Fifteen articles (and four synthesis chapters) compare and contrast objectives, practices, and problems of social/political education in the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany. Social/political education is interpreted to include that area of pre-university teaching referred to in the United States most often as social studies or social science education; in England as social science or social studies; and in Germany as political education. An overview, intended to give the reader a synoptic view of the volume, precedes articles which are presented in four major topical categories. The first section is concerned with the content and theories that underlie social/political education. The second section deals with what is known about the psychological and social makeup of students and with how students learn. The third section describes knowledge and practices related to curriculum development. The final section describes theories of, and knowledge about, how schools are related to society and to social justice. Major themes which run through the chapters are identified in the introductory overview and in the three concluding synthesis chapters. Themes include the extent to which schools are, and should be, institutions for socializing students; the dilemma over whether the major objective of social/political education should be to make students aware of prevailing knowledge, values, and modes of thought in society or to teach students to become responsible adult political activists who work to change and improve society; whether the curriculum should be discipline/subject-oriented or interdisciplinary/problem-centered; and the difficulties faced by educators as a result of the disappearance of authoritative guides to what knowledge is true and what knowledge is most important. A directory of contributors and their affiliations is included.
Social/Political Education in Three Countries
Britain, West Germany, and the United States

Edited by
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This volume contains the papers presented at a conference at the University of Surrey, Guildford, England, July 1980. The conference, years in the planning, was a cooperative effort of the Association for the Teaching of the Social Sciences (Chorley, England), the Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung (Bonn, Germany), and the Social Science Education Consortium (Boulder Colorado). While many persons contributed to the planning and implementation of the conference, special mention should be made of the contributions of Judith Gillespie, Dieter Schmidt-Sinns, Henry Macintosh, Charles Townley, and Marcia Hutson. Approximately 70 persons attended the conference; their names and institutional affiliations are listed at the end of the book. The participants were about equally divided among the three nations.

The conference was titled "International Perspectives on Social/Political Education." The term "social/political education" was a compromise, intended to encompass that area of pre-university teaching referred to in the United States most often as "social studies" and also as "social science education"; in England as "social science," "social studies," and sometimes as "sociology," which is the social science other than history and geography most frequently taught; and in Germany most commonly as "political education." The various terms were often used interchangeably at the conference.

The language of the conference was English, and great credit should be given to the German participants who put up with this Anglo-American provincialism. The Germans were further put upon as the editors persisted in anglicizing the translations, although we did stop short of squeezing out all of the Germanic flavor. During the process, we came to realize anew that language differences are not merely differences in words, they also represent differences in concepts and modes of thought; for some words and concepts, there is no one-to-one relationship between languages. Some of the papers underwent changes as the authors revised and the editors edited, but the alterations were not so great as to lose the flavor and the exciting exchange of views that took place in the conference.
Readers should note that many chapters in this book cite other papers presented at the Guilford conference. In every case, such citations refer to the original papers, and they are noted as such in the end-of-chapter references. However, although a few of the papers underwent substantial revision between the conference and the preparation of this book in general the basic points referred to in the conference citations have been preserved in these revised and edited chapters. Such references may be followed up simply by reading the chapters contributed by the authors cited.

It should also be noted that some of the papers in this volume are also being published in the July 1981 issue of Teaching Political Science. The editing of those papers by Judith Gillespie was a great help to the editors of this volume.

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1. OVERVIEW

By Irving Morrissett

This overview is intended to give the reader a synoptic view of the volume, pointing to some of the themes that run through many of the chapters and to similarities and differences in the views of the chapter authors. A supplement to the three synthesis chapters at the end of the book, it has been written with the advantage of much more time to review, compare, and contrast the papers in their edited form. The synthesis chapters, which appear here substantially as they were presented at the conference, quite properly include the personal impressions and views of the three authors at the close of the conference.

The four major sections of the book, as did those of the conference, form a logical progression (although not the only logical progression!). The first section is concerned with the content and theories that underlie social/political education. The second deals with what is known about the psychological and social makeup of students and with how students learn. The third describes knowledge and practices related to curriculum development. The fourth describes theories of, and knowledge about, how schools are related to society and to social justice. As will be apparent to the reader, the authors dealt with the planned themes in very different and individualistic ways, often crossing over the thematic lines.

The most persistent theme that runs through the chapters—scarceley a chapter fails to touch upon it in some way—is the question of the extent to which schools are, and should be, institutions for socializing students; that is, for reproducing in students the prevailing knowledge, values, and modes of thought of society, as opposed to changing and improving society. Probably a majority of authors and conference participants would like to see the schools as places where society could be critiqued, analyzed, and exposed to change. But many felt that this is an unlikely outcome in most situations, because society at large and the governments that control most of the schools are primarily interested in preserving the existing social structure. Schools seldom participate in making changes, especially radical changes, in existing social structures.
and modes of thought. (An exception is West Germany after the war, but in that case it was the government that took the lead, with the schools following, in the effort to mold social institutions and thought into a social-democratic framework.)

There is little or no quarrel with the view that socialization, in the sense described above, is a necessary and appropriate function of education and that it places a substantial obligation on all parts of schooling—in all places and for all subjects. Children must learn to read, write, calculate, and behave in ways that are compatible, to a large extent, with the culture in which they happen to live. The question raised by many educators is: To what extent, if any, is it feasible and desirable to allow or encourage young people to analyze and criticize and try to change that culture?

While much of the discussion about social justice and social change takes place within the framework of existing modes of thought and social norms, some of the authors question the very bases of the common interpretations of the social order, criticizing the positivistic nature of social knowledge and calling for educational programs that investigate how knowledge is acquired and how existing modes of thoughts restrict alternative interpretations of the world which may be equally defensible. This view of knowledge and the nature of knowledge has become prominent among educational theorists in Germany, during the last decade, under the name "critical theory." Cherryholmes deals with this view at length in his paper, but while Hilligen also points to the importance of critical theory and most of the other English and German authors mention it, Cherryholmes alone among the Americans gives it attention.

After the theme of how education should be related to social change, the next-most-important theme was probably that of discipline or subject-oriented curriculum vs. interdisciplinary or problem-centered curriculum. Discipline-centered courses are by far the dominant form, and are dominant because they can be orderly and well structured and they are consonant with the training of most teachers. Problem-oriented courses, usually requiring an interdisciplinary approach to subject matter, are difficult to structure neatly, and they call upon expertise beyond the training of most teachers; but they are appealing—in theory, at least—to those who wish to make education, and particularly social/political
education, both "relevant to the real world" and facilitative of social change. Although educators of the latter type predominated at the conference, they failed to find a satisfactory solution to this long-standing problem.

Other common themes related to the four topics of the conference are dealt with in the following sections of this initial chapter.

Theory and Content Bases in Social/Political Education

The three papers in this section take quite different approaches to the topic, although they also deal with some common themes that recurred throughout the conference. The Brown/Townley paper describes social studies in Britain with respect to its ideological bases, the impact of recent social changes, and the major content foci. Hilligen digs deeply into the practical and philosophical requirements for the effective teaching of politics science in Germany and, by implication, for the teaching of any social science in any open society. Cherryholmes briefly describes the main emphases of social studies in the United States and then moves on to his major theme, one that also occurs in the other two papers—"critical theory."

Chris Brown and Charles Townley

Early in their paper, Brown and Townley pose the problem that recurred most persistently throughout the conference: To what extent should social/political education seek to socialize students, in the sense of teaching them about the prevailing mores and modes of thought and conditioning them to accept those mores and modes, as opposed to educating them to criticize and make changes? They report that in Britain Her Majesty's Inspectors have recognized the need for some balance between the two, that "education has two distinct and yet interdependent roles in relation to society. First the education system is charged by society . . . with equipping young people to take their place as citizens and workers in adult life and to begin to form attitudes to the prevailing patterns in standards and behavior. . . . Secondly there is the responsibility for educating 'the autonomous citizen,' a person able to think and act for herself or himself, to resist exploitation, to innovate, and to be vigilant in the defense of liberty."
As already indicated in this statement by Her Majesty's Inspectors, and as became apparent throughout the conference, "socialization" vs. "change" does not present a simple bipolar continuum. Whereas socialization, in the sense used here, means one thing—education for the reproduction and continuation of society as is, whatever is—change can refer to many things, including development of autonomous thinking in the individual, criticism of society, and efforts to change society. Efforts to change society may, of course, take many directions.

Brown and Townley go on to discuss various ideological frameworks or philosophies within which the nature and purposes of social studies have been analyzed, stressing that, within Britain, tradition has been a major determinant of the content of social studies—tradition heavily influenced by aristocratic ideology and strongly perpetuated through the British examination system. They say, perhaps too generously, that "tradition has constrained developments in social studies in Britain and Europe, while rationality has influenced developments more in the United States."

The effects of social changes—effects that have been small and transient, for the most part—are noted next. International events such as the rise of fascism, academic concerns about the growth of knowledge in the social sciences, and practical concerns that education must help students cope with an increasingly complex society—all have had some small effects on the social studies curriculum.

Finally, Brown and Townley describe four "models" for social/political education—models which might also be termed content emphases. "Knowledge," referring primarily to knowledge of facts, is seen as the major emphasis of traditional education in Britain. "Concepts" are viewed as encompassing factual knowledge in a dynamic and rational framework, drawing more on the social sciences, and challenging students to think rather than memorize. The "issues/problems" model presents another theme that recurred throughout the conference: To what extent should social/political education be taught through social science disciplines, followed by application to problems, as opposed to consideration first of problems, to which the disciplines may then make contributions? Brown and Townley take a dim view of the issues/problems approach, emphasizing the likelihood that it will result in superficial...
examination of poorly defined, ephemeral public issues. "Skills" is the last model. Two possible emphases are discussed—the development of skills to help the individual cope with the complexities of modern society and the development of skills to help change that society. Brown and Townley see the former objective as the one most likely to be stressed in any program emphasizing skills, resulting in the unfortunate outcome that skill development is usually prescribed for less-able students to assist them in adjusting to and coping with the existing characteristics of society.

The four "models" of Brown and Townley correspond closely with broad categories of "objectives" commonly accepted in the United States. These categories are "knowledge," usually including both factual knowledge and concepts; "participation," usually including problems and issues but with emphasis also on action within or outside of school; and "skills." To these are usually added a category called "attitudes" and/or "values."

Wolfgang Hilligen

Hilligen elaborates in his paper a complex set of questions and prescriptions concerning the content and methods of teaching. His analysis applies particularly to the teaching of political science in Germany, a setting in which he sees problems peculiar to that subject and that setting; but the analysis is also generalizable to other subjects and other settings.

A major concern of Hilligen is the problem posed for teachers by "the exponential increase in knowledge," a cumulative gain that has taken place in the context of increasingly complex national and world societies. He describes the "loss of a canon"—the disappearance of authoritative guides to what knowledge is true and what knowledge is most important. Previously accepted authorities—myth, religion, tradition, and, until recently, the consensus of scholars—have been eroded in the face of increasing knowledge and increasing complexity of society.

Hilligen's concern about the "loss of a canon" is combined with a newly discovered interest in teaching in West Germany which has "led to the emergence of a new branch of pedagogical and social science, called Didaktik in the Federal Republic." This term, only remotely related to its English cognate didactic, broadly encompasses the "theory, goals, content, methods, materials, and teaching strategies" related to any
particular subject. With respect to the teaching of any subject, it includes the questions "What?" (selection of content), "Why?" (reasons for selection of this content), "What for?" (intended objectives), and "How?" (teaching methods). (In the United States, such a distinction is not usually made between "Why?" and "What for?")

Thus broadly defined, Didaktik must deal with all possible aspects of content and method, which Hilligen details at length. With regard to methods of teaching: How can complex subjects be made understandable without oversimplifying? How can account be taken of new knowledge about perception, learning, and the nature and variety of cognitive structures? Concerning content related to the nature and problems of society, how should teachers (particularly in political science) deal with such questions as: How can democratic principles be taught (particularly in West Germany, which—unlike Britain and the United States—does not have a long democratic tradition)? How much freedom, flexibility, and citizen participation are possible and desirable in a democratic society? How can the positive potentialities of modern science and technology best be realized? How can the problems of diminishing natural resources, inequality within and among nations, and the danger of nuclear extinction be handled?

Didaktik makes great demands on teachers, ideally prescribing that they understand their own disciplines, the nature of all scientific knowledge, and the important relationships of other disciplines to their own disciplines (since problems, which must be dealt with, are all interdisciplinary). Teachers must know how to find information that is beyond their own store of knowledge, must be able to understand and present alternative views, should be adept at both raising and solving problems, and should maintain an appropriate balance between authority (related to what they know) and openness to new ideas.

In the following chapters, the translated term "didactics" is used frequently by the German authors. In most cases—which the reader can deduce from the context—the Germans have used this word in the sense of Didaktik as explained by Hilligen.

Cleo Cherryholmes

Cherryholmes begins with a brief review of "three traditions" that have dominated social studies thinking and practice in the United States,
following the well-known work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis: "citizenship transmission" (closely related to socialization, as defined above), "social science," and "reflective thinking." He notes that citizenship transmission has been "the most pervasive view of social studies education" and goes on to analyze the lesser roles played by social science and reflective thinking in the United States.

Cherryholmes then launches into the central theme of his paper—a fundamental questioning of the epistemological basis of social science knowledge and the social studies education that draws upon that knowledge. This matter was touched upon by Brown and Townley, who noted that "the traditional epistemological view [which] saw knowledge as objective, 'given,' and 'out there'" came into question in the 1970s. They quoted Joan Whitehead's criticism of the prevalent approach to social science knowledge, which seeks "to institutionalize this approach rather than engage in questioning the nature and status of sociological knowledge and its place in the school curriculum—issues which are at the forefront of the controversy within the broader arena of sociology." A course which treats knowledge as "given," Brown and Townley stated, "presents a false image of the world. This criticism is particularly pertinent in social/political education, where the knowledge concerned is directly about the social world."

Hilligen dealt with the same concern in a lengthy appendix, introducing the "critical theory of society" as it was developed in the Frankfurt school. He contrasted critical theory with "critical rationalism," the latter representing the approach of "positivist sociologists" who, following the lead of natural scientists, focus on analysis of an existing social order, eschewing consideration of "norms and values [which] are held to be 'prescientific,' personal matters because they are not accessible to the methods of isolating and measuring." In contrast, "critical theory is... concerned with investigating the relationship between the individual and the social whole, seen as being 'reciprocal'.... Society is investigated with regard to what is possible or better; the question as to the 'true purpose of society' is raised." Thus Hilligen posed an urgent need for "epistemological reflection."
While epistemological concerns about the origins and uses of social knowledge in social/political education were incidental to the papers of Brown and Townley and Hilligen, they are the centerpiece of Cherryholmes’s chapter. Cherryholmes leads into this portion of his paper by analyzing one of the products of the "new social studies" in America which was most successful, judged by its wide usage: American Political Behavior. Although this text moved sharply away from previously dominant descriptive emphases on government institutions, focusing instead on human behavior and social-scientific knowledge, it is faulted by Cherryholmes for its "nonproblematic" treatment of social classes, political ideology, and other elements of a social order. "Much of the content and theory of American social and political texts is considered fundamentally non-problematic," he states. "To avoid efforts to interpret and critically appraise interpretations is to objectify social phenomena"; and, quoting Richard Bernstein, "'Objectivism' in the study of social and political life is not an innocent mistaken epistemological doctrine. It has dangerous consequences insofar as it tends to distort and reify 'facts' which are historically conditioned—'facts' which reveal only one among the many different possibilities that human action may take." Cherryholmes concludes that "the effect of objectifying social knowledge is to support implicitly the dominant ideologies of society without reflecting on issues of value and commitment."

The outcomes of Cherryholmes’s analysis are radical in the extreme. They call for a major focus in social/political education on epistemology:

Students must learn that objectification and reification are distortion of social phenomena. ... [A] critical perspective is needed whereby the layers of value and commitment are disclosed and peeled back. ... Beyond textbooks, classrooms should be organized so that interpretation and criticism are fostered. ... The teacher must be committed to symmetrical, nondominated classroom discourse, the sole purpose of which is to pursue the better argument, ... [and] must enforce the norms of discourse and encourage students to identify deviations from them.

Summary

What prospects for change in social/political education in their respective countries do these authors see? Hilligen does not deal with this question. His appended outline of possible approaches to teaching political science, in line with the prescriptions in his paper, may
imply some degree of optimism about possibilities—or at least hope—for change, but his demanding specifications for teaching competence might well lead one to despair that any but a few rare individuals could meet such requirements.

Brown and Townley and Cherryholmes are outspokenly pessimistic about the possibilities of change in the directions they feel are desirable. "The current state of social/political education in Britain is one of haphazard development," say Brown and Townley. "The future does not give cause for optimism. Apart from current economic restrictions, traditional ideological influences are strong." Cherryholmes, opting for more radical changes than do Brown and Townley, is correspondingly more pessimistic. "Major changes in the immediate future in U.S. social studies education do not seem likely," he says. "Publishers have little or no incentive to produce critically oriented materials, . . . treatment of theories of knowledge . . . [being] noticeably absent in most social studies methods books in the United States. . . . [The] interests of teachers are in classroom management, . . . assigning grades, avoiding controversy. . . ." The National Council for the Social Studies, the major professional organization of social studies educators in the United States, "avoids the social criticism which is necessary to understand knowledge claims in the social studies," says Cherryholmes. Indeed, that organization "resembles a trade union that is concerned with the immediate, practical interests of its members."

Measured against the far-out requirements for competent social/political education envisioned by these authors—particularly Hilligen and Cherryholmes—the prospects for change toward these goals seem small indeed. Their analyses and prescriptions can, however, be viewed in another light—as challenging material for theorists and thoughtful teachers to ponder and as possible goals toward which social/political education might move, however slowly.

The Learner and Social/Political Education

As did the first set of authors, the contributors of these papers take very different approaches to a common subject. Torney-Purta reviews an area of research that has grown rapidly in the United States since the mid-1970s—"social cognition" theory, which furnishes a useful
supplement to learning theories focused on the individual, such as those of Piaget and Kohlberg. Fielding deals exclusively and in depth with various versions of "hidden curricula," showing how they affect the perceptions and behaviors of learners. Knutter and Knutter-Schrey present an extensive review of learning theory as applied to political education, against the background of political developments in Western Germany since World War II.

Judith Torney-Purta

Torney-Purta presents a rich and comprehensive review of recent research related to children's social cognition, a term which includes both the content of what children learn about society and social relations and the processes by which children learn in social situations. Her first major point is related to theories of cognitive/moral development associated with Piaget and Kohlberg. She notes recent modifications of views about theories of cognitive and moral development, deemphasizing the age dependency of these stage theories and placing more stress on the social contexts of learning. In a more basic critique, Torney-Purta states that it is "unfortunate that the cognitive/moral developmental position has become so closely identified with moral development," since "there are other important elements . . . which do not fall neatly into the 'moral' category." These other elements are termed "social-conventional," which (quoting Turiel), "are behavioral uniformities that coordinate the action of individuals participating in a social system" and which have little or no moral content. Torney-Purta argues that children can and do distinguish the moral from the social-conventional and that these two kinds of behavioral goals should be distinguished in social/political education.

Torney-Purta deals next with "perspective taking," the ability of children to see things from the viewpoints of other persons. She describes four age-related stages of perspective taking developed by Flavell, reviews research that indicates characteristics and activities than affect perspective-taking ability, and notes that "perspective taking . . . has a close relationship to many of the aims and objectives of social education," including communication skills and intergroup relations. There follows a review of research on how children's perceptions of social institutions develop, followed by a brief review of
Bandura's social learning theory, with emphasis on motivational processes which "have great relevance for social education."

The final group of studies revises related to "altruistic and prosocial behavior." While the author does not specifically relate these studies to those in the Kohlberg framework of moral development, there are apparent similarities—as in the description of possible motivations for altruistic behavior, which include empathy, social approbation, expected reciprocity, and a sense of justice. Torrey-Purta concludes this section by stating:

Prosocial or altruistic behavior is a common thread which ties together many of the objectives of social education. The research in this area suggests the vital importance of providing models of behavior, ... enhancing opportunities for experiencing others' perspectives and empathy, letting children see the benefits of the prosocial action they engage in, and moving beyond the mere exhortation of good works. Both peer and authority relations are important, and a variety of motivations may be engaged in.

The paper concludes with specific suggestions about how past and future research on social cognition might be used to improve evaluation of social education programs and the formulation and accomplishment of objectives related to social perceptions and social behavior.

Roger Fielding

Fielding's chapter elaborates the "hidden curriculum" far beyond the loose meaning sometimes associated with that concept. Summarizing and organizing the work of many authors who have dealt with aspects of the concept, he spells out three types of hidden curriculum, each type having the effect of transmitting to students messages about what they should do or think—messages which are not made explicit by teachers, administrators, or text material and which may be intended or unintended on the part of the school establishment.

The first is the "hidden curriculum of assessment." Students experience "dissonance between the 'formal' curriculum and the hidden curriculum, with its 'latent, covert tasks inferred as the basis for reward,'" and the more perceptive students soon discover which tasks they "need to complete in order to get the highest possible grade with the least possible effort." The hidden curriculum is "antieducational" in that it undermines "the objectives of the official curriculum by lead-
ing pupils to concentrate on acquiring survival skills related to pleasing the teacher."

"The hidden curriculum is schooling," in one view, "consists of a set of rules, routines, and procedures designed to mold individual behavior to the requirements of institutional living." To the "three Rs" of the official curriculum are added the "three Rs" of the hidden curriculum—"rules, regulations, and routines." Beyond such socialization functions of the hidden curriculum, Fielding notes many messages about the nature of education itself that have been suggested by various authors. From Lister: "Education ends when school ends. Knowledge is divided into packages [subjects/topics]." From Postman and Weingartner: "The voice of authority is to be trusted and valued more than independent judgment. There is always a single, unambiguous Right Answer to a question." From Eggleston's list of seven goals of the hidden curriculum: "Learning to accept assessment by others. Learning how to compete to please both teachers and fellow students."

The third form, "the hidden curriculum of the classroom," refers to messages associated with particular subject matter, which Fielding illustrates by reference to his own field of sociology. Two possible kinds of hidden messages are discussed. The first is that the study of sociology may have the effect, unintended by the teacher or the system, of making students critics of the social system. Fielding quotes Meighan's analysis of such possibilities—that sociology lays "everyone and everything...open to suspicion [and]...threatens the taken-for-granted aspects of social behavior." The second kind of message—quite the opposite of the first—is that sociology may condition students to complacently accept views about the social system which inhibit criticism; for example, "tacit acceptance of the idea that society is basically a cooperative system—a value orientation which helps determine the questions that one asks and the educational experiences one designs for students."

In his final section, Fielding reveals his own predilection for the teaching of sociology: whether or not social criticism is sometimes a part of the hidden curriculum of the classroom, he would like to see sociology teaching that fosters social criticism as a part of the explicit curriculum. Such an "oppositional" curriculum would lead inevitably
to "challenges to taken-for-granted, common-sense assumptions about the relationships between teachers and pupils, criteria of high and low ability, designations of success and failure, and so on." It is "only when we have developed such a questioning attitude [that] students [will] become aware of the possibility of actually shaping their world, as opposed to being shaped by it." The implications of Fielding's "oppositional" curriculum for teaching methods, content, and approaches to schooling are spelled out at some length.

Hans-Helmuth Knutter and Gabriela Knutter-Schrey

The Knutters first cite some conclusions of German research in educational psychology which are applicable to political education, including learning capabilities of adults (learning circumstances are much more significant than age), the conditions for "economical learning" (for example, the importance of "active pursuit," appeal to many senses, and clarity of objectives), and motivation (for example, the importance of purpose, appropriate level of content, and recognizable progress). This is followed by a brief report on research focused specifically on political education and especially on the question of how a "disposition toward democracy" can be fostered.

The Knutters next point to historical circumstances that set political education in West Germany apart from that of England or the United States. Germany long had a tradition of delegating political affairs to those in authority, leaving theorists to pursue their social philosophies, whether democratic or otherwise, without confronting the realities of political power. Since World War II, despite the genuine desire of many Germans for the development of a democratic society, the "attitude of political education toward the postwar structure in Germany was uncritical, divorcing theory from practice." This was due to the fact that "during the years immediately following the war, the Federal Republic of Germany was considered a temporary arrangement. Therefore, the goals of political education had no connection with the national reality."

As the Federal Republic has come to be seen as a more lasting phenomenon, political education has moved toward a closer relationship with it, mostly in a supportive role. Even so, the Knutters see political education as primarily concerned with social relations of a nonpolitical nature and concerned more about understanding society than changing it.
In an extensive review of the works of educational theorists who have written textbooks in Western Germany, the focus is on models of social learning and on such matters as student-teacher interaction, student participation, and uses of students' personal experiences.

**Curriculum Design for Social/Political Education**

Each of the three chapters in this section gives, in varying degrees, a view of some of the most significant developments in curriculum design in the author's own country in recent years, provides some assessment of those developments, and suggests directions for future development.

**Hans Sussmuth**

Sussmuth focuses exclusively on developments of the 1970s related to two major curriculum guidelines produced by two states in the central part of West Germany—the Hessen General Guidelines for Social Education (HGGSE) and the Guidelines for Political Education (GPE) developed in North Rhine-Westphalia. Widespread discussions of these two guidelines have taken place, since they were issued by the respective ministries of education in 1973, among social scientists, educationists, public officials, and the public; some degree of consensus seems to be shaping up, both in theory and in practice.

A major point of consensus, both in the two sets of guidelines and in the discussions following from them, is that social/political education should be based, not on separate social science disciplines, but rather on some kind of cooperation or coordination among the disciplines—"to replace previously separate school subjects such as history, politics, social sciences, and geography with broader subject areas ... oriented toward the study sector 'social education,' not toward an academic discipline." How this general objective is to be accomplished was a subject of debate, including much discussion about whether the relationships among the disciplines could or should be "cooperative" or "integrated"—akin to the discussions in the United States about "multidisciplinary" vs. "interdisciplinary" approaches. Sussmuth reports the acknowledged conceptual difficulties in relating the disciplines to each other, noting that "if one judges the situation by existing teaching materials and history teaching strategies, it becomes evident that thus far a rigorous
didactic foundation and teaching models exist only for the cooperative
teaching of history and politics." But he also notes the urgency of
relating the disciplines to each other: "It must by no means be left to
the students to put together the detailed results of the different disci-
plines . . . withdrawal into the isolating independence of the social
science school subjects is no longer feasible . . . ."

One important reason for integrating social science knowledge,
Sussmuth states, is to "shift the emphasis . . . toward a primarily
society-oriented posture." In this connection, he reviews Annette
Kuhn's concern for critical theory in the teaching of history—probing,
like Hilligen and Cherryholmes in their papers, into the epistemological
basis of social knowledge, with a view to "emancipation of the individual
and . . . society . . . [from] uncritical attitudes toward the past." How-
however, social criticism is not a major focus of Sussmuth's paper, but
one among many considerations taking a back seat to his major concern
about the conceptual basis for social/political education. Those other
considerations include (echoing many of the thrusts that played a part
in the "new social studies" in the United States) case studies, studies
of conflict, decision making, student interests, developing "self-
determination," and focus on such significant interdisciplinary social
concepts as process, structure, and causality.

While Sussmuth does not deal specifically with predictions of
future trends in social/political education in West Germany, one gets
the impression that he feels that a very useful process of theoretical
and practical discussion is under way, with results that are already
useful and which promise still more constructive accomplishments in the
future:

Suzanne Helburn

Helburn presents two main themes. One is an overview of the cur-
rent status of social studies in the United States today, a status that
has remained rather static over many decades. The other is an insight-
ful review of the "era of the new social studies" in the United States,
taking issue with many of the generally accepted views about that era
and pointing to its many creative and useful outcomes.

Like other contributors to the conference, Helburn sees socializa-
tion as the dominant function of the educational system: "Schools
enculturate students into the shared values of American ideology and prepare them to fit into a society which is hierarchically and bureaucratically organized, where social stability is best assured through a passive citizenry which accepts authority, dutifully votes, and supports law and order. Given this function, "social studies . . . cannot train a population of active citizens who think for themselves, demand a voice in decision making, and actively engage in social-change efforts." Helburn sees social studies as typically alienating students, failing to engage them in and inform them about the significance of their own life experiences, and misteaching or failing to teach them about significant facts and relationships of economic, social, and political life.

The author sees social studies as locked into a long-lived pattern of courses which are teacher-centered and based on traditional mass-market texts which are "dull, superficial, devoid of political debate and intellectual ferment." In this context, teaching methods are routine and unimaginative, concerned primarily with socializing students to the management requirements of the classroom and to acceptance of the existing society and their roles in it.

Helburn sees the "new social studies" in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s as one in a long series of (mostly unsuccessful) efforts to "humanize the curriculum." The main thrust of her review of this movement is that widely accepted views about it contain serious errors and that it resulted in many innovations which hold great promise for the future (though probably not the near future):

[The] literature [about the new social studies] gives an inadequate and unfortunate picture of the reforms of the 1960s-1970s by exaggerating the importance of social-science-discipline-dominated projects and caricaturing them as undimensioned efforts to convert social studies into social science education. The literature commentary more or less ignores both the diversity in experimentation and the developmental aspects of the period . . . a period of multiple, interacting thrusts.

These assertions are strongly supported by a detailed analysis of the many projects loosely associated under the term "new social studies."

"In my opinion," says Helburn, "the era of reform we have been describing was extremely creative of new approaches to curriculum design; it represented a flowing of alternatives and a melding together of apparently disparate approaches." She cites numerous examples to
illustrate this point, including Taba's "strategies to achieve multiple learning objectives related to the intellectual, social, moral, and psychological development of the child" and Helburn and Davis's use of "discrepant events as unit openers, programmed instruction to teach basic discipline organizers, small-group interaction activities for values clarification and small-group learning, [and] the jurisprudential model of conflict analysis... The period produced technical breakthroughs in applying system design procedures... based on the latest theories of cognition and human development."

Helburn next reviews the movement away from the new social studies, beginning in the early 1970s, citing the reasons for this development and regretfully characterizing it as focused on "basics" and fragmented by "unidimensional" emphases, fostered in part by federal funding patterns, on such subjects as decision making, valuing, and global education. She closes with a catalog of factors related to the "main socialization and screening functions of the schools [which] encourage stability and inhibit change." But she ends with a small ray of hope for change, advising reformers to work "on those fringes where our ideas and strategies are welcome," such efforts to be informed by the lessons learned from the "new social studies" as well as by a "realistic, more accurate view of society, social change, and the functions of schooling in maintaining social stability..."

Barry Dufour

Dufour comments briefly on two aspects of curriculum design in England—the literature about curriculum and practice in the schools. He points to literature calling for change, based on descriptions of schooling and "a general belief that changes in the curriculum are necessary and timely"; "theoretical critiques... based on empirical research," some "tinged with pragmatism," some combining "scholarship with detailed and practical discussion of what is and what ought to be"; and writings based on neo-Marxism and existentialism offering "support for a greater degree of pupil-centeredness, allied with a commitment to an existential and emancipatory view of education which is rooted in creative and expressive work inside the classroom and outside the
school . . . [and presenting] stinging attacks on positivist conceptions of social science and social learning."

Concerning changes that have taken place in school practices, Dufour is moderately optimistic:

There is no doubt that real successes were achieved in the last two decades in the actual expansion of social learning in schools, particularly in secondary schools. . . . Large numbers of secondary schools now offer integrated social studies/social science courses under a bewildering variety of names. . . . All of this has been supported by the continuing publication of new textbooks for the specialist subjects and of project-topic style books for the many forms of integrated courses.

The new courses have not, however, made much use of curriculum project materials, for reasons which the author briefly summarizes.

Having dealt with curriculum literature and school practices, Dufour turns with enthusiasm to his own prescription for "essential features of a curriculum design for the real world." He notes that "there have been two elements in the notion of [curriculum] design—that which emphasizes the artistic aspect and that which emphasizes the craft aspect"; and he argues that for the 1980s, we should make efforts to put art back into design in our curriculum in the sense of encouraging a clearer commitment to developing in children creativity, imagination, self-awareness . . . I am calling for an increased emphasis on the humanities and expressive arts to counterbalance the pseudorational, positivistic, and scientific social science paradigm that many curriculum developers encouraged in the 1960s and 1970s.

Thus Dufour presents a strong plea for a curriculum that is student-centered, humane, and oriented to the "real world." He criticizes "wall-to-wall" curriculum development, which specifies all aspects of a learning situation, arguing for a "50-50" curriculum, in which half of school time is devoted to teacher-planned activities and half to activities initiated by individual students. Relegating unemployed curriculum developers to the dole, he outlines a curriculum based on television, popular culture, politics, the world of work, and other cultures, in which teachers use both public knowledge and the personal knowledge that students bring to the classroom to explore the "real world."
Society, Social Justice, and Social/Political Education

In addition to the three conference papers prepared on this topic, substantial written commentaries submitted by the three reactors are included in this section.

The chapters by Geoff Whitty, Siegfried George, and John Palmer, each reviewing and commenting on developments in the author's country since World War II, present an interesting parallelism. Whitty describes events in England by reference to three reform movements—the "social studies movement" of the 1940s and 1950s, the "new social studies" of the 1960s and early 1970s, and the "political education movement" of the 1970s. George typifies changes in social/political education in Western Germany since World War II by analyzing three texts, published in 1952, 1960, and 1978 respectively. Palmer organizes a major part of his chapter along the lines of the three "traditions" in United States social studies popularized by Barr, Barth, and Shermis—citizenship transmission, social science, and reflective thinking.

As Cohn and Kershaw point out in later chapters, none of these three papers defines the meaning of social justice—a serious flaw, as Cohn and Kershaw see it. One can, however, infer something about each author's views of social justice—particularly in the case of George, who describes with approval the establishment of a democratic welfare state in West Germany after World War II.

All three authors deal with the extent to which social/political education is supportive of the status quo, as opposed to serving as an instrument for criticism and change—a theme that ran through most of the papers in the conference—and all agree on the dominance of perpetuation of the status quo as the major effect in all three countries and on a recent parallel trend in the three countries toward a less critical, more supportive role with respect to the status quo. (This statement should be qualified with respect to Germany, where support of the democratic welfare state at the present time, however uncritical, represents support for a vastly different state than that which existed prior to the end of World War II.)

The three reactors, true to the form that prevailed throughout the conference, did not confine themselves to critiques of the papers. John Haas noted a number of questions about the three papers, indicating
agreements, disagreements, and supplementary statements, and added a
view unique to this conference about the relationship of the individual
to society. Karlheinz Rebel sounded a note of constructive conservatism
concerning some of the major issues of the conference and added a brief
review of the social/political syllabi of six German states. Ted Cohn
contributed a substantial paper in its own right, giving a brief compar-
ative overview of social education in the three countries, then focusing
on the "legitimation crisis" in the social/political structures of all
three countries.

Geoff Whitty

Whitty comments that "while debates about the nature and purposes
of social and political education in England have generally had a more
radical dimension than have equivalent ones in the United States, the
practice of social studies education in England places it almost as
firmly within the liberal-to-conservative part of the spectrum as is its
American counterpart." Whitty's own paper illustrates his point; his is
a plea for radical change, both in the nature of social education and in
the nature of society, of a kind heard only rarely in the United States
(although perhaps more commonly in West Germany, among the advocates of
critical theory). He also describes the quiet, stalwart resistance of
the English educational system to efforts to infuse it with critical
social/political content, a resistance accomplished primarily by assur-
ing that "social studies" is confined to low-status courses for less-
able students.

"There is," says Whitty, "a growing conviction amongst the reformist
as well as the revolutionary left that social justice is unlikely to be
achieved unless contemporary society, as we know it, is superseded by a
qualitatively different and more genuinely egalitarian form of society."
A prerequisite "to enhance social justice via education" is that efforts
must be "based upon a more sophisticated understanding of schooling and
society than has hitherto been evident amongst social studies educators
and . . . more explicitly linked to broader struggles for social justice
within society at large." These points are illustrated by Whitty's
analysis of three reform movements, each deficient in its own way with
respect to his stipulated requirements for successful reform: the
"social studies movement" of the 1940s and 1950s, the "new social
studies" of the 1960s and 1970s, and the "political education movement" of the 1970s.

The author gives the most space to the political education movement of the 1970s. Beginning with the principle that "a form of political education relevant to the real world in which pupils live [must] be part of every pupil's curricular experience," this movement is seen by Whitty as being "increasingly tied up with those whose major interest in it involves a commitment to preserve rather than improve upon the form of society in which we live." The prevailing view that "Britain's current forms of political and social organization are the ultimate end-point of human achievement" requires, in the view of those who have taken over the political education movement, that "the role of education [be] conceived in terms of defending them and extolling their virtues."

Whitty closes with a strong, definitive statement about lessons to be taken to heart by liberal and radical reformers of social/political education: Reform efforts can easily be subverted to maintenance of the status quo. However, the schools can be used as a means of changing society; what is needed is "greater sociological sophistication on the part of radical social studies educators." Goals should be more clearly formulated. Finally, "a conscious attempt to understand the contradictions in contemporary education and the development of educational and political strategies to exploit them" may provide immediate handholds for "those of us who are genuinely committed to the extension of social justice in society."

Siegfried George

Economic, social, and political developments in Germany following World War I through Nazism, World War II, and the post-World War II desolation are emphasized by George as important conditions shaping West German social and political thought and education in the following years. The West German constitution of 1949 declared, "The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state," and the implications of this declaration were manifested in both the rapid establishment of democratic political institutions and the beginnings of a socialist welfare state. With the coming of the "economic miracle" in the 1950s, most of the elements of socialism—notably, the nationalization of natural resources and basic industries—fell by the wayside; but
the welfare state was substantially implemented, providing economic security for citizens and "more public planning in the areas of economic and social development."

The developments just described became a part of social/political education, with the way open for "teachers of social studies... to discuss with their students possible changes necessary for the further development of social justice." The approach to social education in the 1950s is illustrated by George's description of a 1952 text in which social issues are presented through descriptions of the platforms of the many political parties extant at that time, but with little commitment on the part of the authors other than favoring equal sharing of the burdens of the war. Moving on to a 1960 text, George notes that the focus is on problems in a "primarily informative style"—that is, with little emphasis on analysis or advocacy.

During the 1960s and early 1970s a number of important developments took place in German political education—including the emergence of Didaktik (as described above and in Chapter 3), a more analytical approach to social phenomena, critical theory, and a growing interest in curriculum development. The effect of these developments on political education is illustrated by George's description of the 1978 text authored by Hilligen and others, which had the provocative title See, Judge, Act. This text covers a "wide scope of social problems," points to the constitution as an instrument to foster social justice and human rights, and incorporates a variety of pedagogical approaches. The book is "not neutral; it not only envisions a rational discussion of the stated issues but encourages students to develop their attitudes and behavior along these lines of political values."

Although developments of the 1960s and the early 1970s nourished a more critical and analytical approach to social phenomena, they also stimulated wider public interest in curriculum content—so much so that a trend developed in the early 1970s, continuing to the present, which has led to greater control by the states over curriculum and tends to discourage open discussion and criticism. "Radicals" have been dismissed from public service; students, while still interested in social issues, are much more docile than they were in the early 1970s and more concerned about their personal welfare. George notes with regret that a text he
wrote with Hilligen in 1971, "considered progressive and educationally sound" at the time, can no longer be admitted to the schools: "Right now the question of preserving our standard of living seems more important than further reforms."

John Palmer

Palmer begins with a caveat that might well be applied to much of the conference content (and which is related to Ian Kershaw's stringent comments in Chapter 18 about the scarcity of classroom teachers at the conference): that his paper is based on the literature produced by social educators and that little is known about how this literature is related to classroom practices in the United States. Thus cautioned, we are introduced to the central issue of the relationship between school and society via the early-20th-century wisdom of John Dewey.

Dewey believed it was "impossible to separate the educational process from the society that sustained it." Education, he said, is "a process of transforming the child until he shares the ideals and interests of the society . . . not for the existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a better future humanity." Thus was posed the persistent issue of whether education's task is socialization or criticism and the improvement of society—a task that is, of course, at the heart of social/political education.

Palmer provides an excellent definition of socialization as "the process of transmitting from the old to the young stable patterns of behavior and values and of grooming the young for filling established adult roles in the society." And he notes that the content of socialization, in emphasizing "unity, equality, and freedom, for example," is likely to "present a distorted, oversimplified, and false view of American society."

Palmer casts the resulting conflict between socialization and change into the form of Barr, Barth, and Shermis's three "traditions" in American social studies. He equates "citizenship transmission" and the "social science discipline approach" with slightly different versions of socialization, and presents "reflective inquiry or decision making" as "the area in social education where the most creative efforts have been made in recent years and where changing notions of the nature of society
have had a direct impact on approaches to social education." Reflective inquiry has two modes, the "individual emphasis" being exemplified by Hunt and Metcalf's *Teaching High School Social Studies* and the "social emphasis" by the early work on "public issues" of Donald Oliver and his associates.

Palmer states that, despite the promise of reflective thinking, most social studies education in recent years has focused on the uncritical teaching of the disciplines (presumably with socialization, or citizenship transmission, as the result), with increasing attention to problems and value positions resulting from social conflicts of the 1960s. One important result of the social concerns aroused by these problems has been increased interest on the part of the states in solving the problems and an infusion of federal funds to support curriculum development dealing with the problems. Whereas these events might have presented a challenge and an opportunity to social education to deal critically with these social problems, the results have so far been quite the opposite. The late 1970s have witnessed a "growing distrust of rational problem-solving" and of education in addition to increasingly rigid mandates from state and federal agencies which restrict rather than liberate educators.

Palmer concludes with a faint wisp of optimism: "The near-chaotic condition that now prevails in the field may be indicative of a period of transition characterized by a search for new responses to the new social and political realities."

**John Haas**

Haas comments that Palmer's emphasis on socialization, or citizenship transmission, as a dominant force in social studies in the United States deserves even stronger emphasis. Haas refers to citizenship transmission as "CCC"—conservative cultural continuity—and notes that it corresponds to a CCC described by Whitty: crown, constitution, and capitalism. Haas describes it further as relying on "empty catchwords, history-as-myth, rituals of democracy, and other propagandistic tools which mystify the concepts of democracy and capitalism."

In a conference that dealt with society as an impersonal entity and with individuals only in their relationships to the society and polity, Haas made a unique contribution in distinguishing two aspects of social
life—"Gesellschaft (society)" and "Gemeinschaft (community)—and two aspects of individual life: the "person self-defined" and the "person other-defined." As social educators talk about the individual and society, the emphasis is commonly on the other-defined, conventional self and the larger "society of formal institutions," neglecting the "self-revealed, existential" self and the "society of face-to-face interactions," both of the latter being legitimate concerns of social education.

Karlheinz Rebel

Rebel supplements George's accounts of trends in West Germany by describing three issues of current concern. The first is the question of an integrated, problem-oriented approach vs. separate subject-matter fields. Both approaches are used and are being debated, and Rebel warns particularly about the danger of the integrated approach being undertaken by teachers (which must mean most teachers) who are not well enough versed in the different disciplines and their relationships to use this approach.

He refers next to the issue of the closed (completely planned) vs. open (shaped by the needs and interests of teachers and students) curriculum and then to the issue of learning objectives vs. the structure of the disciplines. The former he considers an open choice; in the latter, he leans toward the structure-of-disciplines approach, into which it is possible to "easily integrate societal issues."

Rebel next comments on democracy as "the leading principle in all parts of our life," but questions some uses of this principle in changing society. He notes opposition to the idea of "emancipation" by persons who view it as "an attempt to get rid of our value pattern" and attacks on "so-called critical theory, as being responsible for terrorism and radicalism in West Germany." A further concern is expressed about the fact that the "conflict approach" is being "treated as though it were a value of its own" rather than a necessary tool to manage social conflict.

A final contribution by Rebel is his brief account of his work in analyzing the syllabi of six German states (despite the assertion of George that state syllabi are of little consequence): "The most astonishing result . . . is that the content of all six deals with societal
issues. All try to develop in students a desire to overcome social injustice.

Ted Cohn

Cohn first gives a brief and useful overview of the roles of social/political education in the three countries. In the United States, until very recently, the emphasis has been increasingly on the ideology and methodology of being a democratic American citizen; in West Germany, the emphasis has been on introducing the cognitive content of the democratic state and the duties of responsible citizenship in such a state; in England, the emphasis has been on historical continuity and compromise in the protection of the rights of the individual, with explicit social/political education as "a form of compensatory education for the working-class children."

The author next turns to a lengthy analysis of recent developments in the three countries, positing similar developments related to Habermas's concept of a "legitimation crisis." "Bourgeois culture," according to this thesis, rests on two sets of contradictory values—activism, scientific rationality, involvement, individualism, and utilitarianism, on the one hand, and passivity, deference, "subordinate mentality," and fatalism, on the other. The contradictions can be managed for a while within a bourgeois democratic state, but changes in social and political conditions may upset the balance, "delegitimizing" some of the values and the political structure which rests on them:

The increased inability of British and American governments, in particular, to control and manage the economic crisis has created a crisis of legitimation in the whole concept of a bureaucratic and centralized state power, and consequently in the role of scientific rationalism as the keystone of bourgeois democracy. As a result, there is renewed emphasis among politicians on . . . the traditional value of subordinate mentality and achievement motivation articulated through religious dogma. These values are most clearly exemplified in the ideology of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States.

Finally, Cohn castigates the three major authors of this section for failing to define what they mean by "social justice," but agrees with them that there are good reasons for pessimism, pointing to "a period of retrenchment in the area of social/political education" in all three countries.
Syntheses

While the three persons who assumed the task of synthesizing the presentations of the conference did not refrain from making their own original contributions, and might therefore warrant inclusion in this overview, I shall nevertheless let each of them speak for themselves in their appointed places at the end of the volume.
2. THEORY AND CONTENT BASES OF SOCIAL/POLITICAL EDUCATION IN BRITAIN

By Chris Brown and Charles Townley

"The sociologist may . . . make us aware that curriculum development is in part a social problem calling for social solutions."—Frank Musgrove

The theoretical basis for social and political education—or "social studies," as we shall refer to the field in this paper—must be drawn from two sources: first, like the study of education itself, it draws upon the social foundations of education and, second, it depends upon the nature of its content or subject matter. In this case, however, the source is the same in both instances; both lean heavily on the social sciences, particularly on sociology and history. In this paper we should like to focus upon the concepts of ideology, legitimacy, and social change to examine the development of the field and to describe four models which are available to those who are concerned with social studies as we enter the 1980s.

The Development of Social Studies in Britain

The Ideological Bases

Contemporary writers on both sides of the Atlantic have stressed the relationship between education and culture. Stenhouse (1967) and Lawton (1975) both see education as a selection from culture, while Wesley and Wronski (1964) emphasized the necessity for "social analysis." "The school," they say, "is society's agent to appraise, select, and transmit its culture to the oncoming generation in such a manner as to realize the greatest possible values for the boys and girls who receive the heritage." Because this is a complex matter in the field of human emotions, achievements, and institutions, "it is therefore desirable and necessary for the social studies teacher to be a student of society." Such a position is not new. Its theoretical referents date back to the 19th century and to Emile Durkheim, who regarded education as the "image and reflection of society." As a process, it was to be looked upon as "the methodical socialization of the young" (Durkheim 1956).
More recently, in Britain, Her Majesty's Inspectors have addressed this problem directly. They recognize that "education has two distinct and yet interdependent roles in relation to society. First the education system is charged by society . . . with equipping young people to take their place as citizens and workers in adult life and to begin to form attitudes to the prevailing patterns in standards and behavior . . . Secondly there is the responsibility for educating 'the autonomous citizen,' a person able to think and act for herself or himself, to resist exploitation, to innovate and to be vigilant in the defense of liberty" (Department of Education and Science 1977). They go on to conclude that this socialization element requires us to "have in mind the 'virtuous citizen,' probably living as part of a family, in a largely urban, technology-based society, with minority cultures, working in general towards a social harmony which can accommodate changes and differences." Thus they envisage a changing, pluralist society.

It is against this background of pluralism and change that we are being forced to reconsider the place of social studies within the curriculum. Alvin Toffler's Future Shock is an example of a recent and startling account of the changes currently overwhelming Western societies which also suggests strategies for survival. But Toffler's diagnosis and his prescriptions for educational organization and future curricula, while they may evoke intuitive sympathy, nonetheless lack an adequately coherent theoretical underpinning. Such an underpinning can be found in another sphere of Durkheim's work, where he suggests that such changes are characterized by changes in social solidarity which he labels "mechanical" and "organic" (Durkheim 1956). Mechanical solidarity, which is typically found in preindustrial society, involves social integration through shared beliefs, ascribed roles, and prescriptive socialization which is reinforced by repressive negative sanctions. While this process would be typical of Islamic countries—for example, Iran and Saudi Arabia—it is difficult to generalize about Western industrial nations. For reasons which are developed below, we would suggest that this form of solidarity is largely absent in the United States, still exists to some extent in Great Britain, and, in some respects, still prevails in West Germany. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, is more typical of advanced industrial societies: it emphasizes differ-
ences between individuals (rather than common beliefs), achieved roles, and a system of social control which is a function of restitutive civil law. Under the former system, socialization is simple, clear-cut, and relatively uncomplicated. Under the latter, it becomes far more complex and problematic, since it is no longer possible to identify common beliefs and values. The United States offers a good example of organic solidarity, and increasingly so do many Western European societies.

In education, mechanical solidarity implies value consensus, commonly accepted aims, and a single ideology. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, implies a diversity of values, diffuse aims, and several competing ideologies. The notion of ideology is important because it enables one to explain not only the presence or absence of a particular curriculum area but also the form in which it appears.

John Raynor, examining the contemporary British system and leaning heavily on the work of Raymond Williams, identified four major ideologies which he labeled aristocratic, bourgeois, democratic, and proletarian (see Table 1). The Williams model is important because it reminds us that education is a political activity: "All educational practices are profoundly political in the sense that they are designed to produce one sort of human being or another—which is to say an educational system always proceeds from some model of what a human being ought to be like" (Postman 1970). All educational theories are political theories. Political, educational, and social arguments are inextricably intertwined—and nowhere more so than in social studies, where both content and method may serve either to maintain the status quo or to support change in a given direction. At one extreme one has indoctrination, the most conservative or reactionary position, and at the other revolution, the most radical position.

Wesley and Wronski (1964) also recognized these two polar positions, but they preferred to use the term "philosophies" instead of "ideologies." They identified four philosophies which they placed on a continuum ranging from the most radical to the most reactionary:

reconstructionism — progressivism — essentialism — perennialism

Reconstructionism, as the name implies, is concerned with the school's active participation in the reconstruction of society. Pro-
John Dewey, it advocates progress through the logical process of scientific thinking and the hypothetico-deductive approach. Essentialism assumes that, at any point in time in a given society, the curriculum should be based upon certain essential elements. This is currently occupying the attention of those in Britain who are suggesting a core curriculum for our secondary schools and is thought to have been the

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dominant tradition in American education. Perennialism assumes that there are enduring, absolute truths which education must uncover.

Apart from their polar orientation, there are few similarities between the Williams and the Wesley/Wronski models, for one is rooted in history and the other in epistemology. Both, however, are appropriate for use in analyzing change in education, inasmuch as social change takes us from mechanical to organic solidarity. In each case one needs to determine the points on the continuum at which social studies may be legitimate. Clearly it is not consistent with the aristocratic and perennialist positions (unless, perhaps, we include the classics and religious instruction in the social studies). How far toward the other pole can one go?

Today progressivism and a democratic ideology appear to be consistent with a changing, pluralist, democratic society, but the change is slow. For example, Bernstein (1967) has characterized Durkheim's model of change from mechanical to organic solidarity as change from a closed to an open society. He suggests that as society becomes more open, schools reflect that openness. The teacher's role has become more fragmented, and the pupil's role is less fixed. Teaching groups are changing from a "fixed structural unit of the school's organization" to a "flexible or variable unit of the social organization." The traditional architecture is being replaced by open-plan buildings, and, with a change to more "democratic" or "liberal" atmospheres, one even finds pupils sharing staff rooms in some schools!

There are changes, too, in curriculum content and pedagogy. There has been a change in emphasis from the subject as a clear-cut, definable unit of the curriculum to a unit which is "not so much a subject as an idea—say, topic-centered interdisciplinary inquiry" (Bernstein 1967). The subject becomes subordinate to the idea which governs the particular form of integration. The changes in pedagogy are consistent with the changes in architecture and atmosphere. They involve a change from the learning of facts in a subject-based curriculum to the exploration, often through interdisciplinary inquiry, of principles. Thus the role of the teacher is tending to change from one of a solution giver to one of a problem solver.
It is important to note, however, that no matter how clear the direction of these changes may be, the extent and rate of change is, in practice, very limited because of traditional constraints. What, then, determines the extent to which these changes will be implemented and the basis on which they will be accepted? These questions are particularly important for social studies because it is in this area, where value issues are unavoidable, that conflict and controversy appear to be most dramatic. One has only to think of MACOS (Man: A Course of Study), in the United States and Australia, and the Schools Council Humanities Project and the introduction of school sociology, in Britain, to ask when such changes will be considered legitimate.

Sources of Legitimacy

It is in the work of Max Weber (Gerth and Mills 1946) that one finds a theoretical basis of legitimacy. His typology of charismatic, traditional, and legal/rational authority provides a model for categorizing legitimacy, or the general acceptance of authority, which we may apply to educational systems. In developing countries the whole education system may be a function of a charismatic leader, for example Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. In long-established societies, like many in Western Europe — particularly those subject to the traditional influence of the Roman Catholic church — the curriculum reflects the power of tradition, "belief in the eternal yesterday." In such newer industrial nations as the United States and Canada, legal/rational authority is more likely to be the basis of curricular decisions.

Without wishing to exaggerate the distinction, we would like to suggest that tradition has constrained developments in social studies in Britain and Europe, while rationality has influenced developments more in the United States. Rationality, for Weber, implied a relationship between means and ends, and the term "legal/rational" implied the use of rules and procedures as the most appropriate means of regulating action in order to achieve desired ends. Thus the United States has a written constitution — unlike the United Kingdom, where the common law and historically evolved legislation regulate constitutional matters. Management by objectives and the scientific management procedures of Taylor and Gilbreth, pioneers of time and motion study respectively, had their origins in the United States and were not adopted elsewhere until much
later. The same is true of curriculum planning. The rational or objectives model, involving the identification of precise ends and then the selection of content and methods as means to achieve those ends, emerged in the United States as early as Bobbitt and Taba. Given the history and culture of the United States, it was virtually irresistible. Not surprisingly, that approach has never been applied to any extent to curriculum development in Great Britain.

The curriculum in Britain, and the social studies curriculum in particular, can best be understood in terms of historical constraints and, in Weber's terms, legitimation through tradition. The best example of legitimation through tradition must, surely, be Latin. Originally an international language, and important to the professions until the Reformation, it maintained its importance as a humanizing force in education. Latin was the means of access to the study of ancient civilizations; it was restricted, like education itself, to the elite. With the development of state education, Latin maintained its elite status and only ceased to be a requirement for entry into Oxford University in the 1970s.

The case of Latin is typical of a wider syndrome of traditional constraints. The whole curriculum of the state schools reflects that of the private schools—or, as they are known paradoxically in Britain, the public schools. The public schools have been extremely slow to change in the 19th and 20th centuries, although one might have expected economic and technological changes to influence the curriculum.

In a semifeudal landed society the ruling class did not need much technological training; the appropriate kind of education for aristocrats and gentlemen mainly provided a badge of rank. The classics-based curriculum served this purpose admirably. The fact that the knowledge acquired in schools was no longer useful in any practical way was regarded as a virtue; high status knowledge denoted membership of an exclusive social group (Gordon and Lawton 1975).

Thus the aristocratic ideology emerged and, subsequently, influenced the aims and content of the state schools when the latter were established. Tradition dies hard; today, many of those who make educational policy for the state system were socialized into that ideology through an education which was not in the state system, with its diluted "public school" curriculum, but in the public schools themselves.
Without doubt, however, the most significant single constraint in British secondary education is the examination system of GCE (General Certificate of Education) and CSE (Certificate of Secondary Education), which children face at the age of 16. This system seems to take us back in British educational history to the period of "payment by results," when teachers, assessed and paid according to their pupils' performance, concentrated and restricted their teaching to those areas in which their pupils were to be examined. Today many teachers claim that they would like to implement activities which have real educational value but are afraid to "waste time" in view of the examination ahead, so they spend their time dictating notes. Worse, some teachers allow their GCE course to infiltrate the earlier years; an economics teacher is teaching 13-year-olds what university students encounter when they embark upon a degree course in economics, or a history teacher, instead of following the trend to "process" and the evaluation of evidence, teaches a two-year course in the fourth year and then repeats it in the fifth, for reinforcement.

