This paper introduces key concepts in the field of moral stage development and presents highlights from a long-term research project on moral discussion, and, particularly, on the role of transactive discussion in moral development. The main objective of the research was to identify those features of moral discussion (defined as transactive) that differentiate developmental discussion from non-developmental discussion. Transactive discussion is the label used to identify a form of verbal interaction which is more simultaneous, mutual, and bi-directional than simple verbal interaction. It is hypothesized that moral stage development results from transactive discussion because each member engages his/her reasoning with the reasoning of the discussion partner. Developmental discussion is interpreted as discussion that results in advancement of an individual from one moral stage to another, as determined by changing scores from a moral development pre-test to a posttest. Non-developmental discussion is interpreted as discussion which does not result in any such change. The document is presented in two sections. In section I, concepts, theories, vocabulary, and literature on stage transition in moral development are examined. Topics discussed include Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, stages of moral reasoning, stage transition, models of stage variability, moral education strategies, and moral discussion analysis. In this section, a chronological narrative of the research project is also presented. In section II, a detailed description of the manual used to code moral dialogue throughout the research project is presented and some data on analysis of peer counseling skills are cited. Also included in this section are implications for further research, including that transactive dialogue research should consider the communication skills of participants in moral education programs. (DB)
THE ROLE OF TRANSACTIVE DISCUSSION IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE HISTORY OF A SIX-YEAR PROGRAM OF RESEARCH — PART I
by Marvin Berkowitz, Marquette University

This paper will address the issues of the identification, formalization, and assessment of developmental moral discussion. For the past six years I have been immersed in literally thousands of pages of moral discussion transcripts. Along with John Gibbs and John Broughton, I have been attempting to identify those features of moral discussion that differentiate developmental discussion from non-developmental discussion. We have operationalized these two forms of discussion as, respectively, discussion that results in pretest-to-posttest individual stage development, and discussion that does not.

The concept of transactive discussion reflects one major outcome of our six-year program of research. We feel that we have identified and formalized those developmental features of discussion that we have been looking for. We use the term transactive discussion to label this form of verbal interaction. It is a term adopted from John Dewey (Dewey and Bentley, 1949), who introduced it in an attempt to provide an alternative, more interpenetrative and reciprocal concept for human relations than the generally accepted term "interaction". Interaction often was used to refer to consecutive behaviors: A acts on B, then B acts on A, and so on. Dewey wanted a separate term to refer to simultaneous, mutual, bi-directional relationships; thus, trans-action (cf. Gibbs, 1979A). In a graphic sense, we might see the following distinction between interaction and transaction:

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Interaction

A → B
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Transaction

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A ←→ B
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We would argue that moral stage development results from discussion in which each member engages the reasoning of his/her discussion partners with his/her own reasoning. Rather than merely providing consecutive assertions, discussants "operate" on each other's reasoning. In a very dialectical sense, one's own reasoning confronts the other's antithetical reasoning in an ongoing dialogic dynamic. The problem then for researchers is to specify and formalize the particular discourse acts that comprise the set of transactive behaviors.

This discussion will be presented in two parts. Part I will consist of an introduction to key concepts in the field, followed by a description of our research in the process of moral discussion. This description will be presented as a chronological narrative for several reasons. First, I see the present state of our work as part of an ongoing program of research. Second, I want to give the reader a sense of the process
through which our research evolved. Finally, such an approach allows me the luxury, rare in professional publications, to pay duly deserved tribute to the collaborative and supportive efforts of my colleagues and teachers. Part I will conclude with an introduction to our scheme for coding moral dialogue, as well as examples of transactive and non-transactive dialogue from our scoring manual.

Part II, to be published in an upcoming issue of MEF, will consist of a detailed description of our manual for coding moral dialogue and a presentation of current and future directions of our work. Also presented will be some preliminary data in the analysis of peer counseling skills, some early data in the analyses of our undergraduate moral dialogues, as well as some suggestions for planned future research and applications.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development is central to the ensuing discussion. While Larry Kohlberg has often been heard to deny that he even has a theory, both his own writings and the supportive and critical responses of others attest to some "Zeitgeist" that we may identify as "Kohlbergian theory". Clearly, Kohlberg's intellectual heritage stems from the work of Jean Piaget. Nonetheless, Kohlberg's extensions, revisions, and applications comprise a quite impressive theory in their own right.

The bulk of Kohlberg's professional career has been dedicated to the description of stages of moral reasoning. I choose the term "reasoning" rather than the more traditional "judgment" quite intentionally. First, I do so to reflect the philosophical analysis of the two concepts by Andre Guindon (1978). A second rationale for this choice of terminology is a desire to highlight the rational, cognitive process of moral thought, as opposed to the resultant end state of moral action. To me, these stages represent true Piagetian structures of reasoning about moral issues. (See Gibbs, 1979b, for an alternative theory). That is to say, they represent general, deep-seated ways of thinking about and solving problems of a prescriptive nature. While we could debate how many stages there actually are (six in Kohlberg, 1969; five in Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs, Speicher-Dubin, Candee and Power, 1979; seven in Kohlberg and Power, 1980; four in Gibbs, 1979b), the resolution of this issue is not integral to a stage theory.

What is most integral is the sequential and invariant nature of these stages and the process by which an individual moves from one stage to another. Each stage is an organized whole, a pervasive world view, that is more adequate than, and hierarchically subsumes, the prior stage. Each subsequent stage represents a more balanced equilibrium and a more effective moral problem-solving tool. The sequence of development of the stages is universal and invariant. Stage-skipping and regression cannot occur.

The Process of Stage Transition: Unfortunately, the entire issue of moral stage transition is a highly neglected phenomenon. Theory is sparse,
and research is nearly non-existent. Most of the theorizing has been done by Kohlberg (1973) and Turiel (1969, 1972, 1974). The Piagetian (1967) equilibration process is adopted as the transition mechanism. It is important here to differentiate between the process of equilibration and the state of equilibrium. As Piaget has argued, "What is important for psychological explication is not equilibrium as a state, but, rather, the actual processes of equilibration. Equilibrium is only a result, whereas the process as such has greater expository value" (1967, p. 101). As a state, equilibrium is synonymous with structure or stage. As a process, equilibration refers to an ongoing dynamic consisting of shifts between relative degrees of balance and imbalance, as well as between relative integration and disintegration. The static approach has been over-accentuated, while the process approach has been sorely neglected in the literature (Berkowitz, Gibbs and Broughton, 1980; Miller and Brownell, 1975; Piaget, 1967; Turiel, 1974). This paper will focus on the process of equilibration.

