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ABSTRACT

Using a case study approach, an eighteen-month review assessed the implementation of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) in thirty-seven prime sponsorships in twelve states. Most states showed progress in establishing a role for local educational agencies in the prime sponsor employment and training service matrix. But too little time or incentive has limited union and private employer involvement. To meet developmental needs of youth, sponsors have paid more attention to systematic sequencing of services, emphasized program quality, and tied manpower to education through collaboration with local schools. Despite flexible program targeting, cost and reporting disincentives have deterred special needs group identification. A crisis climate has hindered knowledge development by not permitting time for activities without immediately usable pay-offs, while the maintenance-of-effort mandate has proven hard to enforce. "Sticks" (statutes and regulations) and "carrots" (financial incentives) have failed to assure that new programs serve intended federal objectives. Furthermore, uncertainty about funding levels, regulations, and the law itself lessen federal block grant program effectiveness. (Recommendations are made for improving YEDPA program operations and considerations when enacting and implementing new legislation. The ten case study areas are summarized.) (YLB)

YOUTH AND THE LOCAL EMPLOYMENT AGENDA

An Analysis of Prime Sponsor Experience Implementing The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act

Overview
and
Area Summaries
Final Report
January 1980

GREGORY WURZBURG

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NATIONAL COUNCIL ON EMPLOYMENT POLICY
YOUTH EVALUATION PROJECT
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The National Council on Employment Policy is a private nonprofit organization of academicians and practitioners who have a special interest and expertise in the area of manpower. The Council is primarily concerned with furthering research on employment and training problems and assessing related policy issues.

This evaluation was reviewed by the Youth Evaluation Committee of the Council, but does not necessarily represent the views of the Committee members or the Council members.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

(1) Changing Roles and Relationships of Institutions. One of the most visible of YEDPA's institutional change objectives was to establish a role for local education agencies in the prime sponsor employment and training service matrix. In the vast majority of cases studied, there has been positive movement. Occasionally there have been quantum leaps in the degree of collaboration and program sophistication.

Progress has been most noticeable where there had been little or no pre-YEDPA contact between sponsors and schools. Under YEDPA education and manpower administrators at least started talking together. But substantive progress has been hard to estimate because a great deal of energy was devoted to simply opening communications. The short program year in fiscal 1978 also encouraged sponsors and schools alike to refrain from major changes for the second year.

In the areas where schools and sponsors had collaborative arrangements predating YEDPA, the new legislation added to what was already there but also led to attempts to better rationalize program components and institutional relationships.

Substantively, the LEA programs are geared mostly to provide labor market services, including vocational exploration (work experience) under the auspices of schools. As a rule, these programs do not capitalize on the unique capacities of schools except to provide services to the in-school population. There are a few instances, however, in which schools have taken steps to establish alternative education programs providing more than just labor market services for dropouts. Generally, though, there is only limited evidence of institution building in the form of schools adding staff or providing training to increase the school service capacity.

There have been both procedural and substantive sticking points in CETA-LEA relations. Time and program continuity are indispensable for getting past those humps. Experience in areas with longstanding CETA-LEA relations bears this out, as does the widespread preference among sponsors to leave their 1978 programs and LEA shares intact for 1979.

The problem with trying, as a matter of federal policy, to get CETA sponsors to collaborate with non-CETA agencies, such as local schools, is that the sponsors are the only players under the federal thumb. The Department of Labor can use the force of statutes and regulations to push the sponsors into collaborative relationships, but must rely on persuasion and the creation of credible incentives to get non-CETA agencies involved. This has meant that the process by which schools and sponsors have implemented joint activities under YEDPA has been time-consuming and idiosyncratic.

There has been too little time or incentive for activism on the part of unions or private employers. It was hoped that unions would be involved at least on the youth planning councils. The extent and quality of that involvement increased somewhat in the second year, but still has been limited by the short planning periods and the perceived powerlessness of the councils. Furthermore, to the extent unions have been involved it usually has been in a role which, by definition, has been most visible when unions have objected to plans or procedures. Where more constructive roles have emerged, involvement has been a function of union initiative and not factors inherent in YEDPA, such as involvement in the youth councils. These other factors have included a longstanding and stable sponsorship, a degree of commitment among local union officials, and a healthy economy in which youth workers are not seen to be competing with union members for jobs.

In the midst of the federal overtures to the private sector, it was only natural for the Department of Labor to use YEDPA as one more vehicle for encouraging involvement by private employers. Involvement of private employers continues to be the exception, however. That is not because of a lack of good intentions on the part of prime sponsors. They share the federal interest in establishing private sector liaisons because they feel the quality of private sector work experience is better than that in public or private/nonprofit sector jobs. But good intentions alone are not enough. Where there is involvement, it usually is also a product of good local economic conditions. Frequently, those partnerships also seem to depend heavily on a trilateral arrangement involving local schools. The schools are helpful for gaining access to private employers through previous work-education programs, and lending credibility to sponsor-based programs.

Although YEDPA administrators hoped the new law would improve services for youth at the local level, the Department of Labor did not intend it to be a "cutting edge for institutional change." Yet prime sponsors consistently found it necessary to make internal organizational alignments in order to ease implementation. Program reporting requirements, accounting requirements, the project orientation of some activities, maintenance of effort requirements, and eligibility requirements, for example, all steered sponsors in the direction of isolating the youth programs from other CETA activities and clients. The fact that administrative responsibilities for the youth programs are relatively isolated from other CETA activities only reinforces isolation of youth initiatives locally.

Some of the separation makes sense, especially where local schools are becoming involved. But most of it unnecessarily fractures the CETA organizational and managerial structure and, in the long run, militates against development of comprehensive services.

(2) Shifts in Program Emphasis. In implementing YEDPA, the Department of Labor encouraged sponsors to adapt services, as much as possible, to meet the developmental needs of youth. At the same time, the Department attached a great deal of importance to sponsors developing program quality. There have been few cases of sponsors introducing entirely new services under YEDPA. But sponsors are paying more attention to

sequencing services for youth in a systematic manner and are putting a greater emphasis on improving the quality of local programs.

Complementary services are frequently being packaged together more deliberately so that, in addition to working, enrollees also spend time in career exploration components learning about different occupational requirements and how labor markets work. Sponsors have been slow to attempt program innovation or more sophistication because of the difficulties of getting basic programs in place.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Department of Labor's emphasis on program quality was the sponsor reaction that an emphasis on quality rather than quantity was out of the ordinary for the Department. Although before YEDPA, a concern with quality may have been implicit among federal administrators and lawmakers, many local administrators, who shared the concern for it, did not see a system of incentives to reward quality rather than quantity. Consequently, the new departmental interest was greeted with some skepticism. That distrust was not entirely unwarranted when only a few months after the start of the new programs, sponsors were receiving directives to increase enrollments or lose money. Nevertheless, in order to better assure the quality of programs, prime sponsors are paying greater attention to developing the quality of work assignments and supervision, and making more of an effort to evaluate programs.

To a certain extent, the Department is backing up its rhetoric for program quality by making available to prime sponsors discretionary funds for exemplary programs. But prime sponsors are still held accountable under the Department's performance indicators which, in the end, favor quantity not quality, and the regional office representatives continue to be preoccupied with judging performance on the basis of factors reducible to simple numbers rather than judgmental considerations.

YCCIP is unpopular among local officials because of the difficulties associated with administering it. The small absolute size of the YCCIP grants and the low allowances for non-wage and non-supervisory costs make it difficult for some sponsors to find program operators. The project orientation isolates the projects too much from other CETA services (which the architects of YCCIP may have intended), while their temporary nature makes it hard to staff them with well-qualified supervisors.

(3) Serving Youth Most in Need. Despite the looser eligibility criteria of YCCIP and YETP relative to other CETA programs, sponsors have consistently enrolled poor youth in both programs. More than three out of four are from families with incomes at or below 70 percent of the BLS lower living standard. Those youths actually are enrolled in higher proportions in YCCIP (which has no income eligibility criterion) than YETP. Educators, as well as sponsor officals, are complaining in some instances, however, that family income is not the only predictor of labor market problems. Some cite cases of "over-income" youth from broken homes and those with criminal records being sorely in need of labor market services but being ineligible because of family income.

Although sponsors are singling out groups for special emphasis, very few are taking steps to assure such youths are enrolled in any greater numbers than they would be otherwise. Fewer still are developing services to meet special needs where certain such tailoring would be appropriate. This is partly because both the Department of Labor and sponsors do not distinguish adequately between significant segments identified by demographic characteristics and those identified by need characteristics. The objective in serving those identified by demographic characteristics is simply to provide a higher level of services, so there is no need for differentiating services for them. But significant segments with special needs are likely candidates for specially adapted services.

Another reason that identification of special needs groups is such an empty gesture is that there is little reason for sponsors to do more. There are no rewards for taking extraordinary steps to enroll especially troubled youth, for example, and there are disincentives in the form of pressure to hold down per-enrollee costs and increase the likelihood of "positive placements."

Although YCCIP was not restricted to out-of-school youth, it was hoped the no-frills jobs concept would appeal most to jobless school leavers. In fact, about two-thirds of all enrollees were out-of-school. But that relatively high enrollment of out-of-school youth does not reflect a good match between the program design and local needs. There was a common complaint that youths in the target group--jobless high school dropouts--have some of the most acute problems of all youths and are in need of much more than a no-frills job. Consequently, sponsors frequently augmented YCCIP work experience with counseling, training, and supportive services. There was also some evidence of YCCIP jobs going to high school graduates, rather than dropouts, in areas where job opportunities were extremely limited.

YCCIP has been plagued from the beginning with low enrollments of females; they are outnumbered by males three to one. Part of the imbalance can be attributed to the fact that male dropouts are more likely to enter the labor market after leaving school. But a sponsor-by-sponsor analysis shows the emphasis on "tangible outputs" in YCCIP projects to be a more important factor in tilting enrollments towards males. The emphasis favors construction/maintenance/landscaping work, jobs not traditionally filled by females. At the same time, there are relatively few examples of YCCIP projects geared to overcome sex stereotyping.

YETP permits more comprehensive services than YCCIP and was fashioned to provide in-school youth with labor market information, career and job search counseling, and vocational exploration services in addition to work experience. Most of the youths served are in-school youth. A surprisingly large number of 14-15 year olds are served under these programs--especially by school-based programs. The philosophy among educators in these cases is that if youth employment programs are to be effective deterrents to dropping out, they should be aimed at youths in their early teens. Another presumption is that these younger youths face more limited job opportunities than older youths.

(4) Youths as More Than Clients. In order to better represent views of youths in policymaking and program administration, prime sponsors were required to involve youths on planning councils and encouraged to

involve them in administering programs. These strategies have not worked particularly well. The youth planning councils have not proved to be effective as independent advocates nor as vehicles for youth involvement. They are almost always subordinate to full planning councils and the youths serving on them have been passive participants at best. To the extent there is active and useful participation by youths, it is through alternative means for soliciting and representing youth views.