The recent secondary school survey from Her Majesty's Inspectorate, Aspects of Secondary Education in England (Department of Education and Science 1979), makes the point quite strongly. Speaking of the "high priority which schools give to examination," it reports:

There is evidence that a minority of schools ... attach little importance to anything else ... The work attempted in the classroom was often constrained by the exclusive emphasis placed on the examination syllabus, on the topics thought to be favored by the examiners and on the acquisition of examination techniques. In almost all the schools no time was made available in the fourth and fifth years for reflective work such as might be fostered by independent but carefully guided private study periods and the development of study skills which the pupils might need later in school, or for future education or employment.

A survey of primary schools (Department of Education and Science 1978), also produced by Her Majesty's Inspectorate, reported that many primary schools undertook thematic project work in social studies for which "material was most often drawn from historical and geographical sources." The report reflects the continuation of a traditional, subject-based approach to social studies through history, geography, and religious education, despite the work of Bruner on MACOS in the United States and the Schools Council Project "Time, Place and Society" in
Britain. Both projects attempted to promote social understanding through the concepts of the social sciences, but tradition rules. These are clear-cut examples of the high status/low status dichotomy which affects educational priorities in Britain. This is true of social studies courses and particularly of Mode 3 CSE, all of which have little credibility or currency in the job market.

The Impact of Social Change

As we have suggested, the development of social studies in Britain has been constrained by ideology and particularly by tradition. The idea of social education, in any of the forms in which we now consider it, was totally inconsistent with the aristocratic ideology of the 19th century. The nearest approach to social education at that time would have been religious instruction in the Christian gospels.

Change in the 20th century has been slow. Although economics was introduced in the 1920s, it was studied by a minority of students in a very small number of schools. And, although the Hadow Report (Consultative Committee of the Board of Education 1926) suggested that the curriculum might reflect the changing industrial society, tradition prevailed. Little happened.

Developments on the international scene, particularly the emergence of such radical ideologies as fascism, led in 1935 to the establishment of the Association for Education in Citizenship. But pressure for training in citizenship had little impact on school practice. Only after World War II did changes in school emerge, and even then they were contained within the boundaries of traditional subjects. The desire to produce a curriculum that was "relevant" to the modern world and appropriate in an egalitarian system which had just achieved secondary education for all led to the appearance of a confusion of such new subjects as civics, citizenship, social studies, and current affairs. However, most lacked an adequate theoretical underpinning. They failed to dislodge the established subjects—history, geography, and religious education—and they quickly faded, in most cases. History and geography themselves changed slightly during this period, but most attempts to develop integrated social studies courses based upon history and geography withered when the few enthusiasts who had developed them left the
schools and traditional historians and geographers reestablished their positions.

Many of these new courses amounted to little more than indoctrination. Claims that they encouraged understanding were, in effect, based on a philosophy which led to the legitimation and acceptance of the status quo. To some extent this was true of the move toward social-science-based courses in the 1960s, particularly those based upon functionalist approaches. At the same time, however, the existence of conflict and Marxist perspectives began to explicitly raise the question of whether such courses were intended to maintain the current order or to produce changes within it. Paradoxically, at the same time, most of these courses could be accused of reifying the bodies of knowledge on which they drew.

Not until the 1970s did the sources of knowledge itself come to be questioned. The traditional epistemological view saw knowledge as objective, "given," and "out there," while the emerging interpretive paradigm viewed it as socially constructed and the outcome of negotiation. Joan Whitehead (1974), reviewing The New Social Studies by Lawton and Dufour in Social Science Teacher, claimed that the authors were "seeking to further legitimize a view of social studies grounded in social science as an academic discipline. . . . Hence they seek to institutionalize this approach rather than engage in questioning the nature and status of sociological knowledge and its place in the school curriculum--issues which are at the forefront of the controversy within the broader arena of sociology." Thus the authors were accepting social science knowledge as objective and "given" rather than something which is a social product. This point has important implications for one's view of education and school knowledge, particularly control of knowledge.

It is necessary to distinguish between a (Durkheimian) view of education as enabling neophytes to take their places as competent and acceptable members of an adult society as we know it and a view of education as enabling neophytes, who may be young, to participate in the creation of a world that is partly theirs—not given, but yet to be made. The American philosopher Maxine Greene makes a distinction between education as a structure of socially prescribed knowledge—external to the knower, there to be mastered—and education as a possi-
bility for the learner as an existing person who is mainly concerned with making sense of his own life world. Viewed from the latter standpoint, the problem of defining the curriculum and curriculum content is one of offering a satisfactory explanation of such questions as: What is school knowledge? Who says what about curricula? Why and how do they say it?

As we have seen, social and political education in Britain during the 20th century has been haphazard and transient. In times of political and economic instability there have been calls for more teaching about "democratic values" or "preparation for adult life," but with the passing of each crisis the traditional curriculum has prevailed.

In contemporary Britain, pressure for social and political education is once more on the increase, as inflation and technological developments threaten the maintenance of the work ethic and encourage the development of political activity outside the institutionalized structures of politics. While the pattern of current developments is varied and complex, we can identify four main models of social and political education and two underlying values which inform all four models.

The first of these values is instrumentalism. While traditional subjects are legitimated in the curriculum primarily in terms of their intrinsic worth, social and political education is defined largely in terms of achieving some behavioral or social change. Mathematics is not taught with the specific intention of changing pupils' behavior, nor are such subjects as science and languages. Not even history is explicitly justified in terms of its socialization function, although there may be some vague awareness that studying history tends to encourage loyalty to the nation. Social and political education, however, is nearly always justified in terms of some desirable outcome. This might be a greater level of political literacy, "healthier" attitudes toward smoking and drugs, an enhanced capacity to make moral decisions, or greater respect for other people. Such phrases as "preparation for adult roles" and "encouraging the healthy use of leisure" abound in the area of social/political education. The possibility that such study may have intrinsic merit is rarely considered.

The second underlying value is relevance. This is usually stressed when legitimating the subject to pupils and parents. Because political
and social education, unlike most other subjects, deals with the world that pupils and teachers inhabit, it is possible to claim that it has relevance in a way that history or physics might not. Thus, sex education or learning how to apply for a mortgage is more relevant than studying the Romans in Britain or the Canadian Shield. This justification is of special importance in relation to the curriculum of “less-able” pupils, for whom the study of subjects per se and the consequent accumulation of examination passes is thought to be both inappropriate and difficult to achieve. Providing a more “relevant” curriculum is then simply an aspect of maintaining order and authority.

Although these two values are associated to a greater or lesser extent with all forms of social/political education, the forms themselves are varied. Unless a school is following some externally prescribed syllabus, the manifestation of social/political education will depend on the resources and philosophy available in each school. Nevertheless, we can derive from this variegated practice four types of models: (1) knowledge, in which the transmission of facts is the central concern, (2) concepts, where students are required to analyze knowledge in a conceptual framework, (3) issues/problems, where the selection of facts and/or concepts is determined by the existence of “problems” in the world outside school, and (4) skills, where the aim is to enable students to fulfill their adult roles and/or to act purposefully in the world. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to an examination of these models for social/political education.

**Four Models for Social/Political Education**

The Knowledge Model

We have already suggested that a traditional approach to education involves a considerable emphasis on facts, under pressure from examination formats which stress recall. Social/political education frequently reflects this emphasis even when formal examinations are not used. It has consequently attracted the criticism that a course which treats knowledge as “given” presents a false image of the world. This criticism is particularly pertinent in social/political education, where the knowledge concerned is directly about the social world. However, a neo-Marxist explanation of this situation is that it is no accident that
schooling is organized around knowledge. If schooling exists to reproduce the necessary conditions for the reproduction of capitalist social relations, then a curriculum based on the transmission of knowledge asserts the primacy of existing facts and inhibits the recognition of alternatives.

In British education, the knowledge approach to social/political education is seen best in such externally examined courses as O-level British constitution, CSE syllabuses in civics or social studies, and the Scottish modern studies. A typical social studies syllabus will require students to know about types of housing, income tax procedures, mortgages, and stocks. A civics course might require students to know about election procedures, the details of the passage of a bill through Parliament, and even the rituals associated with Parliament, such as the mace and Black Rod. Although it is now recognized that such courses are often more boring and irrelevant than "traditional" subjects, attempts to make them more acceptable in contemporary terms may only lead to further problems. Thus, social studies courses derived from recognized disciplines, such as sociology or political science, may come to treat the concepts and categories of these disciplines as facts. Students learn definitions of the extended family and the nuclear family or list the functions of education or the causes of delinquency as if these were a further class of facts to be learned and recalled at appropriate times.

However, social and political knowledge differs fundamentally from knowledge found in more-traditional subjects. The functions of a condenser, the battle of Malplaquet, and the square of a hypotenuse are all, in themselves, fairly innocuous. They are not part of students' ordinary lives. But that is not true of most facts pertaining to social/political education. In different ways, social/political facts are part of a student's own experiences. "Types of housing" may be facts like "types of farming"; unlike farms, however, houses of one sort or another are part of everyone's life. The "generation gap" as a topic may touch on some very real and possibly painful emotions in students' lives in a way that irregular French verbs never will. "Politics" for many students means the party political program on television, which everyone switches off.
Many teachers recognize these difficulties but are unable to envisage or implement alternatives. The cognitive orientation of most curriculum and assessment structures eventually reduces all discussion and spontaneity to the necessary factlike processes. Moreover, in isolation it is almost impossible to prevent the apparent objectivity of factual knowledge from disguising a covert prescription. Without some discussion of social values and class structures, it is almost inevitable that an apparently value-free lesson on housing will communicate and reinforce the differential status attached to owner-occupied and rented property, especially council-rented property, in the dominant culture. Some facts in history may perform a similar function. In contrast to a lecture on the physiology of tapeworms, a lesson on the sinking of the Spanish Armada may call forth an emotional reaction similar to that provoked by the news of England's win in the 1966 World Cup. In this respect, history is as much a purveyor of secular myths as social studies. Nevertheless, the problem is most acute in the area of social/political education.

One response to the problem of "knowledge" in social education is to take the phenomenological stance seriously and start with the students' own interests and understandings. However, this approach frequently leads to vagueness, lack of purpose, and sterile, if gargantuan, projects on football teams and pop music groups. Another response is a resource-based approach which allows a good deal of individual and group initiative while providing concrete starting points and guidelines. Gleeson and Whitty, however, suggest that more than this is necessary:

... the teacher needs to be more than a manager of resources, he must become an active collaborator in devising pupils' plans for learning. ... The aim would then be to offer alternative perspectives or questions about the "obvious" which would open up the possibility of new insights without prescribing the sort of particular outcomes which deny the pupil his own part in transcending what "is" (Gleeson and Whitty 1976, p. 17).

In this way knowledge still has a major role to play, but its reflexive nature in social/political education is taken into account and can become an important ingredient in the learning process.
The development of social/political education around concepts, rather than facts, is widely approved in theory but not always implemented in practice. The problem, in part, is that the relationship between concept and fact is not always clear and unambiguous. There is, for instance, a very large gulf between a "fact" of social change—say, the increase in white-collar occupations—and the concept of social change itself. The result is that either the facts come to swamp any conceptual understanding or the concepts themselves become "factlike."

A recent report on humanities examinations included the following point: "There has been a distinct trend in public examinations toward testing awareness of key concepts for a given subject rather than mere compilation of facts. The comments of examiners all too frequently amount to a plea for fleshing out the concepts with appropriate examples, marks being awarded for the pertinence of the selection" (Brown 1980). But this is easier said than done, given the traditional, didactic methods employed in most British classrooms. Conceptual understanding requires a large measure of dialogue and discussion as well as more-traditional teaching.

In Bruner's approach to education, the purpose of developing curricula around concepts is to achieve intellectual growth:

It is only in a trivial sense that one gives a course to "get something across," merely to impart information. There are better means to that end than teaching. Unless the learner also masters himself, disciplines his taste, deepens his view of the world, the "something" that is got across is hardly worth the effort of transmission (Bruner 1966, p. 73).

However, Bruner recognizes the problem of matching facts and concepts: "Given particular subject matter or a particular concept, it is easy to ask trivial questions. It is also easy to ask impossibly difficult questions. The trick is to find the medium questions that can be answered and that take you somewhere" (Bruner 1960, p. 40).

In social/political education the concepts approach has several advantages over the knowledge approach:

—Knowledge is not excluded; but, rather, concepts enable facts to be organized rationally.
Facts are not treated as an irreducible level of objectivity, but interpreted in terms of explicit values which can be recognizably linked to social and political ideologies.

The concepts approach demands much more dialogue and thus enables students to discuss their existing understandings in relation to new ones.

Of the drawbacks, we have already mentioned the difficulties of relating concepts to facts and of injecting genuine discussion into authoritarian classrooms. Another problem, more acute for social/political education than for such subjects as math or science, is defining a concept. Moreover, even if concepts could be readily identified, the task of determining the basic concepts appropriate to social/political education would not be easy.

Bruner sees concepts as part of the structure of subjects or disciplines of knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, that the concepts approach is usually associated with the teaching of recognizable academic disciplines or integrated courses in which the disciplines are seen as the starting point for integration. This has a particular significance for social/political education, whose "facts" can be taught by virtually any teacher. Unlike scientific facts or historical facts, social political "facts" are everyone's prerogative. Knowledge-based social/political instruction may therefore be perceived as being within the professional capacity of any teacher because it requires no special training or insights but can draw on the average educated person's experience of the world. However, insofar as concepts are linked to disciplines, a concepts approach demands the use of teachers trained in the discipline. Social/political education thus acquires not only greater educational respectability and academic rigor but also the status of a "proper" subject rather than everyday knowledge or common sense.

In Britain the concepts approach is best illustrated when claims are being made for the legitimacy of social/political education. The following excerpt from a Schools Council document clearly reflects some of the points made in the previous paragraph:

[Members of the] Social Sciences Committee believe that in the social and political area of experience we should avoid placing an emphasis solely on what people know, but encourage...
them to intellectual activity which can form the basis for practical action in young people's everyday lives. Consequently, we emphasize the contribution of social sciences to the development of such intellectual skills as the ability to:

(i) organize familiar and new knowledge;
(ii) understand the formation of concepts and ideas;
(iii) apply concepts and ideas to new and familiar situations;
(iv) interpret and analyze such situations;
(v) assess evidence and draw conclusions;
(vi) diagnose problems and suggest or evaluate solutions;
(vii) express and communicate appropriately the foregoing knowledge and skills. (Schools Council 1979)

Bruner's own scheme, MACOS, represents another attempt to utilize the concepts approach. MACOS, of course, is well known for its attempt to put Bruner's theories into practice and for the explicit way in which certain concepts are seen to be central to the learning outcomes. It may also display, in the most obvious way, the processes by which conceptual awareness is undermined by factual acquisition:

Very few teachers have been trained in the specific skills of questioning and discussion, yet these are central to the course. Most teachers dominate discussions and restrict their questioning to the lowest cognitive level of factual recall, suppressing the speculation, hypothesizing, inquiry, and community of learning valued by the developers (Townley 1979).

Another manifestation of the concept approach is to be found in the report of the Programme for Political Education. Bernard Crick's major contribution to the theoretical basis of the program is his adumbration of a series of concepts which could form the structuring framework for a syllabus in political education. Crick differs from Bruner in that Crick explicitly detaches concepts from academic disciplines:

We perceive and we think in concepts. Concepts are, as it were, the building blocks with which we construct a picture of the external world, including imaginary or hoped-for worlds. So concepts are not true or false, they simply help us to perceive and to communicate (Crick and Porter 1978).

Crick's core view of political education is not that it should be derived from academic political science, still less from political sociology, but rather that it should engage students in the "language of everyday life" with a view to increasing their political literacy rather than teaching them concepts. Even so, Crick recognizes that his concepts—for example, power, justice, and freedom—are drawn from the
tradition of political philosophy. He concludes his paper by stating, "All I advocate is a far greater conceptual awareness in interpreting material in any study of politics." (Crick and Porter 1978, p. 60).

The Issues/Problems Model

As we indicated earlier, there is currently a strong view in Britain that social/political education should find a place in the curriculum. As noted by Her Majesty's Inspectors, "all pupils have to be prepared to meet the basic intellectual and social demands of adult life and helped to form an acceptable set of personal values" (Department of Education and Science 1980). The term "prepared" refers, not to a moral commitment on the part of pupils, but rather to a task for teachers. Although it is sometimes said that such preparation can be done through teaching such traditional subjects as history and geography, the demands of a discipline squeeze out any significant discussion of the requirements of adult life. At the same time, some social science disciplines—for example, sociology—are viewed with suspicion or regarded as unsuitable for precollege students. Thus, there is no way of dealing adequately with social/political education through the normal discipline structures. What therefore emerges in many schools is an approach to social/political education based on issues and problems.

Issues are matters of current public debate; for example, proportional representation or abortion. Problems are mainly moral issues in which it seems desirable to influence pupils' behavior; two examples might be the dangers of smoking and the importance of voting. Even such larger "problems" as pollution and leisure (always a "problem" in this kind of context) may be focused down onto individual behavior. What is or is not a "problem" is defined with reference to the prevailing worries of the adult middle class.

Basing social/political education on issues and problems presents the following difficulties:

—The content of courses is determined solely by the agenda of public debate as interpreted by the teaching staff; this practice may encourage the acceptance of "official" definitions of issues rather than the recognition of alternative definitions.
- Since issues cannot be "taught," teaching methods rely heavily on discussion—which can easily degenerate into the exchange of slogans and conventional wisdom, in the absence of informed resources.

- The image of the adult world which emerges from a diet of issues and problems is one in which crisis and conflict are endemic, thus neglecting the processes which create stability and order.

- The removal of issues and problems from any structural context tends to encourage the belief that they are the outcome of conflicting attitudes and can therefore be "solved" by attitudinal change.

- Issues and problems naturally give rise to courses which are ethnocentric and ahistorical, with the exception of occasional reference to third-world issues.

Political education easily lends itself to the issues approach. Discussion paper 2.5 in the Report of the Programme for Political Education actually includes the words "issues" and "problems" in its title, "Issues and Political Problems" (Crick and Porter 1978). In this paper, issues are defined as disagreements over goals, values, methods, and results. On this basis, students learn only about situations in which disagreement is present; thus there is little chance of discussing political processes which prevent disagreement (for example, legitimation) nor of exploring routine aspects of social and political life which limit and contain disagreement.

An even-more-damaging criticism of the issues approach to political education is that, since the "issue" is the starting point of the course, the tendency will be to take it at face value and simply explore the arguments put forth in public debate. The possibility of analyzing the ways in which parties to an issue define it and manipulate it is almost, though not entirely, precluded. Moreover, unless a mass of detailed information relevant to the issue is available in some relatively objective form, resources for exploring the issue in schools will be heavily dependent on the popular media—which may themselves be heavily implicated in the issue.

The way in which social knowledge is justified in the curriculum, outside of the social science disciplines, as being problem oriented is neatly illustrated by two CSE Mode 1 syllabi offered by the same board. In one syllabus, labeled "social studies," the word "problems" appears
frequently: "The Family and Its Problems," "Mass Communications: Use and Misuse," "British Social Problems and Services," "World Population and Its Problems." In the syllabus labeled "sociology" there are no such headings. However, some Mode 3 syllabi may read like catalogs of current social ills.

However, where "problems" really make an impact on the curriculum is in the various special pleading courses which currently exist, among them sex education, health education, drug education, parenthood education, political education, social education, consumer education, and multiracial education. Although in Britain these "educations" must struggle with each other and with existing subjects for timetable space, most of those listed above enjoy varying degrees of official support. What they have in common is a "problem." It might be something specific, such as drugs, or something less tangible, such as the supposed breakup of the family or the growth of political extremism. But whatever the problem, "education" is seen as a contribution to a "cure," and a more or less organized group sets about developing ideas and materials to "educate" students into (or out of) the problem. In this country at present, social/political education is in some danger of becoming wholly identified with attempts to solve social problems.

The Skills Model

A fourth model of social/political education is based on the acquisition of skills. The emphasis in skill-based courses is on providing pupils with a capacity to act in the adult world. Part of the skills approach is based on general arguments about literacy and numeracy, but in the specifically social/political area skills range from those as mundane as learning to manage a personal budget to more-complex skills—for example, child rearing or organizing action on a community issue.

A recent report on social and life skills in the further education sector (Developing Social and Life Skills 1980) suggests that teachers have varying reasons for wanting to impart skills. Some see their pupils as deficient in some way and want to "normalize" them. Some stress the need to make pupils competent in particular skills. For some teachers, information is a sufficient basis for adult skills, but others feel that pupils should be able to reflect on their experiences. Some
teachers frankly want to socialize their pupils into specific attitudes and values, while others merely want to act as counselors.

We suggest that there are two main patterns of motivation underlying the skills approach: One stresses skills to survive in a complex world through adaptation and effective role playing; the other points to possibilities of changing the world.

The first approach tends to be the official one. In a Schools Council publication dated 1968 we find the following statement: "Young people's experience is inevitably shot through with the desire and need to come to terms with the objective world of their family, neighborhood and community" (Schools Council 1968). By 1980 these sentiments had focused on fairly specific skills:

At the same time all pupils have to be prepared to meet the basic intellectual and social demands of adult life, and helped to form an acceptable set of personal values. There are some skills—the effective use of language is the most obvious one—which are essential for everyone. There are some sorts of knowledge—about themselves, about other people, about the nature of the world in which they are growing up—which all pupils need. Personal and social development in this broad sense is a major charge on the curriculum (Department of Education and Science 1930).

In this view, students are clearly seen to need help in fitting in, in coming to terms, in meeting demands, and in forming "acceptable" personal values.

One may analyze these objectives in purely Durkheimian terms. The result might well be that Durkheim himself would never have condoned such crudities. However, there are two practical objections to this version of the skills approach. In the first place, it assumes that students must come to terms with the adult world, when it may be equally true to say that adults must come to terms with the world of young people. Second, the assumption is made that without schools young people would fail to become normal functioning adults. This is a very large claim indeed. It rests on the presumption that a course of schooling in social education is a prerequisite for individual happiness and social stability. If that were so, the crisis of civilization would indeed be upon us. Since the argument is always that social education is unsatisfactory, presumably current social ills are being attributed to this inadequacy.
The second facet of the skills approach is to be found in certain definitions of "social education" which suggest that students should be given the necessary skills to alter their situation. The Schools Council Social Education Project took this view. Its working definition of social education was "an explicit attempt to teach people an awareness of their surroundings, sensitivity to their own and to one another's problems, and an appreciation of how individuals can collaborate both to inform themselves and to better their own lot" (Rennie et al. 1974, p. 8). A more succinct definition appeared in a follow-up report: "Social education is an enabling process through which children may acquire skills which will allow them both to achieve a greater understanding of society and to effect change within it" (Masterman 1972). A similar definition is given in a report prepared by a social education working party at Monkwearmouth School, Sunderland: "Social education is the lifelong process of developing those attitudes, skills and modes of behavior which will enable the individual to integrate happily in whatever social context he finds himself and to be active constructively in molding, improving, and changing that society" (Report of the Social Education Working Party 1979).

Those for whom social/political education is a radical exercise in developing critical awareness find this approach to skills very attractive. Gleeson and Whitty said of the Social Education Project: "Their own notion of social education has, we feel, much in common with the notion of social studies as a collaborative and critical enterprise which can result in a conscious decision by pupils to become involved in action for social and political change" (Gleeson and Whitty 1976, p. 91).

However, even this definition of "skills" can quickly become shorn of its transforming elements. One does not have to look far for the emphasis on the complexity of modern society. This theme is stated in the very first paragraph of the Report of the Social Education Project:

One of the qualities of a good education is that it should enable young people to adapt successfully to the requirements of living in the conditions which face them now and will face them when their formal education is over. In modern society these requirements are many and complex, just as society itself is complex. Moreover society is constantly changing, and today's students are being educated for a kind of life which neither we nor they can foresee (Rennie et al. 1974).
And again from Monkwearmouth: "Although it is clear that social education is largely concerned with the formation of attitudes and modes of behavior, there is also an obvious need for pupils to become aware of the nature of the complex changing society they are a part of" (Report of the Social Education Working Party 1979). References to "fitting in" are also present. The Monkwearmouth definition refers to "integrating happily," while the Social Education Project came up with a highly positivistic approach to adult roles: "If our students are to fulfill roles in society which will bring satisfaction to themselves and be beneficial to others, education must not only help them in the development of personality and academic ability, but also provide them with the skills which are necessary to cope with a sophisticated and expanding technology" (Rennie et al. 1974, p. 7). Social/political education as "skills" is clearly only for the "less able."

Conclusion

The current state of social/political education in Britain is one of haphazard development, largely outside the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the social sciences. To some extent this is the result of ignorance, but in part it is a matter of conscious choice. Thus, the field is dominated by questions of morality and values rather than a systematic approach based on social science disciplines.

The future does not give cause for optimism. Apart from current economic restrictions, traditional ideological influences are strong. Perhaps it is appropriate to finish where we began, with Durkheim: "There is, then, in each period a prevailing type of education from which we cannot deviate without encountering that lively resistance which restrains the fancies of dissent" (Durkheim 1956).

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3. THEORY AND CONTENT OF POLITICAL EDUCATION IN WEST GERMANY

By Wolfgang Hilligen

In suggesting theoretical and practical answers to basic questions about content—What should be taught? Why? To what end?—I shall proceed on the assumption that, especially in political education, there is no fundamental structural difference between school teaching and university teaching in the teaching of social studies, civics, and the social sciences.

In the first section I will present a short survey of the current problems in academic teaching in the social sciences. In the second section I will attempt to explain why the selection and justification of content and aims has become a new problem in itself. In the third section I will describe a number of methods, instruments, and psychological prerequisites which have been developed or defined for the selection of content for school and university teaching; in doing so I will examine a number of differences between concepts of didactics in the United States and parallel concepts in the Federal Republic of Germany and, in a short digression, summarize findings of cognitive learning theory which have proved helpful in the selection and structuring of content. In the fourth section I will mention a number of other instruments for academic teaching—for the relationship between systematic scientific knowledge and content covered in actual school teaching as well as for cooperation between related disciplines. Two appendices provide (1) an example of different approaches that could be applied in academic teaching and (2) some remarks on the problem of epistemological justification of normative decisions.

Some Problems of Academic Teaching in the Social Sciences

Since the late 1960s, dissatisfaction with the results of academic teaching has been steadily growing. There are symptoms of this in all disciplines, particularly in the humanities and social sciences. One hears of history students who in their second semester claim never to have heard of Napoleon, theology students who know nothing about Moses. Medical students keep complaining about the unresolved conflict between
specialization and general studies. Even in philosophy—which, with its systematic framework and constant scrutiny of categories, was thought to have possessed an unshakable academic canon—we have seen an attempt to develop a particular pedagogical methodology, since the philosophers have realized that they are no longer able to communicate with their students.

In short, in all the scholarly disciplines one hears the complaint that the highly specialized results of research can be transmitted only with great difficulty. And what often passes unmentioned is the fact that it is left up to the students to recognize connections and context, to incorporate particulars into a general comprehension of their field (in earlier times one would have said into a comprehension of their world).

Political scientists are especially affected by these difficulties, and they realize it. In contrast to practitioners of political philosophy, history, economics, and sociology, their field is constrained by the heterogeneity of its derivation as the meeting point of several disciplines. Moreover, as a relatively young discipline, political science in particular must face the demands of legitimizing its specialized research through practical application of its results, despite the irreconcilable differences between reflection and action. When political scientists state that they have no answers to concrete problems, this is considered a self-condemnation.

In my view, there is a connection between the gaps separating the theory, practice, and findings of political science and the way in which the subject is taught at school and in the universities. The interdisciplinary derivation of the discipline and the complexity of the phenomena investigated and described (phenomena which seldom allow straightforward statements); the compulsion toward specialization, since the mass of information cannot be managed otherwise; the dependence upon cooperation with neighboring disciplines, since all concrete problems are interdisciplinary—in this situation the teacher of political science is often faced with the need to choose between presenting highly differentiated particulars ("teaching everything about nothing") and indulging in broad generalizations ("teaching nothing about everything"). And of course the most common way out of this is to ride one's own hobby horse and to leave perception of relationships and integration up to the
student. But what student is in a position to do this? Perhaps political science majors after ten semesters; hardly, however, those students from other disciplines whose goal is to teach in state schools. What remains is "decimated rationality," at best an isolated series of facts and dates.

We may see these problems systematically culminating in political science, but they are, of course, comparable to those found in all disciplines, particularly in the humanities.

Reasons for Problems Related to Identifying Content and Aims

If choice of content and justification of aims have become problems themselves in the educational sciences, I consider the following reasons to be the most important:

--The exponential increase in knowledge and, in this connection, social and economic change which has called into question previous priorities in the transmission of the scientifically known ("loss of a canon") and

--The necessity of taking into account newer studies in pedagogical science which deal with the fundamentals and premises of perception and learning.

Some brief elaborations on the "loss of a canon": The exponentially rising increase in scientifically secured knowledge has made the question of selection of instructional materials a problematic one. In 1966, a group of Stanford University researchers established that the amount of available knowledge had quadrupled in each of the following time frames: (1) from 1800 to 1900, (2) from 1900 to 1950, (3) from 1950 to 1960, and (4) from 1960 to 1965. This process is continuing. This "knowledge explosion" has been identified as a major problem of our time, a problem which cannot be solved by traditional methods (Bild der Wissenschaft 1976). Rapid social change has meant that common everyday knowledge (to be more precise, the common cognitive structure—see Digression 1) no longer suffices in apperceiving new information. The disorientation arising from this situation is increasing faster than the possibilities for overcoming it. What was wisdom yesterday can be stupidity tomorrow.
What is new about this situation is that until not long ago there were still generally accepted channels ("agents for the mediation of meaning") for things thought to be of primary significance in learning. From myth, religion, classical philosophy, tradition and custom, and, finally, from the consensus of scholars (as long as they could still encompass the results of their disciplines) came the things to be taught, known, and mastered.

All in all, it can be said that our historical situation is marked by the fact that mankind has reached a turning point: for the first time in history, not only individual races but the entire human species is in danger of extinction. The "limits of growth," the shortage of natural resources, the endangering of the ecological system, social inequality within industrialized nations and particularly between rich countries and developing ones—these are problems which concern all nations, even if they are not as yet aware of this fact. Political education must concern itself with these problems. All nations are faced with the need to "learn or perish," as the Club of Rome describes in its fourth report, *No Limits to Learning: Bridging the Human Gap* (1979). "Loss of canon" has become the existential challenge for education.

The "knowledge explosion" and the new content which must be learned require pedagogical and psychological answers to two further questions: 
(1) How can complex and voluminous information be reduced without becoming dangerously simplified? and (2) How can the recognition and understanding of relationships and essential facts be made easier? We believe that any answers to these questions must take into account the structuring implications of the cognitive learning theories of Piaget, Bruner, and Ausubel (see Digression I).

Methods and Instruments for the Design of Content

An Explanation of the Term "Didaktik"

The problems mentioned above, along with other situations, led to the emergence of a new branch of pedagogical and social science called Didaktik in the Federal Republic. The German word "Didaktik" and other German words with the suffix "-didaktik" cannot be easily translated into English. A common definition of the English cognate "didactic" is
"too much inclined to teach others; pedantic." The German use of "Didaktik" is nonpejorative and comes closer to meaning "used for teaching; preceptive; containing doctrines, precepts, principles, or rules; intended to instruct" (Webster's 1971). The German term is still broader in meaning, encompassing theory, goals, content, methods, materials, and teaching strategies. In other words: Didaktik inquires as to the "what" (selection of content), "why" and "what for" (legitimation and intentionality), and "how" (methods, modalities of treatment) of teaching and learning. In its narrower sense Didaktik refers to the selection (legitimation and intentionality) of content, and it is in this sense that it is used predominately in this essay.

Fachdidaktik refers to the teaching of a particular disciplinary subject. Hochschuldidaktik is related primarily to the "how" of the learning process at the university level. Wissenschaftsdidaktik refers (in the narrower sense) to the selection and legitimation of the content to be studied in academic teaching and in the learning of an academic discipline.

Differences Between the United States and Germany

In the United States the purpose, learning goals, and basic content of political education have never been controversial. The nature of democratic ideas was established by the ideals of the Declaration of Independence, the dignity of national symbols, and the continuity of historical development. (Nearly the same could be said of Great Britain in regard to the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act, and other documents that established and reinforced a democratic tradition.) Thus, political education has been closely linked with the results and aims of political socialization; the problem for educators has been mainly one of selecting specific content and strategies.

The conditions for political education in the Federal Republic, on the other hand, are marked by the fact that historical continuity has been broken many times. Germany had and still has to deal with the crimes committed by Germans in the Third Reich and with authoritarian and antidemocratic traditions which are still alive in some parts of our society. Thus, teaching cannot rely heavily on political socialization in and by the family and society, which transmits common fundamental values; the schools (and universities) must be the mediators.
achieve by itself. The question of content, therefore, is more closely connected with the identification of educational aims than is the case in the United States and the United Kingdom. Linked to this problem are questions about the possibility of a scientific justification for normative decisions. This question has been raised by the argument on value judgments in the social sciences between positivist sociologists proceeding from an empirical analytical viewpoint and sociologists of the critical theory school (see Appendix 2).

Since the 1960s questions about what should be taught, why, and to what end have been investigated in the United States, as well as in the Federal Republic, in the context of curriculum theory. Thus, the German word "Didaktik," in its broad sense, has much in common with the American term "curriculum." To date, however, the question of content and its legitimation has received more attention in Germany.

The Selection of Didaktik Instruments

Selection of content (What has to be taught and learned?) should be approached from the standpoint of these questions: What information about society and politics—which results of research in the social sciences—can be regarded as so generally significant that it must be imparted to all students if they are to be enabled to master their existence in a time of worldwide change? If they are to understand and judge what is of importance for survival and for a life with human dignity? If they are to be qualified to participate in the solution of existential problems? This means that the correct starting point for content analysis is neither the traditional school syllabus of traditional subjects nor the findings of the social sciences, however necessary the latter may be to validate the selection of content; rather, the starting point should be existential problems and needs—situations in the students' societal or national environment which mirror these problems and needs and about which the students can make decisions and participate in political action.

Before identifying specific curricula, we must deal briefly with two questions raised earlier: (1) How can complex and voluminous information be reduced and structured without becoming dangerously simplified? and (2) How can the recognition and understanding of relationships and
essential facts be made easier? The findings of cognitive learning theory have been helpful in suggesting answers to the second question.

Digression 1

A FEW FINDINGS AND PRINCIPLES OF COGNITIVE THEORY

Learning can be said to have taken place when a general principle is so clearly demonstrated in a particular case that the learner is able to formulate it as a rule, a key concept, or a problem and to recognize it again in other specific cases. Put another way: whether something has been learned depends on:

--Whether the content is structured around key concepts, criteria, and key questions so as to allow, even force, generalization.

--Whether and to what extent this generalization process is itself clarified and learned at the same time.

--Whether an opportunity is provided to check the generalization against new information.

This cycle of abstraction and reconcretization characterizes didactic thinking (as it does everything scientific) and enables cognitive structures to be built up. Structures form or are formed according to prominent characteristics; for example, reality or parts of reality are often structured in terms of age, income, or class. Cognitive structures are formed with the aid of prominent characteristics or concepts--categories which people use to name, recognize, order, subdivide, structure, and perceive their environment. It is possible to identify four different types of cognitive structure:

1. The cognitive structure which every human has—the system of concepts with which he or she is able to perceive and organize the world. This structure is more or less the result of one's personal history of learning and experiences.

2. (Often parallel to #1.) The general structure of thought or conscious structures to be found in any given period—those things generally considered to be important/unimportant, desirable/undesirable. This is dependent on the overall forces that influence the people of the period—as well as on class situation, age, and special environment.

3. The structures recognized by science. These agree only approximately with reality. (Admittedly, they are often concerned with only a part of reality, depending on their relationship to a specific discipline.) Scientific structures can be recognized by their systems of concepts.

4. The cognitive structures which (in political teaching) are concerned with the problems of coexistence, survival, and
recognize and evaluate decisive questions about society and
the state.

These characteristics, concepts, categories, and ques-
tions are the starting point for the selection of politol-
ical and politcal didactic instruments.

In formulating and concretizing the basic criterion for the fourth
type of cognitive structure described in Digression 1—that concerned
with existence and survival—I take as my point of departure the con-
cepts of "opportunity" and "risk." The following questions arise:

—Which life situations of the present day (and presumably of the
future) are most likely to present risks and opportunities that affect
individuals and mankind, according to assertions of the social sciences
and other sciences?

—Which changes and challenges of the scientific/technological age,
which present opportunities and risks, remain without (or without ade-
quate) political responses?

The concepts of opportunity, risk, and challenge can be made more
concrete when they are related to important life needs. Thus these
further questions:

—to what degree are people threatened by hunger (nonsatisfaction
of most basic needs in the most general form), by oppression (from
imprisonment to more gentle forms of manipulation), by physical destruc-
tion?

—What opportunities are there for satisfaction of needs, self-
determination, coexistence, or peace in a historical situation charac-
terized by the challenges of global interdependence, industrial mass
production, and potential for the destruction of the fundamentals of
life?

Further complementary elements of a didactic method are the follow-
ing key questions, which inquire into distribution of wealth and power,
control, equality of opportunity and participation, the selection of
means to bring about necessary or desired political goals, and the conse-
quences of decision making for the people affected:

—Who is affected? How much? For what reason?

—How much control is needed? How much flexibility? (What amount
of binding control is necessary for survival; what amount of flexibility,
necessary for self-fulfillment, should be politically secured, so that
individual rights are not endangered?)
How much direct participation should there be? How much competence and delegation?

Which means should be used for the realization of goals (education, positive/negative sanctions, force)?

Which forces endanger those goals?

And, in connection with all of these key questions:

Who makes the decisions? Who is in a position to establish regulations? (On the basis of which power structure, which property relationships?) Which possibilities do individuals, or certain social groups, or the constituted society have?

To most of these questions there are, of course, no immediate "correct" answers—not even in those instances where the questions are asked by the disciplines themselves with a deliberate didactic purpose. Rather, such methodological questions are meant to serve as a way of making choices among the range of existing answers, and they provide an overview by means of structuring those answers.

The selection and structuring of answers, as well as the establishment of relationships between the particular and the general, can be aided by a "pincer" question as a part of the didactic instruments:

What amount of factual, conceptual, and methodological knowledge is prerequisite for the realization of an important, more general goal in the learning process? To turn the question around: Is the particular factual, conceptual, and methodological knowledge really necessary for the realization of the general goal? Is enough truly representative knowledge presented?

Built into these categories and key questions (notably in the fourth category of cognitive structure—"dignified survival") are unavoidable value positions on what is possible, necessary, or desirable; what one chooses to designate as opportunity or as risk, and the corresponding decisions one makes, depend on one's conscious or unconscious interests. Even when a teacher wants to be or should be impartial, prejudices will influence his selection criteria and structuring characteristics; that is the inevitable weakness of many a theoretical position. It is, therefore, necessary that the subjective nature of such decisions be made explicit and that they remain open to criticism and allow for alterna-
motives. And it is necessary to legitimize those decisions by epistemological reflection.

Further Instruments for Analyzing the Content of Academic Teaching

Content Analysis in School Teaching and Academic Teaching

The preceding outlines of a didactic instrument, conceived as an attempt to provide public school pedagogy with a procedural framework for investigating structure of phenomena and problems in the field of political science, has also been applied by the Fernstudienlehrgang Sozialwissenschaft of Das Deutsche Institut für Fernstudien at Tubingen University and by the Funkkolleg Sozialer Wandel. In his report on a television project for social studies in the schools, Karlheinz Rebel observed: "One of the most interesting aspects of this experiment with television was the insight that not only could the identical didactic tools be used for pupils, university students and teachers, but also that the identical phenomena were relevant for all of them" (Rebel 1978). In its more theoretical aspects, the methodology requires reflection on the relationship between the system structure and phenomena or problem structure.

In the essay quoted above, Rebel began with the thesis that the systematic structure of the field which the specialist has constructed in the course of his studies will reach only those who have already assimilated the same structure or can be transmitted only to teachers who are interested in the same specialized scholarly orientation. This understanding, he claimed, does not acquire relevance for teachers who wish to relate theoretical knowledge to political practice and who take concrete problems and phenomena as their point of departure. Moreover, the reduction and isolation of factors can lead to a distancing from reality which neglects purpose-oriented reflection. Therefore, Rebel calls for a didactic thrust to complement theoretical studies (Rebel 1978, p. 67-75).

In measuring the relationship between system structure and problem structure, the pedagogical specialist as well as the scholar can orient himself around the following "pincer" questions: With regard to the concrete problem, which concepts and conclusions from research in the field do I need in order to perceive, judge, and "solve" the political,
social, economic, and legal problems represented in the phenomena at hand? And, from the standpoint of research orientation: For which general or specific concepts or theorems does the concrete problem provide a sharper understanding? Which information is necessary in order to analyze the problem? Which concepts necessary to an understanding of the discipline can be exemplified through scrutiny of the concrete problem?

Beyond this, academic teaching aims at systematizing. In contrast to school didactics, which primarily attempt to find answers to concrete or fundamental problems, the content to be taught and studied at the university level is also concerned with the approaches, concepts, principles, and structures of the discipline itself.

Anyone who plans to teach social studies (politics) at secondary levels I or II needs to consider what he should know in order to accomplish the following objectives:

---To acquire an overview and understanding of the discipline.
---To find scientific answers in conceptualizing problems.
---To calculate what the discipline can offer in terms of interdisciplinary investigations—and therefore what other disciplines he must know related to his field.
---To locate more-advanced information.
---To feel qualified to confront "spontaneous" prejudices in his students and in himself.

In answering all these questions, the student who wants to become a teacher should become qualified to find an answer to this broader question: What should be studied and taught if political science instruction is to enable students to participate in solving existential problems?

The structure and concept of systems can also be treated in the sense of problem structures. From this point of view, the teaching of political science—when, for example, the purpose is to provide an overview of the discipline—should not neglect to give information on the various views of politics, policy, and democracy; on opportunities for participation; on problems of preservation or change, regulation or non-regulation; on issues of private and public domains; that is, it should
not neglect the key questions outlined above. A similar concern applies to neighboring disciplines.

The school-level didactic content analysis approach can be extended so that the questions of "what," "why," and "how" can also be applied to academic teaching, at least with regard to "problem raising" and to a lesser degree to "problem solving." The discipline can profit much from such awareness and reflection. A restructuring of the discipline's approach toward problem structure, and vice versa, will lead, not to a loss of theoretical precision (as many political scientists still fear), but rather to a reciprocal illumination through which perception is enriched and the practical applicability of research is increased.

Relating the scientific approach to the didactic approach requires a continuous changing of roles for both teacher and learner, in the following ways:

—From making competent assertions to asking questions.
—From "solving" problems to "raising" problems (this is the reason why we use predominately key and "pincer" questions in our didactic instruments).
—From isolating knowledge to structuring knowledge.
—From certainty to uncertainty.
—From closedmindedness to openmindedness.

What Needs to be Known About Neighboring Sciences?

There are two reasons why political and social sciences (unlike most other areas) are dependent upon cooperation with the neighboring disciplines from which they have been derived:

—All the problems they deal with are interdisciplinary.
—They investigate certain aspects of human society which are also the subjects of other fields; in particular, history, philosophy, economics, jurisprudence, psychology, and anthropology. Those particular aspects which social sciences describe, explore, and evaluate—namely, the ways in which human society is or ought to be ordered, who possesses power; modes of decision making, and which consequences can be expected from the decision makers—can be dealt with only when, for each individual case, a variety of different kinds of information can be mobilized from other disciplines.
What we call "political" science is something unique—not perceived as such by other disciplines, but nevertheless dependent upon them: "The political is not everything, but it is in everything." There are two important requirements for ascertaining what one must know of other disciplines: (1) a general understanding of the fundamental mode of inquiry of the neighboring discipline and (2) an awareness of the particular findings and facts of the neighboring discipline which should be taken into consideration. It would appear that a research orientation is primarily concerned with the second question; however, in order to judge what a neighboring discipline has to offer, it is also necessary for research-oriented teaching to have an understanding of its fundamental emphases and approaches. This is particularly true of the social science teaching of secondary school educators.

Digression 2

SOME REMARKS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTENT, APPROACHES, AND MODES OF INQUIRY OF NEIGHBORING DISCIPLINES

That political science and sociology must cooperate is a truism; that sociology investigates social structures and (transformational) processes is known to every student. The two disciplines are seldom studied apart from one another and are often combined in a single area of study.

One often finds cooperative arrangements in various departments—which, to be sure, are not supported by all sociologists, since they fear that their quantifying methods may get shortchanged in an interdisciplinary effort; on the other hand, political scientists often claim that sociologists do not think through the premises of their own discipline sufficiently. It is, of course, necessary that political scientists also have command of empirical methodology.

In the area of economics, the concern is with the optimal combination of scarce means (input) for the provision of goods and social services which are either in demand or are held to be necessary for public welfare (output). A mode of inquiry on this basis prevents a purely positivistic view of economics. There are currently at least four new areas which belong to the fundamental problem areas of the scientific study of economics:

---A new concept of scarcity: alongside the fundamental scarcity of private and public goods (capital and labor) there is the recent scarcity of natural resources (growth limitations).

---The increasing importance of long-term planning.

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The greater significance of regional disparities.
The growth in relative comparability of economic processes in systems with differing production relationships.

Taken together, all of these factors demand a development in the economy "to a much stronger degree subservient to public, i.e., political developments" (Dahrendorf 1975, pp. 131 ff.), and this realization is one of the fundamentals the social sciences and social studies teacher must face.

In jurisprudence the primary issue is one of tension between the necessity of a binding social order which ensures peace (by means of which cooperative human existence can be regulated in the most reasonable and purposeful way) and individual desires for "justice"—in turn involved with the conflict between the attempts to provide each person equality and at the same time to reward individual effort (Heckel 1974).

Beyond this, there is the political-historical question of the origin of legal statutes, the degree to which legal equality has been attained, and the contradiction between laws and social development (Wietholter 1967, pp. 215-277).

The relationship between social science and history plays a role particularly in teacher training. We should continue to stress that "social sciences without history have no root; history without social sciences bears no fruit" (Finer 1970, p. 19).

In every pairing of another discipline with political science, the mode of inquiry of the other must be ascertained and cultivated. Without historical method, students cannot experience or understand the uniqueness of individuals and events; without a systematic synchronic method, they will not be able to see the truly human in humans, nor comprehend the similar tasks they are facing despite all differences in training.

Again, a "pincer" question could be formulated: From the point of view of a given historical situation, which problems concerning men in that period still play important roles for us? Which historical problems are no longer relevant? Which solutions have to be approached differently on the basis of developments (particularly the development in productive forces)?

From the point of view of political science: For which pressing social and sociological problems of our time does a given historical epoch contain comparable problems? Where does one find changes and differences?
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Appendix 1

AN EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO BE CONSIDERED IN ACADEMIC TEACHING IN A BASIC COURSE ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Table 1 shows how it might be possible to combine four different approaches/structures effectively, when giving and discussing this course. (The course is compulsory for student teachers of social studies/political education at some of our universities.)

In the synopsis the following four approaches are placed parallel to one another:

1. Content areas as commonly found in older textbooks.
2. Systematic concepts and categories of the social sciences.
3. Actual (concrete) problems, to be found in the present-day political discussion and relevant for the future.
4. Abstract problems, formulated as categories or key questions.

These four approaches are concerned with the four kinds of structure in Digression 1. It is my thesis that only if a student teacher learns to combine content areas and systematic knowledge with concrete political problems and their abstract modes can he be qualified to answer the question of significance of a selected content.

For example, the topic "social security" (the first column in Table 1) has to be seen as an aspect of systematic theories and political programs for social justice (column 2). It should be exemplified by current amendments (column 3), and it should be seen as a special case of the general (abstract, categorical) problem formulated in the key questions: How much? For whom? From whom? (and who has the power to decide this?) The same key questions are applicable to taxation policy and other problems of social policy.
## Table 1

**APPROACHES IN A BASIC COURSE "THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY" IN ACADEMIC TEACHING**

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<td>Prehistory (to 1945)</td>
<td>Political Science and Political Theory</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>How much direct/indirect?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginnings</td>
<td>(Theory of democracy with example)</td>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>How much from whom/for whom?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstruction phase</td>
<td>(Democratization with example)</td>
<td>Internal security</td>
<td>Supervision of the individual</td>
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<td>External security</td>
<td>Rights</td>
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<td>Federation and states</td>
<td>Political economics (productivity situation, development of productive power)</td>
<td>Ownership policy</td>
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<td>Legal system</td>
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<td>Sociology Structures (classes and levels)</td>
<td>Education and training</td>
<td>Allocation/socialization and regulation/nonregulation</td>
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<td>Processes (social change, mobility)</td>
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<td>Fringe groups and guest workers</td>
<td>Incentives for integration/regulation</td>
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Appendix 2

EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASES FOR VALUE JUDGMENTS AND SELECTION OF CONTENT

This appendix is intended to briefly outline the basic possibilities of a scientific justification for value judgments and selection criteria; it is also intended (because of the complicated nature of the subject, as a first approach) to clarify the suitability of a complementary relationship between the various approaches of scientific method.

An introduction to the study of basic positions should proceed with very general questions. They could be formulated as follows:

--With which methods is it possible to make conclusive and verifiable statements about man, society, nature?

--Which premises concerning the aim of knowledge control the direction of teaching and research? Should one's efforts attempt to serve "neutral" knowledge (and is this possible?) or should they be aimed at control of nature? control of men? regulation of society? support of "progress" making possible a "dignified" life?

The second question has never been conclusively answered; in the tradition of German idealism, "objective" knowledge was emphasized; today there is general recognition that even those who claim "value-free" scholarship are colored by presuppositions and that theory and practice cannot be easily separated.

With regard to the "how" of perception, one finds differing positions in fundamental opposition to one another:

--Theories which work empirically, which proceed from observation and experiment, and which investigate the observable and measurable in order to derive conclusive, general laws held to be relatively independent of the observer.

--The methods and theories of historical philosophy and humanities which attempt to elucidate historical reality through interpretation of texts and artifacts.

--Critical/dialectical theories operating with a historical concept of a social totality which investigate the relationship between man and society with regard to what is necessary and possible in a society with human dignity.
Within the third orientation, a differentiation should be made between orthodox Marxism and critical social theory (the Frankfurt school: Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas).

In the following explanation, only the empirical/analytic theories (critical rationalism) and the critical theory of society are taken into account because they were the ones concerned with the discussion on epistemology in regard to the "dispute over positivism" with mutual recognition of basic rationality. The normative/ontological position has not played a role in this discussion, although this position, in combination with empirical/analytic elements, is represented by a fair number of social and pedagogical scientists.

Empirical/Analytic Theories (Critical Rationalism)

The triumph of natural science was brought about by "positivistic" methods in the widest sense. Observation, description, classification, abstraction—these are the stages that the method employs. Experimentation becomes a directed activity controlled by a theory (Popper). Problems are investigated on the border between knowledge and nonknowledge (Popper). In order to achieve verifiable results, problems must be divided into measurable, observable factors, and the other variables in the experiment must be kept constant. This is possible with experiments in the natural sciences, more difficult in the general area of the organized world, and most difficult in the area of humans and their social relationships. Results achieved in this way are valid for rational criticism only as long as they are not proved false by new investigations. The aim is, therefore, a critical evaluation of one's own research. Norms and values are held to be "prescientific," personal matters, because they are not accessible to the methods of isolating and measuring. Value judgments and political decisions are for the protagonists of critical rationalism, prescientific. One is limited to the explanation of rational order.

The Critical Theory of Society (Frankfurt School)

Critical theory perceives itself as a further development, a "reconstruction" (Habermas) of Marxism on the basis of the historical development since Marx, as well as the development of scientific thought in our century. The controversy within Marxist thought revolves around the ques-
tion of whether or not a binding interpretation and an obligatory practice should belong to Marxist theory and practice.

Critical theory also makes use of empirical and hermeneutic methods, with the difference, however, that it aims at "emancipation." In contrast to critical rationalism, critical theory doubts that science "should be allowed to proceed indifferently, given the world we have created" (Habermas); "instrumental reason" (Horkheimer) is not in a position to investigate relationships adequately. Critical theory is, rather, concerned with investigating the relationship between the individual and the social whole, seen as being "reciprocal." In the philosophical tradition of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, it stresses the desire for independence and emancipation. Discourse or free dialogue on the rationalizing of norms and interests is a means toward knowledge. Society is investigated with regard to what is possible or better; the question as to the "true purpose of society" is raised.

A further key concept of critical theory is self-reflection. With the help of self-reflection, guided by an emancipatory interest, the critical thinker has the possibility of freeing himself from subservience, in that he recognizes the causes of oppression in himself as well as in others and takes action to overcome them. Important differences between critical rationalism and critical theory can be seen in the way they use the concept "criticism." For critical rationalism, "criticism" means that the results of scientific research must always be subject to scrutiny. "Criticism" is therefore chiefly method, the ever-renewed attempt to "falsify" something previously held to be correct. For critical theory, "criticism" means that the existing world and its constructs are to be examined in relationship to a "possibly better" society.

Consequences for Didactic Value Judgments

Didactics that has been limited to empirical/analytic methods would have to leave decisions about options to the decisions of politicians. Instead of binding norms laid down, as they used to be, in an unquestioned canon of teaching materials, a prescientific arbitrariness would step in, not rational patterns of justification for the "better."

In addition, it is the indecisiveness of the discussion on scientific theory which makes it necessary to take both approaches into
account. The author represents a complementary relationship between the two positions, as can be seen in the arguments here. The view that empirical/analytic and socially critical ways of thinking are mutually exclusive is also represented. However, these one-sided views are represented less and less frequently. Gifted academics representing varying positions (Habermas, von Weizacker) are working in cooperation.

Where further development toward more humanity is desired, society must be pictured differently, as "better" than it is. However, so that projected goals do not exceed what is possible, it is necessary to establish what can be said with certainty about the existing society: interests influencing the process of perception can create dangerous illusions if they are transformed into action without reference to what is possible and what can be experienced.

The possibility of overcoming social inequality cannot simply be "proved," even with critical theory. Critical theory is not concerned with "correctness," in the sense of the empirical/analytic method; its underlying values are based on philosophical traditions and on the history of mind. Thus, starting from these preconditions of thought, it is possible to deduce broad social goals from individual interests, and to understand that a goal must be accepted on both levels if it is to gain acceptance at all.
4. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A RADICAL CRITIQUE

By Cleo H. Cherryholmes

In 1916 the National Education Association Committee on the Social Studies produced a report that was to have lasting impact on teaching about society and politics (National Education Association 1916). Before then the study of society in American education had exhibited two quite different themes. Throughout the 19th century, a number of writers had advocated the notion that schools should consciously be designed to reproduce society:

Norms in the school could provide socialization required for the complex urban world: punctuality, respect for authority, competition for rewards according to institutionally fixed criteria, and acceptance of standardized work routines (Tyack 1977, p. 406).

The use of schools explicitly to socialize working-class and immigrant children has been well documented, and contemporary social and political education remains under this influence.

A second theme in social and political education prior to 1916 lay in the fragmented attempts by the various social sciences and history to institute specialized courses in the public school curriculum (Barb, Barth, and Shermis 1977; Ch. 2). The American Political Science Association even went so far as to recommend the teaching of American government at every grade level (American Political Science Association 1915).

The National Education Association's 1916 report on the social studies simultaneously affirmed the 19th-century concern for social functionalism and reproduction and the role of the social science disciplines and history in the curriculum. The committee was dominated by educators, not social scientists, and a stated major purpose of American schools was the "cultivation of good citizenship" (National Education Association 1916, p. 2). Social reproduction as a goal of schooling was explicitly brought into the 20th century. Students, it was argued, should become good citizens by practicing good judgment in the classroom and by making decisions. The influence and pragmatism of Dewey were present in these recommendations (Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1977).
Thus, the traditional relationship between school and society was retained, and the emerging social science disciplines were merged into a conception of an individual acting pragmatically in a democratic society.

Three Traditions in Social Studies

The 1916 statement was not completely unambiguous or internally consistent. Recently Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977 and 1978) identified and explicated three traditions in U.S. social and political education which evolved from that statement. The most pervasive view of social studies education is citizenship transmission:

The purpose of Citizenship Transmission is that a particular conception of citizenship shall be both learned and believed. Teachers begin with a set of assumptions, beliefs, and expectations about their own society. The teacher knows the important philosophical goals; knows how people ought to relate to each other, what is considered desirable behavior, and what the culture rewards and punishes; and, finally, knows what the culture considers the best form of social participation. . . . A Citizenship Transmission teacher knows precisely what is required of a good citizen and attempts to transmit it; that is, to teach this conception in such a way that students become loyal believers (Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1977, pp. 59-60).