There are two different, but at least partially compatible, positions in the moral development literature regarding stage transition and equilibration (cf. Levine, 1979). The most representative proponents of the two positions are Rest (1973) and Turiel (1969, 1974), respectively. Turiel (1974) views the equilibration process of stage transition as a crumbling of one's present structure due to the perception of intrinsic flaws in that structure, and a resultant new structure that represents a resolution of the conflict within the prior stage: a sort of phoenix rising from the ashes of the prior stage. Rest (Rest, 1973; Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) offers a somewhat different perspective of the source and nature of equilibration. He suggests that comprehension of, preference for, and assimilation of moral reasoning may be based on a complex relationship between one's stage of spontaneous moral reasoning and one's level of passive comprehension of and preference for statements that reflect the next stage of moral reasoning. Implied is a mechanism of conflict between spontaneous reasoning and preferred reasoning, not merely conflict intrinsic to the spontaneous stage. This is supported by a qualified acceptance of a "Platonic" model of moral reasoning development, i.e., that some intrinsic comprehension of higher stages of moral reasoning is always present, although those stages have not been attained for spontaneous usage. Thus, while higher stages of moral reasoning may not be accessible in one's spontaneous reasoning, they may still be available for conflict, due to their relative attractiveness when passively comprehended.

Levine (1979) offers a further distinction between these two models in the context of a discussion of models of stage variability. He postulates a parallel mechanism of equilibration similar to Turiel's, i.e., new stages evolve out of the inherent weaknesses in the individual's predominant stage of reasoning pointed to by an inability to solve moral problems. Regardless of whether one adopts a displacement model of stage transition (Rest, 1973; Turiel, 1974), or a non-displacement model (Levine, 1979; Rest, 1979), the mechanism of stage transition typically seems to be a conflict that is either (1) inherent in the form of the present structure, or (2) due to inconsistencies between the present
structure and some envisioned or experienced higher stage. In either case, the catalyst is typically the failure to adequately solve some moral problem with the presently accessible structure.

Moral Education Strategies: In addition to these theoretical positions, there is a growing body of literature which is descriptive of the circumstances of moral stage development (cf. Higgins, 1980). It is generally assumed in moral education that moral discussion is the central catalyst for individual stage growth. Since the initial intervention study of Moshe Blatt (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975), a great deal of time and energy has been spent on testing and refining the classroom dilemma discussion format. Students have been deliberately exposed to reasoning at a stage that is higher than their own predominant stage of spontaneous usage (Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966). Role-playing (Arbuthnot, 1975), training as peer counselors (Dowell, 1971; Sprinthall, 1976), and direct teaching of the theory and stages (Boyd, 1976) have also been employed.

The most recent formulations of the Kohlberg moral education position (Hersh, Paolitto and Reimer, 1979; Kohlberg, 1978; Power, 1979) also invoke the power of the social atmosphere of the peer group as a means for promoting individual development. This is a complex and as yet still somewhat unelaborated conception of the growth process. It relies on a combination of the more traditional Rest and Turiel models, with an adaptation of a Durkheimian (1961) sociological approach. The latter emphasis accounts for Kohlberg’s (1979) apparent shift in his position concerning indoctrination in moral education (cf. Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972). For a fuller description of this new position, see Power (1979a, 1979b).

Moral Discussions Analysis: One trend growing out of the recent interest in moral education, and particularly group discussion techniques, has been moral discussion analysis. It is a relatively new practice, and therefore, not a widely represented one. Its heritage is mainly in the education and cognitive development literatures. The former is best represented by attempts to categorize classroom verbal behaviors (e.g., Blank, Rose and Berlin, 1978). The latter centers around attempts to identify and objectify social processes in individual cognitive stage development (e.g., Miller and Brownell, 1975). Both of these literatures have their roots in linguistic analysis literature (e.g., Danziger, 1976; Freedle, 1976).

The Transactive Discussion Research Project

Pilot Equilibration Research: This project began when John Broughton joined the faculty at Wayne State University, where I was a student beginning to plan my M.A. thesis. John had come directly from finishing his dissertation research under Larry Kohlberg at Harvard. We began to talk about the moral development literature and noticed two problems with it: (1) the process of stage transition was often cited and theorized about, but rarely directly observed or studied; and (2) nearly all of the intervention research was done in contrived experimental ways and lacked...
external validity. Both of these issues confounded our understanding of moral stage transition, i.e., equilibration in moral development. We therefore decided to design a method for studying equilibration directly, without sacrificing the external validity of the data (Berkowitz, Broughton and Gilks, 1977).

My M. A. thesis was the result of this planning. Seven male undergraduate dyads were formed, and all fourteen subjects were administered standard Kohlberg oral interviews. The dyads then each engaged in one 45-minute discussion of a moral dilemma, which was tape-recorded in the absence of any experimenters. Finally, all fourteen subjects were administered a posttest moral interview.

The design was intended to both insure external validity and to allow the direct study of the equilibration process. These ends were achieved, respectively, by removing the experimenter from the interaction intervention and by directly analyzing the nature of the interaction itself. The former procedure was intended to nullify the effect of influencing stage development through teaching or subtle coercion, (e.g., Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975; Colby et al., 1977; Turiel, 1966; Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969), for any such broadly conceived teaching procedures raise questions regarding the generalizability of the findings to normal development as it might occur naturally without any experimenter intervention.

We intended to foment disequilibrium in the dialogues by asking subjects to discuss their different positions on a moral dilemma we had selected. We planned to analyze the resultant disequilibrium, as well as the entire stage transition process. A number of unforeseen conditions prevented the realization of our plan: first, we did not find significant stage development as an outcome of our procedure. Second, we had too small a sample to find the proverbial needle in the haystack. Finally, we realized that our conception of how to analyze the interactions was inappropriate.