(5) Knowledge Development. YEDPA was envisioned as a provisional demonstration legislation that, by exploring the nature of youth employment problems and testing the different approaches to those problems, would provide a basis for more permanent legislative solutions. Research, evaluations, and demonstration activities--knowledge development, as it is known in the Department of Labor--have been the centerpiece of the federal role in implementing YEDPA. But the Department has also strongly encouraged prime sponsors to test innovative programs and document their own lessons about the results. The knowledge development mandate given prime sponsors, however, lacked direction. The only message that came through was that local administrators were supposed to do something in the name of "knowledge development."

The mandate was not well received in fiscal 1978. Frantically trying to react to every DOL directive, prime sponsor administrators had little patience with a mandate requiring a great deal of thought. Nevertheless, most did something. Where sponsors already had research and evaluation work underway, they repackaged it as knowledge development. Several attempted elaborate social experiments.

The second year produced, in some cases, more deliberate results. Most sponsors that had tried sophisticated projects in the first year backed off and tried less ambitious, but more manageable projects. The others chose to continue what they had started in the first year, many with refinements. Some rationalized that more time was needed; others simply repeated the first year activities to satisfy the Department of Labor.

Knowledge development is one of the few provisions in CETA open-ended enough to allow prime sponsors a large degree of discretion. Ironically, that degree of latitude might be seen as scaring some sponsors who actually want DOL guidance. But knowledge development provides a poor test of what sponsors really do when given a great deal of discretion. Though there may be intellectual returns that would improve long-term performance, sponsors are not given the time required in the short-run to design good evaluations. Even if they were, it is not clear they would be rewarded for conducting more effective programs. In short, the crisis climate of CETA administration does not permit time for activities that do not have immediately usable payoffs.

(6) Stretching the Impact of New Resources. Both the Congress and Department of Labor administrators were concerned that the new YEDPA resources would be substituted for other CETA resources previously being used to serve youth, thereby diminishing the net impact of the new initiatives. To keep this from happening, the Department of Labor instructed sponsors to maintain certain previous service levels to youth in addition to the new YCCIP and YETP services.

In the first year and a half of experience under YEDPA, there was, in fact, a slight decline in the youth share of non-YEDPA enrollments. But the causes were more complex and uncontrollable than a matter of simple policy decisions to cut non-YEDPA service to youth. Institutional and administrative forces as well as the general instability of the CETA system caused by large funding reductions were far more influential. Furthermore, although service levels to youth were reduced. In some cases, there were off-setting institutional changes that enhanced the efficiency of the delivery of services to youth.

Generally, the maintenance of effort mandate was a laudable goal to consider in implementing YEDPA, but the maintenance of effort prescriptions proved to be arbitrary mechanisms ill-suited for implementing the goal because they failed to cope with the underlying forces acting on sponsors' operations.

(7) Inefficiences of Federal Block Grants. The Congress and the Department of Labor provided for both "sticks" and "carrots" in YEDPA to assure that the new programs would serve intended federal objectives. The sticks, in the form of statutes, regulations and departmental directives, prescribed certain policies and procedures. The carrots, i the form of financial incentive grants for certain extra projects, were meant to influence local decisionmaking by rewarding some policies and programs over others.

Sponsors went to some length to demonstrate compliance with requirements to plan and negotiate agreements, and represent youth on planning councils, for example. But since literal compliance rarely assured achieving goals behind those requirements, their net impact depended heavily on how much the federal priorities agreed with prime sponsor priorities and, if they did, whether sponsors would or could take the extra steps to serve those priorities. Where there was some agreement, the "sticks" may have speeded programs and policy development slightly. Where there was no agreement, the sticks appear to have changed little substantively, but did create more work for sponsors.

The use of incentives to encourage, for example, new institutional linkages or innovative programs, was even less successful. Because the incentive programs were introduced at the same time as the formula-funded programs, there was no real base of youth programming or policies on which to build. The incentive grants became simply more money for which to apply and more requirements to meet.

Federal block grant programs are bound to have inefficiencies in them with regard to implementing federal objectives, because of competing state and local priorities. Some prescriptive measures--sticks--are necessary to give substance to vague federal goals. But if those goals are much out of step with state and local agendas, neither sticks nor carrots assure conformity. Then too much direction cutting against local priorities or even a moderate amount of policy guidance provided so quickly that it strains institutional inertia contributes to a sham compliance process in which sponsors do not seriously consider the federal objectives and the Department of Labor cannot fairly judge how well the directives are really being followed.

Uncertainty about funding levels, regulations, and the law itself is a distinguishing characteristic of the entire CETA federal/prime sponsor partnership. Habitual as such uncertainties are, and continue to be under YEDPA, they still exact an enormous toll. Changing signals regarding funding levels caused sponsors to accelerate enrollments and then back-off; some were forced to lay off enrollees and staff. Doubts about what Congress would do with CETA reauthorization in the fall of 1978 strained relations sponsors had newly established with local schools. These factors have reduced the planning and development time for new programs, and hurt the credibility of sponsors with other local agencies. They have also created a difficult work climate and seriously undermined prime sponsor staff stability. In the end, they have almost certainly lessened the effectiveness of the programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This 18-month review of the implementation of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act provides a basis for two kinds of recommendations. One kind suggests steps for improving operation of the Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects and the Youth Employment and Training Program. The second suggests considerations that policymakers keep in mind when formulating new youth policies--an appropriate kind of recommendation since YEDPA was intended to be a departure point for formulating more comprehensive and effective policies.

Improving Operations of YCCIP and YETP

1. The Department of Labor ought to take steps to counteract the tendency of prime sponsors to set up youth service systems separate from adult service systems. Such steps might include (a) encouraging integration of services (this was not emphasized under YEDPA), and (b) relaxing requirements for reporting expenditures by activities within titles.

2. A large part of improving CETA programming for youth involves little more than rationalizing existing services and establishing service sequences. This kind of refinement can be just as important as developing new, sophisticated programs. Because of this, the Department ought to offer more incentives in the form of discretionary money for management innovations, not just design innovations. This is already being done on a large scale through the consolidated youth employment project. Smaller scale, locally initiated innovations also ought to be supported.

3. The Department ought to not only encourage sponsors to assess their own programs, as they are encouraged to do under the knowledge development mandate, but it should develop a system for rewarding self-evaluation and, more importantly, rewarding program quality.

4. The Department ought to identify and publicize outreach, intake, and counseling programs that have been effective in increasing female enrollments in jobs not traditionally held by females. In the

meantime, it also ought to relax the emphasis on YCCIP projects producing tangible outputs in order to permit development of jobs more likely to appeal to female enrollees.

5. In trying to control substitution of youth monies for CETA Title II-B (formerly Title I) monies, the Congress and the Department of Labor ought to examine more carefully the underlying factors contributing to it. Where measures for reducing it are deemed necessary, they should be better adapted to countering underlying forces rather than simply trying to cover up symptoms. Reliance on simple numbers to judge compliance ought to be kept to a minimum. Recognizing that the Department of Labor lacks the resources to evaluate substitution on a case-by-case basis, where numerical guidelines are necessary, they ought to be applied permitting a margin of flexibility.

Considerations When Enacting and Implementing New Legislation

There are more general recommendations that ought to be considered as new policies are developed.

1. Abrupt versus Incremental Change. YEDPA represented a dramatic departure from past federal policies and practices regarding youth employment and training programs. The fact that the youth programs were implemented is more a testimonial to leadership in the Department of Labor and heroic local efforts than to an ability to change inherent in the CETA system. The danger of trying abrupt change again is that the "policy tether" by which the Department of Labor pulls prime sponsors along will snap, as it may have in the case of the knowledge development mandate. In that case, once national direction was lost, sponsors went off in many directions, frequently trying to follow a perceived departmental policy while failing to serve local needs well.

The limits of effective legislation are determined more by the state of the practice of policy and capacity to implement than by limits on innovative thinking; good ideas alone are not enough. In the future legislation, architects ought to take greater care to assure continuity and cumulative development linking current programs with proposed programs. The Department of Labor and the CETA system were lucky with YEDPA.

2. Coaxing Collaboration. There is one important problem with federal policy encouraging institutional collaboration under CETA as YEDPA does: In the prime sponsor-education relationship, only the CETA prime sponsor is accountable to Washington. Even the most forceful federal policymakers cannot convert reluctant unions, schools, local government agencies, or private employers to the CETA religion. Furthermore, uncertainties about the level and availability of funding force local programming decisions to be delayed to the last moment. These conditions make it extremely difficult for CETA sponsors to develop working partnerships. Under these conditions, statutes, regulations, and formal lines of authority are ineffective tools for assuring compliance. Other strategies are required. Again, one objective should be to maintain as much continuity and stability as possible in prime sponsor operations. Accord-

ingly, Washington policymakers should pay greater attention to the impacts that statutes, regulations, and guidance from Washington have on prime sponsor operations. Besides improving the environment in which collaboration takes place, the incentives for it could be improved by providing program money for schools (such as the YETP 22 percent set-aside) and unions, and wage subsidies for private employers.

3. Use of Incentives. A way to strike a compromise between the notion of serving federal priorities through the CETA system and granting local decisionmakers a degree of discretion in developing programs and policies is to employ incentive grants. These would be grants over and above formula allocations supported with discretionary funds. They would fund prime sponsor activities in areas designated as high priorities by the federal government.

The concept of incentive grants is appearing in certain legislative proposals and is gaining some popularity. If such grants are adopted, however, lessons from YEDPA implementation dictate two conditions under which they should be adopted: (1) Incentive grants ought to be available only after a program and policy base is established; this would mean lagging implementation of incentive grants by at least a year behind implementation of the formula programs. (2) There ought to be a ceiling on the number of incentive grants and level of incentive funds available to prime sponsors. This would remove the dollar value of one incentive grant over another, and make it easier for sponsors to apply for incentive grants according to what their policy priorities are, and not because they wanted to build up their overall budgets.

4. Targeting Services by Need. Unlike adult employment and training policies, much of youth employment and training policies should be preventative: preparing youths for work and labor markets in such a way as to minimize the problems they encounter there. But, because family income alone is not likely to be a good predictor of later labor market problems for youths, local administrators should be allowed some discretion in determining eligibility status on the basis of circumstances other than family income, such as offender status or the presence of children.

5. Changing the Emphasis on Program Output. Where the Congress and Department of Labor specify objectives in terms of program results instead of in terms of certain program designs, Washington policymakers are leaving the choice of means for achieving objectives up to prime sponsors. But under the current youth programs, there are still instances in which program "inputs" are specified. The Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects, for example, directs sponsors to provide meaningful jobs that produce "tangible outputs." That kind of specification should be avoided.

What is even more damaging, though, is inappropriate specification of federal objectives. Under the youth programs, as well as other CETA programs, federally established performance indicators and legislative language put a premium on, for example, placements in jobs, transition to private sector jobs, award of a GED or high school diploma, as well as low per-enrollee costs. Yet by stressing absolute levels of achievement and low enrollee costs, rather than relative gains and low service unit costs, federal output objectives steer local programming towards enrollment and service delivery patterns towards serving more qualified youth and offering quick-fix services. Obviously, there is no simple formula for avoiding conflicting objectives. But the Congress and the Department of Labor ought to consider more carefully the likely consequences of their prescriptions.

