Defining intersubjectivity as the accomplishment of consensus between two independently existing persons, this paper posits that concept as intrinsic to the study of interpersonal communication. The paper isolates basic assumptions underlying current approaches to conceptualizing intersubjectivity in the interpersonal communication literature. It then introduces a hermeneutic account of language as an alternative to these assumptions, thus reconceptualizing intersubjectivity as an a priori for communication rather than a condition derived from communication. In conclusion, it explores the implications of this conception for other concepts such as "self," "authenticity," and "human understanding." (Author/FL)
LANGUAGE AS DIALOGIC:
A LOOK AT THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
IN INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

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September 1979
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ABSTRACT:

Intrinsic to the study of interpersonal communication is a concept of intersubjectivity. This essay isolates basic assumptions underlying modern approaches to conceptualizing intersubjectivity in interpersonal communication literature. By introducing a hermeneutic account of language as an alternative to these assumptions, intersubjectivity is reconceptualized as an a priori for communication, rather than a condition derived from communication. Implication of this conception for other concepts such as "self," "authenticity," and "human understanding" are explored.
During the last ten years the study of interpersonal communication has grown greatly. Persons in the field of speech communication use terms like "authenticity," "interpersonal sensitivity," "self-disclosure," and "empathetic understanding" without blushing and without having to defend them as sensible concepts. New concepts are added onto these accepted concepts confirming their reality without having to support or revive the philosophies from which they spring. This is, of course, natural and all well and good on the way to becoming a "normal" science.

During the development of the past decade many essays have discussed and argued for or against particular approaches to teaching and researching interpersonal communication. Fewer, however, have critically examined the central concepts to be used in framing the problems and questions with which the study is to be concerned. The need for critical reflection and investigation becomes most pressing when the social conditions giving rise to the concepts are less visible or are no longer in existence. At these times sorting through central concepts and their assumptive bases becomes necessary and desirable. The study of interpersonal communication has reached a sufficient degree of maturity and autonomy to benefit from fundamental conceptual critique.

While usually implicit, one of the most central concepts in interpersonal communication is that of intersubjectivity. This centrality is
clear. The question of intersubjectivity is essentially a question of how the sharing of experience or communication between persons is to be accepted as possible at all. How do people have a shared reality rather than a private or solipistic one?

Many in speech communication might be just as happy to assume communication is possible and ask only how to improve communication. It is clear, however, that even those denying the question have unwittingly assumed a concept of intersubjectivity and this conception has tacitly influenced their writing and principles for improved communication. Further, any approach to improving communication which, with its own concepts, cannot account for the existence of communication is fundamentally weak. Such positions constantly run the risk of "improving" the individual's communication behavior but undermining the existence of communication in a society.

Other authors in speech communication have dealt with the nature of intersubjectivity more explicitly. Robert Scott, Barry Brumment, and others have relied greatly on a concept of intersubjectivity in their development of rhetoric as epistemic. In their analysis, they have generally accepted meaning and social reality as more fundamental than "objective" reality. The acceptance of this position, which is not unlike that accepted by many in interpersonal communication literature today, is readily open to the attack that it is solipistic. The attack is a serious one since there can be no ground for communication in a totally relative and arbitrary world. These authors explicitly developed a concept of intersubjectivity to escape this bind. While I do not wish to prejudice the extended discussion to follow in the next section, the interpersonal perspectives which parallel this
particular rhetorical tradition have tended to be much more subjective and less philosophically sophisticated in their treatment of similar problems.

This essay examines the various ways intersubjectivity has been conceptualized in recent interpersonal communication literature and a few of the social consequences of accepting these conceptions. In light of the examination, the essay presents an alternative formulation of intersubjectivity based in contemporary social philosophy employing a hermeneutic account of language. Due to their tacit nature, investigating concepts of intersubjectivity in much of the modern literature will require some inference and characterization. The attempt to link particular authors with one position or another is difficult due to the complexity of much of the current literature and the frequent juxtaposition of concepts from competing philosophical systems. For the sake of clarity some abstraction is necessary. This abstraction should bring into focus significant similarities and differences rather than obscure them. While the essay is cast in somewhat philosophic language, the reconceptualization has considerable theoretical and pedagogical import at the basic level of instruction.5

