ABSTRACT

Literature concerning the relationship between higher education and politics is reviewed. Attention is directed to federal, state, and local levels of government and to institutional politics. Federal involvement in higher education, governmental regulation, higher education lobbying, and the emergence of the new Department of Education are addressed, along with statewide coordination, accountability and autonomy, budgeting, interinstitutional relationships, and institutional politics and the community college. Although the review encompasses essentially the decade of the 1970s, it extends to several earlier and significant efforts. The politics of higher education as a field of inquiry is also considered by highlighting theoretical and empirical works that are part of the literature: by identifying concepts and theories from political science and public administration, other social sciences, and the general politics of education literature: and by suggesting future avenues for conceptual development as well as needed research. It is suggested that the involvement of the federal government in higher education has been indirect, occurring primarily through fiscal support to students, specific programs, and academic research. The federal interest in higher education is both fiscal and regulatory. In contrast, the state governments have a direct, multifaceted relationship with colleges and universities. Coordinating agencies, which conduct statewide planning, occupy a critical position in the relationship between government and higher education. The literature reflects increased recognition of academic institutions as political organizations. A bibliography is included. (SW)
Politics of Higher Education

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Prepared by
ERIC®
Clearinghouse on Higher Education
The George Washington University

Published by
AAHE
American Association for Higher Education
This publication was made possible by funding from the National Institute of Education, Department of Education, under contract no. 400-77-0051. Opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of NIE or the Department.
Forword

The way public often perceived higher education as an intellectual, isolated from society's interaction, as a preserve only adequate graduates, was a degree of relevance in fact never been of American higher education from private, institutions and the recognition of the government to establish their formal existence. For many years many private secular colleges such as Hartwick received public financial support during its first 12 years, the forerunner of the City of New York - a member of the board of
trustees. of New York University and was one of the founders of the state's diploma. We have: Hartman, a professor is a division between private institutions and public institutions have reduced some of the barriers to academic science, with the increased emphasis on private sector autonomy, financing, the greater efforts are needed to sustain the government regulation of institutions.

While public institutions have been more dependent on the generosity of the state legislature, the effort has been made to help ensure some institutional policy autonomy. This autonomy is currently being tested, especially needed for centralized decision making, a trend that is in many states and collective bargaining, the major impetus for legislation in an era of financial stringency. This growing federalism is bringing state legislators.

It is probably obvious that the functions of higher education are now actively involved with the institutional process and that the actions of public officials, administrators, and academic mission of the institution are not so well understood are the dynamics of many of the process. This monograph, authored by Leif S. Hartman, assistant professor, addresses the relationship of higher education and politics. From this review, one can develop certain perspectives that will help administrators and state lawmakers to better function in the increasingly political atmosphere of the institution.

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The literature of the politics of higher education, including dis-
tractions, commonly claims that there are few sources. This mono-
graph dispells that claim, while affirming that the existing literature
suffers from a lack of integration and an inadequate amount of
empirical findings. In an attempt to correct some of these prob-
lems, we include a sizable number of bibliographic entries as well
as sections pertaining to the politics of higher education as a field
of inquiry, including theoretical and methodological issues. We
have organized the material according to federal, state, and local
levels of government and institutional politics. Future efforts might
continue with these areas but also cut across governmental levels.

What we sought to accomplish is a comprehensive review of the
literature of the politics of higher education at federal, state, and
local levels of government. The federal chapter discusses the fed-
eral involvement in higher education, governmental regulation,
higher education lobbying, and the emergence of the new Depart-
ment of Education. The state chapter examines statewide coordina-
tion, accountability and autonomy, budgeting, and interinstitu-
tional relationships. The local chapter discusses institutional politics
and the community college. The appendix focuses on the politics
of higher education as a field of inquiry by highlighting theoretical
and empirical works that are part of the literature; by identifying
concepts and theories from political science and public adminis-
tration, other social sciences, and the general politics of education
literature; and by suggesting future avenues for conceptual de-
velopment as well as needed research.

Four topics are largely excluded from this review: student
politics (although student lobbying is included in the first chapter),
the comparative politics of higher education, political socialization,
and the participation of academics in partisan politics and voting
behavior. Any of these topics warrants a full treatment.

Although this review encompasses essentially the decade of the
1970s, it extends to several earlier and significant efforts: biblio-
graphic reviews by Gove and Solomon (1968) and Gove and Floyd
(1975); the recommendations by Karasek for research in the
politics of higher education (1969); the chapter by Wirt, "Education
Politics and Policies," in the book by Jacob and Vines on American
politics (3rd ed., 1976) and the chapter in Jezdahl, "Secondary and
Postsecondary Education: The Politics of Accommodation," in
Mosher and Wagoner (1978).
We call the reader's attention to four other sources of literature. First, a thorough bibliography of literature pertaining to the politics of education, including a section on postsecondary education, was compiled by Anne H. Hastings and published in 1980 by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management. Second, we include a number of doctoral dissertations in this monograph, but we do not claim to have exhausted what is available in a variety of disciplines and academic fields pertaining to the politics of higher education. The availability of doctoral dissertations by means of computer-based searches is a welcome addition to research, and we hope that dissertations increasingly will be easier to obtain. Third, Change magazine was especially useful in the federal section of this monograph. Fourth, this monograph is a review of readily located, public documents. One of the features of this growing field is the fact that many unpublished documents are available in limited numbers. Part of the refinement of this field will be its increasingly public, and published, nature.
Acknowledgment

A number of persons were invaluable in completing this monograph. The director of the Clearinghouse on Higher Education, Mr. Sherwood Smith, and John O'Kane, provided bibliographical advice, in addition to the valuable materials and advice, in the preparation of this study, offered by Marjorie Benedikt of Albany, N. Y., and Mr. Fred Volkstein of Maryland. Sam Sawyer of the University of New York, and Townsend of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education provided valuable suggestions, Mary Floyd of Illinois, Bob Baro of Illinois and L. R. of New York. Marjorie Benedikt of the Albany, N. Y., staff was helpful in obtaining doctoral dissertation data.

The author assumes responsibility for errors in fact or judgment that may be found in this monograph.
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Overview

General themes

Several themes are evident in the chapters on the politics of higher education at federal, state, and local levels.

Politics and higher education are interrelated, and this relationship has a dynamic and fluid quality. The view of higher education as a "victim" of politics is an overreaction to the reciprocal powers of the capital and the campus, despite the persistence of this perspective in some quarters. More accurately, politics and higher education are interrelated. Sometimes resources and decisions flow from the political system to higher education, but at other times higher education lobbies for its own preferences. The relationship between government and higher education is dynamic. While the formal structure of the policy-making system may tend to be stable over time, the process of exercising influence to affect political and policy decisions is more informal, fluid, and issue-specific. In this sense, the political process is indeterminate and unstable. The study of higher education politics needs to reflect these characteristics to illuminate the political process, to investigate the antecedents and consequences of decisions, and to seek more powerful explanations of the interaction between politics and higher education.

As the relationship between higher education and politics evolves, it will become more differentiated. Although higher education has been accused of assuming a reactive posture to federal politics, the relationship between the government and higher education is not a simple case of governmental action and institutional reaction. The relationship is interactive, and it will become increasingly differentiated across specific policy issues. An example is governmental regulation. At both federal and state levels, governmental regulation has increased markedly. Some form of governmental involvement and procedural regulation is a reality and probably a necessity. A working partnership must be forged between government and higher education to allow both participants sufficient accountability and freedom.

Particular political issues and relationships are evident at each governmental level. At the federal level, the government has a heavy financial investment in higher education. Governmental regulation of higher education is increasing rapidly, and the higher education community is attempting to attain what might be termed "an uneasy partnership" with the government in selected regula-
An emerging field of inquiry

The literature of the politics of higher education reflects the rich, multifaceted character of higher education and its various connections with the political process. While this diversity of focus and theoretical pluralism sometimes may be confusing, it also represents strength because it leaves the field open to the identification of new ideas, concepts, and approaches.

Despite the expansion of literature on the politics of higher education during the past decade, it can be argued that this field is still in a formative stage. A comparison with the politics of education may be instructive. The politics of higher education and the politics of education emerged at about the same time. The politics of education could be regarded as a generic field with an emphasis on the politics of public schools. It includes a number of special-interest areas, including the politics of higher education (Hastings 1980). However, the two areas were differentiated quite early, and scholars dealing with the politics of education did not deal with issues of higher education. During the 1960s, the two areas
developed in different ways. The politics of higher education remained largely dormant until the landmark bibliographic essay by Gove and Solomon (1968) and an address at a regional political science association meeting at which the speaker set forth a research agenda for inquiry into the state university as a political system (Kammerer 1969). In contrast, the politics of public school attracted a number of scholars in the 1960s who helped define the field of inquiry.

Other differences between higher education and public school politics include the volume of published material, differences in definitions and terminology, and disaggregation of the field. Comparable coverage of the politics of higher education did not appear until more recently.

While the politics of higher education is informed and influenced by developments in political science, it also is a multidisciplinary field of inquiry. The exclusion of financial and legal issues from this review reflects the open character of the field, which has drawn heavily on other disciplines for content and concepts. The multiple connotations of the word "politics" may vary with the context in which the term is used. A universal definition of politics may be an elusive goal, because universal definitions are both too broad and too narrow. In this monograph, "politics" is defined as follows: Politics occurs at various levels within higher education or between the academic and the political process or governmental institutions. In this sense, politics is concerned basically with patterns of interaction or conflict over values, interests, and goals relating to the perceived needs of higher education and public authority.

The study of the politics of higher education reflects several different forms of interactions. The character of this emerging field is multidimensional. Substantive topics within the field can be defined by areas of concern, such as policy, politics, power, and resources, and by the way in which those concerns affect institutions (within, among, and outside higher education institutions). Examples include the development of institutional mission statements, which are concerned with intranstitutional policy; relationships between public and private colleges, which demonstrate a concern about interinstitutional power and conflict; and the federal financing of higher education, which indicates concern about external resources.

The field of the politics of higher education may also be defined by comparing and contrasting policy and politics. While public policy for higher education and the study of the politics of higher education are analytically distinct, they are integrally related and highly interdependent. However, a clear delineation of the boundaries of the two areas is difficult.
The Politics of Higher Education at the Federal Level

Although federal presence in the structure of American higher education has been limited, federal influence has been substantial. Despite the tradition of state and local control of education, issues concerning higher education are involved in many federal decisions (if only indirectly) and numerous federal agencies are responsible for programs involving higher education. Andringa reported in 1976 that 35 agencies plus the U.S. Office of Education were responsible for programs involving higher education. In the U.S. House of Representatives, 18 of the 22 standing committees dealt with higher education in some way, as did 16 of the 18 standing committees in the Senate (Andringa 1976).

Federal involvement in higher education

Federal presence in higher education is not new, but the extent of involvement and interrelationship is unprecedented. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the negotiations for education parcels by the Ohio Company of Associates, and the Land Grant College Act of 1862 provided for the establishment of more than 100 colleges and universities (Cowley 1980). There have been 53 major pieces of federal legislation affecting higher education, from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Education in 1979 (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1979). Early leaders, including George Washington, explored the idea of a national, primarily postdoctoral university (Madsen 1966); more recently, the joint Graduate Consortium of five private universities in Washington, D.C., discussed the concept of such a limited national university (Quigley 1975).

Two great federal actions have affected higher education: the land-grant movement and the federal interest that began with support of scientific research during World War II (Kerr 1972). The land-grant movement was responsive to two vital forces in America's development: industrial and agricultural expansion, and the trend toward populism and egalitarianism. Higher education was "to serve less the perpetuation of an elite class and more the creation of a relatively classless society" (Kerr 1972, p. 47).

The other force started in World War II with support by the federal government of scientific research conducted in universities. Federal monies first went to students with the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill), and then in the 1960s to the institutions for their expansion. In the 1970s federal funds shifted
back to students via the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (Newman 1973).

The federal government's involvement in higher education takes two basic directions: fiscal support to individuals and institutions, and regulation of institutions in an effort to ensure fiscal accountability and the achievement of social goals.