6. The Other Side of Substitution. The Congress and Department of Labor have consistently taken strong steps to limit substitution of CETA funds in general or YEDPA funds in particular for funds that would otherwise be available. Yet, in the attempts to control substitution--maintain previous levels of effort--policymakers have neglected to study the reasons for substitution or the off-setting "benefits" of substitution. Simply put, (1) substitution of new funds for old funds is not always a matter of deliberate choice and, (2) substitution can buy useful changes.

The Congress and Department of Labor ought to consider carefully the likely implications of maintenance of effort provisions and their enforcement. Such provisions ought to be evaluated to determine what forces they may be trying to counter, what changes (other than substitution) they are likely to prevent, whether specific tradeoffs are attainable by adopting something other than absolute proscriptions on substitution, and how feasible it is to enforce them.

FOREWORD

The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act, signed into law August 5, 1977, marked the start of a concerted attack on the problems of youth unemployment. The law, which was left largely untouched in the 1978 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act amendments and, for the bulk of its efforts, looked to the CETA local government sponsor system, introduces several departures from other CETA planning and implementation processes.

Four programs were authorized under YEDPA. Three were created under the Youth Employment Demonstration Program, now under Title IV, Part A of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. The Young Adult Conservation Corps is authorized under Title VIII.

The Youth Employment Demonstration Program authorizes 3 programs to be operated by state and local prime sponsors established under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. The purpose of the program is to provide employment opportunities and employment support services, and to test the relative effectiveness of alternative remedies to youth employment problems. The Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects are being supported in a limited number of prime sponsorships chosen in a nation-wide competition held late in 1977. The central purpose of the projects is to test whether guaranteeing jobs for 16-19 year old economically disadvantaged youths encourages those in school to stay, and those out of school, to return. Seven prime sponsors selected by the Department of Labor are testing this notion with saturation projects. Ten other prime sponsors are operating smaller projects, that do not necessarily guarantee jobs, but instead test specific innovative ideas. The Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP) are supported by formula allocations to all prime sponsors to provide job opportunities for unemployed youths, 16-19 years old, doing well-supervised work with tangible outputs that are of benefit to the community. Although these projects are not reserved for economically disadvantaged youth, prime sponsors are encouraged to give them special emphasis in selecting participants. The Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP), also formula-funded, is designed to provide a full range of work experience and employability development services for youths. The services are supposed to be targeted for disadvantaged 16-21 year old youths--both in-school and out-of-school--and unemployed or underemployed. Under certain provisions, some 14 and 15 year old youths may participate, as well as some non-disadvantaged youth. Prime sponsor programs under this subpart are expected to link with local education agencies, so that the base of resources for youths can be broadened, and so, perhaps, some of those resources can be better coordinated. In addition to the YCCIP and YETP funds allocated by formula, there are discretionary monies. They constitute about 20 percent of the total funds available under YCCIP and YETP and support research and special demonstration projects. The Young Adult Conservation Corps provides jobs and some supportive services to unemployed youth who can be engaged in doing needed conservation work on public lands around the country. These activities are conducted under the authority of a tri-partite agreement among the U.S. Departments of Labor, Agriculture and Interior.

YEDPA was funded at a level of $1 billion for its first year. Due to implementation lags, actual spending was only half that: $139 million for the Young Adult Conservation Corps, $32 million for the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, $60 million for the Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects and $294 million for the Youth Employment and Training Program. Spending in fiscal 1979 rose to $735 million.

Methodology

In order to evaluate YEDPA implementation, the Council adopted a case study approach. Ten case studies were prepared for a series of four reports by knowledgeable observers. Each case study has examined three to five prime sponsor areas, covering a total of 37 prime sponsorships in 12 states. The sample was chosen, not as a random one, but to represent a cross-section of important prime sponsor characteristics. The selection purposefully focuses on clusters of sponsors to permit analysis of common patterns and variations among them.

Youth and the Local Employment Agenda is the fourth and final report describing and analyzing local experience implementing YEDPA from late Fall 1977 to Spring 1979. The full report consists of this overview and 10 case studies prepared by the following Field Associates.

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The overview synthesizes findings in the case studies, identifies major themes running through them and presents an analysis of the diversity of experiences reflected in them. It does not pretend to capture the wealth of information and detail in the individual case studies.

Copies of the full report can be obtained from the Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research in the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.

In keeping with Department of Labor policy, the associates and project director working on this project were encouraged to express their views. The views do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Labor, the National Council on Employment Policy, or any of the prime sponsors studied.

Rupert Evans, Marcia Freedman, and Garth Mangum, members of the Youth Evaluation Project Committee of the National Council on Employment Policy, have reviewed the research design and findings, and have monitored progress of this evaluation through the four reports. The Field Associates and I thank them for their assistance. We also thank the many Department of Labor, CETA prime sponsor, local school, and community-based organization staff who cooperated with us in the course of this evaluation. I thank the Field Associates and members of the NCEP Youth Evaluation Project Committee who reviewed an early draft of the overview, and John Walsh who helped edit the final round of case studies and summarize their findings for the overview. I also thank Nancy Kiefer who helped edit and prepare the overview and case studies for publication, and Cathy Glasgow, who assisted her. I assume responsibility for the contents of the overview.

Gregory Wurzburg
Project Director
January 2, 1980

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BLS	-	Bureau of Labor Statistics
CBO	-	Community-Based Organization
CETA	-	Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
DOL	-	Department of Labor
ES	-	Employment Service
ESEA	-	Elementary and Secondary Education Act
ETA	-	Employment and Training Administration
HEW	-	Department of Health, Education and Welfare
LEA	-	Local Education Agency
OMB	-	Office of Management and Budget
OYP	-	Office of Youth Programs
SPEDY	-	Summer Program for Economically Disadvantaged Youth
Voc Ed	-	Vocational Education
YACC	-	Young Adult Conservation Corps
YCCIP	-	Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects
YEDPA	-	Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act
YETP	-	Youth Employment and Training Program
YIEPP	-	Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Project

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PREFACE

Assessing Implementation of YEDPA

YEDPA is not maintenance legislation designed to sustain existing policies and service levels. More than anything else, it is legislation intended to produce change. The purpose of the changes has been to rationalize service systems and better articulate the relationships between institutions that are in a position to improve the abilities of youth to function effectively in job markets for the purpose of providing more comprehensive and higher quality services than have been provided in the past.

Over the short-run YEDPA's objectives have been to change the ingredients that have gone into the solution for curing employment problems among youth. Over the long-run it is hoped that if those changes are indeed put in place, youths will have a better time of it in labor markets.

In overseeing implementation of YEDPA, the Department of Labor has pursued five principal operational objectives. It has utilized YEDPA as a vehicle to (1) induce changes in institutional relationships between state and local prime sponsors and other agencies and private sector interests; (2) upgrade the employment and training service offered by prime sponsors; (3) focus services on youth most in need; (4) give youth a voice in program planning, design, and operations; and (5) encourage sponsors to test innovative programs and more generally evaluate program results. In pursuing these objectives, the Department has also tried to maximize the impact of YEDPA resources by preventing, as much as possible, substitution of the new resources for other resources previously committed to serving youths.

The Department of Labor's agenda reflects in large part the impatience of the Congress with youth unemployment problems and hopes for quick results. But the expectations in Washington have been too high, as they have with other initiatives under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. There has been a lack of sensitivity to normal implementation lags and too little attention paid to diagnosing the reasons sponsors have had difficulties meeting some of the objectives.

This evaluation is an attempt to determine how realistic the objectives have been and to get some grasp of whether and how well YEDPA's formula-funded programs have met the short-run change objectives. It does not measure the impact of YEDPA services on youth clients: those kinds of assessments must wait. But it does provide some basis for determining what programmatic and institutional features are in place and may be responsible for the impacts--or absence of impacts--when they are subsequently measured.

The report is organized to address each objective individually and discuss the prime sponsors' experience following the Department's cues. A final section evaluates the effectiveness of the various strategies utilized in the formulation and implementation of YEDPA, for stimulating change at the prime sponsor level.

CHANGING THE ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS OF INSTITUTIONS

The First Priority: Involving Schools

For years, education and employment and training institutions have coexisted at the local level. Since their client populations are not mutually exclusive, there has been considerable overlap in the populations the two institutions have served and the services that have been provided. In some cases, the overlap has produced productive partnerships and specific strategies for developing complementary services. More frequently, the overlap has produced competition over turf and occasional charges and countercharges of institutional failure and incompetence. The result has been a collective inability to serve some youths adequately.

When proposals for a youth employment and training initiative were being considered in 1977, it was natural for the architects to consider building in provisions to push education and manpower together. The main emphasis was on employment and training programs for youth and the fact that a large proportion of the intended clients was in school made the matter of some deliberate strategy for linking CETA and schools imperative.

Both the Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP) and the Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP), the two formula-funded programs administered by prime sponsors, stress the importance of tying YEDPA activities into education. As one of its secondary objectives, YCCIP encourages sponsors to work with schools to obtain academic credit for competencies that YCCIP enrollees gain while on the job. But, for YETP, linking CETA and education is the single most important program objective. Furthermore, unlike YCCIP and earlier CETA mandates for cooperation between prime sponsors and other local agents, YETP provides a specific mechanism for bringing the two systems together. A minimum of 22 percent of each sponsor's YETP allocation is reserved to be administered under the terms of a joint agreement between each sponsor and the local education agency (agencies).

Experiences of schools and sponsors in fiscal 1978 showed a mixed record of collaboration. In virtually all prime sponsorships, there was some progress towards more joint planning and coordinated programming. Sometimes the 22 percent was a timely prod that encouraged giant leaps forward. More frequently, it spurred modest, but positive, steps in the right direction along a very long road. Although it appeared that the 22 percent set-aside was serving as an effective incentive to collaboration, more than incentives were needed to make joint activities fruitful. Administrative differences between the two institutions needed to be ironed out and substantive guidance and models were needed regarding the form collaboration might take.

With the benefit of more time to observe CETA-LEA relations, there is a clearer picture of the roles of the two institutions and how they have changed over the brief period since YEDPA was implemented. But the initial impression remains unchanged.

Progress in the collaborative relationship between sponsors and schools is slow but, in most cases, still positive. The lack of substantive guidance created a vacuum which has not been filled. But the fact that neither side has been particularly dogmatic or prescriptive with regard to program content has, no doubt, helped avert what, in many instances otherwise, would be fiercely competitive struggles for turf and the upper hand. It remains to be seen whether those struggles are merely being postponed.

There have been few surprises associated with the substance of the CETA-LEA programs. Many are simple extensions of previous activities in which schools were involved. But while the practice of staying with dependable programs and known quantities has not broken new ground with respect to program design, the payoffs have been considerable. There have been no cases of new programs blowing up and there have been only isolated cases of disengagement attributable to incompatibility between CETA and LEA officials.