Common Concepts of Intersubjectivity

At the most basic level, most writings in interpersonal communication implicitly conceptualize intersubjectivity as the accomplishment of consensus between two independently existing persons. The root image is essentially that of two entities standing apart from one another. The mind, ego, self, or brain of one has an experience which is coded into one of the various language systems and passed in such a manner so that (unless something interferes) the experience may be recreated for the other.
The addition of feedback and transactive assumptions about the nature of selves and experience usually elaborates and changes the sequencing of the process rather than changes the essential image. For most people this basic image is so sensible as to be unquestionable.

This conception presents a set of problems which have been considered by teachers, researchers, and everyday communicators. How do I as a communicatant get into the other's mind or grasp the other's self so that I can know his/her experience? How do I know that my experience is understood? How can bridges be built between persons so that they understand more completely? How can the barriers between persons be minimized to alleviate distortion? Starting from separation based on the commonsense notion that persons are originally physical bodies standing apart, the problem of "other minds," "alter egos," "other selves," "other roles" and so forth is characteristic of most attempts to understand communication and intersubjectivity. Assuming original person separation, authors in the field have implicitly treated the problem of intersubjectivity in essentially two directions - one which minimizes the impact of subjectivity and the other that of objectivity.

Objective Views of Intersubjectivity

Teachers and authors accepting an objective stance find intersubjectivity possible due to the commonness of the world. While there may be two people, there is one world. Effective communication (as accurate transmission) is enhanced by bringing a "value free," scientific language to everyday life. The basic assumption is that the empirical world can be given to all in essentially the same way. Thus, if subjective factors and inferences can be avoided, all should share a common reality. The elephant is really there. If the six blind men of
Indostan could just transcend their private experience or specify the conditions under which their experience was produced, each would understand the other's reality. This assumption influences both the process of science as well as everyday communication.6

Language is usually discussed as a cloud or fog which distorts our vision and must be cut through to see the world as it really is. If language can be formalized (or operationalized) so that it stands in correspondence with the objective world, the perception of one can be transmitted to another without fear of distortion. Intersubjectivity and thus, effective communication come more from getting out of the self than getting into the other. The problem of other minds is solved by the dissolution of minds and subjectivity altogether.

Clearly this position is best represented by many of those influenced by general semantics and the unified science movement. While not all persons self-labeled as general semanticists accept the assumptions on which it is based and while the tenants of general semantics have been superimposed on other philosophical assumptions, a large group of interpersonal communication writings are clearly influenced by the basic position presented here regarding language, experience, reality and, thus, intersubjectivity.7

The attacks on these assumptions by modern language theorists and philosophers and their defense is not of interest here. What is of interest are the social consequences of accepting this conception of intersubjectivity. Richard Weaver and Herbert Marcuse have so thoroughly analyzed the social effect that only a brief review is necessary here.8

With this view the rational and objective are given disapporionate emphasis in communication. Emotions and values are objectified, separated
from the cognitive, and given a secondary status. The materialism implied, as Richard Weaver argued, limits the human capacity to transcend toward ideals or to draw from tradition. The resulting social condition may range from disinterest through boredom to anomie. The enhanced communication effectiveness is clearly accomplished, as Marcuse showed, by a closing of the universe of discourse and possible experience. Control and communication become inherently connected since the transmission of objective facts presupposes the building of cognitive consensus in coding prior to transmission. Since all experience is reduced to "scientific-technological" experience, objectivity is a political problem decided by the group with the power of definition and supported by the desire for effective and efficient communication. The teaching of interpersonal communication from an "objective" position would seem to enhance rather than alleviate many social problems even if one argues the position is useful in improving each student's interaction skills.