The government can choose among at least four alternatives. It may issue commands to force universities to stop doing something, or to take some affirmative step, or to conform to a series of substantive requirements or standards. Officials can also impose procedures that require universities to review certain decisions or study particular problems with special care. A third method available to the government is to offer subsidies to elicit some desired action on the part of the universities, such as building new facilities or performing particular types of research. Finally, public officials can try to strengthen market forces and thus rely on greater competition to achieve the desired ones (Bok 1980, p. 87).

Federal financial support

Federal fiscal support of higher education comes in three forms: payments to students, such as the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant, veterans' education benefits, and grants to students through Social Security (amounting to about two-thirds of the total federal support of higher education); payments to institutions for academic research and development; and payments to states for such items as equipment, facilities, and the State Student Incentive Grant Program (Gruson 1977).

Another important area of federal financial assistance is tax benefits, which in 1977 amounted to $3.8 billion (Finn 1978b). These benefits include tax-exempt scholarships and fellowships, dependents' exemptions for federal income taxes, and tax-deductible contributions to colleges and universities. While tax benefits are important to virtually all colleges and universities, their impact varies with the type of institution. In 1974-75, voluntary support exceeded $3,000 per student at Princeton and University of Chicago but was less than $100 per student at Northeastern and Duquesne universities (Finn 1978b).

Today, the federal involvement in higher education amounts to nearly $15 billion annually for more than 400 programs (Finn 1978a, 1978b). These examples of federal fiscal support to higher education are noteworthy not only because of the magnitude of the aid, but also because of the value choices each program option represents. Any one major policy choice affects many variables: aid for students versus institutions, for two-year versus four-year colleges, for public versus private institutions, for undergraduate versus graduate students, for lower- versus middle-income families, etc.
Governmental regulation

Governmental regulation dates to 1789 and the theory of regulation rests on legislatures creating special administrative agencies to serve in their stead in regulating complex activities where they do not have the technical expertise (Hobbs 1978). A wide range of regulatory activities—from affirmative action to occupational safety and health guidelines—have affected higher education (Gruson 1977). Clearly, it is in this area of commands and procedures that institutions have reacted most negatively to federal involvement.

The new and allegedly dangerously intrusive law is that which is born of regulatory intent, is elaborated in regulatory mandate, and is enforced by regulatory process... the most nettlesome difficulty of all is governmental regulation of academe (Hobbs 1978, p. 3).

Regulation may be defined as "actions by the federal government that compel a college or university to do something it would not otherwise have done, that make it worth the institution's while to do so, or that make it painful to refrain from doing it" (Finn 1978b, p. 142).

Governmental regulation can be placed into three categories. First, the allocation of funds comes under the heading of subsidy. Second, the use of funds requires accountability for proper application of allocated monies. This area recently has become increasingly troublesome to colleges and universities because of the increased record keeping necessary to ensure accurate and proper use of public funds. Third, social regulations encompass admission and employment policies, safety and health regulations, treatment of human subjects, and aspects of scientific research and experimentation.

Despite the increasing federal involvement, higher education can mobilize to affect or amend legislation that is in its own interest. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (the Buckley Amendment) was amended shortly after its passage to sharpen definitions and to limit the scope of its impact. In the 1976 "Guadalajara incident" 14 universities forfeited $11 million in federal capitation grants rather than succumb to a legislative provision allowing American citizens studying medicine abroad to transfer directly into the third year of study in medical schools in the United States. The legislation was amended to limit transfers even before it was enacted into law. In 1977, the efforts of the higher education lobby helped colleges win exemption from payroll tax increases for social security. And in 1978, the mandatory retirement age for professors was allowed to remain at age 65 for a few more years (Finn 1978b, pp. 151-155).

Higher education also has the ability, as one scholar described
it "to regulate itself on Washington's behalf" (Finn 1975-76) one such area of self-regulation is accreditation. To those in higher education, accreditation is one of the most deeply held values of the academic world—the notion of review and judgment by peers. To those in government, institutional accreditation affords higher education the opportunity to establish its own base for self-regulation, and government can thus avoid an area rife with conflict. Several factors—the default rate of federally guaranteed student loans, the increasing number of complaints from students alleging fraud, and increasing federal expenditures to provide for loan guarantees—have given Washington second thoughts about accreditation. The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, the principal nongovernmental body for coordinating accreditation matters, works with the institutions, accrediting agencies, and the federal government to attempt to satisfy the varying and conflicting interests of the parties (Finn 1978a).

A second area of self-regulation is the analysis of need for student aid. Institutions frequently determine the amount of aid needed to meet anticipated college expenses, based on assumptions about incomes, budgets, and expenses. Other organizations are also involved, including two large voluntary organizations, the College Scholarship Service and the American College Testing Program. The inability of all the parties involved to devise formulas and schedules to which other parties would agree has resulted in government's keeping a "shorter rein on need analysis than was thought necessary before" and a corresponding reduction in the self-regulation of higher education (Finn 1978b, p. 164).

The third area of self-regulation is peer review of proposals for research projects. The basic issue appears to be assumptions about merit and equity. It is assumed that using the "old boy network" will lead to research of higher quality and merit. On the other hand, the "have-nots" would prefer a more open allocation process in which all potential recipients would be informed, have the opportunity to apply, and compete as equals to obtain awards. This conflict within higher education, according to one observer "can only encourage members of Congress and senior administration officials to supervise the allocation of federal science monies more closely" (Finn 1978b, p. 170).

Over the course of the decades ahead, the long-range bargain between the academy and the government must be a trade of self-regulation for privacy. If those of us in higher education succeed in convincing the government that we are making an honest effort to keep ourselves aware of evolving norms of social justice, and are making these norms increasingly manifest within our own systems and institutions, then we may be taken seriously when we ask in return for some private space (Bailey 1978, p. 111).
Higher education lobbying and interest group activity

Government regulations, public funds to college students, and monies for institutions all imply a direction to the relationship between higher education and the government. Admittedly, the nature of regulatory control is such that institutions sometimes accurately view themselves as victims of governmental agencies, what Halverson called the "victim perspective" (1975). Higher education can, however, initiate action to secure policies preferable to the field by the activities of lobbyists and interest groups.

Before 1970, it was virtually impossible to locate references to higher education lobbying or interest groups. It was easier to find pronouncements about keeping education apart from politics. Educators and politicians appear to have similar objectives for education (Halperin 1974). Educators wanted the most financial aid for the least amount of regulation to achieve social purposes; politicians needed to achieve balance in fiscal affairs (something for everyone) as well as accountability to ensure prudent use of public funds. The primary issues were seen as definition (what regulation for what purpose and balance between fiscal and social purposes and between educators and lawmakers).

During the 1970s, essays and empirical studies began to appear on higher education interest groups and their activities. A "map" of the field would include 300-odd educational interest groups located in or near Washington: umbrella organizations such as the American Council on Education, institutional associations, teacher unions, discipline and professional groups, librarians and technologists, groups representing religions and races, liberal and labor lobbies, the Washington-based offices of universities and systems, administrator and trustee groups, and student lobbies (Bailey 1975). Six institution-based organizations are included in the "Washington Secretariat," and their political resources and impact on federal programs have been evaluated by several researchers (Gladieux 1977; Heyns 1973a, 1973b; Wolanin 1976b).

The higher education lobby has moved from "the fringes of national politics to become a major claimant on national resources and good will" (King 1975, p. 109). However, the increased visibility has not necessarily meant greater cohesiveness for the organizations that make up the lobby. Their relationships often have been char-

acterized by decentralization, fragmentation, isolation, and lack of cooperation; and the organizations have adopted a less aggressive, consultative lobbying style (Murray 1977). This lobbying tactic contrasts with the more assertive approach of the major elementary-secondary education organization, the National Education Association.

In 1972, the previously nonpartisan National Education Association backed one of the candidates for President with all the colorful language of anathema and apocalypse associated with interest-group politics in their waxing phase. By contrast, higher education remained throughout this period a passive force, acted upon rather than acting. No campaigns were organized; no great battles occurred; hardly any spokesmen emerged (Moylan 1975, p. 131).

The passage of the Education Amendments of 1972 established higher education's reputation for passivity (Fields 1979a). In 1972, the higher education associations created a debacle for themselves in their efforts at political action at the federal level: "The positions they took on student aid and institutional aid contrasted with the prevailing mood in Congress, and the associations failed to recognize that they were allying themselves with a congressional sponsor whose power was on the decline" (Hansen 1977, p. 214).

The student lobby within higher education, on the other hand, has had a considerable impact on federal politics. Higher education lobbyists have been characterized as "kids in a candy shop" to demonstrate their naiveté and ineptness, but the student lobbyists have earned "high marks" (Fields 1979b; Kendis 1979). Student lobbies have been identified in 24 states; the earliest was the University of California Student Lobby, begun in 1970, followed by the Student Association of the State of New York (Schlesinger 1979). Schlesinger found the success of the student lobbies derived from several factors: the lobbyists familiarize themselves with the group's origin and establishment; they create an organizational structure that maximizes cohesiveness with their governing body; they give careful attention to leadership and staffing patterns, and to building an adequate base of fiscal resources; they do not take access to policy makers for granted; and their lobbying tactics are appropriate to the particular environment (pp. 141-5).

The Education Amendments of 1972, which among other things created the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants and Title IX, have been the subject of empirical research and several publications.

**It should be noted that the higher education associations are legally limited in amount of lobbying they can undertake because of their status as tax-exempt organizations. NEA has a different tax status that permits a greater degree of political activity by the organization.**
(Gladiex 1977; Gladieux and Wolanin 1976; Wolanin 1973; Wolanin 1976a, 1976b). Linney (1979) examined the State Student Incentive Grant segment of the legislation. Based on their study of this Act, Gladieux and Wolanin identify several variables that help define the arena of higher education policy and policy making at the federal level: the substance of existing programs, the actors, the political culture, public attitudes, and resources. The substance of the arena centers on student access and opportunity. The interactions of the actors constitute a "subgovernment," made up of the federal agencies administering education programs, appropriate House and Senate subcommittees, and the Washington Secretariat. The political culture—the ideals and operating norms of the policy arena—set the "boundaries of legitimate federal ends and means." Public attitudes are drawn from Gallup and other organizational polls, surveys taken by individual lawmakers, and a general expectation based upon what has been done already. The resources variable is defined by past patterns of expenditures relative to perceptions about accomplishments (Gladieux and Wolanin 1976).

In general, policy making is incremental, and it is based upon political culture, existing policy, and perceptions about policymaking models. Policy making is conditioned by a basic "political calendar" including national elections, annual budget cycles, Congressional sessions, and the expiration dates of statutes. The transformation of general issues to definitive public problems is a complex process. Diverse policy options are reduced in number and sometimes in scope to a small set of manageable possibilities. Decision making is pluralistic, continuous, and tentative. The quality of decision making may be uneven, and at times decisions may be based on fragmentary data and impressionistic views. Finally, policy outcomes are shaped, sometimes in significant ways, by circumstantial elements (Gladieux and Wolanin 1976).

The Department of Education

Since 1908, 130 pieces of federal legislation have called for the creation of a separate Department of Education (Zettel 1979). When President Carter signed the legislation creating the new Department in October 1979, it brought together an organization of nearly 18,000 people and an annual budget of some $15 billion (Watkins 1979). Justification for the creation of this Cabinet-level agency included the significance of education as "perhaps the most pervasive function in American society" (Zettel 1979, p. 3): the unmanageable size of the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and its deficiencies; the scattered and fragmented education programs and personnel at the federal level; a lack of top-level leader-
ship with the first-ranking education official an assistant secretary
three bureaucratic levels away from the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare: and an assumed lack of accountability in this
diffuse and disorganized arrangement (Zettel 1979, pp. 3-4). The
word “assumed” may be important because opponents of the
new Department claim that there is no evidence of increased
prestige and accountability in the new structure (Shanker 1979).

