The paper examines the extent to which national identification changed among 91 Americans who immigrated to Australia from 1974 to 1978. The objective was to gain a deeper understanding of the bonds between individuals and nations by examining the decisions and decision processes of people who had actually been confronted with and taken advantage of a viable alternative to their native American citizenship. Survey data were gathered for 290 American migrants. Of these, 91 (all adults who had migrated and adopted Australian citizenship between 1974 and 1978) were selected for further analysis. A major area of investigation centered around reasons for the citizenship change. Responses given most frequently were a desire to participate in the Australian political process and a chance for career advancement. Findings indicated that people who changed citizenship because of career advancement reasons were more likely to express conflicts and regrets concerning their citizenship decisions than were people who changed for political obligation reasons and that those who had had a longer time to reconcile their new legal citizenship status with prior national identification expressed less inner conflict over their decisions. The conclusions are that because national identification is such a deep-seated part of individual self-concept, changes in citizenship are difficult and costly for many people, earlier values and attitudes are likely to intrude in the form of continuing conflict and regret, and some people are unable to change their subjective national self-identification to the country to which they perceive they owe their political obligation. (Author/DB)
CITIZENSHIP DECISION-MAKING: DURABILITY AND CHANGE OF NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE AND IDENTIFICATION AMONG AMERICAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA

by

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ABSTRACT

CITIZENSHIP DECISION-MAKING: DURABILITY AND CHANGE OF NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE AND IDENTIFICATION AMONG AMERICAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA

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The research reported in this paper investigates citizenship change decision-making from the perspectives of adult socialization and change of national self-concept. Citizenship is the legal and public counterpart of subjective national self-identification. Insofar as national self-identification is a deeply internalized component of a person's total self-concept, change of citizenship can be expected to be psychologically stressful for adults.

The data analyzed here consist of a stratified random sample of Americans who became naturalized citizens in Australia between 1974 and 1978, and were interviewed during 1978. Their reasons for changing citizenship and their attitudes towards their change are analyzed. We find that reactions vary markedly with the particular reasons people develop for changing and with the strength of national identification. Those who changed for self-oriented reasons of career advancement are likely to have greater difficulties in adjusting to their new citizenship status, while migrants whose citizenship-change decisions were based on the desire to participate in Australian political life or on a sense of moral or political obligation to Australia are considerably more content with their decisions. In addition to reasons for change, other key factors in the adjustment process are the passage of time, which appears to be necessary for processes of cognitive dissonance reduction and resolution to operate, and a change of subjective national identification.
Citizenship is the fundamental condition for full membership in a political community. For most people, it is an objective legal status acquired passively by virtue of being born within the jurisdictional boundaries of a given nation-state. Unlike most other acquired statuses, which divide a nation's population into distinctive subgroups, citizenship status is an inclusive category, whose membership generally encompasses the large majority of the population in all modern societies. Because of this inclusiveness, citizenship for most native-born nationals begins and remains a relatively recessive and unproblematic status throughout life. Its associated rights, responsibilities, traditions, and symbolism are learned early in the lives of most people through intentional and unintentional socialization processes (Piaget, 1951; Davies, 1968; Sigel, 1970; Easton and Dennis, 1969; Middleton, et al., 1970; Tajfel, et al., 1970).

Through these learning experiences, the meanings of citizenship status in a particular national community are revealed, subjectively defined, and internalized to become integral parts of the individual's sense of himself or herself as a person. To the extent that these socialization experiences are effective, the individual acquires a subjective sense of national identification, which is actually a personal translation and transformation of the objective nationality status. The sense of national identification may then be a major force that links and binds individuals together into a more or less cohesive national community.

This perspective thus assumes that subjective national identification, like other learned orientations toward oneself and others, is variable; it is unevenly, but probably normally distributed in a national population. Also in common with other components of self-regard, national identification serves fundamental needs and values for individuals who acquire that identity. In addition to providing a basis for shared status recognition with fellow citizens, national identification also provides the individual with a sense of belonging to an on-going society whose collective goals, values and traditions are taken also as his or her own goals, values and traditions, thereby lending structure and interpretability to daily public experience, to reflections on the national past, and to anticipations of the future.

Although national identification normally exists as a basic but background consideration in most peoples' lives, under certain (usually short-term) conditions it becomes more salient (e.g., during international conflicts, patriotic celebrations, instances of treason, special instruction in national history and culture, etc.). However, for people who leave their native
country to take up residence in another country, feelings of national identification often surge to the forefront of consciousness, and sometimes become critically problematic. This is especially likely for migrants who, confronted directly with a previously non-existent comparison and real choice of objects of national identification, entertain the possibility of changing their legal citizenship status, and eventually do so.

In this paper we explore the meanings of citizenship and national identification by examining the decisions and decision processes of a sample of American migrants in Australia who became naturalized Australian citizens during the 1970's. By studying in detail the thoughts and feelings of people who have actually been confronted with a viable alternative to their native American citizenship, we hope to gain a deeper understanding of the forces that strengthen or weaken the bonds between individuals and nations, a relationship which, for most people, is questioned, if at all, in fantasy only, rather than in action.

We chose Australia as the site in which to study American migration and expatriation because over the past three decades, Australia has been second only to Canada as a recipient of American migrants (Finifter, 1974). Our preference for Australia was based in part on considerations of efficiency in conducting an exploratory study (the size and dispersion of the U.S. population in Canada are many times greater than in Australia), but primarily because we thought that Australia's considerably greater distance from the United States, relative to Canada's propinquity, would mean that Americans who migrate to Australia would have relatively greater commitment to their migration decisions, and would thereby be better able to recall the life situations and decision processes that led up to and followed migration and change of citizenship. We hope that the Australian findings provide a basis for us or others to conduct comparative studies to test these assumptions.

Like the United States (and recently even more so), Australia may be considered a nation of immigrants. Its indigenous Aborigine population currently comprises less than 1% of its total population, but slightly over 20% of its current population is foreign-born (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1978, p. 103). In contrast, the 1970 census reports less than 5% of the U.S. population as foreign-born. Even the most generous estimate of illegal aliens would not increase the percentage of foreign-born in the U.S. to half that for Australia. However, the population of Australia was based much more heavily on British stock, and the base of ethnicity did not broaden appreciably until relatively recently. Moreover, the proportion of the population that is foreign-born has been increasing rapidly in the last thirty years, while that of the United
States has been declining. Australia's distant location and the difficulties related simply to reaching its shores were initial barriers to mass migration from Europe. Only when the vulnerability of the country to foreign invasion, aggravated by its vast coastline and sparse population, was made clear during World War II, did governmental concerns to populate Australia more heavily lead to aggressive efforts to recruit migrants. The diversity of the population grew enormously in the years following World War II. Not only did the percentage of foreign-born increase rapidly, but their social and ethnic origins became increasingly heterogeneous. Consequently, it has been within the lifetime of the average Australian adult that the nation has changed dramatically from one almost entirely of British stock to one which, while certainly still dominated by the British presence, is becoming increasingly pluralistic in origins and values.

In view of this recent demographic history, it is not surprising that efforts to integrate migrants into the mainstream of Australian life and values would be extensive. An obviously important aspect of national integration in an increasingly diverse ethnic population is the attainment of national citizenship, and the policies of the Australian government, particularly during the 1960's and early 1970's, placed great stress on the achievement of citizenship by the "new Australians." It became common, for example, to see newspaper ads featuring the Minister of Immigration urging that migrants become citizens.

For many migrants with occupations in certain professions, the question of citizenship became inextricably linked with job and career opportunities, since the practice of many professions required the adoption of Australian citizenship. The practice of law, for example, is limited to citizens. Although there is some variation by state, teaching in the public schools tends to be restricted to citizens. More obviously, permanent positions of any significance (and, in many cases, clerical and other lower status positions as well) in the federal public service are limited to citizens. Again, state laws and practices vary somewhat, but citizenship is required for most positions in state and local government as well. The citizenship requirement also extends to positions with instrumentalities of government, such as the national airline, the telecommunication service, police departments, and public social work agencies. Because Australia has relatively extensive social welfare programs, the number and variety of jobs and careers subject to a citizenship requirement is quite substantial. Excluding the armed forces, 31% of the labor force is employed by the various levels of government or their agencies (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1978, p. 159, 1977 data). (In contrast, only 18% of the U. S.
labor force is employed in the public sector (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1968, p. 416, Table No. 676, 1977 data)).