This is consistent with 19th-century views of schooling in the United States. Citizenship transmission as an approach to social studies suggests a teacher-centered classroom. The teacher presumably knows the preferred social values and is committed to transmitting them successfully to students. A necessary but not sufficient condition for citizenship transmission is that teachers express the desired values in the classroom. Barr, Barth, and Shermis conclude that "most teachers belong to that tradition we call Citizenship Transmission" (1977, p. 61), although little evidence is offered to support this claim.

A second theme in U.S. social studies, and one that has received increasing attention since 1960, is related to those early demands of the social science disciplines: that the social studies should reflect the academic social science disciplines. Barr, Barth, and Shermis summarize the position as follows:

The purpose of social studies defined as social science—which we shall simplify and refer to as Social Science—is that young people shall acquire the knowledge, skills, and devices
of particular social science disciplines to the end that they become effective as citizens (1977, pp. 61-62).

The social science disciplines have always been important to achieving the 1916 goal of helping students develop good judgment through practice in making social decisions. It was never intended that common-sense interpretations of social phenomena and behavior would be a sufficient base for the development of decision-making and judgment skills.

Social science input to social and political education has been uneven in emphasis and unreflective in practice. For example, the contribution of the social sciences to the social studies dramatically increased as part of the U.S. response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik I. The social sciences made a substantial contribution to what became known as the "new social studies," the major characteristics of which were summarized by Wiley (1977):

Emphasis on the structure of the social science disciplines as basic content and organizing frameworks for the social studies. Structure refers to the concepts and generalizations central to the disciplines and the relationships among the concepts and generalizations.

Emphasis on processes as content: teaching the methodologies of the social science disciplines, teaching students inquiry skills. Greater emphasis on content from the behavioral sciences, especially anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, and social psychology, and decreased emphasis on history and geography.

Attempts to bring the latest findings and methodologies from the frontiers of research in the disciplines into the classroom, to shorten the time lag between research and implementation. (Wiley 1977, p. 296)

The educational response of the United States to the Soviet space program was to increase emphasis on science and technology. The consequences for the social studies was increased attention to the social sciences.

The "new social studies" represented a somewhat surprising reversal of the historical sequence that accompanied the release of the 1916 report. At that time, educators seized the initiative in social and political education from the disparate demands of the disciplines. As the "new social studies" developed in the 1960s, apparently getting its name from Fenton and Good (1965), social studies educators accepted a somewhat diminished role in curriculum development as they turned to social scientists for important content and process decisions. The structure of the disciplines was attended to (for example, see Morrissett
1966), and the questions posed by social studies educators required social scientists to explicate their disciplines. What were the major concepts of the disciplines? What were the major generalizations of the disciplines? It is interesting to note that social scientific theories never drew much attention. Whether the latter were avoided because there was a fear that there were none or simply because no one thought to ask what they were is not known. In any case, social science became a dominant influence in social studies education from 1960 through the early 1970s.

The third emphasis in social studies education in the United States, traceable both to John Dewey and to the 1916 NEA Report on the Social Studies, is reflective inquiry. As expressed by Barr, Barth, and Shermis, the purpose of reflective inquiry is "citizenship defined primarily as decision making in a socio-political context. The assumption is that democracy imposes a unique burden; we cannot escape the requirement of making decisions" (1977, p. 64).

The discussions of reflective thinking in the literature have developed in two directions. One viewpoint, represented in the work of Hullfish and Smith (1961) and Hunt and Metcalf (1968), emphasizes reflection in contrast to decision making. Hunt and Metcalf rely upon Dewey's characterization of reflective thought to guide their work: "Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and further conclusions to which it tends constitutes reflective thought" (Dewey 1933, p. 9; emphasis in original). As Hunt and Metcalf see it, "there is no essential difference between reflection and the scientific method of inquiry" (1968, p. 67). Even though reflection has this scientific or cognitive component, it also includes consideration of normative and ethical issues. They argue that "grounding"--or to use Dewey's term, "providing warrants for"--beliefs is the method of reflection.

The second direction that reflective inquiry took was that of being equated with decision making. This is clearly a part of the Barr, Barth, and Shermis definition, and it is developed in the social studies literature in the work of Engle (1960), Engle and Longstreet (1972), and Remy (1980). The focus on decision making has an incremental, instrumentalist flavor, and less attention is paid to the examination of
values and ethics. Although valuative statements are not excluded from consideration, they tend to be treated in a clarificatory and ranking fashion in which decisions are intended to maximize outcomes along a given dimension. Decision making in the social studies was intellectually derivative from work in psychology (Edwards 1963, pp. 34-41), economics (Luce and Raiffa 1957), and political science (Riker and Ordeshook 1973). The general theme of these views was normative: How does one maximize expected utility? It is the case, however, that the underlying assumptions have been treated relatively lightly in the literature (Cherryholmes 1980a).

The Dominant Usage of Social Science Knowledge

The foregoing characterization of approaches to social and political education in the United States has avoided discussing the theoretical and institutional relationships between the social sciences and social studies education. This is a complex topic; and while only one aspect will be discussed here, the argument to be presented is generalizable to other aspects of social studies education. The focus here will be on curriculum materials, with an illustrative example from one of the most influential and successful American government high school textbooks of the 1970s, American Political Behavior. Some aspects of the relationship between American political science and social studies curriculum development will be discussed. The reliance upon social scientific information and knowledge as nonproblematic will then be critiqued, and finally it will be shown why it is not reasonable to expect this flawed dependence to change quickly.

In 19... Indiana University received a social studies curriculum development grant from the U.S. Office of Education which provided the initial funds to establish the Social Studies Development Center (Mehlinger 1980). The project was for the development of 9th- and 12th-grade materials dealing with American politics. These were later collapsed into one secondary school textbook, published in 1972 as American Political Behavior, which exemplified much that characterized the "new social studies" (Mehlinger and Patrick 1972, p. 6). Prior to its publication, Magruder's American Government, with its heavy focus on governmental institutions, had commanded more than 30 percent of the
American government textbook market for several decades. During the 1970s Magruder's market position was substantially eroded, in part because of the impact of American Political Behavior. Furthermore, new texts copyrighted subsequent to 1972 have contained more material on political behavior than those previously published. It is not clear whether the Mehlinger/Patrick materials caused this shift in content or whether they were merely the first.

The authors intended to develop materials that deviated sharply from those currently available, which were heavily descriptive and institutional. Contemporary research on American politics was very behavioral and positivist in orientation. Drawing upon this behavioral research helped Mehlinger and Patrick to achieve a second goal: to personalize knowledge about American government and politics for students.

Mehlinger and Patrick were clear about their assumptions as they approached social-scientific information and knowledge, and were thoughtful and consistent in developing their materials. Their goals, in summary, were (1) to personalize social-scientific information and knowledge, (2) to focus on behavior as an alternative to institutional description, and (3) to avoid appraising value judgments and political theory. Consider the following:

... professionals and businessmen, upper-income people, and college-educated people are more likely to prefer Republicans than are manual workers, lower-income people, and high school graduates... Before looking at further information about political party preference, it is useful to emphasize the limitations of such information as provided... [in the accompanying tables]. Conclusions about the relationships between social groups and political party preference describe what people tend to do... Another limitation of conclusions about social groups and political party preference is that they describe tendencies of the past... they do not predict the future with complete accuracy... A third limitation of conclusions showing the relationship of social groups and political attitudes and behavior is that they disregard the personality factor (Mehlinger and Patrick 1972, pp. 225-26).

The empirical regularities reported in this section had been supported by a large number of studies, and it is significant that they are reported here because they had been passed over in other, more institutionally oriented, texts. It is also important to note what is treated as problematic and what is considered nonproblematic. The problematics
in the accompanying explanation deal with political party platforms (pp. 226-227), the relationship of political party identification to voting (pp. 228-230), and the influence of one's individual situation on voting (pp. 231-32). It is striking that social class, ideology, the relationship between political party ideology and ideologies associated with other social institutions, and how these factors are related to power relations in society, with its characteristic distribution of social values, are considered nonproblematic.

To avoid efforts to interpret and critically appraise interpretations is to objectify social phenomena. The effect is to validate the phenomena as they appear, to accept them as given. The outcome is that students only learn about political regularities and tendencies. American Political Behavior is among many curriculum materials in the United States which objectify social and political phenomena. To objectify means

a substantive orientation that believes that in the final analysis there is a realm of basic, uninterpreted, hard facts that serves as the foundation for all empirical knowledge. The appeal of these "facts" presumably legitimizes empirical claims about the world. . . . "Objectivism" in the study of social and political life is not an innocent mistaken epistemological doctrine. It has dangerous consequences insofar as it tends to distort and reify "facts" which are historically conditioned—"facts" which reveal only one among the many different possibilities that human action may take (Bernstein 1976, pp. 111-12).

Much of the content and theory in American social and political texts is considered fundamentally nonproblematic. This does not mean that authors cannot be misinformed or that knowledge claims cannot turn out to be erroneous, but rather that such statements as "professionals and businessmen, upper-income people, and college-educated people are more likely to prefer Republicans than are manual workers" (Mehlinger and Patrick 1972, p. 225) are presented as given, objective features of the world. If social phenomena in textbooks are objectified, the primary problem facing students is that of adjusting to those phenomena. For this reason it is not surprising that emphasis on decision making has been a major theme in contemporary social studies thought (Engle 1960, Engle and Longstreet 1972, Reméy 1980).

The thrust of the latter argument is that an individual can influence his or her future by calculating expected utilities in a deci-
sion situation. Of course, it makes sense to enable students to thoughtfully consider problems they face, their available alternatives, their values, and expected outcomes. But a view of social knowledge which couches social action in terms of adjustment to a given social world presents a distorted picture of social phenomena and knowledge of society and is politically conservative. The message students receive is not that institutions are wrong but that individuals are wrong if they do not conform to institutions. Emphasis on decision making gives an advantage to those who are already positioned to smoothly enter those social and political institutions and contributes to unreflective social reproduction.

Legacy of Positivism in the Social Studies

Certain intellectual traditions—for example, the remnants of positivism embodied in the social sciences as practiced in the United States—encourage the objectification of an external social world where knowledge is instrumental and utilitarian. Many contemporary social and political texts implicitly rely on the correspondence theory of truth. But the correspondence theory of truth, in which the truth of statements resides in their correspondence with objects, is epistemologically flawed (Prior 1967) and encourages objectification. The problem with this view is that it is ontologically ambiguous. What does it mean to compare statements with objects? Formal logic enables us to compare statements with statements, but elaborate methodologies and statistical analyses are required by which only inferences are made about things. When those inferences are reified and the qualifications and tentativeness explicit in research methodology and statistical analyses are forgotten, ignored, misunderstood, or never made explicit, then objectification and the distortion and biases that go with it can occur.

One source of distortion and bias in knowledge claims from social research originates in social institutions themselves. Social institutions are patterned and repeated modes of behavior whose organizational structures express socially preferred ways of doing things. Wolin captures this as follows:

A politically organized society contains definite institutional arrangements, certain widely shared understandings regarding the location and use of political power, certain
expectations about the location and use of political power, certain expectations about the claims that organized society can rightfully make upon its members. . . . This ensemble of practices and beliefs may be said to form a paradigm in the sense that the society tries to carry on its political life in accordance with them (Wolin 1968, p. 149).

It follows that accurate descriptions and "true" explanations of social institutions also contain these moral paradigms. If the descriptions and explanations are not reflected up, they give the impression that social institutions are fixed and given and are not the result of historical and cultural conditioning, even though the institutions could have developed differently. The descriptions and explanations implicitly contain the commitments, values, and obligations of the social institutions themselves.

The effect of objectifying social knowledge is to support implicitly the dominant ideologies of society without reflecting on issues of value and commitment. Social studies as citizenship transmission explicitly intends to transmit simultaneously information about and a commitment to social institutions, but in an unreflective manner; social reproduction is the goal. Social and political education taught as the social sciences, on the other hand, often objectifies the social phenomena focused upon. Reflective inquiry is a step in the direction of looking at social values, but such reflection is often conceptualized incrementally—excluding fundamental criticism—in the context of decision making and value analysis and clarification. When one reflects on social and political decisions while treating the institutions within which the decisions are made as nonproblematic, the social values of the institutions permeate the reflections. Radical reflection in terms of knowledge and ideological claims is necessary if social and political education is to be true to the nature of social phenomena and the autonomy of students. Information necessary for radical reflection is not present, for the most part, in social and political texts in the United States.

Some Requirements for Change

How would texts in social studies instruction be different if the problems of objectification and reification are to be avoided? It
should be noted that the following suggestions apply to collegiate as well as precollegiate instruction.

The first suggestion concerns the content of courses and texts. Students must learn that objectification and reification are distortions of social phenomena. Two points need to be made here. One deals with the nature of social phenomena—with social action and institutions—the other with statements about social actions and institutions. Social actions and institutions can be treated as given, naturally occurring events or they can be viewed as phenomena that are, to quote Bernstein (1976, p. 112), "historically conditioned—'facts' which reveal only one among the many different possibilities that human action may take." The point is that many social institutions and actions combine a valuative with an empirical commitment. If institutions and actions are treated as simply things in the world, as "givens" to be studied, then the valuative components of social institutions will be treated as objects; reflection on institutional commitments will not occur. Therefore, students must learn that social institutions exist by choice; they are the intentional or unintentional products of human behavior, products of history and culture. To study social institutions without reflecting on them as historical and cultural products without considering their inherent valuative obligations and commitments is to distort them.

Concerning statements about social phenomena: if the phenomena described or explained have normative components, then accurate and valid statements about these phenomena will contain those norms and values. But a social institution may be viewed differently by different individuals and groups associated with it. Therefore, statements about institutions must be interpreted. Interpretation of social descriptions and explanations is necessary. But interpretations may be distorted, or they may represent the interests of only one group of people. To guard against this possibility, a critical perspective is needed whereby the layers of value and commitment are disclosed and peeled back. Such a perspective will make it more difficult for social institutions which disproportionately benefit one group or class to be justified in general terms. Criticism becomes a means to deal with false or distorted consciousness (Habermas 1970). Textbooks could contain material that
encourages students to think in terms of the construction of social institutions and of the need for interpretation and criticism.

The second suggestion concerns the conduct of classes. Beyond textbooks, classrooms should be organized so that interpretation and criticism are fostered. One generalized model can be found in the work of Jurgen Habermas (1970) on communicative competence. Cherryholmes (1980b, p. 22) has suggested a set of necessary conditions for classroom discourse based on Habermas. These conditions are briefly summarized here:

1. The teacher must be committed to symmetrical, nondominated classroom discourse, the sole purpose of which is to pursue the better argument.

2. The teacher must communicate to students the norms of discourse (see Habermas 1970 and Cherryholmes 1980a), including the right of all participants to initiate comments, to question assertions and interpretations, and to challenge theoretical and ethical frameworks.

3. The teacher must enforce the norms of discourse and encourage students to identify deviations from them.

4. A basic foundation of information and knowledge must precede discourse, and this as well as alternative interpretations of events and institutions can be provided in part by text material.

5. Students must acquire the skills needed to develop and evaluate arguments. Interpretation and criticism are pursued as positions are stated and developed in arguments. If students cannot make or recognize valid arguments, they will not be able to critique interpretations offered in textbooks or in classroom interactions.

This is an incomplete list of some necessary conditions for interpretation and criticism which are designed to avoid objectification and reification of events and institutions.

The Prospects for Change

What is the prospect for change in curriculum materials? Major changes in the immediate future in U.S. social studies education do not seem likely. To begin with, publishers have little or no incentives to produce critically oriented materials. In order to publish a text aimed at the national market, a capital investment of approximately $400,000.
is required for a typical secondary school text and $2,400,000 for a K-6 elementary social studies series. Given the large size of these investments, publishers are naturally cautious in approaching the market. A key consideration is that the materials must appeal to teachers and local curriculum specialists. Both preservice and inservice teacher education, then, are crucial in creating the demand for certain kinds of texts.

Treatment of theories of knowledge, the nature of social phenomena, and the role of criticism and discourse is noticeably absent in most social studies methods books in the United States, although the Hunt and Metcalf text (1968) is a limited and important exception. Often, social studies methods texts reduce teaching to technique: how to write objectives, run and analyze a simulation, ask questions, clarify values, prepare a short lecture, and so on. To the extent that teaching is reduced to technique, the subtlety, complexity, valuational/factual component, and malleability of social phenomena become submerged and lost from sight.

The obvious vested interests of teachers are in classroom management, keeping students interested, assigning grades, avoiding controversy that extends beyond the school itself, and meeting administrative directives. Not only do authors of social studies methods books attend to these needs, but Social Education, the major publication of the primary "professional" association in the field, the National Council for the Social Studies, avoids the social criticism which is necessary to understand knowledge claims in the social studies. Because of its focus on management and technique and its avoidance of research and critique, the NCSS resembles a trade union that is concerned with the immediate, practical interests of its members. A positivist fallacy, as it were, is committed in NCSS publications and presentations because knowledge claims are created problematic. The problematic is the question of how to efficaciously present information and knowledge selected by the scholar. Social and political education in the United States seems to do some things quite well—for example, contributing to social reproduction rooted in 19th-century ideology and policy. Other efforts, such as promoting social criticism and discourse, remain, at present, at the margins of educational activity.
References


5. RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH RELATING TO CHILDREN'S SOCIAL COGNITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

By Judith Torney-Purta

The adjective "social" has been used as a modifier of a variety of terms. Social psychology has been a major branch of the field for many years. Many papers presented at the Guildford conference discuss social education—education dealing with society, presumably cast in the context of maintaining and/or improving it. This paper concentrates upon social cognition—a field of study primarily within developmental psychology which has experienced very rapid growth in the last few years. It would be impossible to review all of this research in the space allowed, but a selection will give at least the flavor. In each case the research will be expected to show its relation to topics and objectives of social and political education. The nature of relationships to variables of age will be noted in cases where studies have attempted to enhance a social/cognitive attribute, that process will be described.

Social Conventions in the Development of Morality

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the psychological theory and research which was of greatest interest to social studies educators was related to the work of Piaget and the moral development theory of Kohlberg. Although there have been many useful ideas derived from these frameworks, there have also been serious misconceptions. First, there has been a tendency to focus on biological maturation and to stress the age boundaries which have been suggested as delimiting stages. This misses the essence of the developmental process as both Piaget and Kohlberg defined it—the interaction between the child and the environment. Because of a combination of biological maturation and interaction with the physical environment (for example, trying out mental schema and transforming those which are inadequate), development through cognitive stages occurs during childhood. Unlike simple motoric achievements (such as a baby's turning over), which are likely to be determined primarily by physiological maturation and can therefore be expected to
occur for normal babies within a relatively small age range, cognitive development depends on this interplay of maturation and experience—an interplay between the internal and the external.

Age boundaries placed on stages indicate the sequence of development and the approximate ages when certain abilities may be present. It is the recognition of the constantly shifting balance between assimilating new information to old structures and accommodating structures to better utilize new experience that best identifies a developmental position. There has been an unfortunate tendency in some of the attempts to use cognitive developmental theory to see it in a very rigid way—as predicting the application of certain other methods derived from learning theory (advocacy or modeling) or as limiting the discussion of moral concepts until the child's natural moral development has progressed to a certain level. Recently, when reflecting on the success of various moral education programs, Kohlberg himself spoke against such rigid applications.

I now believe that the concepts underlying moral education must be partly "indeterminative." There is a necessity in a world in which children engage in stealing, cheating, and aggression and in which one cannot wait until children reach the next stage in order to deal directly with their moral behavior (Kohlberg 1970, p. 82). It is also unfortunate that the cognitive developmental position has become so closely identified with moral development. For social and political educators, there are other important elements of the developmental and the educative processes which do not fall neatly into the "moral" category.

Turiel (1973) argues that the understanding of social cognition in children has been held back by the failure to distinguish between three domains of social experience—the moral, the personal, and the social-conventional. Turiel points out that previous work has tended to confuse the moral and the social-conventional domains:

... social conventions are behavioral uniformities that coordinate the actions of individuals participating in a social system. Conventions constitute shared knowledge of uniformities in social interactions. Examples of social conventional acts include uniformities in modes of dress, usages of forms of address and modes of greeting. Social conventional acts are somewhat arbitrary in that they do not have an intrinsically prescriptive basis. ... The
individual's concepts of social convention are, therefore, closely related to his or her concepts of social organization (Turiel 1978, p. 51).

Turiel believes that some of the research which has purported to deal with moral development has really been concerned with social conventions—for example, studies of children's willingness to disobey rules regarding "forbidden" toys and children's responses to concepts of rules in marbles (on which much of Piaget's work on morality was based).

Turiel reserves the term "moral" to apply to a much more limited set of issues: the value of life, physical and psychological harm to others, violations of rights, and deprivations of something to which the person is entitled. The consideration of what is moral in areas such as these, according to Turiel, has its source not in arbitrary conventions related to social institutions but rather in considerations related to underlying concepts of justice.

Nucci and Turiel conducted an observational study of preschool children in ten schools and then interviewed the children about observed events soon after (Nucci and Turiel 1978). It was possible to distinguish between children's responses to acts which violated social conventions (for example, standing rather than sitting while eating, or spilling sand out of the sandbox) and acts which were moral transgressions (for example, a person intentionally hitting another). Eighty-three percent of the events were classified into the same category by adult observers and children who were interviewed. Children responded that moral transgressions were wrong regardless of whether there was a rule prohibiting the behavior.

In another study, more than 90 percent of children ages 6 through 17 said that it would be all right if everyone in another country decided to change a social convention—for example, to play a game by different rules. In contrast, in response to a question as to whether it would be all right to steal in a country where there was no rule against stealing, the distribution was nearly reversed, with no more than 30 percent at any age level answering yes.

Turiel also criticizes Piaget's and Kohlberg's moral development theories because they state that the acquisition of higher levels of morality occurs when principles of justice displace conventional judgments. In Turiel's view, convention is not a lower form of morality but
a separate set of constructs which individuals use in dealing with their social environments.

Turiel also reports the results of a cross-sectional study which attempted to delineate a series of stages describing individuals' responses to social conventions as a domain clearly separate from morality. At early levels, observed uniformities restrict children's concepts of social organization. At later ages a concrete and, later on, more abstract conception of social organization is found. Finally, social conventions are viewed as functioning to coordinate social interactions.

Although no studies have attempted to raise the level at which children view social conventions, Turiel suggests that individuals progress through these stages as part of a dialectic process in which one level represents the affirmation of a principle and the next represents its negation. Individuals use several methods for gathering information about their social environment. They symbolically take the perspective of others and engage in observation, communication, and imitation. It is probable that further work will extend and test theories about the developmental process.

An attempt to apply the distinction between the moral and social-conventional has been made by Torney and Brice (1979). Children ages 9 through 13 were asked questions taken directly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, phrased so as to investigate whether they viewed the rights enumerated therein as matters of morality or of social convention. For example, the young people were asked, "Suppose that in another country it was decided that it was all right to put someone in prison for several years without going to court -- having a trial. In that country they had no laws saying that people have a trial before being put in jail. Would that be right?" Another question asked, "What if someone in another country was arrested and the police thought that he was guilty, but the person wouldn't admit it. Would it be right if there was a law that said that the police could beat the person to get him to admit to the crime or to get evidence?"

In response to these questions (and others like them dealing with basic human rights, such as the right not to be held in slavery) more than 90 percent of the children said that no law enacted by a country could
justice actions which violated rights in this way. In other words, these matters of morality, not of social convention.

Political institutions have elements of both the social-conventional and the moral. It may be useful to distinguish between moral aspects of citizenship (obeying laws regarding assault and theft, for example) and aspects of citizenship which are closer to social conventions (obeying laws regarding the use of parks). The former will probably be seen by citizens as universal in character; transgressions would be wrong whether or not laws existed. Basic human rights as defined in international instruments seem to fit into this category. Civil and political rights viewed in reference to the national government may fall into either morality or social convention (or in between).

Perspective Taking

The concept of egocentrism—the child's inability to view a situation from a point of view other than his or her own—was central to much of Piaget's early work on communication. It has also been of considerable importance in the social cognition area. Piaget's early investigations concentrated on children's ability to view a perceptual display as it would appear to someone standing in a position different from their own. More-recent research has concentrated on the child's ability to take a nonegocentric point of view regarding a cognitive or social situation.

Flavell, who did the first major work in this area, stated that when a child fails to take the perspective of another individual, there are four possible reasons for the failure: the child may be (1) unaware of the existence of a different perspective, (2) unaware that the situation requires that a different perspective be taken, (3) unable to maintain an adequate representation of the other's perspective while inhibiting his or her own, and (4) unable to respond appropriately, even though understanding the other's perspective, to modify behavior (Flavell et al. 1963).

According to Flavell, the first component, awareness of the existence of other perspectives, emerges during early childhood. With regard to the need for another perspective in a given situation, the child may be aware that different people have different perspectives but
may not be able to identify situations which require that another point of view be taken. Evidence for age-related changes in this component can be drawn from studies on referential communication; it has been shown that older children are increasingly aware of the necessity of attending to the characteristics of their listeners while communicating (Glucksberg et al. 1975; Glucksberg et al. 1966). For example, older children speak differently to a normal adult listener than to one who has been blindfolded.

In the third component of Flavell’s model, it is assumed that the child is able to inhibit his or her own perspective. For example, in a set of cartoons developed by Chandler (1973) the child is asked to describe the events in a seven-picture sequence. Three pictures are then removed, and the child is asked to retell the story from the perspective of someone who arrived late and does not have access to certain information. It is necessary for the child to suppress his or her own perspective (that of knowledge of the original story) in order to recall the story correctly from the point of view of the latecomer. A recently developed test using puppets, which does not depend on children’s verbal ability, shows the existence of this component even in four- and five-year-old children (Brice and Torney-Purta, forthcoming).

The fourth component of Flavell’s model, application, refers to the ability to respond appropriately to the other’s perspective in modifying one’s own behavior. In addition to factors such as verbal ability, there may also be situational characteristics which tend to either elicit or inhibit production of an appropriate message.

Many attempts have been made to chart the course of development of perspective taking. Nearly all the studies find an increase with age in this ability, but there is considerable argument about whether the type of perspective taking found in two- or three-year-olds is really the same ability defined by Flavell or Piaget. There is reasonable agreement that it is not until middle childhood, however, that young people are able to identify the emotions of people who are markedly dissimilar to themselves in important ways or who are in unfamiliar situations. It is also at this age that they become able to view a social episode from the perspective of each participant before coordinating the different viewpoints (Shantz 1976).
In addition to studies tracing the developmental course, there has been some research to determine what kinds of experiences enhance perspective-taking ability. A study with four- and five-year-old normal children used three conditions: ten sessions of guided constructive play in small groups on consecutive days (for example, building a house or train, using materials provided), ten sessions of dramatic play (for example, an imaginary situation set in a restaurant or doctor's office), and a control without group activity (Tomas and Brainerd 1979). Several measures of perceptual, affective, and cognitive perspective taking were administered before the play sessions and again afterward. Although there were no significant differences among the three groups on the pretest, there were substantial and significant differences on the posttest in the direction of enhanced performance by those who had participated in dramatic or constructive play when compared with that of the control-group children, who had had no play experience. The authors concluded that it is possible to enhance perspective taking in young children through adult-guided play activities even over a short time period.

Other research has investigated the possibilities that delay in the development of perspective-taking skills is linked to social deviance and that such skills can be enhanced by practice taking roles and observing one's own role behavior. Chandler found that 45 chronically delinquent boys aged 11-13 were deficient in social/cognitive role taking when compared with nondelinquents. Members of an experimental group spent one half-hour a week for ten weeks making videotapes of skits involving characters of their own age and observing their own performances in different roles in the skits. The delinquents who participated in this training improved more in their role-taking ability and showed less subsequent delinquency than a matched group which made animated cartoons or films about their neighborhood in which they neither performed different roles nor watched their own behavior.

Selman has proposed a series of stages in the development of role-taking ability and has applied his findings to both improving educational programs and treating clinical problems. Selman, Jaquette, and Lavin (1977) set forth an expanded sequence of stages in four areas of perspective taking: physical/cognitive, self, friendship, and peer
group. These authors believe that each individual operates at similar levels with regard to self, friends, and peers.

Let us take an example related to children's understanding of peer-group loyalty. At the first stage, loyalty is seen as a matter of physical proximity (being with a group because everyone is holding hands); at the second stage, loyalty is unilateral obedience to a leader; at the third stage, it is an exchange of favors in teamwork; at the fourth stage, loyalty is seen as the individual's contribution to an ongoing communal whole; at the final stage, it is an agreement to give up one's personal goals for the sake of group goals (Selman et al. 1977, p. 269). Selman and his associates found that children who experienced disordered relations at home and in school fail to develop as rapidly as others through these stages of social reasoning (which are closely related to perspective taking).

Selman also developed and used filmstrip/discussion programs to enhance the social role-taking abilities of children aged 6 to 12 which resulted in gains in role-taking ability, especially when teachers continued to use similar group-discussion methods over a long period. Selman views such research on organizing and describing behavior as useful for the design of intervention to optimize the development of role-taking ability. Although most of those who study social cognition would agree with this aim, not all agree with Selman that the stages are so clearly delimited or that there is such close parallelism between the areas.

Other authors have attempted to relate perspective-taking ability to other kinds of behavior. Kurdek (1973) found correlations ranging from .00 to .30 between moral judgment measures and perspective taking. A parallel set of correlations between perspective taking and moral behavior (which Kurdek defines as equivalent to altruistic behavior) ranged from .00 to .35. Kurdek concluded:

The venture of searching for the cognitive component of various facets of children's moral development, in short, remains defensible, and perspective-taking ability is the front-running candidate for the position (Kurdek, 1978, p. 23).

In summary, perspective taking (especially in cognitive and social contexts) has a close relationship to many of the aims and objectives of social education. Social and political education programs frequently
are intended to increase effective communication; the ability to see the point of view of the listener is intimately connected with communication skills. Courses in intergroup and international relations stress empathy. The global perspective has been widely discussed. The training research shows that positive social relations (especially with peers) and opportunities for self-observation play an important role in fostering perspective taking. With recent advances in measurement, it may soon be possible to include measures of perspective taking as criteria in assessing social studies programs—especially for evaluating group discussion and simulation participation, which have been difficult to assess in the past. Clearly, there are individual differences in perspective-taking ability. In the case of those who are deficient, it may be possible to enhance this ability by using educational techniques similar to those used by psychologists.

**Children's Views of Social Institutions**

Furth and his associates (Furth et al. 1976; Furth 1980) studied the construction of a mental framework for understanding social institutions by English 5- to 11-year-olds, using a free-response format designed to elicit processes of thought about social and economic institutions rather than knowledge of facts. They questioned 5- and 6-year-old children about adults performing occupations and found that young children saw little conflict between what individuals liked to do and their roles; the children focused on external or physical aspects of roles (for example, the uniform worn), and they were egotypical in their approach. The egotypical response, which is related to cognitive egocentrism, is a generalization from personal experience to an entire institution. For example, a young child assumes that all teachers or bus drivers are like the ones he or she knows. This egotypic reasoning gives way to more stereotypic perceptions as the child becomes familiar with mass-media presentations. At a still later stage, the child differentiates the personalities of individual role occupants from the "social roles."

In the years between 7 and about 11, children begin to check knowledge of particular individuals against that of a system of relationships. Children aged 5 or 6 may be characterized as being at a stage at which
the social world is undifferentiated, regulated according to the personal wishes of individuals, free of conflict, lacking in historical dimensions, and egotypical. Furthermore, government and community have little meaning. At 12 the distinction between personal and societal roles is basic; life is open to both tension and improvement, and community/government is at least vaguely understood. Furth (1980) categorizes this progression as a "development of equilibration" process, for several reasons, including the following:

—Children's thinking about societal events is different from, not simply knowing less of, adult notions.

—It is also original and not merely a copy of adult models.

—Developmental stages can be meaningfully delineated.

His analysis of interviews needs further explanation before the exact character of the equilibrative process becomes clear.

Furth's most interesting arguments concerning process deal with actual interviews in which he observed children becoming convinced over the course of the discussion that old modes of thinking are inadequate and playfully experimenting with new assumptions:

Those situations [developmental experiences] indicate spontaneous thinking and especially expanding progress in societal understanding. The children on their own ask questions that reveal an internal conflict . . . ; they express discontent about their own opinions and correct themselves . . . . There are some occasions when the process of equilibration is particularly active in the children. In response to an internal disturbance they reach out to a new balance. The social setting of these occasions is eminently suitable to developmental experience. The children are cooperating in conversation with another person who, although an adult, takes the children's viewpoints totally seriously in a non-corrective and supportive fashion. They are like two peers working together on a common problem (Furth 1980, pp. 91-92).

Furth and his colleagues realize, however, that the one-to-one relationship between interviewer and child cannot be replicated frequently in the classroom. They stress the importance of paying special attention to the child's understanding of the social world, not simply fostering cognitive/logical abilities while hoping that the child will come to apply them to personal relations and social institutions. They state:

This [understanding of social institutions] is an integral part of intellectual development, particularly at an histori-
cal time when the fabric of social institutions with its advanced degree of technology, bureaucracy, and commercialism is no longer readily observable to a normally curious child. . . . I am not suggesting that the schools should "teach" the social insights . . . just as I do not hold that they should teach Piaget's physical logical tasks. . . . [There are] consequences which could be realized, however, in the setting up of an educational . . . environment that would intentionally nourish and foster the child's social thinking as an obligatory component of overall intellectual health (Furth et al. 1976, p. 373).

The growth of increasingly mature concepts of social and economic institutions is closely connected with the aims of social education. And Furth's model is clearly a developmental one. He stresses as clearly as any researcher reviewed here the futility of expecting the transmission of factual material to result in stable or mature concepts of social institutions. The implication of his argument for social education appears to be that the teacher should structure the available knowledge and permit expressions of opinion, almost as a peer would. Whenever possible, the teacher might stimulate the child's own awareness of the inadequacy of immature modes of thinking but without making direct attempts to influence that thinking.

Although they are more closely connected with the field of political socialization than with social cognition, there are two studies which should be mentioned because they, like Furth's, have concerned themselves with children's views of social institutions. Connell interviewed Australian children and concluded by comparing their knowledge about the physical world with their knowledge about the social world:

The children can exert no influence on politics themselves. Now a child learns about the physical world in large measure by operating on it, by holding, biting, and moving toys, by walking around a playground, by squashing plasticine, by dismantling a car engine. He learns about his intimate social environment also, in large measure, through the reactions of others to his own advances and enterprises. But the child cannot do this to his political environment. . . . So the child's political thought is not constrained by political reality, and the persistence of gross misconception and implausible myths is made possible (Connell 1971, p. 22).

This presentation suggests a process quite similar to that described by Furth.

A survey of political socialization and civic education conducted by Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen (1975) assessed adolescents' and preado-
lescents' social conceptions in ten nations, using a more structured framework. Examining children's perceptions of such institutions as the police, laws, the office of president or prime minister, labor unions, and the democratic system, they noted the existence of five stages which are not very different from those described by other authors: Stage one—vague and inarticulate notions, with the emergence of one or two institutions (usually the police) in somewhat more concrete form. Stage two—a sheltered view, in which institutions are seen as promoting harmonizing values (creating understanding, settling disagreements). Stages three and four—a realistic view, with considerable understanding of both cohesive and divisive functions. Stage five—skepticism (not present in all countries).

Moral development, social conventions, perspective taking, and conceptions of social institutions have now been reviewed, as they have been studied in a developmental framework. The studies show that, with increasing age, from childhood to adolescence, these social cognitions improve in quality. There also seems to be some commonality in the kinds of experience found to enhance development, including social experience with peers and one-to-one relationships with adults.

Social Learning Theory

So much of the attention of social studies educators has been focused on the cognitive/moral developmental model that the social learning theory approach has been given little attention. There are clear differences between these theoretical positions, but publications such as Social Learning Theory (Bandura 1977) take considerable account of cognitive factors. In fact, this book might almost have been titled "Cognitive Social Learning Theory." It fits quite well, therefore, into this discussion of social cognition.

Social learning theory is still not a developmental theory, however. It does not describe specific structures which change sequentially, nor does it describe the cumulative environmental/organismic interchange that promotes development in the way that Piaget and Kohlberg do. Stage sequences are not part of social learning theory, although cognitive mediators play an important role.
Bandura identifies four distinct and important processes governing observational learning. Under "attentional processes," he includes models—provided for the child which vary according to their distinctive characteristics and their complexity. He points to the characteristics of the observer but gives little attention to age. Social learning theory has traditionally maintained that the processes of acquiring behavior through observational learning are the same for both children and adults.

A second major category of processes governing observational learning deals with retention. Whether an individual retains over time the behavior that he or she has observed depends on such factors as the symbolic coding of that behavior, the cognitive organization of the individual, and opportunities for rehearsal of that behavior. The emphasis on cognitive and symbolic processes is new within the last five years. The theory no longer maintains that the only important characteristic of the observer is his or her reinforcement history.

A third category of processes governing observational learning is termed by Bandura "motor reproduction processes." This category deals with aspects of the process which result in action, not merely attitude or judgment. Perhaps these processes best indicate how social learning theory can fill the gaps left by cognitive developmental theory.

The fourth category, motivational processes—and its distinction between external reinforcement, vicarious reinforcement, and self-reinforcement—is of special interest. Self-reward is the aspect of motivation which is of the greatest importance to educators. Harter (1978), who has investigated the developmental course of some concepts which are closely related to social learning theory, argues that during childhood two systems are internalized—a self-reward system and a system of mastery goals. These two systems together allow children to evaluate behavior and to self-reinforce that behavior which lives up to their internalized standards. The intrinsically motivated individual in this formulation is one who can operate on a relatively "thin schedule" of reinforcement—that is, reinforcement is necessary only occasionally to confirm the individual's sense of competence. There are, of course, individual differences in the strength of this intrinsic motivation, which Harter describes at some length.
Notions about intrinsic motivation, and particularly about how intrinsic motivation is affected by processes of motivation and types of reinforcement, have great relevance for social education. Teachers will not be available to reinforce behavior once children leave their classrooms. Systems of vicarious reinforcement (so important in modeling) and self-reinforcement must be relied on to maintain behavior. In general, while cognitive developmental theory is precise about developmental changes and vague about processes of change which are instituted from outside the individual, social learning theory is precise about change process and gives little attention to development.

Altruistic and Prosocial Behavior

Many experimental studies of altruistic and prosocial behavior have used the modeling approach, derived from social learning theory. The most common definition of prosocial behavior is "actions that are intended to aid or benefit another person or group of people without the actor's anticipation of external reward" (Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, p. 3). It has been difficult in practice to make sure that the individual has no anticipation of reward, even when none is promised. Donating funds to charitable causes and helping persons in distress (rescuing) are the measures of prosocial or altruistic behavior used most frequently in research. Such research is best conducted by asking children to help or donate to strangers rather than friends, since an important aim of social education is to help children relate socially and psychologically to strangers as well as acquaintances.

Rice and Grusec (1975) compared the effects on children's behavior of a model's verbalizations with the effects of a model's actions. They found that both the verbalization of the intention to give to charity and the actual behavior of giving to charity influenced 7- to 11-year-old children's subsequent donations (in comparison to the behavior of a control group to which no model was presented). These effects were maintained over periods of up to four months. Rice and Grusec reported, from their findings in a later study, that subjects who were in conflict about appropriate behavior were likely to be influenced by either verbalization or action; those not in conflict required exposure to the action model in order for the influence to be substantial. Providing a model
of the desired behavior is usually found to be more effective than preaching; although some studies have found that the effects of observing an altruistic model are enhanced if the child also receives some exhortation about the social norm of sharing or helping (Bryan and Walbek 1970).

A study by Sprafkin, Liebert, and Poulos (1975) investigated the effects upon children of prosocial behavior displayed in television programs. Those who viewed a Lassie episode in which a prosocial act was an integral part of the plot helped more in a subsequent task than did subjects exposed to a Lassie program without such an episode or those who viewed a neutral film. Leifer, Gordon, and Graves (1974) concluded from a literature review that prosocial TV often had some influence on self-control, nurturance, and cooperation, as well as on the behaviors specifically modeled.

All literature reviews (Bryan 1975; Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg 1977; Rüshton 1976) concluded that older children (11 or 12) are more likely to engage in altruistic behavior than are younger children (5 or 6). Very few studies have been done with adolescents, who may in fact be less likely than younger children to behave altruistically.

If children are made to feel that they have received an undeserved reward in a task, they are more likely to donate, according to a study by Long and Lerner (1974). Miller and Smith (1977) investigated "equity stress" in 9- and 10-year-olds. The students donated more when they felt they had been overpaid than when their reward seemed appropriate or too little. The deservingness of the "victim" to whom donations were made influenced donation only in the appropriate and underrewarded conditions. Thus it appears that even young children have some sensitivity to equitable and inequitable distribution of resources.

Although the majority of research has been conducted within the social learning framework, there have been some studies of altruistic behavior using elements from the cognitive/developmental point of view. A recent study by Barrett and Yarrow (1977) suggested that a certain level of awareness of perspectives and of the implications of others' behavior may be a necessary precondition for prosocial behavior. A study of children aged 5 through 3 at a summer camp found that among those who were high in social-inferential abilities, the more assertive
children were more likely to help. Among those with lower levels of perspective taking, there was no relation between assertiveness and prosocial behavior. Oden and Asher (1977) demonstrated with 9- and 10-year-olds that coaching socially solitary children in the skills related to perspective taking (such as cooperation and communication) was successful in both the long term and the short term in increasing the sociometric status of isolated children. Staub (1971) trained kindergarten children, in a role-playing task, to understand and express the feelings of individuals in distress. The next day they were given the opportunity to come to the aid of someone in distress. Girls who had been trained in role playing responded more frequently than did girls in a control group, and the effects endured over a one-week period. Results were somewhat more mixed for boys.

Two studies conducted by Sims (cited in Staub 1979) demonstrated the role of cognitive factors and group identification in prosocial behavior. In the first study it was found that stressing the common racial group of the subject and the potential recipient produced higher donations among 9- and 10-year-olds. This finding is consonant with that of other research which shows that similarity of characteristics in general enhances positive behavior. In the second study the use of questions to elicit expression of the consequences of the child's behavior on other children's feelings resulted in higher levels of donation by girls.

Staub has been interested in the role of participatory learning in stimulating prosocial behavior. From a review of a number of studies done in his laboratory and elsewhere, Staub draws the following conclusions about situations which are likely to enhance later prosocial behavior:

---A sense of benefiting others.
---A sense of responsibility for others' welfare.
---A sense of personal effectiveness.
---Verbal communication (which can affect the degree to which self-attribution takes place and can contribute to the development of a cognitive network about the self, the welfare of others).
---The opportunity for role taking, which may enable a child to appreciate others' needs and their related feelings. (Staub 1979, pp. 215-16)
Rushton (1976) made an interesting distinction within the realm of prosocial behavior which relates it to the issue of motivation. He argued that there are four possible motivations for altruistic behavior. First, there is empathy, which is closely related to emotional or affective perspective taking; the child experiences the feelings of someone else who needs help and behaves accordingly. A second possibility is normative motivation; in most societies a positive value is placed on behaving altruistically, and this norm may motivate such behavior. Teachers frequently attempt to use this motivation. In the third case, reciprocity motivation, the child may share something with another in the hope that the other will reciprocate at some later time. The fourth motive is fairness or justice, the motivation force of "equity distress."

Prosocial or altruistic behavior is a common thread which ties together many of the objectives of social education. The research in this area suggests the vital importance of providing models of behavior, helping children to make verbalizations and positive self-attributions regarding behavior, enhancing opportunities for experiencing others' perspectives and empathy, letting children see the benefits of the prosocial action they engage in, and moving beyond the mere exhortation of good works. Both peer and authority relations are important, and a variety of motivations may be engaged. Part of the power of the research in this area for improving social education comes from the fact that these processes are apparently effective across a relatively broad age span, though little is yet known about adolescents. These methods also seem to be more powerful in classrooms, where children can experience the reactions of others and where various potential reward structures can be combined, than in the psychological laboratory.

Recommendations

On the basis of this review of connections between recent research and social education, let me briefly sketch goals for achievement in the next decade which might be carried forward by collaborative work across nations. A number of structures or processes—for example, clearinghouses, collaborative research, conferences, and publications—might be involved.
1. To develop models for evaluating social education programs, using measures derived from and validated in research on social cognition—particularly areas such as perspective taking and prosocial behavior.

2. To explore conceptual links between perspective taking, concepts of social conventions and institutions, moral judgment and behavior, self and vicarious reinforcement, and various kinds of prosocial and altruistic behavior in order to formulate social education objectives more adequately and stimulate further research.

3. To encourage the exploration by educators of methods which take into account the processes found to enhance social cognition in research (peer or nonjudgmental adult relations, fostering of cognitive links and self-attribution processes, concern for development of self-reinforcing processes, use of adult models of prosocial behavior) so that both the methods and the understanding of the processes may be enhanced.

4. To explore the differential suitability of these models of social cognition in different national/cultural settings with regard to each of the objectives above and to the potential connection of this kind of research with that which comes from other points of view.

References


6. SOCIAL EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTRAINTS OF THE HIDDEN CURRICULA

By Roger Fielding

This paper questions the extent to which social education, in this case specifically sociology, can provide an "oppositional" curriculum which can effectively challenge the legitimacy of the status quo of our society and genuinely encourage our students to be critics of their society.

The alternative is that our social education may be perceived as just more "normal school," not noticeably more relevant to the world outside the classroom than any other aspect of schooling. I address this question via a consideration of the nature of the hidden curriculum, and in doing so I identify three "hidden" curricula: the hidden curriculum of assessment, the hidden curriculum of schooling, and the hidden curriculum of the sociology classroom. I consider the problems of each of these hidden curricula before inspecting some ways by which we might approach an "oppositional curriculum" and thereby avoid the hidden curricula implications of "normal schooling."

The Hidden Curriculum of Assessment

Meighan (1973) suggested that at its simplest the idea of a hidden curriculum refers to the variety of unintended consequences of the ways in which teachers organize learning for their students. Hargreaves (1978) suggested that the idea of a hidden curriculum refers to the notion that teachers teach, and pupils learn, far more than what appears in the official curriculum. Traditionally, suggested Hargreaves, the hidden curriculum has been defined as everything taught in schools which is not part of the official curriculum. The rich diversity of the insights the notion is able to provide stems from the surprisingly wide variety of such unintended consequences to the organization of learning, as it might conventionally be understood. I shall begin therefore by illustrating the more obvious (and perhaps more easily recognized and accepted) relationship of the hidden curriculum to assessment and examinations.
Mardle and Walker (1980) note that there is nothing new about the idea that within educational settings there is some form of hidden message or curriculum by which one learns what is acceptable behavior and what is not, what leads to rewards and what to sanctions. They suggest that this idea is well documented from primary schools (Nash 1973; Barnes et al. 1969) to secondary schools (Hughes et al. 1958; Miller and Parlett 1976). The connecting thread between these works is the notion that what is really learned in institutional education is the necessity for individual or collective identification of "what is wanted" and how to supply it—or not—suggest Mardle and Walker (1980).

This is the simplest notion of the hidden curriculum, the messages associated with the means students find they must use in order to gain high grades and other academic awards. Snyder (1971) developed this notion of the hidden curriculum. He suggested that the formal, or "visible," curriculum is "translated" by the students into discrete and manageable tasks to be mastered. The syllabus of the hidden curriculum therefore becomes the tasks which students need to complete in order to get the highest possible grades with the least possible effort.

Snyder noted that students initially come to grips in practical terms with the formal curriculum—their option schemes, the rules with regard to essay writing and "handing-in" dates, and so on. The next stage is to narrow their focus to the actual tasks which will form the basis of assessment—the essays to be written, the examinations to be taken, the "coverage" of the syllabus which might be needed, the books or chapters to be read for class, and so on. It is at this stage that students initially experience the dissonance between the "formal" curriculum and the hidden curriculum, with its "latent, covert tasks inferred as the basis for reward in that particular setting" (Snyder 1971). Students "translate" the understanding of physics, English, or sociology into mastery of a set of tasks which may have "very little to do with learning or even with real knowledge." The central task of the hidden curriculum has become the learning of which patterns of behavior are "tribally or institutionally" sanctioned. The "tribal" sanctioning here refers to the potentially significant role of student culture in the articulation, development, and maintenance of certain aspects of the hidden curriculum. In summary, for Snyder, the "hidden curriculum" com-
prises those aspects of the formal curriculum which are not reflected in stated learning objectives and thus cannot be assessed by standardized or teacher-made tests.

A notion of hidden curriculum similar to that of Snyder's was used by Miller and Parlett (1974) in their study of the examination system. An issue raised by Snyder's study—differential learner recognition of the hidden curriculum—was addressed by Miller and Parlett. Students were found to be differentially "deaf" or conscious of examination "cues" given by their teachers. "Cue-conscious" students—or their more-active colleagues, the "cue-seekers"—explicitly "played the exam game" or "worked the system." Such notions recognize the existence of a hidden curriculum and suggest that some students are more aware of it than others—some "work the system," other just work hard.

Miller and Parlett also suggested that different types of students, while sharing the same visible or formal curriculum, respond to varying hidden curricula. Moreover, they went on to suggest that these different hidden curricula could be associated with disparate amounts of success in examinations.

With reference to differential learner recognition of the hidden curriculum, Hargreaves (1978) suggests that because many pupils do not protest overtly and explicitly against the hidden curriculum, the messages of the hidden curriculum are successfully communicated. The hidden curriculum, suggests Hargreaves, will be successfully communicated only as long as it remains hidden. This notion of the hidden curriculum, then, essentially reinforces the idea of a relationship between assessment procedures and examinations and pupils' strategies for coping with these constraints.

Hargreaves recognizes Holt (1974) as being among the first to detect the pervasive power of the hidden curriculum. Holt argued that the hidden curriculum rested on fear—fear of failure, embarrassment, loss of status, disapproval, and punishment. For Holt, the hidden curriculum was "antieducational," essentially destructive of the official curriculum and productive of "bad" pupils. The hidden curriculum was antieducational inasmuch as it undermined the objectives of the official curriculum by leading pupils to concentrate on acquiring survival skills related to pleasing the teacher and satisfying his demands. In this
sense, Holt's hidden curriculum is similar to that of Snyder's (1971); it is one of fear of failure, because pupils' motivations for pleasing the teacher are based on fear. Pupils, reports Holt, were "afraid of failing, afraid of being kept back, afraid of being called stupid, afraid of feeling themselves stupid." Holt saw these fears as almost wholly bad and as destructive of pupils' intelligence and capacity.

The Hidden Curriculum of Schooling

If the notion of hidden curriculum is restricted solely to its relationship to assessment and examination (important though that relationship may be), it loses much of its potency for a more radical analysis of education. The hidden curriculum, in a wider sense, is not limited to conveying messages about what is, or what is not, examinable; it clearly carries many other messages as well. Indeed, the powerful criticisms of "schooling" and the ideas of the "deschoolers" are based on the idea of the hidden curriculum of contemporary schools. While the "official" curriculum is "education," the wider consequence of the hidden curriculum is "schooling" and all that term has come to convey.

Illich claimed that

to understand what it means to de-school society ... we must focus on the hidden curriculum of schooling ... to call attention to the fact that the ceremonial or ritual of schooling itself constitutes such a hidden curriculum (Illich 1971).

At least one, but only one, aspect of Illich's hidden curriculum is similar to Snyder's more conservative conception, and that relates to Illich's "myth of measurement of values." Illich pointed out that schools initiate young people into a world where everything can be measured. People who have been thus "schooled down to size," Illich suggested, will let "unmeasured experience slip out of their hands." Illich's suggestion here that this particular aspect of the hidden curriculum will in fact serve to inform pupils' world view—a world where everything can be measured—is clearly an advance on Snyder, and it furnishes a much more radical insight. In summary, for Illich the hidden curriculum refers essentially to "the structure of schooling as opposed to what happens in school."

In commenting upon an earlier draft of this paper, Irving Morrissett (1980) pointed out that much of what is included in the hidden curriculum
of schooling may well be desired by "the establishment" and is thus not wholly "unintended." The essence of this hidden curriculum of schooling, then, may not be that it is "unintended" but that it is not explicit. In this connection, Dale (1977) suggested that teachers often did not choose whether to perform the functions of the hidden curriculum. They need not consciously acquiesce, since the performance of the functions of the hidden curriculum is made an essential, not a voluntary, part of teaching by the structural context of their teaching. The teacher fulfills these functions, then, because of such structural constraints as teacher/pupil ratio, the fact that not all students have chosen to be in school, and the size and type of school. Dale suggested that such structural constraints make it impossible for a teacher to avoid participation in the hidden curriculum. The combination of "having to teach them something" and the particular circumstances, resources, and context in which that activity must take place compels teachers to carry out crucial parts of the hidden curriculum of schooling.

Hargreaves (1973) refers to the "grievous error" he made in his earlier work on the social relations of a secondary school (Hargreaves 1967). He now believes that in referring to rebellious pupils as the "delinquent sub-culture," he encouraged the idea that such pupils represented a distinct and deviant minority for whom special causal explanations and curative measures should be sought. In the light of the idea of a hidden curriculum, Hargreaves revised his ideas and came to interpret the "delinquent sub-culture" as a protest against the hidden curriculum on behalf of a much wider population of working-class people. The protest, therefore, of the "delinquent sub-culture" was only incidentally against the formal curriculum and mainly against the hidden curriculum. For Hargreaves, Willis's (1977) study of working-class boys represents a similar illustration of the protests against the hidden curriculum of schooling. These boys reacted to the hidden curriculum of their schooling by inverting the mental/manual distinction of schools, by which they were found wanting, and affirming themselves through masculinity and manual labor. One unintended consequence of schooling illustrated by Willis, therefore, was the strengthening of the boys' sexist attitudes.
Henry (1963) believed that it is through the hidden curriculum of schooling that the most basic and powerful cultural lessons of Western society are taught. The hidden curriculum, for Henry, produces "good" citizens who can fit into the society, having learned all their cultural lessons effectively. Henry compared the hidden curriculum to a communications system, such as a telephone or radio, with the hidden curriculum being the unnoticed "noise" that comes along with the spoken message, the formal curriculum.

Silberman (1971) suggested that the hidden curriculum consists of a set of rules, routines, and procedures designed to mold individual behavior to the requirements of institutional living. Apple (1979) also suggests that students learn a set of tacit norms, values, and dispositions simply by virtue of living in and having to cope with the institutional expectations and routines of school, "day in and day out," for a number of years. Although the demands of the hidden curriculum may contradict each other, students have, in fact, little choice but to find ways of conforming to institutional expectations. These expectations, suggests Silberman, are generally presented as "moral imperatives" rather than simply as functional procedures which may be disregarded when of no further use.

Jackson (1971) described a school environment in which "delay, denial and interruption" are inevitable consequences of the problems of institutional living in schools and of the need to manage the "social traffic" of the classroom. Essentially, Jackson made the point that much of a student's time is spent waiting—for dinner, for the teacher, for the slower students, or for the end of the lesson. He suggested that learning how to live in schools involves learning how to give up desire as well as waiting for its fulfillment. Not everyone who wants to speak can be heard, and not all students' questions can be answered satisfactorily; nor, observed Jackson, can all students' requests be granted. "Interruptor" is an obvious feature of classroom life, and students' attention during lessons is constantly interrupted, by the teacher or by other students. Jackson went on to explore the strategies that students develop to adapt to such features of school life and the way these strategies may complement or contradict the process of learning. He summarized these issues by suggesting that there are two cur-
ricula in every school and every classroom: the official curriculum, which might have at its core the "three Rs," and the "unofficial or perhaps even hidden" curriculum. Jackson represented this latter curriculum by alluding to another set of "Rs"—rules, regulations, and routines. He continued with the observation that the reward system of the school is actually tied to both curricula—if not more closely related, in fact, to mastery of the hidden curriculum: conformity to institutional expectations can lead to praise, while lack of it can lead to trouble. Students are expected to be intellectually curious and aggressive, yet at the same time passive and conforming (Jackson 1971).

Pollard (1980) makes the point that teachers usually attempt to set up routines, procedures, and standards which are then offered as "the way to do things." This attempt to impose routines stems from the threats to the teacher's interests posed by so large a number of children, and it is the "hidden curriculum of routine" which the teacher uses as a primary means of defense against this pressure of numbers. Denscombe (1980) similarly suggests that the hidden curriculum of the classroom stems from the isolation and autonomy of the teacher in the "closed classroom."

Some of the broader messages of the hidden curriculum were cited by Lister as follows:

—Schooling and education are the same thing.
—Education ends when schooling ends.
—Learning is the result of teaching.
—Learning is the mastery of the curriculum. The curriculum is a commodity.
—Knowledge is divided into packages (subjects/topics).
—Learning is linear—knowledge comes in sequential curricula and graded exercises.
—Specialist knowledge is the kind which is most highly esteemed.
—Economically esteemed knowledge is the result of professional teaching. . . . (Lister 1972, p. 93)

Postman and Weingartner presented a list of messages communicated by the structure of the classroom itself—messages not listed among the official aims of teachers:

—Passive acceptance is a more desirable response to ideas than active criticism.
Discovering knowledge is beyond the power of students and is, in any case, none of their business.

