This interim review of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) youth programs focuses on five topics through which were considered the universe of need, program experience, and policy recommendations. Chapter 1 is an introduction which briefly describes the law itself, including summaries of its major parts. It also discusses the method used to review YEDPA and present the findings. The next five chapters (2-6) are devoted to the topics used to structure the review: (1) public sector job creation, (2) access to the private sector, (3) educational strategies and institutions, (4) supportive services, and (5) management and research. These chapters open with a brief discussion of the main goals/purposes of the law with respect to the topic. They then proceed, in a largely narrative manner, to delineate lessons accumulated through two years of implementing the law. Chapter 7 is a brief concluding note on knowledge development. A sixteen-page bibliography includes a number of program reports, memoranda, and other unpublished documents. (YLB)
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE--
AN INTERIM REVIEW OF THE YOUTH
EMPLOYMENT AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ACT

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The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act sought to improve the quality of youth programs and to test out new approaches while dramatically expanding the level of employment and training opportunities. The YEDPA experience offers important lessons for youth programs and policies.

In 1978, President Carter established a Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment to address this critical national problem and through careful and comprehensive review of research, evaluation and demonstration projects, as well as broad public consultation, to assure the incorporation of past lessons into the policy and program foundation for the 1980's. One dimension of the review was an assessment of the operational experience under YEDPA conducted under the auspices of the VPTFYE by the Center for Policy Service, Brandeis University. The analysis provided a major input into the recommendations of the Task Force which were adopted by the Administration.

This volume is one of the products of the "knowledge development" effort implemented under the mandate of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. The knowledge development effort consists of hundreds of separate research, evaluation and demonstration activities which will result in literally thousands of written products. The activities have been structured from the outset so that each is self-standing but also interrelated with a host of other activities. The framework is presented in A Knowledge Development Plan for the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977, A Knowledge Development Plan for the Youth Initiatives Fiscal 1979 and Completing the Youth Agenda: A Plan for Knowledge Development, Dissemination and Application for Fiscal 1980.

Information is available or will be coming available from these various knowledge development efforts to help resolve an almost limitless array of issues. However, policy and practical application will usually require integration and synthesis from a wide range of products. A major shortcoming of past research, evaluation and demonstration activities has been the failure to organize and disseminate the products adequately to assure their full exploitation. The magnitude and diversity of the youth knowledge development effort puts a premium on structured analysis and wide dissemination.
As part of its knowledge development mandate, therefore, the Office of Youth Programs of the Department of Labor will organize, publish and disseminate the written products of all major research, evaluation and demonstration activities supported directly by or mounted in conjunction with GYP knowledge development efforts. Some of the same products may also be published and disseminated through other channels, but they will be included in the structured series of Youth Knowledge Development Reports in order to facilitate access and integration.

The Youth Knowledge Development Reports, of which this is one, are divided into twelve broad categories:

1. Knowledge Development Framework: The products in this category concern with the structure of knowledge development activities, the assessment methodologies which are employed, validation of measurement instruments the translation of knowledge into policy, and the strategy for disseminating findings.

2. Research on Youth Employment and Employability Development: The products in this category represent analyses of existing data, presentation of findings from new data sources, special studies of dimensions of youth labor market problems and policy analyses.

3. Program Evaluations: The products in this category include impact, process and benefit-cost evaluations of youth programs including the Summer Youth Employment Program, Job Corps, the Young Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Employment and Training Programs, Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects, and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.

4. Service and Participant Mix: The evaluations and demonstrations summarized in this category concern the matching of different types of youth with different service combinations. These include experiments with work vs. work plus remediation vs. straight remediation as treatment options. It also includes attempts to mix disadvantaged and more affluent participants, as well as youth with older workers.

5. Education and Training Approaches: The products in this category present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of various education and vocational training approaches including specific education methodologies for the disadvantaged, alternative education approaches and advanced career training.
6. **Pre-Employment and Transition Services:** The products in this category present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of school-to-work transition activities, vocational exploration, job-search assistance and other efforts to better prepare youth for labor market success.

7. **Youth Work Experience:** The products in this category address the organization of work activities, their output, productive roles for youth and the impacts of various employment approaches.

8. **Implementation Issues:** This category includes cross-cutting analyses of the practical lessons concerning "how-to-do-it." Issues such as learning curves, replication processes and programmatic "batting averages" will be addressed under this category, as well as the comparative advantages of alternative delivery agents.

9. **Design and Organizational Alternatives:** The products in this category represent assessments of demonstrations of alternative program and delivery arrangements such as consolidation, year-round preparation for summer programming, the use of incentives and multi-year tracking of individuals.

10. **Special Needs Groups:** The products in this category present findings on the special problems of and adaptations needed for significant segments including minorities, young mothers, troubled youth, Indochinese refugees and the handicapped.

11. **Innovative Approaches:** The products in this category present the findings of those activities designed to explore new approaches. The subjects covered include the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, private sector initiatives, the national youth service experiment, and energy initiatives in weatherization, low-head hydroelectric dam restoration, windpower and the like.

12. **Institutional Linkages:** The products in this category include studies of institutional arrangements and linkages as well as assessments of demonstration activities to encourage such linkages with education, volunteer groups, drug abuse and other youth serving agencies.
In each of these knowledge development categories, there will be a range of discrete demonstration, research and evaluation activities, focused on different policy, program and analytical issues. For instance, all experimental demonstration projects have both process and impact evaluations, frequently undertaken by different evaluation agents. Findings will be published as they become available so that there will usually be a series of reports as evidence accumulates. To organize these products, each publication is classified in one of the twelve broad knowledge development categories, described in terms of the more specific issue, activity or cluster of activities to which it is addressed, with an identifier of the product and what it represents relative to other products in the demonstration. Hence, the multiple products under a knowledge development activity are closely interrelated and the activities in each broad cluster have significant interconnections.

This volume is one of the many evaluations of YEDPA programs. It should be assessed in conjunction with Youth and the Local Employment Agenda, a case study review of local experience by the National Council on Employment Policy and Foundation for the 1980's--A Summary Assessment of Youth Programs prepared by the Office of Youth Programs. Additionally, the policy implications and applications are spelled out in Youth Employment Policies and Program for the 1980s in the "research on youth employment and employability development" category.

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Chapter 1: Background

A. Introduction

On August 5, 1977, President Carter signed into law the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act. This law, known as YEDPA, has authorized the expenditure of nearly $3 billion over the course of three fiscal years. Its passage expressed a broad consensus in Congress and in the Administration that the needs of unemployed youth had reached a crisis level.

The problem YEDPA was intended to address is conventionally described through statistics: over 1,350,000 youth under the age of 19 who want to work are unable to find jobs. In February 1980, the unemployment rate for all youth was 16.5%, just short of three times the adult rate. For black teenagers, the situation is significantly worse, with a February unemployment rate of 37.9%. These numbers have not improved as the national economy emerged from the recession of 1974 and, with the country appearing to hover on the edge of another recession, may worsen without federal assistance.1

The problem for blacks, hispanics and other minorities is particularly acute. Even though more black youth are employed today than ever before, the ratio of this employment to their total population has declined. Even though the percentage of blacks enrolled in school now equals, and in some categories, exceeds that for whites, the drop-out rate in the major urban school systems continues to rise.2 And even though more black adults than ever are now earning incomes in excess of $10,000, the unemployment rate for young members of these families is no lower than for other blacks.3

It would be a mistake to view youth unemployment as solely a problem for minorities. Most unemployed youth are white. For whites living in economically distressed cities and rural areas, unemployment rates are well above the national average.4 With increasing
frequency, employers complain about the lack of educational and employment skills among young applicants. Tests for reading and math competency—as well as SAT scores—continue to reveal disturbing deficiencies.5

YEDPA was not expected to solve all these problems. Indeed, inherent in its design was the recognition that there would be no simple solutions and that there was not enough information available to promulgate remedies which would have any certainty of denting the problem. YEDPA launched a two-part assault on this dilemma: one part which focused on alleviating the immediate employment and training needs of disadvantaged youth; the other which, through research and demonstration projects, sought a firmer basis on which to design future programs. Together, they constitute the broadest attempt to deal with youth unemployment ever undertaken by the federal government.

Since 1978, as a result of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act, 750,000 young people have been employed throughout the country in a remarkable variety of locally developed programs. Nearly half of these were minority youths working through YEDPA in jobs that would not exist without it.6

The experiences of YEDPA were intended to pave the way for new youth legislation to be considered by Congress in 1980. In preparation for this Congressional process, President Carter asked Vice President Mondale to chair a Task Force on Youth Employment. This Task Force included representatives from all of the relevant Cabinet-level departments in the Executive branch. Its immediate mission was to review youth-related activities throughout the federal system.

Beginning last March, the staff of the Task Force engaged in an extensive program of information gathering, analysis, and discussion. The purpose was to build on the activities underway in individual Departments and, in a timely and informal manner, to use their results to help shape new youth policies for the decade ahead.
Naturally, a central part of this 'youth review' has been the experience of YEDPA itself. Even though programs created by the law had been operational for barely two years, it was vital that data generated by its myriad activities be analyzed and incorporated in the review process. A fair amount of what YEDPA accomplished in this respect was to underwrite the cost of a number of research projects aimed at better understanding the causes, extent, and distribution of youth unemployment. Some of this research has been published and has been reviewed independently by the Task Force.7

Most of YEDPA's resources, however, have been spent to create employment and education opportunities for needy youth. In order to get some understanding of this side of the law, the Task Force asked the Center for Public Service at Brandeis University to undertake a review of YEDPA. The special purpose of this review was to gather 'lessons' which might be relevant to the policy decisions which would emerge from the Task Force's work.

The Center for Public Service was asked to carry out this 'interim' review of YEDPA last August. In essence, the month of September was spent reviewing such materials as were available and producing this document, which must, therefore, be viewed as a quick and tentative assessment of a very complex Law which had been in effect only two years. A draft of this Review was submitted to the Task Force in October 1979 and it has circulated informally as part of the policy review which culminated January 10, 1980, with the President's announcement of his proposed youth initiatives.

The remainder of this Introduction will offer a brief description of the Law itself, including summaries of its major parts, and will describe the method employed to review YEDPA and to present our findings. We would like to point out here, and elsewhere, that this
is not an evaluation of YEDPA nor is it an attempt to distill all of the lessons which might be gleaned from the law. It is organized around five issues deemed important by the Task Force and confines its analysis as much as possible only to those issues. The present version of "Lessons from Experience" has benefitted considerably from the comments of those who read its initial draft; however, the text remains organized according to its original form. Thus, it is correct to describe the current document as an improved version of a review drafted in response to the needs of the policymaking process last year. A complete, detailed assessment of YEDPA is a crucial task which remains to be done.

B. Description of YEDPA

Strictly speaking, the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act was an amendment to the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Three new programs were added to Title III of CETA and a new Title VIII was created for the Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC). In addition, as part of the Economic Recovery Act, Congress doubled the size of the Job Corps and increased the funding for the Summer Youth Employment Program. Even though the Job Corps and SYEP were not part of YEDPA, they were obviously influenced by it and, therefore, were considered in this review.

The total new funding for youth programs in FY 1978 was $1.2 billion. YEDPA was originally authorized for one year; but, in the course of re-enacting CETA in October 1978, YEDPA was extended through September 1980. Each of the major parts of YEDPA is summarized below.

1. Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP)

YIEPP is the most experimental of the YEDPA programs. Its explicit purpose is to demonstrate "the efficacy of guaranteeing
otherwise unavailable employment" to disadvantaged youth who "resume or maintain attendance in secondary school" or "in a program which leads to a certificate of high school equivalency." In order to be eligible to participate in an Entitlement project, a youth would have to be (a) economically disadvantaged, (b) between 16 and 19 years old, (c) reside in a specific geographic area, and (d) comply with the school attendance provision. YIEPP's fundamental goal is to test the effect of assured work on school attendance. Subsidiary goals include testing the capacity of prime sponsors to operate such large scale administrative and job creation programs for youth, experimenting with the use of direct wage subsidies in the private sector, and utilizing alternative schooling arrangements to entice out-of-school youth back into the educational system.

The Entitlement was not allocated through a formula. Under the auspices of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, a nonprofit 'intermediary' designated by the Labor Department to oversee the Entitlement, a national competition was held to select prime sponsors to participate in the Entitlement. The 17 winners were divided into two categories: so-called Tier 1 projects which would seek to implement a full-scale Entitlement for all or major sections of their jurisdiction, and smaller, Tier 2 projects which would be targeted on one high school district and would explore some of the more specific Entitlement issues.

The unique features of the Entitlement are many and include:

- the concept of entitlement;
- the allowance for private sector wages;
- the most restricted income eligibility in all of YEDPA;
- and the most elaborate and rigorous evaluation design.

These features, each of which was prescribed by Congress, set it apart from the rest of YEDPA.
In addition to this basic design, the Entitlement has, through its 17 different projects, tested a diverse array of special services, including:

- expansion of model alternative schools;
- new techniques for linking alternative services with local education agencies;
- special outreach, assessment and placement services for out-of-school youth;
- exemplary programs designed to meet the needs of single parents, offenders, and other hard-to-serve groups.

The visibility of these projects, combined with the continuing availability of cogent and timely reports, tends to give YIEPP a disproportionate share of the attention in this YEDPA Review. Of the basic $1 billion YEDPA authorization (excluding the Job Corps), $115 million was reserved for the Entitlements.9

Through December of 1979, over 66,000 youth had been served in the Entitlement projects. Of these, all were economically disadvantaged, just over half were women, and over 80% were from minority groups. The minority percentage is the highest for any of YEDPA's parts and even exceeds the percentage served by the Summer Youth Employment Program.

2. Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP)

As defined in the current regulations for Title IV of CETA, the purpose of YCCIP is

"to provide youth experiencing severe difficulties obtaining employment with well supervised work in projects that produce tangible benefits to the community."
Appropriate projects are defined by the Act as being "work which would otherwise not be carried out" and can include a range of "community improvements" such as the rehabilitation of public housing, repairs to the homes of low-income residents, energy conservation measures, and park maintenance. The Act severely limits the funds which can be used for materials, supplies, design, and training, thereby placing a premium on projects which can broker such expenses from other state, federal, and local sources.

Youth eligibility for YCCIP was defined broadly and prime sponsors could include anyone between the ages of 16 and 19 who was unemployed. Special preference, however, was to be given to youth who were economically disadvantaged and out of school. The Act also emphasizes the quality of the supervision provided to youths in YCCIP projects and the need to coordinate the youths' work experience with local education agencies in order to facilitate "the awarding of academic credit". Proposed projects are to be both "labor intensive" and to provide "job training and skill development opportunities".

YCCIP is the only part of YEDPA with mandated limits on administrative costs (10% of project funds) and participant wages (at least 65% of total project costs). $115 million was allocated for YCCIP, equal to the amount for YIEPP, but 21% of this amount was reserved to be spent "as the Secretary deems appropriate". Several major demonstration projects have been created through the $24 million set aside for this purpose, while the $91 million which went to States and prime sponsors has underwritten the cost of hundreds of projects, all of which have been obliged to meet the basic requirements of this part of the Act. It should be noted, although its practical impact is modest, that YCCIP was not strictly a formula allocation. The $91 million was apportioned to the States, and prime sponsors were "eligible applicants" for proportional shares of this money, but only if their proposed projects met with the approval of the Regional Office of the Department of Labor.
The effect of these special funding provisions was not much different than a formula allocation, except in the way that it complicated the planning and awarding of grants. Nearly 32,000 youths were served in the program year ending in September 1979, and over 80% of these were economically disadvantaged, indicating that prime sponsors more than met the special emphases of the law. Over 50% of those served were minorities, but only a quarter of the enrollees were women.

3. **Youth Employment & Training Program (YETP)**

YETP is the linchpin of YEDPA. Its goals are ambitious, including nothing less than programs "designed to make a significant long-term impact on the structural unemployment problems of youth." These programs can range from "community betterment activities" (as under YCCIP) to "training and services" generally similar to those already under CETA Title II.

There are several features which distinguish YETP from the other parts of YEDPA and from previous CETA programs, although most of these features are matters of degree or emphasis:

- broader eligibility;
- an elaborate planning process;
- the involvement of public schools;
- coordination with other parts of CETA;
- allowances for experimentation.

Eligible participants are so-called "in-school" youth who are unemployed or underemployed and whose family income does not exceed 85% of the lower living standard.\(^1\) (The income part of "economically disadvantaged" is generally defined to coincide either with the Office of Management and Budget poverty level or 70% of the Bureau of Labor Statistics lower living standard.) Non-income eligible youths
can participate in YETP activities except for paid work experience and intensive services.

The YETP planning process required the establishment of Youth Councils (with youth members), consultation with unions and community based organizations, an inventory of local needs and resources, and special coordination with local education agencies (LEAs). Twenty-two percent of the money allocated to each prime sponsor was to be "used for programs for in-school youth carried out pursuant to agreements between prime sponsors and local education agencies". This 22% set-aside is one of the best known provisions of YLDPA and the one which has caused the greatest immediate change in the planning activities of prime sponsors.

There was some concern that the substantial new funding for youth programs channeled to CETA prime sponsors through YETP might have the effect of encouraging them to reduce their level of youth participation in Title II. Therefore, the law included a maintenance of effort provision designed to avoid such 'substitution' and requirements that YETP services be "coordinated to the maximum extent feasible" with Title II plans.

Certain allowances for experimentation were another striking feature of YETP. Prime sponsors or states (through their "Governor's grant") could

- serve youth under age 16;
- serve up to 10% non-income eligible youth in work experience programs;
- offer job sampling and stimulate job restructuring in the private sector; or
- create "experimental job training within the private sector".

The funds set aside for the "Secretary of Labor's Discretionary Projects" (16% of the total) were intended to "carry out innovative and
experimental programs to test new approaches for dealing with the un-
employment problems of youth." Included in these approaches were a
range of institutions which might be targeted for participation (es-
pecially "community-based organizations which have demonstrated effec-
tiveness in the delivery of employment and training services"),
allowances for the transfer of funds to other Federal departments and
agencies to develop programs through inter-agency agreements, and a
specific experiment with a "Youth Employment Incentive and Social Bonus
Program." The YETP discretionary allotment has been the core for the
many individual projects which make up the Knowledge Development Plans
issued by the Department of Labor.

The law encourages prime sponsors to pay youth participants at
the minimum wage (except where prevailing wages for a particular job
are higher) and to seek academic credit wherever possible for the
youths' work experiences.

The original appropriation for YETP was $1.37 million, of which
about $450 million was available to prime sponsors and Governors. This
formula amount is about 45% of the YEDPA total and, when combined with
the YCLIP 'formula,' meant that prime sponsors received, directly,
just under 55% of the funds.

As of September 30, 1979, there were about 185,600 participants
enrolled in YETP programs, excluding those involved in the discretion-
al processes. This is over three times the number enrolled in YACC,
YIEEP, and YCCIP combined. Over 80% of YETP participants were econom-
ically disadvantaged, and about half were women and half minorities.

4. Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC)

The Young Adult Conservation Corps was created through a new
Title added to CETA. Its purpose was to offer employment to "youths
who would otherwise not be currently productively employed" through
"useful conservation work" on "public lands and waters." YACC
is administered through an Interagency agreement with the Departments of Interior and Agriculture who, as a result, manage virtually all of YACC. Except for the modest role of the Employment Service in referring applicants and for some pro forma coordination requirements, YACC is divorced entirely from the CETA system.

In order to be eligible for YACC, a youth need only be unemployed and between the ages of 16 and 23. Special efforts are to be made to assure that youth do not drop out of school to enter the Corps and the Corps is prohibited from enrolling youth solely "for the normal period between school terms". The projects encouraged under YACC run the gamut of conservation activities—from managing tree nurseries to erosion control and general sanitation. The jobs are meant to "diminish the backlog of relatively labor intensive projects (planned by Interior and Agriculture) which otherwise would be carried out if adequate funding were available". The jobs are meant to be labor intensive, to have "lasting impact," and to provide for some skill acquisition. As with the other parts of YEDPA, arrangements were to be made to offer academic credit for "competencies derived from (YACC) work experience".

$233 million was originally slated for YACC, which makes it equal in size to YIEPP and YCCIP combined. Both residential and non-residential centers were planned, with Interior and Agriculture determining their type, location, and size. Efforts were to be made to locate federal YACC projects near areas of "substantial unemployment" although, given the distribution of federal property, it was acknowledged that this would be difficult. Seventy percent of the $233 million was to be spent on federal programs taking place on federal property, while the remaining thirty percent was to be apportioned to the States for projects developed by them or by units of local government and nonprofit organizations. These projects must take place on non-federal public property and adhere to the general provisions for quality and type of work followed by the federal projects. The individual
states' share of the 30 percent would be based on the "total youth population within each State." Participation in YACC is intended to be a full-time, twelve-month experience which offers youth a replica of the experience traditionally associated with the Civilian Conservation Corps of the Depression era.

YACC is the part of YEDPA least well known in the employment and training system. It appears to join features of both the Job Corps (residential camps) and YCCIP (labor intensive conservation work) while modeling itself on the managerial experience of the current Youth Conservation Corps, which is a summer-only Interior Department and Forest Service program. As of March 1979, there were about 15,000 youths enrolled in YACC. As would be expected, particularly for a program without income eligibility and operating mainly in rural areas, less than half of the participants are economically disadvantaged and less than 20 percent are from minority groups. Interestingly, the rate of female participation (37%) has been higher than in both YCCIP and the Job Corps.14

5. Other Federal Youth Programs

It is difficult to compare the experience of YEDPA with other federal youth employment programs. Although the percentage of youth in the basic CETA Title II programs was declining in the years prior to YEDPA's passage, it still constituted at least 40% of the enrollments and the largest "significant segment" served through Title II. Despite the size and continuity of this youth participation, it is virtually impossible to separate the youth experience in Title II from that of adults, and no studies have been done on this subject since the Neighborhood Youth Corps was consolidated in CETA in 1974.

YEDPA did not occur in a vacuum. The 'new money' went mainly into old channels. This was legislatively intended by virtue of channeling YEDPA through the CETA system and it was also a practical
means to achieve YEDPA's goal of having an immediate impact on youth unemployment. The Youth Planning Charter of 1977 by downplaying YEDPA as a vehicle for institutional change, increased the impact which the existing delivery system would be likely to have on the new youth initiatives.

In this context, the absence of information on youth participation in Title II is unfortunate. When there is no standard of measurement for the status quo, the 'new' will usually be judged innovative by comparison with the 'old'. The people planning YEDPA's implementation, both federally and locally, were constrained by the determining influence of a status quo they could not define with any precision. There were, however, two important exceptions to this situation: the Job Corps and the Summer Youth Employment Program -- the two existing programs aimed exclusively at youth.

(a) The Job Corps

There is no need to describe the Job Corps in detail. It was created through the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and, at its peak in 1967, served about 42,000 youth in 123 Centers. The doubling of the Job Corps in 1977 was its first expansion since being taken over by the Labor Department in 1969 and, when completed, will return the Job Corps to an enrollment level about equal to that of 1967.

The Job Corps' residential centers have become the Labor Department's model programs: they have been lauded as "social experiments that work" and they have been evaluated more frequently and more thoroughly than any other major federal employment program. Indeed, the legislation stipulates that one of the program's goals should be to foster the "development and dissemination of techniques for working with the disadvantaged that can be widely utilized by public and private institutions and agencies" (PL 95-524, Title IV, Part B, Section 450). The Job Corps has been perceived as a laboratory in which experimental ideas could be tried and the successful ones then propagated in the employment and training community.
Unfortunately, there is so much that is unique about the Job Corps that the transferability of its lessons is limited. For example, even though the Job Corps has experimented with different ways to manage and operate its residential centers, there are no comparable local programs which could benefit from this experience (in fact, the Job Corps has been contracting with private, for-profit service providers for years, without any impact of this practice on local sponsors). Again, the Corps has been described as the "largest alternative education system" in the country, but the implications of its educational programs for those developed as local alternative schools are temenous. 20

The Job Corps belongs in this YEDPA review for two reasons:

(1) in order to assess the expansion and improvements in the Corps itself, and
(2) because of the potential relevance of its evaluative data on the likely impacts of YEDPA interventions.

Considerable material is available on the plans to expand and enrich the Job Corps. 21 In 1978, the Labor Department published a two-volume compendium of research on the Job Corps. Some of this data has been used to provide a frame of reference or benchmark for our YEDPA "lessons."