Despite these links between citizenship and occupational opportunities, these are by no means the only incentives for adopting Australian citizenship. Australia is extremely interesting geographically. It has an appealing climate. It is developing very rapidly and yet has a high degree of civil order and security. It has a national symbolism and ideology that stresses its growth, its tremendous potential for development, and its political independence even within the Commonwealth. The early to mid-seventies were times of substantial political activity which aroused the interest of many Americans. And the common appellation of "new Australians" applied to migrants deemphasizes their nativity to a greater extent than the "hyphenated-American" usage common in the United States. Thus, from a variety of perspectives, pressures and incentives for adopting Australian citizenship by migrants to the country are relatively salient.

CHANGE OF CITIZENSHIP AMONG AMERICAN MIGRANTS TO AUSTRALIA

Recent Trends

Between 1945 and 1976, 3070 Americans were granted Australian citizenship. In each decade since 1945, the mean number of Americans who adopted Australian citizenship yearly has risen sharply. Between 1945 and 1949, an average of 31 Americans per year changed to Australian citizenship; in the 1950's, the figure was 36.4; in the 1960's, 103; and between 1970 and 1976, it rose to an average annual count of 257. The peak year was 1974, in which 357 Americans were naturalized in Australia. The total represents almost 10% of the available American settler pool. Numerous other Americans are naturalized in other countries, most notably Canada, which has historically received many times the number of American immigrants that Australia has (Finifter, 1974).

Table 1 presents data on the number of Americans naturalized in Australia and in other countries from 1967 to 1976, and also the number of Australians naturalized in the United States. These data show a clear upward trend in the number of Americans giving up their citizenship for that of another country, while Australian naturalization in the United States is more or less stable. It is a matter of some surprise to Americans that, in the most recent years for which data are available, the number of Americans becoming naturalized in Australia has exceeded the count of Australians being naturalized in the U.S.
Table 1

Naturalization of Americans in Other Countries, and U.S. Naturalization of Australians, 1967-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Americans Naturalized in Other Countries</th>
<th>Americans Naturalized in Australia</th>
<th>Australians Naturalized in U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>770*</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>771*</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
1. Annual Reports, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice. The figures reported are for Americans expatriated because of naturalization in another country. Since exchange of information between countries depends on treaties, these are minimum estimates of the number of Americans being naturalized in other countries.


* The figures actually reported for 1969 and 1970 are 4 and 1537. During 1969, the Department of State delayed expatriations while awaiting the Attorney General's interpretation of Afroyim v. Rusk. Since the discontinuity in figures is an artifact of this waiting period, we have averaged the figures for these two years.
Sample

Between July and November of 1978, we interviewed 290 American migrants in Australia. The samples from which their names came were drawn with the cooperation and assistance of The Australian Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA), according to a procedure of mediated access. The study design resulted in four separate stratified random samples of eligible persons in three different categories of migrants:

1. "New Settlers:" These are Americans who arrived in Australia as "settlers" (i.e., with visas designating them as "permanent residents") between January 1977 and March 1978;

2. "Status Changers:" Americans who arrived in Australia as "temporary residents" at any time in the past, but who applied for and were granted permanent residence visas between January 1977 and March 1978;

3. "Citizenship Changers:" Americans who were granted Australian citizenship from January 1974 through March 1978.

In addition to these three independent stratified (by state of residence in Australia and sex) random samples, a separate sample was drawn of persons in the New Settler group who were accepted for immigration because of their special occupational qualifications. Eligibility for each sampling frame was defined primarily as being born in the United States (or its possessions and territories) and being or having been an American citizen. Persons younger than 18 years of age were excluded, and only one adult member (the first arrived or oldest) was designated as eligible in cases of family groups.

Our intention in diversifying the sampling frames was to study subgroups of American migrants who would be theoretically meaningful for a study of national commitment and citizenship decision-making. These samples range widely on a presumed continuum of national commitment to Australia: New Settlers are least committed, Citizenship Changers are most committed, and Status Changers are intermediate. Of equal importance is that this sample design allowed us to obtain a representative sample of a group of American migrants who are theoretically very important, but who would be difficult to find because of their "rarity" in less focused sampling plans, that is, those American migrants who changed citizenship.

The present paper focuses almost entirely on the special sample of citizenship changers, although occasional references are made to data drawn from the other samples for comparative purposes. Our major concern here is the meaning of citizenship and citizenship change for the sample of American expatriates. Using the procedure described in footnote 3, the response rate
for the overall sample was 61%. The response rate for the Citizenship Change sample was 60%; the number of cases for this sample is 91.

We limited our sampling of citizenship changers to those persons who had changed citizenship since January 1, 1974 in order to reduce as much as possible problems of recall in reporting reasons for change of citizenship, while still including sufficient historical variation for comparisons by year of change. Sixteen persons in our sample (18%) changed their citizenship in 1974, 29 (32%) in 1975, 24 (26%) in 1976, 18 (20%) in 1977, and 4 (4%) in 1978 (first three months only). Given the significance of the decision and its relative recency for members of our sample, we believe recall bias to be minimal. 4

The Survey Data

The questions on change of citizenship began a little over half-way through the interview. For most respondents, this meant after close to two hours into the interview; at that point, effective interpersonal communication between interviewer and respondent had usually been achieved. This section of the interview followed previous sections on reasons for migration, family and social ties in the United States and Australia, images of “ideal” countries and how the U.S. and Australia ranked on a respondent-defined scale of ideal and worst countries, and general social values. No questions with specific or direct political content had yet been asked.

We used the following question sequence to explore reasons for citizenship change:

E1. Now we’d like to come back to some questions about citizenship. Since coming to live in Australia, have you become an Australian citizen? 5

(FOR THOSE WHO HAD BECOME AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS):

E7. When did you become an Australian citizen?

E8. What was your main reason for becoming an Australian citizen? (IF R SAYS ”TO WORK IN PUBLIC SERVICE,” PROBE WITH: Were you not interested in any jobs outside of the public service?)

E9. Were there any other reasons that you became an Australian citizen?

These questions were followed by about two dozen others (mainly open-ended) that explored various aspects of the decision to change citizenship, reactions of friends and family, the ease or difficulty of the decision, etc., several of which are discussed below. However, most of the material on reasons for citizenship change was brought out adequately by the two open-ended questions (E8 and E9 above). Because of the citizenship requirement
for public service jobs, we expected that many people would report career opportunities in the public service as the main reason for adopting Australian citizenship. However, we wanted to probe beyond this possible explanation to contextual or supporting factors that might contribute to the reason for change of citizenship among those who did change for career-related reasons. The obligatory probe in Q. E8 was therefore intended to avoid an overly brief dismissal of the subject of reasons for change of citizenship with merely a passing reference to a career or job opportunity.

In order to avoid a possible misinterpretation, we shall digress just briefly to point out that in an earlier section of the interview our respondents were asked a set of questions to ascertain their reasons for migrating in the first place. These reasons are analyzed in a separate report (Finifter and Finifter, 1979). Here our concern is with their reasons for changing citizenship. In general, the range of variation of reasons for changing citizenship is much narrower than that for reasons for initial migration.6

The reasons for change of citizenship were coded in great detail to preserve the respondents' own distinctions to a maximum extent. The average number of such reasons given was 2.24. All reasons were coded, and the maximum number given was four. Table 2 presents the reasons as classified in our coding categories, along with their frequencies of mention. In several cases, the original fine categories were subsequently combined to create categories with a sufficient number of mentions for the correlational analyses presented below. Nonetheless, because there is inherent interest in some of the detailed categories, these are also presented in the table. In all cases, capital letters are used to designate those categories which were actually used in the correlational analyses.

Among the detailed categories, the single most frequently mentioned reason for change of citizenship is the desire to participate in the Australian political process, typically by voting, but also through more active political activity.7 The simple fact of living in Australia and planning to remain is another frequently mentioned reason, despite the fact that numerous Americans live in Australia and elsewhere all over the world for as many or more years without changing citizenship. Although we had initially coded such matter-of-fact references to permanent residence in Australia separately, we later decided to combine these responses with others that specify an emotional attachment to Australia (through such phrases as "Australia is home," "my roots are here," ecc.
TABLE 2
Reasons for Citizenship Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Mentions</th>
<th>Frequency Combined Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**ECONOMIC INTERESTS**
- To secure Australian pension or other economic benefits
- Special dependency on civil service employment because of economic problems
- AVOIDANCE OF U.S. INCOME TAXES
- CAREER ADVANCEMENT
  - To get a public service job
  - To be promoted or to achieve permanence or other advancement at a public service job
  - Job satisfaction higher in Australia than in U.S.
  - Job or career advancement in private sector
  - Job advancement, general

**SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN AUSTRALIA**
- Planning to stay in Australia permanently
- Emotional identification with Australia
- Wish for establishment of ties in Australia
- To demonstrate purpose or sincerity about living in Aust.

