DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 277 045

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PUB DATE Apr 81


EDRS PRICE MF01/27.20

DESCRIPTORS *Communication (Research); *Leadership Styles; *Organizational Communication; *Persuasion; *Research Design; Rhetorical Strategies; Rhetoric

IDENTIFIERS *Collectivities

ABSTRACT Designed initially as a tool of understanding the often anomalous rhetoric of movement leaders, the Requirements-Problem-Strategies framework was used in recent years to analyze the rhetorical strategies of leaders and leadership roles in collectivities. RPS has also been used in conjunction with other communication theories (particularly Brook's) to identify and account for the patterns of rhetoric unique to particular movements and the events in the life of a movement. Emphasized by the RPS approach are the cross pressures and contradictions that are present in the organizational roles of leaders of collectivities. The studies used to illustrate RPS include the following: (1) E. W. Martin's study of the rhetoric of 1960's free clinics and the creation of a theory on the rhetoric of counter-institutional movement organizations (CIOMS), (2) E. C. Griffin's model of the stages of development in a social movement and the history of a movement's rhetoric, (3) G. Skill's study of rhetoric during a transitional period in a movement's history (the Chinese Communists during their Triumphant period from 1935 to 1942, for example), and (4) K. Reynolds's study of patterns of rhetorical invention, which focused on the rhetorical rhetoric of ordained Catholic revolutionaries in Latin America (RL).

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REQUIREMENTS, PROBLEMS, STRATEGIES REVISITED

THE RHETORIC OF COLLECTIVITIES

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Paper presented at the Central States Speech Association Convention,
REQUIREMENTS, PROBLEMS, STRATEGIES REVISITED: THE RHETORIC OF COLLECTIVITIES

Over a decade ago, I developed a Requirements-Problems-Strategies (RPS) approach for analyzing the rhetoric of social movements. Its core proposition was that the often anomalous rhetoric of movement leaders could best be understood as a reflection of conflicting rhetorical requirements and unique situational constraints. Since 1970, my colleagues and I have attempted to elaborate and illustrate the RPS approach as applied to particular movements, and also to extend its range of application to other collective rhetorics and other leadership roles. I should like here to summarize the work we have done.

By a collective rhetoric I include any and all persuasive messages issued by or in the name of an organization, organizational unit, or composite of organizations which work together to achieve common objectives. SCA and CSSA are collectivities, and they are also components of a larger collectivity which we might call the speech-communication community. The rhetoric of collectivities is assumed to follow in a general way from the very nature of collectivities. The rhetoric of those who lead collectivities is assumed to reflect in large measure their identification with organizational objectives but also their individual interests. Identifying and accounting for similarities and differences in patterns of rhetoric by collectivities and by leaders of collectivities is the task we have set out to accomplish.
Those who speak the name of collectivities have rhetorical requirements different from those who speak strictly for themselves. By definition, all collectivities are goal-directed, rule-governed permeable social systems. As such systems, their members operate consciously and collectively to achieve one or more primary missions and others that might constitute subgoals. The business organization seeks to make profits, the political campaign organization to elect its candidate, the scientific community to produce and disseminate scientific achievements, the social movements to promote its cause. To secure its primary mission, the collectivity sets up subgoals: to produce cars efficiently, for example, or to wrest party nominations from other political candidates.

As rule-governed social systems, collectivities operate according to regulative norms. Implicitly or explicitly, they permit some forms of behavior while forbidding others. The rules may be highly formalized, as in bureaucratic rational, or highly informal, as in the case of most social movements. They may also be flexible or inflexible, conventional or unconventional, pragmatically oriented or reflective of values considered intrinsically desirable.

As permeable social systems, collectivities exist in, and are dependent upon, a larger external system that is itself divisible into various parts. The business corporation buys from suppliers, sells to customers, recruits employees from a labor pool, competes with other companies, is affected by governmental regulations, and so on. Likewise, the social movements draw supporters from the external system and is affected by changes in that system.
The foregoing definitional characteristics of collectivities translate into rhetorical requirements for leaders of collectivities. All are required to recruit and commit followers, to promote ideas, goods or services to outsiders, and to realize politically the resistance from components of the external system. These tasks require, in turn, that leaders acquire material resources, thereby promote favorable images of the collectivity, foster organizational discipline and cohesion, and that they serve as exemplars of organizational norms and values. As suggested earlier, leaders are also expected to bring their personal interests and values to bear upon their roles.