The stated goals for the new Department include:

First, . . . to have the Department founded with proper respect and
guard for the primary roles of state and local governments in edu-
cation. Second, . . . to instill a strong, clear vision of the federal
role in education, . . . stand ready to help when problems arise, . . .
maintain and strengthen the national tradition of excellence, . . . be
the guardian of our national commitment to equal education op-
portunity for all. Last, and most important, . . . to have the Depart-
ment of Education conceived in respect and concern for the indi-

The future position and role of the Department of Education is
somewhat uncertain, since abolition of the Department was among
President Reagan's campaign promises.
The Politics of Higher Education at the State Level

College: and universities have had a direct and special relationship with state governments. America's public higher education institutions were established either by state statute or by provisions in the state constitution. Notwithstanding the dramatic expansion of federal aid to higher education during the 1960s and 1970s, state governments still provide 60% of total educational and general revenues to public colleges and universities (Purves and Glenny 1976). Even private colleges and universities receive substantial amounts of unrestricted funds from state governments in institutional grants or special contracts for programs in the public interest, such as medical, dental, allied health, and veterinary education (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1976).

State responsibility for American higher education was reinforced by the Morrill Land Grant Act, by which the federal government delegated primary responsibility for the organization, support, and maintenance of public higher education to the states. States exercise in particular a significant influence over the structure, organization, scope, and quality of higher education within their borders. Even the universities most oriented to national research reflect to a significant degree the history, traditions, and norms of the states in which they are located.

Despite the traditional separatist view of higher education, the missions, structure, and governance of higher education institutions are inextricably related to the politics and public policy of state governments. Comments regarding the cultural separation of education from politics at the elementary and secondary levels are equally applicable to higher education:

If a profession wishes to gain support, it surrounds itself with words and symbols which elicit public favor and understanding.... To describe professional activities as "political" would place schoolmen in a poor light in terms of the semantics of public support. This is not to suggest that the avoidance of a recognition of the essentially political nature of education has been either cynical or naive. In large measure it has been cultural and prudential (Bailey et al. 1962, p. ix).

Much of the literature on higher education by the early 1970s focused on what state universities had done and should do to make their contribution to the state. Very little of it focused on the relationship of the higher education system and state politics (Gove and Floyd 1975). The situation has improved appreciably since then,
but significant gaps remain. Several themes unite the current assessment of politics at the state level: statewide coordination, accountability and institutional autonomy, budgeting for higher education, and interinstitutional relationships.

Statewide coordination of higher education

The growth of higher education and its complexity during the 1950s and 1960s prompted a parallel growth of various mechanisms for statewide coordination of higher education. The number of states with some form of coordinating agency or board has grown dramatically. In 1960, only 23 states had formal coordinating bodies; by 1972, all but three states had coordinating agencies (Millard 1976). By the late 1970s, all 50 states, several territories, and the District of Columbia had some formal structure for coordination of postsecondary education.

While most of the literature on statewide coordination suggests practical applications in such areas as organization and membership, planning, program review, budgeting, data bases for planning, the administration of aid programs, and nonpublic higher education (Glenny 1971), it is oriented to the practitioner or policymaker, dealing extensively with issues related to coordination (Halstead 1974).

Several comparative or multi-state studies deal with the functions, roles, and processes of statewide coordination. These studies tend to focus on constitutional arrangements deemed most effective or appropriate for meeting the unique demands for coordination in higher education. Finally, a growing body of case studies concentrates on coordination within a single state. The following paragraphs review these latter two categories: comparative studies and case studies.

Comparative studies. At least two seminal books deal with the origin, development, and structure of coordinating agencies in the 50 states. Glenny (1959) offers the first comprehensive study of statewide coordination, reviewing the development of coordinating agencies to 1957 and describing their functions of planning.

program approval, statewide policymaking and budgeting. He devotes considerable attention to the tension between institutional autonomy and statewide coordination and suggests procedures and institutional structures intended to foster a balance between institutional autonomy and effective coordination. In many respects, this work is one of the first to clearly state the case for coordinating agencies rather than state governing boards, or continued institutional competition, or state government intervention.

Berdahl's study of statewide coordination can be viewed as a sequel to the earlier work. It reviews the patterns of coordination in the 50 states, classifying states in four categories: no coordinating agency; voluntary associations; statutory coordinating boards in segmented state systems (that is, states having several institutional governing boards); and a single governing board. According to Millard, the trend during the 1970s has been toward statutory agencies and consolidated governing boards.

In addition to reviewing the roles and to some extent the effectiveness of coordinating boards in planning, budgeting, and reviewing programs, Berdahl pays particular attention to the agency as an intermediary between state government and higher education institutions, and to the more generic issue of the delicate balance between coordination and institutional autonomy. The Berdahl study provides both an analysis of prevailing patterns and forms of coordination in the several states (based on intensive studies of 19 states) as well as a more philosophical discussion of the essential qualities of institutional autonomy, higher education's responsibility to the public interest, and the degree and forms of coordination necessary to maintain autonomy and responsiveness. Berdahl argues for a distinction between substantive and procedural autonomy, with the primary concern of higher education being substantive autonomy. To a large extent, Berdahl views coordinating agencies as effective mechanisms for channeling political conflict.

Several reports, symposia, and edited collectives reflect many of the original themes laid out by Glenny and reiterated by Berdahl. One such task force report, by the Education Commission of the States (ECS), restates the case for effective coordination, reviews the key functions of planning, program review, and budgeting, and offers a series of fairly general recommendations, including the observation that the specific form or structure of the coordinating agency must be consistent with the history and unique conditions within each state (Education Commission of the States 1973). The ECS task force emphasizes the need for states to clearly delineate the respective roles of the state government, the coordinating agency, and the institutions. The report also calls for legislative recognition and support for the independent role of the coordinat-
ing agency so that it can represent higher education in the state free from political interference.

Much of the earlier literature deals with the proper roles of coordination for the education institutions, the governor, and the legislature. Coordinating agencies are seen as a buffer between the institutions and the state and as a mediator between the needs of higher education and the demands of the state for rational planning and accountability. The coordinating agency would channel conflict and insulate the university from direct intervention by the state. If a state could initially obtain consensus on the “rules of the game” by establishing mutually satisfactory procedures for review and decision-making, each sector—the state, the universities, and the coordinating agency—could perform effectively in their respective jurisdictions and areas of expertise.

This view would have the universities responsible for their own administration and for educational policy. The coordinating agency would deal with educational issues from a statewide perspective but with sensitivity to the rights of the institutions and their decision-making processes. For instance, many such agencies are advisory, and others have limited authority in budgetary review. In addition, coordinating agencies would be directed by educators or citizens sympathetic to education and staffed by professionals with some degree of academic experience and legitimacy. State government, then, would operate at a higher level of general review by providing funds in accordance with statewide plans developed by the coordinating agency and by setting the total appropriations for higher education.

An insightful critique of this largely prescriptive literature on higher education coordination, concludes that the early proponents offered administrative solutions for essentially political problems and focused on structure without fully appreciating the dynamics of the political process (Kelly 1972). It is very difficult in practice to maintain the organizational lines of authority, roles, and responsibility as neatly differentiated as much of the early literature prescribes. Rather than an alternative to political conflict, coordinating agencies may be more properly viewed as participants in the political process.

This recognition of the political character of coordinating agencies is reflected in a more recent collection of papers dealing with the current problems and future prospects of coordinating boards (Berdahl 1975). A recurring theme in these papers is the need for coordinating boards to develop and maintain effective political relationships to give weight to their policy recommendations.

Case studies. A growing number of case studies of agencies within an individual state focus on the political relationships of the co-
ordinating agency to the state's higher education environment. Two earlier works on California (Paltridge 1966) and Wisconsin (Paltridge 1968) trace the development of the coordinating agency, the historical origins of the demands for coordination, its functions and roles, and the extent to which the agency achieved institutional legitimacy. These studies tend to concentrate on internal organization to suggest guidelines for other coordinating agencies.

Smart examines the process by which the California Coordinating Council for Higher Education interacted with the legislative and executive bodies of state government, concluding that the Council used strategies for influence similar to those of other interest groups. Influence was based on perceived "expertise" rather than a "leadership" role emanating from a constituency, and the Coordinating Council generally experienced limited or moderate effectiveness in its relationships with state government (1968).

Two studies by Floyd analyze major conflicts over responsibility for master planning and budgetary review between the Illinois Board of Higher Education and the University of Illinois during the 1960s and 1970s (1976, 1979). She found that the Board was sustained in its claims for preeminence in planning for major new academic programs and the location of new campuses, although it was less successful in challenging the state executive over the total appropriation for higher education. Floyd further suggests that if the pattern of conflict in most states gravitated to disputes over the total appropriation for higher education rather than more marginal issues of interinstitutional allocations, the principal conflict will be between the governor and state budget office versus the university system, regardless of the structure of governance or coordination.

In a dissertation on Alabama, Portera addresses the issue of the political conditions necessary to support a major change in statewide coordination such as a move toward greater centralization (1977). He identifies several conditions conducive to the establishment of a highly centralized system of coordination: inadequate statewide planning, unnecessary duplication in programs, and the lack of effectiveness of the current coordinating agency. The constitutional status and political power of the major Alabama universities, combined with the absence of active support by influential political actors mitigated against the creation of a more centralized coordination structure. In Arkansas, despite the general dissatisfaction with the current coordinating structure, legislators and higher education leaders could not agree about the need for greater centralization or the form that such coordination should take (Wyly 1978). The demise of the Wisconsin Coordinating Council for Higher Education in 1971 was probably the result of early domination by the institutions and the Council's failure to deter the
competition between the two university systems in the state (Kelly 1972).

The need for effective political influence on the part of the coordinating agency cannot be overstated. For example, the Ohio Board of Regents’ “ability to create a university research consortium depended as much on its interaction with political actors as its ability to influence actors within higher education.” Its most successful strategy was one that enabled the Board to adjust its “goals and means of implementation to accommodate the introduction of changing goals of political and higher educational actors” (Greer 1979, p. 191). In Connecticut, the conflict over reform and reorganization proposals involved the attitudes and interests of politicians, the staffs and leadership of coordinating agencies, and institutional professionals (Pilver 1977). The state’s goals of rationality and efficiency were secondary to the power interests of those competing groups; Pilver suggests that a major organizational change should embody a redistribution of power within the system or it would be merely a papering over of existing diversity.

At least two clear implications emerge from the available studies of statewide coordination. First, coordinating agencies occupy a critical position in the relationship between higher education and state governments. Coordinating boards operate

...in a kind of no-man's land between higher education and state government. Their effectiveness depends on maintaining the confidence of both.... Even though a board may find it virtually impossible to maintain perfect equilibrium between these two forces, balance should be the goal (Glenny 1971, p. 6).

This clearly political challenge transcends organizational arrangements or informational systems. To some extent, earlier expectations may have been too high, or at least they failed to take political variables sufficiently into account. For example, Glenny more recently has taken a less sanguine view of the efficacy of coordinating agencies that have been challenged by governmental austerity, demands for increased accountability of higher education by governors and legislators, and the emergence of competitive professional analytical staffs (especially budget staffs) in the governor's office and the legislature. “Coordinating agencies thus find themselves in a precarious position at best, captive of the Governor, heretical to the legislature, and unloved by the institutions” (Glenny 1979, p. 41).

Whatever the assessment of their current effectiveness, coordinating agencies are likely to play an even more crucial role in the 1980s during a period of enrollment decline, program consolidation, and institutional contraction. Statewide boards and agencies should play a creative role in managing decline (Hollander
The alternative would be more direct intervention and control by state governments and, in certain areas, the federal government as well.

Accountability and institutional autonomy

The second theme in the studies of statewide coordination is that the increased complexity, interdependence, and scale of higher education lead to demands for new forms of accountability and control by forces outside higher education.

External authorities are exercising more and more authority over higher education, and institutional independence has been declining. The greatest shift of power in recent years has taken place not inside the campus, but in the transfer of authority from the campus to outside agencies (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1973, p. 1).

