Two papers are presented which were originally prepared for delivery at a conference to evaluate the results of 20 years of scholarly exchange between the United States, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. Participants included over 300 members of the public affairs community, including government officials, public policy makers, business leaders, journalists, and educators. Both papers deal with the daily life of Eastern European Citizens. In the first paper, "In a Pig's Eye: Daily Life and Political Economy in Southeastern Europe," by John W. Cole, emphasis is placed on the necessity of viewing Southeastern European culture in terms of its own past experience and in comparison with other agrarian areas rather than in comparison with Western Europe or the United States. Southeastern Europe is characterized as an agrarian society undergoing industrialization and urbanization. In most cases, the most intensive social and economic ties are between parents and their offspring, although there are also important links among village households. In the second paper, "Studying the Soviet Social System: The "Soviet Citizen" Revisited," author Gail Warshofsky Lapidus focuses on the importance of and changes which have occurred since publication of the original "Soviet Citizen" (by Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, Harvard University Press) in 1959. The author concludes that scholars will be able to produce new research as insightful as the "Soviet Citizen" if they are allowed to undertake social science research in outlying regions of the USSR, make an effort to conceptualize societal differences between the United States and the USSR through some other prism than the 'industrial society' model, and if they disseminate research findings in academic and governmental communities. (DB)
Patterns of Daily Life

Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe:

Two Decades of American Experience

May 10-13, 1979
IREX, the International Research & Exchanges Board, is the leading American channel for communication with the USSR and Eastern Europe in the social sciences and humanities. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council established IREX in 1968 at the initiative of US universities, the Ford Foundation, and the Department of State, as an independent, non-profit organization to administer America's advanced research exchanges with socialist countries.

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PREFACE

This IREX Occasional Paper is one of a series summarizing a conference which was organized to evaluate the results of twenty years of scholarly exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The "Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe: Two Decades of American Experience" was held from May 10-13, 1979, in Washington, D.C., at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. More than 300 participants assessed what U.S. scholars and specialists have learned from the exchange experience in order to communicate their conclusions to the nation's public affairs community—to colleagues in government, business, journalism, and to other professionals concerned with the analysis of Soviet and East European behavior and the formation and consequences of American policy towards that part of the world.

The present collection includes papers presented (and subsequently revised to reflect the discussion and debate at the conference) under the heading of Patterns of Daily Life.

The introduction to this IREX Occasional Paper was prepared by Marvin Kalb, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent of NBC News, who chaired the panel at which the original papers were presented. The papers were edited and prepared for publication by Dorothy Knapp and Cynthia Merritt, IREX Information Services.

Allen H. Kassof
Executive Director
December 1980
INTRODUCTION

When I first arrived in Moscow in January, 1956 (as the Soviet foreign ministry official put it, at the time, "in the guise of an interpreter-translator for the U.S. Embassy," woefully short on such meager talent), I was surprised, first and foremost, by how little I was surprised. After all, it was my first visit. Russia had just been sprung from decades of Stalinism. I should have been stunned by the utter greyness of Soviet life, the heaviness of the dictatorship, the odd giddiness one feels at the discovery of a stalk of celery in winter. I was not; and I think I have Alex Inkeles and the staff of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University to thank for the preparation. The relevant point is that it is possible to study the life of the Soviet citizen not only with benefit to the scholar and his students but with the knowledge that the result is a close approximation of reality.

For that reason alone, I am certain that the reader of this collection will gain very valuable and lasting insights into the subject at hand by reading Gail Lapidus and John Cole. True, an academic study, based on the dry bones of statistics and the long distance lens of analysis, is no substitute for the smell of Russia. Yes, literally, the smell of Russia. It is also no substitute for personal conversation. Nor for the bruising encounters of lines and shopping and shortages. A Russian has perhaps the unique capacity of unburdening his soul to a stranger in a matter of moments if he finds that he can establish even a modicum of trust with him. Imagine such quick intimacy with an Englishman! A Russian cries and drinks and lives and loves in his own way; he is a very special person, and he remains unknowable, in a total sense, except in his own environment. Exchanges are critical tools of learning. The more the better, for both superpowers.

But short of this kind of total immersion, there is at-home scholarship, and it has proven to be remarkably effective in uncovering the shape and sentiment of "the new Russian man." He should no longer be a surprise to any newcomer to Moscow, though ironically he may still come as somewhat of a surprise to himself. He is not new, because he is still Russian, and the quality and quantity of exchanges make our world smaller but safer.

Marvin Kalb
NBC News
IN A PIG'S EYE:

DAILY LIFE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

John W. Cole
Introduction

I would like to offer some thoughts about how to understand the conditions of everyday life in the countries of Southeastern Europe and about why this is worth doing. Since I am an anthropologist, it will not come as any surprise that I am enamoured of research into small-scale social units: the stock in trade of anthropologists is to examine social, political and economic phenomena from the bottom up. One of my colleagues likes to call this the pig's eye view of the world: that is, the view that researchers get when they leave office or archive and spend some time in the village mud. What I hope to illustrate is that this view can produce more than a collection of charming monographs about life in isolated villages and urban ghettos, or about the organization of particular factories or collective farms. The study of any country not informed by the pig's eye view is likely to be wide of the mark. This is not merely to say that it is a good idea to know what goes on in the village as well as in the politburo, although I do think that that is true, too. Rather, it is to say that forces generated from below regularly influence what is happening at the top. If one would really understand what is going on in the capital, then one had best understand the kinds of interests in the provinces that leaders in the capital are responding to.

I will say at the outset that I have reservations about much of mainstream Western scholarship on Southeastern Europe. These reservations grow out of what I see as the frequent use of ill-conceived comparisons and ethnocentrism and gratuitous moralizing in place of analytic conclusions. There are alternative ways to intellectualize about Southeastern Europe, and these are beginning to provide interesting and useful alternatives to some of the conventional wisdom about the area. For example, I question the validity of comparisons between the conditions of life in Southeastern Europe and those in Western Europe or the United States. The past experiences of these areas are so different that comparison between them is spurious and often ethnocentric. More valid comparisons are to be made with other agrarian areas, even when these are located on other continents.
About Corporate Structures and Aggregate Data

The main focus of Western research about contemporary and modern Southeastern Europe lies in studies of the actions of leaders and of the nature of party and state organization, and in the compilation and analysis of aggregate economic, social and political data. This research is about how policies are made and implemented and about the effect of these policies on the population at large. It also includes an evaluation or assessment of how things are going over there, mostly done by comparing policy goals with results and by comparing economic and social indicators with those in the countries of Western Europe and the United States.

At the most abstract level, these studies view society as an outcome of policy. Lying behind this view, sometimes referred to as the "idealist" approach, is an assumption that these are centralized totalitarian states where all of the important decisions are made by a small clique of ruling communists who impose their will on the institutions and people of the country. In one of the two main variants of this approach, policies, and hence the characteristics of society, are derived from Marxist-Leninist thought. Such studies stress the contrasts between East and West, making invidious comparisons with the way in which society is determined in the decentralized, pluralistic Western democracies.1

The second variant deems ideology irrelevant and instead finds policy determined by both the nature of a country's techno-economic character and the imperatives of economic development. Differences between East and West are attributed to different degrees of development, which are in turn a consequence of variations in the extent of industrialization. These studies postulate a convergence in social and political forms, regardless of ideology, as the countries of Southeastern Europe "catch up with" the West in industrial capacity.2

In the main, the economy and society of Southeastern European countries are represented in Western literature by statistical trends. While some attention is paid to regional variation within particular countries, data are characteristically aggregated for whole countries. Central to analysis of such data is the establishment of trends based on a comparison of figures for a series of years. Correlations can then be made between different sectors of the economy, economic development and social or demographic trends correlated, the effects of policy in one realm or another assessed, and the direction of future trends predicted.3
We have learned a great deal about Southeastern Europe as a result of research of this type. What it fails to provide, however, is any sense of the social dynamics which produce the trends that it purports to describe. It does not take into account the many different social groupings and their social, political and economic characteristics. While national leaders are carefully studied, they are not the only individuals in the society who have goals to pursue, and the formal or corporate organizations of state and party are not the only framework within which individuals work toward their goals. The interests of all social segments obviously do not always correspond with those of the national leadership, and it is not safe to assume that one can ignore these segments as being of minor significance. The workings of Southeastern European societies result from the interplay of their different social segments, and not just from a population responding to the dictates of the leadership.