This last problem was the most educational in terms of pointing us in a more fruitful direction. We had intended to look for direct overt manifestations of disequilibrium in the stage development process. I had therefore scrutinized the theoretical literature (there being no empirical literature to draw upon) which indicated that the experience of disequilibrium should be characterized by confusion, contradiction and inconsistencies (Turiel, 1974). We produced an elaborate coding typology designed around this conceptual understanding of disequilibrium, but discovered that subjects simply did not display any appreciable amount of our disequilibrium behaviors. Disequilibrium typically accounted for only four percent of the total dialogic behaviors manifested. The ns were so small, that we could make no meaningful comparisons or conclusions. We were forced to conclude that perhaps people do not directly express disequilibrium in overt verbal behavior, or that we did not create situations where it would be likely to be manifested, or that we were not measuring disequilibrium effectively. (I should note that Maria Taranto (1978) has been working with our more recent data and has been attempting to directly measure the interpersonal coordinations in the dialogue: that
may more directly reflect the Piagetian process.)

The next steps in our research were derived directly from the short-comings of the pilot study. We recognized that our sample size had to increase markedly, that our intervention had to be more significant, and that our dialogue analysis approach had to be transformed.

**Intervention Study:** During the M. A. study, our research group began to expand, both in terms of direct participants and supportive colleagues. We were joined by an undergraduate and a graduate research assistant, both of whom aided in data collection. I was also quite fortunate to meet Larry Kohlberg at this time. John Broughton invited him to Wayne State University for a public dialogue with Klaus Riegel. Larry was already aware of our work, met with us and offered valuable advice and financial support (to pay our subjects for the extensive time required in participating in the study). Larry, in turn, proved instrumental in adding John Gibbs to the team. John was originally approached as a possible scorer of our moral judgment interviews, but asked to be allowed to take a more creative role in the project. And so we had a team, a design, and the money we needed.

We decided that the next round of data collection would have to be quite extensive, and three researchers collected data for a full year. First, we pretested 600 undergraduates on a survey of moral opinions (e.g., Should Heinz steal the drug to save his wife's life or not?). Then we individually interviewed the 117 subjects who indicated that they would be willing to participate in the rest of the study. The interviews were standard Kohlberg interviews and were scored by John Gibbs (reliability estimates are available in Berkowitz, Gibbs and Broughton, 1980). From these 117 subjects, we were able to form 37 dyads, matched and/or contrasted on the basis of their moral opinions and their stages of moral reasoning. In addition, we selected twenty-one control subjects. Of these 95 participants, six dyads, and one control subject were lost during the course of the study.

The procedure was simply for the dyads to come in once every one to two weeks for a 45-minute moral dialogue, which we tape-recorded and later had transcribed. There were five such dialogues for each dyad. The experimenter was never present for the dialogues, and the topic (assigned by the experimenter) was different each time the dyad returned.

Two weeks after the last dialogue, each subject came in individually for a posttest Kohlberg interview. Our first goal was to find out if the procedure resulted in significant pretest to posttest development. The controls were compared with:

1. subjects paired with a partner at their exact same stage of moral reasoning;
2. subjects paired with a partner one-third of a stage above them in moral reasoning (e.g., pure stage 3 paired with a person with modal stage 3 and minor stage 4); and
3. subjects paired with a partner two-thirds to a full stage above them.
We found that group 2 differed significantly from groups 1 and 3, which, in turn, did not differ from each other. In other words, we did find significant development, but only for the subjects paired with a partner one-third of a stage above them. The mean changes in Moral Maturity Scores (MMS, weighted averages of reasoning ranging from 100 for pure stage 1, to 500 for pure stage 5) were +7.3, +11.3, +30.3, and +13.2 for the controls, same stage, 1/3 disparity, and full-stage disparity groups, respectively. A footnote to this finding is that a more qualitative assessment found that the latter group did indeed show appreciable structural development, but the magnitude of such changes was small. For a more complete description of this study, see Berkowitz, Gibbs and Broughton (in press).

From the analyses of the pretest to posttest development of our subjects, we concluded that development did indeed occur and that the optimal dyadic disparity for moral reasoning development was not "+1", as per the accepted convention in the literature, but was actually +1/3. We interpreted this as a refinement of the literature. We explained it as due to an overlap of novel reasoning and familiar reasoning which allows the partner's reasoning to be more readily assimilable (cf. Berkowitz, 1980). The task now remained to look at the interactions themselves and see what the developmental process looked like.

Process Analysis: The research described above was my doctoral dissertation at Wayne State University. When I completed my degree, Larry Kohlberg invited me to Harvard to continue my work at the Center for Moral Development and Education. This was a golden opportunity for a number of reasons. The most significant reason eventually proved to be that John Gibbs and I could finally work together in person. Up to that point, we had been collaborating long distance, a matter further complicated by the fact that John Broughton had relocated to Columbia University during the final year of my Ph.D study. John Gibbs and I worked together daily, from September, 1978 until August, 1979, in our attempt to make some sense out of the more than 15 dialogues that we had collected. We were fortunate at that time to be awarded a small research grant by the Harvard University Milton Fund, which paid for the costs of having our dialogue tapes transcribed.

What we needed at this juncture was a new research strategy. From our pilot research we knew that looking for direct expressions of disequilibrium in the dialogues was futile; so we decided to look more generally for dialogic behaviors which might predictably lead to disequilibrium. Following Pike's (1967) suggestion of a procedure that encompasses both the emic and etic characteristics of the phenomenon, we decided upon a mutual bootstrapping method in which our general a-priori conceptions would be transformed by the data which would, in turn, be interpreted and selected on the basis of our a-priori expectations. We scanned the transcripts for characteristics that differentiated successful dyads, i.e., those evidencing pretest to posttest development, from unsuccessful dyads. We looked for signs of integrative or interpenetrative reasoning. We had some a-priori conceptions of what developmental dialogue should sound like from our past experience with moral discussion and our understanding.
of moral and cognitive development. Central to our notion was the belief that development would be most likely to ensue from discussion that produced cognitive conflict or disequilibrium. This should occur whenever an attempt was made to integrate incompatible reasoning with one's own position. Thus, we looked for evidence of attempts to compare, contrast, contradict, or integrate one's own position with that of one's partner.

