The history of football is traced as it evolved from the English game of rugby. The game as it is known today was conceived only after a long series of changes. Three prominent reasons for the change were: to make football more interesting to the spectator; to balance the competition between offense and defense; and to modify the dangerous elements of the sport. The growing popularity of the game on college campuses is described, and its eventual commercialization is discussed. The compromises football imposes on educational values are considered. (JD)
A HISTORY OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL

by

Francis M. Rokósz
Assistant Professor
Physical Education
Wichita State University
Wichita, KS 67208
316-689-3340

March 10, 1981
American football is generally considered to be an evolution of the English game Dane's Head, which was played in the tenth century. It was often played by kicking a cow's bladder several miles between towns. Following centuries saw the game—familiar to current Americans as soccer—become more formalized, as played by British schoolboys. But a more similar game to American football had surfaced earlier in ancient Greece. Spartans played Harpaston on a rectangular field marked off with side lines, goal lines, and a center line. The object was to get the ball over the opponent's goal line by either kick, pass or carry. Blocking, tackling, and holding were allowed to obstruct advancement. There was little order, however, and the contests resulted in continuous mayhem. (6)

The Spartan game was quite similar to English rugby, which had its beginnings in 1823 when a Rugby student, in a desperate effort to score late in a football game, violated the rules by picking up the ball and carrying it across the goal. His audacity proved to be popular as an innovation, and Rugby established rugby as a sport in 1841. Unorganized football was played on the American college campus as early as 1800. Victory was won by kicking the ball across a designated goal, such as a campus walk. Several years later, a contest between Harvard freshmen and sophomores took place under vague rules; and the game gradually prospered on eastern campuses, with each school developing its own rules. By 1860, the Princeton rules called for "twenty-five players upon a side, goal posts twenty-five feet apart, six goals necessary to constitute a game, the ball not to be carried, a ball caught on the fly or first bound to entitle the catcher to a free kick from a clear space of ten feet, no tripping or hacking allowed, and a ball out of bounds was kicked in at right angles to the side line." (6)

With the proximity of Princeton and Rutgers, the game developed on both campuses in similar fashion, and the rules were nearly the same. The two student bodies were constantly at each other's throats. For years they scuffled back and forth over possession of a revolutionary cannon which finally rested in cement at Princeton. Princeton, winning that battle, also beat Rutgers in baseball, 40 to 2 in 1866. The Rutgers student body, smarting from two losses, thought it might be able
to vent its frustrations otherwise. In 1869, Rutgers proposed a series of three football games, the first and third to be played at New Brunswick, the second at Princeton. The initial intercollegiate football game was played on November 8, 1869 under Rutgers' rules, which deviated just slightly from those of Princeton. The game was essentially that of present-day soccer; and Rutgers won six goals to four, six goals being required for victory. The game was played in a hospitable air—that of a great social event. "Rutgers—accordingly in a mass met their visitors at the station and devoted the day exclusively to their hearty entertainment." Spectators sat on fences or on the ground, occasionally singing a college song. The first football cheer was shouted by the Princeton rooters—a hissing and bursting sound. The players arrived in informal attire. The only trace of uniform was the red turbans worn by the Rutgers men. At game time, the participants simply removed hats, coats, and vests and went to it. The second game, played under Princeton rules, was won by the home team 8 to 0. The proposed third game was never played, this the result of faculty displeasure of the distracting influences of the game at both schools.

The following year saw another series of games played and the entry of Columbia into competition. Two years later, Harvard and Yale re-established football after it had been suppressed by both faculties in 1860. Each school developed its own rules—Harvard's being not too dissimilar from those of rugby. The singularity of the Harvard game, compared to those of other American colleges, prompted a challenge from the captain of the rugby team at McGill University in Canada. He proposed, in 1874, that the teams play two games, one in Cambridge and the other in Montreal. Each game would be played under the home team's rules. Although the invitation was received at Harvard with great enthusiasm, the faculty was not about to allow such foolishness to carry away 20-odd students from their studies. A counter proposal was made by Harvard, and accepted, that both games be played at Cambridge.

The first game, played under Harvard rules, was won by the home team three goals to none. The second game, following the McGill rules, was an historic occasion, for it marked the playing of the first intercollegiate game of rugby-style football in the United States. It also marked the American inaugural of the egg-shaped ball with which the Harvard players, accustomed to a round ball, anticipated a great deal of trouble in handling. To the surprise of everyone, though,
the Harvard team showed a remarkable ability in adapting to rugby play, and they held McGill to a 0-0 tie. The excitement of the game demonstrated to everyone present that the future of football at Harvard rested with the adoption of rugby football, which was officially accepted in 1875. Yale, too, adopted the revised method of play and engaged Harvard in a game the same year. The game, interesting in several respects, was notable in that one of the Yale players was freshman, Walter Camp. Quickly thereafter, the other football-playing colleges (Princeton and Columbia) changed to rugby rules—rules that varied slightly at each school.(1,6)

It was not until 1876 that an intercollegiate convention was called in Springfield, Massachusetts to form a unified code of rugby rules. Yale and Columbia argued for eleven players on a side and a scoring system that only allowed goals. Harvard and Princeton wanted fifteen on a side and only touchdowns to count. They compromised. The result was fifteen men and the game to be decided by both touchdowns and goals, with one goal equalling four touchdowns. And, for the first time, an official was designated to govern play. Previously, the team captains arbitrated disputed points.(16)

The name of the game has always been football, but the game has undergone such change that there is now only minor concession toward using the foot in advancing the ball. Football, as we know it today, was conceived only after a seemingly endless series of changes. The reasons for change, of course, are numerous, but the three prominent reasons were (a) to make football more interesting to the spectator, (b) to balance the competition, i.e. to neutralize the shifting imbalances between offense and defense as innovations in the game occurred, and (c) to modify the dangerous elements of the sport. (16)