A great deal has been written in popular and scholarly sources regarding the growing role of state government in the governance of public higher education. State governments and state coordinating boards are exercising more control and introducing more levels of review over public universities and colleges. Governors and executive budget agencies are having a growing impact on the financial independence of public universities (Moos and Rourke 1959). Bureaucratization and the layering of control over higher education are growing (Berdahl 1971; Furniss and Gardner 1979; Glenny et al. 1971; Paltridge 1968). The imposition of new forms of control over individual campuses results in the rise of multi-campus systems and statewide coordinating boards (Newman 1973). The Carnegie Commission, in response, recommends institutional arrangements that could enhance university autonomy, particularly in the areas of intellectual conduct, academic affairs, and administrative arrangements, by encouraging the states to use broad instruments for coordination, by preserving independent board of trustees, and by continuing to delegate influence over academic matters to the faculty (1973a; 1973b).

Several factors have contributed to the perceived erosion of institutional autonomy. The growth in the scope and magnitude of public higher education during the post-war period is one explanation for the heightened political attention and the corresponding extension of bureaucratic control. Total expenditures for higher education rose from 1.1 percent to 2.5 percent of the Gross National Product in the 1960s (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1973a, p. 20). The number of students in Ph.D. programs tripled, while total enrollment at the undergraduate level more than doubled. The number of institutions granting the Ph.D. degree
rose from 180 to 250 during the decade. The rate of increase in cost per student generally exceeded the annual rate of inflation by 2.5 percent and ramped as high as 8 percent in some institutions (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1972).

Numerous demands for more specific and detailed information have affected accountability. These demands have been a function of a number of factors: the increasing size and complexity of higher education; increased competition for public funds; problems with inflation, productivity, and enrollment, which have reduced institutional flexibility; a perceived decline in the value of the college degree; and the recurrent problems in supply of trained manpower (Balderston 1974). The issue of accountability is generally posed in zero-sum terms: increases in external demands for information and additional measures of coordination and control result in a direct loss of institutional autonomy. Ironically, the persistence of this concept may have hindered research on the relationship between higher education and state governments because of the failure to recognize this dynamic as another variant of political conflict or the redistribution of political power.

Several caveats are in order to provide an understanding of this relationship. Institutional autonomy is not and never has been absolute or complete, even for medieval universities (Cowley 1980; Wilson 1965). Many commentators tend to blur the issues of autonomy and academic freedom or, more specifically, to assert a unique claim for autonomy of colleges and universities on the basis of academic freedom:

The case for the freedom of the university goes deeper than this and rests upon a characteristic of higher education that it does not come close to sharing with any other state activity. This is the fact that in certain areas colleges and universities need freedom not merely as an administrative convenience to enhance their efficient cooperation, but as a source of creative energy and an indispensable means to all their achievements. For without freedom, productive teaching and research in the Western tradition are impossible (Moos and Rourke 1959, p. 42).

However, historically autonomous universities in Great Britain denied academic freedom to junior professors while academic freedom thrived in 19th-century German universities, which were heavily influenced by the state (Ashby 1966). Much of the literature reflects the education-above-politics myth (Millett 1970). If education is assumed to be above politics, involvement with political authority would indeed represent a threat to higher education.

The myth of separation of education and politics can lead to a victim perspective, where undue focus on the effects of governmental regulation upon institutions ignores a well documented
finding in political science regarding the reciprocal powers of the regulated agency:

With the great expansion of higher education in the 1960s, the concern for saving institutions from domination by governmental decision-makers was stimulated by the emergence in the majority of the states of new agencies for the coordination of higher education and by the continued rise of the governors as powerful forces in educational policy formation. For many, the University of California became the unhappy prototype of the politically impacted and governmentally hamstrung institution of the future... By overemphasis on the regulatory powers of governmental agencies, it is easy to slip into a perspective on the politics of higher education in which colleges and universities are seen as the victims of politics, as disadvantaged contenders in the endless struggle for money and autonomy (Halverson 1975, pp. 2-5).

In his study of higher education in New Jersey, Halverson shows how the universities were able to align interests in the legislature to win on several major educational issues during a five-year period.

Universities play multiple roles and can be viewed in a variety of frameworks. One model is the state agency that recognizes that universities are charged with a public purpose and that many broad-range education issues are legitimate matters of public policy (Epstein 1974). Viewed in these terms, state influence and control over certain aspects of university operation can be seen as a form of bureaucratic-political conflict similar to that of other public agencies. Higher education may not be unique in the extent to which it has become subject to governmental regulation, and this overregulation is symptomatic of the decline in power and legitimacy of institutions throughout society (Bork 1978).

Authority can be held or shared by institutions, coordinating agencies, and the state government in areas such as approval of academic programs, budgeting, and personnel practices (Frederick Hartmark defines that accountability-autonomy dichotomy in terms of a continuum of influence that varies by context:

The meaningful question for analysis is not which sector has what authority; but rather what decisions are made, by whose authority, at what level of detail, with what effect on the perquisites of either the university or the state (Bork 1978, p. 83).

Such a formulation suggests that accountability may more profitably be viewed in political rather than moral terms. In any case, the nature and extent of governmental influence over higher education is essentially a question, which, while informed by one's values, should be subject to a more dispassionate, empirical investigation. Such treatments of this question in the future not only should contribute to a clearer understanding of the concepts of
accountability and institutional independence, which are at the heart of the relationship between government and higher education, but also should help illuminate that relationship.

Budgeting for higher education

State governments influence higher education largely through three mechanisms: planning and coordination, budgetary appropriations and the allocation of resources among institutions and sectors, and administrative regulation and control. State governments use the budgetary process as a policy instrument to a much greater degree than does the federal government (Glenny 1976). Long-range plans for higher education are activated only with financial support. Similarly, many of the administrative or regulatory controls over institutions are directly or indirectly tied to financing. Of these three modes of state influence over higher education, the budgetary process may very well be the most significant in its impact on the status and viability of higher education institutions. The budget also reflects the relative position of state systems and institutions in the distribution of political power within a state, and, “in the most integral sense, the budget lies at the heart of the political process” (Wildavsky 1974, p. 5).

Some empirical studies of state budgeting for higher education can be classified in two categories: studies of appropriations for higher education and studies of the decision-making process. A growing number of studies is concerned with the determinants of total appropriations, particularly at the state level. By analyzing trends in state appropriations for various functions, these studies have attempted, through regression analysis and other advanced statistical techniques, to determine the relative influence on appropriations of environmental factors, including economic and political variables. Many of the earlier studies verified the incremental character of budgetary changes and attributed changes in appropriations largely to economic or other nonpolitical, environmental factors (Sharkansky 1969, 1970).

One of the earlier studies concludes that economic variables were primarily responsible for changes in appropriation levels (Dye 1967). A similar study essentially confirms this finding that environmental forces affect the political system to influence appropriations policy in the states (Swofford 1976). Another study focuses on higher education appropriations in a single state over a 20-year period, indicating that the increase in annual appropriation was largely explained by state wealth, with changes in urbanization and industrialization being of secondary importance (Bounds 1974). Political variables, defined in terms of reapportionment, two-party competitiveness, and citizen participation, did not demonstrate any
independent effect on appropriations. Population and demographic variables appeared most significant in explaining state appropriation patterns for higher education (Lindeen and Willis 1975). One notable exception to this general trend found that political variables, most notably legislative professionalism and political competitiveness, significantly affected appropriations (Peterson 1976).

Further research may identify the elements of state political systems where more study is needed. It may also contribute to a fuller understanding of the manner in which demographic and economic factors affect the state politics of budgeting.

Agencies, functions, and roles in budgeting. A study of multcampus systems suggests a number of findings about the dynamics of budgeting, particularly with respect to the relationships among campuses, system central administrations, coordinating agencies, the governor's office, and the legislature (Lee and Bowen 1971). It documents the trend toward centralization of decision making and the uses and misuses of technical budgetary information. Lee and Bowen suggest that the relative influence of the systemwide central administration varies with the type of budgetary system practiced in each state; e.g., detailed, line-item budgeting or state officials' negotiating directly with campuses both weaken the role of the system central administration. Regardless of the range of diversity in budgetary practices, the authors find a growing political influence by state officials in university budgeting, as well as increasing administrative control by the state. The authors view the system central administration as in a potentially favorable position for budgetary leadership, serving as a buffer or mediator between the demands of faculty, the expansionist aspirations of individual institutions, and the political concerns of state officials. The roles of coordinating agencies vary in each state, ranging from a formalistic role to one of superseding the system and its campuses. The dynamics of institutional power and influence are played out in the budgetary process, and the relative influence of each actor (campus, system, coordinating agency, executive, legislators, and legislative staffs) varies considerably from state to state.

Glenny and associates published a nine-volume series dealing with the budgetary process for higher education based on a survey of the 50 states augmented by case studies in 17 states. In two of these volumes, the authors analyze the organization and roles of professional budget staffs in the institutions, the state coordinating agency or systemwide board, the state executive, and the legislature. They document the patterns of interagency communication and conflict, and they assess the relative effectiveness of budgetary staffs at each level and their relative impact upon the budgetary process (Glenny 1976; Schmidtlein and Glenny 1976). The study sup-
ports several findings in the literature regarding the growing professionalism of state budgeting for higher education, the complexity of the process, and the potential for political conflict.

The authors assess the effectiveness of the process, noting with some concern the emergence of performance auditing units in state government that have begun to turn their attention to higher education, including many issues of academic concern. In contrast to the criticisms of the growing systemization of higher education, however, the authors are fairly optimistic about the compatibility of this professionalization of the budgetary process with the more democratic, pluralistic processes of policy formation. This study is a valuable contribution in terms of identifying the structure and process of budgeting in the states, and it should serve as a stimulus to additional research on the interinstitutional dynamics of the budgetary process.

Budgetary formulas. A majority of states use formulas based on cost analysis or workload ratios to reduce the scope of decisions required for setting levels for appropriations, and for institutionalizing historical decisions and patterns of support among institutions. The formulas have a profound effect on the budgetary process and the degrees of freedom within which institutions can request additional resources. The first systematic study of budgetary formulas in higher education draws attention to their significance, intended uses and applications, and influence on decision making (Miller 1964). The growing use of formulas is viewed as a function of the trend toward rationality, objectivity, and quantification in budgeting. According to Miller, some of the advantages of formula budgeting include clarity on budget analysis and presentation, the ability to compare institutions and activities, an equitable treatment of institutions, the provision of adequate levels of support, the illumination of basic policy issues, the capability to make complex budgetary decisions more manageable, and the provision of quantitative tools for evaluating past performance. Formulas also have some limitations, however, including the inability to make policy strictly by formula (they are no substitute for human judgment), an uncritical use of projections, and the danger of imposing the formula values as a basis for controlling or auditing expenditures. Miller also suggests that formulas tend to reinforce the centralization of decision making, help to integrate academic policy and fiscal considerations, facilitate the rational consideration of alternatives, and strengthen the role of coordinating agencies and professional budget staffs in the budgetary process.

Lee and Bowen describe the manner in which formulas developed in various states and express concern over their complexity and the extent to which they tend to reinforce historical patterns
of support without regard to programmatic differences among institutions or changing needs for resources (1971). They also criticize the general lack of methodological rigor reflected in formulas and cost analysis as well as their tendency toward rigidity in allocating resources.

Various commentaries on higher education refer to the inadequacy of formulas driven by enrollment—particularly as enrollments decline—and the failure to consider fixed versus variable costs of higher education (Hollander 1978).