We created, refined, and abandoned a number of incarnations of such a model until we finally settled upon what we now term "transactive" dialogue. This term, borrowed from Dewey and Bentley (1949), represented the fundamentally integrative and interpenetrative nature of the dialogic enterprise we were trying to capture. It appeared to us that the dialogues of pre-post "change" dyads could be readily differentiated from those of "non-change" dyads on the basis of the relative presence of transactive dialogic behavior; but we needed to find out if our informal analyses were merely the products of wish fulfillment or had a more substantive basis in reality. Therefore, Gibbs and I planned the first mini-test of the transactive model. We chose two dyads - one that had clear pretest to posttest development, and one that was a clear non-change dyad. We blinded the transcripts and each scored the total of eight dialogues for evidence of transactivity. We found markedly more transaction in the change dyad, 32% to 6%, respectively (cf. Berkowitz, Gibbs and Broughton, 1980).

On the basis of the first mini-test, we further refined our model of transaction and wrote our manual (Berkowitz and Gibbs, 1979) for coding moral dialogue. We then planned two further mini-tests. In the first of these tests, the Heinz dilemma for each of ten dyads was scored blind and independently by both Gibbs and myself. Again, we were able to discriminate the changers from the non-changers on the basis of transactivity. For our last mini-test, we selected six dyads, three changers and three non-changers, blinded the entire Heinz dilemma discussion of each, and again scored them independently. We rank ordered the six dialogues for degree of transactivity and found that our ratings agreed perfectly. In independent scoring, we had no difficulty ranking the three dyads who changed most and the three who changed least. At this point we felt ready to use the manual to score all of the dialogue data. Our preliminary findings will be presented in Part II of this paper.

Preliminary reliability data is now available (cf. Prestby, 1980). A student of mine and I each took two newly-collected dialogues and scored them, adhering strictly to the statements in the manual. The most basic discrimination we had to make was between transactive and non-transactive statements. Of 220 dialogue acts, 195 (89%) were unambiguously scorable. Of the 195 scorable acts, we agreed 93% of the time on this distinction. If we include all of the ambiguous cases in this estimate, the percentage of agreement drops only to 82%. The true reliability probably lies somewhere between these two figures. A second estimate of reliability concerns the type of transactive behavior (in all, there are 18 categories of transactive behavior). When either or both scorers coded a statement as transactive, there was exact agreement 53% of the time on the category of transactive behavior. Our preliminary and very
conservative test enabled us to reliably discriminate transactive and non-transactive dialogic acts and to agree on more than half of those statements that either or both scorers coded as transactive. We expect these estimates to improve when scoring pairs are equally experienced in using the manual.

Examples from dialogues will concretize for the reader those aspects of moral dialogue which we have identified as developmental and transactive. In the first excerpt, which is clearly not transactive, the two subjects are discussing the Heinz dilemma; specifically, the issue of whether a law is just if it treats a minority unfairly:

A: The majority of the people are going to say, "No, we are the majority and it's not hurting us." So how you can say it's totally wrong if it doesn't affect all of the people...if it's only affecting guys like Heinz...."

B: Are you saying, then, that, as an example, during slavery the laws that said....

A: I think we've gone as far as we can without saying the same thing over again. The laws pertain to the majority; but then, there's a minority like Heinz who feel that the law is wrong.

In another example of non-transactive dialogue, two subjects are discussing whether a Civil War era southern plantation owner should help a runaway slave:

A: Why did you say no?

B: I said no because I figured that if he had a wife and two children and it said the law heavily punished anyone found helping a slave....if he was caught, you know, helping him.....

A: It would get him in trouble.

B: Yeah, I thought about his family.

A: I said he should, because I think slavery is such a rotten institution that I wouldn't wish that on anybody. So I said yeah, he should help him escape.

The last example of non-transactive dialogue comes from a discussion of mercy-killing:

A: "It is against the law for the doctor to give the woman the drug. Does this make it morally wrong?"

B: No.

A: I agree.
B: Because the laws are supposed to be there to help people, not to hurt themselves.

A: OK, I agree. I didn't put that down in my answer, but that's a nice way to put it.

The following transactive exchange concerns the Heinz dilemma:

A: "It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does it make it morally wrong?" Going according to the law, it's wrong for him to steal; but if he feels that what he's doing is the right thing and the best thing, then it's not morally wrong, because morals and laws aren't the same thing.

B: Well, do you think it's right for him to do it if he's the only one who thinks it's the best thing? I mean, if you thought it was the best thing to do to get on top of Science Hall and shoot everyone who was wearing a hat? I mean, say you thought that. I mean, certainly some people thought that....

A: That's a pretty self-centered thing to do.

B: Well, let's say that you think it's morally right for you to get on top of Science Hall and shoot all the communists you see, and you think they're communists because they're wearing red.

A: If I was lunatic enough to do something like that, then obviously I'd think it was the right thing to do!

The final example of transactive dialogue comes from a discussion of a mercy-killing dilemma:

A: Let's begin with the first question. Should the doctor give her the drug that would make her die? How do you feel about that?

B: Well, I normally don't feel that anyone else has the right to help another person die or actively kill them. But in this case, when she wants to and she is....I mean, it's her choice, I'd say "Yes, he should give her the drug."

A: I'm not really sure if I understand what you mean, by normally you wouldn't believe that somebody should help another person die. Are you saying that that person isn't saying they want to die, then?

B: Well, I'm talking about normally, where a person is like in a coma situation, where he's implementing his judgment on somebody who doesn't have enough....or can't speak for themselves. Then I kind of oppose it. But when somebody requests it and they're in their right mind, it's
their life; and what they do is their decision.

A: OK, so you believe a person holds their life in their hands.

B: Right, even though I believe that your life was given to you.

In the non-transactive examples the discussants did not operate on each other's reasoning. In the first example, A cut B off and "escaped the field". In the second example, both discussants merely took turns presenting their own idiosyncratic positions on the issue. In the last non-transactive example, A merely acquiesced without ever demonstrating comprehension of B's reasoning. The transactive examples were quite different, however. In the first exchange, B directly attacks A's reasoning with problematic examples. A tries to defuse B's attacks, but B merely readjusts his strategy. In the last example, A makes an obvious attempt to understand and analyze B's reasoning by questioning and paraphrasing. Thus, our research has begun to show that and why -- development results when one person actively engages another's reasoning in moral dialogue, but not when the protagonists in the dialogue merely sidestep or ignore each other's reasoning.