**TO UNIFY FAMILY STATUS OR FEEL CLOSER TO FAMILY**

**TO CLARIFY SELF-IDENTIFICATION**

**NO OR WEAK SOCIAL TIES IN UNITED STATES**

**INFLUENCE OF ANOTHER PERSON**

**UNITED STATES POLITICAL-SOCIAL ALIENATION**
- Dissatisfaction with American values or lifestyle
- To avoid U.S. military draft
- To disidentify with America because of Vietnam War
- To disidentify with America because of political problems
- Harassment by U.S. government agencies
- Crime and violence in U.S.
- To protest or disidentify with U.S., general

**MORAL OBLIGATION OR DUTY TO BECOME AN AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN**

**POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN AUSTRALIA**
- Identification with Australian political system
- To participate in Australian political process

**LEGAL STATUS**
- Ease of travel, ability to enter Australia without visa
- Clarification of legal status, avoidance or solution of legal problems

* Sums to more than 91 because respondents could give more than one answer
# Sums to less than 204 because respondents giving more than one response in combined categories are only counted once.
The next most frequent responses were various mentions of job or career advancement. These are combined in the category called "Career Advancement." Over a third of the sample mentioned such reasons. The only other reason with a relatively large number of mentions is "Moral Obligation to Become an Australian Citizen." Reasons in this category typically include statements such as: "If you enjoy the privileges of living in a country, it's only right to assume the responsibilities." Most of the responsibilities mentioned were specifically or broadly political in reference: "to vote," "to elect people to office," "to fulfill all the roles and not sit back and let the other fellow do it," and the like. These kinds of reasons are most adequately characterized as moral obligations to fulfill political roles. They differ from the political participation category in the stress placed on the moral obligation or duty; the first category merely expresses the respondent's wish to participate without expressly attaching a moral imperative to it. Other reasons tend to be mentioned by only a handful of persons.

The Structure of Reasons for Citizenship Change

In an attempt to search out patterns of association among the separately coded reasons for citizenship change, the twelve final code categories of reasons were converted into dummy variables, and then factor analyzed. Oblique rotation was used in order to allow for the possibility of correlated clusters of reasons. Six factors with eigenvalues greater than one were extracted. Analysis of these factors clarifies the pattern of associations among the reasons and thereby the structure of reasons for citizenship change. Table 3 presents the factor structure loadings.

The factor analysis suggests six basic reasons for citizenship change in this sample. In many ways, the most interesting result is the pattern of loadings for the combined career reasons category. This category has at least moderately strong loadings on five of the six factors. Moreover, in each of Factors I, III, IV, and V, the loadings of career reasons is always opposite in sign to the other strong loadings, creating a series of bi-polar factors. This indicates that mention of career opportunities generally occurs in isolation from the mention of other reasons: people who give career reasons for change of citizenship are moderately to highly unlikely to also give the other reasons that are included in Factors I, III, IV, and V. Conversely, those who are motivated by each of these other reasons are highly unlikely to be concerned also with career advancement.
### TABLE 3
Factor Structure Matrix

Reasons for Change of Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>I Political Obligation</th>
<th>II Avoidance of U.S. Taxes</th>
<th>III U.S. Political Alienation</th>
<th>IV Identity Resolution</th>
<th>V Legal Status</th>
<th>VI Socio-Economic Pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral Obligation</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>-08</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Advancement</td>
<td>-69</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-32</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Taxes</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-03</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>-09</td>
<td>-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay in Australia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Alienation</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-06</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Identification</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-09</td>
<td>-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>-03</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Status</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-06</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interests</td>
<td>-09</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of Others</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Weak Ties</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-09</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of Variance: 31.3 19.1 15.3 13.1 11.5 9.7

*Principle factoring with iterated communality estimates; direct oblimin oblique rotation; decimals omitted; N=91.*
The first and strongest factor, for example, is dominated in its positive loadings by the desire to participate in the Australian political process and the sense of moral obligation to assume citizenship in the country of one's residence. But this factor has a much higher negative loading on job and career opportunities. It is interesting that, as Table 2 shows, all of these reasons are cited by relatively large numbers of respondents. But the factor structure clarifies that they are not the same respondents; those who cite citizenship responsibilities are highly unlikely to cite a career-related reason as well. Accordingly, we interpret Factor I as a bipolar "Political Obligation vs. Career Advancement" factor. Consistent with the philosophical notion of political obligation, the emphasis on one pole of this dimension is the duty of residents in a political community to assume full citizenship responsibilities, the most salient of which is participation in its political life. A meaningful way to interpret the bipolarity of this dimension is to contrast the collective and social responsibility aspects of political obligation as opposed to the individualistic orientation that generally characterizes career orientation.

Factors II, IV, and V also oppose career stress to another orientation. In Factor II it is disapproval of or alienation from American political institutions or other dissatisfactions with American society. Factor IV isolates motives for citizenship change that strive for clarification of migrants' self-identification. Responses in this category emphasize the difficulties and conflicts arising from "dual loyalties." Factor V isolates the legal aspects of citizenship. People who mentioned family status usually expressed a desire to have the same legal status as other members of their family, either to avoid difficulties such as might arise if members of a family travelling together in some third nation carried passports of both Australia and the United States, which might be treated differently with respect to visas, etc. Other responses in this category include feeling closer emotionally to other members of the family who were nationals of Australia (typically spouses and young children). People in the "ease of travel" category stressed other travel conveniences associated with an Australian passport (e.g., the ability to enter British Commonwealth countries more easily), or other legal identification aspects of citizenship. In reviewing Factors I, II, IV and V, we can see a consistent opposition of career interest to some collective orientation, or national identification. It appears that an "individualism-collective identity" theme runs through nearly all of these factors.
Factor II is dominated by the desire to avoid payment of U.S. income taxes. In sharp contrast to every other factor, career advancement is very weakly loaded on this factor, indicating that, as compared to the primary loadings on the other factors, relatively more people motivated by avoidance of U.S. taxes also mentioned career advantages as a reason for citizenship change. (However, recall that the number of persons mentioning tax avoidance is only five.) Insofar as tax avoidance can be viewed as a manifestation of self-orientation, this factor is consistent with our hypothesized individual—collective dimension.

Finally, Factor VI links career advancement with another self-oriented reason, financial or economic advantage, and to a lesser extent with the influence of other persons. Because economic benefits or dependencies and the influence of others refer to external pressures, and because such pressures may also manifest themselves in a search for job security (e.g., in the permanent public service), this factor can be interpreted as "Socio-Economic Pressure." The factor analysis suggests that the career advancement motivations of American expatriates have at least two distinct aspects: one is an individually-oriented striving to attain specific career goals of intrinsic interest to individuals (which may be available only in careers or professions requiring Australian citizenship); the second is a search for job security motivated by economic uncertainty and need.

The factor analysis has revealed the structure of reasons for citizenship change for this sample. The strongest features of this structure are the ubiquitous loading of career reasons on several factors, and the appearance of "political obligation" reasons on the first factor. Apart from these, the number of people to whom the remaining factors would apply is quite small. For example, Table 2 shows that only 5 people mentioned avoidance of U.S. income taxes as a reason for changing citizenship (Factor II), 8 people mentioned alienation from the U.S. social or political system, only 4 people cited identity resolution, and about 15 people gave family and legal status reasons on Factor V. On the other hand, 69 of our 91 citizenship change respondents mentioned at least one of the three categories of reasons that define Factor I. However, only 36 of the 91 mentioned at least one of the three reasons that define Factor VI.

Because Factors I and VI are correlated, and because Factor I is stronger and represents both the individual and collective poles of the hypothesized underlying dimension, our present analysis focuses on Factor I in addressing several related questions: What kinds of people change citizenship for reasons of their own career advancement, and which kinds change citizenship in response to a felt political obligation toward their adopted nation? Does changing citizenship for one or the other of these reasons affect the way these people accept and deal with the fact of their citizenship change?
Demographic and Contextual Factors in Citizenship Change

A cluster-scored variable was created to represent "Political Obligation--Career Advancement" as alternative reasons for change of citizenship. The procedure simply assigned one point each for mentioning desire for participation in Australian political life or feelings of moral obligation to become a citizen of Australia, and one point was subtracted if career advancement was mentioned. Accordingly, scores ranged from -1 to +2, and are distributed as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Pattern</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career advancement only</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One political obligation mention and career advancement OR no mention of any of the three reasons included*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both political obligation reasons mentioned along with career advancement OR one political obligation reason alone</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both political obligation reasons only</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Twelve persons gave mutually cancelling reasons, while 22 mentioned none of the reasons scored in the index.