(b) The Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP)

The Summer Program is as old as the Job Corps but has created a much less positive image for itself. Despite the ambitions of its legislative mandate, it has had trouble overcoming its reputation as 'fire insurance' for the cities:
Programs shall provide eligible youth with useful work and sufficient basic education and institutional or on-the-job training to assist these youths to develop their maximum occupational potential and to obtain employment not subsidized under this Act. \[\text{Ibid., Part C, Sec. 481; emphasis added}\]

The relevance of the summer program for a review of YEDPA stems from the following:

- it is the largest youth employment program in the country in terms of budget (about $750 million), number of enrollees per year (nearly 1,000,000), and extent (operating in nearly every political jurisdiction in the nation);
- much of the local experience managing youth programs derives from SYEP and, therefore, would have a direct impact on YEDPA;
- considerable public scrutiny of the quality of the summer program took place at the same time that YEDPA was being implemented;
- the evolution of the regulations governing the summer program over the last five years reflects issues which are also central to YEDPA;
- there have been explicit, YEDPA-related experiments and demonstrations involving SYEP in the past two summers and further efforts at linking the two programs are planned;
- a substantial data base already exists on the summer program, although it is less useful than the information available on the Job Corps.

The summer program has acquired considerable, if flawed, experience with such topics as the capacity of prime sponsors to manage large job creation efforts for youth, the development and supervision
of quality work experiences in the public sector, innovative arrangements for eliciting the cooperation of the private sector, and the impact of work experience on subsequent school attendance. Like the Job Corps, the summer program provides a kind of lens through which to view YEDPA around these and similar issues.

6. Knowledge Development

'Knowledge Development' has been the slogan of YEDPA. One of the first documents issued after the passage of the Act was a Knowledge Development Plan. This Plan listed a number of "learning objectives" for the law and described a series of projects to carry these out. The Plan has been updated each year and has served to focus and integrate the many experiments and innovations carried out through YEDPA.

It is important to point out now several key aspects of this broad and ambitious agenda. First, it explicitly includes all of YIEP and the discretionary set-asides under YCCIP and YETP, meaning that fully 23% of YEDPA's basic resources would be devoted to this purpose. Second, it has not been limited to these parts of YEDPA. Included in the Plans have been innovations and modifications within both the Job Corps and the Summer Youth Employment Program. Further, several of the major discretionary projects have either been developed through prime sponsors or have had primes as their "target population." The size and scope of knowledge development under the "youth initiatives" is such that Knowledge Development might well be viewed as a fifth part of the Act.

A fourth feature is of particular note for a "YEDPA review." What the Plans have done, in effect, is to create a mechanism which could accomplish two formative objectives:
1. to 'remediate' perceived deficiencies in the Act itself, so that ideas or innovations not specified or permitted by the Act could nevertheless be tried;
2. to create new projects or revise current ones based on feedback from the early YEDPA experience.

This adds a great deal of flexibility to the implementation of the Act, but it also means that the Plans themselves become legitimate objects for scrutiny in reviewing that implementation. Finally, because it specifies objectives for the Act and attempts to provide a coherent framework for its diverse parts, the Knowledge Development Plan can serve as a basis on which to judge many, though not all, of YEDPA's central purposes.

C. Method for the Interim Review

This section will describe the limits to this endeavor, give an overview of our approach, and outline the organization of the review. Something ought to be said, first, however, on the subject of "learning from experience." It is ironic that this issue be taken up in the context of employment programs which, themselves, often expect their participants to "learn from experience" or learn "on-the-job." What we learn from experience, though crucial to the performance of a task, usually remains below the threshold of consciousness and rarely is extracted for the purpose of gaining insights into the nature of the task. Many local employment administrators who were eager to contribute to the "knowledge development" process were disappointed, in late 1977, by the Congressional timetable which demanded results, outcomes, or lessons as early as the spring of 1978. It was felt that the important lessons would have to await longitudinal studies, some of which might take a decade, and that pressure to produce knowledge
would simply become a screen for arbitrary impositions of particular points of view. The challenge, for the knowledge development process, was enormous. On the one hand, it had to structure experiments and research which would yield those long-term outcomes; on the other hand, it had to generate, quickly, demonstration projects whose short-term experiences could guide the formation of new legislation.

In this context, it is important for us to express our belief that (a) the 'lessons from experience' are important in themselves because they communicate directly the experience of the target population; (b) the nature of these lessons will often disappoint analysts because they are qualitative and refer more to a practice (like carpentry) than to a science; and (c) their delineation will take the form of guidelines or behavioral strictures not unlike those found in a catechism or a manual. To search for the "lessons from experience" is another way of saying that we value local practice and judge it to have an autonomous effect on the impact of federal policy. Just as youth themselves are often molded by otherwise unexceptional experiences, the lessons from YEDPA conceal no 'solutions' to youth unemployment, but, rather, reflect the status of the problem. Uncomfortable though it may be, we would view these 'lessons' most appropriately, not as knowledge drawn from an epistemological inquiry, but as precepts from a psychological one. 22

1. Disclaimers

Two realities condition this review: the point in time it occurred and the speed with which it had to be undertaken. The second of these simply alerts the reader to possible changes in interpretation based on later data. It does not excuse the performance of the review itself. The 'point in time' issue is far more significant.

Even though a great deal of money has been expended as a result of YEDPA and even though hundreds of thousands of youths have
participated in thousands of local and national projects, the quantity of reliable data available to assess this experience is not adequate at this point in time. Obviously, none of the outcome evaluations--of which there are three national studies and countless local or project studies--could be marshalled for this report. Nor could we rely on interim evaluations of many of YEDPA's most promising demonstrations. In some cases, these evaluations have not been published; in others, they cover only the first six or nine months of 1978. All of the materials available to us were of an interim or implementation nature. Many of them have so many restrictions or provisos that one quotes them with trepidation. There are still others which do no more than describe a series of events without offering a useful explanatory framework.

In addition to the inherent limits on interpreting available information, there is a dearth of information on some topics. For instance, there has been no national survey or evaluation of prime sponsor behavior under YEDPA. There is a process evaluation of a select number of prime sponsors, and this is a useful study, but we were forced to rely on it more than we might had there been better quantitative data on many prime sponsor issues. Another example is the Young Adult Conservation Corps. A report was prepared by the Office of Program Evaluation and Research on its implementation phase, but this report, which considers only the non-residential portion of the federal share and covers the period through February 1978, tells us little about a program which comprises fully one quarter of YEDPA. The Job Corps is in the midst of its greatest expansion and innovation in a decade. Again, no evaluative documents pertaining to this effort were available at the time of this report, only descriptions of its goals and methods.

Because of these data limitations, we have made greater use of informal and anecdotal material than would a full-scale review of the Act which might take place even a year from now. This material
includes reports on meetings and roundtables held within the past year, unpublished reports on various programs and products, and informal communications between the Center and other agencies, including the Department of Labor.

Most of the materials analyzed in this review were publicly available before January 1, 1980. The bibliography attached to this report includes all material, published and unpublished, which was gathered as part of this review. Naturally, our interpretations of this material are solely our own and any errors in interpretation cannot be attributed to the materials themselves. Again, we caution that this is an explication of lessons from experience and not an evaluation of either a policy or its programs.

2. Method

We began with three assumptions:

- that the purpose of this Review would be to offer conclusions relevant to the purpose of the Vice President's Task Force;
- that the nature of the available information would mean that these conclusions fell somewhere in between federal policy and local practice;
- that the Review should focus on the goals and provisions of the Act itself and the Regulations implementing it.

In designing its review of youth programs, the Task Force formulated five topics through which to consider the universe of need, program experience, and policy recommendations. These are

- Public Sector Job Creation;
- Access to the Private Sector;
- Educational strategies and institutions;
- Supportive Services;
- Management and Research.

29
One might argue whether they adequately cover the major issues and whether they can be separately assessed. We have defined them in self-evident terms, while realizing that many issues and findings would naturally overlap from one section to another. Indeed, by arranging the sections in order of increasing generality, we hoped to demonstrate the degree of interdependence among them. These five topics were used to organize the Act and our interim review of YEDPA programs.

The next step was to analyze the Law according to the issues raised by these five topics. We felt that the only way to make sense of the mass of information, however provisional, was to analyze it in terms of the specific features, innovations, and goals of the Act. To produce these, the following general materials were reviewed:

- the Law itself and the several sets of regulations issued between September 1977 and September 1979;
- the legislative history of the Law, as embodied in several digests and in the House and Senate Hearings in April 1977;
- reputable analytic reviews of earlier federal youth programs;
- the Youth Planning Charter, Knowledge Development Plans, and March 1978 Youth Initiatives Report, all produced by the Office of Youth Programs, DOL.

Once these objectives were spelled out, the available material was divided into eight categories and was separately reviewed for evidence which could be legitimately arrayed by objective and focus area. These categories were: YACC, YIEPP, YETP, YCCIP, Discretionary, Job Corps, SYEP, and general YEDPA.

After the individual analyses were concluded, the material was reintegrated with the goal of
describing the set of programs, activities, and results appropriately summarized under each topic;

- cross-referencing the analyses to produce 'lessons' which were adequately documented and/or indicative of consensus.

The emphasis in this process was on lessons which could either be attributed to the actions of YEDPA or were significantly reinforced or made visible by YEDPA. Even though considerable material on non-YEDPA youth programs is included in our bibliography, it was used primarily as a general frame of reference (with the exception of SPEDY and the Job Corps which, for reasons already noted, were drawn into our purview). Information from non-YEDPA sources was occasionally used to buttress points which seemed valid for YEDPA. Our operating principle was to intentionally 'ignore' findings from earlier sources. One consequence of this procedure may be a tendency to suggest as a 'YEDPA lesson' insights which could, equally, have been derived from other program experience.

3. Organization of the Report

In addition to this Background chapter, there are five chapters devoted to the topics used to structure our review of YEDPA. These chapters open with a brief discussion of the main 'goals' or purposes of the Law with respect to the topic, then proceed, in a largely narrative manner, to delineate the lessons accumulated through two years of implementing the Law. References are generally placed in parentheses and are coded according to the Bibliography. The text includes only the major references: on each point, it would be possible to cite additional studies and reports, but this has been avoided from a belief that the quantity of citations will not alter the essential credibility of the statements in the text which must, ultimately, stand on their own.23 There is a brief concluding note on knowledge development
and an extensive bibliography which includes a number of program reports, memoranda and other unpublished documents.

We would caution against reading this report in a way which looks only at the 'lessons'. In addition to the disclaimers sprinkled in the text, it is necessary to examine directly the goals and programs of YEDPA in order to properly situate the lessons drawn from them.
Chapter 1

1. The February 1980 youth unemployment rates are virtually identical with those projected for February 1979. Further, after a steady rise in the period from, approximately, 1972 through 1977, unemployment rates for minority youth have 'stabilized' at consistently high levels. Adult unemployment rates have also been very stable over the past year or so.

2. For example, a recent study in New York City suggests that no more than 55% of its current ninth graders will receive a diploma in four years. This 45% drop-out rate was generated by the schools themselves, a somewhat unusual practice for public systems sensitive to their public image. For another source with similar data, see Giving Youth a Better Chance, Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education.

3. Source, unpublished review of basic research in youth employment by Leonard Hausman, Heller School, Brandeis, August 1979. Other studies indicate that the gap between 'affluent' and poor blacks is even wider than that between blacks and whites. DeLone, Small Futures.

4. For one example, among many, see Youth Unemployment: The Outlook and Some Policy Strategies, Congressional Budget Office, April 1978.


6. This and all subsequent enrollment data come from the Labor Department's Office of Youth Programs. Enrollment data is issued quarterly and, usually, is reported about three months after the close of the quarter.

7. There are several Task Force and OYP publications, including the one cited in Note 4, above.
8. As of October 1978, when Congress re-authorized CETA, all youth programs were moved into a new Title IV and the basic CETA activities were moved from Title I into Title II, making Title I purely an administrative section. Our text, especially in comments dealing with 1978, uses Titles III and IV interchangeably and takes similar liberties with Titles I and II.

9. In discussing the dollar allocations of YEDPA, we have stayed with the original appropriations in order to provide a sense of the relative, intended distribution of the funds. Actual expenditures, because of carry over, have varied so much that the subsequent funding years alter this balance considerably. See Footnote (1) in Chapter 2 for more information on the latter.

10. Congress specified that YCCIP projects have an "adequate number of supervisory personnel" which, in the regulations, was translated into "at least the ratio of 1 full-time supervisor to every 12 youths." The regulatory language has led to some confusion, particularly as to whether "satisfactory justification" is needed in order to meet the intent of the law by having a better ratio than 1 to 12. A program which desired to have, for example, a 1 to 6 ratio—a number commonly thought to be optimal—would, in any event, be hampered by the 65% minimum expenditure on participant wages. In other words, the desire for projects to be both labor intensive and well-supervised may be impossible to achieve within the dollar allocations of YCCIP. See below, page 41, for more discussion of the meaning of supervisory ratios; and page 39 for discussion of the success of local prime sponsor projects in acquiring funds for supervisors from non-YCCIP sources.

11. The distinction, for youths, between being 'in-school' and 'out-of-school' is, at best, fragile and varies enormously from one school district to another. The dichotomy in target population would be unimportant if it were not translated into different services allowed for each group. Out-of-school programs have, typically, been operated by community based organizations and have offered a full range of services, including assessment, training, remedial education, and work experience. In-school programs have tended to be operated by local education agencies and have concentrated mainly on work experience, a year-round version of the summer program. In adopting this distinction, YEDPA carried forward the structure of the Neighborhood Youth Corps which, in turn, had inherited this from the National Youth Administration of the 1930s. Cf. Lorwin, Youth Work Program, Washington, 1941.
12. It should be noted that the House had passed, in the summer of 1976, a bill authorizing a 'Young Adult Conservation Corps' quite similar to the YACC which emerged in YEDPA. One key difference was that the 'old' YACC had a larger relationship with the CETA system, which was supposed to refer all participants.

13. The involvement of the Interior Department and Agriculture (mainly the Forest Service) in youth programs dates, of course, to the Civilian Conservation Corps. The similarity of YACC to the Job Corps extends beyond their common use of residential centers: both Interior and Agriculture operate Job Corps Civilian Conservation Centers and, now, YACC centers. In fact, they are often on the same property. Combining this with the summer YCC, we find that these Departments are operating three distinct, yet overlapping youth programs and are the largest federal youth employment agencies in terms of direct services to youth.

14. Participation percentages for women and minorities vary widely between the three segments of YACC: Interior Federal, Forest Service Federal, and State Programs. For example, the percentage of American Indians served through the end of FY 1978 varied from a low of 2% in State Programs to a high of 13% in the Interior Department's Federal programs, many of which operate on Indian Reservations.

15. For a description of this process, see the studies directed by Wurzburg for the National Council on Employment Policy, particularly the first round of cases, Initial YEDPA Experience at the Local Level, February 1978.

16. The Planning Charter stated, as one of its ten principles, that "the new youth programs are not the cutting edge for institutional change". When this same document was referred to in the March 1978 report to Congress (Youth Initiatives), principle 7 had become: "to promote institutional change, particularly program linkages between education and work". This was the only one of the ten principles to undergo such a radical transformation. Evidently the message was slow in penetrating because the Knowledge Development Plan for FY 1979 lists as the last of its "new issues": "How can the institutional change process be promoted?" The point in quoting these is to indicate that, in the early phases of YEDPA, the goal was simply enrollment of youth. Once this stage had been reached, the more important agenda was introduced. While the rationale for this may have seemed practical at the time, it encouraged prime sponsors to handle the new youth money much as they were already handling youth under Title I and in the Summer Program.

18. There is a dearth of evaluative material on any of the federal youth programs and there has been no continuous evaluation and monitoring even of the Job Corps. Thus, the quality of the Job Corps studies benefits from a context of scarcity. Two factors, among others, suggest why the Job Corps has received this attention: (1) it is federally operated and, therefore, closer to federal scrutiny; and (2) it offers researchers a relatively captive audience and 'cleaner' testing conditions than, say, the NYC ever did or could.

19. It has been a tradition to use the word "disadvantaged"—meaning, poor—as a synonym for "needing special employment services." Although the overlap between the two groups may be large enough to warrant this as a proxy for need, something which began as a convenient formulation soon becomes embodied as a principle. The poor, as people living in poverty 'need' only money to be removed from this category. Targeting CETA in this way tends to enhance its image as a variety of welfare. Undereducated and unemployed youth, who happen also to be poor, are in need of services considerably more expansive (and expensive) than anything associated with welfare. A similar history can be traced for the use of unemployment percentages in CETA. They began as a convenient and practical way to measure need in lieu of more cumbersome and complex formulas. In time they were taken as capturing that need to the degree that, when the rates go down in a community, so too, presumably, does the 'need' and, shortly, the prime sponsor's CETA funds.

20. Although Job Corps centers do function as 'alternatives' to ordinary education for their enrollees, they also function as alternatives for employment services, residence, labor, etc. To label them as part of the growing alternative education movement is a misnomer. Strictly speaking, they are more like alternatives to the military or to incarceration than anything else and, indeed, borrow much of their strength from this comparison.

21. An idea of the importance of the Job Corps for the issues raised by YEDPA can be gained by noting the percentage of the Youth Initiatives report already referred to which is devoted to the Job Corps. This report, which was the official preliminary overview to YEDPA's implementation, has, in its public form, 115 pages, of which 58 or 50% concern the Job Corps' "expansion and enrichment".
22. Although our point of view is different, we share the belief found in the "literature of implementation" in (a) the importance of local variables on the success of federal policy and (b) the value, in and of itself, of better quality programs. Another way to phrase the second of these points would be to say that we do not believe that local programs should be judged in terms of the policy they are implementing. The paradigm of "problem-solution" exists only on the drawing board; reality is more complex and should be treated as such.

23. The usefulness of many possible citations is open to question. From a logical point of view, it is virtually impossible to generalize from many projects which have had local "success". There is a difference between replication of a program type and a cause/effect statement applied to a group of people. If, among a group of 100 school drop-outs in Florida, a "statistically significant" percentage do better (defined as "stay longer and work more hours") when placed in work experience than when their work experience is "mixed" with other services, does this mean that youth in Colorado should be denied counseling? When the reports emanating from such experiments are read by themselves, there is a temptation to make facile generalizations. When they are read in conjunction with other reports describing different, but similarly designed, experiments, the patterns which stand out have little to do with research outcomes but much to do with practical "lessons" which do not claim propositional truth. For instance, there is a clear pattern--from experiment to experiment--of the experimental design itself interfering with the orderly implementation of the program expected to provide it with data. This type of lesson appears to be the most sensible way to gather information from the wealth of studies now beginning to appear, rather than using their plural "findings" to buttress sweeping statements about youth.
Chapter 2: Public Sector Job Creation
Chapter 2: Public Sector Job Creation

The first paragraph of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act stated that:

The basic purpose of the demonstration programs shall be to test the relative efficacy of different ways of dealing with ... (the structural unemployment problems of the Nation's youth) ... in different local contexts, but this basic purpose shall not preclude the funding of programs dealing with the immediate difficulties faced by youths who are in need of and unable to find jobs. (Title IV, PL 95-524, Part A, Sec. 441)

Another way to phrase this would be: in addition to long-term experiments which will help to formulate solutions to the problem, we will also put into effect short-term programs which present themselves as 'solutions'. The divided purposes of YEDPA--knowledge development and immediate aid--have been reflected in all aspects of the policy's history, from organizational arrangements to the content of participant experiences. Nowhere are they better illustrated than in the public sector jobs made possible by YEDPA.

YEDPA began not only with a divided legislative mandate: its implementation was marked by pressure to respond quickly and effectively to a real problem. An 'Office of Youth Programs' was created in the Labor Department and immediately set about fulfilling the two major purposes of the law while, simultaneously, implementing its four separate categorical programs.

Despite the breadth of YEDPA's experimental agenda, the bulk of its resources have been devoted to creating jobs for youth in the public sector. This means that more than half of its funds have been spent as wages for youth participants. This might be interpreted in any of several ways: as simple cash transfer or income redistribution; as the valid reward youth earn while engaged in productive employment;
or as the continuation of a perceived CETA practice which regards all 'work experience' as 'useful training'. We believe that, on the whole, the resources have been spent on the first and second of these activities and that, considering the historical context of YEDPA's implementation, this should be regarded as a step forward. This context was the widespread perception that public employment is 'makework'.

The stereotypical public job was effectively portrayed in the General Accounting Office's report on the 1978 SPEDY program and in the April 1979 '60 minutes' segment which dramatized that report: youth are assigned, either singly or in groups, to labor-intensive public works activities, few of which require skills or offer decent supervision. The jobs are divorced from education or training and leave the youth only modestly 'less poor' without conveying a sense of the real world of work or the satisfaction of having performed a useful public service.

YEDPA sought to remedy this situation. The language of the law itself required vigorous efforts to improve job quality: "It is explicitly not the purpose of this part to provide make-work opportunities for unemployed youth; instead, it is the purpose to provide youth, and particularly economically disadvantaged youth, with opportunities to learn and earn that will lead to meaningful employment or self-employment opportunities after they have completed the program" (ibid, sec. 411) As a result, YEDPA acquired a job quality theme which might be formulated as follows:

- any and all jobs created through YEDPA should have adequate supervision, involve work useful to the employer or to the community, and enhance youths' skills and career development.

It would be unfair to suggest that job quality had not been a concern of earlier federal youth programs. What was new about YEDPA was not the concern itself, but the explicit and constant articulation of this concern.
We do not wish to confuse this rhetoric with program reality. We do believe, however, that such rhetoric creates a climate of high expectations which, in turn, is a necessary prelude to good programs.

Which parts of YEDPA touch on public sector job creation? Both YCCIP and YACC, in different ways, are public sector jobs programs, and YIEPP is largely, though not exclusively, a program which places kids in public and private non-profit worksites. Even YETP--the largest piece of YEDPA--authorizes and encourages program agents to develop varied work experience opportunities for participants. YCCIP and YACC stress labor intensive projects specially designed for youth participants, while both YCCIP and YIEPP required that at least 65% of the total program funds be expended directly on youth wages.²

The lessons which can be drawn from YEDPA's efforts in the public sector reflect the concerns in the law for:

- The delivery of a broad range of services to as many disadvantaged youth as possible;
- The provision of quality experiences for youth;
- The hope for a long-term impact on the future employability of the youth who participate, and on the health of their communities.

These three categories will be used to organize the presentation of lessons which follows.

A. Delivery

1. Capacity of the Delivery System

It has been in the development and delivery of large-scale public job efforts under YEDPA that the youth employment and training system has been tested most severely.

The capacity of the CETA system to provide, rapidly, large numbers of jobs was cultivated through years of experience with the
summer program and the public service employment program (Title VI), both of which are marked by spurts of growth combined with periods of inactivity. It is possible that the counter-cyclical PSE programs, by their on-again off-again nature, have stimulated a capacity which is uniquely unstable. As of January 1978, when YEDPA efforts got underway, most prime sponsors were operating under the assumption that YEDPA, too, would be a short-term program. Nevertheless, their response to the job development mandate was impressive, even if it reflected their most exercised skill. More detailed lessons will be cited in Chapter 6, but several are especially relevant here.

- The employment and training system is capable of adapting to new requirements, of cutting through normally-expected delays, and of providing youth job opportunities on a large scale and in a timely manner. (NCEP, MDRC, DOL/OYP)

Despite enormous time pressures, sometimes contradictory regulations, and normal implementation problems, YIEPP, YCCIP and YETP programs have effectively developed and placed youth in over 600,000 public sector jobs in the first fifteen months of operation. An additional 50,000 conservation worksites have been provided through YACC, while SPEDY (now the Summer Youth Employment Program), also larger under YEDPA, accounted for another 1,000,000 in the summer of 1979. During this same period, there has been a decline in adult PSE slots from 750,000 to 450,000.3

2. Ability to Target

Granting that large-scale public creation for youth can be accomplished, can it be focused on those most in need?4 YEDPA's experience suggests that it can.
- The majority of youth enrolled in YEDPA have been from minority groups with their participation ranging from a high of 81% in YIEPP to a low of 18% in YACC. The overall minority share of YEDPA was 50%.

Indeed,

- The employment impact of YEDPA on minority youth has been even greater than these numbers indicate. Without YEDPA there would have been a decline in the number of minority youth employed in 1978.

