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79p.: Part of the description of the South Carolina evaluation criteria may not reproduce well.

*Accountability: Agency Cooperation; *Agency Role: Coordination; *Evaluation Criteria: Governance; Government School Relationship; *Higher Education: *Institutional Evaluation: *State Boards of Education

Alabama: Connecticut: Florida: Mississippi: Missouri: *South Carolina: West Virginia

Issues pertinent to evaluation of statewide boards of higher education are considered, and the cases of South Carolina and several other states are covered. Evaluation is seen as a form of accountability. Reasons why better, more formal evaluation of statewide boards will be important to a wide range of constituencies--such as trends toward performance budgeting--are examined, and various complexities of the evaluation process are addressed. The major relevant evaluation efforts undertaken recently are summarized, including the University of Missouri Task Force on State Level Coordination and Governance in Higher Education, two Alabama evaluations, evaluations by the Academy for Educational Development of consolidated governing boards of Mississippi, West Virginia, and Florida; and legislative performance evaluations in Connecticut and South Carolina. Evaluation criteria used by South Carolina's Legislative Audit Council to evaluate the Commission on Higher Education, critical reactions to the criteria from selected respondents around the country, and modifications based on the reactions are examined. The question of who should evaluate issues pertaining to higher education is addressed. Various supplementary materials pertaining to state evaluation efforts are appended.

(SW)
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WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? THE EVALUATION OF STATEWIDE BOARDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by

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PREFACE

This Occasional Paper, the seventh in our series, is presented with a mixture of pride and sadness. It constitutes one of Professor Robert Berdahl's last direct links with the Department of Higher Education which he has chaired for the past decade. The paper reflects one of Robert Berdahl's major intellectual interests in recent years--the problems and possibilities of statewide coordination in American higher education. He has a well-deserved national reputation in this field and has pioneered the analysis of the role of state governments in higher education. This paper reviews the limited literature now available evaluating the performance of statewide boards. We are sure that this discussion will stimulate further thought and analysis on an important topic. Without any question, the role of statewide coordinating bodies have, for better or worse, entrenched themselves in the bureaucratic and political reality of American higher education.

Professor Robert Berdahl takes up a professorship in higher education at the University of Maryland in College Park. He will also be director of a research institute on government and higher education there. Robert Berdahl's association with the State University of New York at Buffalo goes back almost to the inception of the Department of Higher Education and the Department is, in many ways, a result of his leadership as chairman. Elizabeth French is on the staff of the Alabama Commission on Higher Education in Montgomery. This paper results from an evaluation of the statewide board in Alabama.

Philip G. Altbach
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Editors, Occasional Paper Series
WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?
The Evaluation of Statewide Boards of Higher Education

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

A. Evaluation as a Form of Academic Accountability

Evaluation is nothing new in Academe. As early as the seventeenth century a few governments in the colonies and later in the states examined the colleges that they were aiding; although this process involved evaluation, it was not the rigorous operation that we call by that name today. (Harcleroad, 1980) More traditionally, students have always been on the receiving end of grades; faculty have regularly been appraised for appointment, promotion and tenure; and since the twentieth century, most universities and colleges have undergone institutional evaluations by regional accrediting associations and program evaluations by professional accrediting agencies. In most of these later cases, however, it has been a matter of academics judging academic issues.

Lately, current applications of the evaluative process have penetrated yet other layers of the academic system. Not only Academe but the entire administrative structure of the educational community is now subject to evaluation processes which often include a heavy component of non-academic participation. It is no longer uncommon for institutional governing boards to launch formal reviews of campus presidents prior to renewal of appointment; and state agencies charged with the planning and coordination of public post-secondary institutions are now scrutinized by the elected executive and legislative branches of state government.

James L. Miller has stated (1975) that the recent interest in the evaluation of state higher education agencies is a natural outcome of the development of higher education in planning and coordination. He claims that these agencies have been active long enough to insure their survival in one form or another and the debate over whether or not to have coordination is past. Therefore, their continued existence has created an expectation among critics and friends alike to require that they either identify their accomplishments or show reasons for a failure to do so.
Statewide boards of higher education have never been a particularly popular social phenomenon. Poised delicately between the universities and colleges wanting maximum autonomy on the one hand and the various agencies and offices of state government wanting maximum accountability on the other, many statewide boards suffer from role confusion resulting in heavy criticism from one or the other of the "two sides"--and sometimes from both! A British national counterpart to these statewide boards, the University Grants Committee, reports that it learned to operate on the principle of "equal and opposite unpopularity." Not surprisingly then, there has been much tinkering with state structures of higher education in efforts to come up with "better systems."

B. Changing Structures of the State Higher Education Agencies

Statewide boards of higher education appeared on the scene in some 15 states over the last quarter of a century and have steadily increased the extent of their oversight of the institutions (Millard, 1976). Five basic types are identifiable according to their varying degrees of regulatory authority, and states have traditionally been placed in one of the following categories which correspond to the structure of coordination: no coordinating structure, voluntary association, advisory coordinating agency, regulatory coordinating agency, and consolidated governing board. (A definition of these various board types may be found in Appendix A.) It is not within the scope of this presentation to provide a comprehensive analysis of these various types of boards; rather we attempt to show in the following table the rapidity with which changes have taken place among the states over the past forty years relative to the type of statewide structure embraced. (For a comprehensive analysis of
Table 1 indicates that there has obviously been a trend away from having no board or having a voluntary association to some form of formal coordination. Even within the various categories of formal coordination there has been considerable movement and even more consideration of further changes. In the past decade, state legislators in Utah, Wisconsin, and North Carolina all abolished their coordinating boards and created consolidated governing boards; California and Connecticut terminated existing coordinating structures and established new ones in their place; Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri and New York reacted variously to proposals for restructuring the planning and coordination of higher education in those states; and Florida, Mississippi and West Virginia have authorized an external
consulting firm to evaluate elements of their higher education system. South Carolina's Legislative Audit Council undertook an extensive evaluation of the Commission on Higher Education, which resulted in a strengthening of the Commission, and the Alabama Commission on Higher Education has just been evaluated for the second time in accord with its enabling legislation. One thing is clear, many judgments are being passed on the relative merits of the various forms of coordination and governance.

C. Purposes of the Paper

The development of this paper was the result of the authors' participation in the evaluation of one such agency—the Alabama Commission on Higher Education. As will be explained later, however, the focus is less on the Alabama evaluation and more on the elaborate evaluation criteria drawn up by the South Carolina Legislative Audit Council to use in assessing that state's Commission on Higher Education.

The plan of the paper is as follows: Section II will elaborate on the reasons why better evaluation of statewide boards will be important to a wide range of constituencies. Section III will address various complexities of the process of evaluating statewide boards. Section IV will briefly summarize the major relevant evaluation efforts undertaken recently, and Sections V and VI will present the evaluation criteria used in South Carolina, detailed critical reactions to them from selected respondents around the country and our own composite set of criteria based on these reactions. Finally, Section VII shifts the focus from one of which criteria to who should evaluate—in an effort to answer at the state level for issues pertaining to higher education, that age-old issue of "Who guards the guardians?"
II. REASONS FOR FORMAL EVALUATION

A. Ad Hoc and Periodic State Evaluations

As mentioned above, there has already been a great deal of ad hoc evaluation of statewide boards of higher education, and there is every likelihood that this will continue.

Over and above such ad hoc state actions, we sense the probability of more regularized state evaluations along the line of the currently-unique Alabama pattern. The enabling legislation establishing the Alabama Commission on Higher Education in 1969-70 mandated that the Commission be evaluated every four years by a committee which should include at least three persons not associated with higher education in the state. The first two such evaluations have been completed and will be discussed further below.

Apart from these specialized evaluation processes, one can recognize that normal executive branch operations in many states have long included at least passing evaluations of the worth and value of those state activities which come under scrutiny. The more recent theory of performance budgeting calls for development of indicators of agency outcomes, with some amount of financial rewards patterned accordingly. To our knowledge no state has yet established performance criteria for purposes of budgeting the costs of statewide boards.

Another aspect of executive branch evaluations has been the post-audit of agency operations. Historically this audit was usually concerned with legality and propriety of expenditures and with agency efficiency. More recently, however, the post-audit functions has blossomed into a more comprehensive assessment of agency effectiveness and has been moved in over half the states to the legislative branch where, as the Legislature Program Evaluation (LPE) movement, it helps to ensure executive branch accountability.
B. The State LPE Movement and Sunsent Legislation

The Legislative Performance Evaluation (LPE) movement represents an effort by state legislatures to go beyond the traditional post-audit of executive branch fiscal management to include an assessment of the effectiveness of the performance of the unit(s) selected for scrutiny. In several states the LPE Agencies have examined university or community college operations (Berdahl, 1977) and in Connecticut and South Carolina there were LPE evaluations of the statewide board of higher education.

Somewhat related to this practice has been the evaluation aspects of state sunsent legislation. According to the terms of this kind of legislation, first
passed by Colorado in 1976 and followed in one form or another by at least another 34 states in the following four years, targeted state agencies are to be terminated by a time certain if not explicitly renewed following evaluation of their performance. While few of the existing laws are comprehensive in calling for sunset evaluations of all state agencies (and few states could actually deliver sophisticated evaluations on such a massive scale), there are signs that higher education agencies will sooner or later join the queues in at least some states. In Iowa only a Governor's veto blocked a sunset law which had the Iowa Board of Regents scheduled for evaluation within the first five years after passage.

Insofar as LPE or sunset evaluations may be directed at statewide boards in the future, improvements in our understanding of appropriate criteria should be welcome.

C. Possible Federal Government Interest

Given the Federal Government's recent concern for performance evaluations of federally-funded activities, it is not impossible to imagine an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the federally-subsidized State 1202 Commissions, which in 12 states are the statewide boards wearing different hats and in some 14 other states are the statewide boards augmented in membership to satisfy the 1202 requirements. Hence, there is a potential Federal interest in improving the process of evaluating statewide boards of higher education.