Unfortunately, data collected and published in national statistics, and analyses based on them, provide few clues about the nature or expressions of the interests of these social segments. One cannot discern whether an aggregate figure represents a series of data which are mutually reinforcing, or whether it is an averaging of divergent trends. For example, if a statistic is published which shows a national increase in the production of grain, has this resulted from small increases throughout the country, or has production gone up substantially in some areas and down in others? If the birth rate rises, does this reflect a society-wide phenomenon, or is it a result of an increase among only certain social segments of the population? There is no way to answer questions such as these on the basis of aggregate data alone, and projections based upon statistically determined trends using aggregate data are notoriously inaccurate. In ignoring the dynamics of society, such projections miss the growing power of trends masked for a time by temporarily prevalent, but waning, forces.

If one is to know what a country is like, one must know the social processes behind the aggregate data. The problem, then, is to identify the range of interests within each country and the nature of the social relations through which they are expressed. Access to the data from which published statistics were derived can sometimes provide useful clues, but one cannot count on it. After all, the census taker had his own priorities and conceptual framework, and it would be remarkable if they overlapped very much with those of the researcher. In the end there is only one solution to the problem of uncovering the dynamics of society: one must get out into the field and gather one's own data.
A Few Pig's Eye Observations

Several examples of the problems that can arise from aggregate analysis, and how these can be illuminated by research into small scale social units, illustrate this point. Marxist and positivist thought are in agreement that modernization results in the transformation of complex extended families into nuclear ones, in a reduction in family size, and in the general erosion of ties of kith and kin outside the family. The personalistic ties represented by these social relations are said to be characteristic of agrarian societies where the household is the unit of production and activities of more than household scope are organized through alliances between households. With industrialization, the household is no longer the unit of production, and each nuclear family becomes self-sufficient through wages earned by its adult members. With urbanization, related families become dispersed and, lacking compelling economic reasons to interrelate, ties between them are reduced to sporadic sociable occasions before withering away altogether. Such assistance as the family requires beyond its own means is to be found in the bureaucratic ministerings of the welfare state. Relations between members of individual households are now forged in the productive, political, educational and other institutions of modern society. With the transformation of agricultural production from private peasant farms into state farms and collective enterprises, and the concomitant transformation of peasants into agricultural workers, the process of nuclearization is expected to penetrate the countryside as well. Any vestiges of extended families or of personalistic social networks between families are interpreted as an expression of traditional conservatism. Such phenomena are expected to disappear with the passage of time.4

The countries of Southeastern Europe in general, and Romania in particular, are all clearly undergoing industrialization and urbanization. In Romania the percentage of the population employed in urban occupations and the percentage of individuals living in cities have increased substantially since the end of World War II. At the same time, the population has increased from under 16 million (1948) to over 21 million (1977). Moreover, over 90 percent of Romanian agriculture is carried out on either state or cooperative farms. Romania can therefore be expected to show the social trends that are presumed to accompany modernization; and, indeed, national statistics and scholarly analysis based on them show the expected nuclearization and reduced family size. As predicted, urban areas exhibit significantly lower percentages of extended families and smaller family sizes than do rural areas. However, both family size and the number of extended families are being reduced in the countryside as well. The few areas where private agriculture remains show the highest percentages of extended families.5
In spite of this information, detailed research in Brașov County, one of the most industrial in the country, and subsequent examination of statistical data from other parts of the country "from the bottom up," suggest that something rather different is going on.* First, we found that a three generation strategy dominates communities of worker villages in the hinterlands of industrial cities and that it is also strongly represented in the cities themselves. Second, we found that these extended family strategies were not merely a survival of a traditional social form among conservative ex-peasants, but that they are being constantly recreated out of the conditions of modern life in Romania. Third, the areas where the extended family is under the most threat are those which are most remote from urban centers. Our conclusion is that the apparent nuclearization trend in Romania is more an artifact of the nature of the census than of the realities of social life.6


We acknowledge with gratitude the financial support that the Brașov project has received from IREX (1974-1976; 1979) and from the American Council of Learned Societies (1973), Fulbright-Hays (1974), the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare/Fulbright-Hays (1975-1976), and the Ford Foundation (1975-1978).
The people who live in Brașov County have worked out a way to take advantage of a combination of rural location and proximity to cities in order to have the best of both urban and rural worlds. Their optimum strategy is to have at least one individual employed in town, while one works for the local cooperative farm and yet another remains at home to care for their own animals and private garden plots. This is most effective where there are at least three adult members of the household, and the extended family is an obvious way to do this. By deploying its work force in this way a household is able to provide for subsistence needs from the agricultural products its members raise at home and receive from the cooperative farm as pay. Almost all of the money earned by the urban worker can then be devoted to consumer goods which improve the household's standard of living. Clothing, home furnishings, seaside and foreign vacations, and even automobiles are high on their list of preferences.

These households are usually made up of a married couple, their children, and one or more of their parents; more than one-half of the adults in these villages lived in such extended family households. However, we learned that this is not the only three-generation strategy. Although many of the younger generation take apartments in town and both husband and wife work in the city, they nevertheless retain close ties with their parents back in the village. Consumer goods purchased in the city constantly flow out to the parents in the village and agricultural produce flows to the children in the city. Visiting back and forth between town and country is incessant, and in a small but significant number of cases the children of urban dwelling couples live in the village with their grandparents. The resulting level of economic and social interdependence is so great that it differs little from that of the three-generational household.

While the most intensive social and economic ties are most often between parents and their offspring, there are also important links among village households and between them and the households of former villagers living in nearby towns. Siblings, cousins, neighbors, ritual kin, classmates and other combinations of individuals cooperate in an endless variety of ritual, social and economic endeavors. These range from attending weddings, where cash gifts enable the newlyweds to buy furnishings for their home, to helping a neighbor rebuild a barn, to finding a job in a factory for a godson. These are not just occasional peripheral phenomena, but rather a constant element of life; everyone is constantly involved in giving and receiving such support.
Similar kinds of relations exist among families who have "always" been city residents. Within cities a variant of the three-generational strategy is well established. Retired grandparents are the most reliable baby-sitters. They also have the time to keep active in networks over which flows information about where scarce and desirable consumer items can be found, and to stand in the queues which characterize everyday shopping and become especially long when word spreads that some scarce item has suddenly become available. In return for these efforts, older individuals can expect to share some of the comforts provided by their offsprings' wages that they would not be able to enjoy on a pensioner's income alone. In the cities, this cooperation is transformed into a three-generational household much less often than in rural areas or villages, in the main because of the small size of apartments, constructed with nuclear families in mind. No matter how close the cooperation, a desire to maximize the total amount of living space available to the group as a whole leads them to retain their separate households.

The strength of these ties in urbanized counties is in rather marked contrast to social developments in counties which do not have urban centers. In these remote areas villagers do not have the option of working in town while living in the village, and individuals have few vocations other than agriculture to choose from. If they wish to pursue some other career, they have little choice but to leave the village and move to a distant city. With higher pay and more cultural attractions to be found in the cities, that is exactly what most young people are doing. Since a three-generational strategy is much harder to work at a distance, young people who migrate more often live as nuclear family units. Moreover, as older couples are left behind to fend for themselves, migration also creates nuclear family households in rural areas. Thus, the process of nuclearization is actually more characteristic of remote areas of the country than it is of those close to town. While agriculture-based extended families continue to exist, their numbers are being reduced as a result of an uneven development that draws migrants away to other parts of the country.

In summary, we found that both in cities and in villages in urban areas there is very intense domestic cooperation across generational lines, cooperation which in the villages is associated with three-generational households. However, both in cities and in town-and-country combinations, the cooperation takes place between closely related couples who live in different households. In contrast, migration from villages in remote parts of the country tends to
leave nuclear families behind in the village at the same time that it creates new ones in the city. The aggregate data for the country at large, based on a census of households, cannot include information on the quality of social relations between members of different households. It therefore misses those three-generational strategies which are not based on residence, as well as the generally high level of ritual, social and economic interaction found in modern Romanian worker villages. Nor can it differentiate between the social processes going on in villages proximate to urban centers and those that are more distant from cities. As a result, it presents a false image of the realities of social relations in modern Romania.

It would be a mistake to view these domestic relations as a temporary, transient phenomenon associated with an early stage in modernization. In fact, they are consistent with long-range Romanian economic and social planning. Instead of trying to build urban apartments for the entire industrial work force, the Romanians have developed an elaborate economic infrastructure connecting village to town and are depending on commuting labor. In Braşov County, over 40 percent of the urban work force resides in the countryside. Moreover, through an aspect of planning called systematization, the Romanians intend to strengthen this pattern and to increase the cultural and social services available to villagers so as to reduce discrepancies between rural and urban life styles. At the same time, another aspect of their planning, carried out under the rubric of multilateral development, is to expand industrial development in the more remote areas of the country. To the extent that this is successful, it will reduce migration and increase the opportunities for villagers in remote areas to elect urban employment while living at home in the village. One can reasonably expect that this will establish the same domestic patterns in these areas as now exist in Braşov and other urban counties.