Subjective Views of Intersubjectivity

While the assumption of original separation was not changed, in the sixties a vital alternative to the objective view was developed out of the humanistic psychology and "phenomenological" literature. The alternative claim was forwarded that experience is inevitably personal: All presentation is essentially self presentation. The problem of intersubjectivity became for this group that of getting behind the appearances and false impressions to find out what the other really perceives, thinks, and feels. Since the other's experiences are unique and essentially private, understanding, thus, intersubjectivity, is by necessity incomplete and only truly approximated in mystical unity.
Language could not assure intersubjectivity since it was assumed to be both abstract and separated from the real experience. Language as a social institution was held partially responsible for people not knowing their real selves and for the alienated social condition. As the position developed, language was stripped of objective social character. Meaning was held to be in people not words. Understanding could only be accomplished by "empathy," "analogies with one's own experience," or "role-taking." Due to the emphasis on psychological learning and the personal nature of experience, direct experience was highly prized. To have been there, to have experienced a lot, was considered the foundation for understanding others. The understanding of others became closely tied to understanding the self. The locus of understanding was internal to the understander. This conception made games and traditions into barriers to finding one's self and, thus, to understanding others. Creativity and spontaneity, no matter how common, were to be valued as expressions of that natural unfettered self. The continued development of these concepts contributed to what has been called the new narcissism and its concurrent how-to-do books. The putting of the individual as the center of the universe in interpersonal communication has both questionable adaptive value and uncertain effects on the understanding of the other. As Straus has made clear, all primarily psychological theories including empathy are unable in principle to adequately formulate a foundation for intersubjectivity and, thus, account for the existence of communication.

New Solutions to the Problem

Most of the textbook writing as well as much theoretical work still accepts the essential assumptions of the positions presented above. These
positions either deny the significance of personal experience or the possibility of shared social experience. There have been several recent attempts, however, to break the kind of objectivism and subjectivism evidenced there. These positions demonstrate a much greater awareness of modern philosophical thought and the seriousness of the problem of intersubjectivity. These "new solutions" are represented by works frequently referred to as "dialogical," "transactional," "relational," and "constructivistic." Since many other works so labeled do not show any new direction on the issue of intersubjectivity and since a thorough discussion of each approach's stand on intersubjectivity would be beyond the scope of this paper, I only wish to point out a few of the issues left unsolved which are of principle interest to this paper.

Leonard Hawes was certainly one of the first in interpersonal communication literature to directly attack the dualism present in most authors' discussions of meaning and, indirectly, their discussions of intersubjectivity. He showed how the field holds that, "data are either objective and directly observable or subjective and inferential." Data here could include either everyday or scientifically observed behavior and the argument is as relevant to teaching as it is to studying communication. His argument against this polar orientation is essentially that behavior due to its patterned character is directly experienced as meaningful. The non-inferential nature of experience certainly makes intersubjectivity possible. The argument is weakened, however, by not going far enough. How is it that the structure or pattern is developed the same for all? The answer could take a number of directions ranging from idealistic ones (Platonic, innate ideas, etc.) to psychological (conditioning theories, collective unconscious and so forth)
and physiological ones. In any of these cases the separation between persons would be reinserted and the problem of intersubjectivity would remain.

John Poulakos' conception of intersubjectivity as the "Between" has a similar weakness. The "interhuman force" needs itself to be accounted for. Otherwise it takes on a mystical almost metaphysical character. In spite of their tremendous advance over the other position, I have found no study which has meaning arising in the relationship or transaction between people which was able to account for the possibility of presubjective meaning or to define its origin. Most "relational" positions demonstrate a belief in intersubjectivity not a discussion of its possibility.

Jesse Delia in his development of "constructivism" as an orientation to communication study was able to solve part of this problem. Inter-subjectivity was essentially accounted for by "socially constituted symbolic structures." Unfortunately the idealism carried with this solution from its development in Cassirer's writing opens the position to the many attacks on formalism initiated by Husserl years ago.