D. Regional Accreditation and Evaluation Criteria

Regional accrediting associations are also probable users of such evaluations. Although the traditional model of regional accrediting has called for the evaluation of an institution's ability to achieve its own chosen goals, there has been
increasing awareness of late that a university or college’s position in a larger coordinating or governing structure can do much to encourage or inhibit its ability to achieve its goals. Thus, the better regional accrediting teams have begun to pay some attention to the degree of external controls exercised on a campus. While this broader perspective is much to be applauded, it is not without some dangers unless treated with a measure of sensitivity. For example, in a study undertaken by one of the present writers some years ago, it was discovered that a regional accrediting team visited an institution whose president had earlier been a colleague of the chairman of the team. Nothing necessarily wrong there, but as it turned out, the team was treated to a lengthy set of complaints about the stultifying effects of overcentralization by the statewide board. Although the accrediting team members did pay a brief call on the head of the coordinating board on their way out of the state, no “statement of charges” was presented for possible rebuttal–either in advance of that meeting or prior to the printing of the final report. When the confidential final report was submitted to the institution, it was quite critical of the state coordinating board and not too unexpectedly the criticisms were leaked to the press to bolster the institution’s fight for more autonomy (Berdahl, 1971, p. 236). Since the dimension of external controls is a very legitimate aspect of institutional evaluation, there is nothing wrong in principle with regional accrediting teams giving it careful consideration. Judgments about “excessive centralization,” however, do not spring full-blown from the ether; they must be culled from a fair deliberative process which incorporates widespread consultations and which results in explicit guidelines. Therein lies the relevance to regional accrediting associations of efforts to improve our knowledge of what constitutes “good” statewide coordinating and planning.
E. Other Potential Uses

To complete the inventory of potential uses of evaluations of statewide boards, we need to cite a Carnegie Commission recommendation (even though it has never been implemented):

that a special commission on institutional independence be established within the American Council on Education; this commission, which should consist of both ACE members and public members, would be assigned responsibility for reviewing external interference with institutional independence and issuing findings after such reviews. (1971, p. 107).

As was the case with regional accrediting team judgments about "excessive centralization," such ACE commission judgments about external interferences would need to be based on very careful distinctions between those external controls legitimate and necessary and those which are not. It is perhaps because of the complexity of arriving at any broad agreement on these matters (as well as the embarrassing prospect of an ACE commission attempting to censure a state system guilty of excessive interference with institutional independence) that the Carnegie Commission recommendation has not been implemented. However, Roger Heyns, President of the American Council on Education in 1976, did send out a letter on January 6th of that year announcing that if there was sufficient response his organization would be willing to establish panels of qualified persons who would then be available to visit a state where relations between a central board and institutions had become badly strained. The invited observers would then do their best to restore the necessary working relationships. The project was quietly dropped, however, when other associations responded with neither interest nor funds. Nevertheless, the idea of developing some institutional counterpart to the American Association of University Professors Committee A to monitor statewide systems is one which, in some modified form, may someday be implemented; and at such time, evaluation criteria will obviously be needed.
III. CAUTIONS AND COMPLEXITIES IN EVALUATING STATEWIDE BOARDS

A. Personalities May Be More Important Than Structures

To keep things in perspective, one should acknowledge that the success or failure of state boards may normally be more dependent on the role of personalities than on the issue of structure or powers. Samuel Gould has said it well:

The more subtle personal contacts...are the warp and woof of the fabric of (the) relationship (between the state and university);... (such contacts) defy rules and definitions and formulas....They are the true means by which the delicate balance of authority, responsibility, and interdependence existing between the university and state government is maintained, or, when matters go awry, is upset. They represent the interplay of personalities, the development of attitudes on the part of these personalities reflecting a clear understanding of respective roles and motivations, and most of all the creation of a climate of mutual trust and respect. (1966, p. 4).

It is also true, however, that the "availability of practical machinery" can help improve the "climate of opinion" within which the key personalities interact (Enarson, 1956, p. 321). Thus, without exaggerating the importance of board structure, it is still worthwhile to examine criteria by which the strengths and weaknesses of various board patterns are assessed.

B. Classifying Structures by Formal Attributes May Be Misleading

Another caution is needed. Not only are personalities often more important than structure, but structure itself may be deeply affected by the play of many other elements:

Some agencies have more power than their enabling legislation suggests because they are heavy on informal power, influence, and "credibility" with state officials and the public. Other agencies have less power than their statutes suggest because their credibility is low and their recommendations are ignored. The web of informal relationships, communication, and respect among legislators and the state agency is extremely important and is often overlooked (Miller, 1970, p. 49).
Thus, when one deals with categories such as advisory and regulatory coordinating boards and consolidated governing boards, one must remember that in practice the lines blur between different types. In a survey of the three major types of boards in nine other states, a Task Force of the University of Missouri (1972), which had been established to recommend a pattern of statewide coordination and governance, found that in three crucial areas, long-range planning, resource allocation and use, and program control, "board types" was less influential as an explanatory variable than "human, economic, and political modifiers" (p. 49).

The task of classifying statewide boards has been further complicated since 1974 by the designation in most states of statewide post-secondary planning commissions responding to Section 1202 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1972 and funded modestly with federal funds from Section 1203. In some states existing statewide boards have been designated as the 1202 Commission; in others, the boards have been augmented in membership to serve this function; and in still others, entirely separate commissions have been established. There is, therefore, question about the proper classification of a state with a 1202 commission as well as a statewide board, or one with a 1202 commission where there previously had been no board. For our evaluation purposes, we are ignoring the separate 1202 commissions since they are few and of recent origin.

C. Little Guidance from the Early Literature

In a work reviewing the early literature (Berdahl, 1971, Chapter 3), problems of evaluating statewide boards of higher education were discussed and it was noted: "One searches the relevant literature in vain for objective canons of proof which would remove the subject from controversy, but one finds only unsubstantiated and contradictory arguments as to why coordination is 'good' or 'bad,' or why this type is preferable to that."
M. M. Chambers' comments illustrate this dilemma:

South Dakota abolished institutional governing boards and set up one board in 1896 which now governs seven institutions. There have been sixty-four years of experience with this device. Who can prove, and by what techniques, that South Dakota's institutions of higher education are today any better (or any worse), or that the statewide system is any better or worse, than it would have been if separate governing boards had been continued, with open rivalry, or with voluntary coordination, or with a compulsory coordinating agency? (1961, p. 58).

Mayhew (1969, p. 32) also mentions this gap in the literature: "There have been no studies to indicate that elaborate coordination does or does not affect levels of state expenditure for higher education, percentage of a population attending college, cost of instruction, or increased productivity of higher education." That same year a study appeared in Colorado with the finding that "the overall ratio of allocation to request, year by year, and institution by institution, has not increased as a result of the change to the coordinating Commission" (Brooks, 1969).

The University of Missouri Task Force study cited above included an appendix discussing the problems of trying to establish relationships between a particular type of statewide board and various fiscal measures. The one finding reported was that "these data do not suggest the existence of a very strong relationship between types of coordinating structure and the rate of change in the amount of funds appropriated for higher education for the period since 1960" (1972, p. 62).

Nor were any new links established by a more recent study conducted by Henry Frost for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1976), using multiple correlation analysis between the different types of statewide agencies and selected indicators of state performance, such as access, funding and diversity.

D. Problems with Goals-Oriented Evaluation Theory

According to textbook evaluation theory, assessments of statewide boards
should commence with an examination of state goals and problems, proceed to a
determination of board functions necessary to achieve those goals and overcome
those problems, and then move to an analysis of the board structures which could
best undertake those functions. Only then would it be possible to arrive at an
understanding of the kind of leadership which would work through those structures
and functions to the achievement of the desired goals.

In practice, however, such a goals-oriented evaluation process may run into
any of several problems. For example, the state's list of goals may inadequately
respond to serious existing problems or fail to anticipate those which are emerging.
So the evaluation process should appraise not only the achievement of goals, but
also the adequacy of the goals themselves. Yet here we confront the issue of
subjectivity of values in choosing goals. One person's, one agency's, one state's
choices may not be those of others, and it is not possible by mere analysis to
"prove" which set of goals is the most satisfactory.

Astin (1974) points out the difference between conceptual outcomes, which are
basically derived from values; and outcome measures, which can be scientifically
derived to assess the achievement of the conceptual outcomes. Thus, one can
evolve objective means for measuring the extent to which certain desired ends
have been achieved in a given (statewide) context, but one cannot thereby prove
that those ends are to be desired by all above others.

One partial answer to the problem of subjectivity in deciding values, ends,
goals, and objectives might be found in the emergence of a form of national or
state consensus. Two highly visible commissions issued reports in 1973 which
suggested goals for higher education around which such consensus might emerge.
(See Appendix B for the Carnegie Commission (1973) list of purposes of higher
education in the United States and the objectives of the National Commission on

To the extent that an identifiable national consensus might emerge around goals from studies such as these, it might be possible to develop appropriate outcome measures (in Astin's terms) and evaluate statewide boards by the degree to which they had helped to achieve such goals. (The National Commission in fact suggests measures for each of its objectives.)

In the event that national consensus may not prove feasible, a state-level consensus may perhaps be more realistic. In California, for example, the Joint Legislative Committee on the Master Plan commissioned a study (Peterson, 1973) which examined agreement and disagreement among a broad group of academic and lay people of 20 areas selected from the Institutional Goals Inventory of the Educational Testing Service. Similarly, in Oklahoma the Board of Regents conducted a statewide goals study (1976) and involved over 3,000 lay citizens. Presumably, if a strong state consensus emerged, the goals in question could be used as a legitimated set of objectives against which to assess statewide board achievements.

Several problems remain, however. In the first place, while widespread agreement might be obtained on general goals, disagreement often emerges when goals become more specific. Furthermore, even with the specific National Commission outcome measures, honorable people quarrel over the exact meaning of terms like excellence, sufficient, and responsive. In addition, it is not unusual for some general goals, e.g., institutional freedom and flexibility, to have a potential conflict with others, e.g., institutional accountability; and in most cases, no priorities are established to guide evaluators as to which goals have precedence. This lack of goal priorities could be overcome by asking the political process to hammer out explicitly which goals head the list and which fall to the
bottom, but Wildavsky (1964) pointed out long ago how distasteful it is for most politicians to be asked to make choices among macro-policy alternatives as opposed to their preference for trading off items at the margin.

It may be rare, then, to have state goals for higher education presented in a form that is comprehensive, specific and prioritized. But even if this occurs, there will still remain the complex problem in social science analysis of assigning credit and/or blame to the statewide board for the achievement or non-achievement of these goals. Inevitably there are so many other intervening variables between the actions of the statewide board and the alleged results it may be seeking, that while one may attribute certain cause-and-effect relationships to the process, there will usually be little certainty to such judgments. We are thus quite far from having a satisfactory goals-oriented evaluation process for statewide boards.