Explaining Political Obligation and Career Reasons for Changing Citizenship

In trying to explain why people change citizenship for one or the other of these reasons, we considered the impact of certain demographic and contextual variables: age at the time of citizenship change, sex, education, marital status, presence of children in the family, whether or not the respondent worked for the Australian government or an agency or instrumentality of government, whether or not the respondent had served in the U.S. military, and the year in
which the citizenship change occurred. These variables were used to test the following hypotheses:

(A). Younger people, who are generally more concerned than older people with establishing themselves economically and with building careers, should be more highly motivated by career advancement than older people.

(B). The generally greater responsibility of men vs. women in Australia for the economic security of their families should increase the likelihood that men would mention career advancement as a reason for changing citizenship. At the same time, this relationship should be enhanced by the general tendency for women to be somewhat more trusting of political authority (Finifter, 1970; Katz, et al., 1975), which should increase the likelihood of women mentioning political obligation reasons for changing.

(C). Because of the usual negative association between age and higher education, and the hypothesized interest of younger people in career advancement, higher education should be associated with career advancement motivations. But, because of its almost universal association with political and social participation, higher education itself should increase the importance of political obligation and participation for citizenship changers once age is controlled.

(D). Because of the additional economic pressures created by dependents, married people and those with children should be more highly motivated by career advancement.

(E). Working for the Australian government or a government agency, which usually requires Australian citizenship of its employees for permanent positions, should be related to career advancement reasons for citizenship change.

(F). U.S. military socialization should increase the sense of political obligation to Australia. Military socialization, with its emphasis on duty and subservience to authority, might be thought to decrease the likelihood of feelings of political obligation to another political system. However, if such feelings are internalized in a more generalized way, they may be transferable to a different political community. In the case of the United States and Australia, the conditions for such a transference might be present: Australia was a military ally of the United States during World War II and the Vietnam War, and participated with the United Nations forces in Korea. Many American military personnel spent R & R leaves in Australia and came to look upon it as their "home away from home." For many of our respondents with military service, a wartime leave in Australia was the initial stimulus to their migration afterward. Moreover, the close political relations between the U.S. and Australia, especially during the 60's and early 70's, led many Americans to view Australia as in some respects a distant outpost of the United States (although such feelings are obviously insulting
from the perspective of most Australians.)

(G). Apart from personal and individual factors, we expected the influence of the external environment to manifest itself in a relationship between year of citizenship change and reasons for change. The range of years covered by our citizenship change sample is 1974-78. The period begins with years in which political difficulties in the United States were great and trust in and support for the American political system had plummeted. Given the strong and pervasive impacts within the U.S., the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Watergate affair, and the resignation of President Nixon very likely also affected the way Americans living abroad felt about the political system of their native land. For some U.S. migrants, loss of trust and faith in the U.S. political system could become transformed into a higher sense of identification with the readily-available alternative of Australia. Accordingly, we expected that reasons of political obligation to Australia would predominate in the early years of the period covered.

Conversely, in the later years of this period, economic difficulties all over the world increased. Inflation and rising unemployment have increased economic pressures. While trust in the American political system has not recovered from the blows of the Vietnam and Watergate periods, political trust as an object of concern among the citizenry has been eclipsed by economic problems. We therefore hypothesized that economic reasons for citizenship change would be mentioned proportionately more often by migrants who changed in the later years of the 1974-78 period.

Our findings for these hypotheses were as follows:

(A). Age is strongly and significantly related to reasons for change of citizenship (Table 5). People tend to be overwhelmingly career-oriented through their 30's, but career concerns decrease markedly and political obligation responsibilities increase commensurately in the middle and older age groups.

(B). At the bivariate level, sex has some relationship with reasons for citizenship change, but it was not statistically significant, and was opposite to the direction we had hypothesized. Forty-two percent of men, but only 27% of women, scored either 1 or 2 in the direction of political obligation reasons for change of citizenship. However, multivariate analysis indicates that once we controlled for military experience, women were somewhat more likely than men to feel politically obligated to change citizenship. As we discuss below, men with military experience were so much more likely to cite political obligation reasons.
### TABLE 5

Political Obligation--Career Advancement Reasons for Citizenship Change by Age at Time of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>22-29</th>
<th>30-37</th>
<th>38-44</th>
<th>45-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Advancement</td>
<td>-1 46%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Obligation</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (22) (22) (23) (24)

Gamma = .46 Pearson's r = .40, p = .0001

---

### TABLE 6

Political Obligation--Career Advancement Reasons for Citizenship Change by Year of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Advancement</td>
<td>-1 12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Obligation</td>
<td>19 14</td>
<td>8 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (16) (29) (24) (18) (4)

Gamma = -.24 Pearson's r = -.23, p = .01.

*Includes first 3 months only.
as compared to either non-military men or women, that the true relationship between sex and reasons for citizenship change was suppressed.

(C). Education has a weak and non-significant negative relationship with political obligation reasons. However, as hypothesized, this is a function of the younger, more career-oriented citizenship changers being more well educated. Once age at time of citizenship change is controlled, the direction of the relationship reverses, although the impact of education remains small and statistically insignificant.

(D). Contrary to our hypotheses, neither marital status nor the presence of children had a significant impact on reasons for citizenship change. Since both spouses work in many families, the presence of children does not appear to create an economic burden on one spouse over and above the economic pressures felt by single people, at least to the extent that it becomes a prime motive for changing citizenship.

(E). Working for the Australian government at either the state or federal level is quite highly correlated with changing citizenship for reasons of career advancement (gamma = -.60; Pearson's r = -.38, p<.0001. Fifty-two percent of the 31 government employees gave only a career-advancement reason, while the same was true for only 15% of those employed in the private sector. Conversely, fifty percent of the 60 persons employed in the private sector or not in the labor force gave political obligation reasons as compared to only 16% of the public employees.

(F). Among citizenship-changers, having served in the U.S. military was quite strongly related to giving a political obligation reason for change of citizenship (gamma = .39; Pearson's r = .26, p<.006). This seems to substantiate the transference of loyalty argument developed above. However, multivariate analysis indicates that a large part of this relationship is caused by age: as we have shown above, older citizenship changers are more likely to be motivated by political obligation and older persons are also more likely to have served in the military. Nonetheless, even after controlling for age, American military experience still retains some of its hypothesized relationship with reasons for citizenship change. When both age and sex are controlled, the bivariate gamma of .39 drops to a 2nd-order partial of .16. Thus, some tendency remains for U.S. military experience to be related to feelings of civic responsibility generally, resulting in an easier transference of allegiance from one's native political system to that of an adopted ally. A completely unambiguous illustration of the transference
effect comes from our interview with a 65 year-old WW II U.S. Army hospital corpsman. When asked if there are any things that make him feel especially proud to have been an American citizen, he responded, "I was proud to wear the uniform of Uncle Sam. Otherwise, no soap." Then, when asked the same pride question regarding his newly acquired (1976) Australian citizenship, he replied that he was proud, and that "If this country ever went to war, I'd go. Even against the USA!" (We obviously cannot rule out the possibility that some self-selection into the military by those with a greater bent for civic responsibility and obedience to authority also occurs.)

(C). Reasons for change of citizenship vary substantially by year of change. This relationship is shown in Table 6. The largest shift seems to occur between 1974 and 1975, when there is a 19% increase in career-advancement reasons and a 16% decline in political obligation reasons. The trend continues through 1978, but the rate of change diminishes, and we clearly do not have a sufficient case basis for 1978 to place much confidence in that year's apparent anchoring of the trend line.

Since we knew that unemployment had risen in this period, we immediately suspected that increases in Australian unemployment lay behind the year of change effect. Unfortunately, our attempts to substitute the Australian unemployment rate for year of citizenship change have not been helpful in explaining away the yearly differences. Yearly increases in unemployment in Australia are negligibly related to variations in reasons for citizenship change, even though there is a strong correspondence between the largest jump in unemployment occurring between 1974 and 1975 and the shift in reasons occurring at the same time. The major substantive reason for the lack of relationship is that unemployment rises throughout the period, while reasons for change stabilize in 1976 and 1977 (1978 has too few cases for reliable analysis). Thus, while change in level of unemployment may contribute something to this trend, it does not really explain it.