Forging a New Education Role

The point of getting local educators involved in employment and training programs for youth is not simply to tap another source of local expertise but also to stimulate some institutional change. It was hoped that LEA participation would encourage schools to (1) gear more, or at least some of the education process to meeting the employability development needs of youth, and (2) assure that the underachievers and dropouts typically caught in the CETA "safety net" are better served by education and employability development services. Of course, these ambitious institutional change objectives are bound to take more than a year and a half to begin to manifest themselves. But it is important to take note of events as they have unfolded so far in order to determine whether the patterns observed now are temporary, lasting, or intermediate stages in a longer-term evolution.

The programs of local education agencies are self-contained initiatives geared to preparing youth to cope in labor markets. For the most part, the programs are not part of a sequence or larger service network in which youths participate. Rather, they are independent operations connected with other manpower programs only at the point where clients enter or leave. One exception is Rockford where the prime sponsor handles work experience assignments and the school provides complementary classroom-based career exploration services. But usually, "collaboration" is taking place in the planning or negotiating phase, not in the course of day-to-day operations and not in the form of shared responsibilities in a continuum of services.

From a programmatic point of view, there is probably not much need for constant interplay between CETA sponsors and schools. Nearly all of the participating schools have programs that build on a work experience component and a complementary component that provides some type of general career education and counseling.

Remarkably few LEAs, however, have developed programs that capitalize on a relative advantage that schools have over other manpower service deliverers: the capability to augment job preparation with general education. For the most part they are still providing little more in services than reasonably well managed community-based organizations can and do provide. A few such as Hartford, Rockford, and Cook County have established basic education and remedial education components. Not insignificantly, those are programs that are part of well articulated strategies for serving school leavers. Waterbury has developed a bilingual education program to help non-English speaking youth overcome the language barrier. Charlotte and Alamance provide basic education and GED preparation, but their programs appear to be linked to the recently mandated competency exams that graduating high school seniors must pass.

Although LEAs seem to be substituting an emphasis on meeting employability deficiencies for an emphasis on meeting educational deficiencies (and thus duplicating capabilities of other service deliverers), there are some mitigating circumstances. There is a lack of substantive guidance on what constitutes an appropriate and uniquely educational role in employability development. That is a state of the art problem. Indeed, that role, if it is to evolve, will probably be a product of the process of trial and error already underway.

Although the substance of the LEA role in YEDPA has been comfortably vague, the target population is well specified. Consequently, the objective of steering services--regardless of what they are--to the underachievers, potential dropouts and dropouts is being met. Targeting by family income is, admittedly, unpopular among educators, but they are working with participants enrolled or referred by the CETA sponsors. And the fact remains that though the matter of targeting by income is a divisive issue in CETA-LEA relations, it does not yet appear to have been decisive in limiting the effectiveness of youth manpower programs. What may become an issue in the longer run is the matter of whether targeting services by income devalues the services and stigmatizes the recipients.

The Importance of CETA-LEA Contact Outside YEDPA

In the process of pulling prime sponsors and LEAs together, there has been a surprising lack of discord between them that is attributable in part to the fact that in many areas, CETA-LEA collaboration has not been a dramatic departure from past experience. About half the sponsors studied have some pre-YEDPA history of LEA involvement in CETA programs, operating, with some degree of success, modest manpower programs for youth. The earlier CETA-LEA relations served both to establish a communication link between the two systems and to provide a program model that was duplicated, expanded, or improved upon under YEDPA. Chicago, Detroit, and Hartford, for example, have big-city school systems with a long history of involvement in CETA and earlier programs under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962. In these areas, CETA sponsors and schools were beyond the point of introductions and had fairly well-established administrative relations.

In Detroit, for example, where educators were probably as well-versed in YEDPA as the CETA sponsor (one CETA administrator suggested "the Board of Education knew how much YEDPA money we were getting before we did"--Peter Kobrak, Page D-18), relations were further cemented by the cooperation required to operate the city's youth incentive entitlement project. The schools were also involved in implementing a U.S. Office of Education career education project.

Chicago YETP activities include work experience as part of a career development program along with intensive counseling. Building on an existing base of joint programs, the YETP activities provide more extensive counseling and support than are usually available and augment them with work experience. The YETP program operated by the public schools offers 10 to 15 hours of work experience each week and two hours of counseling. It is modeled after a CETA Title I work experience program the schools run with a few differences. Title I serves 14-19 year olds while YETP serves 16-21 year olds, and the Title I program (now under Title II of CETA as amended in 1978) has more restrictive eligibility criteria. But more significantly, the YETP program is providing what are considered to be better work assignments. Nearly 45 percent of the placements are in private sector jobs, and the public sector jobs are mostly outside the school system, and better than the Title I jobs that assign youth to in-school "eraser-beater" jobs. There are some complications, however. School teachers, responsible for the placements, are selecting the best of the YETP eligibles.

In Hartford YEDPA stimulated less marked change in the way schools have run programs. Traditionally, the school system there has run work experience programs under CETA Title I and the summer jobs programs. The work experience has been augmented by some remedial education, but the programs are still basically the same. The lack of change appears to be due in part to the fact that although CETA-LEA relations in Hartford are cordial, the sponsor has not provided strong leadership or an effective counterpoint to LEA policies and practices. The entire YETP grant is handled by the Hartford school system (which turns over part of it to a CBO to divide among some suburban LEAs). The prime sponsor has little to say about how it is spent and had done no monitoring as of early 1979. This situation is attributable in part to the independent style of the LEA, but also, no doubt, to the fact that the CETA sponsor has been weakened and its attention diverted by a succession of scandals involving the use of (non-YEDPA) CETA funds.

The more sophisticated sponsors in a number of suburban areas also established relations with schools before YEDPA. In places such as DeKalb County, Marin County, Lansing Consortium, and Cook County, sponsors made the connection as a logical outgrowth of good management and a local climate in which CETA was not as important a local priority as in larger cities and was not highly politicized. In DeKalb, the single LEA in the county has been involved with training and work experience programs since 1964. LEA staff have always participated in the CETA planning council proceedings, and there are frequent informal contacts as well. The sponsor, interested in keeping down the number of program agents, went to the local schools, as a matter of course, to handle a large part of the YETP allocation (more than 50 percent in both years) and the entire YCCIP allocation in 1978. Program content has not changed, though, and the good relations may have lulled both the sponsor and school into maintaining a relatively healthy, but rigid status quo.

In Marin and Santa Clara Counties, the sponsors were also quick to go to the local schools and were generous in allocating shares--40 percent to the Marin LEA and 36 to the Santa Clara LEA in 1978. The sponsors, however, judged the first year's school-based work experience programs to be rather undistinguished. When the CETA sponsors tried to better specify program content and objectives for the second year, the LEAs resented the intrusion. The CETA-LEA relations cooled off and both sponsors cut their LEA shares to 22 percent. The CETA-LEA relations in those areas have not been broken off, but there is a more cautious temper to them. In light of what has been seen in DeKalb, though, the tension in Marin and Santa Clara may be productive because it is forcing some reassessment.

The Lansing prime sponsor had already developed productive working relationships with the local schools in a sophisticated CETA Title I work experience program. Anticipating enactment of YEDPA, both LEAs involved had developed plans by the summer of 1977 and signed agreements for augmenting Title I programs with transition/counseling and placement services. ..ograms were extended into the second year to provide a better test of the approach the LEAs adopted.

In Cook County the LEAs, using CETA Title I money, had developed elaborate work experience and education programs for both in-school and out-of-school youth. They used the lion's share of their YETP allocation--75 percent in 1978 and 71 percent in 1979--to expand both programs. Before YEDPA, the Portland school system used CETA Title I money to provide employment and training services for youth. Under a non-financial agreement, LEA work experience coordinators developed jobs and identified and placed CETA participants still in school in the jobs. The schools monitored the students in their jobs and provided academic credit where it was appropriate. Receiving 50 percent of the YETP allocation, the school system has expanded its services and developed new programs for serving dropouts.

Atlanta and Columbus were the two cases in which neither earlier CETA "collaboration" nor the 22 percent set-aside accomplished much. Atlanta's programs in the schools, both before YEDPA and under YEDPA, offered little more than income transfers. More intensive counseling and job placement assistance for seniors were added for 1979. But the quality of work remains largely unchanged and no academic credit is granted. The Columbus prime sponsor had a Title I contract for training in a school skill center. For 1978, the public schools proposed a YETP work experience program that was to include an in-school career exploration module. The sponsor rejected the plan because it did not permit sufficient prime sponsor control. It substituted instead an expansion of another existing Title I program that provided work experience. The sponsor excused it as an allowable "22 percent LEA program" by indicating that high school guidance counselors must certify each worksite as being compatible with each participant's career goals. The schools, however, had little to say about the agreement, and the certification provision proved to be an empty gesture. The Columbus school system did use similar program funds to set up its proposed career exploration program to serve about 10 percent of the 1978 summer youth enrollees. But the sponsor refused to extend it into the school year, and the 1978 YETP program appeared to be more income transfer with only nominal involvement on the part of the schools.

In the prime sponsor areas where there was no history of collaboration with local schools, the 22 percent set-aside usually proved to be an effective mechanism for opening doors. But given the pace at which relations have developed between LEAs and prime sponsors and pre-CETA program agents, it is probably too early to find the kinds of changes that the 22 percent set-asdie encourages.

A history of good CETA-LEA relations permitted many sponsors to short-circuit the tedious process of establishing new working relationships with local educators. But such a history is not a prerequisite to the quick establishment of joint programs. Lane, Kitsap, and Clark Counties had virtually nothing to do with local schools before YEDPA. Yet, all established promising new programs using the 22 percent set-aside in the first year. Going into the second year of programming, they left their 1978 programs untouched and kept the LEA shares of the YETP allocation at the same levels.

In Clark County, the prime sponsor operation runs by the book and in mid-1977 administrators dutifully began making arrangements with the local city school district. But the program appears to have gotten its main impetus from the LEA which is sponsoring one of ten career education demonstration programs in the state of Ohio. The schools designed a program of work experience augmented with a career education course taught by the school. Although the class existed before YEDPA, there was no work experience component and it appears not to have been as well taught. LEA officials, thinking they could expand the program, tried to increase its share for 1979 over the minimum 22 percent it received in 1978. But the sponsor, although apparently satisfied with the schools' performance, decided as a matter of policy to hold the LEA share at 22 percent.

Kitsap County combined 29 percent of its 1978 YETP allocation with all of its YCCIP allocation to support its LEA-based in-school program. The LEA share was administered by an area vocational skills center with subagreements signed for each school district covered. By the end of the first year, the program coordinator--an intermediary between CETA staff and school counselors--had implemented a system to develop individual competency-based learning plans, monitor work experience, and provide counseling and support services. The overall program was successful. But because the LEA found YCCIP to be too rigid a component for a comprehensive school-based program, it refused the YCCIP funds for 1979 and received Title II funds instead. The LEA share of YETP funds stayed the same.