To illustrate the difficulty of trying to evaluate performance on the basis of goals and results rather than process, we cite in Appendix C two major evaluation efforts in elementary/secondary education and in state legislative processes which, notwithstanding very substantial funding, staffing and time, were unable to go beyond evaluation of process. Based on these efforts we should not, then, too easily assume that a satisfactory evaluation of statewide boards would result if only substantial time, talent, and resources could be mobilized. Nevertheless, we do urge a continuing double attack on the problem by working at both the conceptual and the practical levels. The literature on educational evaluation, while still oriented primarily to instructional matters, shows promise of development. For example, the Encyclopedia of Educational Evaluation (Anderson and others, 1975) offers a comprehensive overview of the topic. (The following headings are relevant to this work: "the politics of evaluation," "hard and soft evaluation," and "the evaluator's role.") At a
more intense, abstract level, Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority (Dornbusch and Scott, 1975) may stimulate persons professionally equipped to profit from it. Perhaps as a good omen, Paul Dressel's 1976 Handbook of Academic Evaluation does include a chapter on "State Coordination and Planning." While the various criteria suggested (pp. 443-449) cover the most important dimensions of board functions, there are unfortunately few guidelines offered on how to demonstrate the crucial linkage between board activities as "cause" and various "good" and "bad" developments as alleged "effects." Nor, for that matter, is there a normative philosophical framework to justify the favorable and unfavorable judgments. Also helpful is a volume edited by Bowen (1974) containing several excellent articles Brown's piece, "Taking Advantage of External Evaluation," is particularly relevant to our central concern her

IV. RECENT EVALUATION EFFORTS

In keeping with the above-mentioned need for approaching the problem of evaluating statewide boards on both the theoretical and the practical levels, we cite now brief summaries of recent efforts to assess such boards in certain states, reserving to Section V special treatment for the most elaborate evaluation in South Carolina.

A. Self-Evaluation Kits from the Association of Governing Boards (AGB)

Although it does not constitute a formal evaluation undertaken by some agency external to the statewide board, we commence with the AGB self-evaluation process as an example of the mildest form of assessment.

The AGB has a whole series of such surveys, with two of them specifically designed for statewide coordinating and governing boards respectively. While undoubtedly useful as a starting point in understanding a board's self-image, these surveys suffer from major weaknesses: most of the survey questions seem to elicit more of a yes/no flash picture view of the board operations than a nuanced assessment of board performance over any period of time.
The survey for coordinating boards has questions divided into 12 topics, and Topic 9 - Statewide Educational Planning--Policies and Procedures--probably comes the closest to a broad assessment. (See Appendix D.) The treatment of goals lists 12 possible general goals and asks the respondents to rate them as of high, medium, low or no importance. No probing, however, is undertaken on the extent to which, if any, the statewide board has a responsibility for attaining the cherished goals, or on the degree to which the board has achieved those goals for which it is deemed to have some major responsibility.

A letter from the AGB in 1979 indicated that three consolidated governing boards had employed the self-evaluation kits, but that in some states so-called "sunshine laws," requiring all non-executive session deliberations of public agencies to be conducted in the open, had acted to inhibit boards from engaging in evaluations which would probably produce critical and/or divisive information.

B. University of Missouri Task Force on State Level Coordination and Governance in Higher Education

In response to a state "Little Hoover Commission" recommendation and subsequent proposed state bill pointing to a substantial centralization of decision-making in higher education, the President of the University of Missouri established a seven person Task Force to investigate patterns of coordination and governance around the country and make recommendations for the Missouri scene. This Task Force issued its Report (1972) and, on the basis of its deliberations, recommended a milder form of regulatory coordinating board. The substance of those recommendations need not concern us, but the process by which the Task Force arrived at its conclusions is of great interest.

The Task Force established a set of 13 process criteria (see Appendix E) and then, for each such criterion, on the basis of organization theory, postulated board performances expected according to board type: advisory coordinating,
regulatory coordinating, or consolidated governing. The members of the Missouri Task Force then visited nine states covering all three types of boards and compared actual board performances (based on interviews within the state) with the theoretical postulates. The resulting comparative evaluations are shown in Appendix F.

Although the nine state case studies were thin (involving an individual investigator interviewing 6 to 15 persons in a state in two or three days), the Task Force handling of their postulates was fairly professional. They recognized that while the 13 criteria were "considered to be reasonable," they would "not necessarily (be) of equal importance" and that "a reader of this report may be expected to focus his attention on a limited set of criteria and to reject others as trivial or, at best, secondary in overall importance" (p. 8).

C. Alabama Evaluations #1 and #2

The 1969 enabling legislation establishing the Alabama Commission on Higher Education included within it a provision that every four years a committee of at least three consultants not associated with higher education in the state evaluate the effectiveness of the Commission and recommend changes as needed. The first such committee was appointed by the Commission in 1974 and consisted of three out-of-state professionals in higher education plus four Alabamians who had no associations with higher education in the state. Nominations for appointments to the committee came from various sources, including the post-secondary institutions. The report, published in 1975, recommended strengthening the advisory coordinating board and giving it regulatory powers over approval of proposed new academic programs. The Committee arrived at its judgments after soliciting written and/or oral testimony from a wide variety of persons in the educational and political worlds, but had neither the staff, the time nor the
budget to try to develop a formal set of evaluation criteria.

Although the Senate of the Alabama legislature in 1975 subsequently passed a bill embodying many of the evaluation committee's recommendations this house was presided over by a Lieutenant Governor very hostile to the Commission. Under his leadership a conference committee succeeded in cutting the Commission's operating budget from $300,000 to $200,000. In 1976 and 1977 legislation to strengthen the Commission was passed in the House but failed to gain acceptance in the upper chamber.

Thus, the Committee's principal value lay less in any immediate political impact or in the formation of explicit criteria for evaluation, and more in establishing the precedent of the first mandated, periodic state board evaluation and in demonstrating the value of a mixed in-state and out-of-state membership.

The composition of the second Evaluation Committee differed slightly from the first. The first Evaluation Committee had recommended that subsequent groups be appointed by a different, mixed process: four Alabamians were to be appointed, one each by the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker and the Alabama Commission on Higher Education; and these four were to choose the three out-of-state professionals. But this proposal died in the lower house bill, and the second Evaluation Committee was appointed in 1978 in the same manner as the first, by the Commission. This time, however, there were four out-of-state members and five Alabamians. Three of the four out-of-state members represented the same constituencies as the first committee: a former director of a statewide board, an active university president and a professor specializing in studies of statewide coordination and governance. To these was added in 1978 a professor well known for his studies of two-year post-secondary institutions. This latter appointment was initiated presumably to reflect recognition of the 1975 report
criticism that the Commission's relations with two-year institutions in the state needed to be improved. Also presumably the number of in-state members was increased to retain a majority in that category. While such a balance may have been important symbolically in the state, in terms of actual discussions and subsequent recommendations, neither the first nor the second committees reported any in-state/out-of-state bloc divisions whatsoever.

The second committee operated along lines similar to the first: a budget of approximately $28,000 was appropriated and the committee was given six months in which to report: the staff was limited to a secretary and the on-call services of the ACHE staff member designated as liaison to the committee; deliberations were conducted in private and confidentiality was guaranteed all respondents and witnesses; there was an inspection of all ACHE publications, minutes and program review proceedings; and attendance at an ACHE meeting devoted to budget hearings was arranged. During the second evaluation process much more attention was devoted to the political side. Full use was made of the contacts of the five Alabama members to invite in key legislators from both houses and representatives of the incoming Governor's Office, and in addition, persons from groups such as the State Chamber of Commerce and the League of Women Voters were invited to testify; and thousands of copies of a brief Summary Report were distributed around the state, at the same time as the Report itself was issued in March 1979.

Whether as a result of this broadened attention, the arrival of a new Governor (and Lieutenant Governor) and or some other factors--this time a bill to strengthen the Commission passed both Houses and was signed into law by the Governor July 30, 1979.
If the second committee enjoyed somewhat greater success than the first in terms of political impact, it was not noticeably more effective in advancing the national art of statewide board evaluation. At the outset the committee decided, in essence, to attempt to look "backwards, forwards and sidewards." This meant that one part of the evaluation was to look back to the powers and responsibilities accorded the board by its enabling legislation, to determine whether these two elements were commensurate, and if so, how well the Commission had discharged its responsibilities with those powers. Another part of the evaluation was to look forward to emerging problems in the state to ascertain whether the Commission, with its current responsibilities and authorities, (however well it may have discharged these duties in the past) would be able to meet those problems. A looking sidewards or outwards was for the purpose of bringing to bear on both of the above dimensions the relevant insights gained from experiences and studies in other states.

Unfortunately, the relatively primitive state of the art nationally, combined with the Committee's lack of staff, time and budget, precluded doing anything more than profiting informally from the fairly extensive personal experiences of the four out-of-state members. An unsuccessful effort to adapt some criteria from South Carolina will be described below.

D. Mississippi, West Virginia and Florida -- Consolidated Governing Board Evaluations by the Academy for Educational Development

Perhaps as an optimistic omen of the increasing tempo of state board evaluations, three Southern states recently commissioned the Academy for Educational Development (AED) to undertake studies which included assessments of the effectiveness of the consolidated governing board operating in each of these states.
In a July 1979 report to the Mississippi Commission of Budget and Accounting entitled Governance of Public Higher Education in Mississippi, the AED identified the following five major roles of a consolidated governing board and then evaluated the performance of the Mississippi Board of Regents relative to each of these following areas: 1) Governing Board of Individual Institutions, 2) Statewide Planning, 3) Statewide Coordination, 4) Insulation from Political Interference, and 5) Public Advocacy. (The five AED assigned roles and some related tasks under each heading are included in Appendix G.)

The AED found after extensive study of relevant documents and interviewing of numerous personnel that while the Board of Trustees had done a good job in securing political insulation of the universities, it badly needed strengthening in most of its other roles, particularly that of long-range planning. Nevertheless, the AED stopped short of recommending the replacement of the consolidated governing board by a coordinating board, which the AED felt might do a better planning job if freed of governance responsibilities.

This is exactly what the AED did recommend, however, in its August 1979 report to the Joint Committee on Government and Finance and the Joint Subcommittee on Higher Education of the West Virginia Legislature: Support, Performance and Protection of Higher Education in West Virginia. In this report the AED assessed the performance of the West Virginia's consolidated Board of Regents along dimensions similar to those used in its Mississippi study:

1. Management, Control and Supervision
2. Statewide Activities
3. State-level Budgeting
4. Statewide Planning
5. Relations with State Government

A conceptual framework was offered on the nature of these activities as
undertaken by either a consolidated governing board or a regulatory coordinating board, and then comparisons offered of the strengths and weaknesses of each type.

On the basis of this analysis, the AED recommended as a first option the creation of a coordinating board to replace the consolidated governing board and the establishment of three segmental governing boards to operate the various institutions under the planning and coordinating umbrella. In case the West Virginia legislature felt such an option was too radical, the AED offered a second set of recommendations to strengthen the performance of the existing Board of Regents. To the surprise of few persons, state authorities chose the second option.