Starting with Husserl's attack on objectivism and idealism, John Stewart was able to go further in giving a basis for intersubjectivity. In so doing he clearly gave dialogic communication a historical place in the development of interpersonal communication theory. Stewart implied what Lanigan has made explicit. "Husserl deserves credit for the discovery of the encounter or transaction as the fundamental unit of analysis in communication theory." At places, however, Stewart doesn't seem to take Husserl seriously enough. While Stewart used Husserl's noesis-noema analysis to break the subject/object problem, he still wished
to ground experience in the acting subject or to take an existential position. With this position it is unclear how personal experience (subjectivity) can become interpersonal experience (intersubjectivity) or how communication can be presupposed. Stewart seemed to recognize this problem. Modern phenomenological work has moved beyond Husserl’s concern with consciousness and conscious experience to a concern with language and language experience. Dialogic communication needs an appropriate account of language to break its subjective tendencies. As Stewart ended his analysis: "The specific nature of the event [of mutual-address-and-response] and the implication of grounding our approach to communication in an existential phenomenological view of language, however, are yet to be fully developed."29

Hermeneutic Intersubjectivity

Clearly the problem of intersubjectivity in interpersonal communication literature arises from two widely held assumptions--1) The essential human condition is that of separation; 2) Language is essentially seconda and flawed in its relation to human experience. The two assumptions are related. Stewart is correct in suggesting that understanding the unity of people in relationship is linked to an adequate understanding of language.30 Rather than follow Stewart’s existential development of language experience, I wish to ground the discussion in a more social and less person centered position. Intersubjectivity is, thus, to be conceptualized from a related phenomenological position. Modern hermeneutics presents both a new view of language and a clear basis for intersubjectivity.31

In hermeneutics, intersubjectivity is considered as antecedant to separation and the formation of either objectivity or subjectivity. Thus
it is prior to the person's conscious perception of world or others. As Straus has argued: "We do not postulate an isolated, encapsulated consciousness as primary; we do not begin with the assumption of a solitary, empirical, or even transcendental ego, only to wonder afterwards how such a monad could possibly arrive at the comprehension of an alter ego."32

The hermeneutic analysis of intersubjectivity does not "start out with assuming that initially being strangers to one another is the primary phenomenon, the problem being to erect a bridge between them. The bridge, intersubjectivity, Mitsein, is the primary phenomenon, and being a stranger is not the lack of the bridge, but a deficient modus of being with others."33

While Scheler34 was the earliest social philosopher to show that intersubjectivity is inadequately formulated if it is seen as consensus between two independently existing persons, Heidegger35 in his hermeneutic analysis went further in presenting an adequate foundation for intersubjectivity. Heidegger suggested that prior to the abstraction which posits persons as subjects looking at an independently existing world containing other persons, persons (as existential projects) are identical with a particular set of experience and action possibilities. "The experiencer apprehends himself not as an isolable subject, standing over against an object to be manipulated; rather he apprehends himself as a way of being installed in the world."36 The "project" is the center of experience collecting and shaping a particular experiential world with a structure of relevance and implication of meaning extending into the past and opening into a particular future. The individual being identical with this project prior to abstraction finds him/herself in this already constructed and interpreted experience which is accepted without doubt as the way things are.
The individual only experiences "self" or "others" as capable of a perspective or personal perception by reflecting, thus, stopping the ongoing movement of the project and positing one's self at a particular location in the already understood experience. Self, others, and world are not first experienced as things needing interconnectedness but as already connected by the structure of possibilities of what might be done. "Thus, one's [experienced] world is a necessary condition for the possibilities of one's experience, and the world, taken as the structure of anyone's world, is a necessary condition for the possibility of anyone's experience."37

On the bases of this structured experience internal states arise and the empirical world may be asserted.38

As the project-collected-experience is not a personal construction and is prior to the "I," it also precedes the "other." The project is an intersubjective,39 cultural,40 or institutional41 a priori. A project is an intersubjective existential possibility which may be lived by anyone. As the project is taken up and lived it exhausts at that moment what the person is, has been, or will be. It serves as the source and limit of cultural human understanding along a particular line. Since a project is simultaneously human and worldly, I and thou may be compresent to an experienced world. The project is an a priori "we-understanding" as human possibility which underlies each personal perception or personal understanding. In this sense the experience of otherness is that of incompleteness. The experience is of incompleteness since all the possibilities of the project world have not been followed out and appropriated. One is always on the way to understanding self/other experience opening in the project.42