The American states have developed a wide variety of formulas to determine the operating budgets of public universities. These formulas, developed mainly in the expansionist era of the 1960's, tend to assume comparability of institutions, comprehensiveness in program offerings, and average costs of instruction based on large programs achieving economies of scale through their very size and diversity. The underlying logic of this approach to budgeting emphasizes quantity and assumes that quality will somehow provide for itself. While this assumption was convenient and perhaps even reasonable during the heady expansionism of 15 years ago, it has proven demonstrably irrelevant and counter-productive to the educational realities of today.*

Many states that were experiencing significant shifts or an overall decline in enrollments either suspended the formulas or significantly adjusted them to accommodate decline (Meisinger 1976). Meisinger interprets this reaction as a general tendency toward more flexible, less mechanistic use of formulas, in which the rate schedules are negotiated or the formulas are used as indicators rather than mathematical determinants of budgetary levels. Formulas have been used extensively as an aid to calculation by reducing uncertainty and providing ostensibly objective data upon which to make decisions for allocating budgetary increments equitably among competing requests for resources. Meisinger also suggests that overly complex formulas are subject to manipulation by institutions or budget agencies, thereby lessening their credibility. Formulas interact with the political process in at least two respects: as a method for depoliticizing sensitive issues of institutional “fair share” and as a mechanism for perpetuating patterns of resource allocation that serve the interests of a politically dominant group. In spite of their weaknesses, formulas are likely to be used more extensively in the future and refined to reflect more adequately institutional cost characteristics. Meisinger suggests that during a period of stable or declining enrollments and limited resources, many of the functions previously performed by formulas for rationalizing significant budgetary increases will be

* Author’s personal correspondence with a university official, 1980.
Rationality in budgeting. Much of the literature about budgeting in political science and public administration is concerned with the extent to which formal decision processes, such as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), contribute to rationality in decision making. Proponents of budgetary reform in higher education have viewed PPBS and other management systems as a means of improving the quality of information for decision making and encouraging the systematic consideration of alternatives for programmatic goals. Critics of "comprehensive rationality," most notably Wildavsky (1974) and Lindblom (1959, 1968), argue that budgeting is incremental because limited choices are made based on limited information, which is subject to conflicting goals bargained in a political environment.

Several studies have been concerned with the extent to which comprehensive rationality in higher education budgeting is feasible or desirable. Much of the literature on the determinants of appropriations either takes the incremental nature of budgeting as a given or uses trend analyses of annual increments in appropriations as evidence that budgeting leads to marginal adjustments to prior appropriations and that decision makers are primarily, if not exclusively, oriented to the previous appropriation level without regard to programmatic considerations.

On a theoretical level, actual budgeting practice embodies a mix of rational and incremental approaches (Schmidtlein 1973). Incrementalism and comprehensive rationality can be synthesized by viewing the two as competing paradigms. The constraints to rationality and the conservative bias of the incremental paradigm suggest that "the specific process to be employed, within the bounds set by the constraints, is determined by tradeoffs between conflicting values that are embodied in each of the decision paradigms" (Schmidtlein 1973, p. 11).

Some evidence suggests that even the limited use of rational budgeting techniques, such as PPBS, can significantly affect higher education. Program budgeting leads to a closer integration of sub-
stantive academic policy and financial planning (Weathersby and Balderston 1972). The policy focus of PPBS and its reliance on more sophisticated information may provide opportunities for state policy makers to become more involved in colleges and university policy issues (Peterson 1971). In a comparative study of higher education appropriations politics in three states, Lingenfelter notes that the presence of program budgeting in one of the states did not result in any difference in the incremental character of appropriations but that there was some indication that the governor and state legislators were more prone to influence university policy as a result of the more powerful information tools at their disposal (1974). Hartmark’s Wisconsin case study found a high incidence of “rationalistic” as opposed to “intuitive” or “political” decisions made by the legislature for 100 separate budgetary decisions over a three-year period (1978). A significant number of decisions were influenced by PPBS information, which corresponds with significant legislative initiatives on policy issues affecting the University of Wisconsin.

Information and decision making. A key requisite of rationalistic decision making is the extent to which decision makers use systematic analysis of information. A central assumption of the advocates of rationalism in budgeting, for example, is that “the link between informational resources and behavior is direct and significant” (Schick 1971, p. 189). This link explains the emphasis on information systems and analytical studies in most budgetary reforms.

Purves and Glenny found a clear trend in the states toward an increasing volume and sophistication of budgetary information and a greater use of analysis, although the sophistication of budgetary analysis varied widely (1976). Limitations to its effective use include the formalistic character of many budgetary information systems and the volume of information; such information overload results in an actual decline in the amount and quality of analysis. Information systems also have some effect by reinforcing tendencies toward centralization, and the potential power accrues to those in control of the information, particularly professional staffs. The larger, more autonomous public universities, however, are able to use this information to their own advantage and are less susceptible to state influence through the use of such budgetary data than are smaller four-year colleges. Contrary to the popular view that centralized information leads to centralized power (Chel 1973), Purves and Glenny suggest that the power of information is not automatically exploited by state-level officials, who tend to view the information as primarily strengthening the management control by the institutions themselves.
In practice, the relationship of information to political decision making appears to be multifaceted and indirect. Craven uses a framework of political systems to examine the perspectives of interest-group politics, institutional structures, and decision making regarding the use of information (1975). He cites demands, supports, and constraints as the three factors that impinge on the decision-making process. Demands are presented by verbal expressions or specific activities of individuals or groups. Support is the extent to which individuals or groups express preferences, conduct activities, or provide resources, including information, in favor of a particular demand. Constraints represent those political, physical, social, economic, or temporal factors which shape the range of alternatives that realistically can be considered in decision making. The final decision is a product of numerous demands and constraints.

**Interinstitutional relationships**

Four topics are subsumed under interinstitutional relationships: higher education and legislatures, interinstitutional conflict, private or independent higher education, and higher education lobbying.

**Legislatures.** A landmark work in the area of relationships between higher education and state legislatures deals with legislative attitudes toward education (Eulau and Quinley 1970). This survey of legislators, selected executive officials, and staffs in nine states found a significant degree of satisfaction with higher education systems in their respective states but some complaints regarding the quality and amount of relevant information available regarding colleges and universities. Given the fact that this survey predates much of the public reaction to campus unrest and the slackening of the growth during early 1970s, many of the perceptions reported in this survey are now dated.

Nowlen uses issues such as campus unrest and case studies of the Higher Education Committee and Appropriations Committee of the Illinois House to describe the relationship between the legislature and higher education in Illinois (1976). He describes the growing tendency of Illinois legislators to initiate policy rather than to react to executive proposals and stresses the values of mutual trust and informal communication in legislators' dealings with higher education.

A case study on the appropriations process in Ohio identifies the primary actors in determining legislative influence as university officials, Board of Regents staff, legislative and executive officials, and their staffs. University officials continued to exercise considerable influence in spite of the trend of greater centralization of authority in the state coordinating agency (Smoot 1976).
Borgstad analyzes the formal and informal communication patterns between University of Minnesota officials and the legislature. University strategies of influence, and legislative strategies designed to put University representatives on the defensive. Because their power was restricted, legislators resorted to symbolic power over University expenditures, and the final appropriation was quite close to the University request (1976).

Phillips examines the nature and extent of impact by University of Minnesota officials and faculty experts on legislative deliberations on four major issues of the 1977 Minnesota Legislature (1978). She found that the University's contributions to public policy formulation were predicated on a long tradition of active involvement by faculty in public affairs, that the extent and nature of impact varied greatly by issue, that University involvement was greatest during the early stages of issues formulation, and that influence was greater on issues in which the University had no institutional interest at stake.

Wortley and Apfel present a case for greater participation by universities in public policy assistance to state government and describe some recent attempts to formalize such relationships in New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas (1978). They pay particular attention to many of the difficulties inherent in establishing such relationships, stemming from the differences in roles between "science and politics," including the lack of compatibility between the urgent needs of policy makers and more reflective research, problems of confidentiality, problems of availability of faculty expertise and information networks to match experts to the appropriate policy problems, a general distrust between the university and the statehouse, and a faculty reward system that stresses basic rather than applied research. They suggest a number of solutions such as maintaining and fostering informal relationships, involving both parties at the beginning, expanding the faculty reward system, and developing a dialogue between faculty and state officials and staff. They cite the case of the University of Wisconsin as instructive of the value of a long-standing tradition of informal personal relationships and career mobility between the university and state government.

Interinstitutional conflict. A historical overview of the competition between the University of Illinois and Southern Illinois University deals with the politicization of the universities, their mobilization as a statewide political force, and the relationship of the universities to the state's political actors (Rosenbaum 1974). The universities' motivation to engage in political positioning is viewed as dependent on the need to maintain and enhance universities as large and formal organizations.
Rost found that the success of the Wisconsin Governor's proposal for merger of the University of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin State Universities was attributed partly to the weakened political position of the University of Wisconsin, the legislative frustration over ineffective coordination of the two systems, and some active lobbying by education groups that viewed merger in their interest. Rost credits most of the success to the leadership exhibited by the governor and the lack of an effective, mobilized opposition to the merger by the state legislature (1973).

Private higher education. State support of nonpublic higher education, in the form of aid to students and to institutions, has increased significantly in recent years. One study concluded that aid to private institutions had not detracted from appropriations to public colleges and universities (Carnegie Council 1977). However, in at least one state (New York), public higher education appeared to have been affected adversely by rising appropriations for the private sector (Nelson 1978).

Three case studies demonstrate some of the divergent opinions and approaches to aid for private higher education. In Tennessee, both state officials and public college officials generally did not support state aid to private institutions (Celveland 1975). An analysis of the factors that contributed to the 1969 decision to provide state support for Marquette Medical School (now the Medical College of Wisconsin) attributes considerable influence to the political broker's role of the Governor's Task Force on Medical Education (Mullins 1971). In New York, the private sector was successful in obtaining student and institutional aid for private higher education despite ineffective lobbying by the institutions themselves; much of the success of the outcome was a result of a "mobilization of bias" in the policy system that responded to the financial plight of private higher education and its historic position in the state (Scher 1972). As financial pressures increase during the 1980s, it is likely that such political tradeoffs between private and public higher education may become more manifest.

Higher education lobbying. Attempts to monitor or influence educational policy at the state level are not as well understood as those at the federal level (Gove and Carpenter 1977). Gove and Carpenter provide an insightful review of various types of lobbying groups, including those related to faculty, students, institutional associations, and university officials. They view the emergence of lobbying for higher education as a consequence of the growing complexity of both state government and higher education. They note that the types of lobbying practiced and the targets of lobbying activity vary greatly with individual state structures, laws, and traditions, and
identify six groups as potential targets of lobbying: the governor, the governor's fiscal staff, the legislative leadership and members, opinion leaders, the general public, and the state coordinating board. Gove and Carpenter call for further research to identify which lobbying strategies and which lobbying groups are most effective in various institutional settings, and to clarify the relationship of lobbying roles, targets, actors, and issues at the state level.

One recent dissertation attempts to analyze the effectiveness of higher education lobbying in Florida (Anderson 1976). A number of critical incidents are identified that, in the view of legislators and lobbyists, affect legislative decisions. These factors are compared with effective lobbying techniques used by public school lobbyists. A number of attributes of lobbying, including objectivity, factuality, and professionalism, are considered to have been effective. A survey of legislator and lobbyist attitudes in Indiana revealed a high degree of consensus toward postsecondary education on a broad range of issues, which were factor-analyzed into 15 clusters of issues (Sandage 1975).

Conclusion

The political relationship between the state and higher education has expanded greatly in recent years, encompassing issues such as the position of private colleges and universities, accountability to the legislature, and lobbying efforts. A recent report by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education (1980) suggests that the relationship of higher education to the state will become even more critical in the future. With declining enrollments and shrinking state resources, the future vitality of both public and private higher education will increasingly be influenced by decisions made in the statehouse.
The Politics of Higher Education at the Local Level

In a discussion of the politics of higher education at the local level, the term "local" may be defined in three ways: First, local politics can refer to institutional politics—colleges and universities are themselves political systems, and campus governance and relationships reflect tensions and forces similar to those in other political spheres. "Local" also may be used to distinguish from state or federal politics and refer to the relationship between the community and higher education. While such a relationship is not limited to two-year colleges, it is perhaps in the community college where local politics is most evident, because in many states the funding and governance of community colleges involves local government. Finally, the term may designate the implementation of federal or state policy at the local level. This will not be a part of the present discussion, however; other sources have explored a number of policy issues, such as affirmative action, in this format.*

Institutional politics

The view of colleges and universities as political systems involves several conditions. The first is that the separation of politics and education is a myth. The second consideration is a corollary of the first: politics and education are interrelated. Third, models of the college or university are useful in explaining why institutions of higher education are political entities. Such models can be grouped into two areas: apolitical and political. The separation of politics from higher education still exists symbolically because of the tradition and the belief that education must function in an apolitical environment (Goodman 1962). The notion of professors functioning as a "free republic of scholars" has been a persistent myth in higher education, and there have been genuine limitations to professorial autonomy (Cowley 1980). Yet, lehrfreiheit and lehrfreihheit are prized values in higher education. It is assumed that the separation of politics from college and university life is a way to ensure this freedom.