The Florida study was undertaken by the AED for a Joint Executive Legislative Study Commission on Postsecondary Education which reported in March 1980. Among the questions examined was whether to alter the consolidated governing board to a coordinating board with governing boards created at the local or sub-system levels or to leave the governing board in place and create an umbrella coordinating board over it to plan for the two year, four year, vocational and private institutions. In a preliminary Discussion Paper #2, the Governance of State Systems of Higher Education, John Millett of the AED offered six "essential characteristics to be sought in state government organizational arrangements," which are presented in Appendix H.

In its final report to the Florida Commission, A Call to Action (1980), the AED discussed various structural options but made no firm recommendations in this sphere. The Commission Report Postsecondary Education (1980) urged the umbrella board option with strong emphasis on its planning responsibilities. Governor Graham subsequently vetoed an omnibus bill containing many of the Commission's recommendations because it also contained numerous political trade-offs. But he moved to establish the umbrella planning board by executive action.
E. LPE Evaluations in Connecticut and South Carolina

As mentioned above in Section II, the Legislative Performance Evaluation movement has already undertaken evaluations of statewide boards of higher education in two states. Although both bear the imprimatur of an LPE staff study, the differences in the two reports are huge. The Connecticut study Strengthening Higher Education in Connecticut (April 1977) gave considerable evidence of having been written under severe time pressures. Some of the original charge to the Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee had to be dropped and an "Agency Response" normally included in LPE reports was omitted. The study recommended the abolition of the existing coordinating board and its replacement by a stronger board with changed membership. That the state government subsequently implemented this recommendation does not alter the weakness of the report as an evaluation document. It contained no explicit framework for evaluation of the statewide board. Instead, one reads of what appears to be ex parte judgments about the need for stronger central leadership, a stronger board role in planning, budgeting and program review and a better management information service. These judgments may or may not be correct; the point is that the document does not connect them to a larger framework of evaluation which is itself sensitive to the many nuances and dilemmas abounding in this field.

In contrast to this, the South Carolina process was much more elaborate both in devising a conceptual framework and in the lengths to which the staff went in order to acquire relevant evidence. The main flaw, to our eyes, lay in the Legislative Audit Council's(LAC) insistence that its charge did not include appraisal of the coordinating board's positive accomplishments. An evaluation, by our logic, must include recognition of the good as well as the bad.
Nevertheless, the criteria created by the staff were of sufficient interest that when the second Alabama evaluation shortly thereafter took place (as described above), copies of the South Carolina criteria were mailed out to some 70 respondents around the country, requesting their critical reactions on the extent to which such criteria could be applied in Alabama or other states.

In Section V we present those South Carolina criteria and the reactions to them from the 40 persons who responded.

V. THE SOUTH CAROLINA EVALUATION CRITERIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A. LAC Creation of the Criteria

In 1977 the Legislative Audit Council (LAC) in South Carolina was asked to evaluate the Commission on Higher Education (CHE). The subsequent report, Management and Operational Review of the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education (June 14, 1978) recommended changes in CHE membership and in several aspects of CHE operations in planning, budget review and program review. Legislation in 1978 strengthened CHE powers and removed institutional members. Although the report was controversial in that it explicitly disavowed any intention of describing "CHE accomplishments," the seriousness of the LAC effort was clearly demonstrated not only by the creation of the elaborate evaluation criteria, but also by the extensive additional activities which were undertaken. Covering CHE developments since its establishment in 1967, the LAC audit staff interviewed 56 persons, mostly from the ranks of higher education, observed CHE meetings and committee functions over a nine month period, visited coordinating agencies in Alabama and Tennessee, inspected agency plans from 17 other states, employed several out-of-state consultants (including one of us) to evaluate specific
aspects of CHE operations, and conducted a user-survey of 234 persons in the State concerning the quality and usefulness of CHE studies and reports. Clearly the evaluation criteria were spawned in an atmosphere of high professional purpose.

Although the full set of criteria presented below in their entirety is rather long, it is important for the reader to grasp their meaning in order to understand the respondents' reactions and our later composite set of criteria.
Overall Purpose:

The purpose of this audit is to examine the duties and responsibilities of the Commission on Higher Education and to evaluate the performance of those duties.

I. Analysis of Goals and Objectives

Goals and objectives will be analyzed to determine their conformance with legislative intent, the extent to which they are a meaningful and useful guide for the Commission's efforts, and their comparability with goals and objectives of other statewide postsecondary coordinating agencies.

II. Evaluation of Progress Toward Goal Achievement

A. Evaluation of the performance of the Commission and the "1202" Post Secondary Planning Commission in conducting studies and developing plans regarding the roles, structure and operations of post secondary institutions.

1. Research Questions

   a. Has the output of studies, plans, recommendations been sufficient in relation to the staff size, funding, and the demand for information?
   b. Have the important issues in higher education been addressed by the Commission's reports?
   c. Have the plans, studies and reports thoroughly discussed issues, presented understandable, valid and useful information and made specific, actionable recommendations?
d. Have decision-makers in higher education and State Government utilized CHE plans, studies and reports and how has the quality of higher education been improved as a result?

e. Has the CHE obtained sufficient participation of interested groups such as university and college presidents in the planning process?

f. Has the CHE developed a master plan for post secondary education which has been used by institutions?

2. Research Methods

a. User survey: Development of a survey instrument designed to obtain from recipients of CHE studies and reports their evaluations regarding the quality, usefulness and impact of major CHE studies.

b. Personal interviews with university and college presidents, academic deans and other knowledgeable persons.

c. Analysis by audit team of significant CHE studies and plans.

d. Evaluation of the overall quality of CHE reports and plans by individuals outside South Carolina having nationally recognized expertise.

3. Measures

a. Measurement of the extent to which the CHE has addressed issues mandated by the Legislature by comparing the topics of reports to the topics specified in CHE enabling legislation.

b. The proportion of users who rate CHE publications as useful, of high quality, and provide examples of impact upon the quality of higher education.
c. Ratings of the overall quality of reports by individuals outside the State, persons interviewed and the audit team.

d. Comparison of issues addressed by CHE to national issues important to higher education.

4. Criteria
   a. South Carolina legislative mandate.
   b. Minimum recommendations for State-level planning documents made by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
   c. Model criteria proposed by the staff of the California Joint Committee on the Master Plan for Post Secondary Education.

B. Evaluation of the performance of the Commission in submitting recommendations to the Budget and Control Board and General Assembly regarding institutions of higher education.

1. Research Questions
   a. What recommendations have been made by the CHE?
   b. Were the recommendations communicated to decision-makers in a concise, meaningful and useful manner?
   c. To what extent have the recommendations led to action? If not, why?

2. Research Methods
   a. Review CHE publications and compile a list of all recommendations.
   b. When possible, document actions taken and by whom to implement recommendations by reviewing actions of the Legislature, Governor and institutions of higher education.
3. Measures
   a. The extent to which OIE recommendations have led to action.
   b. The extent to which actions based on OIE recommendations have resulted in improvements in post-secondary education.

4. Criteria
   OIE recommendations should cause changes which improve the quality of post-secondary education.

C. Evaluation of the performance of the OIE's review of annual appropriation requests and development of recommendations regarding State funding of higher education.

1. Research Questions
   a. Does the formula provide equitable distribution of funds?
   b. Are the assumptions upon which the formula is based valid and justifiable?
   c. Should the OIE have the responsibility for reviewing appropriations?
   d. Has the formula been used by the Budget and Control Board and/or the General Assembly?
   e. Does the formula promote quality education and, if not, is it possible to reconcile quality education with formula budgeting?
   f. Does the formula promote changes in institutions consistent with other recommendations made by the Commission?

2. Research Methods
   a. Interviews with institutional presidents and vice-presidents for business and State budget officials.

3. Measures
   a. Comparison of OIE recommended funding to Budget and Control Board recommendations and actual appropriation for the last four years.
   b. Judgments of higher education and State budget officials, and national experts regarding validity of the underlying assumptions of the formula.
   c. The extent to which appropriations are based on factors which directly relate to the activity being funded (e.g., physical plant maintenance based upon the characteristics of physical plant age and square footage).
   d. Measure the extent to which percentages and other calculations in the formula deviate from known institutional needs and determine the overall impact on the accuracy of the formula.

4. Criteria
   a. Legislative mandate.
b. CHE criteria. The Appropriation Formula provides for equitable sharing of State taxpayer support for South Carolina's public colleges and universities. Realistic lump-sum appropriations are computed impartially by using actual enrollments, proven student/faculty ratios, uniform salary assumptions, and justifiable average percentages to cover the agreed functions of the institutions.

D. Evaluation of CHE approval of new academic programs and elimination of unnecessary duplication.

1. Research Questions

   a. Has program review promoted high quality, necessary programs and prevented unnecessary duplication of programs?

   b. What cost savings, if any, have resulted from the elimination of unnecessary programs?

   c. Is the criteria used to evaluate programs fair and valid and is it perceived that way by the higher education community?

   d. Do the program review procedures obtain necessary and reliable information and allow for sufficient institutional participation?

   e. Does the CHE review the necessity and quality of existing academic programs in an adequate manner?

   f. To what extent have institutions been able to circumvent or otherwise negate the CHE program review process?

2. Research Methods

   a. Prepare a statistical summary of cumulative data since 1968 including programs approved, programs rejected or
withdrawn, cases where the quality of the program was significantly altered during review, and the likely costs associated with approved and rejected programs.

b. Select a sample of programs approved and rejected and examine the criteria used as a basis for action. Obtain justification of criteria from CHE staff and solicit evaluation of the criteria by the affected institutions.

c. Review the program review procedures and compare to other states' procedures. In the case of the review of existing programs compare with Florida, Wisconsin, and Louisiana.

d. Interview CHE staff, Commission members (especially members on the Standing Committee on Academic Program Development) and academic vice-presidents or provosts at institutions.

e. Follow the progress of proposed new academic programs through the Summer 1977 review cycle including meetings of the Advisory Committee, Standing Committee and Commission approval or rejection.

3. Measures

a. Ratings of performance from persons interviewed.

b. Estimate of cost avoidance achieved by rejection or withdrawal of unnecessary programs and elimination of existing programs.

c. Audit team evaluation of quality of staff work and criteria utilized.

d. Criteria
a. Program review procedures not only must be fair and firm, but also must be perceived as such.

b. Duplication may be necessary in programs with a high demand or which comprise the core of a general education, but in the more esoteric subjects where demand is small and in the more advanced and professional degree programs, where costs are high, even a small degree of duplications may be unnecessary.

c. Program review procedures should require new programs to meet reasonable tests of quality and not unnecessarily duplicate existing programs.

d. Coordinating agencies should encourage the termination of unsuccessful or unproductive programs, new or existing.