Put another way, YEDPA accounted for 75% of the gross increase in jobs for black youth in 1978. (Source: DOL, August, 1979; Lerman; Levy)

With respect to economic targeting,

- Prime sponsors have tended to adopt program eligibilities more stringent than required by YEDPA. Most primes have imposed the 70% BLS standard on YCCIP and have ignored the 85% BLS permitted in YETP. The prime sponsors with Entitlement grants have used an even lower standard of poverty (the so-called OMB definition.) (NCEP, 1978, 1979)

In other words, efforts at targeting on the economically neediest have worked even better than planned, and the expectations for YEDPA's service to minority and poor youth have been met. Additional data have emerged from specific YEDPA programs:

- The great majority of YCCIP enrollees are males (74%). This appears to reflect the nature of the jobs which are perceived as manual labor. 'Service' oriented projects enroll more women. Programs to involve women in non-traditional occupations have been tried under YEDPA but no models for national replication have been developed. (DOL, 1979; MDC; NCEP; VICI)
The Entitlement program strove to keep youth in school and to entice drop-outs to return. In-school enrollments are not vastly different from expectations, but,

- the actual number of drop-outs attracted by the Entitlement has been significantly lower than planned, although the number rose in 1979 in several cities. (MDRC)

The reasons for this shortfall seem connected with the availability of alternative modes of schooling. This will be detailed in Chapter 4.

The Young Adult Conservation Corps presented program operators with the least restrictive income requirements; therefore, it is not surprising that YACC,

- targets the least on younger, poorer, under-educated youth. However, YACC has exceeded both YCCIP and the Job Corps in its percent of female enrollees. This may be due less to the nature of the respective programs than to the fact that YACC draws mainly from suburban and rural areas while the others draw from the cities.7 (DOL, 1979; OPER, 1978)

With the possible exception then of YACC, YEDPA was successful in its aims to target on the most economically disadvantaged and to concentrate its resources on minority youth.

B. Quality

The legislative interest in offering quality work experience to youth is sprinkled throughout the law and its subsequent regulations. Our review of this a priori interest suggests six elements which may bear on quality: project scale, work supervision, monitoring, job design, training and service mix. YEDPA has taught us something in each category.
1. Project scale

The scale of public work programs is an important issue for policy analysis. It has two components: the type of organizational unit and the numbers of youth served by each autonomous unit. There are two major types of organizational units found in CETA programs and an understanding of the difference between them is crucial for an assessment of their effectiveness, for they each embody a distinct model of job creation to serve distinct needs.

The first type, exemplified under YCCIP, might be labelled the group project. In this case, a subcontractor not only employs the youth, but it devises a special work project for the youth and, usually, only youth enrolled in this project are involved. The program operator, in this instance, is both developer and employer. Further, the working unit (for example, the crew rehabilitating a house) would not exist without the YCCIP contract. Although there have been some YCCIP programs which place youth in adult work crews, nearly all of YCCIP programs are of the project type. It is permissible to use crews in YETP and YIEPP programs, but it is rare for the fiscal unit to be identical with the labor unit, as is the case in YCCIP. The crew concept has been widely used in the Summer Program (where participants are usually paid by the prime sponsor and 'outstaffed' to, say, the parks and recreation department) and is intimately linked with the stereotype of makework.

The second type, found most often in YETP and YIEPP, we have labelled the individual placement type. In this case, the subcontractor (of the prime sponsor) does not devise the labor nor, usually, supervise it. Instead, the program operator recruits employers, usually branches of government or non-profit agencies, to participate. The vehicle for participation is not the crew (generally) but individual youths who are assigned to jobs within the host employer. Labor is not specifically devised for the youth, at least in those instances where the program fulfills its intent. If the group project type, from an intake point of view, is shaped like a funnel—all youth
channeled into one, exclusively youth job—the individual placement type is an inverted funnel: all enrolled youth are placed, in a separate process, in separate worksites. While the group project places a premium on the productivity of the employing agency in areas where it may have little experience, the individual placement type places emphasis on coordinating a plethora of kids, job sites, and monitors.

The issue of number of enrollees per program is simpler. The only point to be wary of is that, functionally, autonomy is the key. If a prime sponsor is operating a program that serves 1,000 youth, but has subcontracted all phases—from intake to termination—to four local agencies, the correct scale is 250 youth per program. If, as in the Tier I Entitlements, all 1,000 are served through one office, even for only one service unit out of several, the diameter of the funnel is narrow and the scale is 1,000.

Several of the Tier I Entitlement programs serve upward of 4,000 youth and, therefore, offer lessons for future large-scale, year-round programs:

- Prime sponsors seem capable of developing large numbers of subsidized public sector jobs in their communities, even on the scale required by Entitlement. (MDRC, April 1979)

Entitlement is by and large an individual placement program which matches youth to jobs through a centralized system. From this experience, prime sponsors have found that

- Job banks can be centralized, but not job matching, which is best treated as an individual decision made by the youth and his or her counselor. (MDRC)

- By the same token, even the individualized matching decision should not be made exclusively on the basis of the youth's expressed career interests, unless this interest has been reflected in prior training or work experience. The appropriateness of the job to
the youth's skill level is a more important criterion, as is the location of the job vis-a-vis the youth's home and school. (MDRC, NCEP)

Sophisticated job-matching techniques have led to considerable delay between enrollment and placement and consequent frustration both for the youth and the job sponsor.

Job quality is affected by the scale or size of a program; however, size is not the only determinant. Indeed, the largest of the Tier I programs, run by Baltimore, is judged by MDRC, DOL, and others as the smoothest operating and 'best' of the Entitlements. Furthermore, many cities have acquired reputations for running outstanding, though large, summer programs. Their effectiveness stems, in part, from the 'disaggregation' of these large entities into smaller operating units. Other elements such as monitoring, supervision, and general management also help to explain qualitatively different responses to the demands of scale.

As noted, YCCIP programs are group projects. Issues of scale are important when comparing locally funded 'formula' programs (which are generally small in participants and in dollars) and the larger YCCIP national demonstrations funded either through HUD or through the Corporation for Public and Private Ventures. Some themes do emerge from both local and national YCCIP programs:

- The current requirement for 65 percent expenditures on participant wages severely constrains the ability of prime sponsors to run viable programs. (Boston University, 1979; NCEP, 1978)

Community improvements require considerable expenditures on supplies and equipment which when added to supervision and training costs easily exceed the remaining 35 percent of the money. More generally,

- Needed resources must be available beforehand: projects should not be required to 'hustle' for them. (Ibid.)
The requirement that programs elicit a local match for critical materials acts like a roadblock for the whole program: behind its ramparts youth and staff wait impatiently, generating prophecies of failure.

The evaluations of the national YCCIP demonstrations suggest that the following sizes are optimal for programs performing relatively complex labor like home rehabilitation.

- At least 40 to 60 participants are required for economies of scale and to produce a visible local impact;
- a budget of at least $500,000 must be available, plus required materials. The budget should not arbitrarily limit supervisory or training staff. (BU 1979; VICI)

While not strictly issues of scale the following related points were also made in both YCCIP evaluations:

- grant periods of 2 to 3 years are needed to allow adequate planning and development time; (NCEP)
- a mix of physical improvement activities ranging from the simple (small repairs) to the complex (building rehabilitation); (BU)
- experience by the program operator (contractor) in managing similar work:
- a program orientation which stresses individual effort and quality of product. (BU, VICI)

In addition:

- If community improvement projects are to be operated on a national scale, as has been proposed for weatherization, the work activities ought not to be too complex; that is, the tasks should be easily taught, subject to rapid and precise monitoring, and not require expensive tools. (BU, 1979)

Clearly both large and small programs can be operated effectively. A program can be too small and, therefore, inefficient. And
a large program must have special features to avoid becoming jumbled, impersonal, and therefore, ineffective.

2. Supervision

- The quality of work supervision seems to be the single most important determinant of youth success. The dedication and interest of the adult supervisor is fundamental to his/her ability to work effectively with youth. This is no less true for private than for public sector jobs. (NCEP, MDC, Brandeis, Zimmerman, HUD)

Both the importance of the supervisor and the necessity for observable dedication to the supervisory role are iterated throughout the literature reviewing both YEDPA and pre-YEDPA programs. Concomitant findings, of somewhat less importance, are that:

- Work supervisors and their employers should be involved in designing projects, developing job descriptions, and delineating the work segment of any youth 'employability plan'.

- The appropriate ratio of participants to supervisors will vary considerably depending on the nature of the work (labor intensive or not) and on the nature of the work organization (project vs. placement).

- The current YCCIP ratio of 1 to 12 is too thin for work projects which aspire to teach skills and contribute something valuable to the community. (MDC, Osterman, OYP, NCEP, Zimmerman)

Experience also indicates, however, that a low ratio, even one-to-one, does not assure a good work situation. Many YETP/SYEP placements are assumed to be worthwhile when one student is placed with a single supervisor, but there is no evidence that this correlates with skill development, retention, or further placement. Still, there is some virtue to having supervisory time standards.
A measure of "time spent per week with the youth" by the supervisor would seem to approximate a better way to plan the quantitative dimension of supervision. (MDC, Zimmerman)

The qualitative side of supervision is more difficult to dissect. There are no studies of comparable programs which might guide CETA, although some evaluations of pre-YEDPA programs suggest that there are supervisor characteristics which lead to better quality supervision.

Some YCCIP projects appear to have succeeded, in part, because of their use of union journeymen as supervisors. It also appears possible to 'replicate' this kind of supervision from city to city. (VICI, Brandeis, MDC)

The helpful attributes found in these supervisors were a caring for youth, trade skills, broad practical experience, and orientation to productivity.

The quality of supervision is also related to scale. A large program with many good supervisors can be more effective than a small program in which the adults avoid their trainees. The time actually spent with the youth by the adult is an important determinant of quality, but no national standard can guarantee how well both parties use their time. This must be left to the company or agency which employs the supervisor.12

3. Monitoring

Most prime sponsors have learned that youth cannot simply be placed on jobs and ignored, seeing them only to pay them. While the response has differed from locality to locality, several common threads are apparent:
• Personal monitoring, involving visits of staff to worksites, are necessary, should happen frequently and should be documented. (MDRC, Michel, Pines)

• Client-tracking systems are necessary but should be simple so as not to multiply the current paperwork demands. (DOL/OYP, NCEP)

• Clear performance standards should be established—for participants, for worksites, for supervisors—and enforced. (VICI, BU)\textsuperscript{13}

• Ways should be developed to certify participants who have met those standards while completing their program. (Knapp, Barnett, NCEP)

• But participant standards (or 'benchmarks') should be locally determined for maximum value. Simple guidelines, under local control, will result in substantial national uniformity (NCEP, VPTF)\textsuperscript{14}

• Paperwork is a real fear and a genuine problem with all of the above requirements. The Federal tendency to require 'paper' reproduces itself geometrically as regions and localities cover themselves from below. It should be understood that 'paper requirements' exact a 'price' by diminishing the impact they are intended to document. (VPTFYE, Brandeis, NDC, Robison)

4. Job Design

Not surprisingly, it makes a difference if planning has gone into the design of a job to be filled by a young person.

• Programs which not only have specific job descriptions for their youth, but relate the job tasks to a hierarchy of skills, are likely to be more effective than those which do not. (Brandeis, MDC, HUD)

The extent to which traditional work tasks can be arranged to suit the level of youth abilities or can be reordered to provide some
diversity to the job also appears to be an indicator of a more constructive work experience. Indeed, it seems to be a routine aspect of all good job development for youth.

Job re-design is another matter. Known as 'job restructuring', this refers to the redesign of an existing job either to make it feasible for a youth to enter it or to avoid conflict with current jobs which fall under the purview of a collective bargaining agreement. The limited job restructuring which has been done under YEDPA indicates that:

- As a technique for increasing the number of available jobs for youth, it does not work. (OYP, Vogel, Elsman, MDRC)

- With union assistance, it can be an effective mechanism for resolving union concerns about the impact of youth placements. (VICI)

In the latter case, it is the fact of dialogue with unions which has helped more than the actual restructuring of the jobs. Especially in the private sector, a particular job is part of a complex division of labor planned to achieve certain product goals. There is little room for this system to be maneuvered on behalf of youth, except as a pro forma exercise. However, to the extent that conscious 'job restructuring' causes someone to consider carefully the component parts of a job and their appropriateness for a young worker, it is a worthwhile activity.

5. Training and education

Detailed lessons on this topic will be described in the Education section of this review (Chapter 4). But the separation is artificial. Prime sponsors, schools, and CBJs have all demanded training and education for participants in 'sweat only' programs. There is a consensus that:
all youth work experience should be linked with a training and/or education program. This program can vary from a GED to remedial education to specific occupational training. (NBER, NCEP, HUD, VPTF)

Both YIEPP and YCCIP were intended to offer 'labor intensive' work experience. Nevertheless, program operators in both have applied consistent pressure on their sponsors to broaden the definition of allowable activities, especially in order to provide basic educational skills to their enrollees. (MDRC, 1979; Boston University, 1979)

In the Entitlement, which requires that youth attend an approved school in order to be employed, it has been learned that this policy will not draw many out-of-school youth unless the range of 'approved' schools is expanded to include so-called alternative schools. The alternative can be (a) a program operated by the LEA itself but in a non-traditional site; (b) a program operated in conjunction with the LEA by a CBO or nonprofit agency; or (c) a school independently licensed by the state. (MDRC, 1979)

Training is a familiar word to CETA practitioners, but it has many meanings. When applied to youth, there are debates about what kind of training is needed, when to offer it, and what to expect as its outcome. There is broad agreement on the need for basic educational skills, but much less agreement on the role of specific occupational skills training, especially for youth under 18 or youth with serious learning and behavioral deficits. Some things seem clear from YEDPA's experience:

most youth who find their way into local YETP and YCCIP programs are not yet ready to make a career decision and, therefore, job matching is an illusory exercise. (NCEP)
local program operators prefer to focus on general 'employability skills' and on work experience rather than invest scarce resources in costly vocational training in specific occupations.\textsuperscript{16} (NCEP, MDC, BU)

where occupational skill training is offered, it is regarded as a motivational tool, not as a direct avenue to a career.\textsuperscript{17} (NBER, NCEP, Butler)

The most specific connection between the quality of youth jobs and the education system has come through YEDPA's emphasis on the award of academic credit "by educational institutions and agencies for competencies derived from work experience obtained through programs established under this part" (Section 445). We will encounter the academic credit issue again in Chapter 4. Here it is important to note that, except for a few jurisdictions, the procedures for awarding such credit have not been major stumbling blocks in YETP, but credit has been much less often sought for YCCIP participants.

The implementation of this provision in YCCIP has been uneven, but some general inferences can be drawn:

- Those YCCIP programs operated directly by school systems have tended to offer academic credit; relatively few non-LEA contractors have sought it. (NCEP, MDC)

The least enforced aspect of the provision has been the emphasis on credit for 'competencies'. There is considerable dispute about the definition of competencies, how to measure them, and how to ensure comparability across work sites. Nevertheless:

- In practice, more stress should be placed on competencies, as the law states, rather than simply for time spent on the job. (Youthwork, VPTF, VICI)
The pendulum should not swing completely toward competencies, to the neglect of a youth's successful demonstration of such employability traits as dependability, reliability, and stability—essentially aspects of 'spending time'. Carrying out the competency mandate would require a level of school-CETA interaction more sophisticated than that currently found in even the most cooperative jurisdictions.

6. Service Issues

Even though there was a great emphasis in YEDPA on the quality of work, there was little attention paid to those ancillary services which may contribute directly to work quality. For the most part, the jobs provided in YACC, YIEPP, and YCCIP were meant to be labor intensive, with limited training and supportive services. At the time YEDPA was passed, a substantial body of existing CETA literature (derived mainly from NYC, SPEDY, and the Job Corps) suggested the inadequacy of this 'sweat-only' approach:

- Local program operators have tended to seek and/or demand supportive services for their youth above and beyond those originally planned. (NCEP, MDC, VICI, BU)

- The Summer Youth Employment Program has progressed steadily the past three summers toward more extensive remedial counseling, occupational guidance, and placement services for its participants. Short program duration and the inertia of local traditions appear to make this progress slower than national policymakers would wish. (DOL/OYP 1979)

- The Entitlement programs have been 'enriched' (through exemptions in their planned budget mix of wages and services) in order to provide a range of supportive services to participants. These enhancements often came at local initiative and include not only alternative education but also child care, transportation, supported work and pre-employment services. (MDRC, 1979)
Programmatic evidence suggests strongly that youths with no labor market experience or youths with a variety of problems will not succeed in publically created jobs without certain additional services. (Zimmerman, Vargas, Brenner, Taggart and Linder)

It is not known what long-term impact these services would have on their recipients, but YEDPA was not designed to measure them. The prevalent impact measures, such as future earnings, are at best crude indicators of the differential effects of supportive services.

Preliminary information indicates that the optimum mix of services will depend on such things as location of the job (transportation), family status (emancipated, single parent), school status (including achievement level), and employment history (need for work orientation and occupational information).

A small but significant number of youth cannot at present be served by YEDPA programs because of insufficient funds to provide needed transportation, child care, or other services. Among these are some of the most distressed youth: offenders, addicts, and the handicapped.

Very little work has been done to assess the unit costs of different services. Many local programs must 'beg' their way into such services, even though they believe that the investment avoids a higher societal subsidy in the future. (Knapp, NCEP, RMC, VPTF, BU)

It seems clear that some supportive services are essential and will be offered as a consequence of client demand. What is much less clear is how to plan and evaluate different services for different kids.

C. Impact

With the implementation of YEDPA have come careful and systematic studies of its various impacts. Many of the demonstration programs have an impact or outcome study as a part of their research
design. The participant effects which will be measured include school retention and return, future earnings, labor force participation, career awareness, occupational information, and attitude toward work.

Data is currently available only on school return (see Chapter 4), although one could speculate on the immediate impact of youth income on total family income. The examination of YEDPA's effects on crime, pregnancy and so on, must await specialized, long-term studies.

All of these outcome measures might be related in general terms to public sector employment. But there are two outcomes which have a special relationship to this topic and which can be assessed now: the productivity of youth labor and the 'tangible community benefits' of its products.

There is evidence that:

- work performed under YEDPA has had both a genuine community impact and measurable economic value. (VICI, MPR)

Three models for ascertaining the economic value are now being refined, but early applications show that the value of youth labor can be measured in economic terms and that the yield appears to be substantial, ranging anywhere from 50 cents to $1.50 per dollar of investment.¹⁹

There were some fears that the impact of YEDPA would be weakened through 'work substitution' but

- there is virtually no evidence of substitution; that is, projects undertaken would not have been performed otherwise. (NCEP, MDC, ACTION)

This suggests that there is a great, untapped reservoir of needed public projects and services. In several of the Entitlement areas where whole jurisdictions are included, there has been no shortage of proposed public projects. The City of Syracuse, with both Entitlement
and ACTION grants saturating the eligible population and city services, reports ample available work for youth to do.\textsuperscript{20}

There has been a trend for prime sponsors to implement national emphasis categories, especially in YCCIP, which suggests that

- National priorities for public service work—such as home rehabilitation, weatherization, and conservation—appear to produce a significant local response. (NCEP)

- Moreover, the first wave of knowledge development projects has generated some further possible categories including low head dam conversion, railroad improvement, agricultural entrepreneurship, and rural housing improvements. (OYP)

As noted, this replication effect is likely to be stronger in projects which require less complex local arrangements and where significant matching funds are provided for materials and supplies.\textsuperscript{21} (VICI, HUD)

In this context,

- There is reason to believe that when national priorities are supported by national incentive funds, the local response will be positive.\textsuperscript{22}

To summarize, the efforts of YEDPA in the area of public sector job creation have consumed the majority of its resources. When the lessons from this experience are combined with other studies, it appears that we are now able to describe what a quality work experience is, how best to deliver it to youth, which 'inputs' have the greatest experiential effects, and how to monitor, effectively, the jobs and the job programs. This constitutes a step forward for public policy.\textsuperscript{23}
1. As part of any scrutiny of a public policy, it is essential to be able to know exactly what the money was spent on. In the analysis of government purchased products, such as an aircraft carrier, this is routine; it has not been routine in the analysis of human service programs also purchased by the government. If there is a dearth of such information for YEDPA, then, this represents the norm. Nevertheless, it should be noted that (a) the only useful budgetary figures available are gross expenditures under major categories of the law (YIEPP, YCCIP, etc.); (b) there is no attempt to link numbers of participants to the cost of services; (c) there is no congruence between budgetary categories and activity categories; and, (d) within each program category, there is no effort to attach a cost to each service, which, among other things, means that in CETA there is no such thing as a "unit cost".

Nevertheless, we have attempted to make a crude assessment of the fraction of YEDPA's resources spent on activities legitimately associated with each of our five topics: public sector employment, private sector employment, education, supportive services, and management. Other footnotes will spell out our numbers for each of these topics. The purpose of this exercise was not to make a pretense of performing the kind of budget analysis called for above. Its goal was simply to provide the reader with a concrete framework for judging the impact and emphases of the Act. If, as we note, negligible monetary resources were devoted to the private sector, this may explain the absence of program lessons, even in the face of Congressional expectations (for the latter, see the Senate and House Hearings on H.R. 6138 in April 1977). On the other hand, in education, we stress that most of the funds received by LEAs through YEDPA were spent on student wages. Student wages cannot be considered an "educational expense". Eliminating these expenditures from the estimate for YEDPA's educational funding leaves a rodost residue. This, in turn, makes the significant impact of YEDPA on LEAs all the more noteworthy.

The "costs" of public sector job creation include more than youth wages: there is the cost of job development, program administration, supervisory personnel, and a few ancillary services (for example, transportation or equipment). From this perspective, all of YCCIP and YACC should be considered under this heading. YIEPP, with its emphasis on j placement, falls mostly into this category, and even YETP, despite its broader purposes, has probably been expended largely on youth wages. It is a safe estimate that, on an annual
basis, $650 million has been spent on putting kids on the public payroll under YEDPA. Such an outcome was clearly one of YEDPA's original purposes--immediate aid--but analysts might want to consider whether there is any identifiable long term impact from this $650 m.

2. The 65% minimum was not legislated for YIEPP, but imposed through Labor Department regulation.

3. The source for these and all other enrollment figures is the Office of Youth Programs. Numbers have been rounded for emphasis and an effort has been made not to count twice youth whose enrollment spanned more than one fiscal year.

4. We equate need, here, with poverty. Later, we will discuss the inadequacies of this equation.

5. For example, in a city like Boston, the 85% BLS income translates into $10,650 for a family of four in 1980; the 70% equals $8,750; and the OMB poverty index, $6,700. In 1977, the median income for a family of four in Massachusetts was $19,508. (Bureau of Census data)

6. If it is agreed that the purpose of targeting is simply to make sure that the funds are used to help those most in need of help, there may be simpler and more equitable ways to distribute them than a formula which relies on individual or family income. Cf below, page 143.

7. Thus, it is interesting that in YACC the lowest percentage of female participants is found in the State Programs and not in those operated federally on federal property. In State Programs, the percent is 30; in the Interior's Federal programs, 38. (FY 78 figures)

8. We have explained these distinctions at some length because several readers of our first draft requested clarification of them. The type of organizational unit is a vital consideration, for example, in proposals to form 'weatherization teams' throughout the country or to develop a 'national youth service'.

9. This is not to suggest that prime sponsors prefer public sector jobs for their youth participants nor that they are satisfied with all of the jobs they develop in the public sphere. In fact, when asked, primes usually state a preference for placements in the private sector (cf, for example, Congressional Hearings and VPTF Roundtables).
10. The HUD Interagency Agreement with Labor called for the funding of ten Community Development Corporations to operate youth projects repairing or rehabilitating housing for low income residents. HUD assisted the CDCs in securing matching funds and, except for their dollar size, number of participants, and method of funding, these grants followed the "rules" imposed on formula funded programs. CPPV, while funding programs of a similar size, was testing the replication of a specific model, originated in Portland, Oregon, and did so through the prime sponsor system. Despite its location in the CETA network, the CPPV demonstration received several exemptions from the general YCCIP regulations.

11. Another way to phrase this would be to say that, to avoid a politicized disaster, such projects should sacrifice participant impact in favor of operating efficiency. "Massive, national initiatives" cannot have it both ways.

12. One might suggest that, in domestic policy, there is a domino theory which has been neglected in favor of its international cousin. CETA regulations continually attempt to reach over the heads of local administrators and contractors, in order to impact directly on their activities by, for instance, mandating a supervisory ratio or limiting the time for which a youth is eligible. When the youth is not 'rehabilitated' and the domino falls, it is assumed to be the result of only the policy and the intervening dominos appear invisible. We would suggest that federal policy would be better off attempting to set standards for the immediate recipients of federal funds--standards which would require them and allow them to foster quality programs. It is obvious that without adequate job supervision (regardless of definition) one cannot have a good program. But guaranteeing a certain quality of supervision does not assure a good work experience, it only generates confusion, anger, and a sense of federal insensitivity to local needs.

13. It should be noted that the process of gaining consensus for performance standards from, for example, a private employer differs considerably from the process in a CETA contracted YCCIP program.