Lane County is another sponsor that had no dealings with local educators prior to YEDPA. The sponsor had focused exclusively on dropouts, but readily accepted the YETP emphasis on in-school youth. However, the LEA programs are run in some isolation. A number of LEAs opted to participate and, rather than choosing priorities, the sponsor funded all at a relatively low level. The programs are not coordinated among the schools and are providing little more than work experience. One LEA, however, has developed new occupational classes and is supporting a diversified occupations program that emphasizes private sector involvement.

Points of Contention Between Sponsors and Local Schools

Uncertainties and frictions are present wherever sponsors and schools are working together. Usually they are inconsequential. But there have been a few points of expected and unexpected contention between the two systems that are likely to have long-run effects on the process and substance of CETA-LEA collaboration: the award of academic credit for YEDPA activities, and allocation of funds to local schools.

Academic Credit for Work Experience

Aside from using wages to lure youth back to school and encourage those still in to remain, YEDPA has encouraged the award of academic credit for work experience. Not only has credit for work experience been seen as an incentive for program participation, but the process of negotiating it has been viewed as one more device for stimulating CETA-LEA discussions. There is also the hope that implicit standards for accreditation would enhance program quality.

When sponsors first approached LEAs to discuss awarding academic credit, there was some resistance among educators. Many considered the CETA work experience programs to be of low quality and thought the award of academic credit for such activities would undermine the value of academic credit. Others thought that credit for work would steer students even further from academic areas. But the biggest problems seemed to have less to do with the substance of what was credit-worthy and more to do with turf issues. Schools did not like the idea of manpower legislation suggesting academic credit for manpower programs; they did not like CETA administrators suggesting how LEAs should do their jobs and they were protective of their authority to award credit. The local turf issues inspired by the proposed award of academic credit were complicated by the diversity of state regulations governing it and state education agencies' attitudes toward it. Occasionally, state action was necessary to permit credit for work experience. More frequently, LEAs looked for a state vote of confidence favoring local decisions.

Despite the gloomy early prospects for the award of academic credit for work experience, schools are now providing it in a surprisingly large number of prime sponsorships. Although nationally only about 5 percent of all enrollees are receiving academic credit for competencies gained in work experience, more than two-thirds of the sponsors studied report it as being available in 1979 and the majority have it as a regular program feature serving some enrollees. LEAs or occasionally community colleges appear to be almost always involved in overseeing the work experience jobs for which academic credit is awarded, or otherwise certifying it as being credit-worthy.

The "non-struggle" over academic credit can probably be attributed to the 22 percent set-aside giving schools some stake in CETA operations and the increasing willingness among educators to award credit for activities other than those usually found in the classroom. Furthermore, although states establish guidelines for local school officials to follow in deciding whether to award academic credit, the guidelines are usually flexible enough to provide a wide range of options. Texas and Ohio appear to have been two exceptions, where the state posture has been decisive--with different results. The introduction of YEDPA in 1977 spurred Texas state education authorities to change the guidelines so as to encourage credit for work experience. Sponsors there had little trouble in having LEAs arrange for credit, even in the 1977-78 school years. Although Ohio state education administrators do not appear to have been restrictive in the award of academic credit, the lack of state level leadership appears to have stifled the practice in both the 1977-78 and 1978-79 school years.

Community colleges have been especially receptive to the idea of awarding academic credit for work experience and, as a rule, have been more innovative than most secondary schools in fashioning alternative classroom components to complement the work experience. If there is a drawback to this, it is that dropouts can seldom count such credit towards high school graduation. But once youths are in the community college system, it is assumed they are likely to find alternative settings where they can successfully pursue a GED.

Academic credit for work experience has not been particularly difficult to secure, but the more important question now appears to be, "how significant is it?" Getting schools involved to help assure the quality of work experience, alone, does not justify seeking academic credit. But some supposed advantages of credit are not panning out. Some local educators have complained that, over the last few years, students have been able to gain academic credit for almost anything and that they do not have to worry about whether they will have enough credits to graduate. To the extent this is true, this has diminished much of the incentive for students to participate in the new youth programs. The increasing emphasis on basic literacy and preparing youth for competency-based examinations further detracts from the incentive value of academic credit by requiring more than just credits to graduate. Still another problem is specifying the meaning of credit in competency terms. Though academic credit does count towards graduation and might, it is argued, contribute in a general way to program quality, there are rarely specific competencies or skill levels that correspond to the academic credit received. In short, although academic credit for work experience is becoming widely available, its intrinsic value is uncertain.

Sharing the Wealth with LEAS

Each CETA sponsor is required to reserve a minimum of 22 percent of its YETP allocation to be administered under the terms of an agreement with local education agencies. All of the sponsors managed to negotiate such agreements, but it became abundantly clear that the content of programs varies considerably, and the mere presence of an agreement really indicates very little. Another variable that is intriguing simply because it can be precisely measured is the relative size of the agreement. Most sponsors reserved more than the 22 percent minimum; a few reserved up to 100 percent. It appears that the LEA share of YETP is an indicator although it must be interpreted very carefully.

About two-thirds of the sponsors allocated more than 22 percent to finance CETA-LEA agreements in both 1978 and 1979 (See Table 1). About a half of those allocated 50 percent or more to schools. Less than a sixth of the sponsors for which data were obtained allocated only the required minimum. For the larger sponsors, such as Chicago, Atlanta, and San Francisco, where schools and sponsors were already accustomed to working together, the minimum allocation reflected the local competition for CETA funds. In Albuquerque, schools were already heavily involved in another YEDPA demonstration project. But in Clark, Columbus, and Greene Counties, the minimum reflected the fact that sponsors were still in a cautious, exploratory stage with schools. Although schools in both Columbus and Clark applied for more control and more money, respectively, the sponsors turned them down.

Most sponsors kept the same LEA share in 1979 as in 1978. The prevailing sentiment was that the 1978 programs were run for too short a period of time to prove their worth and that programs and funding levels ought to be continued. Where changes were made, however, they were usually quite deliberate. Three sponsors cut the LEA share down to the minimum or close to the minimum for 1979. In Rockford, the LEA share was cut to 23 percent, because schools failed to serve as many out-of-school youths as planned. In both Santa Clara and Marin Counties, cuts (14 and 18 percent respectively) were a result of increasing CETA-LEA friction. In Santa Clara, the sponsor reduced the share from more than a third down to the minimum because of its dissatisfaction with LEA programs that resembled traditional work experience too much. When Marin CETA administrators tried to clarify program specifications regarding program components and enrollments, the schools resisted the intrusion. There are larger issues clouding CETA-LEA relations in Santa Clara, though. CETA sponsor officials feel that the schools are trying to use CETA resources to replace funds cut by the Proposition 13 ceiling on local revenues. School officials, on the other hand, are afraid of the CETA system being used as a channel through which county and city governments can influence independent school districts.

Usually reductions in the LEA shares were not as big as in Santa Clara and Marin and did not signal serious problems. In DeKalb, for example, the 4 percentage point reduction still left the LEA share at about 50 percent and relations between the manpower and education camps are cordial and extensive. Furthermore, the LEA in DeKalb voluntarily gave up a YCCIP project because school and manpower officials alike felt the schools were out of their element running it. Muskegon, a sponsor with no established LEA relations prior to YEDPA, cut the school share by 6 percent in 1979. But the cut was made because of an increase in the YETP allocation and the resource level for schools is actually higher in 1979 than it was in 1978.

The few increases in the LEA share of the YETP allocation were illusory. In Durham and Waterbury, the sponsor maintained the LEA shares at the same dollar level but, because of cuts in the sponsors' YETP allocation, the LEA percentage shares rose. There were no changes in LEA programming.

Table 1

LEA Shares of YETP Allocations--FY 1978 and 1979
(in percentages)

Prime Sponsor	1978	1979
1. Alamance	22	22
2. Albuquerque	22	22
3. Atlanta	22	22
4. Boston	NA	22
5. Cambridge	NA	NA
6. Clark Co.	22	22
7. Chicago	25	30
8. Charlotte	22	30
9. Coastal Bend	72	70
10. Cobb Co.	NA	NA
11. Columbus/Franklin	22	22
12. Connecticut BOS	22	26
13. Cook Co.	75	71
14. DeKalb	57	53
15. Detroit	23	28
16. Durham	23	31
17. El Paso	41	65
18. Grand Rapids	55	55
19. Greene Co.	22	22
20. Hartford	100	100
21. Kalamazoo	32	32
22. Kitsap	29	29
23. Lane	22	22
24. Lansing	77	77
25. Marin	40	22
26. Muskegon	53	47
27. North Carolina BOS	50	50
28. Northeast Georgia	67	76
29. Oakland	35	35
30. Oregon BOS	22	22
31. Portland	50	50
32. Rockford	35	23
33. San Francisco	22	22
34. Santa Clara	36	22
35. Sonoma	27	27
36. Waterbury	38	50
37. Worcester	NA	NA

Note: DeKalb Co., Kitsap Co., and Clark Co. allotted 100 percent of YCCIP funds to LEAs in FY 78, but none in FY 79. Grand Rapids allotted 32 percent of YCCIP funds to LEAs, but cut back to nothing ~~in FY~~ 1979. Kalamazoo and Lansing allotted 12 and 70 percent of YCCIP funds, respectively, to LEAs in FY 1978. The figure for Kalamazoo went to 13 percent in 1979; Lansing's dropped to 6 percent.

In implementing YEDPA early in fiscal 1978, CETA sponsors usually had to approach educators and tell them about the provisions for LEA involvement. This gave sponsors a degree of control over the competition among LEAs for YEDPA money. When it was time to divide up the pie for fiscal 1979, however, the sponsors that had to deal with more than one LEA sometimes faced a different situation. By then more educators were familiar with YEDPA and the opportunity for money, and the competition was keener. Grand Rapids, wanting to involve all LEAs, agreed to go over the minimum for both 1978 and 1979 in order to alleviate competitive pressure. Others, such as the Connecticut Balance of State and Muskegon, used formulas, based on those used for federal school lunch payments to compute LEA allocations. Others, such as Coastal Bend, Kalamazoo, Hartford, El Paso, and Kitsap, put the onus on educators by giving the LEA share to a single LEA and leaving it to divide the funds among the competition.

So far, it seems the various sponsor strategies for allocating LEA shares have not earned sponsors any enemies among educators. But the competition for 1979 funds still was not particularly hot. If and when more LEAs get interested in gaining access to YETP 22 percent money, CETA administrators may be harder-pressed to justify arbitrary and mechanical measures for spreading the wealth. Already the money is spread very thinly among some schools, yet neither sponsors nor schools seem to be explicitly deciding whether to spread the money as "equitably"--and thinly--as necessary or to concentrate it for strategic purposes. That choice may, for the moment, be secondary to the process of getting money out to schools whose administrators are still in the process of familiarizing themselves with CETA. But it will have to be made by local officials in the not-too-distant future and is bound to present another critical juncture in the evolving relationships between many CETA sponsors and schools.

Spurring Other Institutional Changes

The changing relationship between CETA prime sponsors and local education agencies has been the most visible focus for institutional change. Provisions affecting their interplay have been the most specific; money has been at stake and there is a widespread intuitive appeal to joining these two institutions. But YEDPA was intended to produce other kinds of institutional change as well. It was hoped that unions would become more involved in at least reviewing proposed local strategies, that community-based organizations would take a more active role as program agents, and that private employers would hire youth from YEDPA programs. It was also expected that YEDPA would have a certain impact on changing internal sponsor operations serving youth.

