who have proposed a systemwide metropolitan approach to school desegregation have argued in favor of their proposal totally on the basis of principle and have denied that the self-interest of race political control has anything to do with it. Jefferson was honest enough to state that the issue of political control is basic in the resistance of blacks to metropolitan school systems. And David Bennett let it be known that whites are uncomfortable when blacks and Hispanics are more than 50 percent. While he personally affirmed that there is no actual difference between a school that is 50 percent black and one that is 60 percent black, he did say that when blacks and Hispanics dominate a school in terms of numbers, "that becomes a very significant psychological factor to many people" (Bennett 1980:14).

Both blacks and whites are racially endogamous so far as political power is concerned but exogamous in the use of resources. They prefer to share power, authority, and political control with their own kind but to use their own and others' resources.

As pointed out by Robert Merton, endogamy is a device that serves to maintain social prerogatives .... It helps prevent the diffusion of power, authority and preferred status to persons who are not affiliated with a dominant group."

Finally, Merton states that "notable increases in group consciousness and solidarity involve a tightening of endogamous prescriptions" (Merton 1979:228-229).

It so happens that the scale of endogamous activity for
blacks is broader than the scale of endogamous activity for blacks. Because of the size of their populations in the United States, blacks and Hispanics cannot maintain political control over a jurisdiction that is larger than a city. But whites, because of the enormous size of their population, can dominate a consolidated city-county metropolitan area even when the city portion is heavily populated with blacks and others. Thus, whites who opt for a metropolitan solution to the constitutional requirement to desegregate public schools are not necessarily endogamous. They know that they can guarantee political control among like kind in a larger jurisdiction that others, such as blacks and Hispanics, could never hope to control.

The issue of city school systems versus metropolitan school systems is a dilemma. Blacks wish to maintain political control of some cities and yet have access to the broader resources of the suburbs. Whites wish to maintain political control of counties and regain control of cities but limit the access of others to suburban services and opportunities.

There is a way out of the dilemma by way of the double victory in which the minority and the majority are mutually fulfilled. Blacks may cease excluding whites from municipal politics in exchange for greater access to suburban services, opportunities and guaranteed meaningful participation in metropolitan area political decisionmaking. Without full access to suburban settings and guarantees regarding full decision-making participation in metropolitan affairs, blacks and
Hispanics will continue to opt for an endogamous city life over which they have a measure of control. Thus far, this has not happened in any meaningful way. To repeat the observation of Jefferson, one tends to find blacks in responsible positions only when blacks are in the majority (Jefferson 1980:7). Events and social organization need not be this way. And yet they are. Thus I predict rough sledding ahead for metropolitan remedies for school desegregation until the races are more honest with each other, until the races are more trusting.

Community Planning

Finally we consider ways in which school administrators in these three big cities differ in their involvement of the community in the planning process for public school desegregation. Clearly Milwaukee is out front. It stands head and shoulders above all. Detroit indicated a healthy respect for involving citizens in desegregation planning and implementation; but neither it nor St. Louis could match the magnificent community mobilization effort of Milwaukee.

Others claimed that their attempts to obtain broad-based community support were frequently frustrated and that there is a limit to how much use can be made of a democratic process in working out school desegregation problems (Wentz 1980:11-12). The Milwaukee school board, however, moved with dispatch and confidence: it "authorized the superintendent to proceed with planning specific details with the understanding that princi-
pals, faculty, and community representatives would be involved" (Bennett 1980:2). Established was the Committee of 100 that reported to the court-appointed master. Also involved were 12 planning councils representing geographic divisions within the city, school community committees, the City Council of PTAs, the Coalition for Peaceful Schools, the clergy, ad hoc parents groups, and the Association of Commerce.

Public awareness campaigns were undertaken that used brochures, newspaper supplements, letters, telephone information centers, and television programs. In Milwaukee, "structured community involvement" was used as "a way to complement the planning base established by the superintendent's staff." Up front, the administrators made it clear that "the student assignment system must remain the prerogative of the professionals." But other aspects of the desegregation plan were influenced by parent involvement (Bennett 1980:5).

The involvement of the community paid off. During the 1979-80 school year, 79 percent of the students in Milwaukee attended racially balanced schools (Bennett 1980:8). Milwaukee achieved this relatively high level of school desegregation without suffering any significant increase in white flight (Bennett 1980:15), and reached a court-approved agreement between plaintiffs and defendants that mandated at least a 25 percent black population in each school (Bennett 1980:7). Milwaukee achieved these goals and more because the community was deeply involved in all aspects of desegregation planning.
Such community involvement is not a gimmick. The wear and tear on school officials is great. It can be tolerated only by those who are committee to the idea that school desegregation is a major contribution to quality education. On this proposition there can be no ambivalence, if the community is to take courage from its school people and follow their leadership. If the school board and the administrators do not give leadership to the desegregation process, others will step into the power vacuum and make much mischief for the schools and the community. The histories of numerous cities are replete with such examples (Bennett 1980:11). Milwaukee school administrators mobilized their community in favor of school desegregation before others could mobilize the community against it. The Milwaukee method of mobilization is a model that can be adapted for use in other communities.

Part III

Research Implications

The analysis of how three big-city school systems have attempted to deal with school desegregation reveals a need for more research on the process of school desegregation. To date, most social scientists have been concerned with studying student achievements and whether or not desegregation has had an effect. Such findings are of little value in dealing with community groups and in mobilizing public support.

The chief school administrators know well what they need but the researchers and the research funding agencies have not made an appropriate response. The superintendent of schools
in Detroit said that "the federal government could do schools a great service by identifying the salient factors in school desegregation implementation." He said that there is a "lack of effective research about what models are available" (Jefferson 1980:9). A similar request was made by the superintendent of schools in St. Louis. He called for research that will assist in planning and implementation. He said local school officials under court order to desegregate need help in how to cluster schools and how to plan programs (Wentz 1980:9). Indeed, I would offer the proposal that the federal government, through the National Institute of Education or some other unit, should finance the development of at least five alternative models of school desegregation. Communities then would have models to mold and adapt to their unique situations and not have to start from ground zero in planning for desegregation implementation, as they now must do.

The deputy superintendent of schools in Milwaukee said that issues in the psychology of racial balance have not been resolved. Obviously more research is needed in this area. And, of course, research is needed on ways of adapting the community organization mobilization model of Milwaukee to the needs and requirements of other cities.

In examining the vicissitudes of school desegregation in three urban communities, the Detroit, Milwaukee, and St. Louis school administrators have made a major contribution in policy analysis and have identified a school desegregation
research agenda for the future. It should be embraced by foundations and federal funding agencies and implemented with dispatch.
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