14. This would appear to contradict the implementation literature which emphasizes the variations in local responses to national policies. The contradiction is only apparent. The more restrictive a national policy, the more deviant will be local behavior. When discussing "standards" we are in the domain of community values on which there is considerable national accord. Even if there were not, the important point is not which standards are chosen, but the need to choose, define, and enforce some standards, whatever they are.
There has been a recent controversy over the merits of vocational education, apparently based on a mistaken interpretation of a study commissioned by the National Institute of Education as part of its Congressionally mandated review of vocational education. Nevertheless, existing data has made skeptics of many. See, for example, Randall Collins, *The Credential Society* (1979), pages 16 to 21.

As will be noted in Chapters 3 & 4, the provision of equipment-intensive occupational training is a role increasingly expected of private employers. In some MDTA programs of the mid-Sixties, employers did provide such training to youth. In the mid-Seventies, the designers of NIE's EBCE programs explicitly turned to employers, with their 'state of the art' machinery, for on-the-job training. A non-career education example of such 'experiential learning' has been Philadelphia's celebrated Parkway Program.

That is, the "form" of the training is more important than the actual "content". The Vice President's Task Force Roundtable Series (cf. Butler & Darr) found that employers preferred the graduates of vocational high schools not because they knew how to perform a task but because of the way they were taught while in school. Vocational schools are perceived as imposing a discipline on their students. To graduate from one implies the internalization of this discipline which can be transferred to new work settings. Program operators have found that employers like applicants who have already demonstrated the "ability to learn" a skill, whether in the classroom or on the job. With this in mind, it would seem that, for most jobs, a resume and a transcript are somewhat interchangeable.

The so-called "Service Mix" experiment underway in three localities is not related to this issue of supportive services. The services 'mixed' in that demonstration are the categorical CETA services: work experience, training, etc. Cf. Chapter 7 for more discussion of whether the value of supportive services can be tested through experiments which compare 'treatment' groups with 'control' groups.

Both CPPV and MDRC, in conducting evaluations of, respectively, the VICI and Entitlement demonstrations, have formulated ways to measure youth output. Mathematic Policy Research has been commissioned to devise a broader measure and has applied it to the Job Corps, YACC, the Summer Program, and YEDPA. The numbers in the text are drawn from MPR and CPPV; the MDRC results will not be available until later. (It is useful to note the congruence between the CPPV and MPR figures, since they employ different methodologies.)
20. Again, the ability of these programs to subsidize volunteerism is genuine, but the occupational range of their public sector jobs is narrow; both would benefit from the array of careers available only in the private sector.

21. To a degree, local replication of national categories is a tromp l'oeil effect, since the "national priority" originated in local needs and demands. It is easy, when analyzing national policy, to view Washington and local governments as antipodes and to ignore the subtle dynamic which inextricably binds them. The problems which some of the newer emphasis categories have had--the low head dam conversion or the railroad improvements--may stem from an attempt to "discover" such categories through the Washington microscope.

22. Another way to assess this is to examine those communities which have responded successfully to the lures held out by the knowledge development effort, or, alternatively, simply to note the number of applicants for the original Entitlement (153) or for the latest Youthwork categorical competition (700). These responses indicate, at least, that incentive funds would be spent.

23. The concerted campaign to implement many of the lessons cited in this chapter in the 1979 Summer Program appears from preliminary data (OYP) to have improved both the quality of the work experience and the public's perception of that experience.
Chapter 3: Access to the Private Sector

Overview

"We feel that the private sector has to get involved in this process from day one." This statement, made by Marion Pines, Administrator of the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources in Baltimore, during the Congressional Hearings on YEDPA in April 1977, was typical of the comments entered by the majority of the witnesses. The Law describes the ultimate goal of its efforts as enabling youth to "secure suitable and appropriate unsubsidized employment in the public and private sectors of the economy" (Sec. 431). This clear statement of the purpose of youth employment programs, combined with the widespread view that private employers ought to be "involved in this process," led many prime sponsors and program operators to believe that YEDPA would create new mechanisms through which the private sector could be a partner in youth programs. This was not the case. The details of the law were considerably more tentative than its "intent": the role of the private sector was confined to certain experimental and demonstration efforts, chiefly through the Knowledge Development process and the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects. Even with such tentative gestures, there has been movement toward an expanded relationship with private employers. Since ours is a review of YEDPA, we will concentrate on insights derived from YEDPA programs and YEDPA research; however, we will also note, briefly, some preliminary lessons regarding the impact on youth of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and the Private Industry Councils (CETA Title VII), both of which have been new initiatives aimed at the private sector and authorized during the period of YEDPA's implementation.

It is important to recognize that, in its local manifestations, YEDPA was not a test of the responsiveness of either the CETA system or employers to the enticements of cooperation. Two factors account
for this (should new legislation repeat them, the result would be the same):

- There was little time to implement the new Law. Pressures to have enrollments by January 1978 were particularly discouraging for private sector initiatives because of the lack of prior relations between employers and CETA. Prime sponsors understandably used existing public sector placements when pushed to speed up YEDPA's implementation.

- Furthermore, the regulations adopted for YEDPA and YCCIP stayed well within traditional CETA categories for allowable activities. This meant that new private sector programs would, by regulation, have to follow the precedent of CETA, a daunting one for this particular activity.5

With this background in mind, our review will consider three aspects of "access to the private sector":

1. What role should employers play;
2. Which incentives will stimulate their adoption of this role;
3. Which strategies will foster public/private collaboration, locally as well as nationally.

A. The Role of Employers

- There appears to be a solid consensus among youth program operators, administrators, and researchers that, as the controller of 80% of the nation's workforce, the private sector must be involved in youth employment programs. (Robison, Elsman, Vogel, VPTF)
Tentatively conclusions from some of the Exemplary In-School projects and from the Entitlements support the view that the private sector is home to a more diverse set of jobs than the public sector and to more jobs which are productively and adequately supervised. Some of the positive feeling about the private sector may be a consequence of their "newness" to the CETA system. However, unlike public employers (especially in contrast with government hiring in the Sixties and early Seventies), for-profit businesses can hire those who succeed. If the goal is to achieve unsubsidized employment, what better way than by giving youth work experience in the private sector? This question has been aired more frequently since YEDPA's passage, particularly by prime sponsors feeling cramped by traditional CETA guidelines.

(Practioner Roundtable, Brandeis, 1979; Youthwork, 1979)

- A majority of the Prime Sponsors surveyed through NCEP reported some trouble finding enough work sites in the public sector which met their own goals for quality. The current alternative is to create group projects (see above, p. 37) which can be expensive and time-consuming. (NCEP, MDC)

In this climate, it is all the more important to realize that:

- The private sector is not monolithic. Individual companies will respond to incentives and opportunities in very different ways. (Robison, Burch, Brandeis)

The key variables among employers, relative to youth employment, appear to be size, location, age of company, and type of business. It is not possible to say with confidence how these variables would intersect with policy options, although one of them--company size--seems to stand out:
Based on their own identification of needs, large and small for-profit employers require significantly different policy approaches. (Ibid.)

For example, most large corporations prefer to do their own employee training, which is something that employers with fewer than 500 employees generally cannot afford. Large and small employers also report significantly different views of the labor market, with the former seeing it as generally stable in size, while the latter see it as expanding. (Roundtable Reports, Brandeis, 1979)

Most new jobs are created in businesses with less than 20 employees. (Work in America Institute, 1979; Burch, 1979; Robison, 1979)

This evidence, with its distribution of potential "worksites" among thousands of companies, has major implications for job development, coordination, and the role of intermediary organizations. However, exploring these implications encounters a knowledge barrier:

Relatively little is known about the hiring behavior of individual corporations and of discrete segments of the labor market. (Osterman, VPTF, Burch)

This is true in both a descriptive and a programmatic sense. Public programs have not responded to employers' needs because, in part, they do not know what they are. Employers, in turn, do not plan their activities around the concerns of youth employment and, therefore, can offer few useful generalizations about the composition of the workforce, trends in hiring and training, factors which influence company decision-making, and other corporate behaviors of interest to youth policy. Nevertheless,
Many major corporations are concerned about the problems of unemployed and minority youth. They do not view these problems as resulting from the business cycle; they ascribe them to structural features of the economy. (VPTFYE Private Sector Roundtables)

This concern has been manifested in many places and without federal prompting. For example, the Cummins Engine Company has developed a basic skills education program at its Indiana Headquarters. In Los Angeles, the Lockheed Corporation and TRW, Inc., each have substantial training programs for youths paid for from company funds. Last year, the Norton Simon Company announced a new hiring policy aimed at making one percent of its workforce disadvantaged youths. All of these programs are small when compared with the size of the youth unemployment problem, but they are serious efforts and they suggest that employers may be more responsive to new initiatives than past performance would predict. Employers do have distinct views of the nature of the "problem":

- The private sector regards the chief problem to be a lack of basic academic skills combined with a fundamental ignorance of the expectations of the world of work. (Brandeis, Robinson, Nat. Comm. on Employment Policy 1978)

Generally, large employers are much less concerned about vocational skill training than they are about these more rudimentary deficits. "Ignorance of the expectations of the world of work" is sometimes described as a "poor attitude" or a "lack of motivation" or a "decline in the work ethic": they all appear to mean the same thing. The stress which employers place on basic education and documented work experience finds corroboration in recent studies of the impact of schooling on employment and earnings. Meyer and Wise (NBER 1979), for example assert:
"The weight of our evidence implies that programs that emphasize work experience for youth, together with general academic education, have the greatest chance of enhancing (youths') subsequent labor force experiences."

At the same time, many employers believe that there are available entry-level jobs which are not being filled. Even if there were data to support this contention, a "matching" dilemma would remain:

- There is frequently a mismatch between available jobs and the unemployed. The structurally unemployed, especially poor urban youth, are ill-prepared to fill many vacant jobs. (VPTF Roundtables)

Not only are many available jobs beyond the skill attainments of poor youth, many are located in places urban and rural youth cannot afford to travel. The transportation problem will be discussed in Chapter 5, but we should note here that there are three critical aspects to it: (a) the rising cost of owning a car; (b) the traditional association between place of employment and place of residence (an association which affects attitudes about travel); and (c) the absolute decline in the number of jobs located in poor communities. 8

Finally, employers surveyed for the Vice President's Task Force have urged that their role not be restricted to that of "job provider" or a consumer of trained youth, although even that role would be performed better if employers were integrally involved in the planning and evaluation of training and education programs. A major lesson from this assessment of employer roles is that public programs, including YEDPA,

- have tended to focus too much on the private sector as a consumer of their "products" to the exclusion of its potential as a partner in the "production" itself.
B. Experience with Incentives

The common wisdom holds that private enterprise will need some financial incentive before it will participate in publically sponsored employment programs. (National Commission, 1978) We do not know to what degree this "wisdom" accords with reality, because

- There has been no long-term or large-scale test of direct wage subsidies for youth in the private sector. (CPPV, Elsman)

The subsidies in past programs have been limited in scale, restricted to indirect reimbursements, or hampered with paperwork and eligibility problems. The closest thing to a genuine test which has taken place in fifteen years of public employment programs has been YEDPA's Entitlement through which youths paid by CETA can be placed in private employers.

- There has been a steady growth in private sector Entitlement placements from February of 1978 through December of 1979. Nearly 24% of the 40,000 Entitlement youths are working in the private sector, up from 14% in September of 1978. (MDRC)

There is some debate about how to define the purpose of such subsidies. Are they intended to lead to a net increase in unsubsidized employment or do they simply create good work experiences for youth?

- The Entitlement has shown that direct wage subsidies will attract private sector participation, but it is not known whether this will survive the end of the Entitlement. (MDRC)
"Subsidy reduction plans" are being phased-in this spring at several YIEPP sites and their impact on the level of private sector placements will be closely watched. Some prime sponsors see the imposition of such plans as a sign of 'backing off' from the initial commitment to the private sector at the precise moment when the negative effects of exaggerated pre-program expectations have begun to wear off. Nearly all of the larger (Tier I) sites have experienced significant growth in private sector jobs during 1979.

OJT (On-the-Job Training) is a form of indirect wage subsidy. Youth enrollments in Title I OJT have never been substantial and few prime sponsors see it as a viable model for youth because it presupposes behavioral maturity and a career goal.

- Under YEDPA, less than 2% of the participants are in OJT. Past experience suggests that most youth in OJT are between 19 and 22 years of age, while in YEDPA over 90% of the YETP enrollees are under the age of 20. (Westat CLMS)

Vocational exploration was devised in the early Seventies by the National Alliance of Business and the Human Resource Development Institute (HRDI) of the AFL-CIO as a new form of direct subsidy, which would bring young people into private firms for short periods of observation and shadowing. The so-called VEPs programs were for a long time models which only operated in a few dozen cities during the summer. They have been well received in these cities and, as part of the YEDPA knowledge development, the concept has been expanded to other cities, although still through the cooperation of HRDI.

These VEPs programs should be distinguished from "vocational exploration" as a program activity for eligible youth which, for the first time, was allowed for year-round participants through YEDPA. The general YEDPA provision has not been widely used by prime sponsors as a way to station youth in the private sector. Several factors account for this:
(a) rejection of prime sponsor plans by Regional Offices; (b) confusion over the definition of vocational exploration, particularly around length of placement; and (c) substantive disagreement over whether "exploration" could include "hands-on" activity. Current CETA regulations permit hands-on work so long as it does not "contribute to the additional profit" of the employer; that is, so long as the net profit, before and after the youth's involvement, is the same. Putting aside the question of whether such a notion could ever be measured, it is important to note the negative impact which an emphasis of convoluted definitions and "non-productive work" has on the attitudes of potential employers.

Nevertheless, where vocational exploration has occurred:

- it is a successful model for bringing youth, unions and employers together in a work experience which is well designed and explicitly recognizes the developmental status of the youth. (OYP, HRDI, Vogel, Elsman, Barnett).

Because of its "exploratory" nature, however, this partial, direct subsidy does not promise to be a major incentive for business participation in CETA programs.

This is not the place to take up the complexities of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. It is worth noting, though, that when it was passed in late 1978, it raised expectations in the public sector and was thought to offer a positive avenue through which to place youth in the private sector.

Three developments have dampened the early expectations:

- As noted above (page 60), most new jobs are created by companies with fewer than 20 employees. The Tax Credit was explicitly aimed at larger employers.
The kind of full-time employment of disadvantaged young adults, which the Tax Credit may stimulate, will not be immediately applicable to most YEDPA participants, since 90% of the latter are under 19 (page 369).

The chief "lesson" from YEDPA may well be the importance—and feasibility—of better coordination between employers, schools, and prime sponsors (cf. below, page 126). It is the nature and the appeal of any tax credit to circumvent these systemic factors, but, for youth who need training and work experience, this may be short-sighted even for those who do get hired. (Robison, Congressional Hearings, Brandeis, Darr/Butler)

There is one more aspect to tax credits which employers, when discussing youth, believe to be important:

- Employers are skeptical of using either income tax credits or public employment programs (CETA) as vehicles for stimulating net demand for youth labor. (National Commission, op. cit.; OYP, VPTF).

Employers believe that the demand for labor is a function of overall economic growth, while the problems of the structurally unemployed must be addressed with more specific policies which do not necessarily result in enlarged aggregate demand. Several other techniques, besides those already mentioned, have been promoted as effective ways to increase the demand for youth by lowering the relative cost of their labor. One of these, of course, is the minimum wage. In the context of youth employment programs, the minimum wage debate might well be seen as an aspect of a larger problem—how to determine the most appropriate wage for youth and the relative impact on youth performance of wages both higher and lower than the minimum:
No differential wage experiments are being attempted through YEDPA—neither raising the wage as a youth incentive nor lowering it for special segments of the youth population. (OYP, Kelly)

Both are talked about considerably, but to date there has been no action. There are legal obstacles to lower wages, but not for allowances or for higher than minimum wages. The basic research reviewed in conjunction with this paper suggests that the net effect of an across the board drop in the youth minimum wage would, at best, reduce youth unemployment by less than 10%. This does not speak to any of the equity considerations usually raised in discussions of the minimum wage.

It is unfortunate that the youth wage issue is discussed only in reference to the minimum wage. This obscures the facts that (a) most YEDPA dollars are spent on youth wages and (b) these wages are the youths’ only tangible reward for participation and, thus, are probably the best means available to differentiate between levels of performance. The legitimate concerns about setting performance standards tend to focus on incentives which are non-economic or long-term (future employability). This would appear to neglect a facet of human need and a reality of adolescence.

C. Strategies for Linkage

The old saw about porcupines and lovemaking characterizes the history of public/private partnership around employment. There have been well-publicized attempts which have failed. YEDPA’s own efforts have been indirect, with regulations sometimes requiring interaction, but limiting this to no more than pro forma consultation.

From the experience of the Education/Work Councils (the chief linkage demonstrations project under YEDPA), the early phases of the Private Industry Councils, and, the Entitlement, we can draw tentative lessons:
Advisory councils--whatever form they take--can be effective ways to elicit private sector involvement in the formation of local and national employment policies. (NIE, CPPV, Conference Board)

The preliminary studies of both Private Industry Councils and the Education/Work Councils have been favorable. The PICs represent a large federal commitment which goes beyond the range of youth employment, but a few lessons are relevant:

- The PICs are not generally taking advantage of the regulations which allow them to be independent non-profit corporations, and hence program operators or service providers.

- Only 25% of the PICs which had identified program emphases included youth among them. (CPPV)

It would probably be wise for PICs, as new actors on the local stage, to direct themselves, at first, to roles they know they can play well. Once they are established, it may be more opportune to solicit their involvement in youth programs. There is another lesson worth mentioning here in keeping with our theater metaphor.

- Employers will be more committed to councils in which they are the protagonists or play the leading role. (Conference Board, Vogel, CPPV, NAB)

It may be recalled that one of the themes of employer discontent with CETA has been their sense that they can exert no influence over it. Related to this is the evidence which suggests that

- Most large employers prefer to deal with public school systems rather than with CETA or its subcontractors. (VPTF Roundtables)
Despite the considerable criticism voiced by employers toward public schools, the latter are still viewed as the major institution affecting the lives of youth. This does not mean that employers cannot or will not cooperate programmatically with either CBOs or CETA. It does suggest that

- the "private sector linkage" be conceived as a tripartite one, including public employment programs, school systems, and employers.

The emphasis on "councils" should not direct attention away from the reality that the strongest relationship will be built on joint action around a common problem: in this case, the deficits which erode youth's position in the labor market:

- Based on employer attitudes and past CETA experience, youth are employable when they have sound reading and writing and math skills, and when they understand and practice good work habits.

- There is strong evidence arguing that the latter can only be acquired through real work experience and that programs which are perceived to be successful will combine work experience with basic education. (VPTF, DOL/OYP, NBER)

In other words, the cooperation of employers and the public sector around policy matters should be kept distinct from their cooperation around specific youth programs. As detailed in Chapter 2, work experience and education/training seem to be necessary parts of youth programs and, thus, there is an argument for employer involvement on this level as well.

The connection between the policy role and the program role may be captured in the finding that:
a favorable public image is crucial for successfully involving private employers in CETA programs. (NAB, Conference Board, Brandeis, Elsman, Vogel)

CETA's cloudy public image—whether fair or not—has been a consistent theme when business explains its reluctance to cooperate in the preparation of youth for the world of work.

There are many local examples of public/private collaboration. These often do not fit our idea of "models" but we should regard this variance as a strength and not a form of noncompliance. Local variations have existed in the implementation of VEPs programs, as they surely will in the formation of Private Industry Councils. In Las Vegas, the vocational education department of the school system handles all youth programs for the county and does so through a network of employer-education committees. In Hartford, an industry-inspired plan to develop a career alternative within the public school system resulted in a program which, subsequently, became a "YEDPA model". In a Birmingham, Alabama, college, employers help to plan students' curricula, then guarantee them employment on graduation—but these are disadvantaged youth, not engineers. Near Atlanta, an "EBCE" program uses the VEPs' model to pay for employer relations established before either of these acronyms were known in the county.

The most effective of these examples seem to have several elements in common:

- They meet a real need of local business;
- They have been developed through collaboration with both the schools and CETA;
- While small by national standards, they have been highly visible programs, so that their success or failure cannot escape local attention;
There has usually been a "broker" in the public/private relationship, either an individual or an organization, but one with credibility on both sides of the gulf which often separates the two. (Darr, Butler, Richmond; Robison; DOL/OYP; Barnett; Vogel)

In general, it appears that:

- More local control over program elements will lead to a greater level of private sector contact and, thus, increased access.

- Interesting programs such as youth entrepreneurship, job restructuring, new occupations for youth, though potentially useful elements in a comprehensive delivery system, can never be expected to address employment needs on a grand scale.

- There is a need for flexible tools which can be used in cooperation with the private sector and, particularly, with small employers. (Robison, Conference Board, Roundtables)

D. Conclusion

Much of this chapter has focused on the building of a relationship where there has not been one or where it has been a reluctant one. Very little has been said about the "content" of youth work experience in the private sector. This is partly because there has been less experience to draw from than in the public sector. But it is mostly because the same factors which make for a quality placement—adequate supervision, counseling, and so on—are no different in the private sector than in the public.

There are differences, to be sure, in language, in the definition of productivity, and in organization goals, which may affect the tone and the quality of the worksite. Nevertheless, job "success" is best measured for individuals, not for types of employer. "Meaningful"
work has probably the same characteristics regardless of whether an organization seeks a profit or some other goal. It is for this reason that it appears to us that current efforts, with their predominant public sector emphasis, are out of balance.

Although YEDPA has not sparked a lightening bolt toward the private sector, it has initiated many activities--programmatic, analytic, and reflective--which, in turn, have helped to define the "potential" for the private sector better than before. Our own assessment offers, as the final lesson on this topic, one view of this potential.14 There seem to be three major, yet distinct, roles which private employers can play in public employment programs--the more they are seen as distinct, the more effectively they may be used:

(1) They can be consumers of the products of these programs: that is, they can hire those who complete a training or education program. This can be indistinguishable from a completely passive role, but it can also result from extensive interaction with a specific program. It is the traditional assignment given the private sector in legislation like YEDPA. It is assumed to be influenced by incentives (such as tax credits) and by joint planning.

(2) They can share in the formulation of local employment policy and help to design training programs. Although this role can mean little more than attendance at certain meetings, it has been used with increasing success, as evidenced by the Skill Training Improvement Program of 1978, by the Education-Work Councils springing up in many localities, and by the passage of Title VII.

(3) They can, themselves, be 'producers' of employable youth; that is, they can be viewed as program operators or service providers in the same way and with the same goals as, for example, a school system or a nonprofit agency. This is the most controversial role, but also the one which has gained the
most ground in the past two years. Again, it is assumed that this role can be enhanced through incentives and through joint planning.15, 16

If the last of these roles can be demystified and accepted as legitimate, the collaboration of employers, educators, and governments around the needs of youth which was inaugurated in YEDPA may grow to maturity.17
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 3


2. For the attitudes of prime sponsors, see their original YETP FY 1978 Plans, most of which announced new private sector outreach, although fewer than 10 percent were able to include actual programs. Also, refer to the Planning Charter for the Youth Initiatives and the point discussed above, Chapter 1, footnote 16.

3. We are not reviewing either the TJTC or the PICs. Our comments relate only to two aspects of these programs: (a) the degree to which they will involve substantial numbers of youth and (b) the manner in which their implementation affected the implementation of YEDPA.

4. In trying to estimate the portion of YEDPA resources spent in the private sector, there are only two places to look: YIEPP and the YETP discretionary funds. Accepting a high estimate of the percent of Entitlement youth working in for-profit firms (15%), $17.25 million, annually, found its way to the private sector. In discretionary programs, there are only three locales for private sector activity: CPPV (see page 128); Youthwork (one-fourth of its first round of grants were aimed at "increasing private sector involvement", although all programs had to adhere to standard CETA rules); and the Private Vs. Public Sector Demonstration (in which the performance of "comparable" youth in diverse jobs in both spheres would be examined). Altogether, we estimate the total (three year) cost of these activities at less than $15 million. Thus, our crude analysis offers less than 5 percent of YEDPA's resources expended on private sector programs. Again, the purpose of this estimate is solely to provide one perspective on YEDPA by recalling the intimate link between policy and budget.