Although American football was derived from English rugby, it became clear very early that the exact English rules could not be copied, precisely because the English rules were not at all exact. The ambiguity of the rules, as stated, caused considerable confusion amongst the American players. For example, rule number nine: "A touchdown is when a player, putting his hand on the ball in touch or in goal, stops it so that it remains dead, or fairly so." Another rule permits the carrying of the ball, but only on the condition that a player happened to be standing behind the scrummage as the ball popped out. An intentional "peel out" of the ball was not allowed: It must come out by accident. The English rules
were apparently written with the notion that everyone would naturally know what is meant by such phrases as "fairly so." British had no trouble following the rules because they had developed them through tradition. They simply knew how to play the game; but the Americans had no such tradition. They had no one to call upon to qualify the etiquette of the game. So, out of necessity, the American procedure was to formalize the rules. (4, 14)

The two most significant changes in the rules from the British tradition were the appearance of interference and the disappearance of the scrummage. With the scrummage the ball was placed between the linemen of both teams and the ball was put into play by kicking back to a teammate who would then advance it by run, kick, or lateral pass. This procedure, however, precluded any sort of forethought in determining a plan for play. A second meeting of the Intercollegiate Football Association in 1880 abolished the scrummage and provided that a lineman, designated as the snapper-back, would pass the ball backward with his foot to the waiting quarterback. Interference (blocking) was strictly forbidden by the British. The player running with the ball could not have a teammate between himself and the goal. This rule was stretched by Princeton in 1879 when two players were used as a convoy for the ball carrier, one on each side, but not in advance of the runner. The disgruntled opposition, rather than challenging the appropriateness of the maneuver, accepted it by common consent. But Princeton was to go further. In 1884, they unabashedly sent their interference in front of the ball, and again the opposition relented and copied. The scientific application of interference is today the basis for moving the ball on the ground. (6, 16)

Princeton, as a matter of fact, provided the impetus for several rules changes. The elimination of the scrummage by the rules committee allowed for the retention of the ball, but unwittingly did not provide for its surrender. Princeton took advantage of this opening when they met Yale for the championship on Thanksgiving Day (1880) in the Polo Grounds, New York. At that time, in case of tie, the Championship banner was retained by the previous year's winner. Princeton had won it in 1879, so all they needed was a tie with Yale to remain the champion. When a player with the ball gets tackled behind his own goal in modern football, a safety is called, and the opposition is awarded two points. When this happened in 1880, no points were scored and the ball was brought out to the 25-yard line and put into play, once again, by the offensive team. A team could, therefore, retain possession of the ball indefinitely.
barring a fumble. This is precisely what Princeton did to Yale in the now famous "block game." The game ended in a 0-0 tie, and Princeton was declared the champion of football for 1880. This sort of thing was not to be tolerated by the rules committee, so they made some changes for the next year. In case of ties, two extra 15-minute periods would be played. If still tied, the winner would be determined to be the team with the fewest number of safeties.(6,16)

Princeton and Yale met again in 1881 at the Polo Grounds under the same circumstances as the year before. Another tie would give Princeton the silk banner. And just as before, Princeton found another loophole in the rules. The outlay of the field provided for an infinite extension of the goal lines and sidelines which formed imaginary squares at the four corners of the field. According to the rules, if the ball is either carried or propelled into the squares behind one's goal, the ball is to be placed on the 25-yard line and retained by the offense without penalty. This was not the same as a safety. Taking advantage of this oversight, Princeton held the ball for the entire first half. But amazingly, after the second half kickoff, Yale resorted to the same tactics, and the regulation game ended in a scoreless tie. Two extra periods proved equally fruitless, and Princeton immediately claimed the championship. But, Yale had something up its sleeve. Football at this point was played with eleven men to a side, four less than in earlier years. It seems, said Yale, that the last legitimate championship won by Princeton was done with fifteen men to a side. So, the championship should now revert to the team that last won with eleven players. Back in 1876, Princeton had agreed to play Yale for the championship with only eleven men instead of the customary fifteen. As one might guess, Yale won that game, and on that basis stole the championship away from Princeton in 1881.(6,16)

By this time the public had had it with "political" football. They were sick of sitting through dull games and having championships won on technicalities in the rules. A great clamor arose which climaxxed with a rules convention in the fall of 1882. The conference adopted a rule which proved to be the final break with the English rugby game. "If on three downs a team shall not have advanced the ball five yards or lost ten, they must give up the ball to the other side at the spot where the fourth was made." Clearly, the new rule saved the game from oblivion. As Amos Alonzo Stagg recalls: "Football might have wound up on the financial page, somewhere between Galveston spot cotton and the Savannah rosin market, if the rules com-
mittee had not come to the rescue..." The results of the new rule were immediate. The field had to be lined off in 5-yard sections, giving it the appearance of a gridiron—a term which stays with us. Strategy was turned upside down. Pre-determined plays were now feasible. Signals were used to call the play and set the ball in motion. The players were put in certain positions, consisting of seven linemen, a quarterback, two halfbacks, and one fullback. New teams joined the Association—Lafayette, Lehigh, Dartmouth, Pennsylvania, and the West's first team, Michigan. The astounding growth of American football was on its way. (6,16)