Corporate and Noncorporate Interrelations

Three-generation domestic strategies and networks of social relations among people in town and country are no epiphenomena or mere curiosities. They are elements in a noncorporate social structure which pervades all aspects of Romanian life and influences the way in which political, economic and social change is taking place. Indeed, even the operation of the Romanian corporate world of party and state organization cannot be properly understood without
reference to it.* Let me illustrate this by an example.

A Romanian acquaintance was the director of a distribution center for bottled gas used in cooking stoves. Bottled gas is available only through such centers and can only be obtained by turning in an empty bottle and paying for the gas in the full bottle. Since there was a slightly higher demand for gas than could be filled out of available inventory, a list was established. One's place on the list was determined by how long it had been since one had last received a full bottle. Since supplies of full bottles were received at frequent intervals, there was rarely a delay of more than a few days for anyone who used his gas at a reasonable rate. The formal system of operation for the center was thus quite simple and orderly.

However, there was always a danger that the ability of the center to meet demand might deteriorate, requiring some people to wait even longer to receive their gas. Against this eventuality, people did what they could to make sure that they would not be among those who waited. My acquaintance was the recipient of an endless stream of small favors: neighbors and relatives stopped by his house to leave off a few eggs or some home-baked goods; urban acquaintances would stand him a glass of *tuica* whenever he ventured into a local bar; when shopping, he would often be waved to the front of the line; party officials stopped by his office from time to time personally to let him know about the implications of a new regulation, and so on. He had many good, generous friends and admiring relatives, and life went along smoothly as long as his supply of bottled gas was great enough to fill everyone's request with a minimum of delay. Although he was actually distributing the gas in accordance with prescribed bureaucratic procedures, his friends and relatives were content to think that he was giving them special treatment.

Unfortunately, in 1974 a sudden and severe crisis in the bottled gas industry left my acquaintance in the untenable position of having a lot of people in need of gas looking for him to remind

* By corporate and noncorporate I mean the same thing that some writers, including Lapidus [in this volume] and Cattell [in this conference] mean by *formal* and *informal*. While not entirely satisfied with my choice of terms, *formal* and *informal* leave me uneasy because of the implication that informal relations, in contrast to formal ones, lack structure, decidedly not the case. Noncorporate (informal) relations lack a charter, constitution or table of organization. For a discussion of the patterns which noncorporate relationships can take, see Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions* (Oxford, 1974: Blackwell).
him of their special relationship at the same time that he had few bottles of gas to distribute. He managed to weather the storm, but during the crisis he lived like a hunted man. He stayed home "sick" as much as he dared, completely avoided public places like buses and bars, and at work managed to keep busy in the most remote warehouses, when he could not come up with a reason to be away from the distribution center altogether.

The point of this story is that a knowledge of the formal organization of an enterprise or bureau is not necessarily sufficient to understand how it actually works. Had my acquaintance merely been performing his bureaucratic function, he could have remained in the open during the crisis, blaming "the system" for the shortage of gas. But since he had allowed the impression to develop that he was providing gas as a personal favor, his failure to deliver even during a general crisis was interpreted as a breach in social relations. If we went on to pursue this episode further, we would discover that the attempts to influence the distribution center director were not random, but were in fact determined by pre-existing relationships. Ties of kith and kin, relations which are a part of the noncorporate organization of social relations in the county, emmeshed the director even before he obtained his administrative post. But some of the claims also came from fellow bureaucrats, and developed out of a recognition that individuals who hold formal positions within the corporate structure can establish personal relationships among themselves to obtain favors and to facilitate the performance of office. Gifts and favors given in appreciation for, or in anticipation of, other favors, and the use of influence based on corporate and noncorporate relationships are an integral part of Romanian society.

The implementation of policy in Romania is always affected by the way in which the noncorporate structure is mobilized in relation to it. Marxist theory says nothing about what noncorporate relationships should be like under socialism, beyond the expectation that they will become less significant through economic development. Therefore, the noncorporate structure is dealt with on a tactical, ad hoc basis. When it is used to circumvent or subvert the goals of the party and state, it can be severely repressed. At other times, national policy can be designed to placate it as in the reorganization of agricultural brigades and work teams in the early seventies. Social relations in Romanian villages had originally been ignored in determining the groupings of people into work units. When this proved unpopular in the villages and, as
a consequence, undermined production, work units were restructured to take into account these noncorporate relationships. This reorganization was relatively well-received and resulted in more enthusiastic labor and better production. The changes in remuneration policies for cooperative farms, increasing payments in kind and reducing the number of tasks recompensed in cash, were a similar acquiescence to "popular demand."7

If at times the formation of policy is a compromise between the goals of party and those of local populations, on other occasions the party itself initiates the mobilization of noncorporate networks in order to achieve its ends. A particularly dramatic instance was the formation of agricultural production collectives which took place in stages over more than a decade. At a crucial juncture in 1961-1963, the process was brought to completion, and all villages which had been passed over earlier were to be collectivized (except for a few in the mountains). Professor David Kideckel has detailed exactly how this was accomplished in one village, Hîrșeni, in County Brașov. Although the population in Hîrșeni was for the most part skeptical about the advantages of collectives and reluctant to join, in the end the farm was established. While the impetus for the establishment of the farm certainly came "from above," its formation was not the result of the naked application of state power. Local and visiting county officials incessantly visited village households, but the decisive factor in formation of the collective was the mobilization of the noncorporate networks of kith and kin.

Former villagers who held party and administrative posts in other places, and even factory workers and students, were sent home to convince their friends and relatives to become members of the farm. Virtually everyone who had both a tie to the village and a stake in a state or party position was mobilized in this effort at suasion. Especially intensive efforts were made to induce prominent village households to join the farm. As each household enrolled in the farm, its members were then also recruited to add their voices to the others. In the end, virtually every household became a member of the Hîrșeni cooperative. While the goal of forming the farm had come from outside of the village, the method of mobilizing the village behind the farm was consistent with the way in which a village-wide consensus had been reached on issues of importance in the past.8
The development of a separation of interests between the corporate and noncorporate sectors presents a danger for socialist states in Southeastern Europe. One hears people refer to the officials as "them," and there have been incidents, such as the protest in the Jiu valley, where a segment of the population has mobilized to express its dissatisfaction with state policy. On a more mundane level, the success or failure of local level officials is in large measure determined by their success or failure in establishing a working relationship with local networks. Certainly the national leadership understands that this is a problem and also that on occasion the interests of party and of particular communities or population segments may be at odds. It insists, however, that there is identity of interest over the long run, and that such differences are only over short-term goals. Since such differences could result in overt antagonisms and open conflict, it is important to the leadership that they be identified early and that appropriate measures be taken. Appropriate measures can include an effort to explain the policy more effectively in cases where the communities have a false understanding, modification of the policy where the problem results from the failing of policy-makers, or the re-education or even removal of officials who have misapplied policy (the solution in the Jiu valley case). In Romania the potential seriousness of the problem is indicated by the ongoing efforts of the party to merge socialist and folk symbolism to create an identity between being Romanian and being socialist. Also, the first secretary of the Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu, periodically takes to the airwaves, or has an item published in the daily newspaper Scinteia, exhorting party and state officials to leave their desks and travel to their home communities to explain and promote new or modified policies.

In the modern socialist states of Southeastern Europe, while both corporate and noncorporate organizations exist as partially autonomous social processes, they are also intertwined. One cannot fully understand how the one works without understanding the other. Those of us who study small-scale phenomena have learned that we cannot understand life in village or town without taking into account the workings of party, state and national economy. We have also learned that explanations of party and state are equally incomplete without an understanding of the workings of noncorporate processes. This can best be accomplished through the detailed field study of small-scale units.9
Agrarian States in the Modern World

When governments dominated by Communist parties were established in Southeastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II, it was not surprising that these should be seen in the West as small-scale replicas of the Soviet Union. The existence of communist governments there seemed simple to explain: except in Yugoslavia and Albania, they had been installed by Russian commissars following in the wake of the Red Army. As Western scholars saw it, the advent of communism brought several centuries of indigenous political development to an end. As Soviet "satellites" these countries were presumed to have no politics or economics, but to be under the domination and direction of the Soviet Union, with everything of significance decided in Moscow. In those days it was easy for a student of the Soviet Union to also become an expert on Eastern Europe: one simply added the phrase "and in Eastern Europe as well" to any statement about the Soviet Union. One measure of the progress that has been made in the study of Eastern Europe over the past two decades is that we have almost cured our colleagues in Soviet studies of this sort of intellectual imperialism.10

In these twenty years we have learned that Eastern Europe is not merely a replica of the Soviet Union, and also that it is itself not all of a piece. Prior to the advent of communist rule, these countries had a variety of political and economic experiences. Poland had its long period of partition, with different regions governed by Prussia, Russia and Austria. The Czech lands, especially Bohemia, had served as an industrial and urban heartland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Hungary had developed as that empire's granary. The areas which make up present-day Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia had all been part of the Ottoman Empire, although each area had experienced Ottoman domination in a somewhat different way. Once they became independent of Ottoman rule, each of these Southeastern European countries developed strong political and economic ties with Western Europe and with Czarist Russia. After World War I, ties with the West became stronger than ever and throughout Eastern Europe, in the 1930s and '40s, German influence expanded into outright economic and political domination. The fall of the Third Reich marked the beginning of the transition to socialism.