The rhetorical problems confronting leaders of collectivities stem from conflicting rhetorical requirements in all collectivities—churches, business corporations, movement organizations, nation states—there are inevitable tensions between goals and rules, between the moral and the political, between members' role requirements and their personal values, between the need for ideological consistency and the need to adapt to new realities, between the need for organizational cohesiveness and the need of individual members to assert their individual and group interests against the interests of other individuals and groups within the organization, and even against the interests of the organization as a whole. Moreover, collectivities, like individuals, have interests in common with external social systems as well as conflicting interests. They may exploit divisions within the external system as well as form coalitions with segments of that system. These are invariant characteristics of life in and between collectivities, and they are reflective of the mixed-motive nature of all ongoing human relationships.
To illustrate these requirements and problems, consider the tasks incumbent upon the speech communication community. Like any academic community, its primary goals of teaching, research and service are dependent on information, talent, money, and other such resources. These resources must be coordinated effectively for maximum goal attainment; hence the need for organizations such as university departments and professional associations as well as rules guiding inquiry and dissemination of knowledge. As a permeable social system, the community influences, and is in turn influenced by, such external system aggregates as governmental agencies, foundations, other disciplines, and university administrations, as well as subsystems within the community such as individual members, interest groups, and sub-disciplines. Rhetorically speaking, the speech communication community as a whole is required to recruit and indoctrinate new members, justify its claims to special expertise before accrediting agencies, plead for freedom from political regulations or other such external system pressures, mould and reinforce the sense of collective identity among individual members, mediate conflicts among subgroups within the community, and, in general, legitimate the profession and its activities before outsiders and insiders. Any analysis of the rhetoric of collectivities must begin, I think, with indentification of such tasks.

The rhetoric of those who lead academic communities can best be understood as a tradeoff among conflicting rhetorical requirements. Despite their commitment to the advancement and dissemination of knowledge, leaders of speech communication associations and heads
of academic departments of speech communication must balance that requirement against the need for rhetorical fictions. Moreover, the myths they promote—of unity, power, originality, uniqueness, responsiveness, progress and purity of motive—may have to be adapted simultaneously to different audiences. There must be a rhetoric for outsiders and rhetoric for insiders, a rhetoric for initiates and another rhetoric for the privileged, and yet another rhetoric which rationalizes seeming inconsistencies among these disparate rhetorics. Whatever rhetorical stategems leaders employ, it is certain that they will create new problems in the process of ameliorating old ones.

The Rhetoric of Social Movements

Thus far my comments about the cross-pressures encountered by leaders of collectivities have been rather abstract. The exact nature of these conflicting requirements and the means employed for dealing with them will depend on a number of factors. Of particular significance in our research have been the variables of relative resource control, public acceptance of the collectivity, rule constraints on pragmatic decision making, and degree of bureaucratization. It is on the basis of these variables, we have argued, that social movements might be expected to exhibit patterns of rhetoric different from most other collectivities.

Social movements are severely impeded in their efforts at mobilizing human and material resources and exerting influence by dint of their informal compositions, their commitments to inhibiting regulative rules, and their positions in relation to the larger society. By comparison to the heads of established institutions, their leaders can expect minimal external control and maximal external resistance. And because they are unusually constrained in their efforts to balance conflicting demands, the limited strategic options available to them have greater potential to magnify rather than relieve
problems or to generate new problems.

The single greatest obstacle to goal achievement is illegitimacy. Existing outside the larger society's conception of justice and morality, movements threaten and are threatened by the society's sanctions and taboos: its laws, its maxims, its customs governing taste, decorum, manners, and its insignia of authority. Moreover, the confrontative strategies movements are prompted to employ as a result of the problem of illegitimacy often reinforce images of illegitimacy by political authorities and the general public.