5. There are only four places in YEDPA where the private sector is mentioned in a programmatic context: Section 41d (b) (1) which allows the Entitlements (17 jurisdictions out of 473 prime sponsors) to 'outstation' youth to the private sector; Section 433 (c) (6) which describes the YETP "Governor's Grants", 5 percent of YETP funds to be devoted to six emphasis areas (all still within CETA regulations); Section 438 whose vague language about "private organizations" subsumes employers in its description of the "Secretary's Discretionary Projects"; and, finally, Section 432 which
lists the allowable activities in YETP including "vocational exploration in the private sector" and "on-the-job training". The latter two are traditional CETA categories which are rarely used because of confusion over definition (vocational exploration) and because of paperwork entanglements (OJT). The Governor's Grants mention "experimental training in the private sector" which, in view of the CETA definition of training, does not expand the scope of allowed activity beyond that which existed before YEDPA. The Regulations further circumscribed these activities, with the net result that a prime sponsor wishing to launch a private sector "initiative" would need considerable ingenuity--and a casual Regional Office--to squeeze it into its Plan.

6. This conventional CETA 'outcome' is not sufficient for youth programs. We use it here only as a reference point.

7. "Discrete segments" here includes such things as (a) geographical areas, especially subregions within SMSAs; (b) certain industries and the differences between them (for example, the differences between insurance and banking); (c) the relative density of small employers (for instance, from neighborhood to neighborhood); (d) the dependence of small employers on larger ones (for example, as subcontractors for an auto company); and (e) the impact of national economic policies on specific regions and specific industries. Very few business statistics segregate employers by size when analyzing the effects of trends.

8. For some recent data on the association between residence and employment, D.N. Westcott, "Employment and Commuting Patterns", Monthly Labor Review, July 1979. For an historical view of these patterns in one community, see Sam Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs, Harvard University Press.

9. The word 'subsidy' has been used loosely to describe activities differing greatly in purpose, scope, and procedures. One might say that, through either a tax credit, OJT reimbursement, or Entitlement outstationing, the employer receives "free" labor. However, from the practical perspective, the relative "costs" of each of these are dramatically different. Three questions might well be asked in defining a subsidy:

- Does the employer receive a payment or does the payment go directly to the program participant?

- Must the employer apply for reimbursement, either by invoice or through a reduction in taxes?
• Is this reimbursement equal to full wages or is it calculated on a percentage?

We use the term 'direct subsidy' for one in which the participant is paid directly by the prime sponsor and no cash changes hands between the employer and the program. All others are 'indirect subsidies' whose hidden costs escalate with each affirmative answer to the above questions.

10. In June 1978, 11.3% of the hours worked that month in all Entitlement sites were in the private, for-profit sphere. In December 1979, it was 23.8%. The percentage has increased during each intervening quarter, with the total cumulative percent now equal to 17.4. For the large, Tier 1, projects, the percentage in December 1979 ranged from a low of 16.4 in Cincinnati to a high of 41.2 in Detroit. The only Tier 1 site not showing significant growth in this respect has been Denver, where enrollments have been closed for several months. Source: MDRC, Monthly Statistical Summary, February 1980.

11. Other Task Force publications do discuss the Tax Credit. For example, see Robison, Small Business and Youth Employment, and our Summary Report on the Private Sector/Education Roundtables.

12. For discussions of the minimum wage, we would suggest the following: Lester Thurow's "Working Paper for the Rockefeller Foundation"; Terry Kelly's study for the Vice President's Task Force; Edward Gramlich's for the Brookings Institute; and, for an opposing view, Finis Welch, Minimum Wage, American Enterprise Institute 1978.

13. Actually, most discussions of performance standards emphasize their value as a way to "sort" youth or to guarantee to employers the quality of the youth's preparation. That is, performance standards are used to increase control over the youth and not as an incentive for them. Money has the virtue, from the perspective of youth, of being simple and straightforward: a positive reinforcement. Performance standards, because they serve "two masters"—incentive and control—would be described by psychologists as a negative reinforcement. This would not be as a result of rewarding negative behavior, but because they are not a reward. In behaviorist terms, all "empty" rewards are interpreted negatively.

14. There have been, at least, six reports issued since 1978 which review earlier policies aimed at the private sector. These include:
Training and Job Programs in Action, written by David Robison for the Work in America Institute;

The Fourth Annual Report of the National Commission for Employment Policy, which has already been referred to;

Two Labor Department, internal reviews: one by Jean Barnett and one submitted to the Task Force by Charles Knapp;

A 'state of the art' review performed for Youthwork by Max Elsman of the National Manpower Institute;

A 'retrospective survey' of private sector programs written by Anita Vogel for CPPV.

15. A similar dissection of private sector roles can be found in John Palmer's chapter of the National Commission on Employment Policy's report on the private sector, #8, 1978.

16. One difference between employers as providers and non-profit agencies is the capacity of the former to absorb the legitimate overhead costs of training, supervising, and monitoring youth on the job. This obviously applies only to large employers, but the "hidden" costs of youth placement can be considerable and have been estimated to range anywhere from 100% to 200% of the youths' wages. In other words, a corporation which takes on a dozen youth as trainees will, in addition to the youths' wages, spend a substantial amount on ancillary activities, many of which will be imperceptible to observers. For instance, a troubled youth will "consume" more personnel time than many adult employees, yet this may result in no apparent additional cost to the company since the personnel officer was already on board. Again, in dealing with large companies and when placing troubled, poor, unskilled youth, planners should recognize, when calculating the public's share of a direct wage subsidy, the true costs to the host company.
17. We do not want to endorse an array of new research in youth employment, but we also do not want to give the impression that everything is known, or about to be known, on the subject of the private sector. The knowledge development effort, as indicated, has concentrated less on this topic than any other. Some knowledge—such as that gathered on what makes an effective program—can be transferred; otherwise, there are gaps, especially on the problems listed in footnote 7 above.
Chapter 4: Education Strategies & Institutions
Chapter 4: Education Strategies & Institutions

A. Overview

One of the most publicized features of YEDPA has been its intent to create new relationships between employment programs and public school systems. The so-called "22% set-aside," in YETP sometimes referred to as a "forced marriage," has received a great deal of attention in discussions and reviews of YEDPA, but both the Entitlement and YCCIP contain explicit educational goals and strategies.

It is widely taken for granted that the YEDPA education initiatives represent a break with past CETA practice and a quantitatively significant test of new approaches. It is the purpose of this chapter to define what these new initiatives mean and the impact they have had after about two years of implementation.

Because of the importance of this subject, we need to frame our 'lessons' in some more detail than for the previous two chapters. For convenience, we divide this into three parts: substantive issues, the language of the law, and money.

1. The Issues

There are three major educational issues addressed by YEDPA. It is apparent that they differ in nature and level of generality. They each presume that remedies for youth unemployment must include schools as institutions and education as a type of service:

(a) Institutional linkage. In essence, the LEA Agreements required under YETP were mechanisms for improving the connections between education and employment institutions. Similarly, the YIEPP demonstration sites required substantial administrative cooperation between local education agencies and prime sponsors. The assumption, of course, is that better institutional ties are a pre-condition for effective joint programs.
(b) School attendance. The Entitlement projects have as their fundamental goal to measure the effect of guaranteed jobs on school attendance. This must be differentiated between those youths already enrolled and attending and those not attending whether enrolled or not. Thus, the entitlement experiment can be seen as a group of three problems: the income effects of a job on disadvantaged youth already attending school; the impact of a job on students with poor attendance; and the success of joint efforts to lure drop-outs back to the educational system.3

The Entitlement is not alone in addressing attendance issues. The summer program, the Job Corps, and other demonstrations have looked at the relationship between attendance and subsequent performance. The LEA Agreements include provision to serve youth "who agree to enroll" in a school program. Indeed, the Entitlement might be described as a YETP program whose dollar appropriation equals its legislated authority.

(c) The transition from school to work. Several references to the school-to-work transition can be found in the law and the YEDPA regulations. When, in 1941, Lewis Lorwin used the same phrase to describe the new government "youth work programs," he thought of it as a problem with two distinct aspects. First, "since youth are forced to enter industry at a later age," we must offer them attractive school programs and, if needed, income, in order to keep them out of the labor market. Second, given "changes in industrial technique" which "call for a wider general education" and a "higher level of personal qualifications," it is necessary to "link general education with vocational training and work experience so as to prepare youth more effectively for the transition from school to the workshop."4

The phrase, "transition from school to work," can subsume all issues pertaining to the relationship between education and employment. For YEDPA's purposes, it can be broken down into three separate strands:
(1) Programs to improve guidance, counseling, and job placement (efforts to remedy 'imperfect' labor market information);

(2) Attempts to improve the content and style of youths' educational experience, including alternative school arrangements, upgrading access to vocational training, and increased literacy;

(3) Experiments to measure the subsequent 'labor market experience' of youths who have participated in these efforts.

2. The Language

Because of the centrality of these issues to the problems of youth, it is important to examine the language of the law itself in order to see how specifically the issues are posed:

(a) Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects. Proposals submitted by prime sponsors were to include "assurances that arrangements have been made with the appropriate local education agency or with institutions offering a certified high school equivalency program that such youth is enrolled and is meeting the minimum academic and attendance requirements of that school or education program."/Sec. 418 (a) (4) (k) Even though "demonstrating the efficacy of guaranteeing otherwise unavailable part-time employment" to youth who "resume or maintain attendance in secondary school" is the centerpiece of the Entitlement, only one of the nine "findings" required by Congress relates directly to it:

Section 420 (3): "the degree to which such employment opportunities have caused out-of-school youths to return to school or others to remain in school."

This suggests that less attention was paid to what happens in school than to the mere fact of attendance.
(b) **Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects.** Educational institutions were eligible to apply for YCCIP projects. They were also "candidates" to be "improved" through those projects. Regardless of the schools' "success" in this regard, prime sponsors were required to "coordinate (YCCIP) training and work experience with school-related programs, including the awarding academic credit."

Section 426 (b) (2) We will consider, where possible the response of prime sponsors to Section 426; however, the critical question is whether Section 426 made sense for something like YCCIP, which

- was aimed at out-of-school youth;
- severely limited funds for education and for support services; and was
- labor intensive.

(c) **Youth Employment and Training Programs.** The educational emphasis of YETP is not limited to the 22 percent set-aside. All YETP programs might include:

"activities promoting the education to work transition . . . literacy training and bilingual training . . . attainment of certificates of high school equivalency . . . institutional and on-the-job training, including development of basic skills and job skills." /Section 432 (a) (2) C, F, G, I/8

Later (Section 436), these activities are urged for all participants and attempts must be made to secure "academic credit" for YETP work experience or to document the "competencies" derived from this experience. YETP, in other words, has broader relationships with education than that mandated through the LEA Agreement.

The LEA Agreement is described in Section 433 (d):

"Not less than 22 percent of the amount allocated to each prime sponsor . . . shall be used for
programs for in-school youth carried out pursuant
to agreements between prime sponsors and local
education agencies."

This language assumes that LEA programs will serve those youth
already enrolled in school but it does not mean that they must serve
only those youth. Any youth participating in a school-run program is
de facto "in school". The stipulations for LEA Agreements include
several worth noting in this context:

"set forth assurances that participating youths
will be provided meaningful work experience,
which will improve their ability to make career
decisions and which will provide them with basic
work skills needed for regular employment or self-
employment not subsidized under this in-school
program . . . set forth assurance that job infor-
mation, counseling, guidance, and placement ser-
vices will be made available to participating
youths . . . (and) . . . participants who need
work to remain in school". Section 436 (c) (1)
(3) (6)7

These citations indicate the emphasis placed in the Act on work
experience—even in those of its sections aimed at eliciting the
unique input of public schools. The recommended content of LEA pro-
grams, then, stayed well within the CETA orbit and, as we have seen,
within the range of most existing LEA/CETA programs. The language of
the law narrows considerably the scope of the issues outlined above.

3. The money

If the language had not already done so, the resources avail-
able to explore its educational provisions would have crimped the is-
sues anyway. To some degree, all of the issues are being addressed
through some type of YEDPA-inspired activity. Not all of them, how-
ever, are being subjected to structured scrutiny and the importance
of findings in this chapter must be weighed relative to the total
level of YEDPA--education interaction. That is, they should be compared with the share of YEDPA resources actually directed at specifically educational activities. This means that:

- YEDPA expenditures should be compared with pre-YEDPA experiences;
- the percent of YEDPA subcontracted to LEAs should be disaggregated from the total;
- LEA programs, in turn, should be broken down to separate those which are educational from those which are essentially job creation in the public sector;
- the total level of YEDPA funding should be placed alongside public school budgets, particularly for vocational and career education.

In simpler terms, we need to know how many of YEDPA's dollars went directly to public schools and how many, indirectly, into the pockets of employed youth. Our assessment, which is, at best, preliminary, suggests that a substantial majority of funds labelled as going to "LEAs" actually went for youth wages. The result is that, in absolute and relative terms, less than ten percent of YEDPA's resources might have been available for an impact on educational practice.  

In this context, we will chart the 'lessons' from YEDPA to date in relation to the issues expressed above--institutional relations, school attendance, and the transition process.

B. Institutional Relations

First, and foremost:

- The 22 percent set-aside has fostered significantly increased interaction between LEAs and CETA prime sponsors. (NCEP, OYP, Hoyt, NASB, NIE)
In those jurisdictions with a history of LEA participation in CETA, the 22 percent has had a lesser immediate impact. In other localities, the existence of a non-financial LEA Agreement may indicate continued friction. In order to extend collaboration to less eager jurisdictions, the original concept of a mandatory financial LEA Agreement seems appropriate. In fact,

- The lesson of the 'forced marriage' is that a financial incentive for the LEA to participate in joint action with the prime sponsor works.

The value of this finding should not be under-emphasized, even though

- It is too early to assert whether '22%' represents an appropriate funding level or whether the LEA Agreement will lead to long-term institutional changes. (Wurzburg)

Estimates of the actual percentage of YETP funds contracted to local educational agencies range from 30% to 50%. It is undoubtedly higher than 22% and, therefore, arguments about the 'correct' percentage should be placed in that context.

- YETP has not prompted LEA's to inaugurate new basic education programs. (Wurzburg, OYP, NASB, Kirshner)

The quantitative impact of YETP funds on actual programming in the schools is considerably less than the percentages might suggest. In other words, the leveraging quality of the funds is chiefly in terms of the relationship, not the school system's basic programs. First, 22% of the local prime sponsor's YETP allocation is generally a very small amount of money when compared with the school system's overall budget. 10 Traditionally, new sources of federal funds attract
interest out of proportion to their absolute size and in this regard YEDPA was no exception. Indeed, in a climate of a balanced federal budget, declining school enrollments, and Proposition 13, it might be assumed that YEDPA's relatively small dollars would command a school system's attention. In some places, it has. Even though it will take more time and more money to effect substantial change:

- The impact of YEDPA's educational funds shows a good rate of return from a modest investment. (Elmore, Taggart)

The institutional impediments to expanded collaboration are of two types: frictional and structural. Frictional problems are the easiest to control and include differences in calendar and conflicts over paperwork. Structural problems stem from the differences in goals between CETA--which is a new institution best known for quick and simple public service employment--and public schools, which are venerable community institutions that, in principle, serve the entire community.

- YETP eligibility requirements complicate CETA/LEA coordination and limit YEDPA programs in the schools and the community. (NCEP, Elmore, Brandeis)

Eligibility issues are not solely economic: the paperwork required to prove 'poverty' is as much a barrier as the widespread LEA belief that 'need for service' cannot be equated with family income. Nevertheless, there is strong support, not only in the CETA system, for the assertion that

- too many secondary school students are not prepared for either the world of work or for survival in adult society. (VPTF Roundtables)
We count this as a lesson, because the belief has been intensi-
11 fied by YEDPA. But the traditional remedy—'out of school' pro-
grams—no longer seems adequate. A review of those who have reviewed
the 'school-to-work transition' reinforces the centrality of the pub-
lic schools and the contention that

* Significant improvements in the employability
  of youth will require major changes in the way
  many schools, especially urban high schools,
  teach basic skills. (NIE, Rodriguez, Edmonds)

Concomitantly,

* The experience of YEDPA substantiates recent
  educational literature in arguing that, should
  there be an attempt to improve basic skills
  instruction, special attention should be paid
  to the complexities of implementation and to
  the role of 'building-level' personnel: prin-
cipals, teachers, counselors, youth, and the
  community. (Elmore, Farrar, Levin, Osterman,
  RMC)

The purported failure of schools to teach kids basic academic
and work skills has been attributed to a variety of factors ranging
from racism to a post-Sputnik emphasis on college-bound youth. To the
extent that YEDPA has helped to define a need for school reform we can
adduce some evidence that:

* Channeling funds through the CETA system seems
  to be a good technique for fostering education
  and employment services which have not been
  traditionally associated with either institu-
tion. (NCEP, Youthwork, Elmore, Edmonds)

So far, not only have relationships in many cities been initi-
ated or strengthened, some educational innovations have been tried.
For example, there is a growing recognition that to prepare for the
labor market and educational challenges of the 1980s there is a need to re-examine the responsibilities of school system staff. This re-examination must address (a) the legitimate concerns of teachers' unions and (b) the perceived "professional gap" between school staff and CETA staff. In some places, this has been overcome:

- In Hartford, the state school board has approved a local plan which will 'certify' people with industry backgrounds as educational administrators. This plan also will develop criteria for state certification of teachers as job developers and supervisors. (Richmond)

Institutional relations have been tested in other parts of YEDPA:

- The Entitlement experience suggests that the degree of institutional incompatibility found in other YEDPA programs can be overcome when the scale of interaction is increased. (Butler, MDRC)

Through YIEPP, schools and CETA systems are, often for the first time, sharing monitoring responsibilities and exchanging basic data on student performance. The Entitlement, then, can be used to gauge the results of the YETP experience. It may be that the scale of the formula initiatives is simply too small to make a difference.

The most pervasive mechanism in YEDPA for spurring CETA/LEA cooperation has been "academic credit for work experience." Our review suggests that academic credit is really an institutional issue and that:

- The extent to which credit toward graduation is given for work experience depends on the level of mutual trust and cooperation between local schools and the CETA office and, therefore, is a function of the strength of their linkage. (NCEP, RMC, Darr)
It also depends on the LEA's ability to exercise 'quality control':

- Just as access to the private sector requires active employer cooperation, successful access to academic credit must acknowledge the right of schools to grant it and to place conditions on those it 'licenses' to do so. (NASB, Berry, RMS, NCEP)

In the early days of YEDPA, there were fears that academic credit would be a major stumbling block, but these have disappeared over the course of YEDPA's two years. Overall,

- YEDPA's provisions with respect to academic credit have usually been met for 'in-school' YETP programs and in YIEPP, but rarely for YCCIP and YACC. (NCEP, MDC, MDRC, VICI)

Credit for work experience is widely perceived as a useful tool for many youths, but not unless they are candidates for a high school diploma. There are legitimate and continuing concerns that this credit will be used as a way to speed marginal students toward graduation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that credit for job experience may help stimulate some unmotivated youths by allowing them to learn in 'alternative' environments; to a lesser degree it may encourage other students to perform better on the job.

- No connection has been established between the awarding of credit and the quality of the work experience. (Youthwork, DOL/ETA, Mangum)

The quality of work depends on other factors (cf. Chapter 2), while the awarding of credit depends on the graduation status of the youth and on the institutional status of the program in which he or she is enrolled.
There is also no proof that defining jobs in terms of measurable competencies will either improve the quality of the work experience or elicit greater school system support. (Edwards, Farrar and Cohen, Hoyt, Mangum, NCEP, RMC)

Innovations in this area have been attempted under YEDPA demonstrations, for example, through the Youthwork projects. The point about competencies should not be interpreted as implying that the content of the work experience or its connection to skill and career development is not important. Nor should it imply that schools are indifferent to these issues. It simply means that measuring job competencies is unlikely to catalyze LEA endorsement or upgrade the job itself.

C. School Attendance

The impact of assured employment on school attendance is an issue particularly relevant to the Entitlement experiment. At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that, for youth who already had good attendance, the job should probably be seen as an income or occupational influence. For youth with marginal attendance, the effect of employment may well be reflected in their daily attendance rates; while for those who have dropped out, the issue is more complex, since they have already rejected (or been rejected by) traditional high schools. Nevertheless, the Entitlements—like other YEDPA programs—were expected to attract drop-outs back into school.

It may be worthwhile to recall that a 'job' is an 'alternative' only for unemployment. Youth do not usually drop out of school in order to maintain a job or to generate an income, although this may be what they do when they have left school. Most studies of drop-outs link their decision to factors present in the schools themselves and not to extraneous matters. Thus, it has not been surprising that, both in YIEPP and in the summer program,
planned enrollments for drop-outs always exceed the actual number who enroll. On the other hand, it seems clear that:

- Young people previously out of school can be attracted to participate in the Entitlement through non-traditional education approaches, primarily alternative school programs. (MDRC)

This is an important, though provisional, finding which 'opens the door' to a range of policy implications which will be expanded below.

For the in-between group of marginal attenders,

- No sound information is yet available on the impact of the guaranteed job on school attendance, although early data has been described as 'hopeful'. (MDRC, October 1979)

The Entitlement programs are targeted either on individual high schools or on broad school districts. It appears that the attendance data currently available from many districts is not sensitive enough to register the impact of the Entitlement on the whole district or on an individual school. Based on two cities (Boston and Syracuse),

- Overall attendance seems to show a slightly better trend in schools with a higher concentration of participating youths than in schools with fewer participants. (Butler)

This 'concentration' issue may parallel ESEA Title I findings regarding the need to have a 'critical mass' of resources focused on one school in order to induce measurable impacts.

We will have to wait until late 1980 for better data on the effects of any YEDPA program on school attendance. The anecdotal evidence drawn from the Entitlement, the interim Youthwork process evaluation, and various case studies suggests that linking a work
experience with school will have positive effects, at least on school administrators. At the same time,

- The YEDPA experience encourages the conclusion that a more diverse menu of program offerings is required in order to meet the different needs and interests of out-of-school and under-achieving youth. A simple 'return-to-school' formula is not sufficient. (Frickell)

Unfortunately, data from the Summer Program do not help ascertain the attendance effects of youth program participation.

- Although 89% of the enrollees in the 1978 SPEDY program either returned to school or gained further employment, "there is almost no evidence concerning the indirect effects of summer employability during the subsequent school year or in the future." (DOL/OYP)

Youths with school attendance problems constitute a tiny fraction of the young people enrolled in the summer. This reinforces our conclusion that drop-outs require more extensive services than those available in part-time programs and may even avoid programs which, like SYEP, are seen as "for school kids."

In general, there is no evidence of a negative effect on attendance, and some preliminary evidence which is optimistic about the Entitlement. We will look forward to the data as it emerges from YEDPA, but we re-state our belief that care should be taken not to judge the value of work experience solely in terms of school attendance.

D. The Transition Process

If the "learning curve", which has been used to describe the implementation of new programs, were applied to YEDPA as a whole, one immediate consequence would be the recognition that important changes
in educational programs require considerably longer than two or three years. One might say that, in this instance, the curve is necessarily and unavoidably steep. For example,

- YEDPA has led directly to the creation or expansion of many alternative education programs; however, their distribution is uneven and their net impact is still small. (NCEP, Youthwork, RMC)

YIEPP, the Careen Intern Programs, and Youthwork account for most of the nationally-funded alternatives, but there is at least an equal number of unheralded local programs.18

- These alternatives have been more successful than traditional settings at attracting and holding out-of-school youth. (RMC, YW, MDRC, EBCE, Duke)

Nothing can yet be said about their longitudinal impact, though educators (and others) take for granted that mere participation is better than non-participation. Another way to phrase this would be to assert that an "alternative education program" is as much a social and cultural environment as it is a vehicle to impart skills and to certify competencies.19 YEDPA has sponsored some research into the nature of effective alternatives, but it is fair to add that more work is needed.

- Little is known about their relative cost, modes of effectiveness, or optimal mix of target groups, except that those programs closer to the 'street level' seem better able to 'find' drop-outs. (MDC, RMC, Graubard, National Commission)

It is important to differentiate this outreach function from the organizational affiliations of the program. We found no evidence that any
one organizational mode was better able to operate alternatives: community-based organizations; public high schools; non-profit agencies; independent private schools; community colleges; and even for-profit employers have shown themselves able to devise and maintain alternative programs. It does take time for these programs to establish their local credibility and this factor probably has more to do with successful outreach than anything else. As for the programs themselves:

- The effectiveness of alternatives appears to be more a function of their size—including student/teacher ratio, total number of students, etc.—than of any other quantifiable factor. (Ibid.)

As more studies are done of alternative education, one issue which has arisen acutely in some YEDPA programs will need to be addressed: how to link alternative services to traditional school systems. This issue cannot be reduced to "institutionalizing" them, for this would amount to neutralization. Little has happened through YEDPA to explore this issue; however, attempts have been made to test an "inter-district" version of this: that is, to replicate "successful" program models.