The varied experiences of these countries prior to the advent of socialism, combined with their equally varied geographical circumstances and natural resources, has led each to shape its own distinctive brand of socialism. As Western scholars have gathered
ever more detailed information about the past and present of these
countries, they have become increasingly cautious in making general-
izations about the area as a whole. My decision to limit my re-
marks to Southeastern Europe was intended as a modest dramatization
of this point.

As the study of the countries of Southeastern Europe has gained its
place in Western scholarship, three observations have shaped con-
ventional understanding of the way in which modern conditions of
life have developed there. First, they are socialist states ideo-
logically dominated by Marxist-Leninist thought and under varying
degrees of Soviet influence. Second, they are making determined
efforts to become modern, developed countries. Third, however
distinctive their histories may be, they are nevertheless European
countries. While these observations appear to be self-evident, I
contend that dwelling upon them has tended to inhibit a realistic
understanding of Southeastern Europe.11

To begin with, there is an a priori assumption that communism is
inherently bad or evil. A whole vocabulary of perjorative terms
is applied to communist countries in both journalistic and scholar-
ly writings. Words and phrases such as "totalitarian," "re-
pression," "censorship," "drab," "police state," and "godless" are
freely used, reflecting value judgments and springing from the
writer's preference for his own political and economic system.
As such, they are a form of ethnocentrism which can influence the
nature of scholarship. These attitudes virtually ensure that no
matter how "objective" a scholar intends to be, his or her con-
clusions will ultimately be cast in a negative vein. When the
scholar is dealing with a communist country in Southeastern Europe,
the problem can be compounded for the very terms "Byzantine" and
"Balkan" have come to have negative connotations in the English
language.

In evaluating the performance of these countries, one inevitably
compares them with the United States and with the countries of
Western Europe because they share the same continental setting
and grand cultural heritage and because the general theory of modern-
ization provides the framework for comparative analysis. All of
the versions of modernization theory have in common a model of
development based on the growth of urban industrial society in the
West. To compare Southeastern Europe with the Western democracies,
various economic, demographic and social statistics are used to
serve as indicators of development. Inevitably, the countries of
Southeastern Europe suffer in the comparison. They are less modern,
and, whatever their progress, they continue to lag well behind
the West. Conclusions of this sort reinforce preconceived assump-
tions about the evils of communism by demonstrating its economic
and social failings. Qualitative research by political analysts which promotes invidious comparisons between West and East of qualities of freedom, human rights and political participation further substantiates these evils.

While research fitting roughly into the above mold has dominated Western scholarship about Southeastern Europe, there have been studies which take a somewhat different tack.\(^1\) This research begins with the observation that the countries of Southeastern Europe have followed a path into the modern world fundamentally different from that of the countries of Northwestern Europe. In the 19th century, when the peoples of the Balkans were emerging from Ottoman rule, the countries of Northwestern Europe were already well established as capitalist industrial nation-states. The combination of national movements and international interests which destroyed Ottoman power in Europe also paved the way for Western influence in the former Ottoman lands, and in the course of the 19th century Southeastern Europe became firmly integrated into the Western economic sphere. This penetration tied agricultural production in Southeastern Europe to the requirements of the West, inhibited industrial development, and served to create and perpetuate agrarian society there. While the nature of these societies was rooted in their past, the form that they took late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century was in large measure a product of their attempts to meet the demands and opportunities growing out of their ties with the West. In the process they became countries with severe "peasant problems." The political parties which vied with one another in the period between the world wars made little progress toward solving this problem, and it was, if anything, intensified by Nazi German domination and the trauma of World War II.

The experience of Southeastern Europe in becoming an agrarian hinterland of industrial Europe parallels that of other world areas. Similar processes creating agrarian societies geared to production for industrial Europe and the United States took place in much of Mediterranean Europe, North and West Africa, South, East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. While differing radically in cultural traditions and climatic and geographic circumstances, these areas came to share many political, economic and social forms as a result of these common experiences.

Since the end of World War II, economic and social development in these agrarian states has been approached in various ways, associated with many forms of political organization. When examined in the context of these agrarian countries, rather than compared with advanced industrial nations, the experiences of Southeastern Europe
look rather different: their accomplishments appear in a much more favorable light. In general, they have achieved more industrialization and are sustaining a higher rate of economic growth; their urbanization has been carried out in a far more balanced and controlled fashion with concomitantly fewer urban problems; unemployment and underemployment are insignificant; basic education is virtually universal and "upward mobility" through access to higher education is widely available; a variety of social programs promote the well-being of the general population. Moreover, they are more successful than other agrarian states in retaining the capital they generate for reinvestment and they suffer fewer problems resulting from the emigration of the most skilled and educated members of their population.14

Conclusions

Detailed field research conducted within the countries of Southeastern Europe is contributing to a more accurate and sophisticated understanding of their internal dynamics. Additionally, an analytic framework which examines this area in relationship to others with similar agrarian histories is providing an alternative to conventional ways of interpreting their problems, accomplishments, and future potential. At the very least, the scholarship I have been discussing represents an expansion of information and modes of analysis available to individuals who are interested in Southeastern Europe. It may also have significance for the kinds of policies that Western states develop with respect to both the nations of Southeastern Europe and to agrarian nations in other parts of the world.

The socialist states of Southeastern Europe, although differing from one another in the particulars of policy and practice, have made economic and social advances which compare very favorably with non-socialist agrarian states in other areas. As these states have established their own individual brands of socialism and have experienced some success with modernization, they have become increasingly independent-minded in foreign economic and political relations. Yugoslavia is certainly a case in point, as are Romania and Poland. Policies of détente toward this part of the world seem to be a good idea.

Moreover, policies designed to frustrate the development of socialist states in other world areas are probably ill-advised. My hypothesis is that agrarian states which become socialist have better development prospects than do those that do not. If even
members of the Warsaw Pact can begin to develop independent aspects to their foreign relations, it seems likely that socialist states in the Third World can be expected to maintain a relatively unaligned stance. Encouragement and assistance from the West rather than opposition should make this even more likely.

A final point that I would like to make is that scholars are generally agreed that studying a particular problem from a variety of perspectives and comparing results is a better way to advance knowledge than to have numbers of like-minded individuals working on the same problem. IREX has made a substantial contribution to the proliferation of perspectives on Eastern Europe. IREX grants are available not only to individuals trained at the major centers for Soviet and East European studies, but also to scholars whose primary training has been in an academic field rather than in an area studies program. IREX is also alert to innovative research proposals from scholars who are affiliated with universities not especially known for their East European or Soviet studies. The IREX program has made it possible for these scholars to contribute to the development of Eastern European studies in the United States, and I am firmly convinced that this has been a positive influence.

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NOTES

1. Cyril Black discusses the genes's of the totalitarian model and how it came to be applied to the Soviet Union and Eastern European states in his contribution to this conference [in A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges, IREX Occasional Papers, Vol. 1, No. 1]. Both he and David Cattell in this conference explain the limits of its utility in understanding the Soviet Union. It should be noted that not all authorities who use the totalitarian model attribute it to communist parties. Some see it as inherent in Russian culture or in the cultures of the various East European states, with roots deep in history.


4. An authoritative presentation of this perspective for Europe, both East and West, is S.H. Franklin, The European Peasant: The Final Phase (London, 1969: Methuen), especially pp. 1-20 and 218-234. It also dominates textbook social science and works in general theory. However, in the course of the past two decades a series of monographs on social organization in worker communities in the industrial West has appeared which contradicts the general expectation: c.f. Michael Young and Peter Wilmott, Family and Kin in East London (Baltimore, 1957: Penguin); Mirra Komarovsky, Blue Collar Marriage (New York, 1967: Random House). Michael Anderson outlines the dilemma of the lack of fit between general theory and specific case studies in his Family Structure in 19th-Century Lancashire (Cambridge, 1971: Cambridge University Press). Such works as these, demonstrating the
ongoing strength of kith and kin relations in the heart of the industrial West make it difficult to accept the premise that such relations will wither away with modernization in Eastern Europe.


6. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of research in other parts of Southeastern Europe. The literature in English is richest for Yugoslavia, where research by American and British scholars has been ongoing since the mid-1950s. Among the many works which touch on the role of kith and kin in the process of social change are: Joel M. Halpern, A Serbian Village: Social and Cultural Change in a Yugoslav Community (New York, 1967 [1956]); E.A. Hammel, "Social Mobility, Economic Change and Kinship in Serbia," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 25 (1969), pp. 188-197; William Lockwood, European Moslems: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia (New York, 1976: Academic Press); Balkanistica, Volume III, Peasant Culture and National Culture in Southeastern Europe (Ann Arbor, 1976: Slavica Publishers). An indispensable aid to the study of social relations in Southeastern Europe is Irwin Sanders, Roger Whitaker, and Walter C. Bisselle, eds., East European Peasantries: Social Relations. An Annotated Bibliography of Periodical Articles (Boston, 1976: G.K. Hall).


9. This is, of course, hardly unique to the study of Southeastern European societies. Two works which examine this as a general method are Abner Cohen, Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society (London, 1974: Routledge & Kegan Paul), and L.A. Fallers, The Social Anthropology of the Nation State (Chicago, 1974: Aldine).

10. However, the ongoing imperious attitude of our more numerous Soviet and Russian studies colleagues is indicated by the fact that those of us who study Albanians, Estonians, Finns, Gypsies, (East) Germans, Hungarians, Lapps, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Romanians are expected to join a professional association called the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is no doubt responsible for the recent formation of the American Association for Southeast European Studies.


14. It would take a second essay, longer and more involved than this one, to examine the assumptions made by Western scholars (Marxist and positivist alike) that the human costs of Eastern European achievements are excessive. Western comments on the human condition in Eastern Europe are made against either idealized versions of "freedom" in the industrialized West, or an abstract concept of human rights. They rarely take into account the specific problems faced by small nations attempting to modernize. Condemnation of East European states for severely restricting emigration and foreign travel ignore the implications of open borders for small countries. In the European context, open borders in small modernizing states have meant a "brain drain" and an ongoing export of labor to industrial Northwestern Europe. Case studies, such as that by Jane and Peter Schneider on Sicily, *Culture and Political
Economy in Western Sicily (New York, 1976: Academic Press) and surveys such as S. Castles and G. Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (London, 1973: Oxford University Press) suggest that the human costs of migration are considerable. Whether the human costs of open or closed borders are more severe is problematic.
STUDYING THE SOVIET SOCIAL SYSTEM:

THE SOVIET CITIZEN REVISITED

Gail Warshofsky Lapidus
It is startling indeed when in the USA, they can better evaluate our mass ideological information, and, along with this, our social relations, than we can do in our own country.

A Soviet sociologist

A more complex and sophisticated understanding of contemporary Soviet society has become increasingly critical to our understanding of the Soviet political scene. Differing views about the durability of the present regime, and the scope and direction of possible changes, rest on differing assessments of the belief systems, expectations, and frustrations of different segments of the Soviet population. Discussions of the policy options open to the Soviet leadership, or of the prospects of alternative political coalitions, rest on assumptions about the social constraints which shape the policy process and the political strategies needed to maintain the acquiescence, if not the active support, of strategic social groups. Efforts to predict the possible effects of massive generational change on Soviet political life draw on assumptions about the impact of socialization, life experiences, and role demands on elite perceptions and behavior. Thus, virtually all the current controversies over the character and future evolution of the Soviet political system rest on implicit assumptions about its social basis.

If the importance of such assessments for American policy is self-evident, developing a sound basis for making them is among the most difficult of the problems faced by analysts of the Soviet system. Even in open societies like our own, where highly sophisticated techniques for studying both elite and popular attitudes and behavior can be applied on a broad scale, there are real limits to the accuracy of such assessments. In the case of a closed society like the USSR, the importance of the undertaking is matched only by its complexity.
Social scientists as well as policy analysts have much to learn from the serious study of Soviet society. As a major experiment in directed social change, as an example of forced industrialization under single-party auspices, or as a multi-national laboratory for examining the confrontation of tradition and modernity, the Soviet experience raises important questions—and bears important lessons—for students of comparative social structure and social change. The emergence of new opportunities for the study of Soviet society over the past 20 years is therefore of unusual importance for policy-makers and for social scientists alike.

These new opportunities have resulted from three separate, though related, developments: 1) expanded access to the USSR, and particularly the unique forms of access made possible by the development of scholarly exchanges since 1958; 2) the rebirth of Soviet social science in the post-Stalin years which created a community of scholars and a veritable flood of publications concerned with contemporary Soviet society; and 3) the "third emigration," the massive exodus of Soviet citizens, largely though not entirely of Jewish nationality, which began in 1971.

These developments have not merely increased our understanding of the Soviet system; they have altered our perceptions of it in important ways. Their impact—with a focus on the exchanges—is the subject of this paper. Drawing on the findings of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System of the mid-1950s as a baseline, this essay will examine the new kinds of research that have become possible in the past two decades, will outline the ways in which this research has both enriched and modified our conceptions of Soviet society, and will conclude with some suggestions about the data that remain to be explored, the questions that remain to be asked, and the better uses that might be made of the knowledge we have gained.

The Soviet Citizen, 1959: A Point of Departure

Just 20 years ago, on the eve of the Soviet-American scholarly exchange programs whose anniversary we are marking here, Harvard University Press published a remarkable book by Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer entitled The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Part of a larger group of studies of different aspects of Soviet society which together comprised the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, it was the culmination of a decade of research, an extraordinary concentration of scholarly skills and effort, and a massive investment of governmental resources—roughly 1½ million 1950 dollars over a five-year period.
The Soviet Citizen was a milestone in American understanding of the Soviet system. It represented the first systematic effort to study Soviet society rather than the Soviet system, to move beyond the study of Soviet ideology, institutions, and policies and to focus instead on the impact of the Soviet system on its people. It investigated the attitudes, values, aspirations, and frustrations of the Soviet citizen in an effort to understand how ordinary people responded to the pressure and opportunities generated by their environment.

The Soviet Citizen also represented a breakthrough in conceptualization. At a time when much American scholarship emphasized the distinctive features of Soviet totalitarianism Bauer and Inkeles argued that the USSR shared many features in common with other large-scale industrial societies, including the United States. This approach altered the universe of societies with which the Soviet Union was to be compared, and in so doing it provided a point of departure as well as a subject of controversy for virtually all subsequent comparative research.

Finally, The Soviet Citizen had important implications for American policy toward the USSR, for it called into question fundamental assumptions about the fragility of the Soviet system which underlay the policy of containment. It was still possible to defend containment as an appropriate response to Soviet behavior in the international arena, but if Bauer and Inkeles were correct, the Soviet system had acquired sufficient legitimacy, and was sufficiently rooted in the values and aspirations of its people, that constraining its external dynamism would not result in the dramatic internal transformation which George Kennan, among others, then anticipated.

Looking back at this study from the perspective of the past 20 years, its achievement appears all the more remarkable. For it relied entirely on the only two sources then available to American Sovietologists: published Soviet materials, far more limited in scope and quality than those to which we have become accustomed in recent years, and interviews with Soviet émigrés, interviews which, it should be borne in mind, were conducted in 1950-1951, with men and women who had left the Soviet Union five to eight years previously, and which drew, therefore, on the perceptions and experiences of the 1930s. Yet despite the limitations of their sources, so accurately did Inkeles and Bauer identify some of the major sources of alienation from the Soviet system, and anticipate the reforms undertaken by the post-Stalin leadership to reduce this disaffection, that, in a hopefully apocryphal story, they were accused at a Congressional hearing of having unwittingly helped to extricate the Soviet system from its internal predicaments.
Over twenty years later, *The Soviet Citizen* is still required reading for anyone with a serious interest in Soviet society and politics. As a combination of meticulous scholarship and sophisticated theory, it still represents a model of how much can be learned from even the most limited and refractory sources in an environment that supports the necessary concentration of skills and resources. As the point of departure for virtually all subsequent studies of the Soviet social system, however, *The Soviet Citizen* also offers a convenient baseline from which to review more recent scholarly work and to assess the contribution of the exchanges to our understanding of Soviet society today.

**The Impact of New Research Opportunities: 1959–1979**

It would be difficult to exaggerate the contribution of the scholarly exchanges to American research and teaching about the USSR. The exchange participants represent the first generation of American-born scholars to have had the opportunity to live for extended periods of time in the Soviet Union. The chance to experience firsthand the society about which they write and teach, and to develop a wide range of scholarly contacts and even personal friendships with Soviet acquaintances, renewed and deepened at subsequent scholarly meetings or research trips, are among the by-products of the exchanges which are mentioned in the reports of many participants as having been of even greater value than their opportunities to conduct formal research.