E. Evaluation of the overall adequacy and effectiveness of the Commission.

1. Research Questions
   a. What would be the impact of eliminating the CHE?
   b. Over the past ten years has there been any demonstrative relationship between activities of CHE and improvements in post secondary education?

2. Research Methods
   a. Personal interviews.

3. Measures
   a. Judgements of persons interviewed.
   b. Analysis by audit team of impact of CHE on changes in quality of post secondary education.
B. Critical Reactions from Respondents

In preparation for the review of the Alabama Commission on Higher Education, the second Evaluation Team in 1978 mailed copies of the South Carolina criteria to some 70 persons around the country and requested their critical reactions. The expectation was that a set of criteria could then be developed that would be meaningful in evaluating the Alabama Commission. Responses were solicited from statewide agencies of higher education, the LAC staff in South Carolina, groups like the Southern Regional Education Board and the Western Interstate Compact for Higher Education, the American Council on Education, Middle-States Accreditation, the American Association of University Professors, the Carnegie Council and assorted individual scholars of statewide coordination and planning of higher education. Recipients were asked to comment (on a confidential basis, if desired) on the potential utility of the South Carolina criteria as a model for Alabama and other states, and to suggest modifications as necessary. The following observations are based on the 40 replies which were received. (See Appendix I for a full list of the respondents.)

Although criticism of the criteria covered a broad array of issues, there were four major concerns that surfaced. These dealt with a fine and precise measurement of terms, the political dimensions of the criteria, the balance of constituency interviewed, and failure to address the agency's role as it relates to the academic community and the State. It was deemed important, therefore, to include specific commentaries on these issues.

1. Difficulties encountered in a precise and fair measurement of terms like "sufficient," "equitable," "improvement," and "quality."

The remarks of Morton reflected such a concern:
In general, the approach as outlined has a flavor of objectivity but in real application would likely be subjective. This is because so many of the criteria are not specific and leave room for almost absolute value judgment.

I would suggest a two-part approach—one wherein demonstrably objective criteria can be applied and the other frankly and openly the application of these judgmental measures which defy even a modicum of objectivity.

2. Difficulties associated with the political dimension of the implicit subjective aspects of the evaluation criteria.

Sirotkin noted that the specifications "at points...go beyond assessment of quality of product and process into determination of consistency with preconceived judgments."

Usdan found it important to be more explicit about any preconceived judgments relating to the political process:

the criteria seem somewhat mechanistic and not plugged into the political dynamics that are so vital to the effectiveness of any state board. In other words, the idiosyncratic nature of politics in each state and the educational-political interplay must be more specifically addressed. It is simply unfair to judge an agency and its specific actions without explicitly seeking to understand the political realities in any given state context.

Among the political realities Norris found governmental "hidden agendas" for statewide coordinating boards (e.g., "providing a buffer in dealing with politically difficult issues generated by local ambitions") which "should be acknowledged and evaluated as part of the audit design."

Miller elaborated at some length on the importance of the subtler political dimensions:

...any agency working in the political decision-making arena frequently finds it wise to work indirectly or behind the scenes. Both activities would not be obvious but nevertheless would be real. It should be possible for an evaluating team with its political sensitivity to identify the agency effectiveness along these lines. After it has been identified it will be necessary to write the report carefully in order not to destroy a good thing.... I would suggest...the possibility of looking at all of the criteria...on a second scale which evaluates each in terms
of effectiveness in these qualitative or judgmental ways. On such a scale it could turn out that the higher education agency got high marks for ignoring part of the legislative mandates because it would have been politically or educationally unwise to have attempted to implement it. Another example of such wisdom would be cases in which the political cost could be judged to be higher than the benefits to be gained.

The scale should also take into account the extent to which the agency establishes a general climate in which constructive activity occurs. When such a climate exists, it often is because the state agency has been willing to share credit for accomplishments which it played a major role in. The evaluating committee should look for and recognize this qualitative factor or set of factors. Often they will show up in situations in which the fact of sharing reduces the quantitative score. In some cases it will create a situation in which the apparent leadership or even the real leadership will have been taken by others but the state agency will have either served as catalyst or will have been responsible for creating a climate in which others would be interested and willing to take leadership. Finally, the state agency may have created a climate in which there is a general willingness to accept leadership from multiple sources whereas at an earlier point in time in the same state the situation may have been one in which some participants in the process would accept only those things which they themselves initiated.

The agency should be judged in terms of what is possible in the particular setting and the particular situation given the times, resources, attitudes, etc.... Modest accomplishment in some settings takes more ability than major ones in a different setting.

3. Lack of balance in the composition of clientele interviewed. (Interviewing was limited primarily to university and college leaders.)

Norris:

There is no visible awareness of the need to "consider the source" when evaluating and weighing the information received from the various sources to be interviewed. On some of the indicated factors it would appear that independent expert judgments of persons well removed from the local scene are a more reliable basis for conclusions than opinions expressed by constituents whose ox may have been either gored or gorged.

As an example of the "gored ox" problem, Hollander felt that the proposed criteria and methods created unrealistic expectations which / "would be hard for any agency of state government to meet fully." To rely predominantly for
reactions to activities of any agency on its potential adversaries, he noted, was not to anticipate favorable responses.

Thus, five respondents urged that executive and legislative branch personnel in state governments be added to the interview list, and Usdan suggested that influential lay figures from groups like the Chamber of Commerce and the League of Women Voters be included as well.

Miller pointed out that, regardless of a respondent's particular position and involvement, some observers are "more convincing for whatever reason" and that no room was built into the evaluation process for giving "differential weight" to such opinions. This is an element of concern particularly in "use surveys" in which no interviewer operates to sift the value of what is received.

4. Failure to address agency's role in relationship to the academic community and state government.

If previous comments have alerted us to the need to distinguish between objective and subjective data, to the value of looking at the statewide board in political as well as operational terms, and to the importance of seeking a much broader range of opinions, the next group of comments criticizes the South Carolina criteria for their failure to deal with the agency's particular role in relationship to the universities and colleges and the state government. For example, Friday considers the coordinating board model itself to be inferior since "a body that has little or no governance authority cannot have much effect on (the) vital functions (of delivering teaching, research and a variety of public services to the state)." Thus to him, criteria to evaluate a coordinating board without considering the possibility of better consolidated governing model act only to miss the central point.
review were approaching that complex and sensitive topic / too narrow a stress on cost savings and too simplistic an implied definition of duplicative programs.

Somewhat related are observations by Dunlop and Romesburg on the need for evaluation criteria to assess the linkages between program review and a) planning and b) budget allocations, and also those between budget allocations and planning.

Arceneaux noted that capital outlay procedures needed to be included as well, and Schmidtlein and Petersen suggested that agency staff quality ought to be examined. Petersen and Cole were concerned with determining whether an agency is merely a "responsive commission" or whether it demonstrates initiative in anticipating emerging issues.

Three of the respondents were particularly interested in exploring the impact of eliminating the CHE. They questioned the demonstrable relationship between activities of CHE and improvements in postsecondary education.

Millett, as a good social scientist, agonizes over problems of demonstrating cause-and-effect:

The only satisfactory method of social science research for these questions would be an experimental situation and a control situation. We can resort to this methodology in some kinds of psychological situations, but it is pretty difficult to get experimental results and control results in a political or economic setting.

Who can say what would have happened in South Carolina between 1967 and 1977 if there had been no Commission on Higher Education? Obviously, we can't relive 1967 to 1977 without the Commission. It would be interesting if we could. To be sure, some informed participants and observers may speculate with some reason about South Carolina events in the absence of the Commission. But their observations remain speculation.

You can look at some statistical measures: number of campuses added, new programs authorized, new building constructed, appropriations made for current operations, enrollment by counties, and degrees awarded by program field and level. But how can you know whether or not any of these quantitative changes occurred because there was a Commission on Higher Education? I would guess that the Commission helped to provide the rationale for change, helped to legitimize higher education progress, assisted in "selling" higher education to the power structure
and to the political representatives of that power structure. But I am guessing. Maybe there is a better way to answer. I hope so.

Dunlap suggests using the absence of negative evidence to demonstrate a positive: "What might have happened of a negative nature over the past ten years had not the Commission on Higher Education been in place?".

And Young wonders whether the LAC questions just quoted above would necessarily assess the costs as well as the benefits of Commission activities: 'Planning, review and auditing agencies have difficulty tackling the question of the real costs of their activity, many of which are transferred to the institutions providing services.'

We received numerous cautions about the dangers of using evaluation criteria based on South Carolina--or even a "national model"--to any other particular state. Godwin provides one such example:

Except in certain cases one may find that criteria that can be equally applied to different types of state higher education boards would have to be so general as to be inconclusive.... An evaluation of most assistance to a state and to a higher education agency might be one that focused primarily on higher education issues important to the state and secondarily on comparable standards or criteria for evaluating the state agency.

Kirkwood reinforces this warning:

Given the number of variables which make one state different from another, I would question the advisability or the soundness of seeking to compare the work of one commission on higher education with that of any other state. There will be some commonalities, but my guess is that the difference will be more numerous than the likenesses.

VI. COMPOSITE SET OF CRITERIA

Based on the critical reactions surveyed in the last Section, we have developed
a composite set of criteria covering eleven different categories. We would not for a moment suggest that persons evaluating statewide boards should attempt to use all the various criteria listed. But it is our hope that evaluators could pick and choose those criteria most appropriate to their particular state history and context.

And for the faint-hearted who are intimidated by the prospect of digesting another long list of assessment questions, we offer relief in the form of four short "overriding questions" submitted by Stephen Bailey/in lieu of detailed critical reactions to the South Carolina criteria which he found "silly and pretentious" and lacking "analytical focus and conceptual clarity":

1. Is the intellectual/analytical work of the Commission of high quality? Here, a peer review of selected reports and studies should be adequate.

2. Is there a sense on the part of the governor and the legislature that the Commission's activities are helpful to them in making at least quasi-rational judgments about higher education support and development?

3. Do the affected colleges and universities feel that they are being dealt with by the Commission in a fair and understanding manner--granted disagreements about final recommendations?

4. Does the Commission operate on the basis of a philosophy of higher education that goes beyond simplistic manpower, occupational, and formula projections, and that endorses a maximum amount of institutional autonomy in making decremental as well as incremental decisions?

The following comments, suggestions and questions constitute the "Long List."