Recall is the highest form of intellectual achievement, and the collection of unrelated "facts" is the goal of education.

The voice of authority is to be trusted and valued more than independent judgment.

One's own ideas and those of one's classmates are inconsequential.

Feelings are irrelevant in education.

There is always a single, unambiguous Right Answer to a question. (Postman and Weingartner 1969)

Postman and Weingartner went on to posit, albeit lightheartedly, a "vaccination theory of education," which they suggested was similarly communicated by the structure of schooling. This theory suggests that a subject is something you "take," and when you have "taken it," you have "had it," and if you have "had it," you are immune and need not "take it" again.

Eggleston (1977), drawing on Jackson (1968), listed seven goals that he considered to be central to the notion of a hidden curriculum:

- Learning to "live in crowds," involving the postponement or even the denial of personal desires.
- Learning to use or lose time, tolerating boredom and passivity as an inevitable component of being in the classroom.
- Learning to accept assessment by others, not only by teachers but also by fellow pupils.
- Learning how to compete to please both teachers and fellow students in order to obtain their praise, reward and esteem by appropriate behavior.
- Learning how to live in a hierarchical society and to be differentiated in the process, ... developing a capacity to live with and to tolerate social differentiation is a widely evident consequence of the hidden curriculum.
- Learning ways, with one's fellow students, to control the speed and progress of what the teacher presents in the official curriculum.
- Learning shared meanings with the aid of an established shorthand or restricted code of language ... allowing teachers and students to affirm to each other that they know and understand the procedures in which they are both involved. (Eggleston 1977, pp. 111-12)
The notion that the hidden curriculum is somehow communicated through the "structure" of schooling perhaps needs more attention. Postman and Weingartner (1969) suggested that the message is communicated through "the role of the teacher, the role of the student, the rules of their verbal game, the rights that are assigned, the arrangements made for communication, and 'doings' that are praised or censured." Bowles and Gintis (1976) suggested that the structure of social relations in education not only accustoms students to the discipline of the workplace but also develops the types of personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation and self-image, and social class identifications which they saw as crucial ingredients of job adequacy. In short and more specifically, stated Bowles and Gintis, the social relationships of education replicate the hierarchical division of labor. Alienated labor, they suggested, is reflected in students' lack of control over their education. Bowles and Gintis suggested further that different levels of education feed people into different levels within the occupational structure and, correspondingly, exhibit an internal organization which is similar to that of the hierarchical division of labor. For example, lower levels in education limit and channel the activities of their students, while lower levels in the production hierarchy emphasize rule-following. Higher levels in education emphasize social relationships congruent with the higher levels of the production hierarchy—for example, the capacity to work without supervision and the desirability of internalizing the norms of the enterprise. Even within a single school, suggested Bowles and Gintis, the social relationships of different "tracks" tend to conform to different behavioral norms: students either master one type of behavioral regulation and are channeled into the corresponding level in the hierarchy of production or are allowed to progress to the next and higher level. Bowles and Gintis called this the "correspondence principle" and suggested that higher education, no less so than schooling, had taken its place in the process by which the class structure of advanced capitalism is reproduced (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).

The notion of hidden curriculum, therefore, has several referents. In addition to the principle of "selective negligence," a long list of messages is conveyed by the structure and the social relations of school-
ing. Some of these messages are received by all pupils; the impact of others, as illustrated by Bowles and Gintis, is dependent upon social class. The impact of other aspects of the hidden curriculum not discussed here may depend upon gender or other characteristics (see, for example, Davies 1975; Meighan and Doherty 1975; Davies and Meighan 1975). Finally, as we have seen, certain common aspects of the hidden curriculum may be differentially recognized by students, as illustrated by the differences between the responses of the "cue-deaf" and those of the "cue-seekers" in studies of higher education (Miller and Parlett 1976).

The Hidden Curriculum of the Classroom

Hargreaves (1978) contributed to the identification of yet another aspect of the hidden curriculum. He referred to the "first curriculum" (the formal and official curriculum), the "second curriculum" (which we might call the hidden curriculum, however that notion is understood), and yet a "third curriculum," which he described as the hidden curriculum of the official curriculum. In making such a distinction, Hargreaves drew attention to a third conceptualization of the hidden curriculum—one that can be differentiated from the hidden curriculum of assessment and the hidden curriculum of the structure of schooling. Hargreaves's "third curriculum" is the hidden curriculum of the official curriculum or the "content" of schooling, which I shall now consider with specific reference to the subject of sociology.

Perhaps an easily recognized illustration of the idea of a hidden curriculum specifically related to a sociology classroom is the popular notion that sociology is "subversive" in some way. While it has sometimes been suggested that sociology is deliberately taught in a way which might subvert, a popular suspicion is that however it is taught it will be subversive. While charges of deliberate subversion may on occasion contain some elements of truth—in which cases such efforts would not qualify as conveying a hidden curriculum—the suspicion that subversion may be an unintended consequence of sociology teaching makes a good starting point for consideration of the hidden curriculum specific to a sociology classroom.
Meighan noted several reasons why sociology might be inevitably "disturbing":

--- Sociology casts doubts upon the notion of individual accountability for actions and suggests an alternative insight into the complex, collective social nature of human actions.

--- Sociologists... refuse to take situations at their face value and are neither able to accept official definitions of situations uncritically nor those of the participants... everyone and everything is open to suspicion.

--- Sociology [intends] to improve on "common sense" [and] this threatens the taken-for-granted aspects of social behavior and exposes some of the folk interpretations on which behavior is based, as false or distorted.

--- The discipline takes on a relative, nonethnocentric viewpoint. Comparative studies...[thus] expose the accepted and familiar ways of behaving to comparisons which may be interpreted as unfavorable. This approach allows one to be part of one's own culture yet at the same time out of it. (Meighan 1973; p. 165)

However, Meighan noted Berger's (1971) argument that sociology can be simultaneously radical and conservative:

Sociology, [Berger] concludes, is only subversive in a specific way through its liberating effects on consciousness but in this process it also points up the social limits of freedom and the importance of triviality and mere routine as necessary conditions for both individual and collective (Meighan 1973, p. 166).

Townley (1979) made a similar point in reviewing an integrated social studies course designed for 10- to 12-year-olds, Man: A Course of Study (MACOS), which he described as being the most complex and sophisticated piece of curriculum development ever undertaken in the social studies or humanities. Townley reported that the course provoked a polar range of responses in those who had used it:

Criticisms came from both "left" and "right." In the United States there was a furor because it was felt by many to be too radical, while in Britain, there was a feeling that it is too conservative!... There is a view, in Britain, that the course is written within a functionalist perspective; that there is too great an emphasis on order, harmony, cooperation and consensus (Townley 1979, p. 187).

Reeves (1976) also looked at the hidden curriculum of sociology teaching. He suggested that, while sociology can be ideological, there is a need to distinguish between the message of the subject and the effect it might have on a student. He illustrated his claim that soci-
ology can be ideological with a number of examples of ways in which the ideological potential of sociology may be realized, both in terms of what might be taught and in terms of what might be omitted. He noted, for example, the seemingly widespread belief among sociologists that university sociology is the "real thing" and that everything else is just a watered-down version of it. Reeves suggested that social studies in particular is generally seen as "social" only insofar as it is the opposite of "unsocial," and that often it serves only as a part of the "ideological control of manual workers." Reeves also cited the ideological significance of the distinctions between sociology, economics, politics, and anthropology, as these distinctions serve to limit the explanatory power of each subject. Gouldner (1970) made a similar point with his observation that sociology is primarily concerned with social order and social integration without regard for the economic aspects of social order.

Apple (1979) points out that social studies in the curriculum often encourages tacit acceptance of the idea that society is basically a cooperative system—a value orientation which helps determine the questions that one asks and the educational experiences one designs for students. The lack of treatment of conflict in most social studies curricula and classrooms, he suggests, reinforces the hidden curricular messages of what he has called the "deep structure" of schooling. Apple goes on to describe alternative approaches which may allow that hidden curriculum to be, at least partially, counterbalanced. Among these he includes the comparative study of revolutions—for example, the American, French, Russian, Portuguese, and Chinese revolutions—which would focus upon "the properties of the human condition that cause and are ameliorated by interpersonal conflict" (Apple 1979, p. 92). Another suggestion is the study of the uses of conflict in the legal and economic rights movements of blacks, women, and workers, to show these activities as legitimate models of action. The fact that laws had to be broken and were later struck down by the courts is not, suggests Apple, usually focused upon in social studies curricula.
A Starting Point for an "Oppositional" Curriculum

One of the central, practical questions prompted by the hidden-curriculum approach to sociology teaching has to do with the extent to which the subject of sociology either provides an "oppositional" curriculum or simply becomes part of "normal school" for students, not noticeably different from other subjects nor more relevant to the work outside the classroom. An "oppositional" curriculum would lead inevitably to challenges to taken-for-granted, common-sense assumptions about the relationships between teachers and pupils, criteria of high and low ability, designations of success and failure, and so on.

In the case of sociology, Vulliamy (1973) has suggested that teachers and taught should "do sociology" together. The sociology curriculum would attempt to interpret the sociological assumptions that both teachers and students continually make during everyday discussion and interaction. Vulliamy suggested that only when we have developed such a questioning attitude will students become aware of the possibility of actually shaping their world, as opposed to being shaped by it. Whitty (1976), however, suggested that such new directions in sociology have been treated as incremental additions to existing content in sociology courses—either as new "facts" about everyday life or as new perspectives to be learned about, along with all the others. None of these approaches, Whitty argued, has radically challenged the status quo in the way Vulliamy proposed, and thus none is likely to lead teachers into conflict situations in either school or society. Sociology will be perceived as just more "normal school" until it actually and effectively challenges the existing social relations of school knowledge. My questioning, therefore, of sociology's provision of an "oppositional" curriculum, as opposed to its simple integration into "normal school," seems to address as problematic both the structure of schooling and the content of sociology lessons in schools as well as the more pertinent features of sociology's hidden curriculum.

Irving Morrissett has suggested (1980) that such teaching/learning situations present four possible outcomes:

1. Teachers do not intend for their students to become social critics, and the students do not become social critics.
2. Teachers do not intend for their students to become social critics, but the student do become social critics.

3. Teachers do intend for their students to become social critics, but the students do not get the itch.

4. Teachers do intend for their students to become social critics, and the students do become social critics.

I feel I am essentially dealing here, in a practical sense, with the third situation listed above. I must declare my stance in favor of intended outcomes and say that I hope we do intend for our students to become social critics. Why, then, do our students not "get the itch" in spite of our intentions? The primary reason may be the persistence of the hidden curricular messages of "normal school" with reference to assessment, to the broader structure of schooling, and to the specific messages which invade even our social and political classrooms.

Some of the issues raised here were addressed in Britain by the Joint Matriculation Board and University of Birmingham Project for Advanced Level Syllabuses and Examinations (JPALSE), in particular by the study group associated with this project which prepared a scheme for an "Integrated Social Science" advance-level course. The proposals of this study group went some way toward operationalizing the imperative that students and teachers should "do sociology" together, in contrast to the advance-level schemes in sociology currently available from most British examination boards. The course design, as described by Meighan (1976), advocated three linked features: (1) a student-centered approach, (2) the use of practical experiences, and (3) a network approach to content.

Meighan contrasted these features with current practices in social science teaching at A level, which he identified as consisting of the following characteristics: (1) a teacher-centered approach, (2) reliance on third- or fourth-hand experiences (often codified in textbooks), and (3) a linear, hierarchical, or concentric approach to content (Meighan 1976).

A student-centered approach, Meighan suggested, would involve students' participation in the planning, execution, and assessment of the learning experience; a cooperative teaching method in which students learn from each other and from materials structured by the teacher, with
the teacher acting as guide and consultant during the learning process; 
and a "participative teaching method" based on direct observations, 
"involvement experiences," and simulations (see, for example, Fielding 
and Anderson 1979). He explained that the use of practical experiences, 
or "learning by doing," involves the structured use of three kinds of 
educational experience:

1. First-hand experience. Here the student is conceived as 
   "doing" social science. Whenever possible he will be 
   involved in the analysis of social groups as a participant 
   member.

2. Second-hand experience. The criterion for second-hand 
   experience is that the students study data gathered by and 
   concepts formulated by others.

3. Third-hand experience. The criterion for third-hand 
   experience is that students study the analysis of data or the 
   representation of problems made by commentators (books, 
   films, seminars, tutorials, formal lectures, articles). 
   (Meighan 1976, p. 128)

Meighan suggested that the "network approach to content" stems from 
a need for a less rigid and "absolutist" view of knowledge than that 
represented in existing syllabuses. While an absolutist view of knowl-
edge effectively ensures a teacher-centered or "instructional" approach 
to teaching and learning, the more-relativist "network" theory of knowl-
edge allows for more decision making by students and permits an approach 
to teaching and learning which utilizes first-hand experience. The 
study group attempted to clarify the main characteristics of a "network 
approach to content" as follows:

--The content is seen essentially as a network of interacting, 
overlapping features, and, thus, is not a linear, concentric, 
cyclical or hierarchical syllabus.

--It follows that a course should start anywhere in a network.

--Each item raises questions about some of the others and any 
of these may be the next item for investigation.

--Items may also be reinvestigated after a study of related 
topics.

--Members of a course could individualize their way through 
this network, or be group taught, or a combination of both. 
(Meighan 1976, p. 129)

These features of the proposed "Integrated Social Science" A-level 
course would serve to guard against the danger, warned of by Whitty 
(1976), that new directions in sociology might be treated simply as
incremental additions to existing content. Certainly such a course would serve to challenge the existing social relations of school knowledge in a number of ways:

The practical outcome of the student-centered approach advocated would involve a series of discussions and negotiations with students at the start of a course on what to start learning, how to learn it, how to organize it, and how learning might be evaluated. The role of the teacher in this course would therefore contrast with the traditional role of teacher as instructor.

The use of practical experiences, in conjunction with the student-centered approach, also challenges the rigid, absolutist view of knowledge represented in existing syllabuses, which has in the past effectively ensured teacher-centered instructional approaches. The network approach which represents a more relativist theory of knowledge allows the flexibility needed to accommodate the decision-making of students and the increased use of first-hand experiences. (Meighan 1976)

Meighan concluded his report on the ideas of the study group by commenting that the course became known to the members of the group as a "do-it-yourself" enterprise, reflecting some of the ideas of Postman and Weingartner (1959) about the need for students to become "meaning makers."

The Sociology Workshop experiments at the University of Keele, begun in 1973, are one example within British higher education of an attempt to introduce radically different forms of teaching and learning. The workshop idea emerged from criticisms of a new curriculum introduced at Keele in 1969 which consisted of a compulsory "theory and methods" element and a choice of "options." The focus of these criticisms was on the lecture/tutorial system of the compulsory element and on the way in which this seemed to contradict the aims of the course, which concentrated on ideas and techniques, demonstrated by an analysis of various empirical works, rather than on their empirical content. The workshop system which emerged as a result of these criticisms involved two major changes: (1) the curriculum was opened up to student choice to the extent that students could virtually design their own programs around their particular interests and (2) instead of passively receiving lectures from the teacher, students worked in groups to explore solutions to sociological problems which they had played some part in defining.
of sociology they wanted to study in depth. The only constraint on choice was that students were required to take a balance of workshops focused on such theories as Marxism or functionalism and workshops focused on specific topics; for example, deviance (Simons 1975).

These changes in the organization of teaching and learning at Keele, although apparently lacking any overt reference to the insights of the foregoing analyses of education, nonetheless addressed some of the problematic issues raised by those analyses; among them, differing conceptions of knowledge and the relations between teacher and taught. Simons (1975), for example, claimed that shifting the emphasis for learning onto the group challenged some widely held assumptions about teaching and learning. It questioned not only the authority of "knowledge" but also the procedural authority customarily attributed to the tutor. Simons recorded that several students spoke of deep-seated and widely shared assumptions about authority in the teaching/learning process and observed that these assumptions invariably gave authority to the teacher. Both Meighan (1976) and Simons (1975) indicated, therefore, some feature of a starting point for a truly "oppositional" curriculum which could avoid all the hidden curriculum implications of "normal school."

Conclusions

The implications of this paper may best be summed up in the following questions that need to be faced about our own teaching:

1. What is the place of "relevance" in social and political education?
2. How do we identify what is "meaningful" to students?
3. What kinds of contribution are our students allowed to make to lessons?
4. What kinds of contribution can students make to our lessons as we presently structure them?
5. Do we value the students' own experiences of the social world as a learning resource?
6. What would a "student-eye view" of our lessons look like? How far short of our aims would it fall?
7. Finally, to what extent do the unspoken "hidden" but nonetheless effective messages of our classrooms contradict the aims we take to the classrooms? Is there anything within the parameters of possible change that we can do to ease that contradiction?

References


7. THE LEARNER IN GERMAN POLITICAL EDUCATION

By Hans-Helmuth Knutter and Gabriela Knutter-Schrey

This essay has two purposes:

1. It is intended to present research in developmental psychology and learning theory, in light of German experience and to consider to what extent research in these two fields plays a role in political education. Data regarding this relationship are taken from research on the position of the learner in political education in West Germany.

2. It is intended to clarify the role of political education in West Germany for those from other nations so that they can compare it with political education in their nations. For this purpose, development of political education after 1945 is reviewed.

Psychological Postulates for Political Education

Treatment of the theme "the learner in political education" requires an explanation of some of the basic tenets of educational psychology. In addition, students of all ages should be observed because children, youth, and adults all participate in political education programs.

An effort is made here to present only original data from West Germany and from the East German Democratic Republic. In spite of this effort, however, a strong American influence on German educational psychology will be evident. And, in the case of the East German examples, Russian and West German as well as American influence will be in evidence. Although most of the examples do not deal with political education directly, they are relevant to and can be applied to political education situations. Research in the German language on the relationship between educational psychology and political education is nonexistent, although such research is certainly necessary.

Adult Students

In East Germany, the name of Hans Lowe is closely connected to significant research on adult educational psychology. Lowe refuted through investigation that the alertness of adults begins to diminish after the age of 35 (Lowe 1977, p. 421). On the contrary, he found, adult capacity for learning cannot be reckoned according to the calendar because
it depends on a variety of factors, all of which are in need of additional research. Lowe suggested several factors, including socioeconomic influences, educational background, professional qualifications, occupation, and lifestyle (Lowe 1977, p. 422). He concluded that it is entirely possible that learning capability progresses throughout old age under the influence of training, profession, hobbies, and continuing education.

Helmut Almeroth, also of East Germany, concluded that adult students could perform better when they were already accustomed to various kinds of motivation (Almeroth 1977, p. 426). He stressed that retention powers of students over a long period improved when no time limits for learning were imposed. Another important factor for political education among adults, he found, is that age differences play no role in ability to retain dates and facts.

**Economical Learning**

For all students, old and young alike, performance is influenced by attitudes toward learning (Lowe 1976, p. 122). The following useful rules were compiled by Lowe concerning the economy of learning for old and young students:

1. An active pursuit of learning is necessary, and it should stress open discussion and reflection.
2. For all types of learning (visual and auditory), it stands to reason that subconscious learning is reinforced when visual learning is backed up by verbal reinforcement.
3. Learning improves when many senses besides rote memory are involved. The effort of learning something by rote is infinitely greater than the effort required to learn when several or many senses are involved.
4. In general, the rule holds that one learns better at night immediately before sleeping. It is important that the learner is not exposed to any additional influences before sleeping.
5. Different learning processes should be integrated according to a learning plan which works toward stated objectives. It is most desirable that the learner not be exposed to material besides that which he or she is trying to learn.
6. Learning results are doubled when essential objectives are decided in advance.

7. Repetition should occur, particularly in written form, over a longer time span than is usually allowed.

8. Time is an essential ingredient for learning—all interruptions have a negative influence.

9. Speed-reading techniques can improve learning performance by helping students to identify essential information. (Lowe 1976, pp. 123-132)

Motivation

The pedagogical consequences of research on motivation in young and adult learners were discussed by Lowe in the following manner:

1. At the base of all learning there must be a purpose. This purpose must appear socially and personally relevant to the learner. Among youth and adults alike, there must exist the feeling that it is worthwhile to learn a given subject. Both groups will be more highly motivated if higher expectations are aroused.

2. The level of content must be always suited to the learner so that frustration and discouragement will be avoided.

3. Particularly in the case of adult learners, it is important that recognizable progress be evident so that feelings of stagnation will be checked.

4. An unfavorable influence on learning motivation results when the learner is forced to operate under pressure. (Lowe 1976, pp. 166-69)

Assertions of Educational Psychology Regarding Political Education

Heinz Winsmann of East Germany undertook research into how the experiences, knowledge level, and attitudes of young people were influenced by various social and historical circumstances (Winsmann 1977). The sample consisted of 260 students in their sixth school year. The students belonged to 14 different groups of a political youth organization (the Pioneers). Students were shown illustrations depicting historical and contemporary occurrences. Some of the illustrations represented individuals and others, events. Students were then asked to describe the pictures in writing. The results of students' initial attempts indicated that students were better able to describe those pic-
tunes containing people. However, attempts to describe the pictures which took place 12 weeks later, in accordance with the organizational schedule of the Pioneer group, resulted in students being able to describe both types of pictures about equally well. In both cases, recognition was greater in the case of contemporary themes.

Winsmann came to the following conclusion: "Contemporary subject matter and human-centered content are easier for students to learn because they are more integrated with their understandings, experiences, and attitudes than are historical occurrences."

Werner Correll of West Germany suggested several principles relevant to political education. He treated several themes related to social development between the ages of 6 and 12, and concluded that social maturation evolves, not from within the individual, but from conditioning which occurs from outside (Correll 1971, p. 130): Consequently, it is desirable to encourage children and youth to participate in suitable groups. Negative influences on social development occur when parents and teachers adopt a laissez-faire attitude. When this is the case, directionless children disturb others and positive socialization becomes impossible.

Correll suggested a teaching method which falls somewhere between "integrative" and "authoritative." In this approach, educational upbringing is composed of two-thirds "integrative style" and one-third "authoritative style." The resulting mix of teaching styles helps students become integrated with their environment. As for social development in later childhood and adolescence, Correll suggested exposing students to good literature and conversation and stimulating group activities in which proper social behavior can be tested (Correll 1971, p. 138).

The mere knowledge of democratic institutions, Correll maintained, is insufficient to reinforce a democratic form of government (Correll 1971, p. 246). A disposition toward democracy cannot be encouraged just by talk. Correll suggested that the ideal way to encourage democratic objectives is to teach appropriate content in a group setting in which all members work together. This teaching style would have the following characteristics:
Only a small portion of the students' activities would be observed by the teacher.

Students would participate in many activities of an elective nature.

Students should be exposed to positive reinforcement from peers as well as from the teacher. For example, teachers should accept all behaviors beyond the earliest elementary grades unless these behaviors are antisocial. (Correll 1971, p. 242)

Regarding suitable curriculum for reinforcing democratic values, Correll suggested the following learning goals for students:

---To respect the rights of others and coordinate different needs.
---To work with others to develop plans rather than wait for directions.
---To realize that learning is a cooperative rather than a competitive venture. (Correll 1971, p. 247)

Finally, he argued, it is extremely important that students become socially adjusted as well as adjusted to their own self-concepts.

Application of Learning Theory to Political Education

The Gap Between Theory and Practice

It is typically German to speak of a gap between theory and practice. That theory takes precedence over practice and that practice must be justified in light of theory are basic tenets of German intellectual tradition.

Until 1918, political affairs in Germany were simply delegated to those in authority. The educated classes, freed of the need to participate in politics, could allow themselves the luxury of utopian philosophizing because there were no practical limitations on their thinking. Hegel and his intellectual followers are representative of those thinkers who were not called upon to put their ideas into practice.

A completely different relationship between theory and practice has evolved in the Anglo-American experience, where a long tradition of individual and cooperative decision making has encouraged a pragmatic intellectual tradition.

Political education in Germany must begin from a different premise than is generally the case in Western democracies. It must educate
people to a democracy which is strange to German culture and does not really evolve out of German tradition. The severity of the effects of the numerous breaks in tradition was documented not only by the so-called student revolt, which pressed for an unrealistic utopia, but also by an international empirical research project that characterized the political mentality of German young people as ignorant, hostile, cynical toward reality, and struggling for an ideal society which is not congruent with reality.

Perhaps because of our liking for theory in the Federal Republic of Germany, the questions of what should be learned, how pupils should behave, and how to achieve those goals have been treated in voluminous theoretical publications. Empirical research is, in comparison, more scarce. As early as 1955, Wolfgang Hilligen undertook research on political education programs being offered to school children in Hesse. Later research was focused on textbooks used by Hessen students during the second half of the 1960s. Questionnaires were used to gather data about students' political opinions. The effectiveness of political education in different schools and outside school was also explored. On the whole, theoretical conceptions predominate in this research, even in the work of those authors who attempted to combine theoretical and practical matters. Some authors developed detailed theoretical conceptions which have infiltrated into textbooks.

Development of Political Education After 1945

Political education in Germany is quite ideological. It is believed that students should be brought up according to democratic values but that these values and ideals should not necessarily be tied to the current political system of their native state. Political education has maintained a critical stance toward the German Federal Republic.

The attitude of political education toward the postwar structure in Germany was uncritical, divorcing theory from practice. This attitude was supported by the government and by social institutions in general; during the years immediately following the war, the Federal Republic of Germany was considered a temporary arrangement. Therefore, the goals of political education had no connection with the national reality. Divorcing itself from the existing structure, political education became a utopian scheme in the true sense of the word. Some advocates of politi-
cal education aspired toward an ideal democratic system; others wanted to create a system based on ideas of a socialist nature.

The various conceptual approaches have changed a great deal since 1945. Since about 1972, there has been a tendency within political education to devise new approaches, new objectives, and new curricula—all of which make new demands on students and teachers. Some of these new approaches and trends are described briefly in this section (see Knutter 1979, pp. 148 ff.; Schmiederer 1972, pp. 11-13; Huser et al. 1976, pp. 5-7; Wallraven and Dietrich 1970, p. 105).

—During the early 1950s, Theodor Wilhelm (who wrote under the pseudonym Friedrich Oetinger) published several works in which he maintained that cooperation and partnership were the major objectives of political education. Specific aspects of partnership included the ability to compromise, tolerance, solidarity, and initiative.

—Also during the early 1950s, Oehler, Habermas, and others advocated the idea that the major role of political education was to produce well-informed citizens.

—Ralf Dahrendorf did considerable research on a theme which was much more popular in the United States than in Germany—namely, that conflict is an essential ingredient of society. Wolfgang Hilligen and Herman Giesecke applied Dahrendorf's ideas to political education. This approach stressed the relationship of reality to social thought.

—In the mid-1960s, there was a strong effort (by Rudolph Raasch, Eugen Lemberg, and others) to place the nation in the center of the political picture. This approach, however, did not remain significant for long.

—Toward the end of the 1960s, the idea that the objective of political education was to alter the political system was propounded by Hans Jochem Gamm and Egon Becker, among others.

—Advocates of a "pedagogy of order" who placed public welfare in the forefront (Hattich, Sutor, and Assel) and who wanted to resolve conflicts in regard to that order (Schaaf) tried to counterbalance the one-sidedness of conflict pedagogy.

—Since the 1970s, a movement based on research by Behrmann and Ackermann and heavily influenced by American sociology has maintained
that political socialization is more successful if it is begun during
the early childhood years.

The fact that none of these various approaches has had a permanent
impact indicates that educators should concentrate on realistically
attainable goals and practical teaching methods. Political education
should be related to political and social events, not viewed as an iso-
lated phenomenon. One way of fostering this relationship would be to
strengthen the cognitive domain.

**Synopses of the Works of Theorists Who Are Also Textbook Authors**

This section, based on the work of Walter Gagel (1979), treats
several authors cited by Gagel and shows the influence of theory on
practical instruction.

**Kurt Gerhard Fischer (1973).** Fischer believed in developing demo-
cratic attitudes and behavior by political education. On the basis of
psychological research by Tausch and Tausch, he maintained that social/
integrative methods would reinforce independent thinking and democratic
behavior. The catch phrases that describe this approach to education
are "no moral instruction, encouragement of students' questions, and
establishment of a trusting atmosphere." Working in groups, discussing
procedures and results, and debating alternatives, Fischer argued, are
effective learning strategies.

Fischer developed a model of the learning process which differenti-
ated various phases of learning: gathering information, forming
opinions, forming positions and understanding of their foundations, and
reflecting on those processes. Gagel compared Fischer's model with two
other phase models—his own and one developed by Edwin Fenton (see
Figure 1).

Gagel criticized Fischer's lack of treatment of student motivation
because, according to Gagel, it is this phase which determines how much
self-direction the student will probably employ in other phases of the
curriculum.

Fischer formulated a catalog of "understandings" which students
should master in a teaching/learning situation. It should be stressed
that Fischer's view was quite liberal, particularly as he allowed the
students a great deal of choice regarding the "understandings" (objec-
tives) toward which they wished to work.
Hermann Giesecke (1973 and 1976). Giesecke defined teaching as a particular type of communication which takes place between two (or, as a rule, more than two) people. This communication (interaction) is interpreted as a phenomenon involving two people (teacher and student) who play certain roles within the school, who understand the school rules and objectives, and who both accept learning as the desired outcome (Giesecke 1973). According to Giesecke's "theory of symbolic interaction," by interpreting rules, institutional surroundings, and objects by means of symbols, processes of understanding and definition become necessary and possible; into this procedure are integrated the experiences and needs of the actors. Teaching as symbolic interaction requires such complete integration of the parts that it can be successful only rarely, in the opinion of Giesecke. Teaching methods, therefore, may be regarded as attempts to minimize failure. Advanced planning of teaching can only be done within limits because of the continuing necessity of communication between all acting parts. Giesecke's theory encourages students' participation at all stages of teaching and makes itself the object of teaching. Finally, it sheds light on reasons for failure (Gagel 1979, p. 79).
Giesecke advocated a number of specific methods for political education: development of curriculum, role playing, dramatic production, social studies, challenge, planned play, and mock trials. Rather more important, however, was a general approach to teaching which emphasized clarification of the subject by the teacher, discussing the desired results, and getting the students into a receptive frame of mind.

Critics of Giesecke have questioned his awareness of the realities of industrial societies. In his textbook (1976), however, Giesecke took a skeptical but openly realistic view of political education, observing that "the ideal picture of free citizens contributing significantly to the economic and political decision-making process is no longer realistic" (Giesecke 1976, p. 6).

Wolfgang Hilligen (1975). Particularly important for this discussion is Hilligen's model of learning phases, summarized below:

1. Confrontation with a problem situation and recognition of subjective and objective difficulties.
2. Recognition of and, if necessary, willingness to deal with problems in "general" meaning (posing primary hypotheses).
3. Formation of important questions; for example, what does one need to know in order to solve the problem?
4. Identification of possible explanations (posing secondary hypotheses).
5. Formation of opinions with regard to the hypotheses in general and specific terms (anticipating consequences of various explanations).
6(a). Assessment of possibilities for concrete political participation.
6(b). Identification of implications for other similar situations and problems (need for additional research).

Hilligen believes that a democratic life style is encouraged by common endeavors and values among students and teachers and by a school climate and teaching style which reinforces democratic ideals.

Bernhard Sutor (1973). Sutor emphasized that teachers have less of a monopoly on knowledge and understanding of political matters than they have on other subjects in the school curriculum. Consequently, he recommended teaching methods such as discussion and debate, in which the teacher's opinion carries no more weight than students' opinions (Sutor
To clarify the gap between theory and practice, Sutor developed a didactic analytical model. In Figure 2, Sutor's model is compared with Gagel's model in order to show important relationships between the two sequences of courses.

### Figure 2

**Structures of Two Courses of Study in Political Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sutor</th>
<th>Gagel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>2. Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>3. Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Research</td>
<td>4. Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theorizing, with emphasis on hypotheses</td>
<td>5. Review of hypothesis and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Problem solving</td>
<td>6. Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of objectives, findings, and conclusions</td>
<td>7. Implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Integration and generalization by learner's orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ernst August Roloff (1974 and 1978).** Roloff stressed the importance of the elementary grades for political socialization of children. He maintained that it is in the early grades that students learn to communicate, work together, and work toward common objectives. Particularly important, he argued, is a pressure-free school environment. Roloff maintained that effective teacher-directed learning is a contradiction in terms (Roloff 1974, vol. 1, pp. 21 ff.).

Roloff's draft curriculum for the German high-school classes 5 to 10 and 10 to 13 (secondary levels I and II) emphasizes decision making. While attending classes 5 and 6, pupils are involved in making decisions about their own courses of instruction and in assessing their own aims and abilities (Roloff 1974, vol. 1, p. 153). Gagel criticized this approach, claiming that it does not differentiate between informal principles and government statutes— for example, in the question of religious education. Gagel also disagreed with Roloff's assumption that 18-year-olds are really ready to enter the adult world. Gagel esteems certain
aspects of Roloff's curriculum outline, however, because it gives students a good start on socialization.

Rolf Schmiederer (1972). Schmiederer suggested a teaching approach which is based on the student's personal experiences. These experiences consist of (1) family and socialization, (2) life style and leisure time, (3) partnership and sexuality, (4) school and upbringing, (5) communication and manipulation, (6) work experience and profession, and (7) political institutions and participation. Potential "spheres of experience" groups include underprivileged groups and the environment. Some related subject areas that might be incorporated into the curriculum at the secondary level are production and distribution; economy, power, and authority; and international problems, conflicts, and possible resolutions. Relating these subject areas to students' fields of experience should allow the maximum possible identification of the interests of the pupils with the content of the lessons.

Schmiederer felt that the best methods of student-centered teaching are case studies and projects. The essential elements of this approach to teaching are summarized below:

-- Cooperation between teacher and students in selecting themes and problems to be studied.
-- Extensive autonomy of students in solving problems and completing tasks.
-- Emphasis on work in small groups.
-- Use of a variety of activities for the solution of problems and questions which should evolve out of consideration of the total problem.
-- Participation by students in choosing activities and content.
-- Use of various social science methods and other methodologies; they should be chosen for their relevance to the problem rather than by course of instruction and discipline.

Empirical Research on the Political Attitudes of Students

In this paper, only selections from the best-known and most controversial research will be treated. The study by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (Torney et al. 1975) will not be considered.
In 1957, a group of 171 male and female students at Frankfurt University were surveyed by Jurgen Habermas and others regarding their political attitudes. Political education at school was of considerable influence and importance for that survey. The political attitudes of the persons tested were measured against an ideal conception of democracy which maintained: "Democracy strives for self-determination of mankind. In case the latter has been realized, the first will become perfect. Political participation will then be identical with self-determination" (Habermas et al. 1969, p. 15).

Habermas identified six political types—nonpolitical, irrational/alof, rational/alof, naive, reflective, and participatory—and investigated the degree to which the political potential of these different types contributed to democratic or autocratic forms of government. Within these types, he designated four political tendencies: genuinely democratic, formally democratic, authoritarian, and indifferent (Habermas et al. 1969, pp. 132-147). These types, and the tendencies within general type categories, were combined in an attempt to discover political potential and degrees of realization of this potential (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3**

**POLITICAL POTENTIAL AND DEGREES OF REALIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Tendencies</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Formally Democratic</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory and Reflective</td>
<td>Naive and Rationale/Aloof</td>
<td>Irrational/Aloof</td>
<td>Nonpolitical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formally democratic</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In an earlier study, Habermas had attempted to connect social indicators with student political attitudes (Habermas 1959, p. 335). The
findings indicated that political attitudes existed without reference to social realities (Habermas et al., 1969, p. 275). Habermas concluded that the lack of preparation for political participation in West Germany is due to lack of real democracy, however, not to lack of interest in politics on the part of the German people.

Another important research study involving political education in the schools was undertaken in 1970 by Egon Becker, Sebastian Herkommer, and Joachim Bergmann. This research, based on data from junior high schools, high schools, and vocational schools, was closely related to research by Manfred Teschner (1968) which focused on a college-preparatory high school program in Hesse. The aforementioned studies maintained that empirical research methodology of the type most prevalent in the 1960s is not useful for investigating the attitudes of students of the present generation.

All these researchers agreed that because political education has very little affective influence on students, the aim of teaching should be to give them an intellectual understanding of social structures (Teschner, 1968). According to Bergmann and his associates, the number of students who believe in democracy and act democratically is no larger than the number of students who are obviously antidemocratic and anti-parliamentary. The great majority of students exhibit a superficial identification with and unthinking acceptance of democracy and its social and political structures. Political education transmits knowledge of political institutions, but it does not necessarily lead to political involvement.

Walter Jaide (1970a) suggested that there was in West Germany a considerable percentage of rigidly conservative people, particularly among the working youth. Jaide made a distinction between this brand of conservatism and the political beliefs and activities of loyal and cooperative citizens who leaned toward conservatism. He found that conservative attitudes tended to range from apolitical to antipolitical opinions; however, young people who expressed progressive opinions demonstrated more readiness for political and social activities as a result of being better informed. Jaide identified two major opinion types: conservative and progressive. A survey of 1,800 respondents indicated that working youth were likely to possess more conservative
attitudes and less political information than were students in the upper grades of secondary school. It was also noted that the students were more favorably disposed toward political and social participation (Jaide 1970b, p. 670).

Barbara Hille, a colleague of Jaide, came to a similar conclusion in her 1978 research. She found that students exhibited a general disinclination to espouse conservative political attitudes and a general tendency to support democratic ideals in a rather passive fashion, with little inclination for political activity. On the other hand, some students exhibited a sort of "social-liberal" position backed up by a large amount of political information but no willingness to participate in political activity. Students representing the extreme left position were found to have a very limited amount of political knowledge at their disposal (Hille 1978, pp. 37-40).

Research sponsored by the Emnid Institut compared empirical research projects undertaken in 1968 and 1969 with projects undertaken in 1972. The researchers concluded that young people in 1972 indicated more inclination to participate in political parties and organizations than had been the case in the late 1960s (Die jungen Staatsburger 1973, p. 56).

As a result of this inquiry and of findings presented in previous research, it can be assumed that research which is not of a prescriptive nature gives a more or less positive picture of young people's political attitudes. It is interesting to note that the preceding data were collected during the period of student political unrest—a period during which all traditional criteria were negated. In any case, political attitudes are not exclusively shaped by political education in the classroom; the family is at least as responsible for political socialization as is the school—and probably more responsible (Harnischfeger 1972, p. 123).

It should be stressed that all examples to this point have been concerned with the West German experience, which indicates that students are influenced to relatively unequal degrees by the socializing influences of the school, parents, peer groups, and the mass media. In East Germany, the situation differs in some ways. The German Democratic Republic attempts to present a "united front" where socialization
matters are concerned, in order to discourage any socializing influences which might encourage students to deviate from the desired social and political norms. This pervasive socialization pressure leads the majority of young people to believe and behave in a socially "desirable" manner—but it should be realized that these expressions of agreement with social norms are largely formal in character.

U.S. Influence on German Political Education

In this section we will briefly consider the extent of acceptance within German political education of findings from American research.

Jerome Bruner's theory of structural orientation reached a turning point about ten years ago at a time when his work was becoming known in West Germany through the writings of Wolfgang Hilligen (1968). Bruner's learning theory answers the question of why students should learn about the structure of knowledge. At that time, there was little relationship between education and life, and students were only peripherally concerned with great and pressing public problems (Elbers 1973, p. 65). Bruner brought social criticism to the forefront of educational concerns and suggested that values and priorities should receive major consideration. He stressed the importance of integrating the structure of knowledge with understanding of current problems (Elbers 1973, p. 65). Bruner's theory is related somewhat to Kohlberg's conception of moral education, which became of major importance in the 1970s.

The slogan "back to basics" refers to a movement in U.S. education that focuses on teaching such skills as reading and writing as a basis for facilitating learning in areas such as social studies (Beyer 1977). John Lunstrum favors integrating concept teaching, which should be employed as a means of improving the reading skills of students, with Kohlberg's theories of moral education (Lunstrum 1976, p. 11).

Similarly practice-oriented are the efforts in the United States to improve global education, in which students are expected to become familiar with problems throughout the world. Emphasis is placed on such global problems as food, energy, and the influence of international problems on American domestic affairs.

An overview of the position of social studies in the United States which appeared in the journal Social Education (Jarolimek 1977) pays
particular attention to the role of curriculum development in six Ameri-
can states. Dissimilarities among social studies programs in different
states are pointed out, and attention is drawn to the vast differences
not only between regions but also within specific school districts.
Nearly everywhere, the article notes, there is a lack of coordination of
programs for students from kindergarten through grade 12. (This problem
of coordination is well known also in West Germany, unfortunately!)
There has been a tendency in the U.S. educational system to simply use
traditional material and a reluctance to install new programs. History
and geography dominate the social studies scene, with sociology and
psychology considered less important. The author of this article also
found that relatively few U.S. teachers are familiar with Social Educa-
tion, the organ of the National Council for the Social Studies
(Jarolimek 1977, p. 577).

The difficulties encountered in trying to adopt the curriculum of
one German region in another region point out the immense differences
between the educational systems of the United States and West Germany.
Specific indications of these differences are the intellectual tradi-
tions of the two countries, political influences, and the political
independence of individual regions. Consideration of German political
education brings one to the conclusion that American developments have
exerted less influence on German educational practice than on theory.
There is, however, some indirect influence on teaching materials. From
this it can be surmised that authors who received theoretical and prac-
tical teaching experience at approximately the same time are familiar
with and make use of American research on teaching practices. However,
the vast differences between the political cultures of the two nations
impede wholesale transmission of teaching practices from one nation to
the other.

Summary

Many of the salient points of the preceding analysis are summarized
here.

The following generalizations can be made about the status of
political education in West Germany:
1. Support for the postwar democratic structure in West Germany was undermined by the history of broken political tradition (1918, 1933, 1945) as well as by the fact that the German Federal Republic was regarded as a temporary arrangement. Social criticism and tendencies toward social change, which were particularly strong from 1967 to 1972, have created additional difficulties for political education programs and made the entire political education program particularly stressful for teachers and parents.

2. Political education is a way of thinking and a state of mind—consequently, it is quite controversial. In many cases, people object to it because they suppose it will be used for the purpose of indoctrination into socialistic or system-changing ideals.

3. Political education is often taught by teachers who lack the proper background and familiarity with appropriate teaching techniques.

4. The conception of political education varies greatly among West German regions; sometimes it is limited to politics, sometimes politics is integrated with social and economic affairs, and sometimes it appears under a general umbrella with history and geography (as in Hesse).

5. Regarding parental participation, it has been noted that many parents have a negative attitude toward political education books and curricula. They fear indoctrination of the children against the family authority. There are active organizations of parents with considerable influence on which textbooks are to be used.

6. In recent years, education (including instruction and textbooks) has taken a supportive role toward the German Federal Republic. Guiding principles and schoolbooks are of positive influence.

7. The field of adult political education has increased in importance in most regions of West Germany since 1970. Community and public continuing education programs have been supported by public funds. As a result, the number of persons participating in political education programs has increased dramatically. As opposed to the case of political education programs in the schools, adults have been able to articulate political preferences and ideals and participate in a sort of political education which is actually a sort of political schooling.
The following recommendations are among those on which there is some agreement among the authors quoted:

1. Political education should begin as early as possible—by the fifth or sixth school year.

2. Socialization should begin in kindergarten and in early primary years and should be directed by teachers with appropriate technical and social training and background.

3. Modern teaching methods are encouraged for teaching the subject of political education—particularly group work of all types. Conversely, traditional teaching methods such as teacher-directed discourse and lecture are discouraged.

4. Educational materials should correspond to the innovative teaching methods. This means that instead of textbooks, students should use workbooks of various types. Many organizations are producing appropriate materials, and some are offering these materials free of charge.

5. It must be remembered that political education in the school must conform to public (government) regulations and that it is, as is all education, under the supervision of the state. Consequently, it is inappropriate to indoctrinate students to one-sided political opinion. Also, it is inappropriate to incite students to direct political action. The objective, conversely, is to awaken students' interest in political affairs and to prepare them to participate responsibly in political affairs.

References


8. CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN POLITICAL EDUCATION
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

By Hans Sussmuth

The following article is a report on the state of curriculum development in political education in the Federal Republic of Germany. An exact definition of the concept "curriculum development" means the process of setting up and scientifically elaborating a curriculum. A curriculum is structured according to aims, content, methods, aids, media, and evaluation. Consideration is given here to both complete and incomplete conceptions, inasmuch as the latter appear to be important for the discussion being carried on in the Federal Republic. Selected didactic standpoints in political and historical/political education have been included.

The Status of Political Education: Change or Stagnation?

Since 1976 several reports reviewing the state of political education have been presented which summarize, analyze, and systematize the most important didactic conceptions in a balance sheet of the state of the discussion on the subject (Fischer 1975/76; Gagel 1979; Northemann 1978). The German meaning of "didactics" is nearly identical with curriculum theory. It deals with the problems of identifying aims and problems of curriculum elements, teaching methods, media, and evaluation. It can be seen that the prevailing standpoints, already present around 1970, were completed, perfected, and put into practice in the schools and are now operating with refined instruments. This is true in the case of Wolfgang Hilligen, Kurt G. Fischer, Hermann Giesecke, and Rolf Schmiederer (Gagel 1979; Schorken 1975/76). This statement can be extended to 1980.

Is there, then, a lack of effective innovating potential, and would the word "stagnation" be a better way of characterizing political education over the past few years? It would be incorrect to draw this conclusion, even though the major part of the discussion was only indirectly carried out by political education experts. It took place in the field
of guideline work, which is the responsibility of the Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs.

Since 1973 the drafts of the Hessen General Guidelines for Social Education at the secondary I level (S-I) (HGGSE) and the Guidelines for Political Education S-I (GPE) in North Rhine-Westphalia have been discussed at the federal level. This period of debate on political education is referred to as the phase of public curriculum discussion. The introduction of new areas of education which, as a result of innovative goals and contents, were to lead to a reform of the entire existing school curriculum was perceived by the general public as a socially relevant measure. The course of the controversially conducted discussion on aims and conditions of HGGSE and GPE in North Rhine-Westphalia showed that a broad social consensus was lacking. The introduction of these curricula amounted to a breaking away from previous practice in the revision of school curricula. Curriculum reforms which explicitly call in question the priority of specialized disciplines as reference disciplines for school subjects shift the emphasis in secondary education toward a primarily society-oriented posture.

Attempts to replace previously separate school subjects such as history, politics, social sciences, and geography with broader subject areas and to orient them toward primarily nonspecialized socially relevant goals came under the pressure and control of public discussion in which variously concerned groups took part in order to safeguard and gain acceptance of their interests. The process of forming public opinion following the curriculum development work was an expression of the relationship between schools and society in a democracy. School-related decision making can be carried out only with the participation of affected persons and organizations.

Discussion of HGGSE and GPE was carried out at two levels. Involved were sociopolitical objectives as well as positions touching on matters of academic theory, individual disciplines, and subject-specific teaching methods. The discussion was an exemplary demonstration of the interdependence of political and academic statements. Political opinion and academic arguments stood side by side, so that in the case of every individual problem the question that needed to be asked was whether the matter at hand was more a political battle or an academic controversy.
Representatives of political education, along with representatives of other interest groups, were among the experts involved in the discussion. Hermann Giesecke, Wolfgang Hilligen, Friedrich Minssen, and Ernst August Roloff are credited with having exposed core problems and having brought them into discussion—that is, problems involving understanding of democracy, legitimation, political implications, mandate, and interpretation of the constitution (Hartwich 1978, pp. 141-154; Giesecke 1973, pp. 130-141; Hilligen 1973, pp. 271-289; Minssen 1973; Roloff 1974). Leaving out of account the strong polemical character of this discussion, it can be determined in retrospect that its effects have proved to be innovative. It can also be said that the guidelines discussion in Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia stimulated an innovative phase for didactics in history, as the following developments took place:

—In 1973 the Hessen General Guidelines on Social Education S-I were subjected to revision (Schroder 1979, p. 7 ff.; Mayer and Schroder 1980; Quandt 1980).

—The Guidelines for Political Education S-I in North Rhine-Westphalia were refined during the public discussion phase (Schorken 1974).

—Experts on didactics in history, put on the defensive, sought possible ways of cooperating with the systematic social sciences. New approaches were developed (Kuhn 1974a; Sussmuth 1972, pp. 37-83).

—Social scientists carried out experiments in the context of the need for possible ways of achieving integration or cooperation (Schorken 1978; Forndran et al. 1978; Mickel 1979).

—The Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the conservatively governed states formulated their position on political education, and a conservative group developed a counter plan (Braun 1976; Boleski 1978; Bruggemann and Brunnhuber 1976; Gutjahr-Loser and Knutter 1979, pp. 147-166).

These developments triggered a more qualified discussion on the possibilities and limits of an integrated historical/social science curriculum. In addition, more clarity was obtained in reciprocal political delimitation.
Consolidation of Positions or Stabilization of the Status Quo?

Walter Gagel described and analyzed the prevailing positions in political education (Gagel 1979). These different positions show that there is a broad approach guided by a variety of interests ranging from scientific-oriented learning to life-situations approaches, from students' interest to a societal approach. The same is true for the didactics of history. Some of these positions are listed below, along with their leading proponents:

--Learning of insights—the case principle (K.G. Fischer).
--Categorical learning—conflict didactics (H. Giesecke).
--Categorical learning—the existential relation (W. Hilligen).
--Scientifically oriented approach—making political judgments (B. Sutor).
--Situation-oriented approach—the concept of decision (E.-A. Roloff).
--Situation-oriented approach—the interests of the students (R. Schmiederer).

In a book entitled Positions on Didactics in History (Sussmuth 1980), selected experts on didactics in history describe their theories or parts thereof. These include cooperative history teaching (K.-E. Jeismann), the sociohistorical approach (A. Mannzmann), the goal-oriented learning approach (J. Rohlfes), discovery learning (H.D. Schmid), and the structuring approach (H. Sussmuth).

These works take stock of the present state of affairs and provide an overview of the discussion in political and historical-political education in the Federal Republic. The individual articles make it clear that the phase of refining instruments, consolidating conceptions, and transposing them to school practice has been largely completed. Thus, the question arises as to whether new trends exist or whether what is involved is more a stabilization of the status quo. The situation is to be illustrated by two examples. A description is given of Annette Kuhn's critical/communicative approach, which paves the way for the possibility of connecting the teaching of history and politics (Kuhn 1974b; Kuhn 1980a, pp. 49-81; Kuhn 1980b). A description is also given of the theory of cooperative teaching of history and politics developed by Behrmann and his colleagues (Behrmann et al. 1978a, pp. 100-127).
Annette Kuhn and the Critical/Communicative Approach

Kuhn's critical/communicative approach, first formulated at the beginning of the 1970s, was perfected in the course of the decade and put into practice in schools. She herself sees her approach as "not yet complete." Nevertheless, we are dealing here with what can be considered the most consequential viewpoint in historical/political education in the Federal Republic. In her *Introduction to the Didactics of History* (1974a), Kuhn took the position that present history teaching, with its uncritical attitudes toward the past, would have to be broken up by an ideology-critical approach. Subject-specific teaching methods, she believed, should look more toward the philosophy of science—something that had long been neglected. Critical theory forms the basis of her thinking on teaching methods as well as her reworking of decision areas in teaching of history. According to Kuhn, recourse to critical theory—of the interconnection of cognition and interest, "the sociophilosophical program of critical analysis of pseudo-objectivations"—has hardly been present in history teaching.

The formulation of questions and statements in history teaching takes place in a hierarchical framework of relations involving social theory, student interest, and historical science. Clear priority is given to critical social theory, since the teaching of history means mediating between historical science and the practice of everyday living. The emancipation of the individual and of society must also be the goal of historical research and teaching. Emancipation is the central didactic concept for a critical-historical learning process.

Kuhn's ideas about the psychology of learning are influenced in part by Bruner, but in keeping with her epistemological interest her thinking is determined primarily by examples of critical political psychology. For example, experience of suffering and need (subjective pressure caused by suffering and objective social deficits) as well as interest in "eliminating the state of emotional stress" form the motivational basis of historical learning. The following functions of history and history teaching derive from the previously mentioned premises: the political function, the function of change, the ideology-critical function, the legitimation and identification function, the function of taking sides, and the critical and emancipatory function.
In dealing with history, Kuhn feels, what is important is not so much a critical-rational function but rather a social-critical function. Identity, partisanship, legitimation, change in circumstances of living with the aim of emancipation—these issues have unconditional priority. Historical knowledge and insight into the structures and peculiarities of historical processes are merely of instrumental value for the farther-reaching socially and politically relevant functions. Statements on history are viewed in the context of cognition-directing interests. History is seen as a critical social science. Historical research and teaching fulfill ideology-critical tasks.

Kuhn's approach is a consistent application of a metatheory, the critical theory. In recent articles, she has further consolidated the theoretical basis of her system (Kuhn 1974b; Kuhn 1980a, pp. 49-81; Kuhn 1980b). She emphasizes that her recourse to critical theory does not imply "adopting a complete theoretical model." She points out the didactic innovations to be found in the Federal Republic which have come about as a result of dealing with "undogmatic Marxism." The acceptance of theories or elements of theories also means, for Kuhn, the instrumental use of theory. The specific nature of her system can be described by the concepts "critical" and "communicative." This critical/communicative position gives priority to critical social and educational theories and neglects (as Kuhn herself admits) the aspect of the discipline. However, this position facilitates the possibilities of a cooperative or interdisciplinary approach.

Gunter Behrmann's Theory of Cooperative Teaching

Behrmann is centrally involved in a curriculum experiment in coordinating the teaching of politics and history. His initial plan, published in 1978, was among the first of such teaching models to be put into practice in the schools. According to Behrmann, in German education there has been a pronounced understanding of political education as education aimed at co-responsibility and the assumption of obligations in the "community" of the state. In teaching intended to install democratic values and encourage the "determination of a mature citizen in the Federal Republic," Behrmann points out, it was often assumed that there were quantitative differences but no structural differences
organizations of the educational system (school classes and organized youth groups), and society as a broader "community." Despite numerous critical objections, such as those brought forward by the political scientists Wilhelm Hennis and Kurt Sontheimer, almost all political education programs are oriented toward the model of the rational and active citizen.

If one assumes that there are no fundamental differences between the structures of primary groups, larger organizations, and national or international societies, behavior patterns that can be observed in large, centrally important organizations of complex societies will also occur in smaller organizations and primary groups: This is the position taken by conflict didactics, which generalizes the logic of special-interest political influence to all conflicts of interest. This approach leads to problems that can be described as "linkage problems" between different social levels, a term current in recent discussions in the social sciences.

Behrmann points out that complex societies function as united communities only in exceptional situations; in most cases, political behavior in large social units tends to be governed by the pursuit of power and special interests rather than by primary social virtues. Different interests, conflicts, and competition are also found in primary groups and smaller organizations. People with primary group ties must, however, behave differently when acting in the context of large organizations. This generalization is also true of scientific orientation, Behrmann observes. Direct experience has long failed to provide sufficient orientation in the modern world. The attempt to overcome this orientation deficit through scientifically oriented teaching has its limits. Often, highly specialized scientific knowledge cannot be successfully integrated and taught in a generally understandable form. In addition, the practical significance of such knowledge is ambiguous and not immediately recognizable. Thus, scientific knowledge often does not increase practical rationality.

According to Behrmann, agreement can probably be reached on the proposition that political teaching should describe society and politics not only in terms of the past and present. Political action is always future-oriented behavior in a field of competing interests, value
preferences, problem situations, problem interpretations, and assessments of possibilities. Furthermore, Behrmann points out, German educational tradition has been characterized by a one-sided historical and idealistic orientation. Under the influence of ideology and criticism directed toward "overcoming the past," history has been reduced in recent times to a cautionary tale emphasizing errors and omissions of the past which must be avoided in the present and future. Historical understanding in the idealistic, hermeneutic, humanistic tradition was replaced by a "materialistic" or empirical analytic social science approach. There is no lack of examples for the fact that in this case a one-sided reductionist approach was replaced by another of the same type.

Knowledge of important events in recent history is just as important for the understanding of sociopolitical circumstances or possibilities and for action orientation as is knowledge of general empirical analytic statements, Behrmann believes. Ideas are just as powerful as motivations for action as are material interests. Real possibilities are tied to experienced reality and its historical development. Practical questions as they are understood in classical philosophy—that is, questions directed toward the objectives of sociopolitical action and their legitimation—cannot adequately be developed or answered by either ideology criticism or empirical analysis. In the intermediate area between experience and search for new avenues of action, between reality and possibility, empirical analytic knowledge cannot be done without.

Thus, according to Behrmann, a basic plan for political education should be designed so that these different references are not neglected in favor of one-sided points of reference and so that the reference system remains sufficiently simple and manageable. At the same time, however, any precipitous fixation on specific approaches, action models, and cognitive modes should be avoided, such as by the systematic correlation of reference fields with central ideas of teaching.