Political factors are an obvious alternative explanation. In 1974 and 1975, as Americans contemplated the Watergate scandal, the resignations of both the President and Vice-President, and the associated world-wide publicity these events received, their attraction to readily available alternative political systems might well have increased. As we showed above, the absolute number of Americans who became naturalized in Australia actually did increase sharply during this period (Table 1). At the same time, the early to mid-1970's were years of substantial political interest within Australia itself. The Labour Party, which had not been in power for twenty-three years, won the 1972 election and, under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, promptly introduced a series of far-
reaching, innovative, and highly controversial social policies. After a series of political blunders, some scandal, and continued deterioration of the economic situation, the party lost power after only three years. But in the interim, much political excitement and interest was generated: "Certainly the amount, scope, and intensity of political activity in the 1970's was unusual - to find a similar period of questioning, debate, and potential for change one has to look back to the war and postwar years of the 1940's" (Weller and Smith, 1977, p. 51). A number of our respondents mentioned the Whitlam years as reminiscent of the excitement generated by John F. Kennedy's administration in the U.S., and attributed their interest in Australian politics to that period.

We attempted to see if the relationship between year of citizenship change and reasons for change was a function of Labour sympathizers changing in the earlier period when Whitlam was in power. No such relationship emerged, nor was political sympathy related to reason for change. 14

Thus, far, we have attempted to explain the relationship between year of change and reason for change with measures pertaining to the Australian economy and political system. However, although they are resident in Australia for a minimum of three years, citizenship changers may consider conditions in the United States as well in their decisions to change citizenship. But, when changes in unemployment rates in the U.S., measured in the same way as described above for Australia, were used, no relationship existed with reasons for citizenship change. At the present time, we have not yet coded the extensive interview materials on attitudes toward the American political system. Perhaps those data will enable us to test more completely the contextual factors that may affect Americans' decisions to change citizenship.

Reasons for Changing Citizenship: Summary

It is clear that several factors affect peoples' reasons for changing citizenship, and that bivariate relationships are occasionally misleading. Our findings on the sources of political obligation--career advancement reasons for changing citizenship can be summarized in the multiple regression equation shown in Table 7. In this regression equation, we included those variables discussed above that had an effect on reasons for citizenship change. Year of change was entered as a series of dummy variables, with 1974 omitted as the reference year. 15 The beta values for the years simply confirm that, as compared to 1974, changing citizenship in each of the later years, especially 1976 or
### TABLE 7
Regression Equation for Career Advancement—Political Obligation Reasons for Citizenship Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work for Australian Government</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Which Changed Citizenship</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service in the U.S. Military</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Citizenship in 1978</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Citizenship in 1976</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Citizenship in 1977</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Citizenship in 1975</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Female = 1; Male = 0)</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple $R = .527$, $p = <.001$

$R^2 = .278$
1977, is unlikely to have been done for reasons of political obligation. Working for the Australian government sharply increases the likelihood that reasons of career advancement will be given. Being older and having served in the U.S. military both increase the likelihood of changing for reasons of political obligation, as does being female, although sex has a very small effect. Parenthetically, an equation that eliminated "working for the Australian government" yields a multiple $R$ of .43, and attributed even greater weight to age. Thus, the impact of early socialization as to the importance of civic responsibility and political participation may be delayed until middle age, coming to fruition only after people have established their careers and economic bases. This interpretation is clearly consistent with the universally found positive relationship between age and conventional forms of political participation, such as voting (Milbrath and Goel, 1977, pp. 114-116).

**PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ATTITUINAL CONSEQUENCES OF CITIZENSHIP CHANGE**

We noted above that feelings of national loyalty and identification are instilled in childhood. While much research during the last decade has clearly documented that such early socialization does not render feelings of political support toward the government of one's nation unshakeable, we assume that identification of oneself as an American is far stronger and more deeply rooted than are one's attitudes toward the American government. This is because national identification usually becomes internalized as part of one's self-concept, while attitudes toward government, although of one's own country, remain as postures toward an external agency.

To the extent that national self-identification is internalized as part of one's self-concept, it is reasonable to assume that at least some degree of psychological conflict will precede and/or follow a change in citizenship. Once one's legal citizenship status changes, one forfeits whatever legal rights are accorded to citizens of the country one has given up, and one is officially denied the right to call oneself a national of that country. In the case of American citizens who are naturalized in another country, normal procedures involve the individual's receipt of a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" (Form FS-348), which sets forth the reasons for expatriation. Because of the association of like documents with the most significant status transitions of life (birth, marriage, death, confirmations, school graduations and degrees, etc.), that assign new roles and identities to individuals, receipt of such a certificate in and of itself probably heightens the psychological impact of citizenship change. Having to surrender one's American passport, having thereafter to obtain a visa to enter the United States, and other
indicators of changed nationality status, probably have similar effects.

Nonetheless, most Americans who become Australian citizens seem satisfied with their new citizenship status, although there are indications of a moderately strong undercurrent of regret. Overall, 69% report no "second thoughts" about their decisions. Indeed, one-third of citizenship changers respond positively when asked: "Do you think there are any especially good things about not being an American citizen?" And when asked about things they are not proud of in the U.S. and Australia, somewhat more recount things they are not proud of about America (59% vs. 54% for Australia). 17

On the other hand, 42% express some psychological conflict or regret about their change of citizenship, 18 and almost all (85%) would have preferred dual citizenship, had it been available. 19 Finally, while 57% said they take pride in being citizens of Australia, 80% report pride in having been an American citizen. It may well be, however, that the passage of additional time in their new country will further increase feelings of pride in Australia. The inter-country difference in expressions of pride undoubtedly reflects, in part, the durability of national attachments learned early and nurtured through a lifetime.

The interesting question for the study of socialization is under what conditions the sense of loss at giving up one's original national identification is greatest. One factor that might affect the amount of psychological conflict that people experience in changing citizenship is the reason base they develop for changing. For example, people who change for reasons of their own career advancement might be expected to be generally self-oriented, and to have lower levels of national identification to begin with. Such people might then have fewer regrets and conflicts than people with more "altruistic" orientations that include national identifications with their native country. On the other hand, people who change because they have internalized political obligations and responsibilities in a new country may have already undergone some change in national identification. That is, they develop ways to realign their thoughts and feelings so that their new nation elicits some degree of loyalty and a sense of obligation as a member of the political community. According to this line of reasoning, it should be the politically obligated group that experiences less conflict. In this section, we analyze the relationships between political obligation vs. career-advancement reasons for change of citizenship and various indicators of subsequent psychological conflict.
On several different indicators, our evidence shows clearly that people who change citizenship because of career advancement reasons are more likely to express conflicts and regrets concerning their citizenship decisions than are people who change for political obligation reasons. Somewhat greater unease about the change is demonstrated by those who changed for career-oriented reasons even in the way in which they recall their decision process. Directly after the questions on reasons for citizenship change, respondents were asked how hard or easy their decision was. Forty-eight percent of career-oriented changers reported that they found the decision to be "very easy" or "fairly easy," while 56% of those who had any sense of political obligation (scores of 1 or 2 on the index) reported "easy" decisions.

Part of the reason for the greater ease of the decision reported by those who changed out of feelings of political obligation may be, paradoxically, that they tended to consider the decision for a longer period of time. Only about one-third of the politically obligated migrants changed citizenship within 4 years of their permanent arrival in Australia, whereas 48% of the career-oriented changed within their first four years. Conversely, 29% of those who changed for political obligation reasons waited at least 10 years to change, as compared to only 16% of the career-oriented who waited that long. Those years of waiting are apparently accompanied by some planful deliberation. In responding to the question on what made their decisions easy or difficult, respondents were coded for mentioning aspects of the decision process itself, such as thinking it through, reviewing all the pros and cons, etc. People who waited ten years or longer before changing citizenship were three times more likely to mention such planful considerations as those who changed within 4 years (30% vs. 11%, gamma = .38; Pearson's r = .20, p = .05). Consistent with these relationships, people who mentioned any political obligation reason were more than twice as likely as career-oriented people to say they had been planful (29% vs. 12%, gamma = .33, Pearson's r = .19, p = .05). Thus, the "easier" decisions of the politically obligated result in large part from both having thought about the prospect of changing citizenship and having done this over a longer period of time.