A. **Previous Evaluation**

1. The status of the recommendations made by any previous evaluations should be considered.

B. **Commission Membership**

1. How does the membership differ from other states?

2. How are the members chosen? Can they be easily influenced by the institutions? by state officials?
3. What decisions can or cannot be made because of the membership?

C. Commission Staff
1. Has the staff shown initiative in raising new issues for concern by the commission; by the legislature?
2. Has the quality of the commission staff been strengthened since last evaluation?
3. How strong has the director's leadership been?
4. Could other SHEA's learn anything about effective internal management from this commission?
5. What is the capacity of the staff to adjust to new needs and improve internal functioning?
6. How do staff salaries compare to those of other state agencies? How do they compare to those of the institutions in the state?
7. What staff and other resources are available as compared to staff and resources in other agencies with similar functions?

D. Original Legislation
General Comments:
- Effectiveness of the Commission should be measured against the legislation establishing the agency.

Authority:
- A postsecondary commission with advisory power is likely to influence policy indirectly over the long term, most likely to be effective in defining the questions to be asked and the issues to be addressed.
- A coordinating board is less likely to be able to resolve issues in accordance with their views since the resolution will rest in the hands of other boards with other authority.
- The nature of a coordinating board's function is likely to result in only a portion of its recommendations being accepted and only a portion of its proposals being able to directly relate to outcomes.

- Indirect influences are most significant and these must be understood and perceived by the evaluating agency.

Opinion: A body that has little or no governance authority has little effect on vital functions of teaching, research, etc.

1. Did the legislation give the agency sufficient authority to operate effectively?
2.Were powers which were originally provided sufficiently utilized?
3. Did the wording of the statute agree with either national norms and/or local consensus regarding what the agency ought to be doing?

E. Goals and Objectives of the Agency

General Comments:
- The agency should list its own goals and objectives and seek its own evaluation of how well these objectives were achieved.
- It is less appropriate to talk about the "goals and objectives" of a state agency, than to talk about its functions, "duties and responsibilities" as per statement of overall purpose.
- If a particular action directed by state law resulted in a decline in quality or no significant improvement based on some national set of standards, the audit team's results should reflect why the Commission chose that course or action.

1. Has the Commission developed its own criteria for the evaluation of its performance?
2. Has there been a "self-evaluation" by the Commission?
3. To what extent have the recommendations of the Commission led to action?

4. Is this only a "responsive" Commission?

5. Has the Commission developed general principles of academic excellence against which it evaluates higher education in the state?

F. Sensitivity to the Political Scene

General Comments:

- It is unfair to judge an agency and its specific actions without explicitly seeking to understand the political realities in any given state context.

- Often it is necessary to work indirectly or behind the scenes. It could turn out that an agency may have ignored part of legislative mandates because it would have been politically or educationally unwise to have attempted to implement them.

- Primary responsibilities and governance role of the faculties should not be overlooked.

1. Has agency exercised judgment in cases in which the political cost could be judged to be higher than the benefits to be gained?

2. Has the agency established a general climate in which constructive activity occurs?

3. Has the agency been willing to accept leadership from multiple sources?

4. Is there a sense on the part of the governor and the legislature that the Commission's activities are helpful to them in making at least quasi-rational judgements about higher education support and development?

5. How has higher education fared in obtaining tax dollars from the legislature over the past five or ten years in comparison with other governmental functions such as highways, common schools, etc.?
6. How has higher education's workload increased compared with workload increases of other governmental functions?

7. Did the coordinating board make recommendations which were specific enough to be implemented? The extent to which a Commission's recommendations are not implemented may reflect on other groups outside the Commission.

G. Relationship to Postsecondary Institutions

1. Do the affected colleges and universities feel that they are being dealt with in a fair and understanding manner--granted disagreements about final recommendations?

2. To what extent do institutions go directly to the governor and legislature?

3. To what extent do institutions carry out policies developed by the Commission? Are they required/expect to?

H. Planning Process

General Comments:

- Any commission that has done its job properly would be hard put to find college presidents among its constituency who would agree enthusiastically they had been involved to the extent they believe they should be in the planning process.

- It may be difficult to find any state agency whose reports and recommendations are perceived to have contributed in a significant way to higher education.

- Appropriateness of board actions should be measured in relation to state plan for higher education.

1. Did the planning products identify those groups responsible for implementing recommendations? Did they include implementation plans? If certain actions were implemented, determine whether or not the desired outcome was actually realized.
2. What would be the impact of eliminating the Commission?

3. Who can say what would have happened since the last evaluation if there had been no Commission?

4. How can you know whether or not any quantitative changes occurred because there was a Commission?

5. Has the Commission helped provide the rationale for change, helped to legitimize higher education progress, assisted in "selling" higher education to the power structure and to political representatives?


7. Who participates in the budget process, the program review process? How are information systems and standards developed and maintained and who participates in this process?

8. To what extent in the planning process has in-depth analysis been undertaken to uncover pertinent issues? To what extent have solutions been proposed?

9. Does there appear to be a reluctance to consider innovative approaches?

I. Program Review Process

General Comments:
- No criteria have been developed to assess the quality of the results of the program approval process.
- Eliminating unnecessary duplication assumes that the Commission has developed its own criteria for assessing the worth of academic programs beyond the general legislative mandate and, through practice and policy, has established its own standards of necessity and quality.
- It is practically impossible to thoroughly examine the cost and quality of a program prior to implementation. The review of existing programs
becomes crucial.

1. What is the relationship between program review and determination of budget needs? If one is added, does new money go with it, and if one is dropped, is there a reduction in the amount of resources required?

2. Does the Commission have explicit authority to review and terminate programs?

3. Is there quality built into the program review process?

4. Are resources provided to enable the Commission to address quality issues in the program review function?

5. How do new programs relate to the state plan?

J. Budgeting Process

General Comments:

- The coordinating board should establish statewide priorities for funding of higher education.

- The Commission must be evaluated on its willingness to make hard choices, to balance the financial situation of the state against the ambitions of the institutions.

1. Does the Commission operate on the basis of a philosophy of higher education that goes beyond simplistic manpower, occupational and formula projection, and that endorses a maximum amount of institutional autonomy in making decremental as well as incremental decisions?

2. Does the board promote accountability by helping the state develop efficiency and effectiveness measures for higher education and related institutional performance with funding?

3. In light of changing conditions, does the formula-based budget give an accurate portrayal of an institution's financial needs?
4. Are budget requests in keeping with an overall state plan for higher education? Detailed budget analysis may or may not be assigned to a coordinating agency, but certainly the basic review against long-range plans should be conducted.

5. What is the Commission's role in influencing the capital outlay budget?

K. Reports and Studies

1. Is the intellectual/analytic work of the Commission of high quality?
2. Do studies have significant impact in the specific areas they address?
3. If a Commission study results in a recommendation to maintain the status quo in some area, and the legislature agrees to take "no action" as a result of the recommendation, that is a positive role. Such an activity may not result in an identified improvement in postsecondary education, but it has clearly protected existing quality.
4. Has the output of studies, plans, recommendations been realistic as well as sufficient in relation to staff size, funding and demand for information?

VII. CONCLUSION

A. Who Bells the Cat?

Whether one used the simplified Bailey "Big Four" or some variation on the more elaborate composite set of criteria, the question arises: "Who bells the cat?".

Sections IV and V reviewed most formal evaluation efforts to date, with an emphasis on the evaluation criteria. Let us here re-travel that ground with an emphasis on who does the evaluation.

I. The ACE Self-Evaluation Kit mentioned in Section IV contains guidelines put out by the Association of Governing Boards which are meant to be used by the
boards on themselves. While board self-evaluation is a desirable practice, it is not a sufficient answer to the problem of public accountability because of the obvious problems of bias and self-interest. We will, however, return to a variation of this idea in our concluding remarks to this Section.

2. University of Missouri Task Force: This group was appointed by the President of the University of Missouri and took as its charge to recommend a coordinating structure for the state of Missouri based on its studies of the main three types of models in nine states outside Missouri.

While this process overcame problems of objectivity by dealing with out-of-state material, it also lacked the attention to specific in-state problems which Godwin and Kirkwood among others especially urged be the primary focus of the evaluation.

3. Alabama Evaluations #1 and #2: These evaluations were carried out by committees appointed by the statewide board itself after consultations with university and college leaders. Each committee consisted of a majority of in-state persons having no direct associations with Alabama universities and colleges and a minority (of at least three persons) from outside the state, selected for their experience with various elements in the coordinating picture.

This mixed committee had the advantage of including in-state persons sensitive to indigenous political conditions and out-of-state persons aware of practices and problems in other states. Its major disadvantages were the lack of its own research staff, a modest budget and a six-month life span.

James Miller, Jr., a participant in the 1975 Evaluation Committee, later assessed this evaluation and noted (1975):
The attempt to secure a mix of in-state and out-of-state viewpoints and a mix of lay and expert members appears to this participant-observer to have worked well. So also did the decision to make the lay people and the professionals coequal "members" of the evaluation committee instead of differentiating members and consultants. Member participation in discussions was freer, more continuous, and more wide-ranging than is true when people are identified (or self-identify) with limited roles such as "expert on state politics" or "expert on alternative models from other states." Variations in expertise were recognized, but they did not create barriers to interaction. Such a committee structure would not necessarily work in all situations, but it merits consideration as an alternative to the more common practice of bringing in outside consultants to advise an in-state committee of lay or legislative leaders.

The 1975 Committee recommended a change in the method of appointing the next one. Even though Miller reported the Committee felt completely free to "be objective," the members felt that appearances of impartiality would be better served if the Alabama coordinating board appointed only one of the four in-state members, with the Governor and the presiding officer of each house of the legislature each appointing one of the other three.

The four Alabama members would then, with the help of the coordinating board, select the out-of-state professionals to join them as equal members of the Committee.

This recommendation was included in a subsequent bill to strengthen the Commission, but as earlier pages reported, that bill passed only one house and as a consequence, the 1979 Committee was appointed by the original method.

4. AED Studies in Mississippi and West Virginia: The Academy for Educational Development undertook evaluations of the consolidated governing boards in Mississippi and West Virginia at the behest of state government bodies in each state. (The AED study in Florida is a somewhat different case and will be dealt with below.)
The AED brought both a knowledge of experiences in other states and a potential for impartiality to its studies which in-state agencies and persons would find difficult to equal. On the other hand, if those stressing the primary importance of unique state characteristics (both educational and political) are correct, then an evaluation process lacking sensitive in-state participants may also be deficient.