Part II of this article will present the transactive coding manual (Berkowitz and Gibbs, 1979) in great detail and will present some new directions that our research is taking. (Requests for reprints and for further information should be sent to the author at: Department of Psychology, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233).
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THE ROLE OF TRANSACTIVE DISCUSSION IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT—THE HISTORY OF A SIX-YEAR PROGRAM OF RESEARCH—PART II
by Marvin Berkowitz, Marquette University

INTRODUCTION

How can one assess the developmental structure of an individual's responses to open-ended questions? Can independent scorers use objective criteria for assessing the spontaneous responses of subjects? The first problem researchers face is to develop a theory for distinct and/or sequential steps, positions or stages of development. The second problem concerns the test(s) and/or other selected situations in which the desired behavior can be elicited and recorded. The problems that turn out to be even more puzzling, complex and time-consuming, however, revolve around the strategies for analyzing the responses in a production-type task.

One way, perhaps the way to come to terms with the problems of rater reliability, is to develop a manual. Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates have developed a mammoth manual for rating responses to the Moral Judgment Interview. This manual is now in use, but not yet in print. Jane Loevinger and her associates have developed a manual for rating the spontaneous responses of men, women, boys and girls to a series of thirty-six sentence stems on their Ego Development Test. Robert Selman and his associates have just completed a manual for the assessment of interpersonal understanding. Clark Power and his associates are in the preliminary stages of developing a manual for assessing the moral atmosphere of the school.

Is it possible to develop a reliable strategy to assess not only one person's spontaneous responses to selected questions, but the ongoing dialogue between individuals? When Marvin Berkowitz and John Gibbs were at Harvard University's Center for Moral Education from 1977 to 1979, they tested large numbers of college students with the Moral Judgment Interview for stage level and for their point of view on a particular dilemma. Then they matched students with contrasting views, and stage scores of varying degrees of difference, for five one-hour sessions, during which they were asked to change each others' mind. This process was described in the previous issue of MEF (v. 5-2).

Part II of "The Role of Transactive Discussion in Moral Development" focuses on the process of constructing a manual. Readers who do not work in a research environment seldom get a sense of the process of work in progress. Journals do not publish such reports, in part because it is almost impossible for researchers to distance themselves sufficiently from their task while they are immersed in it. We are grateful to Marvin Berkowitz for his willingness to provide us such an inside view.
Definition and Terminology: We define transactive dialogue behavior as a cognitive operation upon another's reasoning in the context of an attempt to resolve, explain or comprehend differences in reasoning about (in our research) moral issues. We use the term transact to refer to either a single transactive behavior or a single class of transactive behaviors. At the outset it is important to note the parameters of a codable transact. Possibly the single most important criterion is that the transact be concerned with reasoning. Because we are theoretically affiliated with the structuralist model of human development, we are interested in transformations of reasoning structures in the individual. While we are aware that there is no absolute distinction between structure and content, it is nonetheless a useful differentiation to make. We borrow directly from Kohlberg (Colby, Gibbs, Kohlberg, Speicher-Dubin, Candee and Power, 1979) in applying this distinction to the choice/justification difference in moral reasoning.

We have formally adopted the terms choice, justification and position to refer, respectively, to the advocated action, the rationale for advocacy, and the overall stance on the moral issue including both choice and justification. A choice is the particular action that is advocated in one's evaluation of a moral dilemma (cf. Guindon, 1978). A justification is the reason for advocating that particular choice. Only the justification is scorable in a Kohlberg interview. Likewise, only the justification is scorable as a transact.

A transact is scorable only if the speaker's statement overtly demonstrates that a transaction has occurred. It is not sufficient for the speaker to make statements such as "I understand what you mean", or "Well, we certainly disagree on our reasons for that." These are unproven assertions. However, if the speaker were instead to state "I understand what you mean about the value of life as an ultimate value being the final determinant in this situation", or "Well, we certainly disagree as to whether life or law is more important in Heinz's decision to steal or not", then we are looking at overtly demonstrated transactive behavior.

The ambiguity of verbal behavior and the resultant difficulty of coding it are illustrated by phrases such as "Uh huh", "Right", "Yeah", "I see", or "Okay" interjected by one discussant in the flow of the partner's speech. Such phrases occur frequently, but are not transacts. In our original typology (Berkowitz, 1976), we called such speech acts "agreements"; but we subsequently realized that the primary function was not agreement, but rather tempo-keeping or place-holding. We might better refer to them as acknowledgments. Perhaps they serve the ego function of saying "Yes, I am here and I choose to let you continue speaking".

By definition, a transact must include more than one individual's (the self's) reasoning. We have chosen to refer to the three possible perspectives or reasoning agents in a dialogue as Ego (self), Alter (partner), and Dyad (self and partner). The speaker is always defined as Ego and the listener as Alter. Therefore, Ego's perspective is
always at least implicitly involved in any speech act. For a statement to be transactive, it must also refer, either implicitly or explicitly, to Alter's reasoning, or by referring to Dyad's reasoning, which includes Alter's perspective. It should be noted here that the Dyad perspective may refer either to a synthetic position which encompasses both Ego's and Alter's reasoning, or to a statement which focuses equally on Ego's and Alter's reasoning.

A final definitional point concerns the degree to which Ego is actually operating on Alter's or Dyad's reasoning. The ideal transact requires an active transformation of Alter's or Dyad's reasoning by Ego. We have chosen, however, to also code statements that are descriptive, rather than transformational. Some preliminary data from our original sample seems to indicate that such descriptive transacts do not predict well to individual development; but we are continuing to examine this. We have found that traditional counselor training does seem to increase the degree of transactivity in peer communication, but only for descriptive and not transformational transacts (Berkowitz and Prestby, 1980). Thus, we are postponing our decision about how to treat such descriptive acts until more conclusive data are available.

Organization of the Manual: As represented in Table 1, the manual is sectioned along two dimensions: Mode and Primary Focus. The Mode refers to the intentionality or strategy of the speaker. There are two modes: Competitive and Non-competitive. A Competitive mode would be represented by an attempt to "win" or "lose" a disagreement. One might attempt to disprove, critique or otherwise devalue Alter's reasoning. One might, in a more defensive vein, to defuse Alter's attacks. Finally, one might make a concession or retraction, in light of Alter's reasoning. In all of these cases, the underlying mode is competitive. This is similar to taking a distributive mode in a bargaining situation.