- The most important factors in replication appear to be local ones. Thus, replication experiments have not really tested program models; they have used a process to generate local versions of program types. (Elmore, RMC, Huron)

More information will be available on this subject in the next few months. In the meantime, one lesson applicable to alternatives and to conventional programs, is that

- the school to work transition occurs more effectively when educational programs have a
career orientation and provide actual work experience.22 (Lorwin, Knapp)

In this respect, research reinforces widespread opinion: employers, school administrators and CBOs endorse it.

But this same view can lead to the statement that an "effective" program would be one which integrates a range of services and experiences through a comprehensive model of youth development. Support for such a view comes from efforts to deal with acutely distressed groups--the retarded, emotionally disturbed, etc.--not from the CETA system where partial or fragmented services--"service units"--remain the rule.23 There has been some progress in linking these units to individual growth:

- The types of educational services offered youth should be geared to their developmental stage, age, school status, achievement levels, and occupational experience. (Knapp, Gottlieb, Rodriguez, Barnett, Goodwin)

Just as "full-scale" alternatives seem successful for out-of-school youth, short-term guidance and placement services may be useful for those in-school youth whose primary deficit is a lack of labor market information.

Cutting across all services and stages, however, is the view, especially promoted by employers, that deficits in basic academic skills are the single greatest need of many youth. How does this relate to vocational training? If there are trade-offs to be made, employers would concur with the

- growing evidence, both analytic and anecdotal, that specific, classroom-based skill training is of marginal value to in-school youth when compared with basic education and quality work experience. (NBER, MDC, RMC, Roundtables, Grasso and Shea)
Within the vocational education system, this would argue for greater concentration on "pre-employment" skills or general trade courses and for increased cooperation between existing vocational schools and industry to assure the continued relevancy of course offerings. At the same time:

- Vocational education is least available to youth residing in the most distressed cities. (Berry, Brandeis, Quarles, AVA)

In other words, the absence of vocational training, even with caveats about its effectiveness, probably undercuts the value of other employment programs in poor areas. Put another way,

- If there is expansion in vocational education, it should occur in urban areas, but not at the expense of basic skills education. (Grasso and Shea)

E. To Be Young, Literate, and Unemployed

In concluding this chapter on YEDPA and education, we would like to discuss, briefly, the relationship between basic skills and employment. The assumption of an "improved" transition process is that with better "inputs" (increased achievement of measurable skills), there will be better "outputs" (more employment). We think it is crucial to remember that employability is not the same as employment. Considerable doubt remains about whether increased educational attainment will result in greater earnings, longer employment or career mobility. The belief which, after all, is part of the American "promise", that education can make a difference, may explain why

- School enrollment rates for minorities now equal or surpass those for whites. (NBER, Urban Institute, NAEP)
Since the employment population ratios have moved in the other direction for blacks, it appears that one should not look to education for quick solutions to the "job gap".

- Despite a popular conviction that a lack of basic educational skills causes youth unemployment, there is virtually no evidence to support this contention. (OYP, NIE, Edwards, Collins, Jencks, deLone)

However, attitudes are important, and employers do assert that basic skills are prerequisites to successful employment. Public schools are perceived as failing to provide them and this failure undermines the career development of all youth. Our review leads us to agree and to urge that the role of the federal government in solving this problem not be confined to the CETA system. If we want long-term solutions, school reform should take precedence.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 4

1. This topic occupied a large portion of the hearings recently conducted by the Committee on Education and Labor of the House. Problems of Youth Unemployment, GPO 55-780, January 1980, pages 158-349.

2. See, for example, Wurzburg, OYP, Youthwork, Athena, Mangum, and Congressional testimony last June by Ernest Green, Assistant Secretary of Labor.

3. It is apparent that these are not 'pure' questions subject to simple statistical analysis. When the 'simple' mandate of school attendance is translated for distinct subgroups of the target population, it is oddly transformed. With everything else held constant, it means nothing for those already attending; it may affect the attendance of marginal performers; and it looks like a form of disenfranchisement for drop-outs.

4. Youth Work Programs, Lewis Lorwin, 1941. This volume has a disconcertingly contemporary ring to it.

5. In one form or another, each of these means injecting the 'workplace' into the 'classroom'—something fully congruent with the ideology of career education.

6. For samples of the 'universe of need', for participants in the Entitlement, and for most of the special demonstration programs, there is an active attempt to 'follow up' and measure the subsequent employment experience of enrolled youth. Regardless of methodological concerns—of which we have several—it is worth noting two problems: (1) there is a special sensitivity in educational circles to measures which might appear to reduce the purposes of public education to fluctuations in the unemployment rate; (2) there is some doubt about "what difference they would make". This is, if subsequent employment is either unaffected or negatively affected, no one will propose eliminating secondary education. Another way to phrase this is to say that these programs, by implication, suggest that employment services ought to be included as an inherent component of secondary education regardless of their specific measureable impact. Education for the world of work would be considered a part of a 'universal, free' education.
7. Early reports indicated that LEAs were competing surprisingly well for YCCIP grants; however, once they were emmeshed in the limits of YCCIP programs, their rate of participation quickly diminished. Our guess is that more groups--both LEA and CBO--turned down or avoided YCCIP grants than any other federal program in recent memory.

8. It should be recalled that, in CETA, training is the preferred synonym for education. In this way, even if you are referring to social studies, it can appear to be one step in a logical progression toward a job.

9. We would like to iterate the cautions expressed above (footnote 1, page 51). We have included this 'money' discussion because we believe it to be an essential aspect of 'experience' and of 'policy analysis', but we make no pretense to having data adequate for more than a speculative accounting. This type of detailed review of CETA expenditures is greatly needed.

10. An example using Brandeis' neighbor, Boston, may help to explain this:

   School Department Budget 1978 = $195,000,000
   22% of YETP for 1978 = 375,000

The percentage of the total budget which YETP might contribute would be less than .2. The size of this percentage should deflate grand expectations for YEDPA. At the same time, the $375,000 has purchased effects in the school department out of proportion to its dollar value: five new programs were begun, including (a) the first work experience programs at the middle school level (these have, subsequently, received school department funds for expansion); (b) the first new alternative school in several years (which has drawn funding from suburban towns and from state and federal discretionary sources); and (c) a comprehensive, independent school program for the severely handicapped (the LEA Agreement funds 'tipped the scale' and convinced the Department of the program's viability). A new office and function in the School Department were created and other parts of CETA (especially the PIC) have been, thereby, brought into planning for a major new vocational school. YEDPA did not 'cause' the changes, but they would have been deferred in the absence of it.
11. Schools, of course, have viewed CETA programs in a less than favorable light. With the luxury of distance, it seems fair to say that, as institutional partners, schools and prime sponsors are not 'equals'. CETA programs tend to be short-term, focused on employment, and confined to narrow segments of the population (indeed, able to serve less than a majority of those who are eligible). Schools must serve whoever comes to them, their 'educational plans' cover 12 to 14 years, and their goals are broader than employment.

12. It is a cliche to assert that teachers and school counselors are cut off from the world of work and unaware of its needs and demands. The Hartford approach takes for granted that this is not an individual failing but a structural dilemma. Schools are cut off because they have been designed to be cut off. The 'autonomy' so often associated with the operation of schools (and associated with the unpredictable impacts of federal attempts to intervene in schools) is reflected on the level of the classroom. Teachers are not accustomed to work in a manner which is either purely heuristic or purely democratic. In other words, the problem has two aspects: (a) teachers need to learn how to work better with other people, especially people outside of the school setting, but (b) unless these relations are incorporated in the structure of their job--thereby decreasing their autonomy--change will be a sporadic phenomenon, dependent on the initiative of 'motivated' teachers and administrators.

13. In some places, a controversy has arisen over the meaning of 'academic credit'. Generally, it has been taken to be synonymous with any credit granted by a school system. However, two variations have emerged: (1) in which a school system makes a distinction between 'graduation' credit and 'academic' credit (in other words, where work experience might count toward graduation, but be listed separately on a transcript from other courses); and (2) in which, intentionally, programs have sought to have work experience credits reported under academic subjects. We have found little merit in the latter. This has a bearing on the competency issue. Cf. below page 92.

14. There is some historical evidence that work/study credit was often used (and still is) as a way to graduate youths perceived as school phobic or just plain troublesome. Cf. B. M. Fisher, Industrial Education, Madison 1967. Although it is easy to deplore this practice, we should not ignore the reality on which it is based: some youth are school phobic.
15. It may seem ironic, but the perceptions of school administrators can be important, especially if they lead to better attitudes toward CETA and toward the youth served in CETA. The anecdotal evidence has been reinforced by a recent Entitlement survey of principals in its 17 cities. (Cf. MDRC, October 1979)

16. The lack of evidence may result from the inability of any program as brief and as limited as SYEP to impact the behavior of youth some months later. In other words, '...answer to the query about the effects of school attendance may be: we should not have asked the question in the first place!

17. We are referring here to the oft-stated fear that the availability of CETA employment may 'motivate' some youth to leave school in order to find a job or to 'get services'. There has never been any evidence to substantiate this fear.

18. For example, in Massachusetts, the City of Cambridge offers its students a choice of seven secondary level alternatives, none of which receives funds from the CETA system. In addition, many of the 'nationally funded' projects are 'sheep in wolves clothing': that is, they were local ideas, often pre-existing, which managed to secure national funds, usually because of a scarcity of the local variety.

19. We restrict the use of 'alternative' to distinct or autonomous programs. The word 'alternative' can be applied to any change in curriculum, counseling pattern, targeting approach, etc., but this usage blurs the reality of an 'alternative education program'. We also prefer 'program' to 'school', since the latter implies a separate building or separate incorporation--a status accurate for a minority of alternatives.

20. Examples of employer-sponsored, non-CETA alternatives include the Hartford insurance Company's STEP program and Honeywell's Project SPACE.

21. We are suggesting that, except for its virtues for research, the replication experiment's local impact is indistinguishable from the impact of 'incentive' funds.

22. As we noted earlier, page 62, there is data suggesting increased hours/weeks of employment and increased wages during the first two years after high school, for youth who have worked while in high school. The statement that these same youth also performed better in high school and that, therefore, their work success stems from personal motivation merely describes one symptom in terms of another. Motivated youth have a competitive advantage in a limited market: youth who experience success, whether in school or at work, are likely to be (or become) more motivated.
23. The service unit concept is a way to rationalize existing practice where, all too often, no precision or definition is brought to the services available to youth. However, it also risks increasing the fragmentation of these services by making definite distinctions which, in practice, are usually fluid and flexible.

24. Employers are unanimous in believing that even the best equipped vocational school can not remain technologically abreast of developments in many industries, particularly those which are growing most quickly and which, therefore, may have the greatest number of jobs. Many smaller companies cannot keep up themselves. We should note that this is not true for advanced positions in highly technical firms--the 25% of new jobs which will go to researchers and managers.

25. Of course, there have been many studies of the relationship between education and: income, career satisfaction, residential patterns, class status, etc. The more famous of these, such as Jencks Inequality, do not seek to reduce the variable 'education' to 'basic skills'. Everyone assumes that the consequences of education must be taken in a broader sense. At least, in this regard, researchers and the parents of many poor youth would agree. For a different discussion of these issues, see deLone, Small Futures.
Chapter 5: Supportive Services
Chapter 5: Supportive Services

There is an immediate hazard confronting any discussion of "supportive services." This hazard is definitional: what is a supportive service and how is it distinct from the "program services" rendered by CETA to its participants? From the perspective of national policy, everything CETA does is a service--from full-time job training to part-time counseling. This is not what we mean when we refer to a supportive service.

The phrase "supportive service" implies something which is ancillary and optional, something which facilitates a more basic activity, something which varies considerably from person to person and from place to place. By implication, then, a definition of a supportive service should begin with a definition of a "basic" or universal service. The model for basic youth employment services which we have sketched includes:

(a) part- or full-time employment along with the activities essential to developing, supervising, and maintaining those jobs;

(b) part- or full-time training and or education including skill acquisition, remediation, assessment, and anything which takes place in a classroom.

Services which support these basic employment activities sometimes are described as the "glue" which holds them together. Unfortunately, all too frequently this glue is invisible and, therefore, undervalued. Examples of supportive services include: guidance and counseling; job placement and follow-up; transportation to either school or work; child care for the dependents of participants; medical or legal aid; and physical or psychological therapy.

The distinction between basic and supportive services is necessarily artificial. Some supportive services are embodied in
institutionalized programs (for example, the job placement provided by the Employment Services); others require the "purchase" of services from agencies equipped to provide them (especially medical, therapeutic, and legal); while still others are hard to conceive except as integral components of basic programs (transportation and counseling). Obviously, with time, a supportive service can be elevated to the status of "basic." We have done so with education. In the future, this may be true of transportation or child care for CETA participants.\(^2\)

This chapter will focus on supportive services as defined here and will try to ignore the extent to which they overlap with the topics of our earlier chapters. The rationale for this is two-fold:

(a) our belief that supportive services will play an increasingly prominent role in future youth programs;

(b) our recognition that too little attention has been paid in the past to the role of these services.

Having said this, we should immediately list some special problems which our topic creates for a "review" of YEDPA:

1. It is difficult to separate costs attributable to services in general or to specific types of services;

2. It is impossible to differentiate the varying impacts, effectiveness, and extent of the individual services;

3. It is unrealistic to describe certain programs or projects as geared specifically to supportive services.

4. The goals of YEDPA, vis-a-vis supportive services, cannot be extracted from its goals relative to anything else.
Supportive services, in other words, tend to glitch any neat system for analyzing YEDPA or youth programs in general.

A. The Intent of YEDPA

Since we cannot speak of YEDPA "goals" in this area, we are forced to infer the intent of the Act, which can be explicated as much through its total impression as through its specific sections. A quick look at YEDPA reveals three features:

1. the supportive services we listed are not mentioned in YIEPP, YCCIP, or YACC;
2. they are prominent in YETP where "supportive services" are included as one of three essential components of youth programs (the other two being employment and training);
3. there is a prima facie contradiction between these two points of view.

While YETP regulations were urging the provision of those supportive services required to carry out its mandates to serve hard-to-reach groups and in-school youth [Sections 444 & 436 (c)], regulations for the other parts of YEDPA implied that these services were either secondary or unnecessary. It is from this dichotomy that one can deduce the law's intent to compare "enriched" versus "sweat-only" programs.3

YETP, with its mandate to serve an array of needs, inherited the progress which had taken place in the summer program and the Job Corps during the previous few years. This progress has been most apparent in SYEP, where each year's regulations seemed to permit or encourage a more liberal view of the supportive services appropriately rendered to participants. The implication seemed to be that the accumulating 'less-son from experience' was that such services were neither peripheral nor superfluous. Most of what YEDPA has taught about specific supportive services has come through YETP programs.
B. The Reaction

If YETP contrasts with the other parts of YEDPA on the supportive services issue, this does not mean that YIEPP, YCCIP, and YACC were identically circumscribed. The Entitlement was an experiment. Its initial design overlooked the catalytic function performed by certain services and the managers of the experiment have had the flexibility and resources to adapt to the realities of their target population. YCCIP was intended to be "labor intensive" and a monetary lid was put on the capacity of local projects to use YCCIP funds to purchase services or materials.4 YACC non-residential projects were very similar to YCCIP, but its residences followed the Job Corps model and provided more extended services, including some we have not listed: recreation, entertainment, and clothing.5

The intent of YEDPA, as we interpret it, means that its lessons will concern (a) the importance of supportive services in general and (b) the role which various specific services may play in enhancing youth employability.

1. It's No Sweat

Some of the clearest lessons from YEDPA concern the relative merits of enriched versus sweat-only approaches. To begin with,

- Most prime sponsors have planned and offered a wide array of supportive services to youth participants in both YETP and YCCIP. (HUD, VICI, MDC, NCEP, MDRC)

It appears that well over half of the participants in these two programs were involved in some kind of employability training, "world of work" orientation, and counseling.6 This is in marked contrast to traditional programs as illustrated by SYEP where in 1978 only 8% of the participants were placed in projects which emphasized these aspects.7
Even more significantly,

- In YCCIP and YIEPP, local operators have resisted initial restrictions on supportive services and have attempted to provide a range of needed services (and training) activities. (Ibid.)

Some of this resistance was a priori but much of it grew out of operational experience. This has been highlighted in all reports on YCCI demonstration projects and on YIEPP. A product of this continued enrichment process has been the recognition that:

- The "sweat-only" approach to youth employment is not adequate, nor are limited, short-term supportive services sufficient for many youth. (DOL/ETA, MDC, Brandeis)

2. The Value of Support

It also seems clear from YEDPA that better "prescribing" of services is required:

- Many special segments of the youth population—single parents, the handicapped, delinquents, older drop-outs, etc.—require substantial, individually tailored services in order to sustain themselves in employment programs. (OYP, DOL/ETA, Mangum, Graubard)

Many of these services are very expensive, although it is impossible at this point to produce "unit" costs. The expense of such things helps explain why local YEDPA projects have needed to leverage additional supportive services even more than they have materials, supplies, or training.
Projects should not be designed in such a way that forces them to depend on someone else for an essential component. When dealing with hard-to-reach youth, supportive services are essential.

One of the attractions of alternative school programs for troubled youth seems to be the array of services they offer to their participants. Thus, we can say that

A contributing cause for the detected increase in youth dropping out of school may be the lack of what are called supportive services in regular school programs. (RMC, Graubard, Levin, Duke)

3. The Need for Guidance

No matter how "ordinary" supportive services may seem, we have learned that

Guidance, counseling, world of work orientation, and occupational information are scarce commodities in public secondary schools and these services will be more critical in the labor market of the 80's. (VPTFYE Roundtables)

This is an area in which YEDPA appears to have made an unintended contribution by increasing the pressure on school personnel and by focusing attention on the value of counseling. In addition to an absolute dearth of counselors,

School-based guidance personnel often lack the necessary training to offer students exposure and guidance in specific occupational fields.
Many private employers refer to a "counseling crisis" and have concentrated their educational forays on techniques for increasing the effectiveness of guidance counselors. These techniques have included offering audio-visual materials and lecturers, and hiring counselors as "adult interns" during the summer vacation. Nevertheless, one aspect of counseling should be closely scrutinized.

- Studies suggest that LEA and CETA "counseling" should focus on problem-solving, not on "therapy". 10

Further, there is a need for improved supervision and evaluation of the counseling which does take place. Even though public sector counseling ought to be circumscribed, there is evidence that

- For youths with special problems, individualized professional counseling can be crucial in assisting them to meet program and societal expectations. (Brenner, Mangum, Walther)

Uncomfortable though it may be, adaptation to the behavioral expectations of adult society is a key feature of any rehabilitative program. If youth are to accept and follow a norm, it must be applied consistently--but consistency has hardly been the hallmark of CETA, either for individuals or for programs. Indeed, the lack of continuity among programs and services seems to be a source of their ineffectiveness.

- Youth should have service plans which follow them through all the years of their eligibility. The programs which serve them should be stable, well run, and funded for two years at a time. Youth eligibility should not be limited to 1,000 service hours. (Michel, Pines, NCEP, OYP)
This is partly a management issue and partly an argument for more coherence to the services themselves. The service plans should avoid excessive documentation and should be flexible enough to recognize the varying needs of youth. YEDPA has fueled an increase in the use of assessment, "Employability Development Plans," job descriptions, academic credit, and other forms of planning and tracking, but it has not demonstrated the virtues of any one approach to the problem. Perhaps this is because

- Supportive services need to be geared to the age, developmental stage, language, sex, and race of the participating youth.11

Youth without any work experience will need a different mix of services than youth with several summers of SPEDY behind them. Generally, it appears that kids under 16 require more career exploration, occupational information, and world of work orientation than youths about to graduate from high school. These distinctions are not rigid and youth can be damaged by categories of service eligibility which are too "prescriptive". This can be illustrated by a review of the sparse information which is available on the effectiveness of certain services.

4. Who Needs What?

- Career awareness, labor market information, and job-seeking skills can increase the success of many youth in finding employment. (Urban Institute, NBER, Osterman)

Somewhat paradoxical, though, is evidence suggesting that classrooms are not necessarily the best place to deliver these services. For example:
Job Corps participants have acquired world of work skills better on the job than in classroom settings. (OYP/DOL)

and . . .

Pre-employment services are most effective when linked with work experience. (VICI, Work in America)

Pre-employment services include assessment, orientation, coaching and placement. There is some data to support the contention that for certain youth, these services may be useful in gaining access to private sector jobs. Job "placement" alone is not sufficient for most youth.

YEDPA has sparked more awareness of the need to combine pre-employment or "front-end" services with post-placement support both to the individual youths and to the employer. (Robison, CED, Brandeis)

Relatively little research has been done on models for on-the-job supportive services. In terms of resource allocation, YEDPA has maintained the CETA pattern of devoting greatest effort to the front end, little to follow through.

5. Tests and Instruments

There has been a marked increase in the use of centralized assessment during intake and placement, and in the use of standardized testing instruments in CETA programs. (OYP, YW, NCEP)

This follows a decline for several years. YEDPA regulations encouraged many prime sponsors to centralize intake and assessment, while the
proliferation of tests has been partly a consequence of the knowledge development mandate. Some cautions are needed in order to use tests effectively and fairly:

- CETA testing should take cognizance of state laws on the use of tests, should seek to avoid excessive testing, should explain clearly to participants the purpose of the tests, and should use them primarily as guidance tools. (RMC, YW, Knapp, McClung)

Especially for minority groups, there is considerable suspicion of these instruments and it cannot be assuaged through expressions of good will. Indeed, several demonstration programs have been disrupted or significantly altered by controversies over testing.14

6. Getting There is Half the Cost

YEDPA has greatly expanded the involvement of CETA with youth and, thereby, drawn into CETA's orbit many problems and needs previously thought to be the province of other disciplines or other parts of the delivery system. Some of these groups already are being served through specialized programs operated by independent state and local agencies (for example, delinquents and the handicapped); others are served by no special agency (for example, immigrants and single parents). Since many of the services needed by these groups are indispensable but expensive, the role of CETA will depend on coordinating with other institutions where they exist and brokering with service providers where agencies do not exist. Furthermore

- If YEDPA continues to target on harder to serve groups, youth employment personnel will need additional in-service training in order to make effective contracting and placement decisions. (OYP, Brandeis, Vargas, Elmore)
This also applies to what is perhaps one of the most striking lessons from YEDPA:

- Three needs—for transportation, child care and health services—have emerged as having an increasing impact on youth. (Knapp, Barnett, Brenner, MDRC)

Each of these is expensive and the lack of any one of them can be the single, immediate cause for a youth dropping out of a CETA program. YEDPA cannot hope to solve the societal problems which underlie these needs, but planners should be aware that they will play an increasing role in the implementation of youth programs.

- The absence of child care services can disenfranchise many youth from programs specifically designed to serve them.15

- The cost of transportation continues to soar, thereby exacerbating the employment problems of disadvantaged youth. Moreover, too often the youth are not where the jobs are, so the cost of transportation is not a theoretical issue, but a true barrier to employment.

- Many young people, especially those out of school, have had a history of poor or non-existent medical care. From improper nutrition to venereal disease, poor health not only restricts youth participation in employment programs, it can vitiate his/her entire employment outlook.16

There is a documented disjunction between the location of job growth and the concentration of poor youth in jobless areas.17 It should be especially noted that if efforts are made to "move youth to the jobs," problems of racial and cultural conflict will have to be addressed.
Special counseling, orientation, and ongoing support is needed to place minority youth successfully in employers who have few minority employees or limited experience with interracial issues. (Hill, Urban League, Robison)

These services are as necessary for the employer as for the youth.

7. Who Knows What?

It should be apparent that supportive services are not a well-understood fact of youth programming. However, three points seem clear:

- Much more needs to be learned about specific services. They need to be defined better and their cost needs to be isolated from that of other variables, before this new knowledge can be meaningfully applied.

- Supportive services do not lend themselves very easily to a research and demonstration approach. Program models are not simple to find and more than likely not the answer. Better professional practices are needed.

- The nature of many services is such that their availability will depend on the ability of CETA staff to coordinate their efforts with those of other parts of the human services community.

Together, these points argue for more knowledge, more professionalism, more systemic coherence, and better management—all aspects of the next chapter's topic. Before turning to that topic, however, we would like to note that the impact of many supportive services will never be measurable in ways satisfactory to budget analysts. Even though we all may believe that the "social costs" of neglect are enormous, it is easy to forget this at budget time. Youth programming should not be built on dire prophecies. At the same time, reality has
a way of eventually bringing to our attention unpleasant things which have slipped from our minds.
Chapter 5

1. The CETA system distinguishes between 'intensive' and 'non-intensive' services, rather than between 'basic' and 'supportive'. There is, of course, disagreement in CETA as to exactly what the difference is since, by definition, a 'program' (such as Jobs for Youth) cannot be 'non-intensive'. For our purposes, we avoided any distinction which would result in a chapter titled: Non-Intensive Services!