It is difficult to capture the full impact of this experience. For reasons we shall return to shortly, only a handful of exchange participants have made the study of Soviet society the explicit focus of their research and publications. Moreover, few have proven as gifted as my fellow panelists in transforming the experience of daily life into literature (or, as some would have it, into fiction). The engrossing accounts of Soviet life by George Feifer,¹ and the highly prized restaurant guide of Wesley Fisher, *The Moscow Gourmet*,² are among the more tangible and widely-read products of the exchange program. Its impact on American scholarship more broadly has been less visible, but very profound.

With due respect to the impressive accomplishments of earlier American scholarship, it would be fair to characterize the studies that have come out of the exchanges as having a greater "feel" for Soviet reality. They tend, on the whole, to draw on
a richer data base, to convey a greater sense of variety and complexity, and to offer a more subtle account of individual and group behavior, than those written from a distance and based exclusively on Soviet published sources. One need only compare the best of the recent textbooks on Soviet politics and society—written mainly by exchange participants—with the classics of the 1950s and 1960s to be struck by the difference.

The focus of recent work also differs from that of previous American scholarship. Many of the pioneering studies of the USSR were the work of émigré scholars who approached the Soviet system with concerns and orientations which derived from a shared historical and cultural experience. This new generation of American scholars confronted in the USSR an alien milieu. Their perceptions and values derived from a different set of experiences and interests. They brought questions and methodologies drawn from American social science to the study of the USSR, fresh perspectives, if not always more fruitful ones. Their work was less concerned with the relation of the Soviet regime to its prerevolutionary intellectual, political, and social antecedents than with its similarities and differences to other developing, industrial, or Communist societies. They focused less on institutions, more on processes. And in struggling to understand why even the most routine of scholarly activities could become a protracted ordeal of Kafkaesque dimensions, they turned to explanations of Soviet behavior that emphasized not only the intentional actions of identifiable rational actors but also the unplanned and even unintended outcomes of bureaucratic routines and organizational intrigues, compounded by negligence, incompetence, and inertia.3

Moreover, the experience of exchange participants distinguished them from the diplomats, businessmen, and journalists who also gained wider access to the USSR during these years. Broadly speaking, and with some notable exceptions, the exchangees brought a higher level of professional training and a greater degree of involvement and commitment to their confrontation with Soviet life: a fluent knowledge of Russian language; some acquaintance with Russian and Soviet history, politics, economics, and social structure; a familiarity with Soviet publications in their areas of expertise as well as experience in deciphering the Aesopian language of Soviet communications more generally; and a concern with fitting their daily experiences into a larger framework. They had less contact with officialdom, and more with the intelligentsia—the scientific and scholarly communities. While subjected to the severe limitations placed on all foreigners in a police state, they faced fewer formal constraints on their access to Soviet daily life and had greater opportunities as well as ability to "pass" as Soviet citizens and blend into the surrounding environment. Housed in university dormitories or Academy apartment
buildings rather than in Intourist hotels or foreigners' compounds, with greater opportunities to travel independently and only limited access to the Embassy PX, exchangees were not only motivated but also compelled to immerse themselves deeply in Soviet life.

Out of the daily round of "hunting and gathering," of dealings with Soviet day care centers and public schools, of negotiations with advisors, or archivists, or educational bureaucrats, and out of long evenings of conversation in the dormitory rooms or apartments of Soviet friends, emerged a portrait of a society far richer, more varied, more complex, than the stereotypical images of earlier writings, or of some accounts by more recent émigrés. And out of subsequent encounters with Soviet acquaintances at scholarly meetings or return visits to the USSR, came the ability to assess both continuity and change in Soviet perceptions and reality over time. In its broadest terms, then, the exchange program produced a group of Americans with a more concrete, accurate, and comprehensive understanding of Soviet attitudes and behavior, and a greater capacity to make informed judgments about the Soviet scene, than would have been possible without it.

For the smaller group of exchangees whose work specifically focused on contemporary Soviet society, participation on the exchange program was not only of enormous value; it was a virtually indispensable condition of serious research. Indeed, the exchanges account for virtually all recent American scholarship on contemporary Soviet society, and the IREX Preparatory Fellowship Program for a high proportion of all social science exchangees.4

The exchange program facilitated social science research in a number of crucial ways. First, it gave participants access to a far broader range of Soviet publications than would have been available in the United States. Despite marked improvements in the exchange of social science publications in recent years there are still important lacunae in American acquisitions, as well as long delays before recent studies actually reach the shelves of American libraries. Moreover, many important Soviet publications—local newspapers, for example—are not permitted to cross the Soviet border.

Equally valuable was the access the exchange permitted to otherwise inaccessible or unpublished materials: dissertations, books and pamphlets printed in limited editions for limited circulation, court cases, sociological surveys, samizdat literature, and personal papers and diaries. Such materials can be unusually revealing; it is virtually an unwritten rule of thumb among Soviet specialists that the circulation of a publication is inversely related to its frankness.
Thirdly, the exchange program made it possible to supplement
library research with interviews. So extreme is the gap between
the printed word and reality in the USSR that serious scholarship
virtually requires getting behind the stereotypical façade of uni-
iformity and progress conveyed in Soviet publications to encounter
the variety of concerns, perceptions, priorities, and values that
lie behind official policies in different fields. Interviews may
even be used to explore issues not touched upon at all in Soviet
publications. Conversations with criminologists about the sources
of crime and deviance and the measures they believed necessary to
deal with it, or with educational sociologists about inequality
in access to higher education and the factors responsible for it, or
with demographers about why the Soviet birth rate is declining
so sharply and what measures might reverse these trends, all added
flesh and blood to otherwise skeletal accounts of Soviet policy.
Such discussions with Soviet colleagues and acquaintances also
provided informative insights about academic and policy circles,
and even rare glimpses into the policymaking process itself.5

On some occasions, the delivery of a wrong book, or a chance
remark or encounter, yielded unexpected information or insight
and resulted in the birth of unplanned articles, or chapters, or
new projects. To cite just one example, the accidental discovery
of a dissertation containing detailed wage data drawn from a mas-
sive survey in Erevan made possible the first close analysis of
the effect of different variables on Soviet wages.6 By subjecting
the Soviet data to sophisticated computer analysis it was possible
to demonstrate that, despite official assertions that equal pay
for equal work is guaranteed by law, a substantial gap in fact
separates the earnings of males from females of comparable edu-
cation, skill, experience, and level of responsibility.

The new research opportunities provided by the exchanges were
especially useful to American scholars interested in Soviet soci-
ety because they coincided with the rebirth of Soviet social science
in the post-Stalin period. The establishment of the Soviet Socio-
logical Association in 1958, and the proliferation of research
centers and publications in subsequent years, reflected a recog-
nition by the Soviet leadership that any successful effort to
deal with current social problems depended on an open acknowledge-
ment of their existence. Official support for empirical social re-
search, for a limited separation of social science from ideology,
and for an expansion of scientific contacts with the West provided
the necessary backdrop for the development of exchanges in the
social sciences.
The enormous interest of Soviet scholars in Western research, and their willingness to engage in scholarly exchanges—however cautiously—with Western counterparts, is in turn legitimized by the backwardness of Soviet social science and its dependence on Western techniques and methodology. Many Soviet scholars have developed both a professional and a personal stake in such exchanges; their contacts with Western colleagues are an important vehicle for improving the quality of their own research, for gaining access to recent American publications through exchanges of books and reprints, and even, many hope, for winning a much-coveted invitation to travel abroad. Soviet scholars increasingly also seek Western recognition for their own work. They inquire about the possibilities of publishing in Western journals, welcome the enhanced professional standing they may gain at home by having their works reviewed or translated by Western colleagues, and begin to think of themselves as part of an intellectual community that extends beyond the borders of the USSR.

An additional impetus to serious communication with Soviet scholars is their professional and personal interest in learning about the United States, an interest made more intense by the years of relative isolation. At formal meetings as well as in private conversations with groups of Soviet scholars, exchangees are showered with questions about various aspects of American life. And not only about American life; a number of Soviet social scientists are even interested in learning from Western Soviet specialists about the USSR itself. A shared interest in comparing social systems, and a recognition that Western social scientists are often in a better position to analyze the implications of Soviet data, further facilitates an exchange of experiences and ideas.