The longer, more deliberated decision process characteristic of those who changed because of a sense of political obligation results, furthermore, in greater personal significance being attached to the change of citizenship. When asked: "When you took the oath or affirmed your allegiance to the Queen to become an Australian citizen, did the oath or affirmation have any special significance for you, or was it merely a formality?", only 32% of the career-
oriented but 43% of the politically obligated attached special significance to their oath.

If the decision process appears to have been only marginally more difficult for the career-oriented migrants, the aftermath of that decision is enormously so. Citizenship changers who say they were motivated by career advancement are much more likely than those who say they felt political obligations to have "second thoughts" about their decisions. As Table 8 demonstrates, fully 60% of those who are oriented purely by career advancement reported having "second thoughts," while hardly any of the politically obligated did.

Table 8
Self-Report of "Second Thoughts" About Citizenship-Change Decision by Reason for Change*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons Index</th>
<th>Career Advancement</th>
<th>Political Obligation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had 2nd Thoughts</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Have 2nd Thoughts</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gamma = .78; Pearson's r = .49, p = < .0001

*See footnote 18 for wording of question on "second thoughts."

The most commonly mentioned factor causing "second thoughts" is the loss of American identity, as expressed in comments such as: "The longer I'm here, the closer I've grown to my own family and culture, way of life, nationality," and "I'd rather be an American but there's no way out." When asked further, "When you think about having been an American citizen, what, if anything, do you miss most about no longer being an American citizen?", fewer of the purely career-oriented said they missed nothing (32% vs. 47% for all others), and the more career-oriented, the more likely the person was to report missing some aspect of American identification, e.g., "pride in heritage," "pride of my country, pride of being an American," and "the direct bond of citizenship." One-third of the career-oriented missed this sense of American identification, compared to only 17% of those with any political motivation. Moreover, when asked if they would have preferred dual
citizenship had it been possible to have both, all of those who mentioned only career-advancement preferred dual citizenship, whereas 18% of the politically obligated preferred only Australian citizenship (gamma = .40; Pearson's r = .18, p =<.05).

We also area-coded the citizenship change section of the interview for mention of any external pressure on the respondent to change citizenship. The career-oriented were considerably more likely than the politically obligated to mention events or situations indicating that they felt some external pressure to change citizenship (gamma = -.73; Pearson's r = -.35, p =<.001).

National Identification and Psychological Conflict Regarding Citizenship Change

Up to this point we have analyzed the structure of reasons American migrants gave for becoming Australian citizens; we identified political obligation--career-advancement as the most important dimension for this sample, and we then searched out some of the sources and consequences of these opposite rationales for changing citizenship. The next step is to go somewhat beyond the substantive reasons for change to look more closely at the decision process itself in relation to the subjective national identifications these expatriates claimed as of 1978. Although we began this paper by suggesting that objective citizenship status usually becomes transformed into a subjective sense of identification between oneself and a nation during early political socialization, it is not the case that a change in legal citizenship status automatically results in a corresponding redefinition of one's nationality self-concept. For migrants who are faced with the real choice of changing citizenship, and more crucially for those who actually take that option, the consistency or inconsistency between their objective and subjective national identifications can have important impacts on their decision-making and its aftermath.

As we would expect, citizenship changers differ markedly from our other migrant samples in their responses to our most direct question on national identification. Twenty-nine percent of citizenship changers identified themselves as "foremost Australian," as compared to between 2% and 5% of migrants in our other samples who had to date retained their U.S. citizenship. Correspondingly, while approximately two-thirds of migrants in each of the other samples identified themselves as "foremost American," only 23% of the former American citizens did so. For our present concern with the relationship between consistency of national identification and citizenship decision making, we will focus on two subgroups in the citizenship changer sample: those who identified themselves as "foremost Australian" will be referred to as "Consistents," while those who identified themselves as "foremost American" will be referred to as
Citizenship changers who have been able to redefine themselves in accord with their new objective citizenship status can be viewed as having achieved a state of cognitive equilibrium. Such people should thereby be less likely than citizenship changers who persist in identifying themselves as "foremost American" to experience internal conflicts and regrets over their decisions to change. This expectation is borne out by the data. Seventy-six percent of citizenship changers who currently identify themselves as "foremost American" (the Inconsistents), as compared to only 21% of citizenship changers who consider themselves to be "foremost Australian" (the Consistents) express internal conflicts over their decisions. The relationship between consistency of identification and conflict or regret holds up even when controlled for reasons (political obligation—career advancement) for citizenship change. Whether we consider those who are motivated by career advancement, the middle category, or those motivated by political obligation, in each case, persons with consistent national identification are much less likely to express conflict or regret over their change of citizenship than are persons who still identify as Americans.

Because it can often be stressful for people who live permanently as migrants in one country — and most especially for those who, in addition, have adopted formal citizenship in that country — to inwardly feel primary allegiance and attachment to another country, some kind of cognitive accommodation processes will likely come into play to lessen that stress. However, the processes involved are highly complex, and require the passage of time before the cumulative effects of many years of prior socialization into the native nationality can be coped with effectively. Some evidence to support the interpretation that the cognitive accommodation process is time-dependent is found in the overall relationship between elapsed time since citizenship change and expressions of inner conflict over that decision: 54% of those who changed just in the year or two prior to the survey (that is, those who have had relatively less time to reconcile their new legal citizenship status with their prior national identification), as compared to only 30% of those who changed three or four years prior to the interview, express conflicts or regret over their decisions to change.

This difference in level of adjustment, as indicated by presence or absence of conflict or regrets, seems to occur precisely because the passage of time leads to (or allows for) a change in national self-identification. Only 11% of those who changed citizenship in 1974 or 1975 still thought of themselves in 1978 as foremost American, whereas 35% of the more recent changers (1976 to 1978) still identified as foremost American. As Table 9 demonstrates, both time and the adoption of a consistent national self-identification serve to reduce
### TABLE 9

**Inner Conflict Regarding Citizenship Change By Year of Change and Current National Identification***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts and Regrets</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Conflicts or Regrets</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | (16) | (5) | (13) | (16) |

### TABLE 10

**Percent Reporting Inner Conflict Regarding Citizenship Change By Year of Change, Current National Identification, and Elapsed Time Between Arrival In Australia and Citizenship Change***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Lapse (0-5 yrs.)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Lapse (6-37 yrs.)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For persons who identified themselves in 1978 as either "foremost American" or "foremost Australian" (50 of 91 citizenship changers). "Foremost Australian" includes three people who said "Australian but also citizen of the world."
conflicts and regrets. Of those who changed earliest and considered themselves (in 1978) to be Australians, very few (12%) expressed any conflicts or regrets about their citizenship change, while of those who changed most recently and still thought of themselves as Americans, 81% expressed conflicts and regrets.

Nevertheless, we must be mindful of the difficulties inherent in relying on one cross-sectional measurement for studying time-dependent processes. Since we are raising a question about developmental process, only panel data would be adequate to completely trace the true causal nexus. The question that arises in this particular case is whether people who changed citizenship and subsequently do not manifest internal conflict (or at least do not express it to interviewers), have gone through the cognitive accommodation processes we have postulated (i.e., change their national identification over time after their change of citizenship), or whether the complex internal and interpersonal processes of nationality self-redefinition both precede the change of citizenship and are also responsible for subsequent equanimity following the change.

Our data seem to support the former pattern. We have no reason to suspect any "generational effect," whereby the 1974-75 changers are more likely than later changers to be consistent not because of the passage of time but because they were more likely to identify as Australians to begin with. Nevertheless, we believe that both patterns probably occur. For some people who change citizenship, the decision to act precedes nationality self-redefinition; in other cases, the reverse undoubtedly occurs: the decision to change comes after a period of significant self-redefinition. These two patterns are distinguished by the extent to which the process of nationality self-redefinition precedes or follows the formal act of citizenship change. While it is useful to separate these two patterns for analytic purposes, it is also probably true empirically that the process of nationality self-redefinition continues to some extent throughout a migrant's experience. It may intensify and achieve new states of crystallization periodically, depending on external circumstances, a person's decision-making habits, aspects of temperament, and on the pressures of relevant social networks, among other factors. However, we hypothesize that the decision style in which national identification adjustments are made before citizenship change will lead to fewer regrets or conflicts afterward. The more time a person devotes to the citizenship decision before acting to change citizenship (a great deal of which must be spent in consideration of national self-identification), the less likely a person should be to experience post-decision conflicts.