Politics apart from education. This nation has a long history of separating education from politics. The folklore of separation has more to do with perception than with reality, however. The perception was that education was in the hands of a professional staff who were assumed to have the necessary competence and who operated in a politically neutral manner. "Political" was a word associated with the taint of partisan activities in government and legislative relations. In the 1960s, scholars in the politics of the public schools drew attention to the realities of the policy-making process. Based upon the Eastonian notion of policy as an authoritative allocation of values for the society, these scholars showed how policies affecting public schools were infused with politics (Campbell, Cunningham, and McPhee 1965; Conant 1964; Eliot 1959; Kimbrough 1964; Martin 1962; Masters, Salisbury and Eliot 1964).

This research, however, dealt primarily with elementary and secondary public schools. When higher education was mentioned, it was excluded from examination "because, in that policy arena, different groups initiate demands which are handled in substantially different ways" (Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot 1964, p. 261). The Dartmouth College case in 1819, however, is of particular significance because of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court safeguarding this private college from legislative interference, thus legitimizing academic governance as separate from civil government:

This termination of the Dartmouth College case ended the efforts of the states to commandeer the existing private colleges, and it undergirds the hundreds of other cases established since. It also constitutes one of the bulwarks of the American version of political pluralism, that is, the distribution of social functions and powers to governments other than civil government: to educational institutions, churches, business corporations, and scores of other kinds of private enterprises (Cowley 1980, p. 198).

Politics in education. The context in which schools and colleges operate is political. If one accepts the allocation of preferences as basic to policy making, then the internal dynamics of the policy process and organizational decision making involve inherently not exclusively political relationships among actors and groups. Indeed, the separation of education from politics was based more on belief than on fact, and, in fact, the university was "at or near the center of the governmental-political" spectrum (Waldo 1970, p. 107). Lannaccone (1976) examined not only groups of institutions but also statewide patterns of educational politics. While the empirical focus of his study was public schools, his observations apply equally to higher education. Among his findings he identifies four distinct types of linkage patterns between education and politics. One arrangement is termed "locally based disparate," indicating that educational politics is dominated by an elite group of locally based
leaders who operate in an entrepreneurial style. This may be the traditional way in which colleges and universities have functioned in the political arena.

The other three types in the Iannaccone concept are statewide in orientation. One type uses the structure of a monolithic, umbrella organization that attempts to "speak with one voice" for the interests of education. In public schools, the prototype is the statewide conference board, and in higher education it might be a consortium composed of two-year and four-year public and private colleges. The heyday of these organizations was the period of abundant resources, but the days of monolithic, integrative associations and organizations have waned. Instead, one typically finds either of the two remaining types as a linkage pattern. The fragmented linkage pattern is typical where interinstitutional relationships are competitive. When organizations are able to coalesce around common issues, however, the arrangement may be syndical. The synarchy may form either voluntarily, growing out of mutual interest and survival, or temporarily, brought together to investigate policy issues or to propose alternative solutions (Hines 1978).

Apolitical institutional models. The first model of institutional function and operation could be termed nearly antipolitical, for the authors state explicitly that the mission of the university should be based upon academic and intellectual elements. The key to university reform was perceived to lie in the "autonomous ideas" and the centrality of the classroom, and governance should be minimized (Zyskind and Sternfeld 1971).

Corson developed the second model (1960, 1975). The earlier version describes a "unique dualism" in college and university organization which leads to governance mechanisms for academic affairs and for administrative concerns. The later version advocates reestablishment of a sense of community. No one governance model yet proposed is suitable for all colleges and universities, and a process of ongoing "adaptive restructuring" within the institution should be developed to meet new and changing demands (Corson 1975).

The third model, the bureaucratic model of institutional organization, grew out of Weber's initial research on bureaucracies (1947). It was articulated by Stroup (1966), applied to academic organizations in an empirical study by Blau (1973). The bureaucratic model fails to address political issues in a number of ways. First, bureaucracy deals with the routine and expected. The bureaucratic paradigm, if it functions properly, establishes a set of organizational routines and standards designed to eliminate conflict and dysfunction. Conflict and contention are inherent in any political
paradigm. Second, bureaucracy deals with the formal and the official. Political models provide for the informal and the unofficial. Third, the bureaucratic paradigm assumes certainty in cause-and-effect relationships as well as in preferences about decisions. Information systems are open, and individuals have sufficient knowledge about organizational options. With a minimum of uncertainty, decisions can be made nearly by computation; the process is apolitical. When situations are uncertain, political decision making ensues if for no other reason than that judgments are involved. A 2x2 matrix based on Thompson illustrates this process (see Table 1).

Finally, bureaucratic paradigms focus on structure and not on process. Bureaucracy can help explain what should happen within an established structural framework, but bureaucracy does not help explain what often does happen outside the regularities of structure. It does not map the essential elements of the processes by which policies are formulated and decisions are enacted.

The fourth generally apolitical model was provided by Millett (1962) as well as other proponents of what might be termed the "university ideal" of a collegium of academics as a community of dispassionate scholars pursuing knowledge and truth. In one sense, this model is very political: "Enclaves like universities must often be in conflict with the surrounding society. Historically this has continually occurred, in doctrine, morals, politics, standards" (Goodman 1962, p. 170). But it is primarily apolitical because the collegial approach emphasizes coordination and administration by way of a "dynamic of consensus" (Millett 1962). This model places importance on the technical competence of the professional (Parsons and Platt 1973; Blau 1973). Baldridge et al. (1978) critiqued this model,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences regarding possible outcomes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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showing that the collegial approach fails to deal with conflict, and reflects a utopian ideal of the academic community more than reality.

Political institutional models. The case study of the political process of governance at New York University was the first widely used “political” model of the higher education institution (Baldridge 1971b). In this model, Baldridge drew upon Easton’s theory of political systems in examining the political processes within the university by which major curricular, fiscal, and administrative decisions were made. With the formulation of policy as the focal point, the political model makes the following assumptions:

1. Decisions are made by groups of elites, and there is a large degree of inactivity by the masses.
2. Participation by individuals is more fluid than static, but decisions tend to be made by those who persist.
3. Conflict is normal, expected, and functional in promoting organizational change.
4. Colleges and universities, like other organizations, are fragmented into interest groups having differing goals and values.
5. Formal authority is limited by interest group politics and pressure.
6. Academic decision making responds not only to internal interest group pressure, but also to the control and pressure exerted by groups external to the institution (Baldridge et al. 1978, pp. 35-6).

Baldridge et al. later proposed three readjustments: accounting for the impact of external groups with an environmentalist theme; examining long-term decision patterns, rather than a single decision; and enlarging the scope of consideration to multiple groups of different types of colleges (p. 43).

One earlier political model focused on the university as a state, with conflict as its central characteristic (Foster 1968). Conflict is translated into policy by means of the political process within the institution. A number of metaphors illustrate the politics of the university. The so-called “democratic approach” takes its cue from the separation of powers (executive and legislative) of the government. The “autocratic approach” reflects the domination of the president. Emphasizing the pluralistic character of the political model, Foster noted that “because the realities of power are so widely unappreciated, the academic community tends to become preoccupied with constitutions” (p. 439). The goals of higher education are like those of the political system: “obscure, shifting, and often in conflict” (p. 442). Thus, policy making should concentrate on broad-based participation rather than administrative centralization.

Another political model of the university emphasized the local community rather than a state (Sanders 1973). The analogy of a
local community rests upon four principles: the campus is a physical fact and has boundaries and features like a geopolitical community; the university is a total community because basic needs can be fulfilled within the community; resource allocation procedures follow those of a community by using governmental, quasi-governmental, and private channels; and political leadership must be used in allocating resources. Thus, the structure of representation, the constituent groups, and the division of powers must be taken into account. In contrasting the university with the classical (collegial) model or the pragmatic (applied community service) model, Bell advocated that "the university must become, more formally, a political community" (1971, p. 171).

One author described the university as a power center, then "a governmental agency and a political force" (Waldo 1970; Waldo 1970, p. 196). The author posited that the university "from the beginning has had more of a governmental-political role than is customarily perceived, that in the recent modern period its governmental-political role has been growing in scope and importance, and that certain developments now culminating place the university at or near the center of the governmental-political spectrum" (1970, p. 107).

The term "pluralism" is not uncommon among those who advocate political models for colleges and universities. Pluralism is used to describe a configuration of multiple interests, views, and groups. In academic institutions, "coexisting forms of organization" indicate a pluralistic internal structure (Bucher 1970). Pluralism can also be used "in the straightforward prescriptive senses of acknowledging that numerous interests in and out of a large state university have legitimate claims to share in decision-making power or influence" (Epstein 1974, p. 230). Epstein examined seven sources of legitimate interest in governance and explained their nature: the state agency, trustees, managers and administrators, professors, groups who organize through collective bargaining, students as consumers, and organized student power. He did not, however, explain the consequences of pluralism in the university.

A former administrator claimed that academic authority is so diffuse that "no one has the complete power to do any given thing" (Adams 1976, p. 4). Walker, however, characterized the institution as a "pluralistic democracy" (1979a). His prescription would rely on a sensitivity to institutional climate and structure more than on individuals; he would establish trust between and among people, maintain a "democratic openness" with emphasis on team effort and problem solving, avoid reprisals, and develop a keen sense of timing for administrative actions.

An earlier study of the presidency at 45 universities concludes that the ideal role of the president should be that of a "collegial
manager" (Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor 1967). In their view, the university is divided into a bureaucratic or organizational side and a collegial or academic side. Other analyses recognize many streams of action within the institution and the organizational complexities typical of modern colleges or universities (Huntzicker 1978).

The consequences of the pluralistic nature of academic organizations for administrative authority has been a common topic in literature about higher education. A popular approach is to divide authority along bureaucratic and professional lines. However, one researcher analyzed administrative reactions to authority in the context of pragmatism and ideology (Lunsford 1968). In seeking to have decisions accepted, administrators are forced to be pragmatic rather than simply authoritative. In linking the university's mission with its loosely organized and diverse constituency, administrators may be forced to use seemingly apolitical ideologies to effect consensus and compromise.

By substituting the ideal of rational discussion for the more complex reality of institutional decision-making, the executive often describes his own genuine attempts to find an apolitical consensus and his hope of encouraging others in that direction. But he is doomed to failure in every case where the stakes are high and the consultation is less than "open and free." Such cases occur frequently today, especially where the university's affairs touch upon the government and the controversies of the larger society. When they do, the rhetorical use of ideal-as-reality serves another, subtler, purpose—to draw a mask of rationality over the inescapably "political" decision of the executive (Lunsford 1968, p. 102).

Helsabeck (1973) applied insights from political science and sociology—in particular collective decision theory and management science—to the relationship between decision making and organizational effectiveness. He offered some general conclusions: that a compound decision-making system composed of elements of both corporate (centralized decision making) and federated (decentralized) structures was more effective than merely increasing individual participation in decision making; that criteria for participation varied with the type of decision; that membership expectations and political culture were important determinants of participation; that organizational effectiveness consisted of multiple and sometimes conflicting elements; and that one needed to include concurrent regimes (external relationships) to understand decision-making patterns within the institution.