This account is not intended to make light of the severe constraints which American scholars confront in attempting to study problems of contemporary Soviet life: the paranoid Soviet concern with security that treats the most ordinary research projects like attempts at ideological subversion; the restraints on access to institutions, publications, and scholars which tax the ingenuity and fortitude of even the most persistent American exchangees; and the frustrating dependence of American scholarship on Soviet research interests, and on Soviet studies which are often extremely limited in their conception and execution. But it does point to the partial community of interests and skills between exchangees and their Soviet counterparts—and to the kinds of interdependence that develop between them—which make possible fruitful intellectual interchange and which add an important human dimension to the scholarly enterprise.
The Soviet Citizen 1979: What Have We Learned?

In 1960, Robert Tucker titled a suggestive essay "The Image of Dual Russia" to convey what was, in his view, the defining feature of Russian historical experience and consciousness: a fundamental cleavage between state and society, between "official" and "popular" Russia. Broadly speaking, the focus of Western studies of Soviet society has shifted over the past twenty years from "official" Russia to "popular" Russia and, above all, to the interaction of the two.

Economists have discovered that behind the formal structure of a highly centralized and planned economy, and in constant interaction with it, there exists an informal "second economy," with its proliferation of legal, semi-legal, and illegal markets. Likewise, sociologists have begun to investigate a "second society," based on informal social networks and personal exchanges, in which attitudes and behavior conform very little to the stereotypical images of the atomized society—or, for that matter, to official Soviet portraits of an egalitarian and classless socialist community. Moreover, the "two Russians" exist not as separate and self-contained universes but as interpenetrating and overlapping milieus, creating a complex and differentiated mosaic of values, life-styles, and social norms among different social groups, and an intricate pattern of exchanges and trade-offs among them.

The broader implications of this perspective for our view of regime-society relations are only beginning to be assimilated into current scholarship, and are not yet reflected in any comprehensive, synthetic works. Nonetheless, some of the findings of recent research on Soviet society have substantially added to or modified the portrait sketched by Inkeles and Bauer two decades ago, and it is their contribution which we shall now briefly review.

Social Stratification and Mobility

On the basis of the evidence then available, Inkeles and Bauer concluded that by the mid-1930s there had evolved in the Soviet Union a class structure similar to that of Western industrial societies. Occupation was the crucial determinant of social status, and education of occupational position. The ranking of occupations by Soviet citizens revealed the presence of a hierarchy of status not unlike that which prevailed in the United States, with professional occupations very highly ranked and rural and manual occupations viewed as least desirable.
It was not until the 1960s, however, that a more complex portrait of the Soviet social hierarchy could be drawn. The revival of Soviet social science made possible studies of social structure that used both the language and the apparatus of Western stratification theory, while a large number of time budget surveys shed much light on the values and behavior of different social strata. Soviet data, supplemented by the personal experiences of exchange participants, other visitors to the USSR, and émigrés, made it possible to gain a clearer and more detailed picture of the Soviet social hierarchy, and especially of the privileges and lifestyle of the Soviet elite, than was available earlier. It is now possible to identify a wide range of subtle gradations in the position of different socio-economic strata, and to demonstrate that these strata are highly differentiated along a number of different dimensions, from economic position, to cultural level, to political participation, to value orientations and lifestyle. Although direct income inequality in the USSR is somewhat narrower than that which prevails in the United States, differential access to restricted goods and services—from scarce consumer goods to quality housing and medical care to foreign travel—shaped in part by official position, generates substantial inequalities of its own.

Recent Western research on Soviet social stratification has also uncovered the presence of very substantial stratification based on sex. Despite official claims that women have achieved full equality with men, detailed investigations of Soviet occupational and income structure clearly demonstrate that the rewards to equivalent education are significantly lower for women than for men. In virtually every economic sector or occupation the proportion of women declines with increasing level of skill, responsibility, and income; average female earnings are roughly two-thirds those of males. Despite extremely high levels of female employment, both in the labor force and, as we shall see, within the family, sex remains a significant basis for the allocation of social roles; male and female workers differ in the distribution of skill, income, status, power, and even leisure time.

Recent investigations of Soviet social structure raise new theoretical issues as well. While major features of the Soviet stratification system clearly resemble those characteristic of Western society, differences in the roles of both property and power have larger ramifications. Soviet social structure is distinguished by the presence of two distinct social hierarchies, one based on official position and the other based on social class, which correspond to two different mechanisms for allocating resources. While in Western industrial societies the market serves as a uni-
versal mechanism for distributing goods and services, in the USSR a number of goods and services are not freely available for purchase but are allocated through a separate distribution system as a function of official position. The political system thus exerts a greater influence over stratification than is conveyed in some of the sociological literature.

Making a Living

The Soviet Citizen reported that occupational position was highly correlated with job satisfaction; non-manual groups were consistently more pleased with their general working environments as well as with their pay than were manual workers and peasants. Complaints about low living standards—inadequate food, housing and clothing—expressed a deep sense of deprivation which was especially strong among peasants and manual workers.

In recent years these material sources of discontent have been somewhat alleviated by measures which have raised real income, especially among the poorest-paid groups, narrowed income differentials, and made possible a substantial improvement in living standards through the increased availability and quality of consumer goods and services.

Two additional sources of increased well-being, however, both reflecting a more intensive use of labor, are not captured in the earlier literature. The first is the dramatic rise in female labor force participation over the past two decades; close to 85 percent of Soviet women are now employed, largely full-time, while still retaining many of their traditional family responsibilities. Secondly, household income is not only a function of official earnings but also of widespread supplementary and private employment in the "second economy." Recent studies suggest that the structure and incidence of these categories of earnings and expenditures may create a pattern of income distribution which diverges from the official picture of the structure of prices and income in significant ways.

Finally, although the material situation of Soviet families has improved considerably in the intervening years, job dissatisfaction and general worker alienation remain continuing problems. A substantial gap between the educational qualifications of workers and the content of the work they perform has been identified as a major source of frustration. High rates of labor turnover and low labor productivity continue to plague the Soviet
economy, and contribute to a more general slowdown in its rate of
growth; on the other hand, reforms which would result in more
efficient use of labor also jeopardize the official commitment to
job security. To the extent that improving living standards and
secure employment are necessary to secure the political acquies-
cence of Soviet workers, economic performance and political stabil-
ity are closely entwined.

Getting an Education

The Soviet Citizen emphasized the great value attached to educa-
tional opportunity in the USSR, as well as the crucial role educa-
tion played in occupational placement, but no data existed at the
time which would have permitted a more detailed analysis of the
effects of the selection process on educational access among dif-
ferent social groups. Recent Western studies, those of Richard
Dobson in particular, have done much to fill this gap. They
reveal that family background has an important influence on chil-
dren's educational aspirations and performance from a very early
age, and that children's educational attainment is closely re-
lated to their parents' educational level and occupational status.
Moreover, the existence of special schools for gifted children,
and the increasingly stiff competition for places in higher edu-
cational institutions, give additional advantages to children of
intelligentsia background. Thus, Soviet educational institutions
are closely enmeshed in the stratification system: the higher the
prestige of the occupation for which an institution provides
training, the higher the quality of the school itself, and the
more desirable its location, the greater the proportion of non-
manual offspring in its student body.

Keeping Up with the News

The Soviet Citizen pointed to the presence of two distinct chan-
nels of communication in the USSR, one official and highly con-
trolled by the regime, the other unofficial, and relying heavily
on word of mouth. It also attempted to sketch some of the ways
in which communications behavior differed among different social
groups. Bauer and Inkeles concluded that Soviet propaganda had
achieved its greatest successes in shaping its citizens' images
of the outside world, and in inculcating images of the Soviet
Union as a "progressive," "democratic," "classless" society.

In recent years, the official monopoly of communications has been
substantially weakened. Increasing travel to and from the West,
the reduced jamming of Western broadcasts, the letters and tele-
phone conversations which link émigrés with relatives and friends at home, have created a more complex and varied pattern of communications which oblige the Soviet citizen to evaluate and order diverse kinds of information. Nonetheless, preliminary surveys of political attitudes of recent Soviet émigrés indicate that the patterns initially identified by Inkeles and Bauer continue to persist, and that although Soviet public opinion is diverse and discriminating rather than uncritical, Soviet agencies of communication and socialization have made a substantial impact on the values and thought processes of even the most alienated of Soviet citizens.