Generally speaking, movements are also at a resource disadvantage relative to the institutions they oppose. Movement activity may be discouraged or inhibited by various forms of social control, ranging from control over communication resources to outright suppression of the movement.

Social movements suffer too from the problem of being voluntary, nonbureaucratic collectivities. Whereas most formal organizations can provide selective material incentives for joining, most movements confront the "free rider" problem. Potential beneficiaries may reap the rewards produced without the risks or costs by allowing others to work for them. Dependent as they are on largely voluntary support, institutions movements also encounter greater problems than most established/in controlling those who do join the movement. At best the movement's leadership controls an organized core of the movement but exerts relatively little control over a relatively larger number of sympathizers on its periphery.

Finally, movements are encumbered by constraints on pragmatic decision-making. This point was highlighted in an analysis which
Chesbro, Orr and I provided of participation by countercultural and left-oriented movements in the McGovern debacle of 1972. In many ways, the sources of a movement's strength tend to work against its chances at the polls. Toughened by resistance from without, its members frequently become uncompromising. Geared to using pressure tactics in order to influence persons in politically sensitive positions, it frequently alienates the mass of people. Compelled to arouse its own supporters by in-group appeals, its rhetoric is often elitist despite its best intentions; the non-verbal elements of dress, demeanor, etc. conveying the impression of a small we opposing a very large they.

In general, protestors are not very adept at conventional electoral politics. A protest movement is passion and moral conviction in need of organization and discipline, an id and a superego in search of an ego. The supreme politician, by contrast, is a quintessential realist in search of a cause that will win. Master of his own impulses and unencumbered by severe moral scruples, he is free to make common cause with his enemies and to cast off his devoted friends; to solicit contributions where he can find them and promise political influence in return.

The foregoing rhetorical requirements and problems provide only crude indicators of what a collectivity will say and do rhetorically. And the constraints I have named offer only a rough index of the differences in rhetorical strategies between, say, a social movement and a political campaign organization. Beyond extending the RPS approach to collectivities as a whole, we need to put more meat on the RPS skeleton by identifying requirements, problems and patterns of rhetoric generic to particular types and subtypes of collectivities, and to particular roles, functions, occasions and stages of development. We need also to develop methods for identifying requirements and problems idiosyncratic to particular collectivities and even to events which are unique in the life of a collectivity.
Studying Movements and Non-Movements

In analyzing the rhetoric of any given collectivity, my colleagues and I move from the macroscopic to the microscopic; i.e. from the broadly generic to the idiosyncratic. In analyzing a movement's rhetoric, for example, we assume that propositions about collectivities in general, and about movements in general, and about a given type of movement will also apply to the movement in question. But we also take pains to gather information on situational factors unique to the movement. And we look, too, at how acts of rhetoric shape subsequent perceptions of situation. At the most microscopic level, the point at which we examine how rhetoric is adapted to particular events, we assume that there is a "logic" of situation. By this we mean that from a "reading" of the concatenation of factors operating on the collectivity at any given time, some rhetorical options will seem appropriate, others inappropriate. Situations, we assume, impel and constrain rhetorical choices but do not determine them; rhetors are always free to exploit the "resources of ambiguity" in language to structure audience perceptions.

Illustrative of our approach is Mechling's theory of the rhetoric of counterinstitutional movement organizations (CIMOs). As exemplified by the Free Clinic which developed as part of the countercultural movement of the late sixties, CIMOs differ from most protest organizations in that they also provide services akin to those offered by the institutions they oppose. Indeed, the provision of services is partly intended as a model of reformation of the offending institution.
Inherent in all CIMOs, Mechling contended, is a conflict between their ideological requirements and their service requirements. In the face of this conflict, she argued, CTMOs institutionalize and deradicalize at a faster pace than most protest movement organizations. First, the service function requires resources incompatible with being "counter to". Once resources have been invested in services, there is considerable and quite visible loss should these investments be abandoned. On the other hand, anti-institutional ideological stances are relatively easy to "write off". Second, the services rendered may be valued by established sectors of the external system. The CIMO may thus be positively reinforced for provision of these services. Third, the immediacy of the services gives it a sense of preeminence. The service function is adopted as a response to a felt need. To cease meeting that need is counter to the ideological center of the collectivity. "Put simply, while the service function is a component of the anti-institutional stance, the anti-institutional stance is not necessary to the service function." 