In 1883, Michigan went east and played Yale, Harvard, Stevens, and Wesleyan within a week. Even better, Sewanee College in Alabama took to the road in 1889 and beat Texas, Texas A&M, Tulane, Louisiana, and Mississippi all within six days and all without being scored upon. In twelve games that year, Sewanee was scored upon only by Auburn. They were 12 and 0. By 1892, Northwestern, Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, and Chicago were playing each other. Notre Dame—Wisconsin was already a big game. Army and Navy began their series at West Point in 1890. As the game spread throughout the country, public interest was aroused. Early games were attended mostly by students; but, by 1890, sizable crowds of the general public were interested. The game took on a social aspect, as many ladies were attracted to the contest on campus. The Thanksgiving Day game in New York between Yale and Princeton became an annual extravaganza. The day before the game, crowds of college men descended upon the Fifth Avenue hotels, making Broadway virtually un navigable. Alumni came from as far as Oregon and Texas. The Yale banners of blue and white and the Princeton black and orange hung over the streets. Church services were held earlier than usual to avoid interference with the game; and by ten o'clock, the huge procession of vehicles moved up Fifth Avenue toward the Polo Grounds. (3,16)

Football became so widely adopted that conferences had to be formed. Such teams as Texas, Texas A&M, and Arkansas made up the Southwest Conference. The Western Conference (later the Big Ten) had Chicago, Illinois, and Michigan, amongst others. Pennsylvania, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, and Dartmouth were in the Ivy League. What was happening is clear. For the first time in any endeavor, the colleges found it necessary to get together in regulating the game of football. Football served to initiate intercollegiate relations—relations which were to spread to other educational areas of cooperation. (3,15)
Regulation was needed, in part, because professionalism raised its ugly head, and many felt that it had no place in college athletics. A not uncommon practice found "gypsy" players competing for different teams each week. Of almost equal concern was the length of the careers of those who were legitimately attending college. In 1889, two of Princeton's ex-footballers returned for graduate work, as did two famous players for special study. Harvard improved its team with the matriculation of three veterans. Yale recruited four. Up to this time, the participation of a few graduates did not stir much criticism, but the presence of so many ex-players on the teams of 1889 brought a cry for reform. A meeting was held that year in New York where, after much debate, it was agreed to accept the eligibility proposals of Walter Camp of Yale. Anyone who accepted money to play in a collegiate contest would be barred. Graduate students and those taking special courses were made ineligible, and players who did not regularly attend classes were prohibited from participation.

The popularity of football did not rise unimpeded. In the earliest days, the faculties thought the game nonsense, a waste of energy that could better be put to scholarly use. Frequently, football teams were denied permission to visit other campuses. It was bad enough, thought educators, that footballers from Harvard wanted to play at Yale, or Princeton at Columbia, but when, in 1873, Michigan challenged Cornell to play a game as far away as Cleveland, things were getting out of hand. President White of Cornell was not about to let thirty-odd men go four hundred miles "to agitate a bag of wind." In 1885, the Harvard faculty outright banned football games with outside teams. They felt that the game was developing into a "modified form of mayhem and was no sport for gentlemen." The ban was based upon an 1884 report to the faculty by the Committee on Athletics. Football was dangerous. Slugging, tripping, butting, and hacking were commonplace. "The nature of the game puts a premium on unfair play, inasmuch as such play is easy, is profitable if it succeeds, is unlikely to be detected by the referee, and if detected is very slightly punished." The ungentlemanly manly character of the game was also having its effect on the spectators. Cries of "kill him," "break his neck," and "slug him," were frequently heard. The Intercollegiate Association, afraid that other colleges would follow suit, cleaned up the rules for the following year, and Harvard returned.

Even though the rules had been revised, the year 1893 endured an unusually high frequency of injuries. The cause, perhaps, was due to the powerful offensive running plays that coaches had developed in preceding years; or, more likely, it was due to
the unfortunate accumulation of accidents all at once. Regardless of the cause, the nemesis of football injuries was blown way out of proportion by the newspapers. Accounts in the European press typified the exaggeration. The Munchener Nachrichten reported American football like this:

The football tournament between the teams of Harvard and Yale, recently held in America, had terrible results. It turned into an awful butchery. Of twenty-two participants, seven were so severely injured that they had to be carried from the field in a dying condition. One player had his back broken, another lost an eye, and a third lost a leg. Both teams appeared upon the field with a crowd of ambulances, surgeons, and nurses. Many ladies fainted at the awful cries of the injured players. The indignation of the spectators was powerful, but they were so terrorized that they were afraid to leave the field.

The ensuing outcry in the United States led the Secretary of the Navy to abolish the Army-Navy game, which had begun only three years before. But at Stanford, Dr. David Jordan defended football. "We believe," he said, "that the tendency of the game of football is in every way in the direction of manliness. While there are possibilities of evil and possibilities of excess, we(on the West Coast) have not reached those possibilities yet." With subsequent alterations of the rules in 1896, football went through a period of relative quietude. The calm induced the Army and Navy to resume their rivalry in 1899.(7,14)

Public comfort with football was short-lived, though. Incidents of foul and rough play came to the forefront again in 1905. In that year, President Eliot of Harvard made a report to the Board of Overseers on "The Evils of Football." He said: "The American game of football, as now played, is unfit for colleges and schools. It causes an unreasonable number of serious injuries and deaths. The prize ring has great advantages over the football field because the rules of prize fighting are more humane than those of football(a conclusion that persists today). The game offers many opportunities for several players to combine in violently attacking one player." Just such an incident brought strenuous comment from President Roosevelt.(1)

During the 1905 football season, players died from injuries. The public mood in this Progressive era was such that the game of football had to be purified, as did politics and corporate trusts. The spark that fired public indignation to its greatest height, and stirred Teddy Roosevelt's wrath, was the game between Swarthmore and Pennsylvania. That year, Swarthmore had a great lineman in Bob Maxwell. So capable was he at repelling opposing rushers that the Pennsylvania battle cry for the
game was "Stop Bob Maxwell." The Penn players ganged up on Maxwell and sent him staggering off the field at game's end with a bloody face. A photograph of Maxwell's battered body, which caught the attention of President Roosevelt, appeared in the next day's newspaper. Roosevelt threatened to abolish the game if the rules were not modified to eliminate out right vicious play. His sentiments were expressed earlier in the year at Harvard when he defended hearty sport. "I have no sympathy whatever with the overwrought sentimentality which would keep a young man in cotton wool... But... brutality in playing any game should awaken the heartiest and most plainly shown contempt for the players guilty of it..."(3,15)