2. Eyebrows may have been raised at our inclusion of job placement in supportive services, especially when CETA places such a premium on positive terminations. Unfortunately, even when a program is highly conscious of its 'termination' rates, job placement--as a service--tailored to the individual needs of participants and integrated in their program plans from the outset--is a rarity. For a recent, though not unbiased, discussion of this subject, see Osterman, "The Politics and Economics of CETA Youth Programs".

3. This is another instance where the Labor Department's office of Youth Programs succeeded in substantially enhancing the experimental value of YEDPA. At the same time, the so-called 'Service Mix Demonstration' does not address this issue. 'Service Mix' refers to a general program or to basic employment and training services. In fact, to equalize the comparison groups, everyone receives or can receive the same supportive services. Some other demonstration projects, notably the Entitlements and the HUD/CPPV demonstrations with YCCIP, have drawn some observations on the relative impact of granting or denying needed services.

4. The regulations for YCCIP (Title IVA, Section 680.113) state, in effect, that no more than 20% of the project's funds "may be used for project-related training of participants, project supervisors, service to participants, and for the acquisition, lease, or rental of materials, equipment, and supplies". Of the four categories listed, services would have the lowest priority, if only because there would be no project without the others. Cf. above, page 39, for a discussion of these dollar limits.

5. Naturally, these services should have been taken for granted in a residential program. The available information on YACC is insufficient to judge the accuracy of this presumption.

6. The available data does not allow us to break out the services specifically provided to youth. This is a limitation of data collection, not a result of the timing of this report.
7. By 'emphasis' we are trying, without complete success, to make the Labor Department distinction between intensive and non-intensive. Many SYEP participants are offered brief stints of training, tutoring, or counseling; only a few are placed in specially designed components of summer programs which follow a more comprehensive model.

8. There have been instances where program operators have refused to begin a project until certain supportive services were secured. 'A priori' here simply refers to earlier programmatic experience—the widespread, grassroots understanding of the needs of out-of-school youth. Our view is that YCCIP is too flawed to continue, but that there is some value in having a no-frills program in which to place alienated youth for short periods (maximum of three months) before transferring them to more intensive—and expensive—employment programs.

9. The national ratio of guidance counselors to high school students is an average of about 1 to 350. Most counseling time is spent on assisting youth who are going to college; however, the history of school counseling has more to do with truants and the 'adjustment' of recreants, than with interpreting SAT scores.

10. The boundary between problem-solving, in a practical sense, and therapy is not impermeable. A similar problem arises with definitions of counselors as 'youth advocates'. Advocacy means one thing for street-workers in a housing project and quite another for line staff of an employment program.

11. That is, of the youth who actually participate in the program. One of the dilemmas confronting any manager of a YEDPA project is the fact that the youth who do enroll never fit the neat categories planned for them. (This is a consequence of the queue nature of enrollment: new programs get the kids who happen to be next in line.) A group of youths who, in formal terms, look the same can include a preponderance with characteristics as operationally diverse as (a) extensive past CETA experience (or none); (b) severe learning deficits (and there is a major difference between an 'average' achievement level of fifth grade and having ten students at the tenth grade and ten at the first!); (c) dependent children; or (b) multiple arrests for robbery.

12. 'Coaching' means planned efforts to aide a youth in mimicking the anticipated behavioral standards of the employer.

13. Of course, no amount of support will remedy an absolute shortage of jobs.
14. Disruption has not resulted only from disputes over the tests themselves. In some instances, the structure and schedule of the 'data gathering' has either impeded program operations or saddled it with unworkable requirements. Cf. Private vs. Public Sector; Career Intern Program; Youthwork; and the Service Mix Demonstration.

15. Some prime sponsors--for example, Baltimore, St. Paul, and Los Angeles--have estimated that 20--30% of young women applicants have children of their own. The impact of early non-participation in the labor market has gained the attention of researchers recently. Cf. the work of Mary Corcoran for NBER and of Phyllis Wallace.

16. The above citations about early non-participation have application here as well. There have been corroborating studies on (a) physically and mentally handicapped and (b) on incarcerated youth. Freeman and Wise, op. cit., find weaker, but similar patterns for all non-participating youth.

17. A recent set of projections, devised by Chase Econometrics, examined the nation's 108 largest metropolitan areas. The ten with the largest, projected job growth over the next decade included Tuscon, Las Vegas, Fort Lauderdale, Phoenix, Tulsa, and Houston. The ten with the least job growth included Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Scranton, and New York City (which was projected to lose jobs). Cf. New York Times, March 28, 1980. It is worth noting that the regions with substantial job growth are more dependent on the automobile than the older cities whose employment picture is bleak.
Chapter 6: Management
A. Emergency Care or Preventive Medicine?

We have described the divided mandate inherent in YEDPA. The funds for the law were part of a long-delayed economic stimulus package. The language and timing of the Act required rapid enrollments and quick outcomes. Nevertheless, YEDPA's "basic purpose" was to "test the relative efficacy of dealing with youth employment problems in different local contexts." (Section 411)

Fulfilling this mandate was certainly a major practical and conceptual challenge, especially because the missing element in the Act's scheme was a concern for the ability of the CETA system to 'deliver' on its promises. What YEDPA meant locally was that, over a brief period of time, the nation's 460 (now 473) prime sponsors would be required to: (a) expand their service to youth and (b) alter the nature of their existing youth services. Although it cannot be said that a 'purpose' of YEDPA was to test the managerial capacity of the CETA system, it is true that most of YEDPA's programs were implemented through this system and, therefore, a judgment on the programs is a judgment on the system. Indeed, as we will point out, it may be impossible to separate one from the other.

At the same time that YEDPA was dramatically imposing itself on the CETA system, it was, on a scale unprecedented for youth programs, exploring the "relative efficacy" of "different ways" to address the needs of unemployed youth. This experimental focus, dubbed "knowledge development" by the Office of Youth Programs, has generated (and will continue to generate) a wealth of information and reports which, taken together, may offer some potential answers to the popular question: "What works best for whom?"2

Prime sponsors have been expected to include in their Title IV plans local ideas for knowledge development. This expectation has led
to few local experiments, but it reflects the tone of YEDPA and reinforces our belief that, to the degree there is coherence in the Act, both the operational demands placed on prime sponsors and the knowledge development process converge on management issues. The genuine knowledge development which happened locally came through the direct implementation of YETP, YCCIP, and YIEPP. Correspondingly, most of the demonstrations devised by OYP either used the prime sponsor delivery system or tested alternative management approaches. We estimate that expenditures on management innovations or management-related research constitute the second largest category of outlays under YEDPA, after public sector job creation.

This chapter will consider the administrative impacts of YEDPA on the local delivery system and, from this, the lessons it offers to the next 'generation' of youth programs. We must immediately narrow our topic to a cluster of six issues, each of which has some legislative foundation: linkages; methods of delivery; coordination; monitoring; planning; and technical assistance. It is apparent that such a list ignores many of the issues which ought to be considered in a discussion of the management of a public endeavor as large and as extensive as CETA. That we cannot do so is a consequence of (a) the long-standing neglect of such matters in the CETA system and (b) the absence of data on which to make credible generalizations.

Individual knowledge development projects will be blended with this analysis, as they were in earlier chapters. However, given the attention lavished on 'research & demonstration' under YEDPA, it is also reasonable to examine how knowledge development itself has been managed--its plans, its delivery mechanisms, and its results. Much of what has taken place through YEDPA, in the name of new knowledge, cannot be located in the regulations or the Act, yet is of considerable ingenuity and interest. This is especially true for the delivery options chosen for the national demonstrations:

- special purpose, non-profit 'intermediary' corporations;
-127-

- other branches of the federal government (through interagency agreements);
- national community-based organizations, associations, and alliances, both public and private;
- universities, research organizations, prime sponsors, and other direct agents of OYP.

We will defer some comments on the management of knowledge development to our concluding chapter. Since the majority of discretionary funds have been spent through the first two vehicles on the above list, however, we will digress here, briefly, to describe some of their features, before we move on to the local delivery system.

B. Intermediary Corporations

We must distinguish between the highly visible 'intermediaries' and the use of a local non-profit corporation as a means to facilitate a local activity. Both approaches have been used extensively in YEDPA, but it is the former--the national intermediaries--which have attracted the most attention. At this point in time, there are four major operating intermediaries and one or two more under development:

- Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation in New York;
- The Corporation for Public/Private Ventures in Philadelphia;
- Youthwork, Inc., in Washington; and
- The Corporation for Youth Enterprises, originally in Portland, Oregon; now in Washington.

MDRC is the largest and best established of these entities and its reports on the Entitlement have been cited throughout this review.
CYE is the newest intermediary, has experienced substantial implemen-
tation problems of its own, and its creation of youth enterprises in
several national sites is just underway.

CPPV has the most ambitious agenda with respect to the private
sector:

- replication and evaluation of two model pre-
  employment services (Jobs for Youth and
  70001);

- expansion of new enterprises involving youth
  in the operation of businesses and services
  (for example, Open Road);

- tests of methods for restructuring and re-de-
  fining jobs, especially ones which elicit the
  support of unions and employers in quasi-ap-
  prenticeship arrangements;

- development of mechanisms to 'reduce the trans-
  actional costs' attendant upon CETA placements
  in the private sector.

CPPV was originally slated to undertake a direct wage subsidy experi-
ment, but this has turned out to be a complex and sensitive problem
that is still on the drawing board. As with many of the YEDPA demon-
strations, it would be premature to draw conclusions from CPPV's early
experience with these initiatives. The pre-employment programs are
furthest along in development and the only ones for which an interim
evaluation was provided for this review. CPPV, as noted earlier, also
has managed the VICI/YCCIP demonstration.

The keystone to Youthwork's 'exemplary in-school' projects is
the joint participation of educational and employment institutions.
Forty-six projects were funded in the first 'round' of Youthwork com-
petitions in 1978. These have been supplemented by a dozen specially
designed 'non-competitive' projects and most recently, by a second
round of competitive projects focusing on handicapped and hard-to-
reach youth. The original Youthwork projects had their own local
evaluations and were also included in a two-part national assessment: one on impact done by the Blackstone Institute and an "ethnographic case study" coordinated by Cornell University.8

The Youthwork projects were intended to identify and expand promising local activities stimulated by YEDPA. Youthwork was one of only a few demonstration efforts which used a national RFP process and great latitude was encouraged in the first round submissions. All proposals went through the prime sponsor system, as did the resulting grants. Even though this approach has meant a certain lack of comparability across the sites, it serves as a valuable indicator of the local capacity for innovation within existing CETA guidelines. For example, most of the projects which are exploring issues of "academic credit for work experience" are also creating new links with the private sector. Most of the "private sector" projects involve public schools or post-secondary institutions in joint endeavors. And many of the Youthwork projects are adapting or replicating model career education programs developed in the past decade, especially those created by the National Institute of Education as "experience-based career education." The Youthwork demonstration can, thus, be viewed as a mechanism for sponsoring local initiatives that fit within the local delivery system.

The response of prime sponsors to the opportunities made possible through the intermediaries holds several lessons for the future:

• The timing of categorical and incentive programs should be divorced, so that the latter do not interfere with the former.

• The capacity of a prime sponsor to compete will indicate, in part, the agency's managerial competence.9

• On the whole, prime sponsors are eager to seek out and implement programs funded on an incentive or discretionary basis. (NCEP, MDRC, Youthwork, Brandeis, Lowry)
If intermediary corporations are the vehicle for an incentive program, more work will be needed to define their role vis-a-vis Regional Labor Department offices and the national Office of Youth Programs. The role has been the main occupation of the national evaluation of the intermediaries\(^\text{10}\) which is the source of the following conclusions:

- An intermediary cannot be both a simple extension of the Labor Department (surrogate program officer) and an independent research agency.\(^\text{11}\)
- The most successful intermediaries were (a) well-established; (b) staffed appropriately; and (c) able to maintain cooperative, professional relations with both OYP and subcontractors.
- Intermediaries are not quick solutions to staffing and programmatic dilemmas. They, too, require time to be implemented and to eliminate the 'bugs' in their operation.

Each intermediary has its own evaluation underway, and these, no doubt, will lead to modifications of the above comments. The deployment of such a tool for implementing demonstration programs was a risk on the part of the Labor Department but one which the evidence suggests will pay off as the intermediaries mature.

### C. Interagency Agreements

In November of 1979, the Employment and Training Administration published a list of 22 "Interagency Youth Employment Projects." When you include the Young Adult Conservation Corps, it is apparent that a substantial percentage of YEDPA has been spent outside of the Labor Department. The Interagency Projects include two which we have used extensively in this report: the YCCIP projects fostered by HUD in ten Community Development Corporations and the Career Intern Program replicated by Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America at four
sites under the supervision of the National Institute of Education.\textsuperscript{12} Another major, ongoing demonstration is the Youth Community Service project which, in Syracuse, is exploring ACTION's concept of a national youth service. Some of the Interagency Projects have been through prolonged developmental periods and are just getting underway (for example, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's alternative education program).

The interagency agreements are being evaluated both individually and generally. In the absence of a report, a few lessons can be tendered:

- The YEDPA inter-agency agreements have significantly expanded the coordination and cooperation between Labor youth programs and other youth-related activities of the federal government.

- Care must be exercised to avoid burdening the projects with too many layers of monitoring and supervision.\textsuperscript{13} (MDC)

- Extensive planning is necessary to improve compatibility between youth employment goals and the goals of the collaborating agencies. (Dement)

As with the intermediaries, a role question remains unanswered: are these agreements viewed as provisional devices or long-range strategies for better integration of federal youth programs?\textsuperscript{14}

A special case of interagency activity is the Young Adult Conservation Corps. Congress mandated coordination, although it reduced Labor's role primarily to that of a 'program monitor'. Despite its size (nearly one quarter of YEDPA's dollars), relatively little is known about the effectiveness of YACC at this point in time. A few comments are in order:\textsuperscript{15}

- YACC has suffered from implementation delays, although none that could be considered unusual when compared, for example, with YCCIP and the Job Corps.
• The start-up costs for YACC have been high and will probably continue to consume a significant share of its resources; that is, the cost per participant is far higher than in local YEDPA programs.\textsuperscript{16}

• YACC is less targeted than other employment programs: its participants are older, better educated, less poor, and mainly white.

It is also important to add that YACC is viewed skeptically within the CETA system. Unlike the Job Corps, which receives referrals directly from prime sponsors, there is no mandated link between CETA and YACC. This lack of connection may explain the 'invisibility' of YACC on the local level. It does not explain the widespread belief that programs like YACC, especially its residential centers, are an expensive distraction, unlikely to have an impact on youth unemployment.\textsuperscript{17}

D. The Local Delivery System

1. Linkage. Some of the most important achievements of YEDPA have been in the area of new relationships between the CETA system and its logical partners, including public schools, labor unions, community-based organizations, and the private sector. For instance, it will not hurt to repeat that

• The 22\% provision has led to expanded connections between prime sponsors and public schools. (NCEP, NASB, Hoyt, National Commission on Employment Policy)

It has also raised several 'second generation' issues which make it clear that more experience with this linkage is necessary before it will result in concrete institutional change. The fit between CETA and LEA is not an easy one—the marriage did have to be forced—but there has been real progress in less than two years.
The question of labor involvement in youth programs needs more attention:

- YEDPA has not substantially altered the somewhat tenuous relationships between the CETA system and organized labor. (HRDI, NCEP, OYP, Brandeis.)

Improvements in this area will have to await developments in the economy and in CETA itself. These conditions do not apply to linkages with CBOs:

- YEDPA has led to increased collaboration between prime sponsors and a variety of community-based non-profit agencies. (MDC, NCEP)

This is based on both the reported plans of prime sponsors and on observations.

- YCCIP has stimulated more involvement of new CETA contractors than has YETP (even with the 22% set-aside). Particularly noteworthy has been the role played by community development corporations and other non-traditional agencies.¹⁸ (NCEP, BU, ETR, Hearings)

YETP contracting tends to reflect Title I (IIB) practice, in part because YETP itself simply extends this practice. Despite noting that YEDPA has succeeded in expanding the CBO role;

- There is no evidence that the administrative unit is a good predictor of effective programs. CBOs, LEAs, and NPOs, can all operate good projects. (MDC, NCEP, Levin, RMC)

On the other hand, it is generally accepted that
Some CBOs have better recruiting 'access' to hard-to-reach youth because of their neighborhood credibility. (RMC, YW, OYP)

As described in an earlier section, YEDPA has barely begun the process of expanding the relationships between prime sponsors and private employers. Even though the Private Industry Councils were not created by YEDPA, they may solve this problem since

- The PICs are widely viewed as mechanisms to increase this linkage, although they are not expected to foster many new programs. (CPPV, ETR, Robison, VPTF Roundtables)

A study of private sector/CETA collaboration conducted in 1978 by The Conference Board suggests that this link is more dependent on a managerial approach than on an ideological or public relations approach.

- Prime sponsors which have actively sought out private sector input, which have dovetailed their programs to meet private sector needs, and which have been innovative in job development, appear to have more cooperation from the private sector, regardless of incentives. (Conference Board)

All this 'linkage' can have a detrimental effect if it is seen, locally, as another planning requirement imposed from 'above'. Prime sponsors are now obliged to contact virtually everyone in the course of planning YCCIP and YETP programs. But even pro forma contacts can have some virtue when they bring together parties unfamiliar with one another:

- The 'exposure' of CETA programs to the expectations of the private sector and, to a lesser extent, public schools, may have an indirect effect on the quality of those programs. (MDC, Hoyt, NASB, Brickell, RMC)
2. The Planning Process. An elaborate but superficial planning process has been required for YEDPA programs. For this to be a productive exercise and not mere compliance,

- Planning should be done well in advance, involve operational staff, allow for contingencies, and be less vulnerable to constant change in policy and regulations. (Levitan, Mangum, Wurzburg, Darr)

Prime sponsors generally inventoried local resources, coordinated them and formed youth councils. Sadly, much of this effort seems to have impeded the design of good programs rather than made it more likely. The YEDPA experience revealed, not surprisingly, that,

- The current ability of prime sponsors to plan effectively varies enormously. Larger primes often had the staff needed to produce detailed plans, but this is no assurance of quality. (Michel, Butler, NCEP)

Almost everywhere,

- Youth Councils were formed but had a perfunctory involvement in planning. (NCEP, MDC)

This is a matter of both timing and intent. There are unresolved questions about the proper role and composition of Youth Councils. YEDPA has galvanized a lingering CETA issue and in some places primes are now overhauling and solidifying their advisory committees.

- The expectations for youth participation in planning were naive. More time and more care is needed in order to give youth a genuine role. (YW, NCEP, Urban League, NUC)
The presence of youth on advisory councils has done little for the youth themselves and may contribute to the general impression that the councils are peripheral to the 'real' planning. It suggests that,

- The involvement of youth in such things as (a) peer tutoring and counseling, (b) youth enterprises and (c) program evaluation, may be more valuable avenues for their participation than membership on a youth council. (CPPV, ETR, Richmond, NCEP, Graubard, Wurzburg)

One might hazard the same for everyone:

- The necessity for unions and CBOs to review prime sponsor plans is less helpful than involving them in the planning itself. (Conference Board, Brandeis, Levin, Carnegie)

This review function has sparked conflicts where none had existed (unions) and it has raised concern when the reviewers might also be contractors.

A better planning process would depend, paradoxically, on less need to plan; that is, planning is related to the duration of the funding cycle: the more often the cycle 'turns over' the more 'plans' are needed and, hence, the less real planning can occur. Several conclusions on this subject are supported by YEDPA experience:

- A one-year program is not likely to develop the experiences and reputation which characterize effective programs. This argues for funding of two, preferably three, years, subject to annual review. (Youthwork, OYP, Butler, Michel, BU, VICI, NCEP, Demont)

On the other hand,
Each program should be subject to annual evaluation measures previously agreed upon by the operator and the prime sponsor, in order to be eligible for continued funding. (Ibid.)

Under present constraints, prime sponsors have a tendency either to continue all programs from year to year (adding new ones only with new money) or to go through the motions of competitive bidding, only to 'select' the status quo. This suggests a new process for local planning:

- Competition for most available funds among potential subcontractors;
- A three-year funding cycle;
- Annual evaluations conducted by the prime sponsor;
- Potential for certain set-asides or special, no-bid projects;
- Advisory council review of decisions to defund programs which do not meet evaluation criteria.

As Ann Michel has said in her paper on youth programs in Syracuse, it is also important to "avoid competing, federally mandated citizen participation structures and recognize the existence of current ones. Do not create artificial coordination at the citizen participation level". (Michel, page 34). The planning and coordination process should sidestep complexity and not be an impediment to its own purposes. In any case, there is an intimate connection between good planning and the formative evaluation of current programs. In the absence of the latter, planning is an expensive way to whistle in the wind.

3. Scale and Types of Delivery. It has been estimated that, since YEDPA was implemented, prime sponsors have been responsible for
six to ten youth programs which differ in eligibility, operational cycle, target groups, permissible services, reporting procedures, required sign-offs, and so forth. These would include the summer program, an in-school Title IIB and an out-of-school Title IIB, YCCIP, the LEA Agreement programs, YETP itself, and at least one discretionary project. The complexity created by all this can be staggering, but it should not obscure the lesson that:

- Prime sponsors are capable of managing youth programs as large as the Entitlements and as complex as some of the discretionary grants. They are also capable of rapid implementation and quick adaptation to changing rules. (MDRC, NCEP, Michel)

Of course, this has been the history of CETA—rapid escalation followed by a precipitous decline leading to new escalation. Prime sponsors ought to be good at this and they are. The MDRC report on the implementation of Entitlement confirms this expertise as does a look at enrollment data.

- After a slow start in January, enrollments in YCCIP, YETP and YIEPP moved to 90% of the projected levels by June 1978. (OYP)

While prime sponsors can deliver numerically impressive results, pressure to do it quickly will naturally cause new programs to resemble previous programs. Put another way,

- Innovative programs cannot be launched as quickly as more familiar ones. Severe time constraints will preclude innovation. (RMC, YW, CPPV, Public vs. Private, MDC, Taggart)

We are less certain about how to push the system toward useful change. However, it appears that
Money is needed to set in motion the processes which will prompt change. The discretionary projects, especially the Entitlement, have effected changes in the prime sponsors involved. (CDRC, YW, MDC, RMC, Butler, Michel)

When dollars have not followed linkages (as with unions and the private sector), little change is evident; where they have (as with LEAs), the picture is brighter. The use of discretionary funds to stimulate change and to reward performance seems to work.24

But incentives are no substitute for serious evaluations of prime sponsor performance:

- Management should be a CETA priority. It should be measured, evaluated, and, where appropriate, rewarded. But it is unlikely that either incentives or program standards will succeed if they are confined to youth programs. (Michel, Dement)25

It might be expected that all contracts would require an evaluation, but there is a dis-incentive to use precious 'administrative' dollars for this purpose.

- The limits on administrative costs should be softened where there is evidence that it might improve program quality, assessment, and professionalism. (OPER, VICI, NCEP, OYP)

The limit has been hard on YCCIP, and somewhat less burdensome on YETP and YIEPP. There is no magic or universal percentage; the standard 20% might be sufficient if there were fewer claims on this money by intermediary levels of administration.

4. CETA Coordination

- YEDPA has led to greater efforts to coordinate youth programs with other services both CETA and non-CETA. (NCEP, ETR, OYP)
This has occurred in the face of pressures working in the opposite direction:

- Those features of YEDPA which fragmented managerial chores were deleterious, especially separate grant categories, different eligibilities, and inconsistent operating rules. (Michel, NCEP, MDRC)

A common 'coordination' fear had to do with money:

- There has been no significant substitution of YEDPA resources for existing Title II funds. (OYP, NCEP, Brandeis, Westat)

The maintenance of effort clause has worked, perhaps because (a) the youth enrollments in CETA had been shrinking at the same time that (b) there was increasing local concern about youth unemployment. The fact that there were cities where substitution did occur suggests only that

- Many federal rules are insufficiently flexible to differentiate between the extremes of local practice. (Chase, Murphy, Levitan)

YEDPA was added on to existing CETA programs. This meant that the staff available for YEDPA was likely to be drawn from CETA and that 'events' in the other Titles would impact the new one:

- Changes in PSE slots, OJT eligibility, SYEP rules and the creation of Title VII have all had significant, unintended consequences for YEDPA implementation. (Michel, Brandeis, MDC, Robison)

These consequences are very difficult to measure; but, if new youth legislation is combined with major cuts in PSE or SYEP, planners can look forward to negative start-up periods for the new bill. It is
also difficult to state categorically how much overall CETA coordination there should be since the needs of youth under 19 are different from those of adults. Indeed,

- YEDPA experiences suggest that greater distinctions should be made between adult and youth programming. (Gottlieb, Osterman, Taggart, Dement)

Most prime sponsors have either created new 'youth offices' or assigned certain staff 'youth responsibilities'. Administrative, programmatic, and developmental considerations support further movements in this direction, while, simultaneously, encouraging sequenced coordination with adult programs for youth over the age of 19.