In looking at the history of a movement's rhetoric we have found Griffin's systemization of Burkean concepts quite helpful, but not his historical model of stages and phases. The model, we believe, is insufficiently attentive to situational variations. For her purposes, Mechling found it useful to distinguish among noninstitutionalized, partially institutionalized, and fully institutionalized stages of development. On to these stages she charted rhetorics of Division, Amelioration and Respectability.
These correspond, in Burkean terms, to frames of rejection, transition and acceptance.

Particularly interesting was the rhetoric of the partially institutionalized stage, for it was at this stage that the conflicts between the GIMO's anti-institutional stance and its service commitments were most visible. Mechling hypothesized that the rhetoric at this stage would be marked by highly ambiguous figures of speech, deniable messages, suppressed premises, qualified generalizations, messages highly tailored to different audiences, and rationalizations for uncertainty and apparent inconsistency.

Shive also focused on a transitional period in a movement's history, one which posed enormous rhetorical problems. Like Mechling, he offered a Burkean analysis within a RPS framework. The object of his attention was Mao Tse-tung's rhetoric during the United Front period (1935-42). During that period, the Communist Chinese maintained a fragile alliance against the Japanese invaders with their bitter enemies, the Kuomintang. In the face of the Japanese invasion, Communist soldiers were forced literally to adopt the insignia of the Kuomintang army. Shive's opening analysis of Mao's rhetorical requirements provides some indication of the problems Mao faced as well:

1. As the Party grew in size and diversity, and as they identified goals and practices with the rising tide of patriotic, anti-Japanese sentiment, important changes had to be made in the intraorganizational symbol system. Socialist principles had to be blended with nationalist sentiments. The purity of the transcendent goals of the movement had to be reconciled with the expediency of "unholy" alliances with former enemies. Basic policy itself had to be justified, so that past and present actions did
not appear to contradict one another. A new unity of perspectives had to be refashioned, and social, regional and ideological cleavages had to be bridged by new sets of unifying concepts and symbols. The ideal image of the Party cadre had to be altered. In short, the good soldier who changed the insignia on his hat had to accept, even welcome, his new institutions for self-identification.

(2) As the Party addressed a wider range of social and political audiences, the Communists had to cautiously adapt their message to the delicate tasks of establishing truces and fostering cooperation toward a temporarily common goal. To do this, they had to establish new sources of authority and legitimacy as patriotic "loyal opposition", rather than as revolutionary subverters. They had to gain the rhetorical upper-hand in calling for unity with the Kuomintang on their own terms, while at the same time deterring them from capitulating to the Japanese. Promises of cooperation had to be mixed, but not confused, with threats of retaliation for provocative incidents. Finally, the Communist Chinese entered a mixed-motive relationship with the Soviet Union during this period. They increasingly made local decisions for local reasons, while making them appear after the fact to conform to the ideological regimen of Stalin's International.

(3) The enemy had to be redefined. Over the course of the period studied, the Kuomintang was gradually transformed from Public Enemy Number One to imperialism's running dog, to a conditional ally and fellow resistance fighter. In addition, the Japanese menace itself had to be vividly portrayed. All other grievances had to be reinterpreted as secondary functions of the "primary contradiction" between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people.18

Shive's rhetorical history of the United Front period stands in sharp contrast to Griffin's model of dialectical enjoinderment between "pro-" and "anti-rhetorics". The politics of coalition and opposition were immensely more complicated. Even as Mao mobilized peasants, workers, soldiers, the intelligentsia, party cadre, and even landlords, he also played each against the others. In his analysis of messages addressed to these various audiences, Shive noted numerous
inconsistencies, all justified by the overriding folk metaphor of the Tao. For Mao, this ancient spiritual-cultural path became the Road of Revolution, complete with its twists and turns and even switchbacks over uneven historical terrain. Mao demarcated the "correct line" that ran through a forest of error to the Left and Right.