In October, Roosevelt called to Washington the coaches of Yale, Princeton, and Harvard for a conference concerning the improvement of football regulations. Out of the meeting came agreement on the necessity for reform. In January of 1906, the Intercollegiate Rules Committee assembled and adopted, at the suggestion of Paul Dashiell of Navy, the forward pass. Also, the offensive team needed to gain ten yards in four downs instead of five. The effect was to open up the game and reduce the influence of brute strength.(6)

In spite of the revolutionary changes, some colleges thought it advisable to abolish football—Northwestern, and Union for one year, Stanford and California for ten years. Competition between Chicago, Michigan, and Wisconsin was prohibited for one year, also. When Eliot made threatening gestures toward abandoning football at Harvard, Roosevelt promptly stormed to Cambridge and spoke at Harvard Union. "As I emphatically disbelieve in seeing Harvard or any other college turn out molly-coddles instead of vigorous men, I may add that I do not in the least object to sport because it is rough. We cannot afford to turn out of college men who shrink from physical effort or from a little physical pain. Athletics are good, especially in their rougher forms, because they tend to develop...courage." All Roosevelt wanted was good, clean, vigorous play. Danger was part of the enthusiastic life, but the competition therein must be fair. President Roosevelt saved football, and the game prospered steadily to the highest point reached in recent years. There were other factors besides Roosevelt, though, that lent toward football acceptance.(1,6)

On the campus itself, prior to football, student discipline was an outrageously difficult problem: The colleges had more rules for students than they had students. After a full day of required classes and chapel, students found it necessary to let off some steam, and this they did by incessant lawbreaking. Drinking, firecracker throwing, and rioting were common occurrences. The arrival of football did more to divert surplus energy than the most powerful chapel sermon or the strictest disciplinary measure. To be sure, there were other competitive activities before football.
Harvard and Yale engaged in the first crew race in 1852. Williams and Amherst played baseball in 1859. But neither of these sports comprised the physical competitive spirit that did football. After a thoroughly fatiguing game, there could be little enthusiasm for life's impurities. Football served as a remedy for physical and mental softness. The individual attributes of courage, composure, clear thinking, cooperation, self-reliance, perseverance, and ingenuity could be learned on the football field far more readily than in the classroom. The football field was clearly the training ground upon which men were developed from boys. Those who played became lawyers, doctors, and leaders in business and government. Certainly, football's emphasis on winning, individual ruggedness, and teamwork coincided with the qualities necessary to progress in American life. The competitive and martial spirits established in the football arena would go far toward high production in the war-like plains of industry. (6,9,14,15)

Walter Camp is widely thought to be the first to have named an All-American football team; but, in fact, Casper Whitney first picked a team for The Week's Sport in 1889. Two years later Camp's All-Americans appeared in Harper's Weekly, and from 1898 until his death in 1921, Collier's Weekly printed them. The make-up of the early All-Americans lists gives us a clue as to the heterogeneity of the American college campus. (3,10)

At the time of the first All-American team, the college campus was permeated with sons of the well-to-do, and football was regarded as an upper-class sport. Whitney's 1889 team reflects the situation. All the players were selected from the top three teams at that time—Harvard, Yale, and Princeton—and all but one (Helffelfinger of Yale) had names of English background. But Murphy of Yale made Camp's list in 1895 and Penn's Pierkarski was one of the best in 1904. By 1927, an ethnic shift had taken place, and the Oosterbaan's and Kipke's were appearing as often as the traditional Channing's and Ame's. What was happening is clear. The second-generation immigrant, dissatisfied with the prospects of performing manual labor, as did his father, looked to college as a necessary step toward success. Under normal circumstances, his social status would have made it difficult for him to be accepted into the more-prestigious institutions; but football quickly became his means. On the field of battle, performance, not ethnic origin, was the criterion for acceptance. (5,14)
In the old-time college, there was little student freedom, and for that matter, little teacher freedom. Adherence to the classical curriculum, recitation as the method of instruction, and strict discipline over student life made the college atmosphere stultifying for both student and teacher. The college experience for every student was the same. By the late 1800's, however, the elective curriculum had appeared; and this, along with increased student enrollments, served to make the student more heterogeneous. The old collegiate unity was gone; but it was replaced, as football became prominent, with a sort of common enthusiasm. If the students could not attend the same classes, they could at least root for the same football team. A 1902 Yale faculty committee recognized the situation when it reported: "An impression is very strong and very prevalent that the athlete is working for Yale, the student for himself." (12,15)

That football was popular with the students has been established. But a more significant observation to the future of collegiate football was its development as a public entertainment medium. With the support of alumni and administration, the exhortations of the press, the advent of huge stadiums, and the innovations of great coaches came the enormous popular success that college football enjoyed then and now. As outside interests in the game increased, football and athletics as a whole would be less and less controlled by intra-collegiate influences. But, before this took place, the students had something to say.