The concepts of Annette Kuhn and Gunter Behrmann have been described in order to show that we can distinguish a more integrated and open concept—more integrated and open as compared with a metatheoretical or discipline-oriented approach. When we try to review present trends in German political education, there is a tendency toward consolidation of
positions. However, the word "consolidation" may be misleading insofar as it connotes more openness and more theoretical flexibility on both sides. The opportunity exists for further development of integrated political education curricula.

Innovation as a Result of the Guidelines Discussions

To systematically assess and evaluate the second phase of innovation, it is necessary to refer back briefly to the first discussions of the HGGSE and GPE guidelines and the ensuing new emphases in political education. HGGSE (1972-1973) and GPE (1973) moved away from the idea of a system of individual school subjects (Kultusminister des Landes 1973; Kultusminister Hessische 1972/73).

Development of the Guidelines in Hesse

The HGGSE guidelines made use of the idea of areas of learning. The political decision regarding the uppermost learning objective (developing "a capacity for self-determination and codetermination") and the conclusion deriving from this ("providing teaching content and forms which more closely define this learning objective") led to asking questions about where and how students experience society and what effect such experience has on their capacity for self-determination and codetermination as well as to providing descriptions of situations that students would have to cope with now and later on. These situations were related to four fields of learning: (1) socialization, (2) the economy, (3) public functions, and (4) intersocietal relations. In addition, historical, social, and geographic aspects were distinguished in defining the learning objective in order to ensure against loss of recognition of interrelationships, which might cause subject-specific learning objectives to conflict with general objectives.

History was included in the context of its uppermost objective, self-determination and codetermination. The categories "reference to the present" and "change" formed selective criteria for historic content. Objectives receiving particular emphasis were criticism of ideology, correction of a personalizing historical image, knowledge of methods, and political education (contribution to the rationality of political decision making).
In the reworked HGGSE (1973), commitment to "self-determination" was left open to leave room for competing models. No attempt was made to promote a specific conception of democracy. In the theoretical section, the demand was repeatedly made to learn to think in alternatives. The division into learning fields 1-4 (above) was meant to be understood as "one possible structuring of our society." However, this statement could do no more to compensate for the deficit of theoretical grounding for the selection of specific areas of the different academic disciplines than the admission that "in view of the large number of possible situations in which students are apt to find themselves now and in the future, the question arises as to [the disciplines'] choice, relative importance and mutual correlation."

The necessary substantiating context was missing for the prominent aims of history as a focal subject. The uppermost learning objective, "self-determination and codetermination," was cited as a leading reduction criterion and was expected to lead to subject-specific selection criteria: "reference to the present," "reflected awareness of history," and "change." The reduction criteria were identified on the basis of sociopolitical decisions, without involving the results of the theoretical investigations of historical scholarship. They were imposed on the academic discipline, and led to reductionism.

The content for teaching about such central concepts as "process," "structure," "continuity," "discontinuity," "causality," "genesis," and "time" was not determined in the social science curriculum. Thus, there was no basis for determining the theoretical reliability of the integrated approach—of a viable conceptual grid. The approach used by HGGSE in 1972-73 was distorting, in that it neglected the possibilities of historical inquiry and methods in analysis and teaching by breaking up the complexity of the structures and processes of historical phenomena into discrete elements and leaving to chance whether they would fall into place. Since there was no discussion of the theoretical basis of the integrated approach, the necessary objective of making "approaches, methods, questions, and results of current theory formation" accessible to students could not be attained. There was no consideration of the historical dimension in history as a focal subject.
Discussion of HGGSE has been innovative in that these guidelines inspired a number of interested experts on didactics to debate the theoretical foundation of an integrated system (Schorken 1978; Forndran et al. 1978; Kaiser 1978; Mickel 1979). The draft of HGGSE presented in Hesse in May 1980 was elaborated by members of HIBS (Hessisches Institut für Bildungsplanung und Schulentwicklung), and advice was provided by experts from the integrative subjects (Schroder 1979, pp. 7 ff.; Mayer and Schroder 1980). On this basis there was once again an attempt to develop a social science curriculum (S-I) in which the unrelated juxtaposition of the relatable subjects history, social science, and geography would be constructively eliminated.

Caution must be practiced in speaking of "coordination" and "practical cooperation." The 1980 draft of HGGSE attempts to consider the following didactic principles: student orientation; goal orientation; academic orientation; problem orientation; open curriculum; social learning; the coordinated grouping of history, social sciences, and geography as focal subjects; and consideration of learning levels. Constructive criticism of the 1973 guidelines was taken into account in this new draft. The focal subjects—history, social sciences, and geography—form the core of the plan. The clearly emphasized academic orientation is based on the assumption "that the academic disciplines can pinpoint important social and historical-political problems and factors as well as provide categories and methods for their treatment in the classroom" (Mayer and Schroder 1980).

We are not concerned here with the transfer of the systematic demands of a given discipline to the level of the school subject—a kind of "mirror image" didactics. It is also not intended for the academic disciplines to have only an auxiliary function. The prerequisites of coordination or cooperation are knowledge of the structure of the disciplines involved and reduction of their contents and methods in a didactic context. The importance of the individual subjects remains uncontested. The study sector referred to as social education "groups together with more didactic rigor what has always connected the individual school subjects in 'general matters and questions'." Social education is a study sector "in which teaching contents significant for . . . political education mutually imply and supplement each other. In solv-
ing this problem we are not primarily concerned here with an academic but rather a didactic task" (Schroder 1979, p. 10). In accordance with this intention, considerable attention has been devoted in the discussion to the organization of teaching. The employment of teachers, the setting up of school-specific work plans, and harmonization with other subjects are some of the central topics.

There is mediation between academic orientation, student orientation, and goal orientation in that complementary structuring factors are brought into focal work in history, social sciences, and geography by means of study fields—that is, social structure and socialization, economy, political power and public functions, international and inter-societal relations, conflicts, and peace research, all of which are used as coordination instruments in the sense of "dominant perspectives of observation." The study fields are intended to give students orientation assistance within the social reality they encounter. The EGGSE attempts to relate the study fields to situations which, it can be assumed, students will experience now or in the future. Study fields form a social science network of categories based on fundamental situations or life situations: "They have the function of being search and orientation instruments for problem areas and problems, which are dealt with in each case by using differently emphasized subject-specific or non-subject-specific approaches and methods" (Schroder 1979, p. 15).

The procedure can be illustrated by describing the basis of the focal work theme of history. In accordance with the decision in favor of an academic orientation, it is first determined which content is considered a central historical foundation for understanding the present in terms of the status of historical research and relevant cognitive interest: political rule, society, state, and church in the middle ages; revolution and the process of industrialization in the 18th to 20th centuries; national-state and imperialism up to 1914; the age of World Wars I and II; the reordering of the world after 1945; etc. This is followed by a didactic analysis of the selection and structuring of problem situations and teaching content. The main objective is to impart a reflected awareness of history which includes knowledge of duration, change, continuity, discontinuity, process, and structure.
Everyday experiences of students are taken as points of departure, included as the object and conditions of historical learning processes, and thus receive a present reference. Obligatory teaching content exists only at the level of problem formulation and relevant problem contexts. A return to a rigid thematic plan is thus ruled out. Problems and problem contexts are finally formulated as student-related topics. This draft of the HGGSE promises (1) consideration of the structures underlying the academic reference disciplines with their specific approaches, concepts, and methods and (2) consideration of already developed interdisciplinary approaches, concepts, and methods.

Development of the Guidelines in North Rhine-Westphalia

In its decree of March 19, 1973, the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia announced the introduction of guidelines for the teaching of politics at the lower secondary level (Kultusminister des Landes 1973). These guidelines call for politics to form a part of the study sector "social education" alongside history and geography. These subsectors are to be integrated or related to one another. Social education is described as a study sector which "among other things includes socially significant learning goals and content from law, economics, political science, education and other social disciplines." The identification of the subsector "politics" is described as the first step in realizing this aim. Social education is intended to provide the qualifications that will make it possible for the student to take part "critically and rationally in the solution of social and political questions and at the same time includes insights and abilities from the social science disciplines with an eye to working life and university studies" (Kultusminister des Landes 1973, pp. 1-2). The subject "politics" is not based on one discipline but rather falls back on "several academic disciplines for its basis." These include sociology, political science, economics, history, economic and social geography, education, social psychology, and law (p. 6). The extent to which the subsector "politics" itself is to be seen as an integrative subject is left open. The cited academic disciplines indicate integration, as shown by the following statement made by the Guidelines Commission in the introductory part of its draft of April 1972:
"In terms of the disciplines that form the academic grounding, in the case of the teaching of politics we are dealing with an integrative subject."

Curriculum "Politik" (Schorken 1974) gives information on the applied curriculum strategy to develop the guidelines for political teaching. It makes the theoretical grounding of GPE quite clear. The approach is oriented toward the study sector "social education," not toward an academic discipline. The point of departure is the sociopolitical self-image in the Federal Republic. Content from the three components of the sector—politics, society, and economics—is fitted into the curriculum with the help of a structural grid composed of three media of socialization ("work," "language," and "government") and three definition levels ("value-free," "ideological," and "critical"). The content areas identified in this matter are transferred to real-life situations, and the behavioral measures (qualifications) necessary to master them along with the correlated learning goals of the first and second order are grouped together. Emancipation as a higher goal serves as a decision-making aid. The learning goals corresponding to the qualifications differ in their degree of complexity or "refinement" and "interpretation." The relationships between learning goals and content are indicated by a matrix made up of the components "action intentions" (interaction, communication, precaution, consumption, codetermination, organization) and "situation fields" (school, occupation, leisure time, public, international relations).

Politics and history are treated as related but still separate school subjects. The Guidelines for Political Education derive the division of functions between political teaching and historical teaching from the argument of "present orientation." The complementary relationship and the necessity of cooperation are emphasized. The point is made that, while political teaching cannot be equated with the teaching of history or contemporary history, it cannot take the place of history teaching.

The way in which historical teaching is limited in GPE is inferior to methods suggested by known theory of historical scholarship and the didactics of history. Even if, on the one hand, the connection between the subjects "politics" and "history" is traced back to the fact that
"history at schools and higher education institutions has absorbed an increasing amount of social science elements," it is difficult to understand that this expansion involved only content, not change in the functions of historical learning. The more recent social-science-oriented theoretical approaches in historical scholarship have emphasized the inclusion in one category of past, present, and future reference in history: "Historical scholarship and the teaching of history can and must contribute to critical consciousness concerning designs made today for the future."

However, apart from the theoretical considerations, the question must be asked as to how coordination between the teaching of politics and the teaching of history is to come about. On the one hand, political teaching is expected to incorporate historical learning if the situation justifies this, and, on the other hand, historically relevant aspects of political teaching are expected to be included in the teaching of history. But when is historical learning justifiable on the basis of the matter at hand? How can the teaching of history coordinate its questions with the historically relevant questions of political teaching if the learning goals of history teaching and political teaching are not related to one another? In view of the fact that the political curriculum has thus far taken an approach that views "representative historical phenomena in a chronological, connecting, confronting and comparing procedure," it can hardly be seen how the two disciplines, in practice, can be coordinated. It cannot be assumed that the students will make this connection themselves.

It seems that this problem will soon be solved by an initiative of the social-liberal coalition in North Rhine-Westphalia (Geschichtsunterricht im demokratischen Staat n.d.). This initiative is concerned with the concept of "history teaching in a democratic society." The functions and aims of history education are determined by the basic premise that history education is part of political education. The knowledge and attitudes it helps to develop are prerequisites for political and social action. Knowledge requirements for living in the present society are the key selection criteria. The study of history and of the long-term development of social conditions constitutes the prerequisite for an analysis of the present time. The basic aim of history education is
the development of a rational political/social identity and of the ability to think in alternatives.

It is the task of history education to work toward these goals jointly with the related subjects of political science and geography education. Thus, it is required to integrate these fields into the new subject of social science education (Gesellschaftslehre), with history education being the constituent part. Because the didactic and organizational isolation of these subjects must be prevented, however, a special didactic for social science education must be worked out. This task shows the direction and the opportunities when political education and history education are brought together (or fused) in North Rhine-Westphalia—either in the form of cooperation or by integration of these subjects.

Trends and Expectations

The public discussions on "teaching history in a democratic state" in North Rhine-Westphalia and on revised general guidelines for social education (S-I) in Hesse will result in new efforts being undertaken to explore the potential for and limits of cooperation between or integration of the teaching of history, politics, geography, political science, and the social sciences. In contrast to the situation during first nationwide discussions of these complex questions, today a number of scholarly publications are available which offer supportive evidence. In addition, teaching materials are already being produced for a "historical/political curriculum," and further teaching models are contained in the series History in the Classroom: Plans and Materials (Behrmann et al. 1976; Kuhn 1974b). The atmosphere is more favorable than that of the early 1970s; emotions have subsided and objective discussion can take place. One would, of course, have to avoid from the outset attempts to place left-wing labels on efforts to integrate the separate individual school subjects. The degree of integration reached is basically not relevant if the task of bringing about the synthesis is not left to the student alone and if the structure and dimension of each of the involved subjects can be included. The present discussion of the question of independence vs. cooperation or integration of the social science school subjects is characterized by the efforts of political,
economics, geography, and history teaching "to set this indispensable discourse in motion" (Fischer 1978). Systematic attempts are being made to determine the prerequisite conditions for unifying these subjects (Schorken 1978; Forndran et al. 1978; Kaiser 1978; Mickel 1979).

The status of the discussion about historical theory indicates that historical science, in its aims, approach, methods, and content areas, can be appropriately related to the systematic social sciences on the curriculum level. Accordingly, the scientific prerequisites are given both for cooperation and for integration. The fact that teaching-method experts tend to favor coordination or cooperation in the present discussion and to advocate "a gradual connection between historical and political instruction units" (Kuhn 1978, pp. 102-147) can be interpreted as the expression of a cautious, gradual approach—or simply as a lack of alternative ideas. If one judges the situation by existing teaching materials and history teaching strategies, it becomes evident that thus far a rigorous didactic foundation and teaching models exist only for the cooperative teaching of history and politics (Behrmann et al. 1973b; Behrmann et al. 1976). Only further discussion of didactics and teaching methods will be able to bring about a decision on whether the realization of a fully integrated historical/social science curriculum is possible.

The initial question as to which arguments speak for independence, cooperation, or integration can be answered in the context of subject-specific teaching methods and scientific theory. The complexity of political, social, economic, and cultural reality makes the use of the different social science disciplines necessary, since no one of these alone would be able to explain all of reality sufficiently to guide teaching and learning processes. Problem-oriented interdisciplinary research is the answer to dealing with complex situations in order to be able to record as many aspects of the situation as possible with the help of the approaches and methods of different yet convergent scientific disciplines. The descriptive terms "multidisciplinary approach" and "interdisciplinary approach" are used, depending on the degree of integration of the social science disciplines. Analogous to this process, on the level of subject-specific scientific discussion, there is the intention of teaching the student the interrelationships between man and
society, politics, economics, and culture through an integrated historical/social science curriculum.

While all the social sciences have the same subject and aim—that is, the explanation and evaluation of human behavior—approaches and methods differ in the various disciplines. In the case of an integrated curriculum, it must by no means be left to the students to put together the detailed results of the different disciplines. The question of convergence and divergence in the social sciences must be answered and put into practice by the curriculum developer. For this reason both the sociopolitical and the theoretical (philosophy of science) decision levels should be equally involved in the theoretical grounding of social science curricula, and, since no general non-discipline-specific explanatory system exists, the curriculum developer must take into consideration how the individual disciplines see themselves. This perception must be based on the self-interpretation of each individual discipline, its description of social reality, and its subject-specific terminology.

The problems that arise in interdisciplinary work and the efforts to bring about integration were concisely expressed by Hartmut von Hentig: "All interdisciplinarity has thus far ended in disciplinarity and has only served to increase the need for cooperation and communication in science" (Hentig 1974, p. 21). In terms of general tendency, this statement is confirmed in the discussion presently being carried out in the Federal Republic on the social science curriculum. However, withdrawal into the isolating independence of the social science school subjects is no longer feasible in view of the results attained. Caution is recommended for the making of historical/social science curricula. The direction of new work should lie in the attempt to "look for and discuss new theoretical structuring approaches, development plans, and proposed solutions."

For the second time, discussion about the opportunities and limits for constructing a history and social science curriculum has been opened up by political initiatives in Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia. Hopefully, in view of theoretical results and practical experience, the opportunity will be taken to conduct objective talks in the context of the ongoing discussion of political education in Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia, with more active involvement emanating from the universities.
so as not to leave this matter exclusively to the curriculum institutes and the Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs.

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9. THE STATUS OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR REFORM

By Suzanne W. Helburn

Just as the decade of the 1960s bustled with activity and optimism about rejuvenating social studies education with the "new social studies," we who participated in that great leap forward are now indulging in criticism, including self-criticism, trying to explain why social studies classes on the whole have not changed much and why the profession seems so disheartened and in disagreement about what to do next.

I believe that social studies education in the schools confronts a major contradiction that makes it practically impossible to achieve the goals of active, informed citizenship education which most social studies reformers advocate. Although the social studies curriculum is the subject area specifically designed to provide social and political education in the schools, most social/political education happens outside school; and even within school, most of it takes place outside the bounds of the formal social studies curriculum. We learn about politics and society through everyday experience. Today, many of the life experiences which make up our real social/political education are confusing, contradictory, and scary—contributing to a sense of powerlessness to control our own lives or change the world. To be effective, the formal social studies curriculum in school must interact with and inform this life experience—clarify, unveil, help empower students, and help them develop a sense of efficacy. Evidently, for most students in the United States the exact opposite happens. Social studies classes contribute to the process of alienation, as evidenced by recent studies reporting that students find them boring and of little use (Shaver et al. 1979b, p. 151).

Social Studies as Socialization

I think that social studies education fails to meet our objectives as reformers and progressive educators for one primary reason. Although reformers have always seen public education as a vehicle for promoting social change and social uplift, that is not really what schools are for. They are a major conservative force in society, reflecting the will of
the majority or the will of the powerful in a given locality. Schools enculturate students into the shared values of American ideology and prepare them to fit into a society which is hierarchically and bureaucratically organized, where social stability is best assured through a passive citizenry which accepts authority, dutifully votes, and supports law and order. Given these purposes of citizenship education in the schools, social studies education cannot grasp pertinent issues from other than a mainstream perspective. Similarly, given the goals of developing the citizenship skills discussed above, social studies teaching strategies cannot train a population of active citizens who think for themselves, demand a voice in decision making, and actively engage in social-change efforts.

Social studies is required to function within the schools as part of the whole schooling experience. Its objectives and teaching methods must be appropriate to the broad functions schools serve in the society. In *Educating the Worker-Citizen*, Joel Spring (1980) contends that the manpower model of education dominates public schooling. Schools must serve the technological needs of advanced industrial countries for training future workers and for screening them to fit into a differentiated and hierarchically organized labor force. Traditionally, schools have also served to help ameliorate the alienation created by economic development, but Spring contends that the technological needs now overshadow attempts to use schooling as a humanizing force. Traditional didactic instruction fits in with the manpower model of education and the preparation for passive citizenship, the acceptance of existing roles.

Another way to say this is that the socialization goals of the hidden curriculum in the schools control the learning situation, and that most teachers choose to teach in a way which is consistent with these socialization goals. The traditional teaching style—teacher-dominated classes, textbook learning, paper-and-pencil desk work, lectures and listening, following directions, taking tests and earning grades—may bore some students and turn others off, but it helps prepare students for the next grade, and for life.

There are also limits to what is acceptable social studies content which I believe add to the problem by teaching essentially false, general-
izations about our social system. Social studies education must teach the shared values which are the basis for our political faith—that our representative democracy is good and democratic; that our profit-oriented, free-enterprise, market economy protects our basic freedoms, has been the basis for our economic development and efficiency as a nation, and is essential to our future economic well-being; that socialism is hopelessly inefficient, undemocratic, and evil; that our economic and political structures are the best protection of individual advancement and equal opportunity; that the United States is the greatest country in the world. We cannot fundamentally tamper with these beliefs, even though children learning the history, economics, and civics content which inculcates them might well have experienced events which call them into question.

The other side of this content dilemma has to do with those realities which cannot be taught or exposed for discussion in any text. Were I writing a history, economics, or government curriculum today, I would want students to consider the impact of the development of capitalism and the effects of worldwide market competition and concentration; for instance:

---The stabilizing effects of the ascension of the United States to world dominance in this century, but the growing challenge to U.S. dominance by other advanced capitalist and socialist countries and the concomitant instability inherent in this challenge.

---The development of multinational corporations and international banks whose investment and financing decisions profoundly affect domestic economies and international economic stability.

---The increasing and incalculable social costs of economic growth as a result of known and unknown side effects of industrial production and urban living.

---The increasing difficulty in defending the profit system, given these social costs and our growing apprehension that it is energy conservation rather than capital accumulation which is crucial to future human progress and adaptation.
The increasing reliance on government intervention to solve growth and equity problems in industrialized market economies, but the growing inadequacy of existing policy alternatives to mitigate the contradictory conditions created by advanced capitalism.

The contradictory reactions of citizens to their government; they increasingly see government as the cause of the problems of late capitalism while, continually demanding government intervention in their behalf to ameliorate specific conditions.

Readers may not agree with this view of reality, but certainly they will agree that such views cannot appear in any commercial public school text.

Given the purposes of social studies education in the United States and the training/socializing functions of schooling in general, we cannot expect to do much effective training for active citizenship except in those schools where specific circumstances allow more honesty and willingness to inquire into real problems. Reform attempts need to be seen in this light. Only changes consistent with the basic role of social studies education will catch on, and most of these will not represent profound changes in educational goals. The rest of this paper uses this viewpoint to analyze current classroom practices, the disappointing impact of the "new social studies" attempts to redirect goals and to incorporate advances in pedagogy, the potential of current reforms, and realistic strategies for change. While this paper deals mainly with reform efforts in the K-12 curriculum, I believe that the same forces inhibit changes in college and university teaching and, further, that teaching problems at the postsecondary levels affect precollege teaching.

Current Status of Social Studies Education in the United States.

Social studies came into prominence early in the 20th century with the expansion of public high schools. The social studies curriculum incorporates subject matter from all the social sciences, relying mostly on history, geography, and government, but it is designed mainly to prepare pupils for citizenship and adult social roles. Barth and Sherman sum up the broad purpose of social studies and the nature of the values implicit to the curriculum:
Western social studies is citizenship education. What has supported this goal historically and philosophically is the belief that social studies exists to teach future citizens how to cope with the problems arising out of the 20th century complexity and how to make decisions that are seemingly mandated by our pluralistic, technologically advanced, self-governing society (Barth and Shermis 1980).

Although there has been general agreement about the overall goal of citizenship education, educators have disagreed on the best means to provide this citizenship training. These differences became concretized in the curriculum packages created in the last 20 years—during the era of the "new social studies" projects and to a lesser extent in more recent materials.

Increasingly, we have witnessed concern about the current status and future directions of social studies teaching, partly as a reaction to disagreements among professionals and the lay public about the reform movement and partly in response to a number of national status studies which revealed only limited use in the schools of the new approaches, a decline in social studies teaching in the elementary schools, and some student and teacher dissatisfaction with secondary social studies classes. Monographs and articles in professional education journals (Haas. 1977; Superka et al. 1980; Gross and Dynneson 1980; Barth and Shermis 1980) speak of increasing fragmentation in the curriculum, of a general identity crisis in the field, and of the need for agreement on how to revitalize the curriculum.

Recent status studies give us a better opportunity than usual to describe social studies education at the present time (Wiley 1977; Weiss 1978; Stake and Easley 1978; Gross 1977). These reports indicate a common pattern of course content and sequencing across the nation, a pattern which has existed over the 20-year study period and, in the case of secondary-level courses, since 1916. The K-6 curriculum continues to be organized around the expanding-environment framework, which is based on the presumed developmental and psychological needs of children, starting with the social life closest to the children's experience (family, in the first grade) and moving out into an ever-broader social setting (the world, in the sixth grade). The studies reveal a small and declining amount of time spent on social studies and possibly a shift away from teaching social studies altogether in the elementary grades. The standard sequence for grades 7-12 follows suggestions in a 1916 report.
of the Commission on Reorganization of Secondary Education, established by the National Education Association. The committee recommended two cycles of a three-course sequence of civics, American history, and European history corresponding to typical exit points from schooling at that time—"the fact that large numbers of children complete their schooling with the sixth grade, and another large contingent with the eighth and ninth grades" (Lengel 1981).

Perhaps more disturbing than the stability of course organization over time is the stability of teaching practices. Although the status studies provide some evidence of variety in teaching methods and some conflicting data about practices, the overwhelming impression from reading them is that the classrooms have changed very little since we were in school (Shaver et al. 1979a and 1979b). Generally, instruction is textbook-based; lecture and lecture/discussion/recitation predominate in the high schools, and desk work is central in elementary school classes. Not many classes use the "new social studies" materials, and most teachers welcome the back-to-basics movement, agreeing that reading and basic skills are central to the curriculum. The Case Studies in Science Education report (Stake and Easley 1973) dramatically documents this stability, and the following conclusions from that report are particularly worth noting:

--The teacher is the key factor in determining what education will be for any one child; and, though teachers might not be able to bring reforms on their own, they regularly stop changes they oppose.

--The dominant influence toward change has been the "back-to-basics" movement. Many teachers state that reading and arithmetic are basic because other learnings are unlikely to be efficient until the child has had a thorough grounding in the basics. Practically, this has meant that less time is being devoted to science, mathematics, and social science concepts and relationships, particularly at the elementary level.

--Socialization is a preemptive aim of schooling in that it seems to get immediate attention almost whenever an opportunity arises, requiring the setting aside of other learnings when necessary. Socialization practices impress upon students the need to submit personal inclinations to the needs of the community, to conform to the role of the "good stu-
ant, and to get ready for the next rung on the education ladder. To this end, teachers practice the principle that merit deserves special privilege and poor performance needs exposure and censure. (The authors noted that teachers use subject matter to keep control of the class. The new teacher learned "what questions to ask which boy to head off a prank, what homework to assign to keep the study period quiet. . . . Subject matter that did not fit these aims got rejected, neglected or changed into 'something that worked.'")

--The predominant mode of teaching is assign/write/test/discuss—all organized around the subject matter in the text. The textbook is the key to information, which helps to explain why teachers considered reading so basic.

The Conformism of the Mass-Market Text

Recent analyses of political education texts by Mary Jane Turner (1978) and history texts by Frances FitzGerald (1979) further our understanding of the bases for student disinterest in traditional social studies classes. The authors agree that traditional texts are dull, superficial, devoid of political debate and intellectual ferment. FitzGerald emphasizes the 20th-century development of a mass-market text designed to sell because it doesn't offend anyone. Given the centrality of the text in traditional teaching, her analysis, if reasonably accurate, substantiates the claim that important realities of contemporary life are missing from traditional texts and that this silence makes it impossible to explain the world as it is.

FitzGerald characterizes today's texts as "consensus documents, . . . themselves part of history, in that they reflect the concerns, the conventional wisdom, and even the fads of the age that produced them." These texts are no longer written by authors with particular points of view; rather, they are "developed" by publishers competing for the center of a $700,000,000-a-year market shared by 400 companies, of which 40 are major.

FitzGerald traces the evolution of the characteristics of the modern mass-market text, starting with the textbook boom which accompanied the expansion of public high schools in the 1890s. It was then that texts became terse, orderly, restrained, and impersonal, giving the appearance of truth. The period from 1910 to 1940, dominated by progressive educa-
tors, contributed little to the mass-market text strategy of today (although the reforms of the 1950s represented a reemergence of these goals and values). With World War II, texts adopted a tone of high moral seriousness. Controversy and conflict in America disappeared; "democracy" no longer represented a call to action but became simply the name of the American system, the opposite of fascism and communism. "We" and "our" cropped up in text titles, and the term "perialism" was no longer applied to the United States. In the 1950s texts became encyclopedic; they emphasized the rise of the United States to a world power, expressed a morbid fear of communism, and introduced extreme chauvinism. In the 1960s the United States became a multicultural, multiracial society with racial and ethnic injustices, a development that required a dramatic rewriting of history—literally, a re-creation of the American character. Texts discovered "problems" which, because contemporary political and economic realities were soft-pedaled, seemed to come from nowhere. By the 1970s, although references to the turmoil of the 1960s were almost entirely dropped, "problems" were running rampant.

FitzGerald claims that mass-market texts ignore economic history; they do not describe the essential transformation of American capitalism in the 20th century. According to these texts, she charges, the United States still operates under a free-market economy governed purely by national supply and demand, with the government providing certain regulatory and social services. American business abroad still is "a taboo subject"; no economic links are admitted to exist between the United States and Europe. In general, Fitzgerald says, recent texts are weak on analysis of historical forces, and they are increasingly inadequate in portraying an accurate image of the United States or providing a satisfactory explanation of what is going on in the world (FitzGerald 1979).

The Traditional Curriculum Model

To summarize, there exists a tradition in social studies education—not one followed slavishly by all teachers conforming to a national curriculum but rather one which has evolved over the past 30-odd years in response to pressures to carry out the objectives of social studies education. This tradition has the following objectives:
--To give back on a test or in class a set of facts and conclusions about the United States and the world which is contained in a text developed by a commercial publisher, which represents a consensus or compromise picture of the world, and which reflects the political temper of the time.

--To acquire basic reading, writing, and computation skills as well as skills and behavior of the good student/worker/citizen such as cooperativeness, neatness, good penmanship, good manners, respect for authority, ability to follow directions quickly, willingness to carry out a task on time, and amiability.

--To accept the shared values of the society, to be willing to compete for grades and teacher favors, to accept one's place as established by competition, and to try harder.

The teaching strategy relies mainly on the use of didactics and drill based on student reading, paper-and-pencil work, and lecture/discussion/recitation—all based on the text. Classes are organized around teacher interaction with the whole class or individual student work directed by the teacher. The teacher initiates interactions, and students respond directly to the teacher; there is little student/student interaction and little or no student control. The student is the passive receiver/learner of conclusions and preselected information. Teachers motivate students to learn mainly through assigning grades and other rewards or punishments and emphasizing the importance of grades for entrance into college or an occupation.

The Quest for Revitalization

Many teachers cannot sanction, let alone use, such a curriculum model. Ever since public schooling began in earnest in the United States, around 1340 (Katz 1963), education reformers have tried to humanize the curriculum. The "new social studies" represents the most recent of such attempts. But what was the "new social studies"? Has its era ended? Has it been replaced by a more viable and potentially successful reform movement? What are the chances for change, and how should we proceed? These are the questions to be addressed in the second part of this paper.
The Literature Model: Salvation Through Social Sciences

I take the "new social studies" to mean the decade or more of reform from roughly 1958 through the early 1970s. This period was characterized by national curriculum projects, funded mainly by government and private agencies. Because of the unprecedented national funding for curriculum reform and therefore the enormous effort involved, this period is unique in U.S. social studies history.

I hope to demonstrate that the literature gives an inadequate and unfortunate picture of the reforms of the 1960s-1970s by exaggerating the importance of social-science-discipline-dominated projects and caricaturing them as unidimensional efforts to convert social studies into social science education. The literature commentary more or less ignores both the diversity in experimentation and the developmental aspects of the period. I believe that the curriculum inventions of the era live on in today's innovative work and that the changes since the "new social studies" mainly represent a rejection of social science content focus and possibly (and more importantly) of content as a basis of the curriculum. In treating the "new social studies" as just another fad, social studies commentators help create the next set of fads and unidimensional approaches. Furthermore, insofar as the new approaches continue to emphasize active citizenship education, they will be as inappropriate as the "new social studies" but will offer less-powerful bases for curriculum organization because of their deemphasis of powerful content.

Two influential literature reviews, one by John Haas (1977) and the other by Karen Wiley (1977), which summarize 40 or more commentaries on the "new social studies" published between 1963 and 1977, contribute to the impression of the period.

Haas summarizes the literature view of the reform initiative as an effort of scientists, historians, and social scientists—aroused by the 1950s portrayal of public-school education as a mindless intellectual desert and motivated by post-Sputnik funding for curriculum work—to improve the quality of science education and attract intellectually gifted students into science. The big reform push came from 1963 to 1968 and was dominated by well-funded national curriculum projects, mainly in the behavioral sciences. Directed by university social scienc-
tists, many of these projects were sponsored by the National Science Foundation, with the purpose of designing social science discipline courses as potential competitors for traditional high school social studies courses. Edwin Fenton first used the term "new social studies" to suggest parallels with "new math"; he listed 15 points distinguishing the "new" from the "old" social studies (Fenton and Good, 1965). Interestingly, this early, personal view of the movement, obviously affected mainly by Fenton's own work, has become the authoritative description of an era which ended a decade later.

Wiley's review (1977) indicates that commentators perceived the projects as discipline-dominated and fairly similar in character. Content focused on single social science courses organized around the logic of the discipline and the world view contained therein, emphasizing the latest findings from the frontiers of scientific knowledge and generally placing more emphasis on cognitive content and processes than on values and valuing. Objectives focused on learning to apply the concepts and theories in the given discipline to understanding society and those social problems amenable to analysis by the discipline, learning to use the scientific method and inquiry skills of the discipline, becoming sympathetic to scientific inquiry as the means of solving social problems and starting to use this method, and adopting scientific attitudes and a relativist view toward values issues. Teaching strategies involved active student participation through discovery strategies which simulated actual scientific discovery and inquiry methods based on scientific inquiry. Concern for active student involvement required student/student interaction and also student/materials interaction, with control residing in the curriculum materials. Student motivation was to be maintained mainly through the excitement generated through inquiry and through consideration of powerful scientific ideas.

Even during the heyday of the "new social studies," professional educationists began to fault with the discipline-oriented approaches to the curriculum. By 1970 social studies commentators openly described the social-science approaches as being incapable of handling the horrendous societal problems of the 1960s and 1970s, and they gave birth to a new age of "problems"-oriented reforms. Hertzberg (1971) identified the new directions which emphasized "relevance and the immersion in the..."
immediate here and now, the commitment to social action, the stress on interpersonal relations, the involvement of students in deciding what to study, the impatience with traditional disciplines and the attempt to integrate or fuse them." John Haas summed up the "new social studies" critique in this way:

To many educators, the NSS movement was conceptually deficient. One conceptual weakness was that the NSS rationale was unidimensional—that is, committed to single answers to curriculum development questions. Of the three basic sources of curriculum—nature of knowledge, nature of society, and nature of students and learning—the NSS movement chose to emphasize just one way of viewing the nature of knowledge, namely, the structures of the separate academic disciplines and the procedures used by practitioners of these disciplines as they created knowledge. The NSS was unidimensional in its emphasis on the structural aspects of history and the social sciences; to the neglect of the nature of students and the nature of society as sources of social studies curriculum. It was unidimensional also in its emphasis on curriculum materials, to the neglect of school and classroom organization, of the nature of teachers, of the dynamics of teacher-student, student-student, and teacher-student-materials interactions, and of the nature of preservice and inservice teacher education (Haas 1977, pp. 80-81).

But Was the "New Social Studies" so Pure and One-Dimensional?

In my opinion, the foregoing analysis is quite inaccurate as a picture of the whole reform movement. The critics of the movement have not based their work on a historical analysis of the project materials. More important, they do not have an explicit definition of the boundaries of the "new social studies." For instance, Haas's summary is directed toward social science secondary projects. Evidently, many commentators on the period adopted Fenton's early characterization of the term "new social studies." This is unfortunate because it defines the era narrowly in terms of one new focus instead of as a period of multiple, interacting thrusts.

To make this point, it is necessary to start with the actual activity of the period, which is summarized in 11 directories of projects (Social Education 1965a and 1965b; Michaelis 1965; Gibson 1967; Wingert 1969; Lester 1969; Sanders and Tanck 1970; Turner 1971; Taylor and Groom 1971; Social Education 1972; Social Studies Curriculum Materials Data Book 1977). Of the 135 projects listed in these works, approximately 70 represent clear examples of curriculum development. At least 50 of
these projects involved multiple grades, 22 of them either K-12 or 5-12. Seventeen were elementary school projects, 5 were junior high school projects, and 21 were secondary projects. Only a third were oriented toward a discipline of social science or history. This brief nod to statistics indicates the diversity involved and leads one to question the unidimensional appraisal.

Some projects were better known than others, and it is probably fair to say that the ones which most people associate with the "new social studies" are the 31 projects included in two important project-by-project evaluations which appeared in Social Education in 1970 and 1972 (Sanders and Tanck 1970; Social Education 1972). Of these, 5 were in history, 10 in social-science disciplines, 3 in area studies, and 6 in citizenship; 4 were comprehensive elementary and 3 comprehensive K-12 projects. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare funded 11 projects, the National Science Foundation funded 4, private sources funded 12, and school districts partially funded 3. (Some projects received funding from more than one source.) Nine projects involved elementary and middle grades, 15 were designed for grades 7-12, and 7 spanned grades K-12 or 5-12. Historians or social scientists directed 13 projects, social studies educators directed 11 projects, and teams of social studies educators and social scientists directed 6 projects. Only 1 project admitted to designing curricula for the academically talented and even these claimed to be creating materials for both average and above-average students; 5 projects were specifically geared for the least successful student.

Most important for our purposes are statements about intended curriculum focus. Twenty-four of the 31 projects deliberately organized content around social sciences or history; this group included most of the elementary school and comprehensive projects. However, most of these projects were not oriented toward inculcating the structure of individual disciplines; rather, they used concepts from the social sciences as the content base. Six projects deliberately eschewed a disciplinary approach. Twenty-three projects considered some form of inquiry training important, but only 6 stated their objectives in terms of learning the skills of scientific inquiry or historical inquiry.
Values education was considered a major focus of 19 projects, and 12 projects cited citizenship education as an important goal.

Is There a "New Social Studies Curriculum" Model? No!

In my opinion, the era of reform we have been describing was extremely creative of new approaches to curriculum design; it represented a flowering of alternatives and a melding together of apparently disparate approaches. The diversity of the period is caught in Models of Teaching, by Joyce and Weil (1977), which categorizes different approaches developed during the period into four families of teaching strategies. The authors identify these focusing on (1) social relations, (2) information processing and cognitive development, (3) personality development, and (4) behavior modification. However, in focusing on teaching strategies rather than on curriculum design, and in describing the work of innovators such as Hilda Taba, Richard Shuman, David Ausubel, Jerome Bruner, Donald Oliver, B.F. Skinner, and Herbert Zelten in terms of the distinctive teaching strategy per person, the interplays of compatibilities among the innovators and their contributions to overall curriculum design. Taba, for instance, used several different strategies to achieve multiple learning objectives related to the intellectual, social, moral, and psychological development of the child. This is also true of many other projects. The possibility of developing curricula which combined approaches created by Taba, Ausubel, and others represents the major breakthrough of the period. For example, in Economics and Society (Hilburn and Davis, 1974), an overall unit organization was developed which used discrepant events as unit themes, programmed instruction to teach basic discipline organizers, small-group interaction activities for values clarification and small-group learning, the juridicial model of conflict analysis to teach analysis of controversial issues, and Taba's basic comparative case study approach to teach hypothesis and generalization formation.

The era of the "new social studies" is distinctive because of the national curriculum projects and because of the participation of academic discipline professionals. However, the newcomers joined social studies professionals who had been working in the field before and would continue to work as the era was over. Through cross-fertilization from diverse backgrounds, we were able to employ a whole series of inscr-
The period produced technical breakthroughs in applying system design procedures to education which involved designing whole courses of study around multiple objectives based on the latest theories of cognition and human development. We attempted, and to a large extent created, curricula which involved (1) carefully delineating learning objectives to raise students' cognitive, moral, emotional, and social levels of functioning, (2) choosing content based on powerful conceptual and analytical structures of knowledge and on a sampling of facts, cases, and events illustrating parts of the structure and enriching student experience, (3) sequencing, rotating, and spiraling learning activities to permit assimilation of and accommodation to new knowledge, (4) designing learning experiences requiring students to learn and practice necessary skills, to use and extend their knowledge, and to clarify and build their belief systems, (5) using activities which interest students by working simultaneously on several learning objectives, and (6) including systematic and continual feedback to students on their learning.

Focusing on the social science/historian structure-of-knowledge approach as a definition of this period ignores the real accomplishments and undervalues the extent to which current reforms grew out of this earlier period. It also invites the placing of blame on the social science orientation for the disappointing impact of the reforms on classroom practice.

Back to Basics and the Contradictions of the 1970s

In the 1970s the single most important change in U.S. education was the move back to "basics." This came at a time of fiscal crisis in government which hit schools particularly hard because of the decline in school-age population. The "new social studies" curricula came on the market just as the taxpayers' revolt gathered steam and the National Assessment of Educational Progress publicized declining test scores. Congress shifted federal funding priorities in education to promote equal opportunity through education. "New social studies" materials made their greatest impact in middle-class and upper-middle-class suburban school districts, where training the mind and preparation for active citizenship is an appropriate goal, consistent with career training for managerial and professional occupations. Except for a few pro-
grams, among them *American Political Behavior* and *Geography in an Urban Age*, the projects were a commercial flop, particularly at the elementary level. Nevertheless, one recent study (Fetsko 1979) shows that the projects influenced commercial texts, which introduced inquiry activities and social science concepts and generally latched on to salable aspects of the reforms. But the status studies indicate that the project innovations did not reach many classrooms—where, generally, business continued as usual. Many of us now seem to agree that the projects failed to take into consideration the school environment and how innovations actually take hold. Fewer of us go beneath this generalization to recognize the limited viability in the goals of liberal, progressive education, given the schools' socializing and screening functions.

Having viewed these conclusions about the "new social studies," it is important to look at current trends and their success. One can identify two interrelated, but possibly contradictory, kinds of thrusts.

One thrust focuses on content and emphasizes the preparation of children for their future roles as consumers, workers, citizens of the nation, citizens of the world, and members of a multiracial, multiethnic, litigious, private-enterprise society. In part these content concerns reflect changes in federal funding priorities and the availability of grants during the 1970s to develop curricula for ethnic studies, consumer economics, career education, and legal education. These efforts may or may not represent actual reforms, depending on the other learning objectives built into the curriculum or teaching unit. Such programs should gain acceptance in schools because the roles approach fits into the overall socialization and screening functions of schooling. Career and consumer education help students make more-rational choices within the existing choice range provided by society. In placing the focus on choosing among existing options, these programs deflect attention away from inquiry into why there are not better choices or whether choices are permitted to some groups and prohibited to others. Although such programs provide potential vehicles for teaching decision making or values education, probably they are mainly a conservative force. Their activities tend to focus on decisions helpful for maintaining the status quo—for example, how to allocate one's budget. While roles approaches provide an opportunity for teachers to focus on changing roles and to
expose sexism, racism, and other biases, are embedded in a broader framework of ideas about the world and social/political system, they will not enlighten or clarify or give a realistic view of choices provided by the system.

The second kind of reform activity flows directly from the "new social studies" teaching innovations but focuses narrowly on some aspect of citizenship education—for example, values and valuing, decision making, or learning through active participation in community life. Eminent social studies reformers and text writers discuss these thrusts, their success in the classrooms, and their future potential in Goals for the Social Studies: Toward the Twenty-First Century, a special issue of the Journal of Research and Development in Education (1930). These articles indicate little which is really new. Mainly the emphasis has changed to downgrade content as the basis for curriculum. Materials have moved away from applying powerful organizing ideas to current affairs and history, to a problems approach which seems to be a vehicle for developing decision-making, participation, and valuing skills. These approaches use teaching strategies emphasized by the "new social studies," minus the social-science-discipline content focus. Children appear to be introduced to problem solving and valuing on an ad hoc basis, without a conceptual structure for analyzing contemporary problems which would help them make important connections and make sense of the world.

Insofar as these innovations focus the goal—for example, decision making or values—they are just as dimensional as the 1960s discipline-oriented projects were perceived to be by educationists. Furthermore, the articles in Goals for Social Studies indicate that only limited success has been achieved in introducing these approaches in the classroom. This makes sense, since these active citizenship reforms are fundamentally inconsistent with the socialization function of the school. They suffer from the same bias as the "new social studies" discipline-dominated approaches in seeking to reform society through promoting democratic practice in the schools. Furthermore, insofar as they also seek to encourage more student involvement in learning, to make learning easier and more firm, they interfere with the screening function of schools by downplaying grades and by contributing
grade inflation—that is, providing a basis for giving better grades to students who might otherwise be turned off to schooling.

It is true that these approaches downgrade content as a basis for curricula and lack a unifying and reasonably accurate world view, then they do not combat the bland, negative effects of mass-market texts. I agree that the social science discipline structure may not be the best basis for organizing content. To the extent that discipline-oriented courses reflect the ruling ideology, they too can confuse and obfuscate. As examples, the lack of systems thinking and dynamics in elementary economics theory limits expectations to how the economy reacts to change, but it does not explain change, and mainstream economists do not use class analysis to explain income distribution or alienation from work. I am not necessarily advocating using discipline structures as the basis for content and a world view. However, it is important—and possible to introduce students to powerful organizing ideas and to help them to understand social interrelationships and the historical development of social problems, and their connection to the economic and political systems.

Finally, I am troubled by the apparent fragmentation of the current reforms. Why are there separate programs in decision making, valuing, and global education? The curriculum programs of the 1960s involved designing whole teaching systems around multiple objectives, a rotation and spiraling of learning, and balancing of different teaching strategies. Has this aspect of experimentation been lost, or is it being avoided because it is impractical? Possibly the current fragmentation represents a necessary retreat to try to infuse textbook teaching with a little innovation. However, I suspect that the problem is more serious, that it is related to unidimensional thinking in the profession.

Conclusions and Recommendations

I believe that the manpower model of education predominates in shaping schooling. This means that active citizenship education will not gain wide acceptance because it is incompatible with the main socialization and screening functions of the schools. Specifically, the following conditions seem to me to encourage stability and inhibit change:
1. Recent studies of the conditions necessary to implement and sustain innovations (Berman and McLanahan 1978) conclude that changes implemented from the top down do not have lasting effects in schools if they are unrelated to perceived needs of teachers. Rather, permanent change occurs when the people doing the work—teachers—either initiate change or recognize that the specific changes help them do their job.

2. The social studies studies conclude that teachers and textbooks control the curriculum and that teachers respond to the day-to-day pressures and traditions that exist in their schools. The need to maintain control and discipline is a prerequisite to success in teaching and therefore takes precedence in classroom management decisions.

3. In response to the profit opportunities created by the expansion of public school education during this century, publishers have developed mass-market texts. By and large, market forces have disciplined publishers to conform in creating what is almost a standardized product, designed to appeal to the market center. Since texts are the basic source of curriculum content, the effect of this situation is to weaken the content base.

4. Pressures to conform also come from outside professional social studies circles. The lay public—particularly, special-interest groups—continues to take an interest in social studies, eroding the influence of social studies professionals and, potentially, that of social studies education. Because social studies is primarily ideological indoctrination, and part of general education rather than occupational training, there is an inherent tendency for the lay public to feel qualified to influence the curriculum. When times are hard, social studies may be attacked on two grounds—that it doesn't do its job of preparing youngsters for life and that it isn't basic to job training—and thus considered expendable.

5. Although the real control of the curriculum lies with the text and teacher, there are many other influences on the curriculum. Decision making on textbook adoptions and K-12 articulation and content involve local school district textbook and curriculum committees, state committees, state departments of education, local and state school boards, and even state legislatures (Lengel 1981). The practice of
including a spectrum of people in the decision-making process—to democratize and legitimate decisions—actually impedes change because it requires a consensus among a wide range of people and interest groups. Therefore, policies which have evolved over time and which were in place before the bureaucratic structure was developed tend to continue for lack of agreement among the decision makers about alternatives.

6. Social studies professionals, particularly academics, contribute to maintaining the status quo by creating disputes over what the curriculum should be, thereby failing to provide effective leadership for change. These disputes reflect professional rivalries, ideological differences, and intractable prejudices which I do not believe will disappear, even though they could be resolved if we were to adopt a rational, problem-solving commitment to change. The differences not only dilute effective leadership; they also create confusion and false debates over alternative strategies which others in the field have to sort out. However, they are part of academic life, contributing to professional advancement, and therefore important to their participants.

7. One of these sets of disputes relates to the issue of content in the curriculum. In general, social studies educators have given inadequate attention to content and to the serious deficiency created by choosing inoffensive content. Because of its ideological function in the overall school experience, traditional social studies content obfuscates and mystifies; it treats our ideals as real, attainable goals which have not yet been reached, when in reality they cannot be reached in a world dominated by the drive for capital accumulation and increasing concentration of power. To the extent that we mislead, we contribute to students' dissatisfaction with social studies classes—which, of course, can feed back to create more discipline and classroom management problems for teachers.

8. The present pressure to hold the line on or cut social services means tight school budgets, therefore fewer change agents within school systems, less money for auxiliary resources and training programs, less encouragement of teachers to experiment in their own classes, and more pressures to conform—hardly an encouraging environment for teachers.
I see little hope of bringing about pervasive change based on active citizenship education or progressive education goals. We need to recognize this, and to change our sights from attempts to affect the mainstream to working on those fringes where our ideas and strategies are welcome. We have made great technical advances in curriculum design and teaching methods, but knowing how to educate does not mean we can change teaching except where such changes are appropriate. Nevertheless, it is important to continue research and development on the teaching/learning process and to learn more about actual classroom practice. We also need to develop a realistic, more accurate view of society, social change, and the functions of schooling in maintaining social stability as opposed to promoting social change. We should incorporate this knowledge in our teaching to inform teachers about these matters, so that they are aware of the contradictions which constrain their work but nevertheless provide the opportunities for change. If we have an accurate social analysis and are clear about our politics, we will be more successful in choosing more-likely avenues for change.

References


The Language of the Curriculum

The language of the curriculum is replete with words such as design, planning, objectives, development, structure, process, and evaluation. It sounds like a board meeting of a multinational company rather than the language of educators, but these words do illustrate certain trends in education which locate it in a technical, rational world where more-recently popular words and concepts, such as accountability, are perfectly appropriate. The word design does have another connotation, which moves it more toward humanistic and artistic endeavors and away from the deliberation implied in other meanings. By discussing the term design, I shall be able to pick my way through a series of key ideas and concerns that are increasingly exercising my thoughts as an educationist.

There have been two elements in the notion of design—that which emphasizes the artistic aspect and that which emphasizes the craft aspect. There is often a tension between the two interpretations. Craft has been seen as associated with the real world of everyday life, commerce, and industry. It is messy, mechanical, practical, and useful in its orientation; perhaps it is also humble, workmanlike, noninspired—a skill. Art is seen as creative, inspired, nonpractical, not necessarily related to the real world, in the sense that it deals in images and fantasy, imagination and interpretation. Art is of greater value, because it is associated with free will and creative expression.

I do not personally accept these distinctions, but I find them useful in bringing out some problems in curriculum design. Too often, the notion of curriculum design most favored has been one which links it with practical preplanning, craft, and mechanical operations and skills. I want to argue that, for the 1930s, we should make efforts to put art back into design in our curriculum in the sense of encouraging a clearer commitment to developing in children creativity, imagination, self-awareness, and similar values and skills. I am calling for an increased emphasis on the humanities and expressive arts to counterbalance the...
pseudorational, positivistic, and scientistic social science paradigm that many curriculum developers encouraged in the 1960s and 1970s. This emphasis does not imply a flight from politics or the real world; rather, it incorporates a more lively and critical approach to teaching and learning and a more powerful political standpoint than was apparent in the social studies/social science curriculum projects of the last two decades in either the United States or the United Kingdom. (I cannot speak of Western Germany since, beyond my knowledge of the restrictions which teachers face in that country, I have little first-hand knowledge of curriculum in that country.)

One definition of design states that if you take it to mean "the conscious pre-determination of the human environment, you are into planning, into economics, into politics" (Baynes 1976). Any social curriculum must be preplanned to some degree and will therefore reflect the political choices and constraints operating within the school, the community, and the wider society, and these will determine what is seen as worthwhile knowledge and what is seen as undesirable. However, I do not agree with Michael Apple (1979) and other Marxist curriculum theorists who see the operation of ideology in every facet of educational and human activity.

The fundamental themes I wish to pursue in this paper are, specifically:

1. That curriculum design is a necessary activity in education, but that it must include social, political, philosophical, and educational positions, hitherto neglected in the social curriculum, which encourage creativity, flexibility, and opportunities for pupils to pursue their own studies for part of the time. Pupils must be valued as much as teachers as active agents in the design of the curriculum. The choice of topics to study, things to learn about, is as much a job for pupils as it is for teachers, even if teachers do retain overall guidance in the development of skills. A shift toward more pupil choice will make it more difficult (I hope) for us to construct the kind of totally planned social scientific curriculum that emerged, especially in the United States, in the 1960s and 1970s. As an admirer and imitator of the American approach, I learned to love it, then hate it. This wall-to-wall curriculum with all social subject disciplines prescribed and all
objectives built in, kindergarten through grade 12, was the ultimate in
curriculum planning and design—and the death of education! In the
United Kingdom we did not achieve such a comprehensive curriculum, but
certainly the proliferation of social science subjects for our 16- to
18-year-olds in Ordinary (O-level) and Advanced (A-level) General Cer-
tificate of Education (GCE) programs has meant the triumph of positivism
and a narrow and bogus view of human society. There are a few excep-
tions, notably the JMB board's A-level sociology and O-level integrated
humanities, both of which allow a broader perspective.

2. That if the teacher continues to maintain a central role in
the curriculum, as I believe should be the case, certain features are
necessary in this curriculum of the real world.

I would now like to enlarge on the first theme, by looking more
generally at curriculum theory and development, and to consider its
impact on secondary schools.

Writing About the Curriculum

Curriculum as a career and specialist study has now become accepted
in the United Kingdom (as in the United States) at schools of education
and other teacher-education departments. Despite the proliferation of
books and research on curriculum, I have found few books or curriculum
projects which attach themselves to the educational philosophy I have
outlined; that is, a belief in the value of creativity, flexible learning
arrangements, pupil choice, and a commitment to an emancipatory
education, however vague or difficult to define all of this may be. (I
suppose I am talking about the open school, or progressive education,
but I find these terms so vague that I rarely use them.) There are
exceptions, particularly by Americans, among them the well-known books
of Holt, Goodman, and Kohl. Few equivalent works by British curriculum
writers combine the same degree of scholarship and persuasiveness.

Works on the curriculum published in the United Kingdom during the
1960s and 1970s were extremely varied, operating at a number of levels
and conceived in a number of traditions. Some, like those of Kenneth
Richmond (1967, 1971), were mainly descriptive works dealing with the
changes taking place in the schools. They were based on no special ana-
lytical framework beyond a general belief that changes in the curriculum
were necessary and timely. This practical type of book is still being published and is of some use to teachers because it reports and popularizes developments.

Another type of book has offered analyses of the curriculum based on the main educational disciplines—the history of, psychology of, philosophy of, and sociology of education. The sociology of education has probably created the most controversy and interest on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United Kingdom much of this work has been associated with the University of London Institute of Education and has involved cultural, political, sociological, and linguistic analysis of the curriculum (see Lawton 1975, Bernstein 1971, Young 1971, Sharp and Green 1975, Pring 1976, and others). Most of this work has been in the nature of theoretical critiques; in most cases it is based on empirical research and has raised basic questions about the operation of the school curriculum and school practice in general. But it is not of immediate use and relevance to teachers; it does not tell them what to do on Monday morning. Rather, it worries teachers and warns them of the dangers of what they have been doing on Monday mornings! In itself, this is a healthy exercise. Lawton is perhaps an exception to this genre; his books on the curriculum have always been easy to read (and therefore they sell well). His books are also tinged with pragmatism, which does not please some academics and some left-oriented teachers who want their curriculum analysts always to be involved in the class struggle.

There are a few other writers like Lawton, who combine scholarship with detailed and practical discussion of what is and what ought to be. The principal ones are Lawrence Stenhouse (1975, 1980) and Maurice Holt (1978, 1979). Of equal importance are the curriculum projects themselves, from organizations such as Nuffield and the Schools Council, which have associated publications that outline their aims and methods. A useful descriptive and critical summary of all of these projects can be found in Stenhouse (1980).

Another kind of writing about the curriculum comes from a group of people on both sides of the Atlantic. They are writers on the curriculum and schooling who derive their philosophical and educational positions from a wide range of viewpoints—some neo-Marxist, some existen-
tial. Together, they offer support for a greater degree of pupil-centeredness, allied with a commitment to an existential and emancipatory view of education which is rooted in creative and expressive work inside the classroom and outside the school. Some of these writers have a firm attachment to a social curriculum which includes elementary sociological, political, and economic education; others are more wedded to the English/humanities end of the social curriculum continuum. All of them present stinging attacks on positivist conceptions of social science and social learning.