Patterns of Family Life

Using demographic indicators to assess the degree of stability and change in Soviet family patterns, Inkeles and Bauer found that family behavior showed considerable continuity, both in the tendency for marriages to be contracted between people of similar class and ethnic backgrounds, and in the trend toward smaller family size. These findings have been greatly amplified by recent research. In a detailed investigation of Russian and Soviet marriage patterns, Wesley Fisher has called into question Soviet assertions that under socialism, material interests no longer play a role in mate selection. His findings suggest the presence of a "marriage market" which results in a high degree of class and ethnic endogamy. 11

Detailed analysis of Soviet demographic trends have also become possible in recent years. Like other industrial societies, the USSR is also experiencing a decline in overall birth rates, with a trend toward smaller family size among virtually all groups. However, birth rates have remained extremely high in the Moslem republics of Soviet Central Asia, with important political, economic, and social consequences, and the causes and implications of these ethnic differences have become the subject of growing scholarly attention in the past few years.

Sources of Support and Alienation

In their interviews with former Soviet citizens, Inkeles and Bauer found that even those most hostile to the Soviet regime in general terms strongly supported its social welfare programs—free public education, socialized health care, and job security—and viewed them as the most attractive aspects of the system. Elite and popular attitudes also appeared to be congruent in the preference for strong leadership; the émigrés paid lip service
to the principle of civil liberties but were willing to tolerate a high level of governmental intervention so long as it was exercised benevolently and on behalf of the public interest.

Interviews with recent émigrés yielded similar results. Perhaps in response to greater familiarity with the West, there also appears in recent interviews a stronger emphasis on the warmth of social relations and solidarity in Soviet society by comparison with the materialism and anomie of the West. Nonetheless, even though greater education tends to be correlated with greater liberalism, there is a positive correlation between social status and approval of the regime; a higher degree of alienation is found among unskilled workers and collective farmers.

However, The Soviet Citizen failed to anticipate the two major manifestations of alienation within the USSR in recent years, both based on "ideal interests" more than on material deprivations: the dissident movement on the one hand, and the Jewish emigration on the other. Both these movements embrace a broad range of moral and political perspectives, and suggest the presence of a broad spectrum of attitudes inside the USSR not captured by the dichotomy of dissident vs. loyal.

Furthermore, The Soviet Citizen could not explore problems of social deviance in the USSR. Recent studies of crime and alcoholism, to cite two examples, or efforts to investigate the scope and nature of religious belief, address hitherto unexplored but important aspects of Soviet reality. The question of how the structure of the Soviet system and the thrust of its policies at different points in time shape the forms and meanings of social deviance and political dissent deserves the serious attention of social scientists, but that is the subject of a different paper.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

If the exchange programs have not yet produced The Soviet Citizen: 1979—a contemporary counterpart to the Inkeles and Bauer study based on the information and insights gathered during their two decades of existence—they have nevertheless played a central role in whatever limited expertise we have acquired in this area. The fact that the USSR is a relatively closed society has made the exchanges a unique as well as a major source of information about attitudes and behavior in various social milieus. They have made it possible to extend our network of contacts into academic circles, and to gain some insights, however limited, into the
attitudes of influential elites and their role in policy-making in areas one step removed from national security concerns. Most importantly, the exchanges have provided a framework for access to the USSR for a group of scholars who would otherwise have been excluded. However much we may regret the absence of free and unfettered contacts with Soviet scholars, the kind of research described here would be the first to suffer from a weakening or dismantling of the exchange apparatus.

If it is possible to insulate the exchange programs from the vicissitudes of US-Soviet political relations, a number of promising opportunities for new research deserve to be explored in the coming years. First, the fields in which research is conducted could and should be expanded; issues of fundamental importance in such specialties as demography, economic geography, family sociology and social history, to name just a few, have barely been touched. The development of Soviet public opinion research also calls for serious attention from American scholars, as does the growing role of social scientists in the formation of economic and social policy. Secondly, new opportunities suggest the desirability of a geographical expansion as well. The emergence of a number of regional centers of social science research—the Baltic, the Caucasus, Siberia, and Central Asia—may make it possible to begin to explore, however cautiously, questions of social structure and social change in the non-Russian regions of the USSR. In the past, social scientists interested in comparative research had little choice but to treat the Soviet Union as a single entity; it may now become possible to treat the USSR as itself a universe for comparative analysis. Thirdly, new forms of research may eventually become possible if IREX's efforts to promote Soviet-American collaboration in the social sciences ultimately bear fruit. Joint projects using a single research design for simultaneous investigations in both countries could yield interesting data for comparative analysis. Preliminary discussions in a number of areas have already been held, but the prospects for such projects will ultimately depend on the development of Soviet-American relations more generally.

A second category of possibilities depends less on Soviet cooperation than on an imaginative reconceptualization of American research. Viewing the USSR through the prism of the "industrial society" model has directed our attention to a number of broad similarities in social structure and behavior among all modern societies. While these similarities could be identified over more and more dimensions of human experience, it might be more
rewarding, at this juncture, to seek better ways of capturing and conceptualizing societal differences. New theoretical approaches to social stratification, for example, which focus on the cleavage between officialdom and class as two distinct dimensions of social structure in Leninist systems, and the way in which power or resources in one sphere are converted into power or resources in the other, offer one possible avenue for further work. There are a number of Western sociological approaches which have not been utilized at all to examine Soviet society: role theory, for example, could offer useful insights into how Soviet officials or citizens manage multiple and conflicting roles; Western work on cognitive dissonance could be applied to the study of Soviet attitudes; symbolic interactionism, or a focus on the "presentation of self" in Soviet society could shed much light on informal behavior; and a focus on social networks and their function could uncover much about the informal structure of power in different areas of Soviet life. Moreover, insights drawn from such investigations could do much to enrich American sociological theory, to test its concepts, and to help modify its ethnocentric character.

Finally, the results of these research efforts could be communicated more effectively than has been the case in the past. Not only a listing of exchange participants and their projects but also a summary of their findings might be disseminated in both the academic and the governmental communities. The current efforts of IREX to arrange presentations by exchange participants to business groups, government officials, and other interested audiences deserve encouragement and expansion. Finally, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow itself offers a unique but poorly utilized setting for the exchange of experiences and views among scholars, journalists, businessmen, and diplomats working in the USSR. A program of seminars and lectures could usefully supplement the cultural activities arranged by the Embassy, and facilitate the development of a network of contacts and friendships across career lines in much the same way that service in the OSS during World War II, or residence at the Harvard Russian Research Center, created an informal "Soviet affairs community" among an earlier generation of Americans. The opportunity should not be thoughtlessly squandered.

Having outlined a number of possible areas of future research which could yield important benefits, let me conclude by pointing to a major problem: the expansion of opportunities for social science research in the USSR coincides with a severe contraction
of the resources available for such purposes. If the training of American specialists on Soviet affairs is permitted to depend almost exclusively on the fluctuations of the academic job market, there will be few incentives in coming years for students to undertake the enormous investment required. In disciplines like economics, sociology, and demography, which place a high premium on sophisticated quantitative research, there is a high cost attached to the development of expertise on a foreign area, in time, productivity, and in the calculus of promotion. While few major university departments of history or political science would consider themselves complete without a specialist on Russia or Eastern Europe, only a handful of departments of economics or sociology or demography in this country offer even a single course on the area. The expertise on contemporary Soviet affairs that has already been acquired is in serious danger of being dissipated, and the training of future generations of specialists remains uncertain.

Here, too, a number of fresh departures suggest themselves. Fellowship programs at the graduate level, linked to eventual participation in the exchanges, could encourage advanced students in different social science disciplines to acquire additional expertise in the Soviet field if employment opportunities outside academia were simultaneously expanded. New opportunities for retraining could make possible a reallocation of existing specialists from fields with limited job prospects into other areas. Internships could bring graduate students and faculty to government agencies and government specialists to academic centers for varying periods of time; the U.S. Commerce Department's Division of Demographic Analysis, to cite one example, which has filled an enormous gap with its excellent studies, has a superb collection of contemporary Soviet materials and too small and overworked a staff to exploit them fully.

Finally, a clearer recognition of the value of area expertise within our foreign service, media, and business communities, is long overdue. While the problem is a more general one, the unique importance of increased knowledge about the USSR, combined with the especially severe limits on access to this closed society, lend a special urgency to the issue. It is simply not possible to acquire the linguistic and area expertise needed to make the most of a Moscow assignment in a three-month crash program, or to build up a fund of experience and an extensive network of contacts and friendships if residence in the USSR is only a brief interlude in a career path that places a low premium on area expertise. Without serious and innovative efforts to make better use of existing expertise, and to attract a new generation of students to the study of the USSR, we will find ourselves without the knowledge and perspective that only long training and experience can provide.
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NOTES


3. It is obviously impossible to isolate the impact of the exchanges from other factors shaping American scholarship on the Soviet Union during these years. Changes in the Soviet system itself in the post-Stalin period, and in relations among Communist states, altered the object of study, while changing orientations in American social science brought new questions and methodologies to the fore.


5. For one example among many, see Peter Solomon, Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy Making (New York, 1978).