5. Monitoring & Reporting.

- Eligibility and reporting should be streamlined and made consistent from program to program.

- The choice between simplicity and completeness in record keeping can require unpleasant trade-offs, nevertheless, in all cases; simplicity should prevail, even when it entails a cost in documentation. (Chase, Levin, Michel, OYP, Darr, Richmond)

Individual eligibility is obviously related to the targeting of resources. YEDPA programs utilize different targeting methods and, though some of the consequences were noted earlier, it is worth listing them here:

- YEDPA's services have been successfully concentrated on economically disadvantaged and minority youth. It has been the major source for most new jobs by black youth in the past two years. (Lerman, OYP, NBER)

- The distribution of funds by formula does not guarantee that certain 'low incidence' population will be served.26
As individual programs gain exposure and a reputation, they are better able to recruit and serve needier groups of youth. (Graubard, RMC, YW)

YCCIP has been aimed at economically disadvantaged and out-of-school youth. This targeting has exceeded the requirements of the law. (NCEP, OYP)

The summer program is the major source of summer employment for urban minorities. (OYP, Ginzberg)

Most prime sponsors and program operators have not taken advantage of the 85% provision of YETP, preferring instead to 'target' as much as possible. (NCEP, OYP)

Much of the YEDPA 'achievement' is a continuation of past practice. It was easier in many jurisdictions to stay with the 'poverty' level income guidelines than to implement a whole new set. Those jurisdictions which opted for the looser guidelines did so either to accommodate the concerns of school systems or to better serve a largely suburban or rural population.

Some experiments in targeting have occurred with the results of (a) stimulating pressure for expansion of the eligibility and (b) producing new ideas for ways to increase the impact of youth programs. (MDRC, OYP, ACTION)

These are complex issues and will not be decided solely on the basis of effectiveness or equity. YEDPA has substantially augmented programs for youth, but resources remain scarce relative to the magnitude of the problem. There is no simple equivalence between being poor and being in need, especially in the case of youth for whom 'poverty' is a family characteristic, not a personal one.

Economic targeting seems to be a reasonable proxy for need, but it should be made clear that CETA programs will serve only needy youth who also meet program expectations. It should be remembered that
- Broader eligibility would increase community support for CETA and increase the participation of school systems and private employers. (NCEP, NIE, NMI, Richmond, Brandeis)

Individual eligibility might be expanded to include youth who have 'special needs' as defined through Public Law 94-142. Because recruiting private employers is so closely tied with successful and 'competent' programs and to the employers' expectation of community impact, there is some rationale for programs which provide employers with a heterogenous group of participants. In any event, effective income targeting can be separated from individual eligibility:

- Carefully defined geographic areas with high concentrations of poor youth, somewhat in the manner of YEDPA's Entitlement projects, might provide sufficient income targeting while offering some local flexibility in deciding which youth, within those communities, should be served.

Another way to phrase this would be to say that 'youth unemployment' is not an individual problem, but a community characteristic. Resources, then, would be aimed at increasing a community's ability to (a) provide jobs, (b) educate its children, and (c) create a decent living environment.

Current systems for monitoring client performance need to be improved, but

- More complex systems by themselves will have no immediate benefits for the youth they track. All 'improvements' should carefully weigh benefits and costs. (Taggart, Michel)

Monitoring or tracking has a direct impact on the coherence and continuity of the system and an indirect, albeit significant, impact on the 'clients' of that system. The use of 'certificates of achievement'
for participants in CETA programs is a separate issue. It is often taken for granted that CETA participants need a quasi-diploma to enhance the credibility of their experience in the eyes of potential employers. No evidence uncovered during this review supports the value of such documents. At the same time

- Clear performance standards for youth and for youth programs should be introduced. In too many cases, youth do not know what is expected of them and earn no rewards for good performance. (OYP, Mangum, National Commission, Robison, Michel, Taggart)

YEDPA experiences with tracking systems argue for the following:

- Keep the system simple and manageable (bearing in mind who will be using it);
- Base data collection on the minimum needed by each level in the system—the youth, the program, the Prime Sponsor, and DOL;
- Tie all variables to two uses: program quality and program accountability;
- Eliminate all classifications of need and service which will 'label' youth by income or 'deficiency'. (Brickell, Brandeis, Chase, Murphy, Lorwin, OYP)

Data collection is an activity where caution should be exercised and where the adage about 'doing nothing' in the absence of certainty seems to apply. On a parallel matter,

- CETA fiscal information is too segregated from program management to be the effective management tool it is, for example, in the private sector.
As our report has highlighted, there is also

- A lack of fiscal information on such things as actual expenditures for programs and activities; the average or predictable costs for 'units of service'; and the variation in cost from region to region and from one target group to another. (CYEP)

Throughout the CETA system, administrators are charged with overseeing programs that are very expensive and that effect the lives of many people, both adults and youth. The lack of sound budgetary information, the fluctuation in funding and programs, and the absence of effective managerial training all contribute to limiting the quality of CETA's administration. The next section will pursue this topic; however, we should note that it surfaces in a federal program which is already plagued by too much concern for 'obeying the law' and too little attention paid to the law's purposes. Expanded federal tracking, monitoring, and reporting, at this point and in the absence of 'enabling' changes in other respects, would be deleterious to program quality and subject to the ridicule of being ignored.

6. Technical Assistance. Not surprisingly, YEDPA has placed new responsibilities on prime sponsors and program operators, but has not provided the training or technical assistance needed to carry them out.

The implementation of new programs has led to rapid staff turnover, frayed nerves, and general instability:

- There is a critical need for expanded technical assistance, training, information dissemination, and mutual support for prime sponsors, LEAs, CBOs, and other contractors. (NCEP, VICI, HUD, Youthwork, MDC, Robison, Brickell, ETR)

Very little has been done in this domain during the implementation phase of YEDPA even though:
A growing body of literature documents the determining role played by local implementation in the achievement of federal objectives. (Elmore)

This, in turn, enhances the impact of staff in planning and carrying out local programs. However, an ETA study of technical assistance and training activities "reveals very serious deficiencies":

- "There is little investment in the substantive training of prime sponsor and DOL staffs. (It is necessary) . . . to mount large-scale and continuing technical assistance and training activities." ²

Here, in this quotation from the 1980 Knowledge Development Plan, we see a merger of "knowledge" and "practice". Eleven distinct initiatives are planned in this area, ²⁹ although none of them addresses a widely perceived weakness in the CETA network:

- The Regional Offices of the Labor Department were not fully prepared for YEDPA, were understaffed, provided inconsistent interpretations of federal law and discouraged local attempts to implement federal objectives for knowledge development. (NCEP, MDC, YW)

A genuine interest in improving local staff capacity and in expanding the exchange of 'lessons' and 'models' has not yet found expression in 'large-scale' activities. ³⁰ In addition, it will have to contend with the tenor of CETA, best exemplified in the fact that, out of 207 sections in the 'new' CETA, only one discusses responsibilities to "provide appropriate preservice and inservice training for specialized, supportive, supervisory, or other personnel". (Section 314) In this context, YEDPA would be seriously weakened without its knowledge development mandate, which forms the subject of our concluding chapter.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 6

1. Cf. especially Chapter 1 and the overview to Chapter 2.

2. It is anticipated that, at about the time of publication for our 'interim review', the first in a long line of "final" evaluations and studies will begin to roll out of Washington.

3. For example, Wurzburg (NCEP Report #1). We would note that the 'reasons' for this are simple: prime sponsors had neither the time nor the money nor the staff nor the regulatory flexibility to "mount" rigorous experiments. In this context, some of them may have regarded the knowledge development section of their "plan" as gratuitous.

4. Our estimate would make it larger than private sector, education, and supportive services combined, although still less than a third of the public job creation. Again, we caution that ours is an estimate not an accounting. We exclude the costs of normal administration of categorical programs and we include, from the Entitlement, MDRC's budget.

5. We should note that this neglect is hardly unique to the CETA system. Whether the field is housing; welfare, or health care, there is rarely more than a token federal effort to stress quality management or to pay close attention to the capacity of local agents to deliver on Congressional promises. Health care programs are good parallels, since so many of them use individual eligibility as the linchpin of their delivery and evaluation of services. The problem is not confined to the federal level. For example, despite the sheer managerial dilemmas facing local magistrates and judges, few states offer any training in the operation of a court.

6. There has not been any systematic survey of prime sponsor performance under YEDPA. The closest has been the National Council on Employment Policy's ten case studies; however, these studies suffer from their virtues in this respect: for all their excellent detail, they are easily challenged when used to summarize YEDPA experience. One might analyze prime sponsor plans, but this requires believing that these documents represent reality. We have referred to the survey conducted by the Employment & Training Reporter only because they (a) talked to a lot of prime sponsors and (b) asked some of the right questions. We would urge that a thorough, national survey be undertaken, particularly if there is a "new" YEDPA.
7. CPPV no longer is under contract to perform this experiment which has been metamorphosed into something barely resembling its original intent. The reluctance to pursue this experiment should be attributed to the Labor Department, not OYP.

8. The evaluation process for second round Youthwork projects has been revised considerably in order to bring it into line with the "control group, multi-site" model employed in other demonstrations. Thus, the Cornell team continues to issue its reports although, now, their value may be nothing more than ironic reminders of a past Youthwork would prefer to forget.


10. Lowry Associates have one contract to evaluate the intermediaries. Their first report looks primarily at the relations between the intermediaries and DOL. Their conclusions are reasonable, but the explanations and the methodology are not.

11. Since the intermediaries have been partially funded by private foundations, the definition of their role has great import for the future of this money. These are complex issues which have no "right" answers. Experiences with comparable federal ventures, for instance, in housing or in education, might be instructive. In addition, it would be interesting to see how the intermediaries would evolve were OYP better staffed and the Regional Offices more competent.

12. Usually referred to here through its evaluation conducted by RMC, Inc.

13. The Career Intern Program is a good example of the confusions which can result when there are seven major actors on the stage: the local OIC, the local prime sponsor, the local education agency, national OIC, the evaluator (RMC), NIE, and the Office of Youth Programs in the Labor Department. It should be noted that the same multiplication of approval levels has been a problem with the intermediary projects as well.

14. Two unintended by-products of the Interagency Agreements have surfaced recently: (a) they have increased interest in and support for youth employment programs throughout the federal system and (b) they lack substance and direction to the policy analysis carried out by the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. (Cf. the latter's Summary Report.)

15. The Office of Program Evaluation and Research in ETA took a look at the early implementation of the non-residential portions of YACC. Also available are the required reports to Congress issued jointly by Labor, Interior, and Agriculture. These are useful, but not evaluative.
16. YACC shares this cost dilemma with the Job Corps. The latter, for example, has a budget equal to half of YEDPA, (excluding YACC) yet serves 20% as many youth. It is not apparent, to us, that it serves them more effectively than might an equally well-run but cheaper local program. The large start-up costs for programs like YACC and the Job Corps exercise a form of tyranny over future policy decisions: how can they be abandoned when so much was spent on setting them up?

17. Despite Congressional popularity, YACC has little to recommend it in the context of this report. The romantic spell cast by the Civilian Conservation Corps of the Depression Era is a kind of negative nostalgia which has little meaning in the South Bronx in 1980. If YACC disappeared tomorrow, it would have no more effect on urban youth unemployment than the sinking of a dinghy in Tahiti would have on the level of the Hudson River.

18. The national knowledge development efforts have had a similar effect, especially when the demonstrations have required that local recipients foster contacts with the local CETA system.

19. These recommendations were made by a group of thirty YEDPA program operators from around the country who met last July at Brandeis University under the sponsorship of the Vice President's Task Force and the National Institute of Education. Cf. Brickell, op. cit.

20. Eulogies about programs of "demonstrated effectiveness" are most often invoked when the purpose is precisely to avoid evaluation and open competition.

21. This idea is borrowed from Ann Michel's paper, "Managing the New Youth Employment Initiatives" written in January 1980 for the Vice President's Task Force.

22. The summer program is the classic example of this odd production cycle, but a survey of the slot levels in PSE over the past five years would be equally instructive. We should not underestimate the deleterious impact of this "accordion effect" on CETA's potential institutional partners, particularly public schools and private employers.

23. We believe that the real issue is less one of innovation than it is one of creating programs which adhere to achievable goals, are allowed to be part of a rational delivery system, and are well run. Innovation is borrowed from technology, where it is more appropriate than in human services.

24. Cf. above page 129 for related points.
25. Another caution has been expressed by Michel: "The use of the incentives funding method must be very selective or we will discover over time an increasingly disproportionate part of our youth employment efforts are funded in this manner and a de-emphasis of core services".

26. The term "low incidence" is borrowed from the sphere of special education. Here, it refers to the physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed, delinquent, and other "hard-to-reach" subgroups of the youth population whose distribution, in arbitrarily defined areas, is sparse.

27. The Education of All Handicapped Children Act carefully delimits the potential size of its "eligible" target group. It would be easy to employ a compatible definition which was even more selective.

28. Completing the Youth Agenda: A Plan for Knowledge Development, Dissemination and Application for Fiscal 1980, Office of Youth Programs, August 1979. (As we note in Chapter 7, though admiring the KD effort, we believe this title to be misleading.)

29. Ibid, pages 81 - 96.

30. Even a generous interpretation of the eleven new activities planned leads to a total of about $4.2 million for this initiative. Earlier knowledge development plans had no parallel activities. Based on our estimates of YEDPA expenditures, this $4.2 million is .75% of the amount spent on research and management in the past two years! The promise is that YEDPA will improve the quality of the attention devoted specifically to managerial concerns on the prime sponsor level; the reality is that the major impact of YEDPA on training has simply been increased awareness of the need.
Chapter 7: Putting Knowledge in Perspective
Chapter 7: Putting Knowledge in Perspective

A. The Knowledge Development Plans

We would like to conclude our interim review of lessons from the YEDPA experience with a brief discussion of the official process through which the Labor Department has pursued its mandate "to carry out innovative and experimental programs to test new approaches for dealing with the unemployment problems of youth" (Section 438).

In order to make even a preliminary assessment of this process, it is necessary to understand the circumstances in which the Labor Department's Office of Youth Programs began operation in mid 1977. The most important piece of youth employment legislation ever to pass Congress had just been signed; 460 prime sponsors (and innumerable community agencies, schools, etc.) were clamoring for advice about what it was and how to implement it; the law contained a variety of prescriptions for services never before tried; the prospect for major discretionary grants drew a horde of research and demonstration firms, each armed with impressive notions; a raft of experimental projects would have to be conceived and launched; and all this would have to be done with a skeleton staff but in time to give Congress "answers" in the Spring of 1978!

Even though the latter date turned out to be symbolic, the Office of Youth Programs was still able to report that all aspects of YEDPA were underway and would soon be reaching full implementation. The first of several "Knowledge Development Plans" had been drawn up and most of its research and demonstration activities were contracted. In the face of gargantuan demands, the achievements of OYP are impressive and merit comparison with other federal agencies' efforts to fulfill their missions during the same period of time.
It was not only that experimental programs were implemented; a great deal was accomplished that was technically adept, true to the spirit of the law, and targeted on the central dilemmas of youth employment. Among other achievements we would list:

- the Plans themselves, for their success at lending the appearance of coherence to the somewhat conflicting demands of YEDPA;
- the imaginative use of alternative service deliverers, including intermediaries, other branches of the federal government, and national non-profit organizations;
- the commissioning of extensive studies of youth unemployment, particularly that done through the National Bureau of Economic Research and Ohio State;
- the effective and orthodox implementation of several demonstrations, particularly the most difficult of all--the Entitlement--but also the YCCIP experiments through HUD and CPPV and the ACTION program in Syracuse;
- the use of the knowledge development funds as a vehicle to respond to new needs as they evolved and to modify projects on the basis of experience.

Outstanding examples of the latter are the Consolidated Youth Employment Programs, the Comprehensive Opportunity Project, and the effort to put the "lessons into practice" described in Chapter 6. The prior constraints operating on the knowledge development process cannot be overemphasized nor can the pressures to produce quick "results". The response of the Labor Department to all this has been remarkable. We can anticipate future references to this period as one of the most creative in decades of coping with the needs of youth.
We do not believe that our praise is needed, however. As the time approaches when many of the demonstrations and experiments begin to "bear fruit" in the form of definitive results or final reports, the virtues of the process will be evident. It is because of these virtues, that we wish to consider, for a moment, some of the concomitant deficiencies. In a sense, we are concerned that the YEDPA experience not be described inaccurately and conclusions not be anticipated which could never have been supplied in the first place.

B. The Youth Agenda is Not Complete

Despite the title to the 1980 Knowledge Development Plan, it would be misleading to imply that the "completed agenda" was more than the OYP agenda devised in 1977-1978. YEDPA will not be supplying to any constituency the "last word" on any of its topics. It was never designed to have all the answers, nor has there been time or money enough to transform it into such a faustian mold. At the appropriate time, that is, when most of the major experiments have been concluded (perhaps in late 1981), the success of the knowledge development effort can be measured. In advance of that, we would like to mention some of the possible weaknesses:

1. Some planned experiments have encountered major delays. The best examples are the "Educational Voucher or Social Bonus", which may begin in October 1980 and the private sector subsidy demonstration, which may never happen.

2. In some instances, the research design has interfered with its "subjects". Key examples include the Career Intern Program, the ETS testing program, and Youthwork's original grants. (RMC, YW)

3. The need for "researchable" projects has sometimes produced experiments whose utility is limited. For example, there is the...
Private vs. Public Sector Demonstration, the Service Mix, and the Mixed Income

4. Some projects were conceived too hastily or were poorly implemented. The Public vs. Private is an example, as are the Corporation for Youth Enterprises, the Low Head Dams, and the Railroad Improvements. (MDC, Dement)

5. Some demonstrations will yield no information nor were they intended to. This category covers simple program improvements (as in the Summer Program); continued funding of existing projects (like the Supported Work); and grants for activities which have clearly limited applicability (ACTION).

6. Too little attention has been paid to improvements within the existing youth employment system. This includes staff training, prime sponsor evaluations, and program stability. (Dement) It also includes the next:

7. New efforts are needed to communicate the results of knowledge development to the local level. Obviously, some of the delay here has to do with an appropriate wait for "results". But the issue is broader than that, involves complex cross-fertilization of data, pre-YEDPA experiences, etc., and reflects a point of view endemic to the national office.

Our final concern about YEDPA's knowledge development is the most important:

- Despite the breadth and intensity of the knowledge development process, many questions either remain unasked or have generated new issues to explore.

Examples here include (a) alternative strategies to involve the private sector; (b) the differential impacts of various supportive services; (c) effective techniques for low-incidence populations;
(d) the impact of a job on learning (as opposed to attendance); 
(e) the effective ways to teach kids basic academic and employability skills; (f) major issues of institutional reform, and (g) exploration of the real connections between school and work.

No one should have expected that YEDPA would touch on all the important youth employment issues. In fact, the more that youth employment is perceived as itself a symptom of larger social problems, the more apparent it is that YEDPA's "lessons" are necessarily modest.

5. Rigor and Vigor

Our title does not refer to a vaudeville team, but to the two characteristics of the YEDPA experience which seem to capture its uniqueness. On the one hand, the pervasive spirit and diffused examples of knowledge development have lent a sense of "rigor" to local youth employment programs - a new belief that innovations can be tried, that things which do work will be endorsed, that it is "okay" to fail in the pursuit of better ideas. This rigor needs to be translated into specifics: better performance standards for prime sponsors and program operators, more consistency in what is expected of youth participants, and so forth. But YEDPA, particularly in its knowledge development, has prepared the way for major changes in the youth delivery system.

If rigor has to do with discipline and focus, the new vigor which YEDPA injected into youth employment has to do with a sense of energy and of available resources. The federal government, especially in the Summer Program and the Job Corps, was already pouring funds in the general direction of youth. YEDPA, however, targeted these funds, gave them new purpose, and spread them throughout the community. YEDPA is where the "action" has been and, for the first time since the mid Sixties, youth employment has begun to attract new ideas, new people, and new hope.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 7

1. For example, witness the delays in implementing the "Schools & Hospitals" section of the Energy Act of 1978. Somewhat closer to home is the prolonged planning for the Alternative Education Demonstration, partly funded by YEDPA, but entirely managed by the Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention.

2. This type of delay should be distinguished from the implementation delays encountered by many specific programs. No theme seems more like a litany in YEDPA evaluation reports than "unavoidable delays", except, perhaps, a theme which often caused the delays: "intense pressure to get underway quickly". In other words, many programmatic "delays" are cosmetic only. A more rationale schedule would have allowed adequate time to do new things— that is, the time it usually took!

3. The "battery" of tests developed by the Education Testing Service for administration to most participants in YEDPA knowledge development projects has been the center of errors, confusions, and controversies. There have been special conferences aimed at resolving some of these problems, but important issues are outstanding. For example, (a) whether the tests are appropriate for certain handicapped groups; (b) whether the testing process is sufficiently sensitive to certain communities and certain kids; and (c) whether some of the subtests are of sufficient quality to make the effort worthwhile. Certainly, the recent publicity over other, unrelated ETS activities has not made resolution of these issues any easier for OYP.

4. This is a complex issue. The basic approach taken by OYP—reliance on tests, control groups, random assignment, controlled variables, model designs, etc.—is more reasonable on paper than in reality. When a question having to do with, say, the value of "mixing" kids from different income groups in YEDPA programs is translated into these terms, we find a demonstration aimed at determining the "impact" of wealthier kids (over the 85% BLS level!) on poor kids when they work side by side. This trivializes the question. In the same way, the controlled experiment in public versus private sector work experiences misses the point: when all else is controlled, there is no difference between the two! Considering the lack of rigor in earlier youth employment programs, one can excuse the zeal which leads to a few excesses of this sort.
5. One might include in this category the Entitlement and the Private Sector Initiatives. The Entitlement would be cited not because it was poorly implemented, but because the mission given it by Congress was fundamentally implausible: to test methods for guaranteeing jobs to poor youth. The Private Sector Initiatives are, we noted, so limited as to barely involve the private sector. The ambivalence characterizing this initiative suggests that it was intended as a "response" to a demand and not a genuine inquiry into the field.

6. The "larger social problems" referred to suggest a series of doors no one is eager to open. We would like to mention just one: adult unemployment in poor communities. As more and more attention is justifiably paid to unemployed youth, there ought to be parallel efforts aimed at their parents, though they might be more "intensive and expensive". This can be a vivid form of neglect within the confines of, for example, a public housing project or a district courthouse.
Bibliography - Introduction
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction

The following list, extensive though it is, does not include all of the materials reviewed for this study. There are three main categories of excluded items:

(1) Reports prepared for the Vice President's Task Force summarizing various meetings, seminars, and roundtables;

(2) A variety of progress reports, submitted to the Office of Youth Programs (DOL) by contractors in compliance with the terms of their contracts;

(3) A series of "knowledge development memos" produced by evaluative contractors in response to a "knowledge development census" performed by Andrew Hahn of Brandeis University on behalf of the Office of Youth Programs.

These materials were often useful in suggesting ideas or supporting ideas already developed. In no instance were they the main underpinning for any of the "lessons" in the text.

The Bibliography still contains a varied diet of materials. Most of them had an impact on our review, though they have usually not been cited in the text. We made no effort to connect statements in the text with specific references in the literature, even though we believe that this customary procedure would be essential to an evaluation or assessment of YEDPA and its products. But we have not performed such an evaluation. Our opinions would be neither "proven" nor disproven by such references: they would merely be given the gloss of objectivity. As an alternative procedure, we have placed in parentheses, after each of our 'bulleted' statements, several
documents which we believe support that statement. That is, if someone read all of the documents cited in parentheses we believe that he or she would come to a conclusion similar to ours or, at least, recognize the basis for it. As we have said, this report is a compilation of our opinions - opinions informed by experience and conditioned by a close review of the following documents.

We had one further purpose in appending this list: to offer to the reader, in one place, the best available bibliography of YEDPA generated documents. There are few items antedating 1976 and, we hope, few produced before January 1980 which we have missed.
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