At the end of the continuum of apolitical and political models, opposite the rationality of bureaucracy (a closed system) is an open system, which posits that colleges and universities can be included among those organizations demonstrating loose, unstructured, and changing goals; an unclear technology, based more on trial and
Table 2: Metaphors of Governance with an Accompanying Presidential Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance metaphor</th>
<th>Description of institutional functioning</th>
<th>Ideal prescription for role of president</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitive market</td>
<td>University is supplier of goods in free market.</td>
<td>President is entrepreneur and establishes preferred kind of organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>University has defined objective and hierarchy for its accomplishment.</td>
<td>Trustees appoint president, who is evaluated according to job performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective bargaining</td>
<td>Fundamental conflicts of interests on campus are resolved by collective bargaining.</td>
<td>President mediates disputes, facilitates compromise, supervises contract administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>University is a community with multifaceted “electorate” that forms coalitions.</td>
<td>President is analogous to candidate for public office and functions as political leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Social pressure exerted to form agreements about standard operating procedures.</td>
<td>President manages agendas, solicits public agreements, implements collective decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Individuals make autonomous decisions; coordination and control not needed or ignored.</td>
<td>President gains influence by serving as catalyst in suggesting viable solutions; knowledge is used to make subtle adjustments in policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent judiciary</td>
<td>Leadership is assumed without an explicit constituency; authority is bestowed.</td>
<td>President attempts to capture historic “truth” of university and serve as temporary leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plebiscitary autocracy</td>
<td>An autocrat makes all decisions until the electorate become dissatisfied and autocrat abdicates.</td>
<td>President serves as a decision maker and organizer of opinion; persuades others to follow.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

error than on cause-and-effect relationships, and a fluid pattern of participation by individuals. A college or university, in other words, might be termed an "organized anarchy" (Cohen and March 1974; March and Olsen 1974b). The term "organized anarchy" suggests a variety of metaphors for higher education (see Table 2).

The purpose of these approaches to the structure, governance, and functions of colleges and universities is to provide insights into organizational behavior. The likely focus for political activity would be in academic or institutional governance.

**Higher education governance.** The structure and function of the governance of higher education grows out of the context in which it is placed. Against the backdrop of the development of higher education, the process of governance has been cast along lines of "shared authority" between administration and faculty on important issues of policy. Formally, authority is shared by the representation of faculty and non-teaching staff on committees and governing bodies. Informally, administrators involve or consult with faculty leaders before making momentous decisions (Clark 1970). Walker (1979a) described how a president can become a political leader by cooperating with or coopting the opposition.

Much of the literature on academic and institutional governance suffers from a series of shortcomings. First, the literature is replete with prescriptions about how the academic system of government should work under ideal circumstances. These references too often tell little about the dysfunctions of governance, about nonroutine situations, and about conflict and compromises. Second, the literature focuses on the formal apparatus of academic government, on the constituent representation on campuswide governance bodies, and on the decisions made by these organs of government. The literature tells us little about informal structures that work parallel to formal bodies and about power exchanges that either enhance or subvert the decisions made by the formal organizations. Third, the literature sheds only dim light on the dynamics of the political process through which these formal structures actually make decisions. The warp and woof of politics is passed over for the superficial stability of structure and its assumed constancy over time. A basic characteristic of political systems is their impermanence and their tractability. Actors, objectives, and means shift with issues over time.

Certain works are exceptions to these shortcomings. The final volume from the Stanford Project on Academic Governance advocates use of the political model and concludes that collegial styles of management are on the ebb (Baldridge et al. 1978). Faculty influence is being undermined on many campuses, unions created to protect faculty interests are becoming a major force in institu-
tional governance, and the influence of groups and agencies external to the campus, including the courts, have increased markedly in recent years.

Another book, written as a guide for institutional managers, examines power sources and relationships in academic institutions (Richman and Farmer 1971). The authors describe two approaches to management: the open system approach, in which the institution and its management interact with the external environment so that the organization can adapt, change, and survive; and the contingency approach, in which managerial practices are chosen in response to specific situations that arise. They identify goals relating to academic programs, student impact, faculty, administration, the overall institution, and the outside world, and provide a "road map" to the identification, understanding, and manipulation of power. Richman and Farmer use a weighting scheme to identify the places in the institution where power is to be found. Finally, they discuss the complexities of multiple levels within the institution, incorporating layers of administration as well as other constituent actors such as professors and students.

A recent book on governance perceptively treats both internal and external governance (Mortimer and McConnell 1978). The authors identify levels of governance both inside and outside the institution and cite those who participate in governance (see Table 3). Four basic questions are used to organize the book: what issue is to be decided, who should be involved in the decision, at what stage of the decision-making process should such involvement occur, and at what level in the organizational structure should such involvement occur (Mortimer and McConnell 1978). The authors drew upon the concept of discretion developed by Davis: "A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction" (1969, p. 1). Discretion is situation-specific; its amount depends upon the situation. Discretion is balanced by the extent to which academic governance is codified. The achievement of balance also may be seen in the dilemma of centralization versus decentralization and of autonomy versus accountability.

Politics and the community college

Of all types of institutions of higher education, the community college may be uniquely political for several reasons. First, the philosophy of the community college movement has its historical roots as well as expansionist years embedded in the egalitarian mission of increasing access and opportunity (Zwerling 1976). Second, community colleges in more than half the states are supported by varying combinations of local and state fiscal sources, including stu-
dent tuition (Lombardi 1973; Garms 1977). Third, in their curricula, community colleges have visible and functional ties to local communities. Fourth, the community college arose out of perceived needs in the community, and it may be in finding new meanings for “community” that the future of this form of higher education lies (Gleazer 1980). Politically, community colleges are tied to local governing structures as much if not more than to state government (Richardson, Blocker, and Bender 1972). For example, the “strong constituent identity” of Hawaii’s community colleges differs from that of the University of Hawaii (Wong 1974). The political problems inherent in establishing new community college districts—funding, governance, and management—are illustrated in two articles dealing with proposed Illinois community colleges (Chan 1974; Colburn and Shellenburger 1975).

One basic feature of the community college is its political nature because of the diversity of relationships to local communities. Another basic characteristic is the pluralistic campus governance, which may border on fragmentation. This pluralism is evident in several areas: Community college leadership has been portrayed in somewhat more authoritarian terms than have administrators in other segments of postsecondary education (Lahti 1979; Richardson, Blocker, and Bender 1972). Faculty control has been evidenced by a strong academic collective bargaining movement in the community college (Kemerer and Baldridge 1975). Strong administrations combined with a rapidly growing academic collective bargaining movement give the community college, more than other colleges, fragmented internal control.

Another basic characteristic of the community college is a rather high degree of involvement with agencies outside the campus. In addition to funding and governance ties with local communities, these outside relationships include the trend toward increasing state control (Martorana and McGuire 1976; Martorana and Kuhns 1977) and the political involvement of community college leaders in such areas as lobbying.

In spite of considerable involvement with agencies outside the institution, the community college often is underrepresented to lawmakers. Three problems for community colleges can be identified: relative newness at the state level, where community colleges are not as well represented as their counterparts in higher education; lack of a unified voice, because no one group (except possibly college presidents) has articulated the position of the community college to legislators; and lack of accurate and reliable data, because colleges have not used enough statistical data to support their position (Gleazer 1980, pp. 110-11). At the same time, the community colleges have considerable potential for effective representation in politics. The restoration of a statewide aid
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of decision making</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Governing boards</th>
<th>Academic administrators</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Federal courts</td>
<td>Accrediting bodies, consortia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alumni associations, disciplinary associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>State Department of Education courts, legislature</td>
<td>State governing or coordinating board</td>
<td>State associations</td>
<td>Student lobbies</td>
<td>State Education associations, professional and disciplinary associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community college district</td>
<td>County or local government</td>
<td>School board</td>
<td>Local associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local citizens' associations, taxpayers' associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of decision making</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Governing boards</th>
<th>Academic administrators</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>Board of trustees</td>
<td>System officials</td>
<td>Senates and unions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senates and unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional campus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local board of trustees</td>
<td>Campus officials</td>
<td>Senates and unions</td>
<td>Student government</td>
<td>Senates and unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School or college</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deans</td>
<td>Councils</td>
<td>Student clubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division or department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Committees</td>
<td>Committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

marily collegial, and the most accurate description for some institutions may be bureaucratic. Nevertheless, these organizations do have a political dimension, and many higher education issues and relationships can be understood most accurately through the use of political models.
Interpretive Summary

Politics at the federal level

The federal government has been deeply involved in higher education, although the involvement has been indirect, occurring primarily through fiscal support to students, specific programs, and academic research. While this arrangement has been criticized for varying reasons, it would appear that this diversity, a system of checks and balances, and a pattern of decentralized control offer benefits and advantages for higher education.

The federal interest in higher education is both fiscal and regulatory. Those in higher education seek to obtain the most financial support for the least amount of regulatory control. Less regulatory control—or at least a clarified governmental role in regulation—is likely as government begins to respond to a growing cry from higher education about the onerous burden of regulation. At the same time, monitoring of fiscal programs may increase as government seeks to use programs to achieve desired ends as well as to assure proper expenditure of public dollars. An uneasy truce may thus evolve between government and higher education in regulation and fiscal accounting. Higher education may be favored in matters of regulation and government will be favored in matters of fiscal accounting.

The functioning of the higher education community as a developing interest group is less clear. On the one hand, the activity of the higher education lobby at the federal level has increased markedly during the 1970s. Its impact on the substance of policy outcomes, on the other hand, is uneven, and the impact certainly is not commensurate with the level of activity. One cannot simplistically pronounce that higher education should begin to speak with one voice. The enterprise is too diverse, and in times of scarce resources it tends to be fragmented. Policy issues may increasingly be viewed along the lines of two-year versus four-year colleges, and private versus public institutions. It will be more difficult to achieve balance in the ways in which policies affect different types of institutions. It will be incumbent upon institutional leaders to find ways to achieve consensus between institutions, for the impact of the federal government on programs and institutions of higher education will be of growing importance in the coming decade, if only because of the necessity of fiscal support for students, programs, and institutions.

The future policy directions of the Department of Education and its influence on higher education are uncertain. Most of the activi-
ties during its initial year involved personnel selection and consolidation of offices and units; indeed, the fledgling department may be dismantled before it has any effect on policy.

Politics at the state level

In contrast to the role of the federal government in higher education, state governments have a direct, multifaceted relationship with colleges and universities. This relationship can be examined from four angles: in terms of statewide coordination, accountability and institutional autonomy, the budgetary process, and interinstitutional relationships. Statewide planning is a principal function of the coordinating agencies, which are gaining expertise in master planning. Coordinating agencies occupy a critical position in the relationship between government and higher education.

Various aspects of the literature about budgeting and decision making bring this complex relationship into bold relief. Despite their technical sophistication, purely quantitative approaches to explaining appropriations for higher education have been inconclusive in dealing with proxy indicators of political variables. The area of decision making suggests a number of possibilities in terms of theoretical insights and empirical findings. Budgetary agencies have gained experience, and decision making has become more centralized at the state level. Those in higher education are increasingly concerned about the limitations of enrollment-driven budget formulas. Evidence suggests that even limited use of rational budgeting techniques provides closer integration between academic and financial planning.

The relationships between higher education and the state will be of growing importance in the coming years, as declining enrollments and shrinking state resources put additional pressures on both sides.

Politics at the local level

The literature reflects increased recognition of academic institutions as political organizations: describing the college as a political system, explaining the political dimension of intra-organizational relationships, and discussing the influence of authorities external to the campus. The political models illustrating these relationships all have merit, depending on the circumstances, time, and objectives of the situation to which they are applied. Nevertheless, not all higher education relationships are political—many could be characterized as apolitical, collegial, or bureaucratic.

External agencies have increasingly become involved in campus affairs. As this trend continues, higher education must find ways to
remain intellectually dispassionate yet involved in events and agencies external to the institution.

Concluding observations

The past two decades of scholarship involving the politics of higher education have demonstrated unequivocally that higher education exists in a political environment and is a direct participant in the political process. With the challenges of scarce resources, declining enrollments, interinstitutional competition, erosion of institutional autonomy, and governmental intervention or even indifference to higher education, colleges and universities will become more directly engaged in the political process at all levels of government.

Scholars should pay greater attention to the politics of higher education as these developments unfold. The field of inquiry has advanced significantly during the past decade, and it exhibits a broadening base of empirical research informed by many theoretical perspectives and research designs.