One cannot help but observe similar patterns of rhetorical invention in Reynolds' study of ideological rhetoric of ordained Catholic revolutionaries in Latin America.19 These radical priests and bishops sought sweeping changes within the Church and in the society at large. At the same time, they were of the Church and were dependent upon it for legitimacy, protection, material support, and channels of communication. Said Reynolds, the "logic" of their situation compelled exploitation of ambiguities in Catholic theology. Like Mao, the liberation theologians of Latin America dialectically transcended distinctions between the old and the new, the conservative and the progressive, violence and love, socialism and Catholicism. The "new" Church being advocated was but a return to the original spirit of Christianity. The progressives acting to shake off the yoke of oppression in Latin America were operating in the spirit of the prophets of the Church and of the people of God who had marched toward the promised land. Disobedience, even violence, were justified as acts of love. Although only a small minority of the Catholic clergy dared to proclaim themselves outright Marxists, they could observe that Marxism was a useful "tool of Analysis", and they could cite John XXIII's acknowledgement that there were positive aspects to socialism. Some priests went so far as to proclaim that true socialism is Christianity lived in its integrity.
When forced by the institutional Church to resign because of his Marxist activities, Camillo Torres declared, "I took off my soutane to be more truly a priest. We cannot have a supernatural life without charity, and our charity must be efficacious." 20

As one shifts from the discourse of movement leaders to the discourse of leaders of institutionalized, bureaucratized collectivities, one finds overlapping patterns of rhetoric. It is not surprising, therefore, that observers such as Zarefsky 21 and Hahn and Gonchar 22 should discover rhetorical similarities. But there are also differences.

A case in point is found in Jablonski's study of letters written by American Catholic bishops justifying to Church members the changes in Church doctrine and practices that were an outgrowth of the Second Vatican Council. 23 Jablonski labeled the bishops "institutional innovators" and distinguished their role from "bottom-up" insurgents (i.e. Torres) on the one hand, and organizational bureaucrats on the other. In conflict for the bishops was the need to function both as innovators and as guardians of the established order. "Though high in the Church hierarchy and thus vested with considerable power, the bishops encountered massive resistance as the Church implemented its reforms. Many bishops were themselves ambivalent about the proposed changes but were cast as change-agents by dint of their roles." 24

Like the Latin American prelates studied by Reynolds, the North American bishops had to justify proposed reforms by means of a rhetoric of legitimation. She notes these differences, however, between bottom-up change agents and top-down change agents:

In bottom-up programs of change, leaders must create a rhetoric of discontinuity to establish the legitimacy of the collective's grievances as well as the need to induce changes from the outside. Whereas insurgent
leaders must call attention to the confrontative and divisive character of their action, institutional innovators must defuse potential conflict by proclaiming the value of purposeful—and authorized—institutional change. Indeed, institutional innovators must create a semblance of continuity within which major alterations in institutional philosophies and practices may be viewed as attempts to perfect and to preserve the institutional order.

At the same time, however, institutional innovators encounter special rhetorical requirements and problems when confronted with conflicting demands for change. Sometimes, institutional innovators must temper their own conservatism in order to embark on programs of radical change. By the same token, institutional innovators may need to mediate between superiors who wish to slow down the course of changes and subordinates who hope to accelerate it.

Jablonski's reference to "bottom-up" versus "top-down" change agents is one that Mechling, Schreier and I emphasized in a recent monograph. The former help to organize grassroots insurgency efforts within institutions; the latter manage, speak for, or advise institutions.

As regards insurgent-initiated conflicts, bottom-up change agents are "actor-oriented"; top-down change agents are "system-oriented". From an actor orientation these conflicts are necessary and inevitable consequences of systems that cannot possibly satisfy the needs of all persons equally or completely. The focus is on distributive benefits—on maximizing resource acquisitions from what is considered to be a finite resource pie. Authorities, moreover, are regarded as partisan and discriminatory.