If the project is originating movement of self/other experience, it is important to describe its status and show how it remains as an a priori
possibility for any person. Here the second common assumption of objective and subjective views of intersubjectivity is replaced. While language may have originated as secondary and arbitrarily connected to experience, the present existence of language as historical and meaningful prior to each individual's existence changes the nature of that relationship. Historical language is our common affinity, our intersubjectivity, which makes possible understandable expression. "The substitution of a language world for a perceptual one moves what forms worldhood from the natural world to the cultural world. The field of silent objects is replaced by the field of human expression . . . . Intersubjectivity here is the necessary given from which one begins for there is no private language to be found." Empirical things, including persons, in themselves are non-social and non-human. To be an object in a human world a linguistic interpretation must be present. Language is the expression of human possibility which composes the thing as experienced. It is the revelation of what things are in the presence of historical community that they would not be in the absence of those persons. The "self" without language would be without possibility, thus, without a world, a past, or a future.

Linguistic interpretation is not a subjective or personal act of judgment. Human possibilities are presignified and are understandable because they are part of a social tradition of which the person is a part. This is not to say that language determines or distorts experience. Language is the way a thing expresses itself. The social word and the cultural possibility are the visible and invisible side of the same thing neither prior nor independent. When the attention is paid to living, the word is hidden or covered up in making apparent the possibility for action. The word only becomes visible in abstraction. As long as you understand
the sentence the attention is to the developing thought. The attention is to the words only when understanding is no longer present or the thought is put aside. This relationship is not as clear if language which is traditional is confused with "terms" which carry their arbitrariness with them. Marias argued that:

a name or word generally is something that exists prior to our experience of the thing the word names. It is a social reality that precedes all of us, and this is why we understand it. We can use it, and we can understand it because it precedes us. But if I invent a word it is not really a word; you do not understand it. I have to explain it. I have to explain that I give a certain meaning to the word I just invented. It is not a proper word, it is a "term." A "term" is a word (or a nonword) that has to be defined. Therefore the similarity between words and terms is a very superficial one.45

Because of the inherently social character of experience and its relation to the expression of possibility in language, it is the expression or the project as revealed in language that has a perspective or point-of-view. Listening to the message which is an opening of the project and the experience places both the speaker and listener as subjects to that world. Message sensitivity, rather than person sensitivity, makes available the human quality of the world. The expression is a manifestation of a traditional but open-ended project which is an opening of human possibilities into which both are moving prior to isolating the expression qua
expression by someone. As Ysseling summed up the relationship: "The sequence of words is more important than the speaking subject. The latter is not so much the producer of his narrative as its product. Man and his environment receive their being from the tale that is told. Man and things receive identity, presence, stability and objectivity in and from discourse." The speaker, actor, or thinker has no privileged access to their experience. The "listener" may be more sensitive to language and may grasp implications, assumptions, and a history which are expressed by the "speaker" but not explicitly known. When attuned to the message the "speaker" and "listener" become indistinguishable. All consciousness becomes intersubjective consciousness. Language as a social institution replaces consciousness as a ground for personal and interpersonal experience. Persons are, in this sense, together in understanding prior to the judgment of separation or difference. The ground for intersubjectivity, thus, is not in people and bringing them together, but in what is said. The experience in what is said arises in the interplay of distanciation and appropriation and possibilities and actualities in expression itself.

Implications of a Hermeneutic Understanding of Intersubjectivity

An acceptance of a hermeneutic understanding of intersubjectivity has implications for the reconception of other basic concepts in interpersonal communication. A few basic examples will indicate the thrust of this rethinking.

Hermeneutically understood the concept of "self" shifts from an internalized, psychological construct, common to objective and subjective positions, to a conception of self as "subject" of an ongoing project. This "subject" logically precedes the isolation of "self" as an entity
separate from experience and other selves. The psychological self, thus, does not stand as the center or definer of meaning but is an abstract residue of a mode of living which is already in a meaningful world. The abstracting and looking for the self stands in the way of understanding since the looking inward prohibits the person from being open to the experience being formed and showing new possibilities for living. Properly understood, the self cannot help but be contextualized. An understanding of the self is of the world being faced, not of who faces this world. As a person lives they cannot help but be themselves. The world at the moment exhausts who they are, have been or can be. Speaking is not, first, a presentation of self but the opening of a possible world. As Ricoeur made clear, understanding is not a way of taking hold of things but a moment of dispossession of the narcissistic ego.47