Although students had participated all along in informal games on the college grounds, only a few athletes accrued the benefits of organized competition. And even those athletes who participated in baseball, rowing, and tennis were not engaging in the sort of bruising activity that was required of football. In the period from about 1875 to 1908, much of the students' exposure to rigorous physical activity had been encountered in the bleachers at football games. President Roosevelt voiced his concern in 1907 by encouraging "in every way a healthy rivalry which shall give to the largest possible number of students the chance to take part in vigorous outdoor games." He thought it far more important that one, regardless of ability, "play something himself" rather than "go with hundreds of companions to see someone else play." The less-than-talented boys, seeing all the attention and effort going toward intercollegiate football, wanted an even break. The student body as a whole just simply was not getting sufficient physical training. (8)
Initial efforts by administrators to remedy the situation took the form of departments of physical culture. Students were required to perform regimented calisthenics and gymnastics in stale, suffocating gymnasiums. American youth were not interested. Gymnastics wasn't any fun. Even Naismith's invention of basketball didn't elicit much enthusiasm at the start. What the boys wanted were rough and tumble, energetic, alive games in the fresh outdoors. They wanted challenging competition and fun. The answer had to be intramurals. At first, student organizations controlled the competitions; and the class unit was the most natural form of organization because of the small number of students. But as enrollments increased, the fraternities took over central responsibility, since they were more permanent fixtures on campus. Student control was most effective between 1900 and 1914, but as individual participation further increased, conflicts with coaches over the use of facilities occurred, and the system became too burdensome. Athletic associations soon found the need for strong coordination, so a movement for departments of intramural athletics swept the colleges—the first at Michigan and Ohio State in 1913. From the rise of football, then, developed the concomitant enthusiasm for intramurals, an enthusiasm which has led to the institution of vast intramural programs in today's colleges. However, as historian Frederick Rudolph points out, the increase in athletic participation by the student body at large had its side effects, because it introduced "a strange and troublesome double standard in collegiate athletics: a standard of amateur fun for the mass of students, and for the expert a standard of near-professionalism and sheer hard work..." (8,15)

That first Princeton-Rutgers game in '69 was, as were all the other early football games, pretty much a private affair amongst the players. Most contests found the players just barely outnumbered by the spectators: and those who witnessed the games were usually students and relatives of the players. As the word got around that football was an exciting game to watch, the crowds grew and consisted largely of people who were in no way affiliated with college or players. The 1878 Princeton-Yale game attracted the first really big gathering. Four thousand people watched, a pathetic showing compared to the 110,000 that would view the 1926 Army-Navy classic at Soldier's Field in Chicago. It didn't take until 1926, though, to observe the hold that college football had on the public interest. The 1891 Harvard-Yale game is famous for stimulating America's first counterfeiting of tickets. The Boston Globe reports:

At 12 o'clock the vanguard of the great crowd began to storm the gates. At first they came by twos and threes, then in half dozens, hundreds, platoons, regiments and finally a broad river of bobbing heads stretched blocks away from the gates. Scores of pretty girls hurried past the paralysed ticket taker with a hop, skip and jump. Nobody knows just how many persons were admitted on counterfeit tickets... the counterfeits were beautifully done. (1,3,6)
The mention of girls in the Globe report brings out an interesting relationship between the fair sex and football. Prior to 1885, societal rules of behavior did not allow women to attend sporting events. Much of the reason for their exclusion can be traced to the compromising atmosphere which surrounded the scenes of contests in the big city. But the substantial change in location for the Yale-Princeton game (1885), from the Polo Grounds to the pleasant surroundings in New Haven, stimulated women to attend in large numbers for the first time. Subsequently, college football games became a social affair, whereby a young gentleman could take his date in as respectable a conscience as if he were taking her to the state fair. Once the barriers of decency were circumvented, women flocked to see the games. There was something exciting about football that baseball lacked. G. Stanley Hall, psychologist and president of Clark University, speculated that the female enthusiasm was caused by a "sexual attraction" to the gladiators on the field. Football gave the appearance of war, far more than did baseball; and the weaker sex seems to have a "strange fascination" for prowess in battle, "perhaps ultimately and biologically because it demonstrates the power to protect and defend." The corresponding male attitude toward women, says anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell, does not really reciprocate. "...football players play with an eye to their prestige among teammates, other football players, and other men."(14, 15)

The turning point for college football, in terms of audience appeal, came in 1906. Football had been characterized by viscous, infighting play, but the institution of the forward pass introduced new dimensions and new problems. A more intelligent approach to the game was now necessary for success. Brute strength alone would not carry the day. The American football spectator sensed this and enjoyed the resulting choreography. Although the common viewer might not always understand exactly what was happening on the field, he could, nevertheless appreciate the struggle of line against line, the swirling maneuvers in the backfield, the synchronization of patterned movement, and of course, the trick plays. Americans admired the small team which could "outfox" its larger opponent. This was never more evident than in the 1903 game between the Carlisle Indians and Harvard. Morris Bealle's account is entertaining:

Glenn S. (Pop) Warner was coach of the Carlisle team. He had taught the Braves
A bag-full of tricks, but the greatest of all was sprung at the beginning of
the second half. Harvard kicked off to the Indians and the ball was caught on
their seven-yard line by Johnson, their quarterback.

Instead of making interference, they came together, just as is done in the mod-
ern huddle, in front of Johnson, with the apparent intention of running back
the kick by the aid of a "flying wedge" formation. With this huddle as a shield
the ball was shoved inside the back of Dillon's jersey which had an elastic
band around the bottom. This was done so deftly that it was not seen by any-
body on the Harvard team, much less by any of the spectators.

Immediately after the ball was resting securely under Dillon's jersey, the
whole Carlisle team ran toward the south side of the gridiron, then fanned out
in a long line across the field and scampered like frightened antelopes toward
the Harvard goal line with arms outspread and palms up.

The Harvard team was bewildered, but those in the grandstands could see the
ball bobbling around and sticking out like a hump from Dillon's back. Immediately there was a rumble of astonishment which turned into roars of laughter
as the crowd arose to its feet.