From a system orientation, insurgent-induced conflicts are unnecessary, dysfunctional, irrational. What insurgents label as conflicts are really misunderstandings, differences of opinion,
or problems that can be resolved by recourse to information, expertise, top-down persuasion, or cooperative group problem solving. Treating them as conflicts by behaving combatively is dysfunctional because it interferes with realization of the system's supraordinate interest in providing collective benefits. Insurgents are irrational because they ignore the possibilities for enlarging the resource pie through cooperative efforts and for shrinking the resource pie through their combative efforts. The protests of insurgents are frequently seen as signs of personal pathology. Institutional authorities, by contrast, are rational and nonpartisan. If they are deficient it is in the communication skills necessary to "get through" to the insurgents and those they seek to mobilize.

The distinction between actor-oriented versus system-oriented conflict rhetorics was born home to me in interviews and readings on the subject of public information for the prevention of occupational cancer. The problem of occupational cancer from carcinogens such as asbestos and vinyl chloride is now widely recognized, although it had been downplayed by institutional managers, health and safety officers and government agencies for many years. Top-down change agents have since developed "educational" programs premised on the need for a system-oriented approach. The problem, as they typically view it, is one of getting workers to comply with their health and safety directives. Employee resistance to such devices as air masks is seen as a function of insufficient information and of defense mechanisms such as denial and rationalization. The flow of needed information is assumed to come from superiors to subordinates and from experts to nonexperts.
Contrast this top-down approach with that of a grassroots organization known as PHILAPOSH, The Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational Safety and Health. Leaders of PHILAPOSH stress sociological; institutional analysis (rather than psychological models of persuasion) as a prelude to effective change efforts. They maintain that companies are generally more interested in promoting profits than in protecting the lives of their workers; that they have been guilty of minimizing, ignoring or suppressing knowledge about the problem of occupational cancer; that institutional health and safety officers are "owned" by their companies; that presumptions of expertise and higher status create barriers to compliance by workers; and that the solutions promoted by top-down change agents (e.g. air masks) are, at best, half measures which forestall adoption by companies of needed but more expensive technological safeguards.

As an alternative to top-down change efforts, the leaders of PHILAPOSH mobilize rank and file workers for confrontations with their superiors. At consciousness raising meetings sponsored by PHILAPOSH, workers from different companies come to see that they have common problems and that they can overcome them only by acting together. The emphasis at these meetings is on shared expertise. Complaints by workers are treated as real rather than irrational. Workers are taught how to monitor the air in their work surroundings (rather than trusting company experts), to identify health hazards, to file complaints with OSHA and lawsuits for disability benefits with the courts. They are also encouraged to press superiors for information about the generic names of the chemicals they work with, and, should they fail to get satisfactory answers, to press union grievances or engage in other job actions.
Like Free Clinics studied by Mechling, PHILAPOSH is in danger of becoming institutionalized; it has already muted its more radical rhetoric to some extent. One virtue of sociological analysis of the kind provided by the RPS approach is that it can render shifts in rhetoric of this kind more explicable. Each case study can also serve as a concrete exemplar of the framework's general propositions.

Summary and Conclusions

Presented herein has been a review of theory and research conducted over the past decade utilizing the Requirements-Problems-Strategies (RPS) framework. Designed initially as a way of understanding the often anomalous rhetoric of movement leaders, it has been applied in recent years in analyses of other collective rhetorics and of other leadership roles. It has also been used in conjunction with other theories (usually Burkean) to identify and account for patterns of rhetoric unique to particular movements or to events in the life of a movement.

Emphasized by the RPS approach are the crosspressures and constraints on leaders of collectivities which inhere in their organizational roles. All leaders must balance goal demands, rule demands, resource demands, pressures for organizational cohesion and pressures for autonomy, personal interests and the interests of the collectivity, the need to gather and provide accurate information and the need for image-enhancing rhetorical fictions. Depending on the type of collectivities they lead, they are also constrained in various ways. For example, social movements are uniquely constrained by dint of their informal composition, their commitments to ideological strictures on pragmatic decision-making, and by their noninstitutional status within the larger society.
Counterinstituional movement organizations are additionally constrained by having to provide services similar in kind to the institutions they oppose. Collective rhetorics, it has been argued, can better be understood from foreknowledge of these crosspressures and constraints. They provide at least partial explanations for genres of rhetoric associated with broad classes of collectivities (e.g. political campaign organizations, scientific communities) and also can guide analyses of the rhetoric of particular organizational leaders.