Consequently, authenticity in hermeneutics is a relation to language and experience, not to self.48 Authenticity requires holding one's feelings, theories, or prejudices open to question by the experience coming in language. Going back to an earlier analogy, authentic communication is not a matter of building bridges but a mode of existing where the self and other residues are surrendered to the opening language event by both listener and speaker. It is a looking and listening, not to the self or the other's self, but the possibilities for action opening in the discourse. Creative expression is not the expression of an in-here, hidden, locked-up self but letting the richness of traditional language gather and disclose a social reality which calls out a new way of living. Due to the historical nature of language, authenticity and creativity are rooted in tradition in a sense a psychological self never can be. While "self" as a psychological construct holds onto an already understanding of tradition, authenticity is a listening to a new understanding of tradition out of itself which makes a new future possible and understandable. Creative expression is
not a breaking from the past, but a cultivation of historical language as our tradition so it will show what else could have been done and, thus, bear new fruit. As Kisiel suggested, "a cultivation of a tradition that it not only gives us access to the past, but also continually opens up new possibilities of meaning."49

The concept of "understanding" is also changed in this conception of intersubjectivity. Understanding as a result of correct transmission is a derived form of understanding since the isolated speaker's intent is abstracted from linguistic expression as the primary phenomenon. Understanding in a primary sense is a finding of the interrelated human possibilities implied in the expression. There is no direct access to another's psychological experience. We can never be the other. Many would see this as the limiting edge of communication. Yet, if the reconceptualization on which this paper is based is accepted, linguistic experience is primary to psychological experience. We are just as much the other as we are ourselves as we live a social language. I have the same access to other as to self-experience--namely a careful attention to the world being expressed.

The good listener does not have to get in back of the language to the speaker's assumptions, experience, or orientation to understand the expression. The expression is the manner assumptions and orientations reveal themselves in the historically meaningful language. The expression is not of feelings, perceptions, and experiences outside of it, the expression is those feelings, perceptions, and experiences in one of their forms.50 Understanding is of the emotions and perspectives of the world which the self assumes as it finds itself following out a project. On the basis of the understood expression, subjective states are posited. The understanding of the expression comes first and gains nothing from the abstract inference of states beyond the expression.

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Due to psychological reductionism in many modern theories the primary experience is missed. It is not persons and experiences which interpret words. In ongoing interaction language refers only to more language and words interpret other words. Inadequate understanding is determined and amended, not by independent verification, but by further ordinary language. As Habermas argued, "any attempt to locate misunderstanding in communication is itself part of a further (or possibly the same) process of reciprocal communication, and therefore not the result of 'observing' such processes. The critical vantage-point can never be better than that of a partner in the communication."52

Accepting intersubjectivity as prior to individuality and as a basis for communication rather than something to be accomplished in communication changes the focus of communication study from techniques for accurate transmission to the question of what style or modality of living allows greater understanding of expression as an expression of language itself. At the very least, more focus will be on the social nature of the individual; language will be treated with more care; and the traditional nature of new human possibilities will be more carefully investigated.
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2. The teaching of interpersonal communication essentially grew out of the experience of the sixties. I find it interesting to reread Joseph Ilardo, "Why Interpersonal Communication?" Speech Teacher, 21 (1972), 1-6; and compare the philosophy on which the study is based to current social conditions, attitudes, and problems.

Brummett, pp. 28-36.

A large gap often stands between the theory and concepts used in the research in the field and the casual acceptance of sixty-style humanistic psychology and even "pop" psychology in many interpersonal texts. Both teaching and research are weakened by this separation. Unfortunately an extended discussion of the relation between this conceptual analysis and pedagogy is beyond the scope of this paper.


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42 For Further development of this point see, Deetz, "Conceptualizing," pp. 17 ff.

43 While not particularly parsimonious, theories of language experience and use may differ greatly from theories of language acquisition and development.