Posing as an interferer, Dillon headed straight for Carl Marshall, captain of
the team, who was playing safety. Marshall sidestepped when he saw Dillon bearing
down on him. It looked like a smart piece of work on Carl's part, but it
turned out to be otherwise as the Indian loped across the goal line. In de-
defending Carlisle against trickery, Pop said, "The public expects the Indians
to employ trickery and we try to oblige."

So that was the old hidden ball trick; and that, in part, is what made college
football exciting, if not altogether predictable. (1, 14)

Besides providing entertainment, it was, and still is, thought that foot-
ball provided the spectator with an emotional release of his suppressed ag-
gressions. Noted psychologist G.T.W. Patrick wrote, in 1903: "The game acts as
a sort of Aristotelian catharsis, purging out our pent-up feelings and enabling
us to return more placidly to the slow upward toiling. By inner imitation the
spectators themselves participate in the game and at the same time give an unrestrained expression to their emotions." In earlier times, the Romans had their
gladiators and the English their knights. Twentieth century Americans possessed
their football players and were, in turn, possessed by them. Through psycholog-
ical displacement, the American football spectator could legitimately vent the
natural aggressiveness for which modern society had few outlets. Football served
a therapeutic purpose, and for that it could hardly be criticized. (1, 11, 14)

For whatever reason the people came, they came in large numbers. And to
accommodate the huge football crowds, equally huge football stadiums needed con-
struction. Harvard, as one might suspect, was one of the first colleges to build
a new stadium—a horseshoe structure (40,000 capacity) which opened in 1903. The
Eli's of Yale could be watched by 75,000 in the concrete Yale Bowl of 1914.
Princeton followed shortly with Palmer Stadium. Most of the pioneer eastern
$653,00 was taken. The 1928 season at Yale showed profits of $348,500. (12, 13, 16)

For all the emphasis on gate receipts and money from concessions, they only accounted for part of the total financing of the athletic operation. Of the $1,900,000 that was required to construct Ohio Stadium, $900,000 was paid by alumni and subscription holders (those who gave over $100 would have ten years option on two seats per year and their names inscribed in the stadium's corridors). Harvard's Class of 1879 celebrated its 25th anniversary by donating 40,000-seat Harvard Stadium. Similar gifts were endowed elsewhere. But, whatever the source of football monies, one thing was becoming amazingly evident. Out of financial necessity, college football was big business. It no longer belonged to the student who originated its development. Football was in the grasp of the paying customers, a stronghold that has yet to be relinquished. (1, 13, 15)

The development of football as a business has been an ongoing process which is, as many see it, detrimental to educational purpose. Strenuous complaints by faculty and students have all along been voiced concerning the apparent irrelevancy of big-time football to collegiate education. William Rainey Harper sided with his faculty in expressing the view that a university's function is not "to provide at great cost spectacular entertainment for enormous crowds." At Stanford, Professor James Angell considered football spending a "menace to sport, for sport's sake—which it defiles the very front of pure amateurism." The outcry against huge athletic expenditures was not one that involved just monetary considerations, for very often in the 1900's athletic programs were self-sufficient. The "great cost" of which Harper spoke would later be applied to the ever-present athletic parasite (coach, alumnus, and player) who was in college athletics for what he could get out of it, detached from educational values and the needs of the students at large. "The overemphasis on athletics is assuredly an evil," said Angell, "...through the lowering of the standard of scholarship of the athletes... (and) ...through the distortion of ideals of college life..." (7, 16)

Everywhere, like criticism was heard; but, at Stanford, action was taken. Professional coaches, training tables, and gate receipts made football such an obsession that the faculty at Stanford abolished the game in 1906. Until 1918, Stanford played intercollegiate rugby. During the rugby years, the evils of football were eliminated, and more students could actively participate in rugby. But
for all the general student satisfaction, one thing gnawed at the undergraduate mind. The "big game" with California was missing. The crowds, the glory, and the excitement seemed worth a return to American football. By 1918, student sentiment and alumni and public pressures could not be denied. The faculty compromised by reinstating football on a new basis. All control (coaching, training, and direction of athletics) was to be vested in the regular academic staff. This, supposedly, would put the game in a new light; but the faculty athletic committee was not really happy about the return of football, because little emphasis was given to "the enjoyment of the students at large, and of the educational value of sport in the University."(7)

Once the universities committed themselves to financial football, public relations became of the utmost importance. The lives of the athletic departments depended upon their football teams' drawing power. It became necessary to promote and establish college football as a grand spectacle, one which would be so entertaining that nothing would be better to do on a Saturday afternoon than attend a football game.

The waving pennants, raccoon coats, players' uniforms, marching bands, cheerleaders, and the colors all contributed to the pageantry.