On the other hand, the bargaining literature (Pruitt and Lewis, 1976) also discusses integrative strategies, which we call the non-competitive mode of transaction. Such strategies refer to attempts to dialectically synthesize the two positions in question or to find some common dimension or element to which both parties would ascribe. Included in this category are any transacts that seem to be neutral in terms of their distributive intention. Thus, if one person merely offers an elaboration or extension of Alter's reasoning, it could neither be labelled as distributive (Competitive), nor integrative. The Non-competitive mode, therefore, includes both integrative and neutral strategies.

The second factor in our two-factor scheme is called Primary Focus. Primary Focus represents the object of the reasoning, i.e., the Ego's, Alter's or Dyad's reasoning which is the figure, in a Gestaltist sense, in the dialogic act. In using the scoring manual, it is often useful to identify the Primary Focus of a transact in order to match it to the correct transact in the manual. An Ego focus statement may be an attempt to offer a clarification of one's own statement or to defend one's own reasoning against Alter's attack. Notice that in both cases, although the Primary Focus is Ego's perspective, Alter's perspective is also represented. In the first example, the clarification is
warranted only insofar as it fulfills some need or confusion apparent in Alter's reasoning. In the second example, the parry must accurately consider Alter's attack to be effective. Indeed, the scoring manual requires such relationships for the statement to be scored as transactive.

An Alter focus statement might be an attempt to paraphrase, critique, or extend Alter's reasoning. For example, Ego might offer an alternative interpretation of Alter's position. Note again that although the Primary Focus is Alter's reasoning, Ego's perspective is quite apparent in the elaboration.

A Dyad focus statement might be an attempt to juxtapose Ego's and Alter's positions; or, more ambitiously and more transactively, to integrate the two positions. Because both positions are clearly represented, such statements are labelled "Dyad Primary Focus". There can be two types of Dyad Primary Focus: (1) treatments of a collective position; and (2) parallel or equal treatments of Ego's and Alter's positions. The latter is best represented by a juxtapositioning of reasoning. The former is best represented by an integration of positions, or a paraphrase of a mutually agreed upon position.

There is a third differentiation made in the Table of Formal Transacts (Table 1). This relates to the level of operativity: Operational (O), Representational (R), and Elicitational (E) transacts. There are also hybrid transacts represented by R/E or R/O. Operational transacts are cases when Ego dissects, analyzes, alters, or, in some other way, reshapes the Primary reasoning. Representational transacts are descriptive in nature; one engages in a Representational transact when one paraphrases Alter's or Dyad's reasoning. As noted previously, we have both intuitive and empirical preliminary evidence that Representational transacts may not be developmentally rich; but we will continue to score them until we have more substantive data for retaining or discarding this measure. Elicitational transacts represent a category of facilitating statements that are not orthodox transacts because they do not clearly operate on Alter's or Dyad's reasoning, other than calling for more of it. They can be fairly unimpressive utterances, such as "Why?", or "Tell me more." Yet, such facilitation can provide Alter, and possibly Ego, with the basis for developing the dialogue in ways that sharpen the cognitive conflict. R/E and R/O are useful categories either when statements are ambiguous or when a transact clearly has two forms. R/E, for example, can describe a transact in which Ego or Alter asks: "Is my paraphrase of your reasoning accurate?" This form is both Representational and Elicitational.

The Table of Formal Transacts (Table 1) has two columns and three rows. The columns represent the two Modes, and the rows represent the three Primary Foci. The types are indicated in parentheses next to each individual transact in the table. We have found that the Formal Transact is the single most useful defining characteristic of a transact. It is a colloquial statement of the underlying function of the transact. The Formal Transact is written as if the speaker were stating his/her intention in engaging in the act. Every transact has at least one, and up to four, Formal Transacts.
The Formal Transacts are merely the first step in using the manual to score a dialogic act. Once one locates a potentially matching Formal Transact, one turns to the full explication of the transact in the manual (called Transact Explication). Table 2 is excerpted from such an Explication. The Explication offers the name, Mode, Primary Focus and Type of the transact at the top of the page. This is followed by the Formal Transact(s). At the top of the page, we have also included an exploratory dimension which we tentatively entitle Style. Since we have not fully formalized or tested this dimension yet, I will not elaborate it here. The next part of the Transact Explication is the Functional Definition. This is a more technically presented description of the function of the transact, as well as an explanation of its Mode, Primary Focus and/or Type. For many transacts, the next entry in the Transact Explication is the Distinctions and/or Notes. These entries serve to qualify the applicability of the transact. The Notes point out the necessary conditions for the transact to be scored. For instance, in Table 2 the Note in the Transact Explication for Competitive Extension reads: "Ego must at least imply a rejection of the offered extension." The scorer then knows that a non-evaluated extension is not scorable as a Competitive Extension. The Distinctions offer suggestions for similar, but distinct alternative transacts that one should consider in order to avoid making a scoring error. In Table 2, we see three different Distinctions. The scorer is cautioned to look at three other types of transacts that may readily be confused with Competitive Extensions.

Following the Distinctions and Notes are numerous examples taken from actual undergraduate moral dialogues. These examples often include "marginal" and "fail" examples with explanations of why they are labelled such. There are also often references to the Notes or Distinctions that provide the basis for questioning or disqualifying a match. Likewise, in the Distinctions and Notes section there are often cross-references to the examples that typify the qualifications being made. As in moral stage scoring, the examples are very useful in concretizing otherwise abstract distinctions, especially for the novice scorer.

The last section of the manual is an Appendix, which lists the dilemmas and questions used in the moral dialogues upon which the manual is based. These are provided so that only a brief synopsis is needed before each example in order to provide context for the content of the discussion. They may also be useful for others who would like to locate hypothetical discussion dilemmas.

The Transacts: Dialogues are scored in terms of eighteen possible kinds of transacts. For Ego, these transacts are: feedback request, clarification, competitive clarification, and refinement. For Alter, the transacts are: paraphrase, justification request, completion, extension, competitive paraphrase, contradiction, reasoning critique, competitive extension, and counter-consideration. For Dyads or Ego/Alter, the transacts are: juxtaposition, common ground/integration, dyad paraphrase, competitive juxtaposition, and comparative critique. Table 1 lists all eighteen transacts, with a prototypic statement for each. Table 2 offers a complete description of one transact. Researchers who would like to score their own dialogues will find a complete description of all eighteen transacts in the manual.
Issues in Transactive Scoring

The strategy for the analysis of raw data in a production-type task is a major problem facing the researcher and the reason for resorting to the painstaking process of developing a manual. For problem-identifying purposes, rather than as examples of a problem-solving nature, two issues are discussed here: (1) the unit of analysis; and (2) the summary statistics, e.g., general score and estimate of reliability.