Although the politics of higher education as a field of inquiry and the study of policy are analytically distinct, they are also related in at least two important respects. First, an understanding of the political process contributes to informed participation in that process by those in higher education. Several studies of the politics of higher education at the federal level, for instance, comment on the political naïveté and ineptness of higher education in pressing its interests before the federal government. Meltsner (1972) argued that effective policy analysis requires a preliminary step of political feasibility analysis if the analyst's recommendations are to influence policy. The study of the politics of higher education should broaden one's understanding of the dynamics of the policy process and the variations and determinants of influence by higher education institutions, interests, and associations.

Second, the analysis of policy affecting higher education enhances research on the politics of higher education by placing the policy in an environment based on reality in which political issues must be confronted and examined.

The normative character of much of this literature may well persist, largely because the object of study carries with it so many subjective meanings of value and personal identification. As an enterprise, higher education is too important to the advancement of knowledge to eschew a critical analysis of public policy for the sake of a narrow interpretation of objectivity. To the extent that research on the politics of higher education contributes to the understanding of public policy, further progress in this field of inquiry may be critical to the future of higher education.
Appendix: Conceptual and Methodological Issues for Research

This appendix assesses the status of the study of the politics of higher education as an emerging field. It describes some of the prevailing conceptual and methodological bases of this diverse field, identifies major trends in theory and research, and suggests future directions and the potential for this field to contribute to the social sciences and to public policy in higher education.

Theoretical and conceptual approaches

One of the most prevalent conceptual frameworks employed in the politics of higher education is political systems theory, generally based on the formulation by Easton (1965). Essentially, systems theory focuses on process, more specifically, the antecedents and results of decisions made as a part of the policy process. According to critics of systems theory, it is not really theory but at best a heuristic construct for identifying variables and ordering them logically into intuitively compelling relationships.

Concepts from political science. A number of political science perspectives are evident in the literature of the politics of higher education. At the institutional level, various concepts of power, authority, influence, and control are reflected in the literature on academic governance. Recurrent weaknesses in this literature, however, are the lack of well developed theory and the failure to use what theoretical propositions exist, which would advance the knowledge and understanding about the power relationships within academic organizations. Although some studies do not include these weaknesses (Báia 1973; Richman and Farmer 1974; Mortimer and McConnell 1978; Epstein 1974; Baldridge 1971b; Baldridge et al. 1978), a large body of literature on institutional governance lacks theoretical depth, tends toward normative prescriptions, and devotes insufficient attention to informal organizational and political processes as opposed to formal structures. The field now is ready to begin investigating the bases, uses, and consequences of conflict and power.

The literature about state politics of higher education includes several examples of the use of concepts from political science. Examples of views about organizational power and bureaucratic political behavior are evident in the material on statewide coordination. Interest-group pluralism is reflected in some of the literature on lobbying. The literature on budgeting uses concepts from
polical science, management science, and decision theory.

**Contributions from other disciplines.** The literature on the politics of higher education reflects a broad use of theoretical frameworks and perspectives that come from several disciplines. Much of this material derives from political science or from public administration, but a growing body of material comes from sociology and organizational theory as well. One example is a concept of academic power by Clark (1978a). Clark identified ten sources of academic power, including ridership by professors, the faculty as a guild or profession, institutional authority, governmental authority, political authority, and systemwide academic oligarchy (1978a). This concept of academic power as having multiple facets and sources appears useful in at least three ways. First, notions about academic power often distinguish only between the bureaucratic and the professional. Second, multifaceted constructs of academic power can stimulate more powerful research designs for empirical studies focusing on academic power. Third, views incorporating multiple dimensions of academic power can enhance the understanding about power, influence, and authority in academic organizations.

The dichotomy between bureaucratic and professional authority provided a focus for Blau's examination of power and authority within academic organizations (1973). This broad-ranging synthesis of empirical data and its analysis of the multiple facets of authority and power contribute significantly to the understanding of institutional politics.

One model of the academic organization was that of an "organized anarchy" (Cohen and March 1974). Three researchers examined the inception and early development of the National Institute of Education (Sproull, Weiner, and Wolf 1978), employing the familiar research techniques of document search, survey research (questionnaire development and administration), and interviews. They concluded that this "experiment in organizational development" could best be understood through the analogy of organized anarchy—an unpredictable environment, ambiguous goals, and an unclear technology.

Studies using organizational concepts often are focused on single organizations. Higher education exhibits certain systemwide characteristics, one of which is coordination. Clark has written about coordination as an activity growing out of the tasks of higher education and the structure of embedded power (1978b). In Clark's terms, coordination can be of four types: bureaucratic, political, professional, and market mechanisms. Political coordination, for instance, can include increasing the involvement of political parties, increasing corporatism (interest groups), or increasing the representation and participation of individuals and groups. The
utility of this framework is that statewide coordination can involve
more than merely formal institutional governance. Coordination
can involve multifaceted and complex relationships between the
campus and the state as well as among institutions. These relation-
ships tend to span administrative, political, professional, and mar-
et mechanisms. Clark cautioned that “one form of coordination
should not be pursued fanaticly to the exclusion of the others”
(p. 91).

Another set of concepts pertinent to the politics of higher edu-
cation is based on interorganizational theory. This theory recently
has begun to focus on the “space” between organizations and the
specific relationships between organizations. One scholar identi-
ified the contexts for decision making: a unitary or single-purpose
context, a federative context where sub-units have individuals
goals, a coalitional context where units cooperate as necessary, and
a social-choice context where organizations function as autonomous
units (Warren 1967). This material can be applied to the study of
colleges and universities as political institutions. An individual
college or particular units within it might operate in any one or a
combination of these contexts. Helsabeck (1973) found empirical
evidence indicating that academic decision making is most effective
when a combination of contexts is operative. Two other researchers
who studied higher education and community power according to
interorganizational ties noted that the more traditional approaches
using either elitist or pluralist conceptions of community power
were inadequate (Perucci and Pilisuk 1976). They regarded inter-
organizational ties as a variant of social ties or relationships be-
tween individuals. They found that interorganizational ties existed
in arrangements that they termed “resource networks,” which in-
cluded educators. These networks could be mobilized and brought
to bear upon community issues.

Development of theory. The preceding review of conceptual frame-
works and theoretical perspectives cannot include the many, varied
approaches in this field or those applied from other disciplines, but
it does illustrate the diversity of perspectives and approaches in
use. This diversity is a healthy state; a consensus of theory is
virtually impossible in the early development of a field. A general
theory of politics or of the politics of higher education may be both
unattainable and undesirable, but more conceptual refinement,
generalization, and theoretical speculation are needed to advance
the field.

The progress of theory and empirical investigation are conter-
minous and mutually interdependent. Research across subject
areas can be complementary and synergistic. Porter’s study (1974)
of determinants of influence in the Michigan legislature suggests
that legislators take their cues from other legislators who are viewed as "experts" in a policy area, regardless of their actual technical expertise. Influence by actors outside the legislature is realized as the legislative expert becomes the target of attempts to influence the legislature as a whole. This concept has significance for questions of influence by universities, state lawmakers, officials, and staff. According to Porter, "political science knows little about how the decision-making process differs across policy areas within the same legislature" (p. 130).

Approaches to research

Systems theory and related concepts of the policy-making process have significantly affected research design in the politics of higher education. Systems theory has been extremely useful not only as a conceptual framework, but also as a heuristic device for suggesting appropriate research questions, organizing data collection, and suggesting foci for empirical analysis. Systems theory has been articulated not only in terms of political systems (Easton 1965), but also in social psychological terms (Katz and Kahn 1978). Systems theory facilitates an examination of the antecedents and consequences of policy and political decisions; specifically, it deals with context, input, throughput, output, outcome, and feedback.

Concepts about policy also serve a useful heuristic purpose in organizing research in the politics of higher education. In fact, in an overview about the development of the general field of politics of education, Scribner and Englert identify four basic "conceptual categories" in the politics of education: government, power, conflict, and policy (1977). Functional concepts of policy making provide another major analytical framework, perhaps similar in several respects to the framework of systems theory. What these formulations mean is that policy making is a multi-stage process.

Scholars have defined the policy process in various ways. Easton thought of it as interest articulation, demand aggregation, and authoritative enactment (1965). Schneider offered six stages to the policy process: formulation, articulation, mobilization, codification, application, and redefinition (1969). Price also thought of policy making in six functional stages: instigation and publicizing, formulation, information gathering, interest aggregation, mobilization, and modification (1972). Functional approaches offer several benefits to the researcher. They serve as heuristic devices for stimulating inquiry, they provide an analytical means by which policy can be examined in comparative frameworks, and they avoid a narrow concentration on only one stage of the policy process. As an example, interest group theory may focus only on inputs, decision theory may focus on process, and policy analysis may tend to be
concerned with outcomes. Depending upon the facet of the policy process under investigation, different theoretical and methodological approaches are suggested.

A large number of empirical studies, particularly dissertations, employed some form of case study methodology. Many were studies either of single issues, such as the passing of the federal Education Amendments of 1972, or studies of multiple issues to illuminate the political or policy process in a single state. Case study methodology has been fairly well developed but not necessarily well applied in all instances, even though it appears to represent a generally accepted methodological practice, especially in doctoral dissertations. The pattern, to be specific, is to rely upon document search, survey research, and interviews. More attention should be given to detail, cases developed more rigorously, and multiple cases synthesized more frequently. Carefully designed cases grounded in theory can not only map the field but also contribute to the development of theory and research.

A limited number of studies employ participant observation (Hartmark 1978; Nowlan 1976; Rost 1973), often in conjunction with document search, survey research, and interviews. Participant observation affords the investigator access to information and documentation that might otherwise not be available, and a sensitivity and understanding of the policy-making environment that generally cannot be attained through other means. As in other methodologies, the investigator must guard against problems of bias and too close an identification with the phenomena under study. When augmented with evidence from other sources, such as interviews and documents, participant observation can lead to valuable insights into the policy process.

The methodology of comparative studies generally does not share the epistemological weakness of the case study approach. The comparative method can serve many of the same purposes of experimental research by "controlling" variables through patterns of differences and similarities. Comparative studies also provide a valuable source for generalizations and hypotheses, which can guide further research. Given the growing findings from case studies, it is hoped that future research will attempt to integrate case material by reference to the comparative studies that bear on the issues under investigation.

Relatively limited use of more sophisticated statistical methods beyond survey research and opinion surveys is reflected in the literature. One notable exception is the study of environmental influences on appropriations for higher education (Dye 1967; Peterson 1976). The limitations in this approach generally include difficulty in applying concepts to operations, a lack of consensus on variables, and differences in results deriving from cross-sectional
versus longitudinal research designs. These studies of environmental determinants continue to be useful in identifying variables for more in-depth examination, often by means of qualitative methodologies, and for providing insights into patterns and uniformities in budgeting outcomes at a broader or macro level of analysis. Greater precision in defining the variables to be measured and consensus on definitions of terms will develop as these methodologies are refined and extended. Given the general trend toward quantitative methods in the social sciences, one might anticipate the application of more advanced statistical techniques to other areas in the politics of higher education. These areas might include institutional budgeting, other organizational studies, patterns of interinstitutional relationships such as public and private higher education, and analyses of other environmental factors affecting public policy.

Many nonsystematic, experientially based essays and commentaries on various aspects of the politics of higher education have been written. Although much of this general literature tends toward the subjective, it can direct research investigators to potentially significant issues for analysis and testing of prevailing concepts. Furthermore, it serves a critical role in identifying emerging areas of conflict between government and higher education. A number of concepts reflected in this literature should be subjected to empirical investigation. The notion of accountability in its various forms, as it relates to federal, state, and local governmental intervention in higher education, is one case in point. The topic of accountability also focuses attention on an area where the relationship between government and higher education will become more differentiated as a partnership between government and colleges evolves for mutual benefit. Finally, the question of accountability brings into focus the impact of public policy on higher education, which has been largely missing in political science until recently (Heatwole, Keller, and Wamsley 1976).
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