These other institutional change objectives have been met with varying degrees of success. It is evident that in order to succeed in changing the way institutions do business, money is an invaluable facilitator when it is used to give more players a stake in the action. But it also seems that money alone will not make institutional change "take;" circumstances have to be right and it helps if a number of concurrent forces are all pushing in the same direction.

Union Involvement

The original hope was that YEDPA would stimulate some minimal degree of union involvement by requiring union approval of proposed plans and by providing for union representation on the youth councils. During first year planning, union involvement was minimal. Because it centered around the most tangible function--plan review--union involvement was identified with, at most, either passive acceptance or active objection. Due to the haste of the start-up of fiscal 1978 programs, the circle of involvement in the planning process was small and most sponsors found unions acquiescing to proposed plans by their tacit non-involvment. There were some instances such as in El Paso, Rockford, Kalamazoo, and Atlanta where unions objected to plans because they infringed upon collective bargaining agreements or unions felt that YEDPA activities might displace union workers. There were only a few instances in which union involvement was a signal of affirmative program support. In San Francisco, the painters' union established an apprenticeship program under YCCIP for fiscal 1978. After much negotiation, a number of unions in Rockford agreed to help out on a YCCIP stadium renovation project.

In the second year of YEDPA, there was slightly more evidence of union involvement. The involvement includes more program support than in the first year. Although fiscal 1979 was better than 1978, union involvement was still restricted to fewer than a fifth of the sponsors studied. A Greene County carpenters' union is involved in a pre-apprenticeship program for females in non-traditional jobs. In California all of the sponsors have unions involved in sponsoring projects, providing instructors and training facilities, and providing assistance on project development. In Cobb County a machinists' union sat out the first year of YEDPA review but took a more active role in the second year review and youth council proceedings. Part of the new interest appears to be in response to the willingness of managers at a local production plant to provide training for youths under YEDPA; it may also reflect a concern for protecting union interests.

Obviously CETA-union relations can be more productive when they are based on more than unions simply reviewing sponsor plans. But the incentives for unions supporting programs are difficult to identify and the processes for getting them involved in those programs are harder to put in place. Furthermore, active union participation is not absolutely necessary in order for sponsors to develop access to apprenticeship programs or union sanctioned pre-apprenticeship programs. This all means that there is no single model for "effective" union involvement. But it also means that because there is no magic combination of factors that automatically create cooperation, time and a sense of institutional stability in CETA are all the more important.

The Private Sector

YEDPA is one in a series of efforts by the Department of Labor to increase private sector hiring of the hardcore unemployed and the economically disadvantaged and generally raise the level of private sector involvement in planning local employment and training activities. On-the-job training programs have been augmented by the Skill Training and Improvement Program (STIP), the targeted jobs tax credit, and the recent formation of the private industry councils. This has all coincided with an overall employment situation that, until mid-1979, was favoring increasing employment.

YEDPA, however, actually offers less opportunity for prime sponsors to leverage private sector involvement than the other measures. The law and departmental promulgations include exhoratory language encouraging private sector involvement in general terms but YETP and YCCIP do not offer subsidized employment or training subsidies, except under certain carefully controlled circumstances. As a rule, youth trying to utilize prime sponsor activities under YCCIP and YETP to gain entry to private sector jobs have no more advantage than they would under other CETA programs, unless LEAs have developed good relationships with private employers. Enrollees have their youth working against them when employers are looking for stable and committed workers to add to their workforces.

Despite the lack of specific program features that might give YCCIP and YETP enrollees an edge over older CETA enrollees or non-YEDPA youth, there is a small degree of private sector involvement. Although it is confined to a minority of the sponsors studied, certain factors crop up consistently among them.

Of course, local economic conditions make all the difference in determining private sector placement or OJT opportunities. Institutional arrangements and prime sponsor policies notwithstanding, when local hiring is brisk, private sector employment prospects are good, even for young adults. Lane County, capitalizing on a local construction boom, is establishing a good record for developing OJT slots. A town in the Oregon Balance of State sponsor set up a solar heating project which spurred private investment and there is now a growing solar heating business hiring YEDPA-trained youth. Even where sponsors are taking no affirmative steps to place enrollees in private jobs, youths are finding stepped-up private sector hiring. In Cook County, for example, local administrators tried to establish a private sector vocational exploration project but never succeeded because of uncertainty over DOL regulations. Nevertheless, there is a high demand for workers to fill entry level jobs in the county and CETA enrollees--youth included--are obtaining private sector jobs.

It is not so clear whether prime sponsor attitudes and policies and certain institutional linkages can make a difference when local economies are not so robust. But certain sponsors are acting to encourage private sector placements. The City of Portland is in the midst of an all-out campaign to stimulate economic development with private sector investment. The city intends to purchase training from local industry as much as possible, in the hope that successful trainees can move into OJT positions. Cobb County, although not immersed in an economic development campaign, has stressed training in skill areas that are in demand in the private sector, and has utilized local corporate training resources, also in the hope that the initial contact will lead to later opportunities. In both these cases, encouragement from Washington may have helped the sponsors move in the direction they are moving, but other local conditions and the basic philosophy of local administrators determined whether the Washington policy was heeded.

Frequently it appears that a commitment by prime sponsors alone is not enough to drive much private sector cooperation. The active presence of local education agencies is an extra ingredient that is at least present--if not persuasive--in the cases where private employers are involved with the youth programs. In both Cook and Lane Counties, local education agencies made inroads into the private sector. One LEA in Cook County established contact with private businesses through employer orientations. Another set up an advisory board, for school-based programs, that included business representatives. The Lane County school system endorsed the YEDPA programs and mounted a selling campaign among employers in a successful drive to develop OJT slots. LEA officials in Lane County attribute their success to the fact that the schools, unlike CETA sponsors, are local, mainstream institutions. But, officials in some LEAs also appear to have a great deal of familiarity with local labor markets and local employers.

LEA involvement was observed in other areas that showed considerable private sector involvement despite poor local economic conditions. In the first year of YEDPA programs one local school in the Oregon Balance of State sponsorship placed half its enrollees in private sector positions by aggressively marketing its YETP career exploration program (because of funding uncertainties the program was not continued). In El Paso, a project developing OJT slots improved its record in the second year of programming after supportive services were augmented and a vocational technical institute became involved. Albuquerque is relying heavily on a program developed and run by local schools, which places youth in training positions with the local hotel and tourism industry. Cobb County's training program that has been successful in placing youth in private firms also involves both one city high school and the county vocational technical school.

What is lacking is a comprehensive picture of the cases where the private employers are involved, and a systematic comparison of prime sponsor and LEA roles in such cases. But based on what has been observed, local schools have an edge over sponsors in gaining access to local employers. The former are more likely to have been involved with local employers under cooperative education and work study programs. Furthermore at least some educators share the opinion of one Lane County educator, who feels the schools have more credibility than CETA prime sponsors as mainstream, locally-based institutions.

Prime Sponsor Organizational Changes

Inevitably, as with every change in policy under CETA, the introduction of YEDPA had an effect on prime sponsor internal organization and the way local CETA business is transacted. In general, the effect was to further balkanize service delivery at the local level and create a more distinct dichotomy between youth and adult services.

YEDPA pushed about four-fifths of the sponsors studied in the direction of setting up program delivery and even intake separate from adult services. Large sponsors such as Oakland, San Francisco, and Chicago already had separate youth offices. YEDPA served to reinforce their separateness by augmenting staff and requiring a greater degree of specialization.

Among the few sponsors that left formal arrangements for operations unchanged, most adopted a program delivery approach that effectively isolated youth operations. Lane County, Portland, and Hartford, for example, delegated a great deal of responsibility and money to local schools.

Rarely have sponsors moved in the direction of setting up a separate youth office wholly because youths were seen as a separate problem with unique needs. The usual reason for separating youth programs has been to simplify compliance with Department of Labor reporting and accounting requirements. The need for enrollment and expenditure reports by title forces local administrators to program separately or else come up with elaborate information systems that can make the necessary distinctions.

The emergence of separate youth tracks has worked against the development of comprehensive services at the local level. In some cases it has probably contributed to internal conflict. The most extreme example was Rockford where a nearly autonomous youth office was set up in 1977, only to be disbanded in the middle of fiscal 1979. Portland encountered similar problems when it began integrating youth services into the overall CETA delivery system. The cost in both cases has been high in staff turnover and morale.

Aside from the shifts in institutional alignments attributable to the YETP 22 percent set-aside, the changes in relationships between sponsors and other local agencies have been scattered and uneven; they have not followed any discernible pattern. The uneven response of prime sponsors and differing local circumstances have diminished and altered the final results. The most identifiable change within the CETA structure has been a remarkably pervasive pattern of bifurcation between youth serving and adult serving agents. The pattern is not attributable to a federal policy encouraging such separation of services. Rather, it is a consequence of administrative requirements and circumstances that work against developing comprehensive programs.

SHIFTS IN PROGRAM EMPHASIS

It was hoped by the architects of YEDPA and administrators in the Department of Labor that the new law would expand the manpower services already available to youth locally under CETA Title I (now Title II) and provide a basis for establishing new services adapted to meeting the special labor market needs of youths. Another objective was to get prime sponsors to put greater emphasis on assuring program quality.

YEDPA, though encouraging innovation, did not force specific new models at the prime sponsor level (although the Department of Labor has sponsored numerous national demonstrations). Since very few sponsors were starting with a clean slate, most changes in programming have been adaptations of what some sponsors already had. Consequently, though formula-funded YEDPA activities have not proven to be a watershed for novel program concepts, this is not to say some changes are not evident. In fact, the emphasis on youth has had the effect of steering sponsors towards rationalizing services they already had and incorporating new services into systems of local activities that are, at least, somewhat better adapted than before to meeting the labor market needs of youth. Instead of a jobless dropout facing a menu of possible programs from which to choose, there is a more systematic process of assessment and development. Perhaps the most important program gains have been what logic long has called for, but which politics frequently forbid: tying mapower to education. On the whole, collaboration between local schools and CETA youth programs is on a very basic level and the future of the relationships is uncertain. But the chasm between the two institutions has been bridged, at least temporarily. The future of the relationships seems now to hinge more on substantive matters.

YEDPA has also contributed to a greater prime sponsor consciousness of the need for assuring program quality, though the effect of this new awareness is sometimes hard to pinpoint. Local officials have repeatedly said they welcomed the emphasis on quality, as if there had been no federal concern with CETA program quality before. They lacked time during the first year to do much about quality assurance. But given the time and opportunity in the second year of programming, sponsors appear to have taken specific measures to monitor and improve program content and delivery.