Of the strident politicos, the recent work of Young and Whitty is the most thought-provoking and important (see especially Whitty and Young 1976 and Gleeson and Whitty 1976). Their work and that of their associates has given us a clearer understanding of some of the epistemological foundations of the social curriculum. Witkin (1974) and Abbs (1979) are refreshing for their treatments of the more subjective elements in learning; both are firm advocates of the major but neglected role of the creative and expressive arts in the development of feelings, beliefs, and values in young people. Abbs presents a powerful critique of rationalism in the modern education system.

The daily teaching in London schools and his superb books demonstrate what Chris Searle and others of his kind can achieve with pupils in English lessons, encouraging awareness in pupils of racism, sexism, and oppression. Searle (1977) shows us that the relevant knowledge capable of transforming society already exists within the pupils themselves; it only needs to be developed.

Last, I must commend the work of one American who has influenced me—Maxine Greene. The broad interdisciplinary sweep of her work and her passionate championing of many of the political, educational, and philosophical standpoints which I hold dear have made me attempt to get her work more widely known in the British Isles (see Greene 1974 and 1978).

Practice in the Schools

I want to turn now to a brief critique of actual school practice in the United Kingdom in recent years in the social curriculum and then, at
greater length, move on to my outline of the elements of a curriculum for the real world.

There is no doubt that real successes were achieved in the last two decades in the actual expansion of social learning in schools, particularly in secondary schools. A large minority of schools now offer integrated work in the first, second, and third years of secondary education, although the extent of rethinking in some of these changes has often been minimal; many courses are simply no more than geography, history, English, and religious education pushed together. At the senior end of the school the growth of the social curriculum has been even more remarkable, no doubt fueled by the incentives and structure of examination courses which are being developed at an ever-increasing rate. Large numbers of secondary schools now offer integrated social studies/social science courses under a bewildering variety of names. The growth in the provision of specialist social science courses, such as O-level and A-level GCE sociology (for 16- to 18-year-olds), has also been dramatic, with social anthropology being the only specialist social science which is not yet examined at O or A level or in the Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) examinations. Some of this growth has been associated with the "Mode 3" provision in examinations, which gives teachers a more central role in devising syllabuses. All of this has been supported by the continuing publication of new textbooks for the specialist subjects and of project-topic style books for the many forms of integrated courses.

What seems surprising is the low take-up rate of curriculum project materials. Materials of the early Schools Council projects are used by about 10 percent of teachers, and the MACOS (Man: A Course of Study) materials are used by as few as 5 percent of teachers. These low rates must be a comment on the resistance of teachers to these forms of curriculum renewal, unrelated as they are to a clear examination base, but they are also a comment on the nature and relevance of these projects. Many were not disseminated very well, and many are inappropriate in terms of cost to schools, structure and design, and language level. In contrast, the second generation of Schools Council projects, such as Geography for the Young School Leaver, have fared somewhat better because a vigorous dissemination policy was planned right at the start.
and because they fit more easily into a stable subject base which leads to examinations. However, all of these project materials suffer by virtue of being developed and based at university or college departments. It may be that social studies/humanities teachers are resistant to overtures from these quarters; or it may be that the developers miscalculated the needs of teachers, which I think is more likely. Nevertheless, I do believe that all of the social studies projects had many redeeming qualities and that they have had some kind of influence, and I agree with Stenhouse (1975) that projects like the Humanities Curriculum Project have generated very fruitful discussion about teaching methods and strategies. And of course teaching style and strategy are just as important as content in changing the curriculum.

Some Essential Features of a Curriculum Design for the Real World

There are two important aspects of a curriculum design for the real world: the organizational structure of the teaching—the methods, style, and philosophy—and the content.

There are three features which should inform the content:

1. There should be a more pronounced emphasis on the humanities within the integrated social curriculum and a greater value accorded to the expressive arts and creativity within this form of learning.

2. There should be a stronger critical element, which encourages pupils to think, argue, and develop ideas rather than merely absorb so-called objective knowledge about the social world, transmitted exclusively by teachers.

3. There should be a wider scope in the treatment of controversial topics and a wider range of themes considered appropriate for school study (see Dufour 1979).

Teaching Method

British education has long championed the cause of child-centered learning but has rarely explored the precise meanings and implications of this credo. Even more unusual has been the attempt by schools to practice this educational ideal. Most secondary schools in Britain are still formal institutions with all the major elements of the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy, characterized by formal procedures, by detailed rules governing interpersonal behavior, dress, movement within...
the building, and forms of address, and by clear status demarcation in a hierarchical structure. There are similarities with prisons and hospitals, except that in our schools (apart from the private boarding schools) everyone goes home at four o'clock, after spending a substantial part of the day in a strange, artificial environment.

There are exceptions to this regimen. Most of our primary schools are friendly and informal places, and even a few secondary schools are relaxed and humane institutions. My ideal for a school—and my description comes close to the school I have worked in for the last decade—is one that is typified by informality and flexibility and which organizes itself for the maximum achievement of the intellectual/cognitive and personal/pastoral goals, regarded as an inseparable unity. Individualized learning and teamwork would have priority in the context of what I would like to call "The 50/50 Curriculum," a curriculum in which pupils spend half their time in the social subjects on teacher-originated work and half their time on topics they have chosen themselves, working with tutorial assistance from the teacher. This approach immediately calls into question most of the activity of curriculum mongers, whether they be HMIs, LEA advisors, academics, or anyone else. Curriculum developers would join our ever-increasing 'dole queues. They would be put out of work because staff and pupils together would devise the curriculum on an individual basis as the work proceeded, although there would be certain constraints imposed by examination boards and the political sensitivity of some of the work.

The plan I am outlining is not utopian. It has been in operation for many years now at Countesthorpe and has been a success at all levels. However, I do admit that those who study the hidden curriculum would need to stay in business, because my own experiences in teaching at Countesthorpe and my research there have indicated how patterns and structures—often unintended and unwanted—can emerge in a context of almost total pupil-centeredness. I have never fully supported the complete individualization that operates at Countesthorpe; I believe a 50-50 balance is a good compromise between teacher and taught. Teachers have experience, knowledge, skills, and many other qualities which can benefit pupils. I do not accept the brand of Marxist analysis of the curriculum which suggests that because all knowledge is socially con-
structed and teachers transmit official knowledge to pupils, the teacher must play a negligible role in order to avoid dangerous and impudent impositions on the minds of children.

I do argue that the teacher must have a reduced role, because children also bring to the school knowledge, skills, individuality, and personal history which must also be awarded serious and proper status in the school curriculum. Education can extend the horizons of both teacher and taught. The real world which pupils bring with them to school includes interest in and knowledge of popular music, fashion, motorbikes, football, and many other features of youth culture. As a teacher I can learn from and help to extend the understanding of the pupils about the cultural, social, and political environment in which they are so heavily engaged. We can help them explore this world critically, but there are also times when we must allow pupils to do work which they want to pursue regardless of our own devious aims.

Content and Topics for a Study of the Real World

Finally, let me outline the kind of content or themes which I would want to put before pupils as part of my 50 percent—thees and areas of study which I would argue forcefully are increasingly central to an understanding of the real world.

Television. Television is now the major medium for influencing our conception of the social world—and this certainly is the case for pupils. They derive imagery, feelings, and information from television about how the world looks, its events, and its power structure. Because television is edited and partial in its treatment of the world, the school has a duty to help pupils analyze this treatment critically. There is ample research evidence from both sides of the Atlantic which shows how limited is children's knowledge of the social and political world.

Popular Culture. This category includes pop and rock music, fashion, films, motorbikes, football, and many other things which vary according to class, region, and country; but the essential influence of these phenomena is universal. Schools should give pupils the opportunity to study these aspects of their lives, which are so important to them (also to younger teachers and perhaps even to a few older teachers!). Over the last two years I and my schoolteacher colleagues have tutored
15- and 16-year-old pupils on projects on Punk music. This has enabled us to discuss race and racism, demonstrations and political protest, the police, social order and control, and many other political themes. It is likely that these pupils would not have considered these "teacher-type" themes if they had not been approached under the guise of a study of Punk.

Politics. This vital area is disliked by many adolescents. It can be made more meaningful to them if a real-world approach is used; that is, instead of studying procedures and structures of parties and the state, which most government courses emphasize, pupils should be given the chance to study the real world which they see on their television screens—events such as demonstrations, strikes, industrial conflict, wars, and international terrorism. This study should not exclude the hidden bases of politics, such as behind-the-scenes views of power, or issues such as sexual politics and sexism in society. I am not arguing for a sensationally oriented curriculum but rather that such themes are ever with us and must be studied as much as the more-regular aspects of politics. (Since 1976 there have been many demands for more political education in the curriculum from all sources of curriculum development, including the government and the inspectors. However, I believe that the kind of realistic and critical brand of political education which I am espousing here would have little support from these agencies. See Dufour 1979 and Whitty 1979.)

The World of Work. I agree with the recent demands that the world of work be included more centrally in the school curriculum. However, if pupils are to learn about the important role of business and capitalism in our country, they must also study trade unions, industrial relations, movements for workers' control, socialism, and communism. These all form part of the fabric of discussion of the economy in the United Kingdom, and they must all be afforded a proper place in the social curriculum.

Other Cultures. In the world today, with its problems and inequalities, it is important for all schools to try to develop pupils' worldmindedness—their appreciation of other peoples, other cultures, and other countries. In order to understand the present Middle East difficulties, some knowledge of Moslem culture is necessary. Since the,
United Kingdom, along with the United States and Western Germany, is a multiracial society, the study of other cultures is vital. Some countries, including the United States, place a fair emphasis on global education in their professional curriculum development, but in Britain we either adopt an ethnocentric approach or we tackle this subject within geography, with the result that all the feelings and cultural aspects are squeezed out under the weight of geographical concepts.

Several major subdivisions need to be included in an other-cultures program:

—Multiracial education. This is a key area, and we should encourage more pupils to study it.

—Education in social and economic development. The study of the persistent inequality in the world between the rich and poor countries is a necessity.

—Traditional societies. Many pupils are fascinated by tribal groups around the world. These groups are all undergoing change, willingly or imposed, and it is important that we help pupils to understand the reasons and problems associated with these changes.

—Other countries. It is valuable for pupils to study some specific countries and to construct comprehensive accounts of a country or countries.

The importance of all this work is that in pursuing this comparative perspective we can assist pupils in moving toward a clearer and less stereotyped view of other peoples and cultures.

These, then, are some of the features of the teacher-initiated social curriculum which I propose. Much of this may coincide with pupils' choices, for the interests of the two groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The task should be, not to present information in a dry and rigorous manner, but rather to explore ideas in a variety of ways—through pupil projects, discussion, research work in the library or outside school, literature, creative writing, or drama. A social curriculum for the real world can be approached from a narrow social studies/social science perspective, or it can be given life via a humanities approach which combines the public forms of knowledge of the teacher with the more personal forms of knowledge and interests, of the
pupils. In my view, here lies the essential challenge of a curriculum design for the real world.

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Although conceptions of social justice can, in theory, be used to justify political and economic arrangements as different as Marxism and monetarism (Harvey 1978), discussions of the relationship between education and social justice in Britain have typically emanated from those who see themselves on the left of the political spectrum (for example, Lawton 1977). Commentators representing a range of perspectives on the left have tended to agree that neither our society nor its educational system currently measures up to any meaningful definition of social justice. There is a mass of evidence (for example, Halsey et al. 1980) that neither the procedures nor the outcomes of the English educational system can be considered socially just, within the terms of any of the major definitions of the concept. There is also a growing conviction amongst the reformist as well as the revolutionary left that social justice is unlikely to be achieved unless contemporary society, as we know it, is superseded by a qualitatively different and more genuinely egalitarian form of society. Social and political educators have often claimed that they have an important part to play in this process. Indeed, perhaps more than any other area of the curriculum, social studies education has attracted those who, from the exponents of a mild progressivism in the 1940s to the advocates of a Freirean radical pedagogy in the 1970s, have seen their work as contributing to the enhancement of social justice both in and through education.

Yet, while debates about the nature and purposes of social and political education in England have generally had a more radical dimension than have equivalent ones in the United States, the practice of social studies education in England places it almost as firmly within the liberal-to-conservative part of the spectrum as its American counterpart (Palmer 1980). It is this dichotomy between the theory and practice of those approaches to social studies education committed to the enhancement of social justice which leads me to focus in this paper on the relationship between society and social and political education.
In discussing the explicit provision of social and political education in English schools, I am particularly concerned to consider how far this aspect of the school curriculum may be seen as having a role in the maintenance or transformation of existing inequitable social and economic arrangements. I will point to the limited extent to which prevailing approaches to social and political education in England have effectively challenged the status quo and suggest that the radical or conservative effects of work in this field are highly contingent upon its articulation with other aspects of schooling and society. I will therefore argue that strategies intended to enhance social justice via education will make little headway unless they are based upon a more sophisticated understanding of schooling and society than has hitherto been evident amongst social studies educators and unless they are more explicitly linked to broader struggles for social justice within society at large.

**Traditional Social and Political Education in Britain**

Overt social and political education has never commanded the widespread support in Britain that education for citizenship appears to command in the United States. Although there have been successive attempts to legitimate greater curriculum provision in this field, they have often fallen foul of a considerable resistance amongst English educators to the idea that education should "serve the needs of society" in any direct or obvious manner. Practical and vocational education have always enjoyed low status within the English educational system when compared with an education grounded in liberal humanist conceptions of culture. This has tended to militate against anything which might smack of citizenship training. As a relatively stable society, Britain has generally favored implicit means of socialization into the status quo and thus has been much less overtly obsessed with the need to inculcate pupils with its dominant ideology than is the case with societies which are experiencing rapid social change or trying to legitimate a new political regime. Unlike the United States, Britain was not faced in the early years of this century with the need to weld together a disparate immigrant population, and, unlike the Soviet Union, it was not faced with the task of initiating pupils into a new political ideology.
This has contributed to a situation in which high-status knowledge in
English education has been firmly associated with the academic disciplines and hence with knowledge that tends to be literate, abstract, differentiated, and unrelated to everyday life (Young 1971). During the course of this century, overt state control of the English school curriculum has been progressively reduced; control, since World War II, has been exercised largely through teachers' professional ideologies and a particular conception of professionalism (Grace 1978). Taken together, these features of the English educational system have helped to give it an appearance of relative autonomy from prevailing economic and political conditions.

This is not, of course, to claim that education in Britain is without economic and political significance. Indeed, various analyses have suggested not only that the autonomy of English education is more limited than it has often appeared, but that apparently autonomous educational systems play a vital role in social and cultural reproduction (for example, Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Nor would I want to claim that social and political education have been less absent from English schools. What I am pointing to here is a difference in the form in which, and perhaps in the degree to which, it has been a major feature of English schools when compared with those in many other countries. The dominant tradition of social and political education has remained, at least until very recently, that which was derived from the English public (that is, independent) schools, in which the children of the ruling class were—and indeed still are—educated. Here implicit socialization via the experience of the school's regime combined with the study of Ancient Greece and Rome to provide what social and political education was deemed necessary. As mass secondary education developed during this century, this high-status curriculum (somewhat updated) was aped by the state grammar schools. Though academic history and geography courses grew in importance as classical studies declined, any suggestion that they were or should be vehicles for overt political education (as opposed to components of a "liberal education") was always hotly contested.

It is interesting to notice, in view of my earlier remarks that social and political education have been most in evidence when there has
been a perceived problem of social control; that what overt and explicit
education for citizenship has existed in English schools has been
largely directed toward the children of the working class. Thus, for
instance, a rather passive concept of education for citizenship, in the
form of civics and similar courses, was always a significant feature of
the curriculum of the secondary-modern schools; however, when the latter
were combined with the grammar schools to form comprehensives in the
1960s and 1970s, the grammar school tradition tended to be the dominant
one. While overt education for citizenship has continued to exist in
the lower streams of the comprehensive schools, it has generally been
considered a low-status activity amongst teachers when compared with
academic—history and geography teaching, and teachers of the latter sub-
jects in England have consistently distanced themselves from those con-
cerned with social studies and social education.

I want now to discuss some of the attempts to challenge this tradi-
tional hierarchical dualism in the English secondary school curriculum
and to consider what light their fate throws upon the possibilities and
problems of using social and political education as a vehicle for foster-
ing social change and the extension of social justice in society. All
these attempts—by the social studies movement of the late 1940s and
early 1950s, the "new social studies" movement of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, and the political education movement of the late 1970s and
early 1980s—have sought in their different ways to make the explicit
teaching about and/or for life in contemporary society a more central
feature of the school curriculum. In arguing that their approaches
should be made available to all pupils, they have also sought to extend
social justice in education as a prerequisite to contributing to the
realization of social justice through education.

The Social Studies Movement of the 1940s and 1950s

The fate of the social studies movement of the 1940s and 1950s has
been chronicled many times (for example, Cannon 1964). This rather
amorphous movement was heralded with extravagant claims which have, in
fact, left precious little mark upon the English educational scene.
While it was certainly not a really radical movement, and one of its
major obsessions was to develop education to fit the changing demands of
British capitalism and democracy after the war, it did propose significant changes in our system of schooling. It opposed the prevailing elitism of the English educational system and proposed alternatives which would open the way for a more "healthy" society. The argument was that social studies should form a backdrop to more specialized studies and allow all children to feel themselves to be "closely associated with the past and present struggles and achievements of mankind, and to have a personal contribution to make towards future progress" (Hemming 1949). James Hemming explicitly argued that pupils following courses "broadened by social studies carried on with plenty of project work" were "adventurous in outlook, approachable and articulate, eager to give their minds to new problems." Those who followed a curriculum composed entirely of academic subject-based courses had, on the other hand, "a marked tendency to be parochial in outlook, reserved, conditioned against change."

Hemming's ideas had a lot in common with the ideas of American progressivism, and there was a further parallel in the concern of two other influential writers of that time, Dray and Jordan, to ensure "orderly change" in a society facing the dual threats of totalitarianism and anarchy (Dray and Jordan 1950). It may, of course, be argued that had the social studies movement succeeded in transforming the educational system to produce the creative, flexible, and tolerant citizens which Hemming envisaged, they would have bolstered British capitalism more successfully than has in fact happened. It remains the case, however, that this movement fell foul of the traditionalism of the British school system even before its impact on the outside world could begin to be assessed. It failed to make headway in the grammar schools, and the secondary modern schools (in which it did make some initial progress) increasingly came under pressure to compete with the grammar schools for examination successes in discrete, well-established academic subjects.

Thus it was that the "liberal" (let alone any possible "radical") promise of this early social studies movement was largely stillborn. Only the most explicitly conservative features of the tradition remained as a target for its successor, the "new social studies" movement of the 1960s. The divisiveness by which such courses were restricted to the bottom streams of secondary modern schools probably served only to main-
tain the elitism of British schools and society. The concept of citizenship encouraged in most of the courses that survived was far from the active one which Hemming had envisaged, but rather a passive one in which activity and involvement did not seem to go beyond the ability to fill in an income-tax form, remember the name of the local mayor, or decorate some old lady's kitchen without pausing to consider why she was permitted to exist in such squalor. Small wonder that their critics dismissed such courses in "life adjustment" as "social slops" and sought for alternatives which encouraged pupils to look critically at society rather than passively accept their lot in a society seemingly beyond their control. The earlier movement, although it had consciously challenged the prevailing social relations of the school, had ultimately made no significant impact even there—let alone in society at large.

The "New Social Studies"

I now want to consider the nature of the English version of the "new social studies" movement, which, while sharing some central assumptions with its American counterpart, had some distinctive features. The most important of these was probably its identification, particularly in its early stages, with a small group of sociologists, which made the movement less of an attempt to reform the teaching of established subjects such as history and geography and rather more of an attempt to gain a legitimate place for [other] social sciences alongside them in the curriculum. Given that British historians and geographers do not consider themselves social scientists, and given the rather limited interest shown in the 1960s by economists and political scientists in teaching pupils below the age of 16, the English "new social studies" movement was very much a lobby of sociologists who hitherto had had no recognized place in the school curriculum. This situation was to have implications not only for the way in which the movement developed but also for the way in which it was perceived.

The English "new social studies" movement combined an overt attack on the uncritical nature of many existing social studies courses in secondary modern schools and on the lack of rigor in Hemming's alternatives with a rather more implicit critique of the lack of relevance in the conventional academic curriculum of the grammar schools. Thus
Lawton and Dufour, in the standard reference book for the "new social studies" in England, mounted a dual case in support of the inclusion of social science in the school curriculum:

1. The practical need for young people to develop an awareness and understanding of their own society, illustrated by the statements made in such reports as Crowther and Newsom that young people need to be "less confused by" or to be able to "find their way about" in a complex, industrial (and welfare) society.

2. The fact that our world is increasingly a social-scientific world; i.e., that social science as a form of knowledge is increasingly important to a balanced understanding of the universe. .... (Lawton and Dufour 1973)

On the surface, the first of these arguments seems, in some ways, little different from the rhetoric of some of the more conservative forms of citizenship education which are designed to fit pupils into society as it is, while the second can be read as an appeal that advocates of a liberal education based on initiation into "public forms of knowledge" (Hirst and Peters 1970) should not ignore the social sciences as a form of knowledge which ought to be represented in the school curriculum.

However, it seems clear that many advocates of the "new social studies" saw their subject as offering a much more critical perspective on society than their public rhetoric of legitimation revealed. Rather than being committed to the fine-tuning of society in terms of its traditional values and ideals, even some of the more cautious members of the "new social studies" movement argued on occasion that a social science-based social studies should encourage "a critical approach to the values of society" (Lawton 1968). Others implied that the exposure of public to the knowledge generated by the social sciences would remedy "half-truths" and make pupils "critically aware" of the extent to which their own common-sense ideas were distorted by bias and prejudice. The alternative firm foundation of "true knowledge of the social structure and the social processes" (Dufour 1970) generated by the social sciences would seemingly provide a basis for critical thinking about social reality. Social justice within education would be achieved by making the "best" knowledge available to all, and some clearly harbored the hope that social justice in society might ultimately be served by the use of such knowledge as a basis for changing the world. At the very least,
the teaching of the supposedly universalistic knowledge generated by the social sciences was expected to free pupils from the narrow conservative outlook which many earlier social studies courses had merely served to reinforce.

Yet, while the rhetoric of the movement stressed both rigor and relevance, and while some of its advocates saw it as having considerable radical potential, it was so obsessed with the need to avoid the fate of Hemming's earlier initiative that, in practice, rigor was stressed at the expense of relevance. The thrust of the movement was to establish sociology and a sociology-based social studies as a subject like any other in the school curriculum. While some of those involved would now say that this was a conscious attempt to use the space offered by the academic emphasis in English education for radical purposes, such a perspective was often lost in the probably vain quest to achieve equal status with other academic subjects.

This effort to legitimize sociology meant that the earliest social science courses in English schools were often based on the transmission of the sort of implicitly functionalist sociology which was already beginning to be rejected by radical students in higher education as a form of conservative ideology but which still constituted the basis of respectable academic sociology. More significantly, the methods of social science teaching in schools were generally based on a traditional transmission model of learning, even if the methods employed often involved worksheets rather than chalk-and-talk. Above all, the emphasis on emulating other academic subjects led to the relative neglect of the dimension of relevance and thus detracted from the meaningfulness of social science to pupils. As Denis Gleeson and I have argued at length elsewhere (Gleeson and Whitty 1976), this served to defuse most of the radical potential that the movement may initially have held.

Even when the earlier content was replaced with supposedly more "critical" concepts and perspectives, social studies was often taught with scant regard for its meaningfulness and relevance to pupils and, in particular, to working-class pupils. The undue emphasis on teaching the concepts and structures of the social sciences as a basis for increasing critical awareness produced a social studies which was sometimes even less meaningful to pupils than the existing courses in life adjustment.
Concepts become tools of critical analysis and the basis of action in the real world only if they are recognized as being meaningfully related to the world as it is experienced by pupils. This is not to argue, as some people have implied, that a radical approach to social studies would consist of an uncritical celebration of working-class culture, but rather that social studies has to be meaningful before it can become critical in any strong sense of the term. In the absence of this, social science tends to be perceived by pupils as having little more than certification value and, as such, combines with their "cultural capital" in a way similar to other academic subjects and thus performs a similar role in the process of social reproduction.

It is, however, one of the ironies of the situation that the attempt to establish social science as another high-status academic subject not only militated against its being meaningful to students, and hence a possible basis for social action for change; it also seems to have failed even in the quest to establish the subject firmly in the curriculum. In the current political context, there is growing demand that subjects should be "useful," and the curriculum is once more coming under scrutiny from extraprofessional quarters. To some extent this pressure has been successfully resisted by defenders of the liberal humanist conception of education (Whitty 1978), but what is noticeable is that sociology and social science-based social studies figure hardly at all either in external demands for useful subjects or in the defense by liberal humanists that certain subjects have an inalienable right to a place in the curriculum irrespective of their immediate utility. While part of the explanation may lie in sociology's (largely unwarranted) reputation for being a critical and subversive subject, it seems possible that it is as much a result of the subject's reputation as being largely irrelevant to the real world. Even those approaches which have attempted to meet earlier criticisms of the "new social studies" on this score seem to have done so too late to command much favor.

The Political Education Movement of the 1970s

The third movement that I wish to discuss here is the political education movement, which rose to prominence in the late 1970s after a decade of quiet gestation. In recent years, this lobby has met with
considerable success in the political arena (at the rhetorical level, at least) in demanding that a form of political education relevant to the real world in which pupils live be part of every pupil's curricular experience. It seeks to develop pupils' "political literacy," which it defines as involving "the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to make a person informed about politics, able to participate in public life and groups of all kinds and to recognize and tolerate diversities of political and social values" (Crick and Porter 1978).

If, as I have argued, the "new social studies" was never really critical because it was not meaningful to students, then the political education approach to social and political education might seem better placed to provide meaningful starting points upon which a genuinely critical approach might be built, particularly where based upon real-life issues. Again there clearly is a strand of thinking within the movement which argues that this is the case, seeing a parallel between attempts to develop the political "literacy" of English school pupils and Paulo Freire's work in developing critical consciousness via adult literacy programs in the third world (Porter 1979).

Given the minimal penetration this movement has made within schools to date, it is only possible to speculate about the fate of this radical dimension in the political education movement. However, the portents do not look encouraging, and the movement seems increasingly tied up with those whose major interest in it involves a commitment to preserve rather than improve upon the form of society in which we live.

There is little doubt that the initial stimulus for the emergence of political education into the political agenda lay in official anxieties about the confrontations between political groupings of the extreme right and left on the streets of London in the summer of 1977. In announcing grants for political education work by the National Association of Youth Clubs and the British Youth Council, members of the (then) Labour government explicitly drew attention to the drift toward extremism amongst the young and the need to win them back to the middle ground of British politics. More fundamentally, some observers have argued that the political education movement is part of an attempt to reestablish hegemony in a new phase of corporate capitalism. Explicit political education is seen as necessitated by the collapse of the social demo-
cratic ideology in the face of contradictions in the system exposed by the reemergence of mass unemployment (Jones 1978). Certainly the linking, in the last government's Green Paper on education (Department of Education and Science 1977), of studies of the democratic political system and studies of industry (whose role in the way "the nation earns and maintains its standard of living," we are told elsewhere in the paper, children should learn to "properly esteem") was an early indication of the intimate connection in official thinking between political education and the defense of present economic arrangements.

In a wide range of official pronouncements on economic and social policy, there seems to be an almost Hegelian assumption that Britain's current forms of political and social organization are the ultimate endpoint of human achievement; the role of education is therefore conceived in terms of defending them and extolling their virtues. Thus, a senior Conservative party spokesman on education, Norman St. John Steva, M.P., demanded ("Tories Take Stand" 1978) that teachers of political education undertake to uphold the crown and constitution (the third C, for capitalism, being left implicit!)—a demand which goes completely against recent traditions of autonomy within British education. There is, then, a fair amount of prima facie evidence that the success of the political education movement in mobilizing support from politicians is associated with the latter's belief that it could assist in preserving and bolstering respect for the status quo in periods of economic crisis.

Defenders of the political education movement on the left would, of course, argue that it is unfair to criticize a movement for its bedfellows. Yet it is not only the political supporters of the movement who create doubts about the extent to which, in practice, political education could be the context for a genuinely meaningful and critical education. The lobby's own major publication, Political Education and Political Literacy (Crick and Porter 1978), cannot entirely allay the fears of its radical critics. When the book was published in 1978 it certainly cleared up some of the ambiguities about the movement's stance, but it also exposed many points of contradiction and glossed over other potential ones. While some of the work suggested by Crick and Porter might encourage the development of "critical awareness," other examples might
well produce the sort of quietism or "domestication" which was often the outcome of traditional low-status citizenship courses.

The balance and range of work reported in the volume does not provide a great source of optimism in this respect, and a number of examples seem to treat political education as yet another packaged commodity for pupils to consume—even though "politics is par excellence a field to be mastered by learning by doing, by discovery through active experience," as Nigel Wright (1978) remarked in regard to Her Majesty's Inspectorate's suggestions about political education. Very little work is reported that is based upon active involvement in the politics of the community, and the ideas of the more radical wing of the political literacy movement (who do regard it as an extension of Freire's idea of cultural action for freedom) are not such in evidence. Perhaps even more disturbing is the way in which some of the movement's own spokesmen have described its work to the public and politicians and the tendency of their utterances to shift the focus of the movement sharply toward a concept of political education as the production of uncritical, conforming citizens.

Two examples will serve to illustrate this tendency toward the goal of conformity. First, in publicizing Political Education and Political Literacy in a radio interview (BBC Radio 4, July 16, 1978), Crick was asked whether more political education in schools would lead to demands for pupil power. He responded that, on the contrary, the pupil power movement had been the result of a lack of political education, and he then went on to make the rather revealing point that, while the political education movement felt that schools should give consideration to extreme points of view, they should do so only after "having gone through the ordinary, acceptable beliefs and institutions of society." Even this is perhaps some advance on the academic version of Crick's ethnocentrism, where he seems to suggest that politics ceases when compromise and conciliation cease—or, to quote Berridge's succinct statement of Crick's position: "He offers us the politics of liberal democracies as politics, period" (Berridge 1978). To argue that we should offer pupils evidence of alternatives in ways which try to predetermine their attitudes toward them suggests a form of education only marginally more open than offering no such evidence at all.
Another example comes in an appendix to Political Education and Political Literacy. There it is suggested that the decline in public confidence in British political institutions is "less to be associated with failings within the institutions themselves than with a failure to present . . . the broad principles and practice of parliamentary politics to the public . . . in a systematic and purposeful way." The writer, the chairman of the Politics Association, goes on to tell us that his association seeks to end the long neglect of political education as the best long-term means of ensuring that "the whole works" does not fall apart. The association does not wish to exclude the "consideration of alternative ways of doing things," but it is in no doubt that schools and colleges should "support the principles and practice of parliamentary politics" [emphasis added]. In these circumstances, the commitment to recognize the shortcomings of parliamentary politics and the existence of alternatives seems little more than a formality. Although this position is scarcely surprising, since the Programme for Political Education is sponsored by the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government and this particular paper was addressed to an audience of members of Parliament, it is hardly encouraging to those who believe that political education should involve a genuinely open consideration of alternatives.

Lessons of the Reform Movements

These three movements to reform social/political education in English schools illustrate the ease with which reform movements that command at least a degree of liberal and radical support, and which at a rhetorical level appear to have a contribution to make to the enhancement of social justice, can come (either directly or by default) to contribute to the maintenance of existing and manifestly unjust social arrangements. Incorporation is an ever-present danger for radicals who seek to use the state educational system as a site of intervention for social change. I do not, however, want to argue that schools and the school curriculum are inappropriate or irrelevant sites upon which to struggle for social justice, but rather that radical social studies educators have in the past often based their strategies upon an inadequate analysis of the context in which they have intervened.
Thus, as we have seen, the social studies movement of the late 1940s displayed virtually no sociological understanding of the nature of the English school system. The "new social studies" movement of the 1960s was, on the other hand, extremely conscious of the status hierarchies of English schooling but displayed only limited insight into the ways in which the prevailing social relations of education contributed to social and cultural reproduction. While recognizing the social significance of the existing dualism in the curriculum, the "new social studies" movement shared the widespread assumption that social justice would be well served by making available high-status knowledge to all pupils. What it lacked was the sort of insight offered by Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) about the way in which an academic curriculum can itself be profoundly inequalitarian in its effects. Finally, the more radical elements of the political education movement of the 1970s appear to have underestimated the pressures in a period of economic crisis for social control to be exercised via ideology rather than value (Howard 1974) and the extent to which their own rhetoric could be taken up and utilized to generate hegemonic rather than oppositional discourse. All three examples point, in other words, to the need for a greater sociological sophistication on the part of radical social studies educators.

It may well be said, of course, that such comments are all very well with the benefit of hindsight, and there is certainly a degree of truth in this. While the relative autonomy of the English educational system in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to a misrecognition amongst liberals and radicals of its role in social and cultural reproduction, it is probably also the case that there was more genuine space within which radical educators could work in the schools during those decades than there is today. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the recent attempts to gear education more closely to the perceived needs of capitalism and liberal democracy in crises (of which the "official" interest in political education is but one manifestation) are indicative of the extent to which education has been successfully used for alternative ends. Those radicals who argue this position would therefore presumably want to join in the defense of liberal conceptions of education and, in
the social and political education field, would probably continue to fight for a discipline-based social studies.

Others feel that the recent initiatives to functionalize education for capitalism should be welcomed as removing the mystifications engendered by the liberal ideology of education and exposing more clearly the lines of conflict within education and their relationship to conflicts within the wider society. They further argue that such initiatives generate their own contradictions and that the role of radicals within education is to turn those initiatives to radical ends. Thus, for instance, it might transpire that the movement toward a closer relationship between school and the outside world—a familiar theme in many governmental and industrial demands on the education service—would provide a better basis for developing a genuinely critical perspective on the nature of our society than would the academic social sciences. Indeed, given that those committed to the preservation of the existing social order in some form or other are themselves divided between those who wish to extend the influence of the "industrial trainers" in schools and those who wish to preserve the "old humanist" traditions (Williams 1961), there may in fact be more space than we imagine to develop a meaningful and critical alternative to both. This might, for instance, involve advocating the teaching of "really useful knowledge" similar to the sort of "spearhead knowledge" which 19th-century working-class radicals described as "knowledge concerning our conditions in life . . . (and) how to get out of our present troubles" (Johnson 1979). Thus a greater consideration of the broader contexts of educational practice would not necessarily foster the degree of pessimism about the possibilities for change which Fielding (1980) has rightly suggested emerged from some of the neo-Marxist perspectives on schooling in the mid-1970s.

But this is mere speculation. What I wish to stress is that social studies educators committed to an extension of social justice need to pay more attention to the wider sociological contexts in which they work than they typically have paid in the past. Not only do we need (as other contributors to this conference have emphasized) to define our purposes more clearly, we must also seek to understand more fully the nature of the social and political context into which those purposes are inserted. If, as Denis Gleeson and I have argued (Gleeson and
Whitty 1976), one of the purposes of a radical approach to social studies teaching is to assist students in an active exploration of why the social world resists and frustrates their wishes and how social action might focus upon such constraints, then it is equally important that our own attention be directed toward such issues. Recent work in the sociology of education can perhaps help us here (see Young and Whitty 1977), and papers such as Fielding's (1980) point to the potential fruitfulness of drawing upon some of this work in understanding the realities of social studies classrooms. This is not to suggest that we should get our "theory" right before we act, but that we should constantly interrogate our practice with theory and vice versa. This would therefore involve not the wholesale adoption of any "off-the-peg" theory, Marxist or otherwise, but an active exploration of the complexities and contradictions of school and society and the possibilities and constraints which they generate.

This process would also involve continual reflection upon our experience of earlier modes of action. Thus, for instance, we are now, in the light of the experience of the two social studies movements discussed earlier, more aware of the need for a radical approach to social studies teaching that is both meaningful and critical and which probably involves a social action element (Gleeson and Whitty 1976). It is also clearer that neither the teaching of social science nor the celebration of working-class life per se is an appropriate strategy for the achievement of an education which is itself socially just or which can contribute to the attainment of social justice in society. Finally, the experience of the political education lobby should make us more aware that the outcome of any proposal for curriculum change is highly dependent upon the disposition of political and ideological forces surrounding it and that the pious hopes of individuals are no substitute for collective action.

This last point raises a further aspect of my plea that we should locate our work as social studies educators in a broader context; it reminds us of the essentially limited role which social and political education in school can play in the achievement of social justice. While a conservative approach to social and political education may serve to reinforce the dominant ideology in school and society, a
radical approach to the social studies curriculum will not on its own serve to counter that ideology. Thus a radical approach needs to be much clearer about its relationship to broader struggles for social justice, both in order to develop a more coherent sense of the relevance of educational struggles to the achievement of social change and in order to mobilize support for radical initiatives against the undoubted strength of the conservative forces which oppose them. While this argument runs counter to the traditions of English education by explicitly linking educational and political action, these traditions have anyway been openly breached by recent government initiatives. Though my arguments may appear to some to be unrealistic or inappropriate in the current situation, I would contend that a conscious attempt to understand the contradictions in contemporary education and the development of educational and political strategies to exploit them must be high on the agenda of those of us who are genuinely committed to the extension of social justice in society.

References


The objective of social justice as a problem in political education in West Germany cannot be understood without referring to some historical aspects of the German society. The struggle for social justice could be traced back to the beginning of industrialization; but for our purpose, I think, it is more important to mention the social conditions which supported the growing National Socialist party in the 1920s and the nearly hopeless situation for the majority of the German people after World War II.

The development and growth of the Nazi party was, at least to a certain extent, due to the miserable economic situation after the disaster of World War I. Large groups of the population lost their money in inflation; unemployment and poverty resulted from the economic depression. The state at that time was neither willing nor able to cope with existing problems. Political radicals found a fertile ground for their nationalistic programs. Because of this historical experience there is a widespread awareness of the relationship between economic welfare, social justice, and democratic development in West Germany. During periods of lighter recessions (for example, 1956-1968) right-wing political groupings get some support, whereas in times of prosperity these groups tend to disappear.

For many of our students it is nearly inconceivable what the conditions of living were like at the end of World War II. Our cities and industries were destroyed; there was an extreme shortage of houses and apartments. About 7 million refugees had come to West Germany both from the eastern part of Germany (East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania) and from Czechoslovakia. In addition, there was a migration of about 4 million Germans from the Russian zone to the Western zones. Many people were starving, unemployment was extremely high, families were disrupted—the situation seemed to be hopeless.
Because of these conditions and the fact that capitalism was charged with having been the economic basis of National Socialism, it is understandable that a large part of the population favored a more socialistic way of dealing with the economic and social problems. Even the newly created Christian Democratic party asked for state control of basic industries and natural resources. Some of the constitutions of the West German Bundeslander contain regulations for this type of socialization; for example, the constitution of Hesse (Articles 41, 42), which was adopted by plebiscite on December 1, 1946, by a majority of 72 percent.

The West German constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949 empowered the parliament to take steps to socialize basic industries and natural resources—but the unexpected economic development since 1949 has made it impossible to find a majority which would support this change either among the population or within the political parties.

Nevertheless the question of whether continued economic development or an alternative, more socialistic structure of our society would be more effective in bringing about social justice is still part of our controversies in universities and schools. Less controversial is our highly developed welfare state. If a foreigner who left Germany in 1945 came back today, he or she would hardly be able to compare the situations then and now. On an international level, West Germany belongs to the group of countries with the highest income and general standard of living. Our society deals with social problems no less effectively than other societies—which, of course, does not mean that there is no injustice.

These preliminary remarks may indicate that the specific meaning of problems of social justice in Germany is grounded in (1) the historical experience that injustice may lead to political radicalism, (2) the situation at the end of World War II, which led people to believe that the economic structure ought to be drastically changed, and (3) the successful development of our economy and the welfare state since 1949. These issues, with changing emphasis, have been part of social studies teaching during the last 30 years.
The Constitutional Basis of Social Justice

In social studies textbooks, this statement from Article 20 of the West German constitution is often quoted: "The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state." This statement indicates that there is a constitutional obligation to bring about social justice. Previous German constitutions did not have anything similar, and this constitutional principle is understandable only in the light of the above-mentioned historical experiences since the end of World War I.

Experts on constitutional law agree on the major aspects of the social-state principle: it is not only the expression of a general—program, it is a norm binding the lawmaker. It requires an active—not merely reactive—approach to social politics; it obliges the state to improve the infrastructural conditions of the society and, in general, to do more public planning in the areas of economic and social development; and it has as its basis the conviction "that the present day situation of the society should not be taken as something given and unchangeable, but that the state is obliged to change the society and to improve its respective situation" (Maunz et al. n.d.). Even the relatively conservative position taken by these authors concedes an obligation of the state to change the society for the sake of social justice. Others will go farther, but, in general, it may be said that teachers of social studies in West Germany have good reason to discuss with their students possible changes necessary for the further development of social justice.

In order to demonstrate how the problems of social justice have been treated in schools since 1950, it would be possible to refer to curricular regulations. But I prefer to give some excerpts from social studies textbooks, because curriculum mandates in Germany traditionally have not had as much importance as one might expect. At least until 1970, curriculum guidelines for political education did not greatly influence actual teaching.

The Treatment of Social Justice in Textbooks Since 1950

In West Germany—presumably, as in all other countries—issues of social studies are to a large extent a reflection of the general political situation. Certainly, some progressive authors of textbooks have identified problems and offered tentative solutions before these prob—
lems reached the level of public interest. But these are exceptions; generally, political education responds to political developments rather than vice versa.

From this viewpoint one should not expect in textbooks an elaborate analysis of the problems of social justice in the early years of the Federal Republic, because people were so involved in reconstructing the cities and industries that the many social problems were viewed under the prospect of being solved one by one. The "economic miracle" and the newly acquired democracy tended to divert people's attention from social problems, because the future looked so promising.

The following descriptions of three textbooks published during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, respectively, illustrate changes in social studies textbooks over the last three decades.

Example 1: Robert Wefelmeyer, Staatsburgerlicher Unterricht und politische Erziehung [Citizenship education and political instruction] (1952). This book contains various chapters on social problems. "Economic and Social Programs of the Political Parties" (p. 94) contains quotations from the postwar programs of the Social Democratic party, the Free Democratic party, the Christian Democratic party, the German party, the Communist party of Germany, and the German Law party. These programs range from a free market economy to complete state control; from the socialization of basic industries to a free-enterprise system in which profits are shared with employees. It is interesting to note that these different programs are described without any comment or evaluation. Apparently pupils were expected to form their own judgments on these matters.

Concerning "the right of many to private property" (p. 101), it is stated that, according to the constitution (Article 14), every citizen has the right to own private property. In "The Social Obligation of Property" (p. 103), the use of private property is seen to be limited. Private property is linked to public welfare: "The democratic state refutes the capitalistic-individualistic concept of property and fully agrees with the Christian position that property essentially means an obligation to mutual help in subordination to the goals of society" (p. 103). In "Common Property and Socialization of the Economy" (p. 104), the author presented different positions on the problem in question and
then seemed to favor socialization: "World War II and its consequences impoverished large segments of the people. They lost their property by being expelled, by confiscation and inflation. The demand for an equal share of the burdens and for socializing basic industries became more important the more it was proved what role industry and big business had played during the war" (p. 105). The chapter finally quotes the articles on socialization (Articles 14 and 15) from the West German constitution and refers to the constitutions of several Länder with their respective regulations.

From our present-day viewpoint, it is interesting to see how a textbook author in the early 1950s looked at the problems of social justice. He was more concerned with general basic problems than with factual information on what was really going on in Germany at the time. Perhaps the immediate problems were so obvious that he expected students to know about them anyway.

Example 2: Gunther Frede and Karl Kollnig, Freiheit und Verantwortung [Peace and responsibility] (1960). Political education between 1950 and 1960 changed from a primarily descriptive approach to a more-problem-oriented way of dealing with social issues. A good example of this change is the textbook of Frede and Kollnig. Their awareness of the actual social problems in our society is evident from many chapters of their book. The more important issues which they mentioned include the treatment of human rights in the West German constitution and the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. They stressed the aspects of "economic equality" and "social security" in the U.N. Declaration: "These social rights were declared because human dignity and personal freedom can only be secured if the individual is free of care for his daily bread and free of fear and need" (p. 13). One page later the authors cited human rights as the basis for individual development, independent of social class, wealth, and home.

The postwar German family is described and critically viewed in the context of its various functions for the society. Information on the legal status of the family is combined with appeals to the reader to consider the family as the basic and necessary unit of the society. However, a large number of social problems are also discussed: equality of men and women, structural changes in the family, social support,
working mothers, divorce, and population development—this last, a rather recent problem: "The German people is going to be a dying nation. Low birth rates and an ever-growing increase of people over 65 will lead to . . . unbearable burdens for the coming generation" (p. 72). These issues are presented more vividly in the Frede/Kollnig text than in Wefelmeyer's textbook. Problems are stated and explained by various contributing authors and by a number of statistics. There are no reports on how people in our society experience social problems, no case studies, nor any descriptions of real situations, although the subject matter would have favored this type of content. The primarily informative style is maintained throughout the book.

The social stratification of the society is also discussed: "We live in a time of a societal crisis and—as we think—of transition" (p. 74). With this statement the authors attempted to convey the notion of necessary and rapid changes in postwar German society. They predicted that the traditional strata of society—middle class, rural class, workers, and retired people—would undergo changes because of economic and industrial development. One of their chief concerns was the participation of workers in economic decisions, the strengthening of the partnership between owners and workers in order to avoid social struggles. In this text, society is considered not so much a field of social conflicts as one of compromise and peace.

The refugee is one important topic. The more than 11 million refugees in West Germany still constituted a great problem in 1960. It was the intention of the government to integrate these people as fast as possible, even though the hope that they would return to their homes was supported by official statements. The presence of this huge number of refugees in an already devastated land caused so many additional problems that it is really surprising how fast the integration proceeded. Students at that time were confronted daily not only with the often miserable conditions of the refugees but also with the fact that many of the refugees succeeded in their professions and even surpassed the original West German population. Frede and Kollnig informed students about the specific situation of refugees; for example, the difficulty of finding jobs in the rural areas where they had been brought. They pointed to the many social factors supporting integration, especially of young
children, and they foresaw that a new generation would grow up without hope of returning to their homes.

The chapter on work and profession informs us about the many possible professions open to young people. In 1960 there was a demand for workers in almost every field. Unemployment was unknown. The textbook, therefore, offers an optimistic outlook on the social opportunities for workers and professionals; for example, teachers. Other problems dealt with are the position of the unions in our society, equal payment for men and women, the 40-hour work week, and the growing bureaucracy.

Large parts of the chapter on the economy describe how the economy works. Problems are mentioned concerning a free economy versus a planned economy, the concentration of economic power, and the availability of consumer goods to the citizens. At the end of the chapter, portions of the programs of the Christian Democratic party and the Social Democratic party are described which illustrate that in 1960 there were still important differences between the parties concerning socialization of basic industries.

Some Aspects of Social Studies in the 1960s and 1970s

A look at other developments during the 1960s shows that important changes concerning social studies have taken place within the last 20 years. There was an immanent development of concepts of political education in West Germany. Scholars and teachers shifted away from the more descriptive type of political teaching to social conflicts, to the question of living and the good life, and to analysis of social phenomena. The didactic of political education became more and more a science of its own.

Under Nazi rule the social sciences had been neglected and many scientists had left Germany. After the war some of them came back, but it took about 20 years until the social sciences became broadly influential. The Frankfurt school (Horkheimer/Adorno) became especially influential. The "critical" approach of the social sciences led to a widespread critique of the "economic miracle" of West Germany because so many deficiencies were made known in various areas of the society (schooling, minority groups, distribution of wealth, economic power, Nazi history of Germany, prejudices, etc.). This critical method was also applied in
several empirical studies concerning the effects of social studies teaching on pupils. The results were not very promising. Political education turned out to be rather ineffective.

About 1966, curriculum development programs were made known in West Germany. Compared to developments in other Western (and Eastern) European countries, the discussion on revised curricula began rather late. After the war curricula had been worked out, but they were not nearly so specific as those after 1966. For the first time in German history, around 1970, curricula became a matter of public discussion. Newspapers and radio broadcasts took up the matter. In some Landes governments it was deemed almost fatal to support certain types of curricular revisions. Even at this writing, in Hesse, the revised curriculum in political education is being retained in order to avoid public discussion on these matters before the federal election. Although the curriculum development programs were difficult for teachers to understand, on the whole it can be said that some elements of curricular thinking are visible in every classroom.

Finally, it must be mentioned that state control over our schools has been strengthened during the last ten years. The German constitution provides state control over the school system (Article 7 GG). The Bundeslander hire the teachers; they provide all of the money; they are in control of the curricula and textbooks. Educational problems, of course, are not handled solely by politicians, but politicians have the last word on them. One specific issue is the "radicals in public service" policy. The position of the government is that people who deny basic principles of the constitution should not be employed in public institutions. This position has been supported by decisions of the West German supreme court. In this respect, West Germany is less liberal than France or England. In my opinion, the discussion on radicals has had the deplorable result that many teachers (and even students) are afraid to say what they think politically. Too quickly the accusation of being anticonstitutional is brought up.

This atmosphere directly affects textbooks. I am coauthor of a textbook (George and Hilligen 1971) which immediately provoked public discussion when it was published ten years ago. By some the book was labeled "communist" and by others "destructive of our society," but by
many scholars and some Bundeslander it was considered progressive and educationally sound. Today, I think, it would be impossible politically for such a textbook to be admitted into our schools.

Example 3: Wolfgang Hilligen et al., Sehen—beurteilen—handeln [See, judge, act] (1978). My third example is selected from among the textbooks which are now in use in the schools of some Bundeslander. The textbook of Hilligen, Gagel, and Buch shows a broad awareness of social problems. In many aspects, developments in political education—as mentioned above—have been worked into it. Because of the wide scope of the social problems covered in this book, I will summarize the main ideas.

The book states that for the first time in German history the concept of social state has become a constitutional principle. But this concept is not explicated in the constitution; thus, it is a continuing task of politicians to bring about social justice. In a democratic state many individuals and groups, if not all, should participate in this task. One measure of social justice is the realization of human rights. These rights not only protect the citizens against the state but also guarantee public benefits to the individual. Thus the original "social question" of the 19th century has been solved in the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, industrial societies create new social problems concerning equality of opportunity within the society. It is the task of social politics to understand and to solve these problems.

More specifically, the following problem areas are dealt with in various chapters: health, the dangers of getting sick, and the results of sickness on the individual; education and opportunities for professional training; work, the situation in the labor market, unemployment, and contentment in the professions; free time and vacation; environment, housing, and pollution; safety, the judicial process, and crime; public status, social inequality, and participation in public affairs; social problems of basic institutions—for example, the family and the economy; poverty in West Germany; social problems of underdeveloped countries; and dangers of war. It is nearly impossible to describe all of the aspects of social justice which are contained in this book. The authors utilize a problem-oriented approach to cover the areas of experience of young people and general world problems. The more fundamental questions
addressed in the other two textbooks concerning the socialization of basic industries are not discussed by Hilligen and his colleagues. Their textbook simply quotes the constitutional regulations without explicating them. Apparently the issue has lost its significance for the authors.

The authors use a highly diversified approach, with case studies, statistics, interviews, charts, and comics. The values inherent in this approach are expressly stated. The textbook suggests "options" for the realization of human rights, for the dignity of man as the basis of all political decisions, for the equality of opportunity in our society, for more self-determination and participation, and for the development of alternative social institutions to cope with the changing world. Thus; the approach is not neutral; it not only envisions a rational discussion of the stated issues but encourages students to develop their attitudes and behavior along these lines of political values.

The Training of Social Studies Teachers

The changes in social studies teaching in West German schools were widely initiated by scholars who previously had been teaching in primary, secondary, and/or professional schools. Their teaching experience turned out to be a good starting point for the development of teacher-training programs. One of the principal goals of these programs is the close connection between theoretical and practical education.

However, there still are differences between the various teacher training programs. Student teachers for the grammar school and the secondary I level (grades 5-10) get a "didactic" education in addition to their "social science" education. This consists of special courses in political education and practical studies in addition to an examination. Student teachers for the secondary II level (grades 11-13) and for professional schools so far have not been obliged to take part in a didactic education; some of them did it voluntarily, and right now efforts are being made to offer the same didactic education to all students.

The effectiveness of our training programs is highly controversial. Students prefer courses with practical impact, whereas many professors complain about the diminishing interest of the students in theoretical controversies. Most of our student teachers have only six semesters for
their preparation, which generally is regarded as being too short; there is not enough time for either the theoretical or the practical education.

German professors have a highly privileged position. The West German constitution guarantees "freedom of research and teaching" (Article 5, 3) which excludes administrative control. Within the university curriculum each professor is free to choose the subject matter for his or her courses. It is practically impossible to exert "force" on a professor. However, most professors realize that they have an obligation, over and above their scientific studies, to deal with the professional and personal problems of their students.

Our students are no longer rebellious; there are few demonstrations. But the students are quite aware of social and political problems. They prefer scholars and teachers who not only teach the social sciences but also express their own involvement in controversial issues. When problems of social justice are at stake, it is difficult for the professor to hide behind the "objectivity" of the social sciences. Many student teachers are now faced with possible unemployment, and they will not be prepared to analyze social issues without looking at their own condition.

The rapid postwar industrial development of West Germany has led people to overlook a number of social problems which are of great concern to our present-day students. I want to mention only two. First, there are still several million people who are considered "poor" because their income ranks below the public support rates for the needy. Politicians speak about the "new social question" in our society. Second, West Germany has about 4 million foreign workers (including their families). The children of these foreigners quite often do not get an appropriate education or professional training, a fact which is likely to create serious conflicts in the near future. Although our universities offer courses and programs to cope with these problems, the reality of our schools is often disillusioning for many students who are confronted with classes consisting half of Germans and half of foreign pupils who do not speak German.
The Social System Valued by Young People

The best textbooks are useless if they are not successful in transmitting their ideas and ideals to the students. It might, therefore, be of interest to look at the results of an empirical study of the attitudes of the young generation toward work and economic order conducted by the Institut für Jugendforschung in Munich (Frankfurter Rundschau 1980). In West Germany and West Berlin, 1,235 representative young people aged 17-29 years were interviewed in 1979; 785 were random interviews and 450 were quota interviews. This study was financed by the German Shell Oil Company, which in 1973 had supported a comparable study by the same institute.

The 1979 study found that 80 percent of the young people interviewed were content with our system, as compared to 70 percent in 1973 (Die Einstellung 1980). The following question was posed concerning basic needs: "On this list you find described different needs. Which ones are especially important to your personal lives?" The results, shown in Table 1, reveal that desire for personal freedom took precedence over all other needs; neither a desirable profession nor an abundance of free time was more strongly desired. There was a trend toward desire for privacy, whereas social concerns were ranked lower in 1979 than in 1973 (Die Einstellung 1980).

Table 1

BASIC NEEDS OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN WEST GERMANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Need</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal freedom</td>
<td>85 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A profession which I like</td>
<td>80 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free choice of a job</td>
<td>67 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good pay</td>
<td>67 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much free time</td>
<td>64 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean air, clean water</td>
<td>63 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to go to theaters, concerts, lectures</td>
<td>.37 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No social misery in my neighborhood</td>
<td>24 29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The political attitudes of these young people were demonstrated by their fear of freely expressing their opinions on political matters. Nearly 50 percent of them expected to be penalized for freely expressing their opinions. Between 1973 and 1979 the number of young people who were critical of our system rapidly declined. Detlef Riemer, who was in charge of the research for the study, predicted: "About half of the young generation is going to be submissive to authority."

The responses of the young people surveyed in 1979 to questions about life perspectives are shown in Table 2. Although the statements do not include many aspects of social justice, a general trend toward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective Statement</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would like to have children and a happy family life.</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It means much to me to be acknowledged by others.</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For me it is essential to a meaningful life that I have privacy.</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to develop my creative abilities.</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To me hard work and success are part of life.</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think we are going to poison ourselves by environmental pollution.</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to have a career.</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To me fashions in clothing and automobiles are not very important.</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am afraid that technical progress will destroy our lives.</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am afraid of nukes.</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to help people in need.</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to retire to the country.</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All men should have the same income.</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whoever still has children today acts irresponsibly.</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find that my life is meaningless.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel attracted to a youth religious sect.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
privacy and professional success is evident. Family life, social acknowledgment, and personal creativeness are valued higher than environmental problems, fear of nuclear power plants, or social equality. The question about the meaningfulness of life was answered in rather individualistic terms.

For teachers of social studies, these empirical results are not very promising. They support the position that the schools are becoming more reactive toward development and changes in society rather than active in initiating changes. It is not primarily the fault of our schools that students are afraid of expressing their opinions and—as a possible result—increasingly desirous of privacy.

I do not know how these numbers compare with the results of opinion polls in other countries. The trend toward conservatism in West Germany is welcomed by one group and detested by another. There have been many attempts to bring about reforms in various areas of our society. One of these areas was our school system. Since these reforms have not always shown swift results, the reformers have become discouraged. Right now the question of preserving our standard of living seems more important than further reforms.