5. AED Study in Florida: The AED study in Florida contrasts with the two just mentioned because in Florida the commissioning agent, the Joint Executive-Legislative Commission on Postsecondary Education, is not a passive recipient of the AED findings but is itself actively engaged in a broad inquiry into post-secondary education in that state. As a further interesting variation, the Florida Study Commission has asked some out-of-state consultants (including the senior author of this study) to comment on certain aspects of the AED reports. Thus the Florida example combines the strength of in-state persons, an authorized staff, an out-of-state professional consulting firm and the use of individual out-of-state persons for ad hoc purposes. What it lacks is sufficient time: six months is not enough for a careful study!

6. Legislative Audit Reviews in Connecticut and South Carolina: The Connecticut study is listed here along with the South Carolina one merely to warn observers not to judge things by their outer labels. While both reports are products of state legislative program evaluation units, the Connecticut one falls far short of the high professional standards espoused by the emerging national Legislative Program Evaluation (LPE) unit in the National Council of State Legislatures. Even the much more carefully done South Carolina report fails to provide a balanced appraisal of the Commission on Higher Education's achievements as well as its alleged shortcomings. But at least the South Carolina process
shows the potential of a trained professional evaluation staff, adequate time and budget, and the use of selected out-of-state experiences, reports and consultants.

B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Patterns

What needs careful judgment is whether the gains in employing state professional evaluation staff who are generally experienced in evaluating public policy implementation but only passingly familiar with the subtle nuances of complex academic issues (the staff must bounce from one policy area to another) outweigh those to be expected from employing persons not trained in evaluation techniques as such but who are much more sensitive to the academic values involved.

An alternative dilemma is that between using a national consulting firm that has staff both trained in program evaluation and specializing in higher education issues, but who know less about the particular educational and political conditions unique to a state, and employing in-state persons with the opposite strengths.

The Florida pattern combines both the strength of an in-state commission and staff with that of a national consulting firm specializing in higher education problems, plus the ad hoc use of individual out-of-state professionals.

The particular choice which a given state may make among the various alternatives will obviously emerge out of the conditions then prevailing in that state, but ideally the process of evaluation selected would reflect some sensitivity to the above general analysis of gains and losses associated with different evaluations agents.

One major variable in choosing the type of evaluation agent(s) hinges on whether the assessment is to be a built-in periodic practice or an ad hoc exercise generated only when the accumulation of criticisms of a statewide board seems to justify it.
The spread of sunset legislation (mentioned in Section I) and the Legislative Program Evaluation movement reinforces our recommendation, based on the Alabama experience, that the evaluation become a regular process, not connected with any particular crisis or disagreement.

If this is done, then choice of evaluation agents will have to take cost considerations more carefully into account. An assessment to be undertaken every four years, for example, may necessitate a more modest budget than one mounted only once in a decade.

Whatever the choice of timing, budget and evaluation agent, another suggestion received has convinced us to recommend that the process begin by asking the statewide board itself to specify the criteria by which it hopes to be evaluated. Fuller and Cooper both made this point, which came with particular force from Cooper, former staff member of the South Carolina Legislative Audit Council staff:

The audit plan/criteria were developed by the Legislative Commission staff. That was a mistake. Our first step, and I suggest you consider this as your first step in Alabama, should have been to ask the Higher Education Commission to propose the criteria they use (or will use in the future) to evaluate their own performance. One standard for any organization is to have a plan for evaluating its performance.

Obviously the choice of evaluation would not stop with the statewide board's own suggestions, but it is a good place to begin. The evaluation agency chosen should then undertake a critique of the suggested criteria, discuss any disagreements with the statewide board and then finally establish the formal criteria.

Once this has been done in one cycle, the existing criteria will help the statewide board to monitor the accumulation of relevant data so that in the next evaluation process, most information needed will already be available. Later evaluation agents will always retain the right to modify or abandon the earlier criteria (and the statewide board can always suggest changes) but over a period
time, both by trial and error in that state and the power of examples from other
states, there should emerge a more satisfactory evaluation process.

Having said this we are aware that it is considerably easier to write about
a good process than to deliver on it. Few people or agencies seem to enjoy being
evaluated, and this is particularly true in higher education where academics are
fond of saying that "delicate matters relating to the life of the mind" cannot
be crudely evaluated. In this regard another member of the South Carolina Audit
staff (Cole) responded to our letter by linking problems in evaluating statewide
boards to broader problems of assessing outcomes in higher education in general.
Below (with her order somewhat transposed) she first lays out the Legislative
Audit Council approach and then issues a challenge to academics to enter the fray
and try to do better:

The evaluator seeking criteria is immediately plunged into
philosophic questions concerning the nature of higher education
in general and State-funded higher education in particular. A
Legislative Program Evaluation agency must consider whether or
not the taxpayers are receiving the greatest benefit possible
from the money invested in higher education. Particularly
during a time of shrinking resources and declining enrollments,
the proper role of the publicly-funded institution becomes an
issue. Programs which a private institution may choose to offer may be
a luxury for a public institution. Each public institution should
develop its particular strengths rather than attempting to grow in
all directions. The coordinating board must be evaluated on its
willingness to make the hard choices, to balance the financial
situation of the State against the ambitions of the institutions
while trying to provide the best possible educational opportunities
for the citizens of the state.

...it is imperative that higher education agencies place more
emphasis on self-evaluation and developing measures for assessing
their own programs. Otherwise the task of deciding the desired
outcomes of such programs will always be left to people outside the
field of higher education.

...the evaluation of such coordinating boards is a difficult task
because of a past reluctance on the part of educators to quantify
most areas of higher education. When the auditor tries to examine
how the agency performs and assesses its programs, he finds himself
attempting to evaluate programs which resist the very idea of
measurement.
While educators often repeat the myth that higher education cannot be measured, several educators did express to us the idea that it is the academicians themselves who have an inborn resistance to quantification and accountability. It may be inevitable that this attitude is absorbed to some extent by the regulating/coordinating board. At the very least, it inhibits the board's efforts to impose measurements.

Howard Bowen is one scholar who has accepted the challenge of statements like that just quoted. His recent book *Investment in Learning* (1979) provides much information on outcomes in higher education and he himself has well described the central dilemmas in attempting to measure such outcomes. We can do no better to end this work than to return to the opening broad themes of evaluation in Academe by associating ourselves completely with Bowen's plea (1974, p. 121):

> To evaluate outcomes is difficult partly because it is hard to sort out causes and effects, partly because the final outcomes may not be known for decades and partly because some of the most significant outcomes may be impossible to identify or measure in objective terms. Yet, despite the difficulties, educators have an obligation to assess outcomes as best they can, not only to appease outsiders who demand accountability but also to improve internal management....There are some useful procedures for obtaining quantitative data on outcomes, and ongoing research (which should be multiplied many times) will produce more ways of measuring outcomes. Inevitably, however, the assessment of outcomes will require large elements of judgment. One of the problems is to bring to bear on evaluation the judgment of professionally qualified but disinterested persons (1974, p.121).
APPENDIX A
Structure of State Coordinating Boards

(1) **No coordinating structure**—self explanatory;

(2) **Voluntary association**—some coordinating structure, with greater or lesser degrees of activity, formed voluntarily by institutional initiative;

(3) **Advisory coordinating agency**—state-mandated agency which does not supersede institutional or segmental governing boards and gives advice and recommendations on higher education to institutions and state agencies;

(4) **Regulatory coordinating agency**—state-mandated agency which does not supersede institutional or segmental governing boards and has final approval powers in at least certain key policy areas;

(5) **Consolidated governing board**—one single board which both governs and coordinates all public higher education within the state, except possibly public community colleges.
APPENDIX B

Proposed National Objectives for Higher Education

A. Carnegie Commission Purposes of Higher Education (1973)

(1) The provision of opportunities for the intellectual, aesthetic, ethical, and skill development of individual students, and the provision of campus environments which can constructively assist students in their more general developmental growth.
(2) The advancement of human capability in society at large.
(3) The enlargement of educational justice for the postsecondary age group.
(4) The transmission and advancement of learning and wisdom.
(5) The critical evaluation of society--through individual thought and persuasion--for the sake of society's self-renewal.

B. National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary Education (1973)

(1) Each individual should be able to enroll in some form of postsecondary education appropriate to that person's needs, capability, and motivation.
(2) Each individual should have a reasonable choice among those institutions of postsecondary education that have accepted him or her.
(3) Postsecondary education should make available academic assistance and counseling that will enable each individual, according to his or her needs, capability, and motivation, to achieve his or her educational objectives.
(4) Postsecondary education should offer programs of formal instruction and other learning opportunities and engage in research and public service of sufficient diversity to be responsive to the changing needs of individuals and society.
(5) Postsecondary education should strive for excellence in all instruction, research, public service, and other learning opportunities.
(6) Institutions of postsecondary education should have sufficient freedom and flexibility to maintain institutional and professional integrity and to meet, creatively and responsibly, their educational goals.
(7) Institutions of postsecondary education should use financial and other resources both efficiently and effectively and employ procedures sufficient to enable those who provide the resources to determine whether those resources are achieving desired outcomes.
(8) Adequate financial resources should be made available to permit the accomplishment of the foregoing objectives. This is a responsibility that should be shared by a combination of public and private sources, including federal, state, and local government, and by students, parents, and other concerned individuals and organizations.
APPENDIX C

Related Examples of Evaluations of Process

In 1972 a two-year Educational Governance Project was funded by the United States Office of Education under Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Headed by Roald Campbell and Tim Mazzo Jr., and based in the College of Education at Ohio State University, the Project produced case studies of twelve states and two major reports (Campbell and Mazzoni, 1974a and 1974b). Not even a staff of four senior persons working with thirteen research associates over the two years was able to overcome the problems of assessing output rather than process: "No statements are made by us about the linkage between a given model and changes in such areas as teacher performance or student achievement. Though we personally believe that structure can affect policy outcomes of this sort, the many intervening variables and the limitations of our data preclude any but the most speculative comment" (Campbell and Mazzoni, 1974a, p. 46).