One of the first decisions a college needed to make involved the colors that its athletes would carry into battle. It was in the 1876 Penn-Princeton game that uniforms were first worn. Princeton appeared in black knee pants and stockings and a black shirt with orange trim and a large orange P. Penn came out with white flannel cricket suits, which they would later trade for the red and blue. Yale claimed blue and Cornell carnelian and white. Ohio State first selected black and orange, but quickly switched to scarlet and gray when it was discovered that Princeton was black and orange already. Although there were charges and countercharges of plagiarism, there would eventually not be enough colors to go around. Duplication was inevitable, as both Williams and Amherst chose purple. The University of Chicago changed its color after one year for a very different reason. The original color was yellow, which was worn as a U.C. monogram. Yellow ran, though, and had an undesirable symbolism, which was pointed out by opposing players. The following year, Chicago took maroon for peace of mind. The players were not the only ones to wear the school colors, for the spectators frequently bedecked themselves with the appropriately colored hats, scarfs, neckties, and pennants. The school colors were symbols of unity, of common purpose. Colors were often responsible for team nicknames. Yale was called blue. Princeton was known as the Tigers because of the horizontal orange stripes on its black uniforms. Harvard was the Crimson.(2,12,13,15,16)
By the century's end, many schools had yellmasters. Organized cheering of sorts burst from the stands at the very first game. Princeton had its skyrocket, "S-s-s-s boom ah!" Later, Yale's cheer went: "Eli-Eli-Eli-U." One might suppose that the "Eli" was a reference to benefactor Elihu Yale. Between cheers, the bands played and the students and alumni sang the school songs—such as Ohio State's "Across the Field" and "The Buckeye Battle Cry." There certainly was a lot of hoop-la in the stands, not to mention Cornell's perpetual problem concerning "the responsibility for doing something...about the eight obstreperous inebriates in Section H Row 52, the three nauseated adolescents in Section D Row 45, and the extremely dead-looking alumnus laid out under the Crescent." For all the circus atmosphere, it was a wonder that anyone could, or had time, for figuring out what was happening on the field. Athletic associations made it a bit easier, though, for both spectators and reporters. Beyond 1900, most college fields had scoreboards, and the 1913 season saw the Chicago players wearing numbers on their backs. The rest of the Big Ten followed the next year, and in 1915 the University of Pittsburgh copied to enhance the sale of programs. (2, 13, 14, 16)

In the beginning, newspapers paid very little attention to football. The 1869 game warranted a five-line mention in the New York Tribune. The first substantial notice of the game came in 1881, with criticism of those Yale-Princeton "block" games. When newspapers did send reporters to an occasional contest, it was obvious by the next morning's edition that they knew little of the game. Beyond the inevitable exaggerations of brutal play, articles rarely contained more than running accounts of who carried the ball and who stopped it. With public acceptance of football, the press became more interested—seventeen reporters from one paper covered the 1893 Thanksgiving game between Yale and Princeton. The advances of football in terms of newspaper space reflected simultaneous advances in the public favor. The corresponding rise of football growth and press attention would continue through the boom of the 1920's and beyond. (3, 15, 16)

The American college had never really known popularity until the rise of football. For the first time, the colleges were being favored with a popular press, and public relations through athletics became recognized by many as a valuable institutional asset. The successful beginning of Stanford as a college has been attributed to its success in football and the subsequent reams of publicity. Abundant publicity was good advertising, and good advertising meant larger enrollments and increased endowments. "At the University of Chicago under President Harper it was said that Rockefeller gifts were celebrated like football victories, and football victories like
the Second Coming of Christ." President Adams of Wisconsin was so convinced of the value of football as a drawing power that he would not allow scholastically incompetent football players to be expelled by the faculty. Not everyone, though, thought football a God-send. A professor at Hiram College thought it a disgrace that the good name of a college appear on the sports pages "in connection with accounts of prize fights, horse races and contests between bull dogs and game cocks." Nor did he care for "the hooting and yelling" at the games, or the "desecration" of Thanksgiving by playing on that day. Actually, Cornell got along quite well without committing itself to a huge football operation. A 1929 Carnegie Foundation report on college athletics found Cornell to be one of four major universities with admirably perceptive football programs. Cornell's emphasis on a strong intramural program, so that all students could participate in football, received such praise that defeating Princeton for several years running could not have achieved as much publicity. But almost everywhere, football as public relations was being trumpeted as the major justification for its existence. (2,7,13,15)

Faculties didn't especially care for football. They didn't go along with college presidents in viewing publicity garnered from football as an aid to student enrollments. The University of Chicago faculty argued that "a student's choice of a college is not governed...by the athletic prowess of the school—or, if he was so influenced, that he couldn't be much of an addition to the student body." At Cornell, no special considerations were given the athletes. Admission standards were not lowered, probations went unmitigated, and classes were not scheduled around practice. Frustrated by faculty indifference, in 1928, Coach Dobie charged that: "The faculty is the cause of the poor football teams at Cornell, not the players or the coaches." Faculties also frustrated college administrators. President Thompson of Ohio State (1905) thought the faculty ought to "recognize not only their right but their duty to lead in all forms of college athletics." Referring to the excesses of football wrought by unethical students, alumni, and coaches, Thompson regarded the denouncing of football a waste of energy. What is needed, he said, is a high standard of moral excellence which could be personified by an energetic faculty. (2,13,16)

Despite the urgings of college presidents, most faculties sat football out; and their studied indifference directly led to problems in the sport that continue to plague current educational administration. Someone had to control a university's athletic programs. The faculty didn't want to, so the students and alumni did. In the
very beginning, the undergraduates ran the sport for which only they were enthusiastic. But as classes of football players graduated, it was not uncommon to find old players right back on the field in following years—now as interested assistants and advisors. As a result, joint student-alumni control of football developed. It was not long before Princeton's team was coached by a committee of three graduated players. It also was not long before the growth of football introduced such complexities of operation (training, financing, recruiting, etc.) that student management eventually became ineffectual. Large athletic programs required an efficient and disciplined approach, which in turn required the expenditure of much time and money, none of which the students could provide. With the disinterest of the faculty and the incompetence of the students, the door was let wide open, and the alumni leaped right through.(15,16)