As a surrogate indicator of the extent of consideration given to national self-identification prior to the citizenship change decision, we use number of years
between the year of arrival for permanent residence in Australia and the year in which the oath of allegiance to gain Australian citizenship was taken. Because we are dealing with very small numbers of cases in this refined analysis, we dichotomized this variable into 5 years or less and 6 years or longer. In conducting these tests, we also consider the year of citizenship change and consistency of national identification, because we have already established that both of these variables are related to reported regrets or conflicts about the citizenship change decision. If we adopt a model of cumulative impact, we would expect to find conflict most often among Inconsistents (American identification) who waited only a short time before changing citizenship, and who also changed more recently. Conversely, the least amount of conflict should be evident among the Consistent identifiers, who changed in the earlier years, and who waited longer to change citizenship after they arrived in Australia. Table 10 indicates that the hypothesized pattern is only partially supported, but the findings suggest a theoretically interesting and reasonable refinement.

For people who changed citizenship more recently, the elapsed time between arrival in Australia and citizenship change does operate as we suggested: a longer elapsed time results in less frequent reports of post-decision conflict, even controlling for self-identification. Of those who changed in 1976-78, all of the Inconsistents who waited only a short time before changing citizenship express conflict, as compared to 70% of their counterpart Inconsistents who waited longer. Time lapse before citizenship change also operates in the same way for Consistsents who changed more recently, reducing still further the level of regret reported by Consistent (Australian) identifiers. While 50% of the Australian identifiers who changed in 1976-78, and who waited only a short time reported conflicts, only 14% of Australian identifiers who changed in the same years but who waited longer reported conflicts.

However, elapsed time between arrival in Australia and citizenship change does not serve to reduce present conflicts for those who changed in 1974-75. In fact (although the numbers of cases in these cells are too small to place very much confidence in the results), it appears that those who changed earlier and who thought about the change for a longer time are slightly more likely to report present conflict. These results suggest that as time passes from the date of citizenship change, the decision may undergo additional reevaluation. The length of time one took initially to come to the decision loses its relevance as one copes with whatever conflicts may remain. We interpret these findings to mean that length of decision-making operates not only to us, as researchers, as an indicator of thoroughness of prior consideration, but that respondents also consider it initially to convince themselves of having made careful decisions. They then use
these reflections to reduce dissonance and inner conflict in the wake of their
decisions to change. This effect operates for a year or two after the decision.
It therefore appears that part of the accommodation process consists of people telling
themselves that a decision that took so long to come to must, perforce, be a
good one -- hence, conflict is reduced. But three to four years later, the
way in which the decision was made initially becomes much less important than
whether the necessary psychological adjustment -- change to a consistent national
identification -- has been accomplished. If it has been, very little conflict
remains (only 2 of the 16 Australian identifiers (12%) expressed conflict
3 to 4 years after they have changed citizenship). But, if one still identifies
as an American, conflict and regret will persist (3 of the 5 American identifiers
who changed in 1973 or 1974 (60%) report conflict), regardless of the elapsed
time between arrival in Australia and citizenship change, and presumably,
therefore, the care with which the decision was made.

CONCLUSION

Relatively few people undergo a change of self-identification that is as
basic as one involving national identification. But millions of immigrants who
came to the United States and other countries did so, and as international
migration patterns change, some native-born Americans now go through the same
basic process. If anything certain can be learned from the public opinion studies
of the last decade, it is that adults undergo more change in political attitudes
and values than we previously recognized. Fundamental changes have occurred in
the extent and pattern of public support for the political system, in party
identification, and in voting participation habits, even though all of these were
once thought to be stable attitudes and behavioral predispositions, which changed
only rarely over the lifetime.

One of the things our study has shown is that, at least for as deep-seated
a part of the self-concept as national identification, such change is difficult
and psychologically costly for many individuals, and that earlier values and
attitudes are likely to intrude in the form of continuing conflict and regret.
This appears to be especially so when one's native citizenship is exchanged for
a self-oriented value, such as career-advancement, and when a person does not
adapt psychologically by changing his or her subjective self-identification, as
well as the legal status of citizenship. On the other hand, when people make
legal changes in citizenship status and construe their motives for doing so on
the basis of those very values that they are socialized to think of as part of the
citizenship role (i.e., political obligations and national self-identification), their resocialization can be successful and relatively free of conflict and regret.

Moreover, it would be totally unwarranted and ethnocentric to assume that, because of America's long history of immigration, it is only American citizenship that is highly prized and psychologically difficult to relinquish. Several suits have been brought in recent years by aliens living in the United States who wish to retain their own citizenship even while working in the American "public service." Just last year, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the State of New York against two resident aliens who sued to be able to retain their own citizenship (British and Finnish) while teaching in that state's public schools, and in 1978, the Court ruled against a plaintiff who wished to retain his foreign citizenship while working in a state police force. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs' remarks clearly indicated their strong political and social identification with their own countries and their wishes to retain those identifications even while living and working in the United States. Whether increased international migration will eventually cause employment barriers against aliens to be broken down will be interesting to observe in the years to come.

Having reached this conclusion as to the importance of national self-identification, a more basic question demands attention: Why do some people change their subjective national self-identification and the country to which they perceive they owe their political obligation, while others do not? This question sets our agenda for further analysis.
FOOTNOTES

The Russell Sage Foundation is supporting the coding and data analysis of this project as part of a larger study of citizen expectations and national commitment. The National Science Foundation provided the major support for the field work in Australia (Grant SOC 77-09126). Additional support was provided by the Australian-American Foundation (the U.S. Fulbright program in Australia), the Australian National University's Research School of Social Sciences, and the Departments of Political Science and Sociology at Michigan State University. We are indeed grateful to all these sources for their support. Thanks are also due to Annette Courter, Amy Crowley, Mary Downey, Judy Hudson, Claire Kehoe, Rita McPhail, Sue Nagel, and Frank Simon, for their able assistance in coding. Finally, but most notably, we wish to express our gratitude to our respondents for their generous cooperation.

1The most careful estimates of net settler arrivals in Australia have been made by Professor Charles A. Price of the Department of Demography, Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences. He used official figures for settler arrivals and departures, but adjusts them to omit second-time settlers (so that their multiple entries are not counted as multiple individuals) and adds visitors who later become settlers. Using his estimates (provided in personal communication), there were 30,036 net settler arrivals from the U.S. between 1947 and 1973 (representing only 55% of the total arrivals, i.e., approximately 45% of American settler arrivals ultimately leave Australia). Since a waiting period of five years was required for citizenship prior to 1975 and three years since then, we have calculated citizenship changes from 1952 to 1976 (2877) as a function of the 30,036 1947-1973 net settler base.

2The U.S. population is almost 16 times larger than the Australian, so that America still receives a much larger proportion of Australians than vice versa. Nonetheless, socialization into the symbolism and ideology of America as the recipient of the world's immigrants is so strong that Americans are unused to thinking about emigration from their country, to say nothing of giving up American citizenship.

3The procedure involved our preparation of a letter (on the letterhead of the Australian National University) to sampled persons, explaining the study and its sponsorship, and requesting their participation. Included with the letter were a reply form, on which persons who were willing to be interviewed were asked to enter their name, address, and telephone number, and a stamped envelope addressed to us at the Australian National University. The letter, reply form, and return envelope were enclosed in a DIEA cover envelope, and were mailed by the Department to persons sampled according to our instructions. We are very
grateful to the DIEA, and especially to Mr. Tony Fortey, Chief Migration Officer of the Population Research Section, for their assistance.

4This conclusion is supported by the numerous detailed and vivid recollections reported by respondents about the citizenship ceremony, gifts they received, celebrations, the exact words of praise or rejection from friends or relatives, minute (and occasionally bitter) reports of reactions to American consular proceedings that followed upon naturalization, etc. Several respondents pulled out files of citizenship change-related correspondence and documents; one gave the original of his Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States to the interviewer for transmittal to the study directors (it was, of course, returned). Several people cried during this part of the interview. Such indications of heightened personal involvement provide substantial evidence for the current significance and, therefore, the high recall accuracy of the circumstances and motivations surrounding citizenship change.

5"Coming back" refers to the fact that there were filter questions before the interview itself began to ascertain that the respondent was, in fact, born in the U.S. and was or had been an American citizen. These questions were used to verify the sampling procedures.