References

Die Einstellung der jungen Generation zur Arbeitswelt und Wirtschaftsordnung [Attitudes of the younger generation toward the world of work and the domestic economy] (1980). Hamburg: Institut für Jugendforschung [Institute for Youth Research] and Youth Bureau of German Shell, Inc.


These comments are based primarily on materials written by social educators over the past three decades. How accurately or to what degree they also reflect educational practice in the common schools of the United States is problematic. We have only recently recognized how little we know about classroom practice and the behavior of students and teachers in social studies classrooms. I have some notions about classroom practices based on observation, personal experience, and reports of field studies. Those notions will occasionally influence these comments. In the main, however, we are dealing here with theoretical writings, textbooks, and materials written for inservice or preservice teachers, and curricular materials used by elementary and secondary students. Presumably these can tell us a good deal about what social studies educators think ought to be done in schools, but that may have little relationship to what occurs once the classroom door is closed. We simply don't know.

It is important to note that the varieties of social education utilized in the United States fall within the conservative or liberal, as distinct from the radical, frame of reference. Although some viewpoints were spoken of as "radical" when first proposed, the term was being used not in the ideological or political sense but rather to indicate a sharp departure from current practice. In particular, the Marxist perspective has been almost totally lacking in the social studies, and to date no influential work written from that perspective has appeared in the United States. Much attention has been given by some to reconstructing, correcting, or improving society, but always in terms of traditional values and ideals, not of some new social order yet to be conceived or borrowed. Those few who said they would let the social perspectives of students wander wherever chance might lead them were convinced they knew in advance where that would be.
Socialization and Social Improvement

Although I intend to examine the relationship between society and the social studies from the close of World War II to the present and reflect on what we might conclude from that experience, I want to begin with John Dewey's thoughts on the subject. This is not to suggest that many social studies specialists during the past three decades were heavily influenced by Dewey, for I have no evidence to support that claim, but rather to point out that the most influential philosopher of American education believed it was impossible to separate the educational process from the society that sustained it.

For Dewey, learning is primarily social, and education is at its heart the forming of the character of the child rather than the acquisition of knowledge by the child. It is a process of transforming the child until he shares in the ideals and interests of the society. The good society, in turn, is dependent on "how numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared, how full and free is the interplay with other forms of association" (Dewey 1916, p. 96). This means a society in which economic class and other barriers to communication among citizens are absent, so all can share common interests and life goals. This is possible, says Dewey, only when each adult generation deliberately works to educate the young "not for the existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a better future humanity" (Dewey 1916, pp. 10-11). Because communities or nations do not tend to adhere to this approach, Dewey asked whether "it is possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state and the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?" (Dewey 1916, pp. 113-14).

If the type of educational situation Dewey desires is to be realized, two conditions are essential: "the tendencies due to present economic conditions which split society into classes" must be overcome, and "national loyalty . . . patriotism" must be subordinated to "devotion to the things which unite men in common ends irrespective of national political boundaries" (Dewey 1916, p. 114).

I believe that Dewey described in these comments, published in the second decade of this century, the essential struggle which went on within social education at midcentury in the United States and which is
not yet close to resolution. As Dewey saw, whenever we think about society—raise questions about it, approach it critically, openly—some aspect of the established social order is in jeopardy. This fact has profoundly affected social education in recent decades. Many social educators have believed that their responsibility is to pass on the prevailing cultural myths, to support the status quo, to avoid controversy and conflict. Textbook writers and publishers, members of state textbook selection committees, and those teachers who accepted Edgar Wesley’s assertion that "the social studies are the social sciences simplified for pedagogical purposes" have often reflected those perspectives. Schooling has as one of its primary objectives the preservation of the institutions of the existing society rather than the questioning of current practices. It is quite likely that this view of schooling dominated classroom practice during the period under consideration here. Some, including a significant number of social studies specialists who wrote theoretical material during the period, disagreed; they believed that the contemporary condition of society dictated a program of social education designed to reshape either the society or the student or both. For this second group, the relationship between the society and social education was extremely close, and one could not be discussed without also discussing the other.

To state the matter another way, the proper role of formal schooling and direct teaching of social studies in the socialization of children has been a subject of continuing debate. Socialization is usually defined as the process of transmitting from the old to the young stable patterns of behavior and values and of grooming the young for filling established adult roles in the society. In the social studies, in particular, the school acts to promote and teach political values and traditions. This activity has as its primary purpose the perpetuation of the dominant values of the culture. But some, along with Dewey, have questioned whether this view of schooling is any longer appropriate. These individuals contend that to emphasize unity, equality, and freedom, for example, is to present a distorted, oversimplified, and false view of American society. The ethnic and cultural differences that now exist cannot be homogenized into a picture of unity. Given this view, it is not at all clear that schools can continue to deal with political social-
ization as they have in the past. The new conditions make the old ways both unworkable and inappropriate. To the extent that social education programs have attempted to continue traditional content and methods, the contrast between the substance of these programs and the social reality surrounding the student has contributed to an educational malaise in some cases and to outright hostility to formal education in others.

In large measure, proposals for changing social education over the last three decades have been designed either to socialize the young more effectively, assuming that the task of the schools is to induct the young into the society as adults construe it, or to propose an alternative approach to social education based on a recognition that social consensus does not exist and that passing on the cultural myths will be disruptive and miseducative rather than constructive in the long run. A primary objective of these approaches has been to change or improve on the status quo rather than simply to pass it along.

These conflicting views of the relationship between socialization and schooling are reflected in the distinctions arrived at by Barr, Barth, and Shermis in their analysis of citizenship education programs (1978). They identified three approaches to citizenship education: citizenship transmission, teaching the social science disciplines, and reflective inquiry or decision making. Citizenship transmission appears to be another name for socialization. A particular conception of citizenship is presented to students and is expected to be both learned and believed. It is assumed that certain facts, explanations, interpretations, and predictions predispose the learner to a particular world view; no critique of the social institutions being transmitted is planned for or anticipated, and "what is" tends to be construed as "what ought to be."

The social science discipline approach assumes that the acquisition of the knowledge contained in the social sciences leads to effective citizenship. It also usually assumes that the body of literature making up the social sciences is an accurate reflection of reality. The reflective-inquiry and decision-making approaches may utilize social science materials, but they assume students will build a world view through analyzing and criticizing their own experiences or the experiences of others, whether past or present.
The third perspective, because it has been emphasized in the literature of the last three decades (if not in the classroom), requires more extended presentation. It appears to be the area in social education where the most creative efforts have been made in recent years and where changing notions of the nature of society have had a direct impact on approaches to social education.

Reflective Inquiry—The Individual Emphasis

Perhaps James Baldwin, a writer who would not usually be thought of as a social educator but who may have been a more effective one than any of us, expressed in 1962 a concern of some social educators during the period: "We live in a country," he wrote, "in which words are mostly used to cover the sleeper, not to wake him up." We must strive to put ourselves in touch with reality, he urged, to "mount an unending attack on all that Americans believe themselves to hold sacred. . . . We are the generation that must throw everything into the endeavor to remake America into what we say we want it to be" (Baldwin, 1962).

Many teachers and social studies specialists, starting from similar premises, have tried to devise instructional programs to meet Baldwin's objectives. Others have begun with notions about teaching youngsters to think, to develop a critical capacity, or some other related general objective. In each case one finds a rejection of the assumption that students need merely to receive and absorb what is passed on to them about the society.

Teaching High School Social Studies', by Maurice Hunt and Lawrence Metcalf (1955), presented a fully developed version of this approach to social education. Hunt and Metcalf began with the assumption that society is beset by much uncertainty, disorganization, and lack of consensus. Many individuals are confused by competing political, economic, and social beliefs. These produce two levels of social conflict—interpersonal and intrapersonal—which combine to create substantial individual and group difficulties. Individuals, in fact, tend to exhibit inconsistent and uncertain behavior and are morally irresponsible because they lack the intellectual understanding and personal commitment required for morally responsible behavior. For Hunt and Metcalf, then, the conditions of contemporary society and its impact on individuals directly
determine the type of social education needed. The teacher is to be a significant factor in assisting the individual to understand and cope with contemporary life.

Hunt and Metcalf determined that areas of conflicting belief and behavior which are closed to rational analysis--areas such as race, social class, sex, religion, morality, and political power--are particularly crucial in the lives of individuals and are sources of great difficulty and trouble. Therefore, it is precisely these areas dominated by prejudice and taboos, rather than thought, which are particularly significant for teachers. A social studies program that helps young people examine their conflicts and beliefs in "closed areas" would be most likely to reduce the emotional stress in the individual created by the confusion that prevails in society. This process of examining beliefs should be intellectually rigorous, permissive, and nonthreatening. It necessarily involves learning a good deal of social science, but it certainly does not involve indoctrination or socialization of the students into the dominant mores and assumptions of the culture. Indeed, schooling entails challenging and critiquing any widely accepted conception of citizenship and the interpretations, assumptions, or myths on which it is built.

This approach to social education assumes that schooling can influence the individual in fundamental ways and thus can affect society as well. American society is in turmoil, transition, and perhaps even crisis. Because society is in turmoil, so are many citizens. Social studies teachers can help determine the long-term resolution of these difficulties by helping individuals understand and come to terms with themselves and the society. Thus, not only is there a direct relationship between the nature of contemporary society and social education, but schooling has the potential to affect and, to some significant extent, shape the future society.

Reflective Inquiry--The Social Emphasis

A more common approach to social education in this period emphasized the examination of public, as distinct from personal, issues. Courses falling within the general classification of "social problems" came to be regular fare in almost every secondary school. Countless attempts
were made in the literature to define the term "social problem," and many textbooks helped the unimaginative teacher select a set of social problems sufficient to fill a semester or year. Many teachers put together their own courses, utilizing the enormous variety of paperback books and other instructional materials that presented one or more social problems.

Donald Oliver, then a young faculty member at Harvard, wrote in 1957 that the goal of social studies instruction is to "increase the student's ability to deal effectively with broad social issues which confront all citizens of our society" (Oliver 1957, pp. 271-300). All social institutions have the same fundamental purpose: individual fulfillment. In order for that purpose to be realized, people must understand these institutions and be able to cope with them successfully. The specific purpose of social studies is to attempt to so educate children that they have the maximum opportunity to choose what they should be in a society dominated by diversity rather than uniformity.

Oliver, as did Hunt and Metcalf, began his theory building with an analysis of the society and assumed that it is important to base any program of social education on such an analysis. The relationship between the schools and society must be direct; presumably, if the society were to undergo significant change, schooling should change as well. Oliver and his colleagues eventually wrote a series of booklets, each of which developed a "public issue" (Public Issues Series n.d.). Stress was placed on classroom discussion, on training students in good discussion techniques, and on enabling the individual student to "take a stand" on an issue and defend that stand against opposing positions. The classroom procedures assumed a high degree of rationality and critical skills on the part of the participants. Although the material used to develop the issues might be contemporary or historical and from any part of the world, the focus was always on an issue assumed to be of fundamental importance in contemporary America; for example, can we have both equality and individual freedom, or both public security and a clear right of dissent?

One frequently found in this period the assumption that citizenship education necessarily involved developing in the young a set of critical abilities needed to participate in inquiry, reflective thinking, decision
making, or some such intellectual activity. A good citizen makes decisions based on a careful analysis of the evidence, not on emotion, prejudice, or some other "thoughtless" procedure. While one could fill a volume with the different lists of these abilities, they typically included such skills as identifying central issues, using language accurately and precisely, recognizing underlying assumptions, distinguishing between fact and opinion, distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant data, recognizing stereotypes, assessing the adequacy of data, arguing deductively, and using logical syllogisms correctly. There is little evidence, of course, that many adult citizens make use of these skills or that teachers are capable of demonstrating their use. Indeed, it may be that a citizenry skilled in such devices and motivated to use them would produce social chaos. There seems little likelihood that this hypothesis will be tested in the foreseeable future.

The Mainstream—Disciplines and Social Problems

While the last few pages have presented only a few examples from the social education literature of recent decades, I believe they demonstrate that a segment of the field did respond directly to analyses of the contemporary society. It is difficult to quantify such information, but I am confident that this group constituted a small minority of social educators. For most of the others, the teaching of the disciplines, however arranged, remained the sum and substance of social education. Such programs changed, of course, according to the shifting consensus of scholars to the extent that their scholarship filtered down to curricular materials used in the schools. Depressions, wars, social disorder, international tension, peace, or prosperity do not alter the storehouse of knowledge accumulated by a given discipline. There is one significant caveat, however, to that generalization. Over time social reality does affect the questions being asked by scholars and, eventually, the substance of the knowledge accumulated. As a consequence, the content included in courses such as history, political science, and economics gradually changes, while the topics taken up in social problems courses may shift rather quickly.

As an illustration of this point, a major social change during the period under review was the recognition of the plight of certain racial
and ethnic minorities. A succession of judicial and legislative actions, coupled with greatly increased activity on the part of minorities in demanding economic, political, and social equality, turned the attention of scholars to research problems related to these matters. In the field of history, for example, a vast literature was produced on Negro slavery and its consequences. Impact studies and public policy research became the vogue in political science. In a similar fashion, curriculum projects, textbooks, and course offerings in the schools showed new emphases in the same areas. Numerous national curriculum projects supported by the federal government were designed for the express purpose of providing classroom materials focusing on major social problems of the day, including those associated with minority populations and their legal rights and the achievement of justice and equality for all citizens. It is difficult to imagine that any secondary school during the 1960s and 1970s failed to offer instructional units dealing with race, minorities, civil rights, and related subjects. Textbook publishers went to great efforts to assure the prospective buyer that these societal concerns were given adequate attention in their textbooks. While the response might be delayed, publishers, teachers, and others involved in the social education enterprise are influenced by major societal concerns, and they attempt to fit appropriate new content into existing courses.

Changes in Values Education

An interesting example of this phenomenon occurred in the area of values education. Schooling in the Western world has traditionally focused on the character development of the child rather than on imparting knowledge. The teacher and the culture of the school have typically represented the dominant values of those in control of the society. Although this appears to be inevitable, in this century educators in the United States have often attempted to be objective or neutral. The more obvious forms of indoctrination have been scorned in favor of "objective social science."

In the 1950s questions addressed to teachers about values education would have generated little response, but by the early 1970s attention to values and valuing was a certain indicator that a teacher was up to date with the latest social education fashion. Why this very rapid
change in a decade? A plausible explanation, it seems to me, takes us to what was occurring in American society. The 1960s was a decade of intense social conflict, race riots, the controversy over the Vietnam War, the draft debate, and the like. The conflicting values residing in the populace which had been identified much earlier by the research of Lynd, Myrdal, Warner, and many other social scientists suddenly thrust themselves onto center stage. The relatively submerged differences of value and belief signaled by where one lives, with whom one associates, or where one worships suddenly were translated into vivid scenes on television screens of swinging clubs, bloodshed, shouted epithets, and assassinations. The myth of value consensus evaporated quickly.

Many people were unsure of what they believed, and they were troubled by the values conflicts they now knew they had with their neighbors. So what was to be done? The faith of Americans that education can solve social problems came to the fore, and it was deemed acceptable for teachers to assist students in recognizing their values and beliefs and comparing them with those of their classmates. Some teachers, of course, interpreted this as an opportunity to indoctrinate their own values, while others dealt with values as another item in the curriculum along with facts, generalizations, and theories. Whatever the approach, I believe that the introduction of social studies content for the express purpose of dealing with values was a direct result of the surfacing of value conflicts among the general populace.

In a number of ways, an examination of the American value system was thrust into formal as well as informal social education during this period. I have referred to some of these—the values education movement, the popularity of social problems courses, the development of social studies programs and the related curricular materials exemplified by Hunt and Metcalf and the Harvard Public Issues Series, and the wide attention given to civil rights and the treatment of minorities. These developments coincided with thousands of hours of television and countless pages of printed material in the informal social education system which dealt with the same general content. The direct experiences of some young people in the streets or on the battlefield and the vicarious experiences of almost everyone through television undoubtedly provided a more powerful social education than was found in the classroom. In any
case, the social educator was forced to reckon with the social education children brought with them into the classroom. It was a curriculum "planned" by television executives, organizers of civil confrontations with authority, and the Pentagon. None of us yet knows how to cope with what students now bring with them in the way of direct and vicarious social experience. That would appear to be a primary research and development task for social educators in the 1980s.

The Growing Distrust of Rational Problem-Solving

The people of the United States have experienced a barrage of confidence-shaking events in the last two decades, and there is no sign it has ended. Indeed, Robert Heilbroner summarized the mood very well in 1975 when he asked, "Is there hope for man?" (Heilbroner 1975, p. 13). Our faith in our ability to deal with such problems as poverty, racial hatred, and economic instability is slipping away. The quality of life is deteriorating, in part as a direct consequence of our successes and some of our traditional values and beliefs. Human survival has become a real issue, replacing concern about where we will go for our next vacation or the horsepower rating of our automobiles.

Historically, we have relied on the capacity of formal education to make life better and more bearable. If that traditional faith continues (and there are signs it is weakening), to the extent that students and teachers are apprehensive and confused about the state of the nation, one would expect "presentism" to dominate social education—a concern for the self and for the immediate problems facing society. It is interesting, however, that a countervailing trend is evident.

Private schools, many of them sponsored by religious groups, are increasing rapidly, and their social studies curricula rarely include contemporary social problems. The existing public schools are under heavy pressure to reject social-problems materials and the analysis of values in favor of "basics," which translates into history and political science studied as organized bodies of knowledge. The content suggested by Oliver, Hunt and Metcalf, and the values-education and critical-thinking movements of the recent past are viewed with great skepticism in many quarters.
The fundamental elements of the scientific method which have so dominated Western thought since Copernicus—curiosity, belief in testing, searching out error in order to approximate truth more closely, formulation of hypotheses and theories—these remain suspect when applied to society and culture. To be sure, we have a variety of social sciences that may be pursued by scholars in accordance with the methods of science, but the public is apprehensive about teachers and students in the common schools examining society and culture in this fashion. Robert Hanvey, a social scientist who worked in curriculum projects in the 1960s, asked, "Will the schools, as instruments of the society, actually be permitted to diffuse a knowledge so recognizably threatening to traditional assumptions, explanations and values?" (Hanvey 1967, p. 81). Socialization or indoctrination is acceptable; testing, searching, hypothesizing are unacceptable.

It is fundamentally inappropriate, many contend, to attempt to employ essentially scientific methods in social education because the political community is so different in its procedures and assumptions from the scientific community. While scholars working in the social sciences have obviously modeled their research procedures after the natural sciences, even within that scholarly community the uncritical transfer of methods that have been fruitful in one field into another continues to be questioned?

One response, then, to the condition of society at this moment appears to be for social studies to ignore it or even flee from it. Perhaps the prospect is so threatening that dealing with it reflectively, directly, in a problem-solving mode, is simply not possible. This is understandable. The individual feels so helpless when confronted with the enormity of the contemporary situation that the faith of the 1950s and early 1960s in the notion that teachers and children sitting down together could deal rationally with social issues and even develop solutions for them appears ludicrous to many. Our most brilliant economists cannot resolve the problem of price and wage inflation—apparently one of the most limited, definable difficulties facing us. How could teachers and children possibly deal in a meaningful way with a really tough issue, such as human survival?
As a result, educators and the public are turning increasingly to curricula focused on organized bodies of knowledge or to religion. Each of these in its own way prepares the student for coping with contemporary society. Each has a long history and can be defended by well-developed rationales. It will be interesting to observe whether these approaches to social education gain wider acceptance or whether new versions of the critical-thinking/social issues/values curricula are developed and adopted.

It should be pointed out that shifting to a discipline-oriented curriculum in social studies does not eliminate certain unresolved problems. Historians have not, for example, provided the teacher and student with a synthesis of American history that deals adequately with the United States as a multiracial, multicultural society. The textbooks are very inadequate in many respects and leave the teacher to wrestle with fundamental content questions that the best historians have not yet resolved. These are questions concerning the nature and reality of contemporary society, the same questions that concern many educators who have rejected a curriculum consisting of organized disciplines in favor of social-issues, critical-thinking, or value-analysis approaches.

The Growing Distrust of Education

Another development related to the search for different curricula undoubtedly has major consequences for classroom teachers. The roles of the teacher, the textbook, and the school as purveyors of truth are being seriously questioned. Young people have learned not to trust advertising, the media, older people, the government, and, eventually, the schools. Information and propaganda, particularly in those areas included in the social studies, have become mixed and blurred. One never knows whether what is being heard or read is information or propaganda or if the distinction is even a meaningful one. Schooling is considered by some to be another form of propaganda: it has its special purposes, and it is no more to be trusted than General Motors or the American Medical Association. In some respects this situation appears to be a realization of the fondest hopes of those who have advocated critical thinking and challenging the status quo in social studies education. Unfortunately, however, it tends to produce confusion, doubt,
and cynicism rather than a revised set of beliefs that lead to constructive personal and social action. Rather than providing a forum for discussing, clarifying, and resolving the problems and conflicts of the society, the classroom has fallen victim to the same ills that weaken the effectiveness of other social institutions. Student distrust of teachers, source materials, and schooling has a devastating impact on the effectiveness of social studies programs. This is but another example of the way in which changes in the larger society have a very direct impact on schools and schooling.

The Increasing Influence of the Federal Government

The last few paragraphs provide a convenient transition from the social studies to more-general observations about the relationship between schooling and society in the United States, a relationship that is undergoing change.

Historically, the independence of states and local school districts from federal control of educational policy and programs has been a significant characteristic of our system of common schooling. Federal regulation has been extremely limited and the federal bureaucracy very weak. Until recently, few prominent educators had served at the federal level. The influence of states on individual school districts has varied considerably but typically has not been so pervasive as to prevent local school districts from developing their own approaches to social/political education. When viewed in a world perspective, the thousands of public school districts in the United States traditionally have had substantial autonomy in developing their instructional programs. That few districts have taken full advantage of this autonomy is more indicative of the lack of initiative and imagination of elected school boards and instructional staffs than of limitations imposed by the formal structure of the system of public education.

However, despite the fact that social studies curricula of schools tend to be more alike than different, as one goes from school to school in the United States it is impossible to predict what one will find. Here and there individual teachers, social studies faculties, or entire districts have taken advantage of their autonomy and created courses or
programs that depart substantially from the norm. Some of these, of course, are of dubious value, but others are exemplary.

There is little question but that the traditional independence of the local school district, whether it be a metropolitan district composed of millions of citizens and several hundred thousand students or a rural district with a total population of less than one hundred, has been lost through the heavy incursions of state and federal mandates in recent years. Few districts can now survive without major financial subsidies from both state and federal governments, and both levels of government demand control in exchange for their money. Although locally elected school boards still theoretically determine policy for schools in their districts, in fact the major responsibility of these boards today is to implement federal and state mandates.

This shift is reflected in an editorial in the Dallas Morning News. In commenting on a recommendation by the superintendent of the Dallas school district that all teachers receive a substantial pay increase, the editorial states:

> Dallas taxpayers, of recent years disenchanted with their public schools, still no doubt recognize that the major problems within metropolitan schools have not been caused by teachers, but have come from without: federal intervention through busing, changes in textbooks to highlight subjective cultural materials rather than basics, a social mindset that has handicapped the schools with social-reform concerns.

> The competent Dallas teacher, down in the trenches with the children this highly complex and culturally varied city sends her or him, deserves better pay. ("Wright Plan" 1980, p. 34)

As this editorial suggests, one area in which the imposition of federal regulation is particularly pervasive is that of equity, civil rights, and legal due process. The diversity that has traditionally existed in the United States with respect to attitudes toward and treatment of race and sex differences has been sharply curtailed by actions of the federal government and the judicial system. A primary vehicle for effecting this change has been the educational system. Thus, while the federal government has not moved to take direct control of the social education programs of the schools—an action that would be viewed as contrary to the Constitution and a gross violation of states' rights—it has mounted a powerful program of social education in the area of social justice by requiring all who receive a dollar of federal money to con-
form to certain policies and procedures. Civil libertarians who are strongly opposed to the growth of federal power over the lives of individuals have, however, tended to be very supportive of this substantial increase in the control of institutions and their members by the federal government.

In the period under review, then, the schools have been a major locus of efforts by the government and the courts to implement a particular interpretation of social justice. To an extent greater than ever before, in recent years actions of the federal government have directly affected individual school districts and individual teachers. As I indicated earlier, many of the issues and concerns related to the evolution of this conception of social justice have been central to some of the social studies programs developed during the period. This was entirely voluntary, done by social educators out of a sense of the importance of these matters in the lives of their students and the society generally. Given the trend of the last decade, however, one must wonder how long it will be before the federal government takes action that will more directly determine the content of social education programs in the public schools.

The Long-Run Challenge

Social Darwinism and laissez-faire theory, as exemplified in the works of William Graham Sumner, summarized well the relationship between the schools and society in the United States at the beginning of this century. Gradually but decisively, these theories were replaced by a faith similar to Dewey's, that democratic processes informed by human intelligence and experience could constructively interfere with natural processes to bring about a better society. Schooling was a central element in such a social theory. In the current mood of doubt and fear, the tide is running strongly toward authoritarian solutions that either view the role of the schools as a passive one (at least theoretically) or construe the school as being of importance second only to the family in indoctrinating the young into a particular view of society.

The dramatic changes in the United States and the world over the last two centuries, stimulated primarily by science and the explosion in available energy, define the problems that our political systems must
now attempt to resolve. The world of the 1980s is dramatically different from the world of 1914 or even 1940. The relative success or failure of social and political education in fostering processes that deal creatively with the problems that face us may determine the future of humankind. There is no consensus within social studies, however, as to what social studies program offers the best hope of achieving this goal. The near-chaotic condition that now prevails in the field may be indicative of a period of transition characterized by a search for new responses to the new social and political realities.

References


Reaction to John Palmer

The broad strokes John Palmer has used to depict social education in the United States during the last three decades seem to me to yield a generally accurate picture of this intellectual landscape. I view my task, therefore, as one of highlighting certain features in Palmer's painting as well as clarifying some partially blurred aspects.

It needs to be emphasized that Palmer and I are describing what might be thought of as a portion of the intellectual history of social education. We tend to ignore such other dimensions of the field as theory, pedagogical practice, curriculum organization, and the culture of the school.

Palmer locates the "varieties of social education" on a continuum extending from radical through liberal and conservative to reactionary. He suggests, however, that the range of actual frames of reference is restricted to the centrist positions on the continuum—that is, those in the liberal-to-conservative range. Undoubtedly this is the case in the United States, but I would add two qualifications. One is that the three or four rationale positions which have been explicated in the literature of the field are not now and have never been equally available as justifications for curriculum and instruction. I would contend that one position (taking various forms over time) has always been dominant in the field, and that the other rationales are always cast in the roles of reform positions. I call this dominant position "conservative cultural continuity," or CCC (Haas 1979), by which I mean social education as socialization (or enculturation), as "nongerative" learning of a nationalistic mode of living, buttressed by various ploys such as "empty" catchwords, history-as-myth, "rituals of democracy," and other propagandistic tools which "mystify" the concepts of democracy and capitalism.

It appears to me that, historically, the various reform rationales have been notably unsuccessful in unseating or even deflecting the dominant CCC position. All I see is the occasional quasi-reform designed to make the CCC approach more palatable to students, teachers, and others.
A second qualification of Palmer's contention is that the liberal-to-conservative range may not apply in the United Kingdom and the West German Federal Republic. From conversation with and a reading of some of the works of Geoff Whitty, I suspect that a somewhat neo-Marxist perspective on political education exists in the United Kingdom. Second-hand reports from U.S. visitors to West Germany suggest that a Marxist social education may occupy a place on that country's continuum of rationales.

Although Palmer notes the lack of a Marxist perspective in the literature of social education in the United States, he might have also pointed to the dearth of existentialist, anarchist, and "communitarian" (Oliver 1976, pp. 26-28) literature in social education. In regard to a communitarian perspective, some of the more recent works of Donald Oliver and Fred Newmann begin to argue for a renewed sense of community as a goal of social education.

A balanced rationale for social education, it seems to me, might adequately address sets of questions derived from four sources of curriculum: (1) the current and emerging nature of knowledge (as related to social living), (2) the current and emerging nature of society (in local, national, and global contexts), (3) the current and emerging nature of learners and learning theory (including psychosocial and cognitive/affective development), and (4) the current nature of the socialization/enculturation processes in the milieus of home, community, and school (and in the impinging national/global ethos communicated via such potent media as television). Or from another point of view, a social education rationale might reflect choices of emphases from among the major domains of individual growth and development: intellectual, vocational, and psychosocial.

Palmer cites Dewey's worry that an educational system of a nation/state may, by its very existence, preclude a liberal (which is to say "liberating") education. I believe Dewey's fear was well founded, yet I do not counsel despair. What I do suggest is that social educators construct a valid dialectic in which the contending forces ("demystified," of course) are presented in the crucible of making decisions concerning social education. From the heat of conflict will emerge a social education for and by those participating in the process. I think
the major issues in such a process will emerge from the interactions among the concepts (or others of a similar nature) in the matrix in Figure 1.

Figure 1
FOUR POSSIBLE CONTEXTS FOR SOCIAL EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Social Life</th>
<th>Nature of Individual Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Person Self-Defined (consciousness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Person Other-Defined (composite of surface roles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemeinschaft (community)</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesellschaft (society)</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another View of the Individual and Society

What I am suggesting in Figure 1 is that human life is a composite of individual and social identities, and, further, that there are qualitatively different forms of existence in both individual and social living. As an individual, I am an existential "me," a "me" alone and fearfully free, an "I" conscious of "me"; at other times (perhaps most of the time), I am husband, father, teacher, writer, driver or passenger, shopper, bicycle rider or pedestrian, and so on. Both kinds of identity are "the real me," yet one is existential and the other one is conven-
tional; one is how I see me—self-revealed yet difficult to reveal to others—while the other reflects how others (but I, too) see me, in a single role or as the sum of several or many roles, easily revealed yet somewhat shallow as far as personhood is concerned.

As a participant in social living, I again have two kinds of existence, each a form of membership, participation, and belonging. The German language distinguishes two types of social living—gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. Probably the closest English approximation to gemeinschaft is "community," especially as in the phrase "a sense of community." Gemeinschaft refers to an intimate kind of communal life, involving multiple face-to-face interactions, in a family-like atmosphere, among a "small" number of persons (perhaps ten to as many as several hundred) who engage in more or less unspecialized activities. Traditions are highly valued, as is continuity or resistance to change. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, refers to society or formal societal institutions. Here social life is relatively impersonal, since most associations are unnatural or even forced. There is an emphasis on contracts, reciprocity, and the status of individuals, with activities based on rationality and rules and regulations. Generally a "large" number of persons (from a few hundred to many million) engage in a wide variety of highly specialized activities in an atmosphere where change is valued. Bonds between members are loose, but bonds to the whole are rigidly enforced (as in a national trade union or in military service).

Thus, in the matrix in Figure 1 we have two forms of individuality and two of sociality, which allow for four combinative possibilities: boxes A, B, C, and D. Social educators (broadly defined to include, in addition to professional educators, parents, students, and any other interested parties) will of course have personal preferences among these types (that is, A, B, C, or D), and each will tend to advocate one combination over the other three. The conflict-resolution process which should ensue will, I maintain, yield a form of social education, albeit "local" in nature, even though national and world contexts will inevitably be introduced throughout the process. An approach to a social education curriculum can be derived and set in place.

In a democratic society, probably no single rationale position (sui generis) in social education should preempt the field. Rather, one evi-
dence that a diversity of social wisdom is heard would be that a divers-
ity of social education curricula exists. Furthermore, if one believes
(as I do) that our "lost connections" in Western societies are repre-
sented by the combination of concepts in box A of Figure 1, then the
best hope lies in small, local efforts to renew feelings of communality
and to liberate our rich inner selves. If we wish to reconnect self to
self, person to person, and humanity to nature, perhaps the most appro-
priate places to focus our attention are our families, classrooms,
schools, and communities, and our own personal existential lives.

Reaction to Siegfried George

Siegfried George casts political education in West Germany in a
historical light. He seems to suggest that the history of Germany in
this century points to economic prosperity as the sine qua non for the
existence of social justice, and for the development of democratic philos-
ophy and institutions. Because capitalism was found to have supplied
the economic base during the Nazi period, West Germans were drawn toward
socialism, yielding a mixed economy since World War II.

If economics is at the heart of West German social philosophy, I
would expect it also to be the core of social education in the schools;
I am unsure if this is the case. I am also confused by George's claim
that since 1949, the "economic miracle," combined with the new democratic
institutions, turned people's concerns away from social problems.

I think I have detected an evolution in West German political educa-
tion similar to that which has occurred in the United States over the
past 30 years. The sequence, as I see it, has been from an emphasis on
institutional structures, to one of stressing political processes (that
is, political behavior), to a concern for sociopolitical problems or
issues, and finally to a return (mainly since about 1975) to a struc-
tural approach combined with legal education (law and order) and a turn-
of-the-century form of national chauvinism. In a related vein, both
nations appear to have experienced increasing centralization of control
of education over the past two decades.

What particularly impressed me in George's analysis of the textbook
by Hilligen and his colleagues was his description of the book's approach
to values. I find it very appealing for authors to state explicitly that
their curriculum product is designed to have students explore ways for enhancing (1) the realization of human rights, (2) the dignity of man as the basis of all political decisions, (3) equality of opportunity in society, (4) more self-determination and participation, and (5) the development of alternative social institutions to cope with the changing world (George 1980). Perhaps these values are appealing because, I suspect, all of us at this conference believe deeply in them.

Reaction to Geoff Whitty

What first captured my interest in Geoff Whitty's paper is that the "CCC" approach is also alive and well—and dominating the social education curriculum—in the United Kingdom. The only difference I noted was that whereas "CCC" for me stands for conservative-cultural continuity, for Whitty it means crown, constitution, and capitalism—which seems to amount to the same approach, with the exception of a few minor cultural differences.

I was surprised to learn that the "new social studies" in the United Kingdom chiefly meant the introduction of the discipline of sociology, to the neglect of the other social sciences. Also surprising is that British geographers do not consider their discipline to be a social science.

What was not surprising was that the "new social studies" movement in the United Kingdom became an abortive attempt to dent the CCC approach. As in the United States, "rigor and relevance" foundered on the rocks of nationalism and tradition. What had not occurred to me, however, was that there were social class overtones to such terms as history and geography (upper class and upper-middle class) and sociology, social studies, and social education (working class and lower class).

I would predict, on the basis of Siegfried George's paper and the American experience of the past decade, that the youthful political education/literacy movement in Britain will swing to a conservative orientation, stressing law and order, traditional mores, loyalty to the government in power, and, in general, the production of "uncritical, conforming citizens."

I have one strong agreement and one disagreement with Whitty. First, the disagreement: I'm not at all sanguine that the schools are
the appropriate arena in which to focus the struggle for social justice. Of all social institutions, public education is probably the weakest with respect to initiating social change. Of course, as social educators we must do what we can, but perhaps our personal efforts should be directed more toward influencing political and economic institutions.

My agreement with Whitty is about the nature of contemporary Western industrialized societies: Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Social justice cannot be achieved in any of these regions until each changes drastically and creates "a qualitatively different and more genuinely egalitarian social order."

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Any attempt to compare the school systems of various countries and their social/economic patterns, including the values and norms behind them, is almost doomed to fail. The terminological problems alone are sufficient to build up barriers of mutual misunderstanding. The risks become less dangerous when smaller sectors of the educational systems are being compared and when a frame of reference is defined.

John Palmer is right when he stresses the fact that in the United States—whatever the aims to be reached in connection with school and society—the frame of reference is somewhere between conservatism and liberalism. The existing social order there is evidently based on a minimum consensus of the political parties. Geoff Whitty describes a similar frame of reference for England, although he also identifies some radical elements there. In reading these two papers I ask myself whether the terms both writers are using—"conservatism," "liberalism," and "radicalism"—which once had special meanings based on common understanding, are today still adequate descriptors of our political scene, or whether they impede open discourse rather than facilitate it, given the difficulty of comparing different cultures.

Siegfried George, in analyzing the West German situation, uses another frame of reference, referring to the historical experiences of a majority of Germans, including many who are responsible for defining the aims and objectives of social education. Those experiences contributed to widespread awareness of the relationships between economic welfare, social justice, and democratic development. George tries to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of political education by citing youngsters' fear of expressing their opinions freely. Yet he fails to analyze the really important social question today, with its entirely new aspects: The normal German citizen, whether employed or unemployed, need no longer starve; his medical care is secured, and he can't usually be thrown out of his flat. However, new groups of people are suffering under social injustice: the so-called guest workers and especially their children, the old and permanently sick or insane people, the new generation of
refugees. Only by keeping the typically German frame of reference in mind—the deep-rooted awareness of the relationships between economic welfare, social justice, and the struggle for a democratic development—can the scattered data gained by various, rather problematic opinion polls be interpreted as expressing a certain tendency rather than regarded as describing generalizable results.

Societal Issues in the Newer Syllabi

Whereas John Palmer concentrates on an analysis of materials written by social educators. Geoff Whitty analyzes different theoretical approaches to political/social education and Siegfried George analyzes textbooks over a period of 30 years. I shall make a few comments on the representation of societal issues in the newer syllabi of social studies in West German states and the didactic positions behind them. I shall try to do this mainly by naming a few key problems which arise in connection with developing a new syllabus. These key problems are, despite the sociocultural differences among the three countries in question, similar to each other, which does not mean that they necessarily have similar solutions.

Integrated Approach vs. Separate Subject Matter Fields

Some of the present syllabi in West Germany follow an integrated approach, combining historical, geographic, economic, and political aspects. With this approach societal issues, which are always of a complex nature, can be more easily brought into focus. The disciplines are then used to analyze these problem fields by means of their specific methods and terminologies. The danger is that a discipline—especially political science—may lose its key function, and political education is like a wastepaper basket where everything—and nothing—may be found. In addition, many educators and politicians are afraid of the loss of factual knowledge—a tendency similar to that found in the United States, where the "basics" are gaining ground again. These dangers have led, in new syllabi in some German states, to renewed stress on certain disciplines, especially history and geography. The didactic approach to societal issues—a positive trend during the last 20 years—may suffer if the teachers are not well trained for their jobs, and especially if they are
not trained to use the disciplines in an integrated approach to societal problems.

Closed vs. Open Curricula

If societal issues are the core of a syllabus, they must be identified and selected according to the subjective needs and concerns of students and teachers, representing the whole of the society. But how can such syllabuses be developed by central planning bodies—which follow political trends and are influenced and directed by political parties, parliaments, ministries of education, and other agencies which are trying to guarantee a certain minimum standard in terms of organized bodies of knowledge—and at the same time take seriously the concerns of the people involved? This dilemma is unresolved, and the syllabi now in use in West Germany can be characterized by two opposite terms: (more or less) closed and (more or less) open.

Objectives vs. Content Orientation

The tasks of selecting and justifying aims and organizing learning objectives was once more or less restricted to university educators and curriculum specialists. Although most teachers didn't find the results feasible enough for their practical work, they almost unanimously accepted the method of using objectives for their lesson planning and teaching tasks. The content was of secondary importance. But now the "miracle weapon" of the objectives approach has lost its glamor among the specialists and content has gained importance again. This does not necessarily mean that we have gone back to a pure structure-of-the-disciplines approach. Instead, we find in the most current syllabi relevant aspects of the students’ social reality, sometimes called "situation fields" (Situationsfelder, involving school, family, leisure, and job:) or "intentions in acting" (Handlungsintentionen, involving interaction, communication, consumption, production, organization, and participation). From a content-oriented approach, it is relatively easy to reflect on aims and objectives as an integral part of the situation or action field in question, and—more important—it is possible to more easily integrate societal issues into the syllabi.
Political Controversies About General Principles

All newer syllabi refer to general principles, norms, and values found in our federal constitution or in the state charters of the German Länder; for example, respect for the critical, emancipated citizen and for the dignity of every human being. These principles are linked to the human rights declaration of the French Revolution, the American Declaration of Independence, and the English Magna Charta, newly discovered and interpreted. Although the consensus is that it is impossible to deduce objectives from these general principles, they serve as instruments by which objectives and content may be critically analyzed. Thus the concept of democracy tends to become a pervasive principle influencing all parts of society, not merely the political organization of the state. In other words, the democratic principle is considered to be substantive and dynamic, not just formal; it is the leading principle in all parts of our life. It has become for some of these educators the key principle for changing our social order, as can be seen in Siegfried George's paper. But at this point the controversies begin, especially over the term "emancipation," in its broad meaning and in the practical political consequences drawn from it. The opposing educators and politicians see in "emancipation" an attempt to get rid of our value pattern. They have even more strongly attacked the so-called critical theory, as being responsible for terrorism and radicalism in West Germany.

A similar controversy exists about the aim of preparing the young generation to handle conflicts. In some didactic positions, as well as in some German syllabi, the conflict approach is treated as though it were a value of its own. This tendency is certainly not to be welcomed; on the other hand, political and societal conflicts do exist, and the schools—and especially the social studies—must prepare students to deal with conflicts effectively and rationally. This problem is particularly important in connection with social justice and with the question of how much consensus is possible in a modern pluralistic state which has a monopoly in education and which shows an increasing tendency to determine general principles, control syllabi, and select content. Therefore, dealing with controversial issues, thinking in alternatives, accepting opposite views, and finding acceptable solutions by compromise—all should be part of any modern syllabus, and indeed they are integrated...
into some of our syllabi. The influence of the state should be restricted to general principles, and the syllabi should abstain from too-detailed regulations.

Society and Social Justice in Some of the Newer Syllabi

In contrast to the situation in the United States and the United Kingdom, the influence of the German states on the syllabi is strong, and growing stronger. Geoff Whitty's remark about the "appearance of relative autonomy" in the English educational system shows how great the difference is. There are no "class overtones" in Germany like those in England, where history and geography are reserved for upper- and middle-class students and political/social education is directed at lower-class students.

The most astonishing result of my examination of six modern syllabi (Baden-Wurttemberg, 1976; Bayern, 1975-1973; Hamburg, 1976-1977; Hesse, 1976; Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1974; and Rheinland-Pfalz, 1973) is that the content of all six deals with societal issues. All try to develop in students a desire to overcome social injustice; none advocates the socialization of basic industries and natural resources, a policy which solves almost no problems and creates new ones. All six concentrate on problem fields not far removed from the experience of the students. As a whole, this picture is much more positive than the reputation of syllabi in general, and of social studies syllabi in particular, would have us expect. After reading them, the question is, rather, whether German teachers are able and adequately trained to effectively use these--as a whole--sensible didactic instruments.

Conclusions

Unlike Siegfried George and Geoff Whitty, I am of the opinion that conservatism is not, in itself, less democratic than socialism. Both attitudes in principle allow democratic thinking, freedom, and social justice, and both allow meaningful political education. The important point is that people should learn that both positions are acceptable in our society, and that within this frame of reference there are a variety of possible ways of thinking, living together, and educating our young. Even if the controversies cannot be settled--and perhaps they should not
be settled, in order to keep the process of thinking and education going on—there is sufficient consensus about content and method to permit cooperation among all educators who are committed to a democratic way of thinking. But this kind of cooperation can come about only if we improve teacher education and inservice training. I see this as our number-one task.
16. SOCIETY, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL/POLITICAL EDUCATION: A REACTION

By Ted Cohn

In considering issues raised by George, Palmer, and Whitty in their papers dealing with "society, social justice, and social/political education" in their respective countries of West Germany, the United States, and England, I want to concentrate my remarks in three areas: first, a consideration of the rather different roles of social/political education, as part of the overt school curricula, in England, West Germany, and the United States; second, a consideration of the extent to which recent developments in the area of social/political education can be seen as part of a response to a general "legitimation crisis" common to most industrialized capitalist states (Habermas 1976); and third, a brief comment on social justice as a concept and the manner in which the three authors have handled social justice in their papers.

The Differential Development of Social/Political Education

It is immediately apparent that social/political education as a part of the overt school curriculum is accorded rather different levels of importance in England, West Germany, and the United States.

In England, under the guise of social studies, social/political education is a recent curriculum development with a dubious academic credibility, which has been mainly confined to the so-called "less-able" student (Gleeson and Whitty 196; Whitty 1980).

In West Germany, social/political education in anything like its present form is also a recent, postwar phenomenon. Nevertheless, it does have a clearly defined institutionalized place in the secondary school curriculum for all students, alongside the more traditional subject disciplines such as history and geography. However, the attempt in the Lander of Hesse to introduce a common social/political education curriculum for all secondary school students, replacing the old discipline-based approach with a new integrated problem-solving social science program, drew fierce criticism from academic disciplinarians and political conservatives (Dumas and Lee 1983) and proved abortive (Sussmuth 1980). Thus, social/political education is seen as an addition to the
traditional disciplines rather than as a replacement for them or as the basis for a major new synthesis of previously discrete areas of knowledge.

In the United States, social/political education, there called social studies, has been a very important part of the school curriculum since the beginning of the 20th century. Although there has been continuing debate about the form, content, and purpose of social studies programs, since the time of Dewey there has been a pragmatic theme emphasizing the practice of good citizenship (Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1977) and since 1960 an increased input of social science concepts (Wiley 1977).

Explanations for the different levels of importance attached to social/political education as a discrete part of the school curriculum are to be found in the rather different socioeconomic, political, and educational histories of the three countries.

Social/Political Education in England

The relative stability of British society—without major political upheavals, no major influx of immigrants, and a politically decentralized education system—has "favored an implicit socialization into the status quo" (Whitty 1970, p. 2). This has been aided by the segregation of children from different social classes into different teaching and learning groups, so making it relatively easy to introduce and justify differential socialization practices. At the same time, the ideology of the British state as a constitutional monarchy, which is de facto ruled by a separately educated public school/"Oxbridge" elite (Giddens and Stanworth 1973), has placed more emphasis on historical continuity, religious conformity, political compromise, and individual rights, often concerning property, than on an ideology of activist democratic citizenship. As Whitty indicates, the recent statement by St. John Stevens regarding political education—that is, that it should be concerned with emphasizing the legitimacy of "Crown and Constitution"—exemplifies this position.

Thus, until recently, it has proved possible to encompass social/political education within the "hidden curriculum" of the school, the literature of which is usefully reviewed in Fielding (1980), and within the cultural traditions of school history (Heater 1977) and religious...
education. The creation of social studies as a school subject concerned with social/political education, in the 1960s and 1970s, reflects the crumbling base of traditional working-class motivational syndromes—described by Habermas (1976) as particularistic, fatalistic, and characterized by a subordinate mentality—consequent upon the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s in Britain. Social studies can, therefore, be seen as an extension of the same working-class deficit-socialization thesis, so dominant in British sociological and educational circles in the 1950s and 1960s, which produced the argument for compensatory education (Crooter Report 1959; Newsom Report 1963). This is not to suggest that the content of social studies has necessarily been perceived by social studies teachers in this way, but rather that this was a major reason for the form which its institutionalization has taken in English secondary schools, mainly as a subject for "less-able," generally working-class, children.

Paradoxically, this form of institutionalization has provided social studies in England with radical curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment possibilities not found in higher-status areas, as Young (1971) suggested was possible and Whitty has supported in his paper. However, other factors have increasingly been working against the realization of these possibilities. Among these factors, from the beginning, has been the way in which the low-status position of the subject has hampered its being taken seriously by the teaching profession as a whole, by students, and particularly by those in authority (Gleeson and Whitty 1976). Additionally, the very attempts to give it some form of spurious academic respectability, along with the general move toward academic credentialism, are increasingly constraining social studies within the dominant educational knowledge structures of the school. Finally, the changing political climate and the increasing emphasis on technical skills across the whole curriculum (Slater 1980) have important implications for the future of social/political education in England.

Social/Political Education in West Germany

The creation of social/political education as a discrete part of the school curriculum in West Germany after 1945 reflected the combined wishes of the Allied occupying forces, especially the Americans, and the leaders of the new republic (Dumas and Lee 1978). The content of social/
political education emphasizes a belief in the need to introduce a new generation of school students to the fundamental concepts of bourgeois democracy as well as to the rights and responsibilities of citizens in such a democracy (Dumas and Lee 1978). However, the form which social/political education has taken, in terms of knowledge structure, represents a continuation of the dominant medieval contemplative "humanities" tradition, with an emphasis on the mastery of knowledge content rather than on techniques of using knowledge and with a great reliance upon the textbook (Dumas and Lee 1978; Oppenheim 1977).

Thus, its inclusion as part of a compulsory core curriculum has led the German version of social/political education to conform to the dominant forms of educational knowledge to a greater extent than is yet the case with social studies in England. In this context, the introduction and legitimation of overt social/political education for all students was made easier than it would be in England, because curriculum content is, and historically has been, controlled directly by the state in West Germany, while in Britain it is controlled directly by the school and indirectly, at least in terms of high-status knowledge in secondary schools, by the universities (Bernstein 1971).

The cognitive content approach to social/political education in West Germany has been helped by the existence of religious education as a separate part of the core curriculum, so that questions of moral and values education can be confined to this area of the curriculum rather than spilling over into social/political education (Dumas and Lee 1973). Social/political education can, therefore, be reduced to a merely technical/cognitive study (Habermas 1971) of the workings of the state apparatus.

This is not to suggest that there have been no changes in social/political education in the past 30 years. George (1980) has suggested that there has been some movement from a purely descriptive approach to a social-problems-oriented approach, although within a strongly hierarchical teacher/student relationship. Additionally, in the 1970s, the hidden constraint upon open discussion in the classroom imposed by the "radicals in public service" controversy was an important factor in the continued emphasis on textbook knowledge. In this atmosphere, it is not surprising what happened to the potentially radical Hessen General Guide-
lines on Social Theory. These guidelines were originally conceived of as a new integrated social-science-based subject, replacing the previously discrete areas of history, geography, and political education with a synthetic critique of the problems and social structure of West German society, drawing on critical theory. In practice, they became a consideration of what the traditional academic disciplines could contribute to the study of "social and historical-political problems" (Sussmuth 1980, p. 14). Thus the guidelines were politically and epistemologically deradicalized.

Social/Political Education in the United States

In the United States, a combination of factors helped in the early institutionalization of social/political education in schools. Large-scale immigration into the burgeoning cities of the American industrial revolution created a demand for social/political education programs "to give the immigrant child a sense of identity with American ideals and American standards of citizenship" (Violas 1973, p. 5). At the same time, the more-fluid knowledge structures of American universities and the early institutionalization of a pragmatic, empirically oriented social-science tradition (Oberschall 1972) provided social/political education, in the form of social studies, with the possibility of an institutional base in high-status knowledge institutions and an academic respectability which could not be attained in England or West Germany. This was aided by the fact that, even by the late 1930s, many teachers had taken social science courses, admittedly often of dubious quality, during their training (Bernard 1945).

Two other important factors in the development of social/political education in the United States were the constitutional prohibition in theory, and widespread prohibition in practice, of overt religious education in schools (Butts 1950) and the specific ideology of the political state. The former created the institutional space for the teaching of moral values under the aegis of social studies, a practice which, with the disintegration of the traditional value consensus since 1945, has become a focal point of debate in the 1960s and 1970s (Palmer 1980). The latter is important because embedded in the very creation of the American state are concepts of equality and democratic political activism in a decentralized state which are alien to the English and German
traditional traditions (Lacey 1966). These have created an ideological tradition which has emphasized "democratic practices" as well as knowledge of the "democratic state." This tradition has been reflected since the beginning of the 20th century in social studies programs which have generally accepted, at least at the level of rhetoric, the need to provide opportunities for the practice of democratic citizenship as well as knowledge about the democratic state (Dumais 1978; Joyce 1972). This tradition has also contributed to the development of social/political education programs in the United States which have concentrated on ways of knowing and on cognitive methodology rather than on states of knowledge and cognitive content, although the more general development of educational knowledge structures has also been important (Bernstein 1971).

Summary

The differing historical patterns in the development of social/political education in the three countries, therefore, can be seen to result from different social and political histories, different dominant educational knowledge structures, and different national ideologies. In the United States, until very recently, the emphasis has been increasingly on the ideology and methodology of being a democratic American citizen; in West Germany the emphasis has been on introducing the cognitive content of the democratic state and the duties of responsible citizenship in such a state; in England the emphasis has been on historical continuity and compromise in the protection of the rights of the individual, with explicit social/political education as a form of compensatory education for working-class children.

Social/Political Education and the Legitimation Crisis

So far I have attempted to sketch in a very general way reasons for the rather different ways in which social/political education as a school subject has developed in England, West Germany, and the United States. Now I want to analyze some of the most recent developments in the area in the three countries, drawing on concepts developed by Habermas in his legitimation-crisis thesis (Habermas 1976).

At the heart of this "legitimation crisis," Habermas suggests, is a motivational crisis that has arisen because "bourgeois culture as a whole was never able to reproduce itself from itself. It was always dependent
on motivationally effective supplementation by traditional world views" (1976, p. 77). Thus, what he calls "the civil privatism syndrome" requires the successful internalization of the bourgeois values of activism and rationality, together with the contradictory traditional values of particularism and a subordinate mentality, creating a situation where "the democratic citizen is called on to pursue goals; he must be active, yet passive; involved, influential, yet deferential" (Habermas 1976, p. 77)—thereby retaining a technical interest in the steering and maintenance performance of the administration but little concern for its legitimation as such.

The other motivational syndrome, "familial vocational privatism," is likewise a combination of

the specifically bourgeois value orientations of possessive individualism and Benthamite utilitarianism [and] the achievement orientated vocational ethos of the middle class, as well as the fatalism of the lower class . . . secured by religious traditions (Habermas 1976, p. 77).

These last two religious traditions, he argues, are essentially prebourgeois in their origins. However, the balance between the various elements is different in each advanced capitalist society, and within any one society it is also changing. Common to all such societies is the increasing delegitimation of all these values, as contradictions develop between the sociocultural, economic, and political systems (Habermas 1976, pp. 77-92). Recent developments in social/political education reflect attempts by the state to counteract this delegitimation process.

Challenges to Traditional Legitimacy

In Britain, West Germany, and the United States, the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s created conditions which challenged important aspects of civil and familial/vocational privatism. The rapid improvements in the mass media and transport, the structural changes in the industrial base, the development of a centralized, increasingly bureaucratic corporate sector, the growth of a welfare bureaucracy, the general upward social mobility, and above all the increase in creation of wealth, were all important factors in creating these conditions. Thus, the traditional cultural values of particularism, subordinate mentality, and working-class fatalism were challenged by the changing nature of the social and political system. The new requirements of the social and
political system placed an increased emphasis on the specifically bour-geois sociocultural values of activism, secular rationalism, and universalism. This manifested itself in social/political education in the three countries in rather different ways.

In the most traditional of the three countries, England, the cognitive content tradition-dominant in modern educational knowledge structures (Bernstein 1971), which had its roots in medieval contemplative discipline forms, provided very limited opportunities for the development of social/political education. These structures restricted the "new social studies" movement, which was based on a mildly radical Fabian functionalism (Whitty 1980), to programs for less-able, and therefore mainly working-class, students. Nevertheless, this movement, as did the Crowther and Newsom reports (1959 and 1963), recognized the new demands being made on education as part of the sociocultural system, particularly with regard to the erosion of working-class fatalism and a subordinate mentality.

In West Germany, the most recently created bourgeois democracy of the three countries and the one which faced the most difficult economic and social problems in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, there was a move from "a more-descriptive to a more problem-oriented way of dealing with social issues" (George 1980, p. 4), although still within the dominant, cognitive-content "humanities" tradition (Dumas and Lee 1978).

In the United States of the post-Sputnik era, which had the most flexible educational knowledge structure of the three countries (Bernstein 1971), the developments in social/political education were the most dramatic. The "new social studies," which resulted from these developments, was founded upon the social sciences (Wiley 1977), whose dominant tradition was positivistic, and involved, in its various strands, a renewed emphasis on pragmatic reflective inquiry in the Dewey tradition (Thelen 1960; Hunt and Metcalf 1958) and a concern for the methodology of decision making (Taba 1967). These characteristics of the new social studies represented attempts to define the parameters of a new secular, universalistic rationalism and to develop an activist methodology in its pursuit.

The developments of the 1960s in social and political education can, therefore, be seen as responses by the education system, as part of
the sociocultural system, to the delegitimation of various traditional
elements of civil and familial/vocational privatism—response—which
are, however, partly constrained by the dominant knowledge structures
within each education system and by the varying nature of capitalism in
the three countries. Common to all the responses is an emphasis on
scientific rationalism and universalism and an implicit belief that the
problems of advanced capitalist societies can be analyzed and solved
through rational debate, without endangering the fundamental stability
of those societies. Concomitant with this was the belief that science
and technology would provide the cornerstone for the achievement of a
humanistic meritocracy (Bell 1960; Crosland 1962). Interestingly enough,
both the development of the welfare state and the growth of the public
sector, as well as the pedagogy of social studies in Britain and the
United States—and curriculum content, in some cases—challenged the
specifically bourgeois value of possessive individualism, reflecting the
contradictions inherent in the increasingly important welfare bureaucracy
and public sector.