The Matter of Definitions

There are seven kinds of services that prime sponsors are now providing under YCCIP and YETP: work experience, basic education, classroom training in job skills, job search techniques, the use of occupational data, on-the-job training, and career exploration through job rotation. Regrettably, these categories of services do not correspond to those service categories delineated by the Department of Labor: work experience, on-the-job training, career exploration experience, vocational exploration in the private sector, and transition services. Under the DOL rubric career exploration experience, for example, is intended to correspond to a combination of work experience and a classroom component to teach job search skills or provide occupational information. But Kitsap County labels work experience for out-of-school youth as work experience, and for in-school youth it is career employment experience. Chicago reports all YETP jobs as career employment experience, while counting YCCIP jobs as work experience: one program agent operating both kinds of jobs says quite candidly there is no difference between them. There was also one case where sponsors dressed up old programs with new names and little else. Columbus took its world of work orientation for summer program enrollees, lengthened it somewhat and called it classroom training. It also extended its CETA Title I work experience programs for youth--little more than an attempt at income maintenance--and called it career employment experience.

None of this is to imply that sponsors are attempting to deceive the Department of Labor or create a distorted image of their programs. They simply use DOL jargon instead of generic terms for their activities. Ambiguity surrounding the program activity terms does, however, call into question the usefulness of national activity enrollment data and comparisons among prime sponsors of enrollments in certain program categories. Within prime sponsorships, however, the data are useful for reflecting distributions among activities at any one time, and the changes in distributions over time.

Program Emphases Under YEDPA

Before YEDPA, prime sponsor employment programs for youth were confined to the annual summer work experience programs and Title I. The summer jobs programs were traditionally assembled in a hurry and placed youth in 7-10 week job assignments. In the Title I program young enrollees were lumped in with most of the Title I service population and placed in work experience slots and skill training. Except for the summer program, there appears to have been little evidence of a "youth track" in prime sponsor manpower programming, since there was hardly a reason or federal policy mandate on such a client-focused approach. YEDPA, with its focus on youth, has pushed sponsors in the direction of establishing a youth track which at least recognizes a developmental sequence requiring more than an isolated training program. Although many fall short of achieving a continuous sequence of labor market experience, the trend is in that direction. Sponsors have had the most success with a comprehensive approach under YETP because of its flexibility. YCCIP has proven to be an inappropriate program for delivering comprehensive services. First, it severely limits the services sponsors can provide to augment straight work experience. Second, because of its small size and its peculiar program requirements (required solicitation of bids for operating the program, low wages, service population, unique eligibility requirements, possible conflicts with organized labor, etc.), an increasing number of sponsors have found it to be incompatible with a comprehensive approach and an administrative headache not worth the effort.

In the time between late 1977 and early 1979, prime sponsor youth programs followed a predictable evolution. In the frantic rush to start up fiscal 1978 operations, they tended to base new program development upon existing capacity and programs. They lacked the time for anything more creative. Although some new program activity titles and ambitious plans cropped up, fiscal 1978 was a (stunted) year for work experience and some classroom training, both largely outgrowths of Title I activities, that had developed for youths, and, in some cases, of summer youth program activities.

The pattern for fiscal 1979 was to tinker with the 1978 YETP programs but to leave their basic designs largely intact. Work experience remained as the core of YETP programs serving in-school and out-of-school youth. There have been some administrative changes affecting the quality of work experience but the basic value of that approach remains unquestioned.

The main YETP design changes between 1978 and 1979 were in changing intake, assessment, and referral activities through which enrollees passed before placement in jobs, and in beefing up transition services for placing participants in unsubsidized jobs or helping them in their job search strategies. The implicit goal was to bring the jury-rigged and struggling programs put in place in 1978 more in line with the ambitious plans.

One small but noteworthy shift that began to show up in fiscal 1979 YEDPA programming has been the increasing emphasis on private sector placements. Even in 1978, sponsors were concerned about the lack of opportunity for gaining work experience in situations that would provide experience transferrable to the private sector. Over time this interest has grown. The change corresponds in part to the private sector emphasis in YEDPA and to the private sector initiatives that sponsors are expected to launch under CETA Title VII.

Most sponsors, however, have taken little positive action to further private sector placements, their endorsement of the notion notwithstanding. The prevailing sentiment is that their hands are tied. The first year experience with OJT projects was disappointing with no sponsor developing the expected number of slots. At least two sponsors, though, have achieved some degree of success with private sector-related projects. Kitsap County, a sponsor that had a better than average degree of success with OJT in 1978 nearly tripled its planned placements, increasing them to 17 percent of all placements. In a strange twist of the OJT story, Cobb County discontinued the OJT component it initiated in 1978 for the purpose of encouraging private sector placements. Administrators found such a good record of private sector placements for enrollees in their intensive YETP classroom training that they decided to rely on that program instead for private sector bridge building.

YCCIP has gone through an evolution different from that of YETP. Although it too is based on providing work experience, rigid program specifications in the law and regulations made it extraordinarily difficult for sponsors to establish continuity between it and other activities.

Programmatically, sponsors have come to see YCCIP as working against the grain of the comprehensive service approach embodied in YETP. While the latter is providing a policy emphasis and the mechanisms to support a comprehensive approach to assisting youths having trouble in labor markets, the former steers sponsors in the direction of an extremely limited response: straight work experience. The national emphasis on reserving YCCIP for dropouts only exacerbates the conflict in signals. Saddled with a program targeted for those youths most likely to be educationally deficient and in need of supportive services, the sponsors found themselves unable to provide the extra support most feel those youths need. Frustrated with the intended program design, sponsors have nevertheless attempted adaptations. More than a third of YCCIP enrollees are not dropouts: some have high school diplomas or high school equivalency certificates, and more than half of them are in school. In Durham, Detroit and Oregon Balance of State, high school students outnumber all other YCCIP enrollees by large margins. The sponsors are serving dropouts in YETP instead. In Oregon, YETP dropout enrollments exceed the national proportion by more than 50 percent and in Durham and Detroit, dropouts outnumber in-school youth. Sponsors who do enroll large proportions of dropouts in YCCIP frequently augment work experience with a number of ancillary activities, such as basic education, career counseling, and training. Boston, with nine out of every ten YCCIP enrollees being dropouts, offers an educational component and structures one of its YCCIP projects to provide graduated levels of difficulty in work and a number of counseling services.

Besides faulting the concept underlying YCCIP, sponsors criticized even more vociferously its administrative unmanageability. Shortly after enactment of YEDPA prime sponsors started complaining about the availability of YCCIP funds and inviting bids from potential program operators. The announcement time and plan review period meant that preliminary planning (before announcements were made) had to be cut to the bone. Although the plan review period has been a fact of life for sponsors for years, the bidding process was an extra unwelcomed hindrance. Another problem encountered in the first year and persisting into the second year has been the limit on the indirect costs (5 percent, as opposed to 20 percent in effect for YETP) and direct costs for supervisory time and project supplies (10 percent).

There have been counterproductive side effects of the YCCIP administrative provisions that, on balance, appear to be doing the program more harm than good. The low allowance for expenses over and above enrollee payroll expenses and the relatively small size of each sponsor's YCCIP allocation have served to discourage competition among CBOs for YCCIP contracts. Because the projects have not been viewed as being "self-supporting," usually only the large private non-profit organizations have been able to afford the projects, taking advantage of economies of scale and absorbing non-allowable overhead costs.

Still another drawback to YCCIP has been the basic project orientation. Although initially some sponsors were receptive to the idea of discrete program activities, the second year of operations produced increasing criticism. Perhaps the biggest weakness to the project approach and its attendant temporary nature and isolation has been the impact on supervision. Because, unlike YETP, YCCIP work assignments are not mainstream activities, supervisory staff have frequently been obtained on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Rockford's stadium rehabilitation project that has been under the overall supervision of union volunteers is the exception. More frequently, the supervisors are CETA public service employees--themselves on temporary assignment--hardly any older than the program enrollees, and sorely lacking in supervisory experience and job skills. In the haste to settle YCCIP contracts, sponsors were also unable to do a very thorough job of screening for project quality in the first year, although there was a growing emphasis on this in the second year.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are a number of YCCIP projects that appear to be effective in providing well supervised and productive jobs, the overall approach does not appear to have caught on. The concept of straight work experience goes against the prevailing local sentiments in favor of providing comprehensive services to jobless high school dropouts. Given the climate in which CETA programs operate, the extra administrative burden required to implement and maintain YCCIP projects also makes them unpopular.

YCCIP got off the ground in fiscal 1978 despite its small size and disproportionately high overhead in extra time, design effort, and general administrative headaches. But during the period of uncertainty over YEDPA authorization and funding levels in the early fall of 1978, YCCIP suffered far more than YETP. Set up as discrete projects, YCCIP activities frequently did not have the momentum to carry them through from one fiscal year to the next. They were likely candidates for deferred funding. DeKalb County, Coastal Bend, and El Paso postponed start-up of their second year YCCIP programs. Administrative staff in Kitsap County, frustrated with the lack of flexibility in YCCIP, quit trying to integrate it with other activities and eventually joined Clark County in eliminating it altogether. The consensus in those places has been that they can utilize YETP to serve the same population served with YCCIP. Apparently the loss of the YCCIP allocations is affordable financially and defensible politically.

Assuring the Quality of YEDPA Programming

The dominant prime sponsor response to the YEDPA accent on quality worksites, supervision, and general programming implies that there had been little prior attention to quality. Local administrators welcomed what they perceived to be a new federal interest. And despite the fact that there are no hard incentives for quality programming (increased allocations for good programs or decreased allocations for satisfactory programs that could be improved) there appears to have been a jump from 1978 to 1979 in the attention that sponsors are paying to program operations and results.

In addition to the explicit federal concern with program quality, two other factors seem to have fostered the prime sponsor push in that direction: time and the knowledge development mandates. In the first year of YEDPA programming, prime sponsors were behind before they even got started. They were struggling to implement new and unfamiliar programs as late as half-way into the fiscal year, while being barraged from Washington with changing signals about the pace of youth program operations and orders regarding shifts in policies in other CETA programs. Late in the first year, uncertainty over CETA reauthorization and funding levels also put program management on a day-by-day basis. Sponsors hardly had time to react and put programs in place, let alone pay attention to the effects those programs were having. Going into the second year of youth programming, the pace, though still hectic, permitted more attention to little luxuries, such as paying some care to program development and worksite selection. But the idea of quality assurance also appeared to have been given a boost by the parallel national emphasis on "knowledge development." That mandate gave evaluation activities a higher priority than they had been accorded before. Although not seen as being the same thing, knowledge development and the emphasis on program quality proved in many cases to go hand-in-hand. One other factor that no doubt has given impetus to the emphasis on quality has been CETA's bad press image. The national mandate to stop "fraud and abuse" has forced local administrators to at least document what they are doing to improve local accountability.

The Department of Labor's strongest emphasis on program quality was with regard to establishing "meaningful" jobs and well-supervised worksites. It has been most explicit with YCCIP calling for projects in which youths were producing "tangible outputs," and actually specifying a supervisor-to-enrollee ratio not less than 1 to 12. Although not quite as specific with YETP (and its much broader range of possible activities), the Department has emphasized the importance of linking work experience to training and school curricula.