6The reasons most frequently cited for initial emigration by citizenship changers were: "quality of life" factors (including crime and violence in the U.S., the fast pace of American life with its emphasis on competitive striving, the degradation of the natural environment, population density and crowding, a more hospitable environment for bringing up children in Australia); possibilities for economic betterment available in Australia; opportunities for travel and adventure; family ties in Australia or the absence of family ties in the U.S.; job or career opportunities in Australia; and political dissatisfactions in the United States (Finifter and Finifter, 1979). Other studies of American migrants in Australia have been carried out by the Australian Department of Immigration, 1969, 1971; Bardo, 1980; Brownlee, 1973; Cuddy, 1977; DeAmicis, 1976; and Phillips, n.d., but to our knowledge no previous systematic research has been carried out on Americans who have changed citizenship.

7Some respondents mentioned that they first became interested in political participation in Australia because the smaller population provided for greater political access and effectiveness. We will analyze political participation of migrants, both in the U.S. prior to their migration, and in Australia as well, in a future report.
Since the reasons for citizenship change were coded and recoded into as few categories as seemed reasonable to balance the criteria of fidelity, exhaustiveness, refinement, reliability, and sufficient cases for analysis, it is not surprising that the twelve reasons reduced to as many as six factors. The more usual uses of factor analysis achieve much greater reduction because of the inclusion of frequently similar and repetitive closed-ended questions.

Harman (1967) suggests that it is useful to try to interpret bipolar factors with a unitary concept that suggests the entire continuum. He cites a bi-polar factor having loadings for "Heat" and "Cold," and suggests it be called "Temperature," as an example (n. 153). Because a satisfactory term capable of melding the extremes of individualism and collectivism has thus far eluded us, we have chosen to retain the bi-polar name.

The "avoidance of U.S. taxes" category is worth a brief explanation. While mentioned specifically as a reason for changing citizenship by relatively few people, this issue does have some current salience among Americans living abroad, particularly those in middle and higher income tax brackets. The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1976 sharply curtailed tax benefits available to Americans earning income and living abroad, and increased both taxes due and the complexity of the forms and calculations involved. By lowering the amount of income earned abroad that may be deducted from U.S. income taxes and limiting the credit on taxes paid in the countries where such income is earned, applicable rates of taxation were sharply increased. This aspect of the 1976 law has been protested vigorously by Americans working abroad and American employers abroad. Its initial implementation was delayed following these protests and several bills to change the Act have been introduced. See Fisher, 1978, for a detailed discussion of the way this Act affects Americans working abroad. The final regulations he discusses were being awaited at the time of our interviews, and several respondents in our other samples mentioned this as a reason for consideration of Australian citizenship in the future.

The political scientist Woodrow Wilson, was keenly aware, as President, of the socialization function of military training for instilling "...the spirit of obedience, the thought of the Nation, the consciousness of having some kind of personal connection with the great body politic they profess to serve" (Curti, 1946, p. 233). Research on the impact of military service on political attitudes shows some, although not strong, effects. Jennings and Markus (1977) found that Vietnam veterans had somewhat lower levels of political cynicism than non-veterans. Schreiber (1977) argues that military service does not have a consistent impact on non-military attitudes. Nevertheless, his data do show that veterans score somewhat higher than non-veterans on some measures related to authoritarianism, such as preference for order and conformity to law.
Indeed, many of our 1978 cohort of new settlers migrated to Australia because of unemployment in the U.S. at the same time that Australia was decreasing immigration because of its own unemployment problems.

We coded unemployment figures on the assumption that there must be a time lag between unemployment problems, a person's decision to change citizenship, and the actual culmination of that decision. Percent change in unemployment was computed from the 1st quarter (measured in February) of the year before the respondent changed citizenship to the first quarter of the year in which he or she changed. The codes were: for 1974 citizenship change: -19%, representing a decline in unemployment from 2.1% to 1.7% between February 1973 to February 1974; for 1975: +135%, from 1.7% to 4.0%; for 1976: +7.5%, from 4.0% to 4.3%; and for 1977 and 1978: +7%, from 4.3% in February 1976 to 4.6% in February 1977. (All figures are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1978, p. 21, in which it is pointed out that Australian unemployment calculations are based on the same concepts as American figures, and are comparable in meaning.) Because quarterly unemployment figures vary, choice of a different quarterly comparison would have yielded different results, but we have not yet experimented with any other unemployment measures.

The respondent's first-preference vote in the 1977 federal parliamentary elections was used as an indicator of general political stance.

The use of 1974 for this purpose was quite convenient, because 1974 is the only year in which a majority of respondents are coded on the positive side of the reasons index, which facilitates interpretation.

Although some countries permit their nationals to adopt the citizenship of another country without abrogating their original citizenship, it is not always clear that the second citizenship is really recognized by the country of origin. In some cases, return to the original country subjects a person to all citizenship duties of that country, including the military draft, and the new citizenship is, in effect, simply not recognized.

The "pride sequence" of questions was as follows:

E19. Are there any things that make you feel especially proud to have been an American citizen?
E20. Are there any things that make you feel not proud to have been an American citizen?
E21. Are there any things that make you feel especially proud to be an Australian citizen?
E22. Are there any things that make you feel not proud to be an Australian citizen?
"Inner conflicts and regrets" about the citizenship change decision were measured by an index consisting of answers to Q. E14, "Since you became an Australian citizen, have you ever had any second thoughts about that decision?" and an area-code covering all of the questions that asked about reasons for changing citizenship, how the respondent viewed his or her decision afterwards, and the reactions of friends and family to the change. People classified as having "inner conflicts or regrets" responded "yes" to the "second thoughts" question and/or specifically expressed conflict or regret in answering the other questions covered in the area-code. Illustrative comments that were counted as expressions of conflict or regret include: "I gave up citizenship for nothing - I would rather be an American - I'll tell the U.S. consulate why I did it and try to get my citizenship back;" "I just wasn't in my right mind when I did it;" "It was a bad day at Black Rock - I cried during the ceremony - it was a stupid thing to do;" "It was a symbolic attempt to establish a root -- futile;" "It was like taking a knife and cutting off one part of my life..."

The question was: "If it were legally possible for you to have kept your American citizenship after becoming an Australian citizen, would you have preferred to have citizenship in both countries, or do you prefer to be an Australian citizen only?"

The question was: "How easy or difficult a decision was it for you to become an Australian citizen? Would you say it was very easy, fairly easy, somewhat difficult, or very difficult for you to decide to become an Australian citizen?"

The statutory requirements for eligibility for Australian citizenship generally include three years of permanent residence. In a very small number of cases, citizenship changes for Americans in our sample were gained earlier than the normal waiting period by virtue of an exception granted to persons who are married to an Australian citizen. Empirically, for our sample, the elapsed time between arrival for permanent residence and the year of taking the oath ranges from less than 1 year to 37 years.

Illustrative statements coded for external pressure include: "When this (job) came up, I was desperate;" "It was financial blackmail;" "I was being forced into it by peer pressure;" "The (U.S.) consulate hounded me -- wouldn't renew my or my daughter's passports (because I owed $900 in social security benefits that were being reclaimed)."
In Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a proscribed act must be performed voluntarily for expatriation to be constitutional. Accordingly, the State Department routinely asks those naturalized in another country (via a written questionnaire) whether they performed that act "voluntarily and of your own free will." Few citizenship changers understand the purpose of this question, and many who feel committed to Australia and their Australian citizenship feel insulted by it. However, those who feel they did not adopt a new citizenship willingly have grounds to appeal if they are expatriated, although it is widely believed in the American community abroad that repatriation is extremely difficult to achieve.

The question used to measure basic national identification was asked very early in the interview, well in advance of the set of questions on citizenship:

A38. Now we have a few questions on how people think about nations. Some people feel that basically they are citizens of the world rather than of any one nation. Others feel that they are foremost Americans, while others feel they are foremost Australians. Which of these comes closest to your own feelings -- citizen of the world, foremost American, or foremost Australian?

This question was adapted from Taft, 1965.

Thirty-three of the 91 citizenship changers called themselves "citizen of the world." In some cases, this category serves as a "half-way house" and in other cases it serves as a "free port" for former Americans who are psychologically and/or ideologically unprepared to adopt "foremost Australian" as their national identification. However, an adequate consideration of this category is beyond the scope of the present paper.

"Inner conflicts and regrets" are defined in footnote 18.


In late 1978, the Australian Public Service Board recommended to the Cabinet that the citizenship requirement for public service positions be discontinued on the grounds that it discriminated against aliens. However, even if this is done, our data indicate that employees of state and local government are much more likely to be affected by the citizenship requirement than employees of the federal government.
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