The developing economic crisis of the 1970s in all advanced capi-
talist societies has raised serious doubts about this optimistic belief
in scientific rationalism. The increasing inability of British and
American governments, in particular, to control and manage the eco-
omic crisis has created a crisis of legitimation in the whole concept of a
bureaucratic and centralized state power, and consequently in the role
of scientific rationalism as the keystone of bourgeois democracy. As a
result, there is renewed emphasis among politicians on the ideology of
possessive individualism and utilitarianism and on the traditional
values of subordinate mentality and achievement motivation articulated
through religious dogma. These value orientations are most clearly
exemplified in the ideology of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald
Reagan in the United States. This is not to say that the Callaghan and
Carter administrations have not represented a significant move in this direc-
tion, because in many ways, they have, but not so systematically and
openly as Thatcher or Reagan. Thus, in Britain and the United States, a
major political response to the failure of economic crisis management
has been to blame it on a failure in socialization of citizens into the
basic motivational structures of capitalist society—a failure for which
the school system, and especially its alleged "progressivism," has been increasingly blamed.

It has been necessary to spend some time elucidating this position because any attempt to relegitimize these motivational structures would involve increased intervention by the state in the school curriculum, including the area of social/political education. The much-discussed proposed new political education program in England might well become a vehicle for such a venture (Whitty 1980), while the "back-to-basics" movement in American social studies, which specifically rejects a social-problems, values-oriented approach in favor of the study of organized bodies of knowledge, is rapidly gaining ground (Palmer 1980). The significant point about this movement is that it replaces relevant subject matter and active learning with a passive, subordinate learning role (Bernstein 1971).

Efforts to Re-Establish Legitimacy

In Britain and the United States, similar crises in economic management have suggested the possibility of the future reorientation of social/political education toward the relegitimation of the fundamental motivational values of the bourgeois state. In West Germany, the situation is somewhat different. Because Germany has been far more successful in managing its economic crisis than either Britain or the United States, the Germans have not experienced a serious crisis of rationality over the role of the bureaucratic state in economic affairs. However, the student troubles in West Germany during the 1960s and the terrorist campaigns of the 1970s, which centered around a clash between the humanism of mainly upper-class university students and the dominant state ideology of economic instrumentalism (Habermas 1971), significantly influenced the development of social/political education. In the short term, that conflict brought into public consciousness the distinction between technical and practical problems (Habermas 1971), and it was a factor in the emergence of the school curriculum as a matter of public debate (George 1930). Specifically, the conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s served as a catalyst for the new proposals for social/political education in Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the longer term, these clashes generated a "law and order" crisis which produced the "banning of radicals from public service" act and significantly reduced the generally accepted
legitimate areas of discussion in social/political education (George 1980). They also contributed to the emasculation of the radical potential of the Hessen social/political education proposals, although the conservative influence of the dominant educational structures was equally important here (Sussmuth 1980). Thus, social/political education in West Germany remained, during the 1970s, essentially oriented toward cognitive content with little attempt to critically examine the nature of West German democracy or develop an activist commitment to the bourgeois state (Dumas and Lee 1973; George 1981; Oppenheim 1977). Nevertheless, the opening up to public debate of the principles of social/political education in the various (Sussmuth 1980) rendered these principles potentially capable of de-escalation in the future (Habermas 1976, and thus subject to major change. Future developments in social/political education in West Germany, however, also rest upon the continued ability of the government to manage the economic crisis in an international context in which economic management is becoming increasingly ineffective.

Social Justice

Paradoxically, since the theme of social justice is central to the stated theme of all papers, none contains a major consideration of the concept of social justice per se. George provides a number of examples of what he believes can be defined as "social justice" in West German social studies but he never clearly articulates his definition. Palmer touches upon social justice in his discussion of Dewey's concept of the "good society" but never articulates his own view. Whitt initially declares social justice as unattainable under present social structures and returns to the matter only tangentially at the end of his paper.

The failure of all three authors to give due attention to the concept of social justice is unfortunate. Although there are numerous definitions of social justice, they vary greatly in emphasis and substance and often are in conflict with each other. The plethora of books and articles published in response to Rawls's book (1971) illustrates the extent of the debate, which goes back at least to the time of Socrates. Thus, although George, Palmer, and Whitt are all implicit, and at
times explicitly, critical of current social structures and thus the interpretations of social justice which underpin them, they may hold widely divergent personal views of what constitutes social justice. Some discussion of their own views would have been helpful in providing some indication of what they understand by the term "social justice."

It is possible to argue here that social justice as a meaningful concept cannot transcend the existential dimensions of a particular time and place. However, while accepting the importance of the influence of sociohistorical context on the development of concepts such as social justice, I would, like Lukes (1977), argue that these criteria can and do transcend a particular time and place. In other words, I am suggesting that social justice can and should be considered in terms of absolute standards which transcend the immediate social conditions of existence.

This leads me to ask: Can one properly assess the adequacy of social political education in the pursuit of social justice without a definition of the latter term? My own feeling is that one cannot. If there were a generally accepted view of the criteria for defining social justice, a definition could be taken for granted; however, as I have indicated, such criteria generally do not exist.

In an important sense, therefore, all three papers failed to address adequately an important element of their theme. This is unfortunate, because what is taught as social/political education depends specifically—rather more so than do most other areas of the school curriculum—on assumptions about what constitutes social justice and the "good society"; and it is in discussions of the "good society" that the fundamental contradictions inherent in advanced capitalist states (Ehrenberg 1971) can become manifest, at least at the level of academic debate. Thus, the values education debate in social studies in the United States raised important questions about the nature and operation of concepts of social justice, and the highest level in Kohlberg’s moral education hierarchy challenged one of the most fundamental tenets of the bourgeois state—the sanctity of private property (Kohlberg 1973). Similarly, the original Hessen social/political education program (of Rahmen Richtlinien) in West Germany implied a definition of social justice which was highly threatening to the state (Dumas and Lee 1978; Sussmuth 1980). In England also, social studies in the 1960s and 1970s emphasized the primary or a
rationality centered on a meritocratic view of social justice which was, potentially, highly threatening to the traditionally based elite power structures. Britain, with its rigid class structure (Goldthorpe 1980) and the most inequitable distribution of wealth of the three countries, is particularly vulnerable to such an analysis. It does seem likely, therefore, that a more detailed consideration of the relationship between social justice and social/political education in the three countries would be a fruitful area of investigation.

Conclusion

In considering the papers by George, Palmer, and Whitty I have tried to do three things. First, I have attempted to show how the longer-term development of social/political education in each country has been considerably influenced by a complex interaction of dominant forms of educational knowledge, the political ideology of the state, and social and political history. Second, using Habermas's theory of "legitimation crisis," I have tried to show how this crisis has affected some of the most recent developments in social/political education and how it might affect future developments. Last, I have suggested that social justice is a central concept in analyzing developments in the area of social/political education, and that none of the three authors has given enough thought to the relationship between social justice and social/political education.

In conclusion, there is one area about which we are all in agreement: we are pessimistic about the most recent developments in social/political education. I have suggested that social/political education is somewhat more sensitive to changes in the dominant ideology of the state than are other areas of the school curriculum because of the immediacy of its subject matter. If this is true, our pessimism should surprise no one. The rapid growth of an authoritarian, nationalistic, religious fundamentalism in the United States; the massive level of policing and the "radicals in public service" debate in West Germany; and the increasing threat to trades-union and civil liberties in Britain, combined with the most pernicious social and economic policies of any British government since the 1930s—all point to, at best, a period of retrenchment in the area of social/political education. In this belief,
if no other, it seems likely that the vast majority of the members of
the Guildford conference would be in agreement.

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17. A COMPARISON OF RECENT AND CURRENT TRENDS
IN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: SYNTRESIS

By Lita-Barbara Lange-Quass

This synthesis is given from the point of view of a historically oriented political scientist, not that of a social studies educator. I have compared the histories of civic education in Germany and in the United States, trying to find out why the trends were motivated, at the close of World War II, to bring the conception of social studies to Germany during the occupation. I have always been interested, since the "new social studies" started, in observing developments from 1955 to the late 1960s to see if points of contact between American and German developments could be found. Thus, not being directly involved in the latest debates concerning political education, I might stress some other aspects and give a more detached view than would a teacher of dialectics or a professor of social studies. On the other hand, I like colorful pictures better than pale ones; I like to draw broad lines of development rather than stick to details; and I will point out conflicts.

What are we talking about in such a meeting? Are we discussing our own history of social/political education? Are we focusing on present problems and the short-comings we have tried to cope with since social/political education began? Or do we dare to paint the future, give thought to upcoming necessities—subjects which will urgently need to be taken into account?

In preparing this synthesis, I tried to imagine what anticipations the conference organizers might have had while planning this international meeting. There are, I think, two reasons why people are motivated to attend an international conference on social studies or political education:

1. To learn about recent developments in another country, which might open up new perspectives in recognizing directions of development or new trends in one's own country. Knowing that political education in a neighbor nation faces similar problems might change our attitudes toward our own problems: we might become more accepting and patient or, on the contrary, more decisive and aggressive in pursuing change. Look-
ing beyond one's own borders could even lead to searching out new strategies for coping with one's own difficulties.

2. To explore the potentialities for international cooperation. Some years ago Dietar Schmidt-Sinns wrote: "The development toward domestic politics makes it indispensable to achieve an internationalization of political education" (Schmidt-Sinns n.d.). Do some of the presentations and discussions at Guilford suggest topics for cooperative research projects?

Theory and Content Bases for Social/Political Education

Going through the papers for all the topics, I found it noteworthy that almost every paper contained a large part dealing either with the evolution of social/political education during the last decades or with the subject of theory and content. Comparing these statements, I think we could make the following generalization about the historical development of social/political education in the United States and in the Federal Republic of Germany: The genuine underlying basis for social/political education in our industrialized Western societies, if they are democracies, is the concept of citizenship transmission, or, as John Haas termed it, the "CCC" approach—the transmission of "conservative cultural continuity"—or, as it has been put by Geoff Whitty, "Crown, Constitution, and Capitalism."

But at some point, at different times in the United States and in Germany, there was a questioning of this dominant concept. In the 1920s in the United States, and again in the 1960s, society had become so complex that social knowledge about it was split up in various sciences. The specialization of knowledge in various social sciences led to the request of different disciplines to add their share to social/political education. Immigrant problems, Sputnik shock, and other events led to the establishment of new courses in the States. Similar developments in Germany led many participants to feel themselves entitled to contribute to social/political education. As a result, the need for a detailed curriculum was felt; in an overcrowded curriculum, there was a need to legitimize the selection of content.

As Wolfgang Hilligen has pointed out, different types of didactics had to be developed, concerned with questioning what, why, what for, and
now. It now became possible to consider new approaches to social/political education, including: social studies including social sciences, reflective thinking or inquiry, and the so-called social problems or public issues courses—or, in German terminology, the theory of conflict. These different approaches, which could be summed up under the label of the "new social studies," had some effect on teaching materials and in the classrooms. But I assume that classroom instruction is still dominated by a perhaps slightly modified citizenship-transmission approach.

Although there is similarity in the historical development of social/political education, I would like to point to what may be an important difference between the United States and Germany. It has often been said that the Americans have always had a pragmatic approach to teaching the social studies, while the Germans have a theoretical approach. But Cleo Cherryholmes's paper may indicate that the reproach of pragmatism to the Americans is no longer true. Cherryholmes accepts the view of the so-called critical scholars, such as Habermas and Adorno, and applies this critical theory to his analysis of the American Political Behavior text by Mehlinger and Patrick. Cherryholmes's paper is very close to a critical analysis of American Political Behavior which I myself wrote several years ago but which has never been translated (Lange-Quassowski 1972).

Before I came to the conference, I thought: perhaps Cleo Cherryholmes is just a lonely bird; "one swallow does not make a summer." But the discussions at this conference give the feeling that one school of thought in the United States is moving toward adoption of critical theory—although hopefully not just on a theoretical level. This feeling is reinforced by the need expressed by several Americans—Jack Nelson and others—for more and more-intelligent skeptics in American education. On the other hand, I got the feeling that there are quite a few Americans who are frightened by a discussion of critical social studies in the German sense.

While there are disagreements in Germany, there is substantial consensus on basic purposes in German political education. Those German educators who picture social studies education as independent thinking and problem solving are not opposed to the existing political system, but they want to improve it considerably. The objective of improving
the system does not mean sustaining the status quo, nor destroying it, but changing it gradually into a more democratic system.

If maintenance of the status quo were the task of social studies, we would not have to think very much about it. We would just go ahead with citizenship transmission. But it is my own view that discussion of the philosophy or theory of social studies and teaching, such as we have had here, is necessary and helpful in defining the role of the "new social studies" and that it should go on. I am convinced that nobody has to be frightened that this will be destructive.

Having commented on the topic of theory and content, I want to point to another development occurring both in the United States and in Germany, which we have not talked much about, but which in the near future might become more important and which in the long run might threaten every reform movement. I am talking about "back to basics." This movement in the United States as well as in Germany has to be seen within the broader context of a shift toward conservatism. In the United States feelings of insecurity and fear have been provoked by Vietnam, Watergate, Iran, Afghanistan, economic crisis, and ongoing debates about values, giving some Americans the feeling that there is a need for a new belief system. In the United States, the movement back to "God and Country" is expressed in part by the foundation of one new private school after another. In the Federal Republic the strong rejection of the conflict approach in social studies seems to reflect a conservative demand for a commitment to the still-pervasive old German traditions. I will refer to this again when I summarize the topic of social justice.

Curriculum Development

Consideration of "back to basics" leads to my next topic of discussion—curriculum development. "Back to basics," in my opinion, tends to destroy every effort for a reflective inquiry approach. Unfortunately, this conservative movement is facilitated by weaknesses that have become apparent in the "new social studies." Social studies reformers have come to realize that the "new social studies" relied too much on methods, on analysis, on decision making—on processes with almost no content. One of my own major criticisms regarding the Harvard Public Issues project was that the conflicts do not reach and involve
the students (Lange-Quassowski 1972). The materials do not explain to the children the socioeconomic background in which a conflict occurs. They focus on personal moral judgment—for example, asking a student to decide if an airplane pilot should drop a bomb on a Vietnamese village, or if in the trial in Nuremberg it was right to condemn to death the commander of Auschwitz.

Dealing with such conflicts may not help students to understand much, when insufficient information about the whole political background and the socioeconomic context is provided.

Another problem is whether efforts should be made to build an integrated curriculum, or if relations among different subjects should be left up to cooperative efforts of teachers of the subjects. The development in Germany up to the early 1970s was characterized by clearly distinguished subjects, completely unrelated to each other. In the early 1970s new curricula with just the opposite tack were tried, a totally integrated approach. These curricula had almost no chance of being used in schools; they were immediately rejected. Now the trend is toward some kind of cooperation or coordination.

I think we should be very skeptical about the practicability of cooperation between different teachers at school. Normally they will not take the time and energy to coordinate the problems they are dealing with in their disciplines. But even if they do make this effort, that alone does not help the student get a correct insight into the interrelations among problems.

As an example of possible cooperation, we talked about the Afghanistan crisis. A religion teacher could talk about Islam and the Koran. The history teacher might know about the different kings and power structures in Afghanistan and the country's relationship with Russia; perhaps he would even know about economic impacts on power structures. But which of these teachers would give the information necessary to understand the impact religion has on Russian politics and Soviet ideology as they are affected by the 70 million Islamic people living in Russia in the regions bordering Iran and Afghanistan? Although Hans Sussmuth might be right in questioning that progressives favor integration and conservatives favor reliance on cooperation, I doubt, from my personal experience of studying political science, that we can rely on cooperation to give stu-
dents an overall point of view on power structures in society. When I studied political science it was left to us to integrate what we learned, with the result that most of us were unable to get an adequate picture of the reality of democratic government. Concerning integrated curricula, I think there are some examples within the American "new social studies" which can help us develop more-integrated materials, although it does not help us to turn to American projects for the sake of integration as long as they are so positivistic and noncritical.

Society, Social Justice, and Political Education

In reading these papers I was amazed to see what subjects were discussed by the authors and the reactors. Apparently this subject provoked much more thinking about the political and social conditions in which social studies are taught than did any other. All of the papers dealt more with this sociopolitical framework than with questions of social justice. My impression was that social justice seems to be a key concept, stimulating and clarifying our thinking about the dependence of social studies on political conditions. Indeed, it is threatening that Germany as well as the United States is experiencing a conservative backlash in the social studies, that state control over social studies and schools in general has been growing enormously during the last decade.

Siegfried George mentioned in his paper the frame of reference in which the development of German social/political education must be viewed, pointing to the Nazism and political indoctrination Germans experienced in the 1930s. I might add here that the research I have done shows that we did not have any tradition of democratic political education in the Weimar Republic of the 1920s (Lange-Quassowski 1979). Although I would not say (as some Americans think) that the Americans forced a democratic government on Germany after World War II—it was a process of mutual development—I must say, from my research on re-education in the social studies field, that the Americans helped us a great deal in establishing political science and other social sciences at the university level as well as social studies at the school level. Alone, we would have started later and differently and would perhaps have had a different pattern of development.
I am underlining this strongly to make us aware of the different historical conditions in which the new conservative movements are taking place. We have had 10 years or 15 at most of development of critical theory in Germany, and I doubt that there has yet been much impact of all the critical didactics in the schools or in the classrooms. Since there was no tradition of democratic political education in the schools before the late 1950s, the subject was gradually introduced in the curriculum beginning in the 1960s. But it was taken into the traditional German three-track system which is very hierarchically organized and at the beginning it was nothing more than knowledge about institutions. Now, having a tradition of social/political education of only about 20 years, and having developed a critical view of the theory of political education only during the past 10 years, German civic education is already shifting back to content and to cooperation instead of integration, an approach which may result in somewhat nondemocratic, passive attitudes in students. Students thus educated within the gene-
german historical background will fulfill their democratic duties because they are required to do so, not because they are committed to democracy.

From my point of view, "back to conservatism" in political education in Germany means going back to old German traditions, which have not been democratic but rather authoritarian.* We Germans badly need critical thinking within the schools to finally get committed at some time in the future to democracy. Siegfried/George's concern, in the debate on radicals in the public service, is not so much alarm over the few who might not be allowed to teach, as Kariheinz Rebel suggests in his paper, as concern that members of a whole young generation which has hardly learned how to behave democratically now see their future threatened if they engage in radical political activity as they try to find and define their political view of the world.

*Quite a lot of research has been done in the past decade concerning democratic political movements in Germany during the past century; see Walter Grab, Deutsch revolutionäre Demokraten, and Axol Kuhn, Jakob im Rheinland, Stuttgart 1976; Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratisc
Partei Deutschlands (So:pad) 1934-1940, Frankfurt/Main 1980; Biographisch Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933, München 1980. But there is no doubt that such political thoughts never belonged to the mainstream of German political tradition.
Another point of concern for critical German social studies educators is state control of the schoolbook publishing market, for social/political education as well as for other subjects. The adoption practices are so authoritarian that neither the publishing house nor the author normally learns the reasons why a book is rejected in one state and adopted in another. There is a whole wave of literature now researching the varying practices of the different state bureaucracies regarding adoption practices (Nitzschke 1977; Stein 1979; Tewes 1979). This new research shows that those practices follow a long authoritarian tradition in Germany. George's statement that one of the first schoolbooks written by Hälligen and him for social studies would no longer be adopted is another sign of a conservative threat to a democratic development in Germany, a conservative threat which makes the critical social studies educator suspect.

Looking Toward the Future

Although you often hear that we in Germany should not always dwell on our past, I think it was necessary here to draw upon history to give a better understanding of the political context in which our discussion--especially related to the increasing influence of the state--must be seen. Although I have given my opinion that we have not yet been able to overcome our past (to say it in German for the Germans: Unsere Vergangenheit zu bewältigen!), I think I should end with the indication that the task for social studies educators is as well to overcome the future. In terms of subjects or themes of the conference, there has been very little discussion of how to cope with future problems. We talked a lot about teaching problems, how to teach teachers, effectively, how to cope with the negative effects of the hidden curriculum, what we have to know about the learner, and so on. But we gave little thought to future developments in society and politics, although we have alluded many times to their influence on the curriculum. If further developments in society and politics are going to have so much influence on what we are doing, we have to give more thoughts to those developments.

I will not have time to discuss at length what will go on in the next one or two decades, but I do think that the importance of domestic
world politics referred to by Dieter Schmidt-Sinns (n.d.) will increase in the following areas:

1. The new industrial revolution brought about within the next one or two decades by new technologies, by information technologies in particular, will deeply change our industrial society into an information society which will have to rely on a totally different occupational structure. We will go through a period of struggle by employees and trade unions against unemployment, dequalification of jobs, and so forth. The new information society will perhaps change personal relationships more than television has changed family life.

2. A subject of equal importance in future decades will be the burden we put on future generations by confronting them with great residues of chemical poisons, atomic waste, water and air pollution, and related problems. No generation before us has left so many problems for future generations. The explosion of nuclear weapons and the threat against all life on the earth—survival of mankind—is a second dimension of concern about this future.

3. A third area of future concern, which I mention only briefly, is the North-South conflict, the major dimension of which is the struggle for oil.

Ending here, I note with apology that I have commented on the areas in which I felt most qualified, and so have omitted discussion of the learner and comments on social studies in the United Kingdom.

References


13. A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE CONFERENCE

By Ian Kershaw

So wide is the gulf between theorists and practitioners in curriculum making that it is difficult to reconcile oneself to the task of attempting a synthesis of the proceedings of an international conference on the subject of social and political education. As one of only three practicing teachers working in schools who attended the conference, I feel particularly conscious of a need to articulate a view of what transpired from the perspective of a teacher involved in attempts to introduce social and political education into the formal curricula of a school.

I here have to make plain my prejudice: Not until the curriculum theoreticians begin to understand the complex social and political world of the school and the political behavior of teachers in their workplace will their prescriptions for radical innovation transcend mere rhetorical invocation. I fear already that what I have to contribute is going to seem unremarkable and "lowbrow." However, I ought to say as an optimistic pessimist that the notion of social and political education, as I conceive it to be, is so important an area of concern for anyone involved in the education of young people that it must be pursued, even in the face of weighty arguments suggesting the almost impervious nature of schooling to any radical proposals, let alone changes, which challenge the status quo.

The Need for Definition of Terms

The first issue I want to raise is one that Ted Cohn (1980) pointed to in response to three papers presented by Siegfried George, John Palmer, and Geoff Whitty on the relationship between social justice and social and political education. Cohn highlights the failure of all three to adequately consider social justice as a concept, and thereby to define or elaborate on the meaning of social justice. Of course, as Cohn himself recognized, this raises the question of whether it is possible at all to consider social justice separately from the reality of the social conditions of a specific society. I do not want to argue
that point here. I would simply wish to agree with Cohn when he states that "social justice can and should be considered in terms of absolute standards which transcend the immediate social conditions of existence." I do so on grounds that I have an ideological view of the nature of people and how they should be able to conduct their social relationships within any society. My ideology then, whether you agree with it or not, becomes critical to any meaningful discussion I might have about social and political education since, by definition, it is in part dependent upon my conception of social justice. If, as Cohn again points out, there are no criteria by which to judge social justice, as there is no definition or elaboration, how is it to be pursued through social and political education? In fact, what is being pursued?

This brings me to a major obstacle that confronted me in attempts to judge the value of all the contributions to the conference. No conception, no clarification, no definition was offered by any contributor of what, in his mind, constituted social justice, and thereby no idea of the notion of social and political education. Throughout the conference it seemed to be acceptable to assume that we each attached the same meaning to social and political education and that our ends in terms of social justice were compatible. I am far from convinced that they were.

I do not wish to fall into my own trap by failing to make clear my own position regarding the meaning, as I conceive it, of social and political education, or by failing to elaborate the ends which I believe my conception seeks to pursue. Before I do so, however, I should make it clear that I have a triple purpose in mind.

The first purpose is to establish that I have attached a particular meaning to the phrase "social and political education" which is not synonymous with terms like social studies, social science, sociology, or any other realm of knowledge, be it integrated or otherwise. One of the most disconcerting, and I believe misleading, habits of conference members was to use a variety of terms interchangeably. The assumption made by nearly all seemed to be that "social studies," for instance, held the same meaning and was equivalent to the term "social and political education." As I hope will be clear from my definition and elaboration, it
does not and cannot be—unless, of course, my conception is so totally
too wide of the mark that I was at the wrong conference.

My second purpose in elaborating upon my own definition and concep-
tion is to argue that only on the basis of an explicit purpose is it
possible to begin to confront the complex problems to be faced in any
attempt to establish a radical innovation within state schools. Further,
unless this first step is taken, it will never be possible to establish
a dialogue with teachers and others in the community whose commitment is
needed if anything is to be achieved in any school. As Whitty suggests:

A radical approach needs to be much clearer about its rela-
tionship to broader struggles for social justice, both in
order to develop a more coherent sense of the relevance of
educational struggles to the achievement of social change and
in order to mobilize support for radical initiatives against
the undoubted strength of the conservative forces which oppose
them (Whitty 1980).

My third purpose is straightforward. It is to provide the reader
with at least some basis upon which to judge my ideological stance
with social justice and change in society and to be able to relate my
observations to some kind of internal and external criteria.

It is not my purpose here, it must be emphasized, to promote my
ideology as the conception of social and political education. Rather, I
would like to establish the need for a conception before any dialogue
can be undertaken.

A Conception of Social/Political Education

Definition

Social and political education is the lifelong process of develop-
ing those attitudes, critical skills, and modes of behavior which will
enable the individual, in whatever social context he finds himself, to
be active constructively in molding, improving, and changing that society.

Aims

To provide learning experiences which will enable each individual
continuously:

—To learn in collaboration with others.

—To understand the complexities of the changing society in which
  he or she lives, and of other societies; to cope with a changing society,
  the predictable and unpredictable through interaction with values and
traditions as they exist and may develop, and acquire an insight into the nature and dynamics of social organization and institutions.

—To inquire into and increase his or her own awareness of and confidence in the range of cognitive and affective perceptions that he or she can bring to bear on the process of understanding and making sense of the world.

—To be involved in community interrelationships that will facilitate an active engagement with the educative potential of the community.

—To exercise the freedom to discover alternatives and promote change.

—To inquire into and increase his or her awareness of the diversity of human behavior, its origins, development, motives, and needs.

Lifelong Learning Objectives

AFFECTIVE

—Demonstrates resolution to value all individuals equally.

—Demonstrates willingness to learn and to change one's behavior.

—Interprets feelings, interests, and needs of other people.

—Considers other people's feelings and interests in all his or her thinking.

—Demonstrates willingness to be honest about his or her own feelings.

—Demonstrates resolution to act in accordance with moral choices and decisions.

—Makes judgments about his or her own conflicts, anxieties, and problems.

—Demonstrates a willingness to examine his or her own values/motives, and to modify them in the light of observation of the values and judgments of others.

—Demonstrates forms of collaborative engagement within a community, with groups and individuals consistent with valuing others equally.

—Displays willingness to show objectivity in situations of conflict.

—Demonstrates the right to actively participate in democratic processes, including the right to pursue the change of those processes.
- Demonstrates willingness and courage to express his or her feelings and interests and those of others, in attempting to promote change; acts in solidarity.
- Questions the dichotomy between the oppressed and oppressors in our society and in other societies.
- Questions the unequal distribution of power, authority, and resources in our society on the basis of human need and moral choices.
- Demonstrates courage to actively participate in promoting change on the basis of moral decisions.

Cognitive
- Evaluates the complexities of society through an interdisciplinary and eclectic approach to the exploration and explanation of the realities of social living and in experimentation with the realities of social living.
- Appraises the social expectations and conventions of groups in society.
- Assesses the accuracy, precision, and logic of information about the realities of living in society.
- Evaluates information about human behavior.
- Judges the logical consistency of moral decisions based on internal and external criteria.
- Justifies a decision to modify a position arrived at by analysis and education, in the light of new evidence or perceptions.
- Demonstrates the ability to appraise information or situations in the light of previous personal experience.
- Judges the value of material, the quality of evidence, the consequences, and the possible effectiveness of implementation.
- Judges the adequacy of the laws, rules, and contracts that affect self and others in society against moral criteria.
- Judges appropriate forms of collaborative engagement with a community, its groups, and individuals on the basis of valuing others equally.
- Judges the adequacy of change in society on the basis of moral criteria and the need to solve conflicts of interest which are problematic in a continuously changing society.
- Judges the adequacy of the way in which social institutions function and are organized in society.
—Judges the unequal way in which power, authority, and resources are distributed in our society on the basis of human need and moral choices.

—Judges effective and appropriate ways of promoting change consistent with moral choices.

The Importance of Stating Learning Outcomes

This definition and elaboration is, of course, but a prerequisite for further development and thinking about purposes and outcomes; but it will now be apparent, I hope, that my conception of social and political education also holds consequences for the conditions under which learning opportunities for such ends could be provided. Another conception will have different purposes requiring other conditions. The main point, of course, is not whether my conception is viewed as more or less radical than another's, but that when purposes are made explicit there is something on which to ground a dialogue, either about the nature of the purposes or about the ways in which they can be achieved. I would go so far as to suggest that at heart it becomes a political and ideological conflict made public, rather than a pretentious effort to discover consensus where there may be none.

Extant approaches to curriculum making in this country tend to eschew the practice of making explicit statements about learning objectives, and I gained the strong impression at the conference that as a result of the behavioral objectives boom in the United States, there is now something of a backlash in that country.

As Suzanne Helburn suggested at the conference, the real innovation of the 1960s was the fundamentally revolutionary nature of course design and planning, utilizing objectives-based models. This is a view with which I would agree, for there seems nothing quite so radical and challenging as making statements about ideological outcomes for a social and political education within state schooling. Unfortunately the behaviorists, if they did not invent the outcomes model, at least claimed it for their own under the awful title B.O. (behavioral objectives). The resulting "Stamp Out B.O." campaigns have caused teachers, particularly in this country, to reject almost out of hand the idea of making statements about intentions. Stenhouse (1975), having led the campaign in...
this country, has much to answer for! He and his supporters were so
successful that to talk about outcomes now is itself a politically risky
business in many educational quarters.

Not wishing to belabor the point, my suspicion is that, whatever
the reasons, rejection of statements about desired outcomes serves only
to hinder dialogue and debate about critically important issues within
the area of concern that I understand social and political education to
be. Worse still, it is a handicap to those of us wishing to discover
some solidarity with those others working toward similar ends. Without
such statements, without making explicit the kind of society we wish to
see, without outlining the qualities and values we wish to develop, on
what basis do we collaborate, proceed, or, indeed, change anything?

The Gulf Between Theorists and Practitioners

I am now led back to my opening statements about the gulf which
exists between the theorists and the practitioners—the teachers and the
taught. Roger Fielding's interesting paper, illuminating the phenomeno-
logical world of his pupils in the sociology lesson, highlights the
primacy of the hidden curriculum which

claimed superior knowledge for the teachers and a devaluation
of pupils' opinions and, consequently, a high status for
knowledge defined as such by the teacher and a low status for
pupils' own experiences and experientially based knowledge
(Fielding 1980).

This seems to me but a reflection of the situation which exists between
the theorists and the practitioners in the social and political educa-
tion arena.

Having seen the advertisement for the [Guildford] conference, and
having been impressed with the scope of the issues to be considered, I
applied to be enrolled. I should, of course, have done my homework more
thoroughly. I was daunted and not a little shocked to discover that,
out of a total of approximately 80 participants, only three were teachers.
The rest were academics—pure theorists, most with little or no direct
experience of working with young people in the context of schools.
Indeed, there appeared to be an underlying arrogant assumption, within
the papers and in much of the discussion, that there is no thinking or
action going on about social and political education other than that
which is in the minds of academics. (The conference managed to spend.
five days talking about social and political education entirely without
reference to women's liberation movements, community education, black
consciousness and minority group action, community action groups, infor-
mal youth work, or any other group with a direct interest in, and experi-
ence of, social and political education. This can only be an indictment
of us all, and one which serves to demonstrate the poverty of our think-
ing.) The daunting temptation, of course, was to succumb to the hidden
curriculum which attempts to claim superior knowledge for the academics
and a devaluation of teachers' opinions.

Now, the point is not that pure theorists have nothing to contrib-
ute; it is that teachers as practitioners can contribute too. The con-
flict presented by the dichotomy of separating theory from practice,
academics from teachers, cannot easily be resolved—and certainly not by
a simplistic attack upon the ivory towers of the academic world, as if
by indicting them and thereby attempting to claim superior knowledge for
ourselves, teachers are going to bring about a radical change in the
conceptualization of the problems to be faced in the field of social and
political education. We have as many ivory towers of our own.

The fact is that I agree with Michael Young when he says:
I am concerned with the problem of change in education; with
developing a theory or theories that may enable those involved
in 'education to become aware of ways of changing their or
their pupils' or students' educational experience, even if
this leads us to conceive of teachers' struggles as not inde-
dependent from other struggles in the work places and communi-
ties where people live (Young 1977, my emphasis).

Our problem is that teachers do not regard themselves as politicians, or
as acting politically in their workplace. This problem is compounded by
the fact that those who are politically involved usually insist that
they are working in the interests of the school and its community, when
in fact they are often no more than profiting their own self-esteem,
reputation, and career interests. Furthermore, any attempts to intro-
duce radical innovation into the curriculum have to face the reality
that schools as organizations are governments too, and that the social
and political dimensions of their internal structures are inextricably
linked to the communities they serve and to the wider society beyond.

My concern at the moment is with establishing the realization that
the politics of innovative decision making within schools is fundamend-
ally important to the fate of any attempt to change the curriculum, and
that the phenomenological/political world of teachers is an area of con-
cern which the theorists cannot afford to ignore, and one which as yet
they hardly seem to have recognized. If people seeking to introduce a
radical innovation are unable or unwilling to recognize and confront the
practical and political problems which the practitioners themselves per-
ceive in their schools and communities, I can see little hope of over-
coming the syndrome whereby the theorists' prescriptions for change
overcome the communication barriers which already exist. My optimistic
conviction is that change toward a radical social and political educa-
tion can be effected if academics and practitioners move toward a collab-
orative relationship, where theory and practice might come to be seen
as a dialectical process leading toward praxis. I look forward to the
moment when a teacher of social and political education is appointed a
professor of education while remaining in his post at school, continuing
to develop a theory or theories about ways of changing educational
experience.

I have deliberately refrain[ed] from commenting about the absence of
discussion in the conference about the conditions for learning necessary
to establish a radical program of social and political education, or
about the teaching and learning skills which might be seen as prerequi-
sites for an educator in this field. This is not to imply that I regard
them as unimportant issues, but rather that I can proceed toward a prof-
itable discussion of these matters and others only on some basis of
understanding and agreement about the purpose of a social and political
education. I am not certain that we have an understanding. I am sure
that we have no agreement.

We must begin with the fundamental problem of why schools omit from
their curricula any systematic attempt to provide a radical social and
political education that helps pupils to acquire those attitudes, criti-
cal skills, and modes of behavior which will enable them to begin to
make sense of their experiences in an integrated way and to be active
constructively in molding, improving, and changing society. The fact
that sociology, political science, history, or any other discipline is
able to contribute to the solution of the problem cannot be accepted as
an excuse for discouraging teachers, or anyone else in the community,
from searching for solutions to the problem. Neither should it become an excuse for permitting any realm of knowledge to take over the social and political education of young people.

References


The conference at Guildford was truly international in character—more so than other international conferences I have attended, the others tending to be dominated by one country. In this case, all three countries were ably and truly represented, making it possible to see the "national character" in the course of the presentations and interim conversations. The German tendency to categorize, the English tendency to politicize, and the American tendency to pragmatize—all appeared many times over.

I was aware of five themes that recurred during the conference, and five avenues for productive research occurred to me.

Five Recurring Themes

Theory vs. Practice

The first theme, both in prominence and in frequency of occurrence, was the relationship between theory and practice. This arose, perhaps, from the fact that most of the participants were from universities and colleges, but it also seemed to characterize the state of the field of the social studies. If theory exists to clarify reality, then the relationship between theory and practice ought to be obvious. Theory should be grounded in reality and should constantly refer to reality. This is not always the case. In some instances, we seem to develop theories about theories, and the practitioners yawn. In other instances, we fail to suggest the practical meaning of theory, leaving it at the abstract level. Again, the practitioners look elsewhere for guidance.

The problem of theory vs. practice was solved in principle a generation ago in the movement called "cooperative action research," which had a short life during the early 1950s. The movement required that university consultants work cooperatively with teachers on questions of importance to the teachers, jointly designing research intended to examine the questions as revised for research purposes. The movement resulted in reports that did not look like the research then in vogue, and the movement was quickly dispatched by the formal researchers of the...
day. While "action research" is still spoken of occasionally, it is hard to tell what it is. It is definitely not cooperative, involving practitioners in the design.

The problem of theory and practice as discussed at the conference did not contemplate such a solution. It turned on older notions, such as "bridging the gap," which means that theoreticians explain to practitioners the practical usefulness of their theory. Such an approach keeps the practitioner out of the process of theory making, and it is bound to be inadequate, as has been demonstrated throughout this century.

The problem is complicated by the indefinite status of the social studies in the university. The currency exchanged in the university—that which one seeks to accumulate—is prestige. The prestige system of the university has little or nothing to do with the theory/practice dilemma as faced by educationists. The pressure on the member of a university faculty is to produce abstract theory, and to leave application of theory to others. It is not surprising that cooperative action research has a low standing in the university. It's too close to practice. The university expects its faculty to speak as from a high place to the multitudes, not to get with the rabble and participate in their confusions and difficulties. It may be that alternative institutions will have to form to deal with the theory/practice problem. Indeed, such alternatives are forming, though many of them don't last long. I refer to the teacher centers and to the growing number of specialized institutes, some in universities but free of faculty domination.

Disciplines vs. Issues

A second major theme expressed during the conference was the question of whether the social studies should be viewed as an array of disciplines, and so offered, or, instead, viewed as an arena where broad social issues are examined.

The issue is of considerable importance. It has an influence on the prestige of the social studies field in the university (see above); it also has a profound effect on the way the field is organized and offered in the lower schools.

Briefly, the issue is as follows: Organized disciplines are easier to teach than unorganized public issues. Since they are easier to teach, they are often well taught, and thus they win the respect of the stu-
dents. However, the disciplines as such have little to do with the affairs of daily life. They therefore often seem abstract and irrelevant to the students. Why, from a student's point of view, is it important to know the past? The past is just that—the past. It is gone. Many a teacher has failed to convince students that history is worth their serious attention.

On the other hand, the study of immediate social problems is obviously of immediate importance. Transportation, taxes, crime, public health, and many other current social problems are all around us in the media; the materials for study appear daily in the press. One can actually talk to the actors in these dramas. The study of contemporary social issues is fun and exciting.

However, social issues don't come in neat, well-organized packages. Precisely because they are contemporary, they are unsettled, and one cannot "know" the solutions. Moreover, whenever students plan and develop the study of such issues, they go beyond the teacher's knowledge almost at once, and the study is not well directed. Too frequently, the study of contemporary social issues is therefore superficial and even mistaken. It's lots of fun, but it's shallow. It does not win the respect of the better students as does the approach through the disciplines.

There have been many attempts to have it both ways at once, and the attempts have generally not succeeded. A four-year social studies program at the high school level which devotes three of the four years to the disciplines and the fourth year to "Problems of Democracy" is the most popular solution to the problem in the United States. In England and Germany, the approach seems to be to keep issues and disciplines separate, with much more emphasis on the political aspects of the issues. However, the study of issues is only now becoming widespread in these two countries.

The problem of the relationship between the disciplines and the study of public issues remains to be solved satisfactorily. No one at the conference, as far as I could see, was satisfied with the present state of affairs, and no one had an adequate solution to propose.
School and Society

The question "Dare the schools change the social order?" goes back to the early 1930s, of course, but it still crops up, and it appeared at the conference.

The question has never been answered adequately. One participant in the conference insisted at length that the schools are inherently weak social instruments, and that they can do no more than reflect the movements and pressures of the larger society of which they are a part. Others—especially the English who were interested in teaching politics to students, and the neo-Marxists in the group—insisted the opposite. Since the schools work with the entire population at its most impressionable period, they argue, the schools can indeed change the social order, particularly if they make the students aware of the large-scale influences that operate on it.

This argument has not changed in 50 years. One observation by this observer might change it a little. It may be that the effect of the schools on the social order is very long term, and that the argument since 1930 has overlooked this. For example, the younger generation was taken, in the United States, by Theodore Roosevelt's campaign for conservation. Roosevelt expressed his times so accurately that he captured the imaginations of a whole generation of young people.

Some of these young people became teachers. I myself was taught by such teachers in the 1920s, and I was thoroughly propagandaized concerning the necessity of conservation, the importance of wilderness areas, and the value of the national parks. When my children came along, these matters were taken for granted. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the environmental movement has gained such power so quickly. The way was paved by Roosevelt nearly four generations ago; it was spread by the schools, and the entire population was prepared. The schools were selective in what they propagandaized in the 1920s. Prohibition was an equally popular movement at the turn of the century, but the schools did not take it up, and it died. The same can be said of other popular movements in Roosevelt's time: prevention of cruelty to animals and antivivisectionism, religious revivalism, even most of the popular music.

It may be, given this example, that the schools should think of themselves as having long-term effects, and that school people should
believe that when they speak to the young about an issue with one voice, the effect will be widespread in a generation or two or three. So it may be now, for example, with respect to worldmindedness.

The Weakness of the Social Studies

One of the themes that recurred was the weakness of the social studies. This was spoken of more by the English than by the other participants. It seems that it is difficult to persuade educational authorities in England to give a place to the social studies, as contrasted with history or geography. In England, "social studies" appears to mean the study of social issues, and one is reminded of the discussion above of issues vs. disciplines. However, in the United States the field is weak, too, especially in the elementary grades.

Evidence of this weakness comes from the widespread practice in the elementary schools of taking time from the social studies whenever time is needed for other purposes, such as pageants and festivals, fund drives, collections, and so on. One would not take time from the "3 Rs" for these purposes, but the social studies is so ill defined that one can take time from it and it will not be missed.

Similarly, Man: A Course of Study was placed in grade 5 with almost no attention to what was already there (typically, U.S. history). The most widely accepted rationale for elementary social studies is Paul Hanna's old expanding-environments theory, despite the fact that the approach has been under attack for years because it does not correspond with the facts of child development. Moreover, Hanna's own defense of it (in conversation with this writer) was propagandistic—it was supposed to lead inevitably toward worldmindedness.

The field is weak because it lacks an organizing conception of purpose and an agreed-upon content. The conference did not face this problem, so the problem remains to plague us.

Politicking the Curriculum and Research

A minor theme at the conference, but one that recurred, was the idea that the social studies should be the expression of a political program, and that unless research in the field gave expression to social injustice, it should not be done.

This position is outrageous, from the point of view which insists that students be educated to form their own opinions, especially in the
political sphere. It violates the freedom of inquiry of students and researchers, and it promotes a fragile consensus instead of informed opinion.

The theme arises from the fact that social injustice exists in Germany, England, and the United States. The principal proponents of the theme at the conference came from England, where social education appears to be programmatic in character. In the International Education Association's study of mathematics, it was found that the father's occupation was most strongly related to achievement in Germany and that it was very strongly related in England; the correlation was relatively weak in the United States. Class barriers do exist, but it is doubtful that the way to remove them is to turn the social studies into anti-class propaganda.

The Research Agenda

Five lines of research that should be productive occurred to me during the conference, both because of things said during the presentations and as a consequence of some private conversations.

Social Values and Mechanisms of Children

Descriptive research is lacking concerning what children's social values actually are. Further work, a la Kohlberg, would be productive of knowledge that would allow us to know better what we are doing with children when we intervene in their social behavior. I did some of this years ago and reported it in a book, Children's Social Values: An Action Research Study. The book was badly reviewed and had no impact, but it contains some insights of value. One of them is the finding that children spend much of their effort in school keeping even the balance of aggression and counteraggression, and that the teacher ordinarily tips the balance when he or she intervenes. Other equally interesting findings are there to be made. The techniques of developmental psychology would serve the purpose.

Nature and Content of Social/Political Education

It is interesting that, among the recurring themes of the conference, there was little or no discussion of the nature and content of social/political education. The discussion dealt at some length with the general aims of such programs, but scarcely at all with what the
programs should include. I conclude that systematic thought in this field would be productive. It is easy to find fault with the usual American secondary social studies program, but apparently perplexing to develop agreed-upon alternatives. In many high schools, the social studies program is fragmented beyond recognition.

If it were up to me, I would build the entire program around the concept of national and world citizenship, with a strong sequence and very solid content. Perhaps a national conference on this topic would result in papers that would move the problem toward solution.

**Structure of the Social Studies**

Closely related to the nature and content of the social studies is the structure of the field. As things stand, it is a scattering of disciplines, lacking cumulative effect.

There are several important questions that call for examination. One of these is the place of history and geography. Should they be separate subjects? Should they be combined? Made subordinate to an overriding theme, such as citizenship? How should achievement in social studies be evaluated? What about the relationship between social studies and actual life? What kind of sequence would lead to cumulative knowledge in this field?

What is needed are strong proposals in response to questions of this type. Perhaps the immediate way to generate such proposals is to give awards for dissertations and papers that deal with the questions, to form a high-level commission on the topic, to devote national meetings to the questions over several years, and in general to call attention to the problem and keep attention directed to it for a period of time.

**Effect of Social Studies on Attitudes and Behavior of Students**

Several research studies have shown that participation in social studies classes has no perceptible effect on the civic behavior of students. Research is needed on why this is so and what can be done about it. My own guess is that social studies programs do not deal with civic competence—the skills required to take part in the political community. In the absence of instruction in how to do things, the students do nothing, or turn elsewhere for help. We could learn from the labor movement in this field.
Political Development

The growth and development of political knowledge, skills, and attitudes among young people would be a very fruitful line of research. In the absence of knowledge in this field, it is difficult to plan a social studies program intended to increase political knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Such studies should cover the entire range of child development, from the beginning of socialization, at age 2½, to adult life—say, age 25. Social studies people should learn enough of research technique in child development to take part in such work. Graduate programs should stress the field, to the end that students may emerge from such programs equipped to carry on the work.

Conclusions

From my point of view, the conference was both productive and disappointing. It was instructive for me with respect to the social studies in England and Germany. Certain ideas were presented with which I was not familiar, so I felt educated. As I have indicated, I was sorry that there was not more talk about the content—the curriculum—of the field. That will have to wait for another occasion, which I hope will come soon.
RELATED RESOURCES IN THE ERIC SYSTEM

Social/Political Education in Britain


Describes the social world of childhood as told to the author by a group of primary school children, with particular reference to the classroom. Results reveal a complex knowledge of the values of social interaction. Knowing how to be competent members of the classroom was a primary concern.


Examines and criticizes theories and arguments in contemporary sociology of education and points out limitations in these theories. Topics discussed include the Labour party's contributions to educational policy, education and democratic socialism, and political education in the curriculum.


Examines social studies in England in light of political developments such as increase in demand for local educational control in Scotland and Wales and closer economic and social ties between England and the European Community. New directions for citizenship education are recommended which reflect these developments and encourage students to develop critical-thinking skills.


The author presents a general framework of social studies concepts and inquiry processes to be developed in the middle years, which correlates to primary and secondary offerings and which is appropriate to the development stages of students ages 8-13.


Considers the sociological research of Max Weber in relation to recent sociology of education. Elements of his approach (social action, power, authority and bureaucracy, ideology, and class) are compared with other approaches.
This issue of Social Science Teacher contains articles and resources related to social science teaching on the elementary and secondary levels in England. There are five sections: articles, miscellaneous, reviews, resources, and briefings. The three main articles in the issue discuss the role of environmental studies in social science curricula, the third world and third world studies, and pros and cons of interdisciplinary programs.

All five 1976 issues of Social Science Teacher are presented here. They contain articles and resources for social science teaching on elementary and secondary levels in England. The February issue examines assessment of social science programs, the ideological potential of high school sociology, and an experimental program of "linkage" whereby students in two schools teach each other by exchanging learning packages. Articles in the April issue focus on social change and social control as goals of studying society, usefulness of traditional standard examinations for new social science curricula, and an experimental sociology program which studies community rights. The June and October issues are special editions on school textbooks and curriculum projects, and games and simulations, respectively. The November issue includes articles on cultural studies and values education and on teaching the concept of role.

Social/Political Education in West Germany


The sequence, content, instructional goals, methods, materials, and classroom environment of West German social studies education are described.


In recent years, political and social studies have been under revision in the individual states of the Federal Republic of Germany. Many states have issued framework guidelines for the various school branches and levels to provide teachers with orientation aids. Progressive educators see the goal of political and social studies as being more than just the imparting of knowledge via political, social, economic, and legal institutions. They are more concerned with awakening interest in these things with the aid of a knowledge of interrelationships and events. The goal is the articulate citizen capable of criticism and thus the creation of the preconditions for democracy and further democratization. Two learning objectives developed by the state North Rhine-Westphalia are the ability and willingness to think in terms of political alternatives, to work as a member of different social groups, and to display
concrete teaching processes so that the school is a public showcase of a democratic institution.


An innovative social studies teacher education program at the University of Tubingen, West Germany, is described. The problems, aims, and structure of the course of study as well as general theories of learning in West Germany are discussed and these educational phenomena are compared with their American counterparts.


This theoretical discussion explores pedagogical assumptions of political education in West Germany. Three major methodological orientations are discussed: the normative-ontological, empirical-analytical, and dialectical-historical. The author recounts the aims, methods, and basic presuppositions of each of these approaches. Topics discussed include what is and what is not learned in schools, how teachers might talk about political education, how to formulate political and educational ideas theoretically and how to conceptualize them, to what degree theoretical positions can be called political, how theories are discussed in political didactics, and literature on the discussion of political didactics within West Germany. Views of socialist Herbert Marcuse and liberal Karl Popper are compared in an attempt to show politics as the concrete expression of theories extracted from the humanities and the sciences. Remarks on the paper by Cleo Cherryholmes at Michigan State University and Klaus Hornung at Pedagogische Hochschule, Reutlingen, West Germany, are included. German bibliographic sources are cited in the document.


A German version of the Sesame Street television series which integrates social and political education is described.


Surveys leading positions in political education in Western Germany and outlines the main aspects of neoconservative, liberal, and socialist thought.


This paper examines West Germany's educational system by discussing the status of K-12 political and social studies education. It was not until the late 1960s that social studies education was introduced as a subject on a wide scale into West Germany's school curriculum. The reason for its introduction and development was the desire to supplement the traditional German conception of a democratic state with elements of American democracy as a way of life. Empirical studies dealing with the results of political education from the 1960s indicate that attitudes regarding more democracy, less prejudice, and a greater readiness to criticize and participate in the political process have not changed much. This is due to several factors: the lack of a central institution which would determine objectives of social studies education and deal with pedagogical and methodological problems, the lack of special training of many teachers in social studies, and the tendency of many tenured teachers to rely mainly on poorly written textbooks and not to utilize audiovisuals and other supplementary materials. Two reactions to the paper are also included.


The evolution of political education in Germany from the late 19th century to the present is outlined.


Social/Political Education in the United States


Three teaching traditions of social studies are examined and compared: (1) social studies taught as citizenship transmission (traditional), (2) social studies taught as social science and history, and (3) social studies taught as reflective inquiry (reform).


A summary and a critique of citizenship education that defines it as education for decision making within a democratic society. Ethical and epistemological aspects of the fundamental assumptions are clarified.

Ten conclusions about children's learning are presented from 15 years of research by the Educational Research Council of America. These include effectiveness of short textbooks, interest in learning technical words, need for social science curriculum to challenge, and detrimental effect of ingrained teacher attitudes to teach social studies by rote.


Reviews and often refutes positions concerning the nature of social studies. Focuses on how the social scientist relates to three commonly accepted elements of citizenship education: (1) knowledge, (2) participation, experience, and decision making, and (3) values and attitudes. Proposes an elimination of the barrier between social scientists and social studies educators.


Survey results of 440 educators who designated preference for one of these social studies approaches: history, experience, critical thinking, social science, involvement. Although critical thinking was the first preference, more than 70 percent of the teachers expressed belief that history was the most frequently used approach in American public schools.


Examines certain assumptions about social research which guide teaching and give power and authority to curriculum.


A definition of "the disciplines" is presented along with a case for organizing curriculum on the basis of the social sciences. Several arguments against the disciplines are discussed and rejected.


In this symposium, six social scientists examine their fields (history, geography, political science, economics, anthropology, sociology) and identify essential concepts to serve as a foundation and a set of guidelines for classroom work.

Comparative Views

The document contains the texts of two speeches and a group discussion of adult political education in the United States and Germany from a conference that compared recent social, economic, and political developments in the two countries. The first speech characterizes adult political education in Germany as constituting approximately 10 percent of the total adult education program. A clear relationship is indicated between recent demands for political education and disillusionment with highly industrialized mass society. Review of ten political education curricula currently in use reveals high interest among adults in West Germany in business, the family in modern society, educational policy, citizen action, the social market economy, and European integration. The second speech focuses on the United States and explains recent adult education demands as a result of dissatisfaction with corporate authority and a demand for citizen participation at all levels of decision making. The third report presents a discussion by German and American educators, government officials, and spokesmen from political institutes of the first two papers. Topics discussed include the relationship between political action and political learning, causes of the renaissance of interest in adult political education, cultural environment, and changes in adult political perspectives as a result of political education. The conclusion is that additional data on the nature of participation in adult education programs will be required before valid cross-cultural comparisons can be made.


Compares emphases of the American High School Geography Project with the West German curriculum development project. Notes the German project's stronger relationship to social issues and political education. Concludes that the German geography project has lost momentum, but that the ideas have reached most teachers.


Social studies education in 22 countries is described. The purpose of the publication is to stimulate international communication and cross-cultural study among practitioners in different countries. The introduction to the report discusses issues related to social studies education and to international communication. Common concerns, curriculum approaches, educational practices, and methods are outlined. Significant differences are noted in terms of national wealth, quality of school life, attitudes toward the legitimacy of social persuasion and social activism, and attention given to individualization of instruction and specific learning difficulties. Common problems include defining the scope and nature of social studies, the lag between new knowledge and teaching, curriculum innovation, assessment and examinations, development of intercultural curricula, and information retrieval. Existing communication efforts in research, program development, and professional
Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, the United States, and Zambia. The basic format presents the social environment, the educational setting, an overview of social studies education, curriculum descriptions, and school organization.


In question-and-answer format, this article outlines some issues regarding perceptions about contemporary social studies education in West Germany with some comparison between that system and the American one.


This book describes social studies programs, citizenship education, and major social studies issues in the Federal Republic of Germany, Thailand, Japan, Nigeria, England, and the United States. The first chapter considers the transnational nature of the social studies, traces the development of social studies, and discusses effects and need to "internationalize" social studies in the United States. Next, the section on Germany discusses the organization of the public schools and political education in postwar Germany. Social change and institutional reform are major issues. The report on England focuses on the structure of the educational and examination system. Major issues center around cultural pluralism, decentralized decision making, and multiethnic education. The final report on the United States discusses global challenges.


This article discusses the history of nationalistic education; describes examples of it in Poland, Germany, France, Russia, and China; and examines selected requirements related to it in the United States. Several approaches for making nationalistic education more relevant to a global society are presented.


In order to provide the educator with effective ways to translate new curriculum goals into classroom practice, this book presents seven case studies of curriculum change in Great Britain and the United States. The studies offer descriptions of a variety of phases in planning and

The political education of young people in West Germany, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and United States is examined. Purposes of the study are to (1) define civic education cross-nationally, (2) deal with methodological problems in assessing student achievement and attitudes, (3) convey a detailed picture of student knowledge and attitudes, (4) assess the impact of home and school on knowledge and attitudes, (5) relate characteristics of school and national political systems to affective and cognitive outcomes, and (6) consider the place of a comparative civic-education study in political socialization research. Classroom-administered questionnaires covering factual knowledge, civic attitudes, perception and understanding of political processes, and background information were answered by more than 30,000 10-year-olds, 14-year-olds, and pre-university students. Answers were analyzed to show similarities in political education in different countries, to show processes of influence, and to compare age-level results. Results showed that classroom climate was more important than classroom practices. For example, more knowledgeable, less authoritarian, and more interested, though not necessarily more democratic, students attended schools where they were encouraged to have free discussion and to express their opinions in class. Cause and effect was conjectural only, but mental development and age of students proved important.
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Note: This list is based on information obtained from participants at the Guildford conference. In some cases, titles, affiliations, and even names have changed; however, this list reflects information that was correct as of July 1980. Two of the chapter authors, Charles Townley and Wolfgang Hilligen, were not physically present at the conference; their papers were presented by others.

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