Once the alumni took over football, victory was to be had at all costs. Why the games had to be won is a simple enough question—one which probably deserves a complex answer. But the basic consideration must lie with the pervasive competitive spirit that held the nation just before and after the turn of the century. Americans hated to lose, at anything, including football. And there was no better area to direct one's competitive loyal energies than toward the alma mater's football squad. Virtually all the questionable athletic practices that linger today had their roots in the last years of the 1800's, when over-zealous alumni thought it necessary to recruit student-athletes and hire competent coaches. Familiar pleas could be heard from alumni across the nation, such as that of one disgruntled Cornell alum: "This boy Smith at Humber Academy is one of the greatest...(athletes). A lot of other colleges are after him strong, but as far as I can find out no one has made any effort to interest him in Cornell. Why don't you birds wake up and get busy"? The query was made in 1924, but it is virtually timeless, for it could have been echoed in 1890 or 1970 as well. On many campuses in the 1890's, the alumni, with the blessings of the president, developed several unethical recruiting practices which are taken matter-of-factly now. Alumni "agents" went about the countryside scouting for and coaxing athletically inclined students to attend favored schools; and often the alumni would contribute financial aid for remission of student tuition and board. Correspondingly, of course, admission standards had to be lowered because the better athletes were not always the better students. For a good stretch in the 1890's, Stanford continuously beat up on California in football, prompting the California Occident to complain that "time and time again have
athletes entered Stanford after failing in the entrance examinations at California. A lamentable situation, that, but one which continues today. The time has yet to pass which will see as uncommon educational phenomena the management of athletic scholarships, lowered admissions standards, under-the-table gifts for players, easy curriculums, special tutorial programs, and professorial arm-twisting to the advantage of student—athletes. (2,7,15,16)

As mentioned previously, the first coaches were usually recently graduated students who had played football well. Their services went unsalaried, though their expenses were taken care of by the athletic departments. However, out of the alumni's perpetual lust for victory arose the need for highly competent direction. It would hardly do to have, as Harvard did for a game in 1903, ten coaches on the field. The call for sound generalship was heard throughout the country; and it was eastern football that answered. Eastern schools had the most experience with the game, so it was natural that their best players were tagged for coaching positions elsewhere. From Yale, Stagg went to Chicago, Camp to Stanford, and Heffelfinger to California. Princeton sent Poe to Virginia, Hutchinson to Texas, and Cowan to North Carolina. Cornell's Warner coached at Carlisle. Few coaches stayed at one college for very long, but at one point in the 1890's, Parke Davis counted 45 former Yale players, 35 from Princeton, and 24 Harvard men coaching at schools around the nation. The salaries were not usually great, about $400 for the season; but Stagg was induced by Harper to go to Chicago in 1893 for $2,500 and professorial rank. Salaries today are much higher (30,000 and up) to compensate, no doubt, for the increased complexities and pressures of the sport. (1,7,16)

Soon after accepting a position as head of the football team, public and alumni pressure made it clear that a coach's job depended upon his producing a winning football team. And with the emphasis on winning came the subsequent emphasis on strenuous training of the players. As one Stanford coach said: "These fellows want to understand that football is not fun; it is hard work." Trickery, deceit, and questionable training methods became the order of the day. Football turned away from the players, and developed into a coaches' game, in which tricks and innovations had to be devised so that coach A could stay a step ahead of coach B. Pop Warner invented so many tricky formations that he caused more changes in the rules than anyone else. The screen pass, crouch start, single-wing back, shifting defense, and hidden-ball trick were all his. Harvard countered with leather uniforms, because they were lighter than conventional suits and made tackling more difficult. Yale used verbal signals to call its plays. Amos Stagg invented the
tackling dummy and lights for night practice; and Ohio State practiced in the spring as well as fall. Walter Camp devised the training table, which further evolved at Ohio State (1892) in a players' regimen that went like this:

Every fellow arises at 7 o'clock and breakfasts at training table at the "dorm" on rare beefsteak, poached eggs, fried potatoes and dry bread. The forenoon hours are devoted to study and recitation and at noon an hour is spent at rehearsing signals and individual practice, after which comes dinner on rare roast beef and other substantial. At 4 o'clock the men practice team work with the second University eleven until dark, when they take a run of seven miles, and then rub down, eat supper and go to bed...

Surely the football player was becoming divorced from the educational purpose of the college. Football demanded too much of his time. And it was just such an extravagance as Harvard's 28-game schedule in 1882 that lit fies under many here-to-fore complacent faculties. Faculty initiative turned Harvard athletics over to a faculty-student-alumni board of control. Cornell did likewise in 1889; and Ohio State faculty took the reins in 1910, as did the other faculties of schools in the Ohio Conference. The Chicago faculty exerted firm control from the beginning, minimizing alumni energies from the start.

The belated faculty action in nearly all colleges had its effect. Even with revamped systems of athletic control, the alumni continued to have a profound influence on decision-taking processes. The obsessive need for victory led to an obsessive need for innovation, and innovation led to specialized organization. The care, feeding, and training of football heroes, and the continuous development of physical facilities and administrative advances cost money.

The cost of fielding a three-platoon football team in 1960 was as high as $760,000. Football scholarships for 188 players at Ohio State amounted to $111,000. Indiana's new 48,000-seat stadium cost $6,600,000. In 1961, Illinois spent $84,000 to operate and maintain its stadium. Oklahoma's recruiting system needed $14,000. Twenty-four thousand dollars was spent at West Point for uniforms and equipment. Motion-picture expenses were $20,600 at Ohio State. Team travel at most schools averaged about $25,000. Another $100,000 can be added for miscellaneous supplies and salaries. Coaches salaries go toward $90,000. All these expenses have, of course, vastly increased in 1981, and it is significant that even at some of the most highly organized and successful schools, football loses money. Amidst the doubt about the relevancy of college football to higher education, big-time football programs across the country endure great difficulties in maintaining self-sufficiency. Thus, coupled with the seemingly countless compromises football imposes on educational values, leads one to think that the whole deal is more trouble than it's
worth. Some years back, Holy Cross thought so--it dropped to small-time operations. Long ago Chicago dropped football altogether. (10)
BIBLIOGRAPHY