The Unit of Analysis Problem: This is always a difficult issue in non-literal, interpretive, verbal analysis. Kohlberg stage scorers face the same problem in defining what entails a criterion judgment. In theory, it is fairly readily definable; but in practice, it becomes an interpretive clinical task. Likewise, there are a number of such problems in the transactive scoring task. How much of Ego's verbal behavior is necessary in order to be able to score it? This depends upon the transact in question. The examples listed in the Transact Explications in the manual give a good indication of this. For some transacts, such as Comparative Critique, a relatively extensive utterance is required. For other transacts, such as a Justification Request, a simple "Why?" may be sufficient.

How should Alter's utterances be included in the scoring of Ego's utterances? There are a number of reasons for including Alter's behavior in the scoring of Ego's transacts. The first reason is that Alter's behavior provides context for the interpretation of Ego's behavior. A second reason is that the basic theoretical nature of the transactive dialogue is interactional, not individual. From the dialectical perspective (Riegel, 1977), it is distortive to isolate individual statements from the temporal flow of a dialogue. Again, while this may be theoretically clear, it is far from operationally simple. How much of Alter's behavior is to be considered? How is the information to be used? Are Alter's statements necessary, or merely supplemental information? Once again, the answers will depend upon the transact in question.

Another unit of analysis problem stems from a need for the formalization and standardization of procedures. Can we identify a uniformly defined unit of speech for our analyses? The units need not be of the same exact length, but need to have some common formal features. The simplest solution would be to score individual sentences. Unfortunately, people do not speak in complete grammatical units; and even if they did, it is by no means clear that such grammatical units would parallel semantic units for our purposes. We have tentatively settled on an alternative solution. We have noticed that a dialogue is like a duet in which only one individual performs at a time, i.e., alternating solos. This alternation is the key to our current solution to this problem. We define as a unit each act by Ego that is preceded and followed by a meaningful act of Alter's. (Of course, the opening and closing utterances in a dialogue are exceptions to this rule.)
The reason for qualifying Alter's boundary statements before and after Ego's statement as needing to be meaningful is that discussants often produce tempo-keeping or turn-taking place-holder statements, such as "uh-huh", or "yeah". These generally do not disrupt the continuity of Ego's behavior. In fact, their function often seems to be a signal for Ego to continue. In those cases, we choose to ignore the tempo-keeper Alter has uttered and consider Ego's continuance as part of the same act as the preceding statement. This solution is by no means flawless. However, our ultimate criterion has to be the function or structure of an act.

The Issue of Summary Statistics: This refers to the problem of summarizing the scoring of a dialogue. It is one thing to score a dialogue, but quite another to condense that scoring for purposes of either communication or statistical analysis. We have tried two simple techniques thus far. The first is a frequency count or percentage of transacts in the dialogue. The second is a qualitative differentiation based on the degree and mutuality of transaction in the dialogue. The underlying and key issue, however, is whether the statistic should be dyadic or individual. My feeling, at this point, is that we will need to develop both options simultaneously.

A second summary statistic problem is that of appropriate estimates of scoring reliability. This issue is closely related to the unit of analysis problem also. While this issue is beyond the scope of this presentation, I will at least try to introduce it in the spirit of this "problem-raising" discussion. When one is scoring an open-ended raw protocol for occurrences of select behaviors, it becomes problematical to determine the degree of scoring consistency. This is due to the fact that some utterances may be labelled as a transact by both scorers, one scorer, or by neither scorer. Only when both scorers label an utterance as a transact can one begin to look at whether the scoring is in agreement. Thus, we have two reliability scoring issues: (1) whether an utterance is scored at all; and (2) whether the scoring is in agreement.

Implications and Applications

One very clear implication of our research into transactive dialogue is that we must consider the communication skills of participants in moral education programs. In the past, the assumption has been that the structure of the task is the key condition necessary for moral development to result. Now we may question whether we can further enhance or insure any such effects by training students in transactive communication skills. We are presently planning to do this in the context of peer counselor training. We have already assessed the effects of traditional (undergraduate) peer counselor training on communication skills (Berkowitz and Prestby, 1980) and are attempting to secure funding to implement a training program based on our manual. We have found thus far that traditional training increases the amount of transacts employed in dialogue, but only of the Representational Type. We intend to supplement that training with emphasis on Operational Type transaction.
Another important issue is the developmental status of our transacts. My best guess is that a substantial percentage of the eighteen transacts require the individual to have developed some degree of formal operational reasoning. I have collected data on the formal reasoning, dialogic behavior and moral reasoning of 100 undergraduates toward the end of identifying these relationships; but these data have not yet been analyzed. I also plan on studying the developmental dialogic behavior of younger adolescents, in order to understand the developmental path of transactive behavior, if any. I should note that William Damon, at Clark University, is currently completing a study of moral interactions in young children. Deanna Kuhn, at Columbia University, is interested in the formal reasoning bases for structural conflict resolution.

Of course, we are also continuing our analyses of our original validation sample, so that we may demonstrate the relationship between transactive dialogue and individual moral development more fully.

In the future, I would like to see a formalized curriculum developed for the training of transactive dialogue. I would also like to contribute to the development of a sequential and/or hierarchical overview of the types of dialogue relating to individual structural development from pre-school through young adulthood. Finally, I would hope for a fuller understanding of the nature of social process in the individual construction of knowledge (Berkowitz, 1980).

Coda

What kind of time and effort has our project involved? Such information may be helpful to graduate students and young researchers.