The discourse of those who lead collectivities is similar in some respects, different in others. The Marxist insurgent and the "top-down" American Catholic bishop both justify arguments for change by appeals to traditional values and beliefs. But, as I have argued in this paper, there are also vast differences between the actor-oriented rhetorics of "bottom-up" insurgents and the system-oriented rhetorics of those who lead or speak for established institutions.

It is a mark of something more than disciplinary overspecialization, I think, that our field has not only treated organizational communications and social movements rhetoric as conceptually distinct, but has approached the two areas of study in very different ways. As is reflected in the titles of these subdisciplines, organizational leaders are regarded as communicators while social movement leaders are assumed to practice rhetoric—the latter term is somewhat less flattering. Correspondingly, we have devised principles of "effective communication" for the leader of formal organizations, but no such body of prescriptions has been devised for movement
leaders. Instead, we subject their discourse to critical analysis, and often to ridicule.

I hope it is clear from this paper that there is merit in joining the study of discourse (whether labeled rhetoric or communication) by leaders of all manner of collectivities under a single conceptual umbrella, and, thence, in identifying and accounting for similarities and differences in patterns of discourse. One possible vehicle for structuring our insights is the RPS approach, but I make no brief for using it to the exclusion of other integrative frameworks. At the level of microscopic analyses of particular events in the life of a collectivity, it surely needs to be supplemented.
NOTES


2. The distinction between collective rhetorics and the rhetoric of those who lead collectivities will not consistently be maintained in this paper. Strictly speaking, collective rhetorics are anonymous; they come in the form of unauthored circulars, announcements, committee reports, advertisements, etc. It often matters little, however, whether the message is authored by an organizational representative or is anonymous, so long as the former's pronouncements and actions have an official status. It is assumed that these messages largely reflect the interests of the collectivities represented.

3. Note the similarity of the definition to definitions of human organizations. I use the term "collectivity", however, to include groupings of people at various levels of abstraction. Social movements are collectivities typically consisting of one or more core organizations as well as a large number of persons sympathetic to the movement's cause who are organizationally unaffiliated. See, for example, Ralph H. Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 308. Whether the RPS framework can be extended to units as small as a family or friendship group is a question I have not yet explored.

4. For an excellent discussion of mixed-motive conflicts, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, Galaxy, 1963), Ch. 2.

6. For a discussion of militant, moderate, intermediate and expressive patterns of movement rhetoric, see Herbert W. Simons, Elizabeth W. Mechling and Howard Schrier, "Functions of Communication in Mobilizing for Collective Action from the Bottom Up: The Rhetoric of Social Movements," in Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory, ed. Carroll C. Arnold and John W. Bowers (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, in press). (Subsequent references are to Simons, Mechling & Schrier). These are ideal types in the Weberian sense, each with behavioral and ideological sub-dimensions. In actuality, as we point out, movements often vacillate between rhetorical styles and factionalize over issues of rhetorical strategy. Nevertheless, their rhetoric tends to differ from that of institutionalized, bureaucratized collectivities. Movements have little choice but to mobilize on the basis of ideological and normative appeals. They are more prone to employ noninstitutionalized, confrontational pressure tactics. And, too, they are more likely to offer ideological statements which delegitimate existing institutions. Much more precise statements can be offered about genres associated with particular types of movements. See the sections of our chapter on mobilization and external influence.

7. For a fuller discussion of these tactics, see the section on Social Control in Simons, Mechling & Schrier.


11. On the relation between rhetoric and situation, see the discussion of "Objectivist vs. Interactionist Approaches..." in Simons, Mechling & Schrier.


14. Mechling, p.34.


16. For a detailed evaluation of Griffin's theory, see Simons, Mechling & Schrier.


18. Shive, pp. 5-6.


20. Quoted in Reynolds, p.10.


26. Simons, Mechling & Schrier: see the introductory section.
27. These terms were initially employed to distinguish theories of conflict, but I have since found them useful in characterizing genres of rhetoric by conflict participants. See Herbert W. Simons, "Persuasion in Social Conflicts: A Critique of Prevailing Conceptions and a Framework for Future Research," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), 227-247.