In another example of their scholarly caution, Campbell and Mazzoni first note that "structures, intentionally or not, are never neutral. Each makes it easier for some values to be realized rather than others." They decline however, to state their own preferences for which values ought to be realized. Instead they offer a description of the values of both supporters and critics of each of the major models analyzed (for example, those who place more importance on accountability may favor the centralized executive model, while those more interested in insulating education from partisan politics may prefer the separate agency model).
Another major study—this one of state legislatures—also felt obligated to evaluate process rather than outcome but exhibited no reserve about professing which legislative structures and procedures ought to be valued. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures received a Ford Foundation grant in 1970 to make a fourteen-month Legislative Evaluation Study. The resulting report (Burns, 1971) explains how panels of experts finally evolved five major criteria, employing seventy-three total subheadings, by which each state legislature was judged and rated. All fifty states were then ranked on each of the major criteria—functionality, accountability, information, independence, and representation, and a composite state rating was offered, with California and New York leading the scores and Alabama and Wyoming at the bottom of the list. More importantly, based on the ideal model, recommendations were offered for the improvement of the legislative process in each state. While the research team agreed that legislative results were more important than the means used to achieve them, it argued that, methodologically, evaluation could really be made only of process and that in the long run, this might prove to be the more crucial variable.
### Statewide Educational Planning—Policies and Processes

1. Indicate your opinions regarding the board's past and present performance in statewide planning by responding "yes" or "no" to the following questions, and if appropriate, whether you feel that the practice needs refinement and updating, or whether a new practice should be initiated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Needs refinement</th>
<th>Should initiate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Has the board adopted specific policies and long-range objectives to guide the development of postsecondary education services in the state?</td>
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<td>b. Are the methods for achieving each objective clearly stated in a &quot;master plan&quot; or other public document?</td>
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<td>c. Does the plan define the unique role and scope of services offered by each institution?</td>
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<td>d. Do you feel that the board has sufficient authority or influence to see that the plan is implemented?</td>
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<td>e. Do you feel that the objectives and plans are based on valid and realistic projections regarding the foreseeable future?</td>
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<td>f. Is there provision for periodic review and updating of the plan to meet new needs?</td>
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<td>g. Do you feel that the planning process adequately involves all sectors, including the private and proprietary institutions?</td>
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<td>h. Does the plan provide an effective means to eliminate unnecessary duplications of programs and services?</td>
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<td>i. Are the objectives set forth in the plan and the methods of attaining them consistent with available or realistically projected fiscal resources?</td>
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<td>j. Are there established procedures by which the board receives reports and evaluates actions taken to implement the plan?</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. Do you feel that the long-range (five years plus) and the intermediate or short-range (one to three years) objectives of the plan have the understanding of:</td>
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<td>The public higher education institutions?</td>
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<td>The private higher education institutions?</td>
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<td>The proprietary institutions?</td>
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<td>The present membership of the board?</td>
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<td>Most state fiscal and administrative officers?</td>
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<td>The general public?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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</table>

2. Do you feel that these groups are supporting these plans? Please circle the numbers under question k which indicate those who are supporting the plans.

3. Comments on this topic:
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING STRUCTURES FOR COORDINATING AND GOVERNANCE OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION

General

1. **Program Control** - Ability to establish sound pattern of institutional missions; to distribute programs among institutions in educationally sound and efficient manner; and to discontinue old and establish new programs in a rational manner.

2. **Resource Allocation and Use** - Ability to define fiscal needs on a coordinated and responsible basis in relation to specific institutional missions and overall staff needs. Includes consistency to budget development and presentation procedures, efficiency and effectiveness of procedures, and control and evaluation of application of resources.

3. **Long-Range Planning** - Ability to conduct continuous and meaningful long-range planning for higher education in the state for all post-secondary institutions and to implement the resulting plans.

4. **Assignment of Responsibility** - Ability to identify responsibility and accountability for conduct of higher education at institutional and state level. Includes an appropriate differentiation between responsibilities for broad policy establishment and management within policy guidelines.

5. **Comprehensiveness of Purview** - Degree to which structure for coordination and governance permits and encourages coordination among all segments of post-secondary education, including the private and community junior college sectors.

Influences

6. **Institutional Autonomy and Influence** - Ability of institutions to maintain individual educational character, to exercise appropriate control of own operations and approaches to assigned programs, and to bring institutional and educational considerations to bear in state-level decision making affecting higher education.

7. **Lay Representation** - Degree to which representatives of the lay public of the state participate in coordination and governance of higher education.

8. **State Government Influence** - Degree to which state government, executive and legislative, can influence development of higher education in concert with other programs of the state, while encouraging integrity and continuity of the higher education enterprise.

Administration

9. **Span of Control** - Degree to which coordinating and governing bodies and staff thereof are able to act on the basis of an adequate familiarity and understanding of the individual operating units and institutions for which they are responsible.

10. **Costs of Bureaucracy** - Degree to which staff and other dollar costs of the structure for coordination and governance can be kept at a level consistent with the overall requirements of the activity.

11. **Processes of Bureaucracy** - Ability of structure of coordination and governance to operate with the minimum necessary paper flow, review levels, and related attributes of bureaucratic processes.

12. **Responsiveness** - Ability of institutions and of coordinating structure to maintain the flexibility of operation required for timely and efficient response to specific needs and requirements.

13. **Agency Staffing** - Degree to which nature and responsibilities of coordinating or governing bodies permit the attraction of appropriately qualified staff.
University of Missouri Task Force (1972)

POSTULATED AND OBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE STRUCTURES
FOR COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE ACCORDING TO EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Advisory Coordinating Agency</th>
<th>Coordinating Agency With Regulatory Powers</th>
<th>Consolidated Governing Board</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does Not Meet Criterion</td>
<td>Partially Meets Criterion</td>
<td>Meets Criterion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Program Control</td>
<td>![Status suggested from postulates]</td>
<td>![Status specified by conclusions from case studies]</td>
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<td>2. Resource Allocation and Use</td>
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<td>3. Long-Range Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Assignment of Responsibility</td>
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<td>![Status specified by conclusions from case studies]</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Comprehensive-ness of Purview</td>
<td>![Status suggested from postulates]</td>
<td>![Status specified by conclusions from case studies]</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Institutional Autonomy and Influence</td>
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<td>7. Lay Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. State Government Influence</td>
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<td>9. Span of Control</td>
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<td>10. Costs of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>![Status suggested from postulates]</td>
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<td>11. Processes of Bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Responsiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Agency Staffing</td>
<td>![Status suggested from postulates]</td>
<td>![Status specified by conclusions from case studies]</td>
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APPENDIX G

Five Major Roles And Related Tasks of a Consolidated Governing Board As Identified by the Academy for Educational Development/Governance of Public Higher Education in Mississippi (1979)

1. Governing Board of Individual Institutions

As the governing board of individual institutions, the Board of Trustees has the responsibility to:

- establish within the institutions a well defined decision making process that sets forth the roles of the president, the faculty senate (or similar group), the student senate (or similar group), staff representatives, and students;

- appropriately classify governance decisions as academic affairs, faculty affairs, student affairs, non-faculty personnel affairs, or administrative and financial affairs;

- develop, above the level of the institution, a grievance procedure for fact-finding and recommendation;

- clearly differentiate between governance and management and between work planning and work performance;

- delegate managerial autonomy to the institutions' administrations;

- develop and maintain a comprehensive management information system that provides planning and evaluative information; and,

- periodically evaluate management and governance performance.

2. Statewide Planning

As the entity responsible for state-wide higher education planning, the Board of Trustees should, at least for the state universities:

- periodically determine the State's higher education needs in instruction, public service, and research by considering geographic access, student costs, and State development patterns;

- consider the role of private institutions, junior colleges, and accredited postsecondary proprietary schools in meeting state-wide needs;

- develop differentiated missions or roles for the universities that consider:
standards or quality; admissions standards; instructional programs; public service programs; research programs; enrollment size; and, special expectations;

--provide for broad-based community, faculty, and student inputs into the planning process;

--periodically publish a master plan that indicates the aspirations and strengths of the system, areas that should be improved, strategies that should be improved, and anticipated financial requirements of the system; and,

--develop a process that relates the master plan and institutional mission to facility requirements.

3. Statewide Coordination

The Board of Trustees should:

--maintain a current and comprehensive inventory of the programs the institutions offer and of correlated indicators of program productivity;

--use a well-defined process of periodic program review and evaluation;

--develop and maintain an intelligible budgetary process that provides for the equitable allocation of state-appropriated general fund revenues according to statewide plans, institutional missions, enrollment patterns, and special institutional needs;

--maintain for all institutions a well-defined and flexible personnel and classification plan that can be adjusted for varied missions and programs;

--develop and implement an equitable, mission-related plan for physical facilities expansion or renovation; and,

--develop and maintain a comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date information system that provides useful information to the institutions and, for policy decisions, to the Board and the Legislature.
4. **Insulation from Political Interference**

In fulfilling this aspect of its role, the Board should:

--provide evidence of its commitment to protecting academic freedom;

--support the managerial autonomy of the institutions; and,

--commit itself to a philosophy of political accountability without political subservience.

5. **Public Advocacy**

The Board needs:

--an effective program of public information;

--the reasonable cooperation of the executive branch of the State Government;

--the reasonable cooperation of the legislative branch of the State Government; and,

--the interested and informed opinions of groups on the performance, needs, and future of higher education in Mississippi.
APPENDIX H

Six Essential Characteristics to be Sought in
State Government Organizational Arrangements from the

1. The state government organization for higher education should be comprehensive in scope, including two-year programs in technical education, two-year college transfer programs, baccalaureate programs, graduate programs, and first professional programs.

2. The state government organization for higher education should be concerned with the welfare of private as well as of public higher education institutions in the state.

3. The state government organization for higher education should be oriented toward the concerns of state government with the needs for higher education services, access to higher education, the fullest possible utilization of all available resources for higher education service, the delivery of services of appropriate quality, the elimination of duplicating programs of high cost and limited enrollment, the effective performance of higher education services, and the efficient performance of higher education services.

4. In order to fulfill its role of giving attention to the state concerns with higher education services, the state organization should not be vested with the authority and responsibility of campus governance.

5. The state organization for higher education should be provided with the requisite authority and responsibility to prepare periodically a state master plan, to coordinate program offerings, to undertake analytical studies, and to develop standards of appropriation support for the current operations and the capital plant requirements of higher education institutions in the state for consideration of the Governor and the state Legislature.

6. The state organization for higher education should be supported by the elected officials of state government without demanding or expecting the state organization to be politically subservient to elected officials.
APPENDIX I

Respondents to Informational Request on South Carolina Criteria Relative to Its Appropriateness and Utility as a Model for Review of State Boards in Other States

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Campbell, Roald and T. L. Mazzoni, Jr. State Governance Models for the Public Schools. Columbus, Ohio: Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, 1974a.


Florida. Joint Executive-Legislative Study Commission on Post-Secondary Education. Postsecondary Education. Tallahassee, 1980.

Florida. See also Academy for Educational Development above.


Mississippi. See Academy for Educational Development above.


West Virginia. See Academy for Educational Development above.

1. E. D. Duryea, *Perceptions of Faculty-Governing Board Relations, 1900-1969* (September 1978)


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