The manual construction work described in Part II of "The Role of Transactive Discussion in Moral Development" followed three years of preliminary work. Having the benefit of the support and encouragement of Larry Kohlberg and the rest of our colleagues at the Center for Moral Development and Education, we were able to spend the better part of two years trying to identify and formalize those aspects of moral dialogue that relate to individual development. We spent the first year defining the phenomenon and beginning to formulate some concrete representation of it. This included laborious readings and re-readings of verbatim transcripts of moral dialogues, as well as countless hours of "meta-dialoguing", i.e., our own dialogues about our subjects' dialogues. These lengthy debates and disagreements about the meaning of our subjects' utterances would probably provide ample data for anyone else interested in dialogue analysis. The second year was spent in scoring and re-scoring data as we changed and adapted and transformed our scheme in our frequent sojourns back to the drawing board. The final manual was written in about one month of full-time, last-second effort during the summer of 1979. The work continues; I have just scored one-third of our validation sample and am pleased to report that the manual has been perfectly able to discriminate the six pre-to-posttest change dyads from the five non-change dyads.
TABLE 1

TABLE OF FORMAL TRANSACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Focus</th>
<th>Non-Competitive Mode</th>
<th>Competitive Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feedback Request (E)</td>
<td>Competitive Clarification (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you understand or agree with my position?</td>
<td>My position is not necessarily what you take it to be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego</td>
<td>Clarification (O)</td>
<td>Refinedment (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) No, what I am trying to say is the following.</td>
<td>(a) I must refine my position or point as a concession to your position or point (Subordinate mode).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Here's a clarification of my position to aid in your misunderstanding.</td>
<td>(b) I can elaborate or qualify my position to defend against your critique (Superordinative mode).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paraphrase (R/E)</td>
<td>Competitive Paraphrase (R/O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) I can understand and paraphrase your position or reasoning.</td>
<td>Here's a paraphrase of your reasoning that highlights its weaknesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Is my paraphrase of your reasoning accurate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification Request (E)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contradiction (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why do you say that?</td>
<td>There is a logical inconsistency in your reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion (R/O)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reasoning Critique (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alter</td>
<td>I can complete or continue your unfinished reasoning.</td>
<td>(a) Your reasoning misses an important distinction, or involves a superfluous distinction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Your position implicitly involves an assumption that is questionable (&quot;premise attack&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Your reasoning does not necessarily lead to your conclusion/opinion, or your opinion has not been sufficiently justified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Your reasoning applies equally well to the opposite opinion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1
TABLE OF FORMAL TRANSACTS - Cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Focus</th>
<th>Non-Competitive Mode</th>
<th>Competitive Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXTENSION (O)</td>
<td>(a) Here's a further thought or an elaboration offered in the spirit of your position.</td>
<td>(a) Would you go to this implausible extreme with your reasoning?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER (cont'd)</td>
<td>(b) Are you implying the following by your reasoning?</td>
<td>(b) Your reasoning can be extended to the following extreme, with which neither of us would agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUXTAPOSITION (R)</td>
<td>Your position is X and my position is Y.</td>
<td>COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMON GROUND/INTEGRATION (O)</td>
<td>(a) We can combine our positions into a common view.</td>
<td>(a) Your reasoning is less adequate than mine because it is incompatible with the important consideration here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYAD OR EGO/ALTER</td>
<td>(b) Here's a general premise common to both of our positions.</td>
<td>(b) Your position makes a distinction which is seen as superfluous, in light of my position, or misses an important distinction which my position makes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYAD PARAPHRASE (R)</td>
<td>Here is a paraphrase of a shared position.</td>
<td>(c) I can analyze your example to show that it does not pose a challenge to my position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2
EXAMPLE OF TRANSACT EXPLICATION

COMPETITIVE EXTENSION

MODE: Competitive
PRIMARY FOCUS: Alter
TYPE: Operational
STYLE: Interrogative or Declarative

FORMAL TRANSACTS:

(a) Would you go to this implausible extreme with your reasoning?

(b) Your reasoning can be extended to the following extreme, with which neither of us would agree.

FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION

Ego is attempting to defuse Alter's position by extending Alter's reasoning to an extreme which Ego considers to be mutually implausible. The primary focus is "alter" and the type "operational" because Ego is extending Alter's reasoning.

Distinctions

(1) Do not confuse with Ego's attempts to provide disconfirming examples from outside Alter's reasoning (see Counter Consideration), rather than extending from within Alter's reasoning.

(2) Do not confuse with critiques of Alter's reasoning that do not center on extensions (see Contradiction, Reasoning Critique).

(3) Do not confuse with critiques of Alter's reasoning embedded in the context of Ego's own position (see Comparative Critique).

Note

Ego must at least imply a rejection of the offered extension.

EXAMPLES

Match Examples

(Example 1 refers to whether Heinz should steal an exhorbitantly priced drug from an unyielding druggist, or let his pet die - Dilemma 1, Q. 4).

1. A: Seeing how this druggist being such a fucker by charging them ten times as much as what it costs to make it.....It seems to me that there are people who are attached to pets. Pets aren't as important as human beings, but still, that doesn't (unclear).....
TABLE 2
COMPETITIVE EXTENSION - Cont'd

E: Okay, if you take into consideration all the people who own pets in the city, which is a hell of a lot, would you think it would (be) cool to be walking the streets and seeing fifty thousand people breaking into druggists' stores stealing medicine for their dogs or cats?
A: That's a great question, that's a great question. (33.3:p11;L8)

(Example 2 refers to the general purpose of the law - Dilemma 1, Q. 7).

2. A: I don't mean close to assholes, I just mean that what they're doing is because of what they feel and not everyone else feels that way, so everyone is doing a different (unclear) 'cause they feel different.
E: Well, let's....If rape....If there were no laws against rape, would you rape, if there wasn't? No. If there were no laws would you rape? Why not?
A: 'Cause I don't do that.
E: Okay, if there were no laws against attacking people with a baseball bat, would you do that?
A: Why would I attack someone with a baseball bat?
E: Okay, if there were no laws against stealing, would you steal my car?
A: I don't know, probably not. (33.3:p19;L15)

(Example 3 refers to the relationship of law to morality - Dilemma 1, Q. 6).

3. A: Number six. Is it against the law for Heinz to steal? All right, that part of the question, yes. Does it make it morally wrong?
E: Going according to the law, it's wrong for him to steal. But if he feels that what he's doing is the right thing and the best thing, then it's not morally wrong, 'cause morals and laws aren't the same thing.
A: Well, do you think it's right for him to do it if he's the only one who thinks it's the best thing? I mean, if you thought it was the best thing for you to do, to get on top of Science Hall and shoot everyone who was wearing a hat--I mean, say you thought that, I mean, certainly some people thought that... (33:p14;L8)

"A Preliminary Manual for Coding Transactive Features of Dyadic Discussion" is available from Professor Marvin Berkowitz, Department of Psychology, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233. A check for four dollars (made out to "Marquette University") covers photocopying and mailing costs.
REFERENCES