In responding to the broad DOL mandate for assuring quality of programs, local sponsors could do very little in the first year except include the usual boilerplate assurances in their plans. But in the second year, they ~~began~~ establishing priorities and fleshing out strategies for monitoring program quality.

Prime sponsors have devoted the greatest attention to supervision. Sponsors share the Department's concern over the difference that good supervision can make. But the emphasis also appears to be due to the fact that sponsors can get better control over supervision than other program variables. Sponsors have had difficulty placing youth in jobs related to their career goals and in jobs that offer experience that can be used in private sector employment. They see supervision as a way of providing at least good work habits that youth can take anywhere.

Although sponsors have found it easier to control the quality of supervision than other variables, it is not a simple job. Appearing to have little difficulty meeting the Department's prescribed ratio of 12 enrollees for every supervisor in YCCIP, many have gone much further by requiring lower ratios. But, of course, the quality of worksites and even supervision hinges on more than simple ratios.

It also depends on the nature of the worksite and the supervisors themselves. Greene County originally assigned one supervisor to five enrollees in its YCCIP projects, but found that program design made it desirable to assign one supervisor for up to 30 participants in some YETP worksites. The Department of Labor, gracefully, did not try to specify supervisor qualifications; but aspects of program design dictated and even worked at cross-purposes to good supervision. The YCCIP project approach frequently was most easily handled by staffing projects with public service employees. They were administratively convenient to assign and inexpensive; but they sometimes lacked both supervisory expertise and work skills which they would pass on to enrollees. The YCCIP supervisors are also more likely to be young. In some cases, as in Rockford, they have actually been other YCCIP enrollees. YETP, on the other hand, permits better situations. The YETP work experience positions have been developed in mainstream work areas where enrollees frequently work with permanent employees and share the same supervisors.

Supervision was the most identifiable and easily used quality criterion in the first year of YEDPA. But it has not been the only significant determinant of quality. The structure of local operations has a persuasive effect on how seriously "quality" is taken and whether or not it is an enforceable standard. In Chicago, quality is hard to deliver because the local administrators interested in it and ultimately responsible to the Department of Labor for it are four levels removed from the actual programs. The actual worksites are run by subcontractors to CBOs, who receive money from city agencies, who, in turn, receive it from the sponsor. Hartford is in a similar situation. Cook County manpower authorities, although not so far removed from program operations, must rely on independent program agents to delivery the quality that the sponsors promise. Sponsors have also complained that the limited allowance for supervisory and supply costs is inadequate for properly administering some programs, YCCIP especially.

With the onus on them to assure program quality, sponsors have gone beyond the procedural requirements and program specifications of the Department of Labor in order to keep tabs on local programs and improve local accountability for program results. The extra measures are both passive--program design requirements--and active--monitoring and operation procedures.

Sponsors like Chicago and Cook County that rely heavily on subcontractors to operate programs are trying to improve programs by becoming increasingly prescriptive about program design and procedures. Chicago emphasizes building rehabilitation for worksites because administrators feel the quality of the work experience is superior to that found in social service activites. Cook County administrators, after specifying quality of supervision for 1978 programming, paid more attention in 1979 to factors reflecting client needs and program outcomes. Schools are required to certify work experience as being relevant to educational and career goals. One CBO that submitted a questionable project proposal was turned down until it could obtain employer testimony as to the marketability of skills the project would teach. Even where sponsors are not prescriptive, they are requiring, increasingly, that program deliverers specify supervisor-to-enrollee ratios, assure that worksites meet safety standards, and describe the kinds of servi-·s available to enrollees.

Many sponsors are also adopting aggressive monitoring programs (or requiring program deliverers to do so). In Kitsap County, worksites are visited every 2 to 6 weeks. Muskegon is tracking sites with the help of its management information system. Greene County, putting a strong emphasis on work experience quality, conducted two system-wide evaluations in August 1978 and January 1979 which were used as the basis for deciding whether to extend funding a summer project to year-round. Detroit has added money to permit program operators to add new supervisors to act as trouble-shooters and counselors. Some sponsors, such as Charlotte and Muskegon, are also making an effort to evaluate supervisors in addition to enrollees. In order to get supervisors more involved in the developmental program, Kitsap County now prepares learning plans for each enrollee, which supervisors review, noting the competencies gained by each enrollee. Kalamazoo's youth services committee is considering plans to explore ways for improving worksite quality in its 1980 knowledge development plan.

It remains to be seen whether the current attempts to upgrade local programs and monitor their activities will result in better outcomes. But for a number of reasons, sponsors appear at least to be worrying about that issue.

SERVING YOUTH MOST IN NEED

YEDPA was designed as a targeted program to concentrate work experience, training, and other job services on specific categories of youth. YCCIP is aimed at 16-19 year old out-of-school jobless youth; there is no income eligibility criterion. YETP is targeted for 14-21 year old in-school, underemployed and unemployed youths from families whose current family income is less than 85 percent of the BLS lower living standard. Up to 10 percent of the YETP funds in a prime sponsorship can be spent on projects mixing income-eligible enrollees and enrollees from families whose income exceeds the 85 percent threshold. But, such "mixed-income projects" must be part of an experimental design to test the effectiveness of programs with mixed enrollments relative to programs composed entirely of economically disadvantaged youth. Such projects are subject to approval by the Department of Labor.

Although the targeting provisions include fairly specific suggestions, they leave prime sponsors with a large degree of latitude in selecting youths to serve. The income eligibility criterion under YETP and the age cut-offs for YETP and YCCIP are the only enforceable client categories. The flexibility is intended to permit prime sponsors to better adapt youth programs to the participant needs of each sponsor area. The hope at the national level consistently has been, however, that prime sponsors would serve those youths most in need, that is, those youths with the least chance of finding assistance from other sources.

Since YCCIP and YETP were first introduced, prime sponsors have followed the statutory enrollment requirements with only minor difficulty and appear to be following the Department of Labor emphasis on serving the most economically disadvantaged youth. The different targeting provisions of the two programs have created distinctive enrollment profiles. Unfortunately, the process of singling out particular subgroups for emphasis is not becoming any more systematic than it was during YEDPA start-up, nor has it taken on much more than symbolic value. It continues to be an arbitrary political process responding to interest group demands for special attention while complying with DOL planning requirements. Even where a deliberate process is used to identify underserved groups, there are only rare attempts to tailor services to their particular needs.

The YCCIP Client Profile

YCCIP has attracted a more educationally disadvantaged group of enrollees in a narrower age group than YETP. Nationally, slightly more than two-thirds of all YCCIP enrollees are dropouts. That overall figure holds for the sponsors covered in this study, although the proportion of dropouts ranged from under 6 percent to 100 percent. Of the 11 sponsors whose YCCIP program enrollments consisted of less than 60 percent dropouts, fewer than half made up a sizeable portion of the difference with high school graduates. Instead, most of those with low enrollments of dropouts run programs featuring part-time jobs and enroll large proportions of in-school youth. Reasons for low dropout enrollments varied. Connecticut

BOS emphasized serving dropouts in 1979. But because sub-agents around the state did not carry out the state level policy, relatively few were enrolled. Fewer than 55 percent of Atlanta's enrollees were dropouts because large numbers of high school graduates were still looking for work.

One of the early concerns over the YCCIP program was that, because it had no income eligibility criterion, local sponsors would enroll a client group less economically disadvantaged than if their choice was constrained. Based on the first few months of operations, it appeared that sponsors were enrolling economically disadvantaged youth as if YCCIP were an income tested program. But because most sponsors were still building enrollments at that time, no pattern was certain. Since then, however, it has become clear that sponsors are reserving YCCIP for economically disadvantaged youth. Nationally, more than a fifth of all enrollees are from families on AFDC. Three-fifths are from families in poverty. Indeed, YCCIP is serving a more economically disadvantaged population than YETP, an income tested program. Of the major cities studied, only Portland's YCCIP enrollments included more than 5 percent non-economically disadvantaged youth. At least part of this may be because Portland is wealthier and whiter than the other cities.

There are a number of reasons for the high enrollment of economically disadvantaged youth in YCCIP. The most widely stated is that the sponsors want to serve those most in need. No doubt, at least one factor in that preference is the political clout of interest groups representing the poor. That makes it politically hazardous not to serve the hardest-pressed youth. Another factor may be a high concentration of economically disadvantaged youth in the YCCIP applicant pool. Although data are not available to determine whether the applicant pool is any different from that for YETP, observers frequently note the stigma attached to any CETA program and cite this as a factor discouraging interest among higher income youth. Because YCCIP offers only work experience and money (minimum wage at that), youths who do not meet the income criterion may face better options: they are not as hard-pressed to earn money for survival and they probably have better access to higher paying jobs. Administrative expediency may also contribute to the high proportion of economically disadvantaged youth in YCCIP. Forced to comply with three sets of income eligibility criteria for the summer program, YCCIP and YETP, some sponsors try to enroll those youth meeting the strictest criteria, so they can be referred anywhere.

One of the weak points of YCCIP is its underenrollment of females. Nationally, about three out of four enrollees are male; aggregate figures for sponsors included in this study are comparable. There has been no appreciable improvement since the programs got underway. At least part of that problem is ascribable to YCCIP's heavy emphasis on dropouts. The rationale is that female dropouts are fewer in number and less likely to enter the labor market after they drop out, and so the YCCIP applicant pool is heavily male. In fact, the relationship between school status and the proportion of females is not convincing. The emphasis on "tangible output" projects--i.e., projects that involve construction and rely on jobs not traditionally filled by females--appears to be more important in tilting YCCIP enrollments heavily in favor of males. The sponsors with higher than average enrollments of females, such as Kalamazoo, Detroit, Marin, and

Worcester, consistently ran YCCIP projects that were more service oriented and featured jobs which were not sex-stereotyped.

The YETP Client Profile

Under YETP prime sponsors can offer a wider range of services (more than just work experiences as under YCCIP), serve larger numbers of youth (YETP allocations are more than four times as large as YCCIP allocations), and enroll youths from a wider age range (14-21 years old for YETP compared to 16-19). The only YETP eligibility restriction is the income test for enrollees. Because of the wider target population and range of services, the YETP client population is more diverse than that of YCCIP.

Thanks to the emphasis on service to in-school youth, most enrollees have been 19 or under (roughly 90 percent nationally and among the sponsors studied). Furthermore, facing a demand for services that has consistently outstripped what sponsors have been able to supply, they have concentrated on serving older youth who seem to be the ones in most acute need. Of the programs with relatively large (20 percent or more) enrollments of 14-15 year olds, however, most rely heavily on schools as program agents. Local schools run the largest YETP programs in Worcester, and more than a fifth of the sponsor's enrollees are 14-15 year olds (100 percent are students). In Rockford, Columbus/Franklin, Clark County, Grand Rapids and Lansing, where the schools have a large role in the YETP programs, the proportion of 14-15 year olds ranges up to two-fifths. The reasons vary. Many educators feel that for the youngsters who drop out, most have already made the decision well before they reach their sixteenth birthday and so in-school programs intended to prevent dropouts concentrate on the age group where the decisions are made. Some schools have been unable to reach out-of-school youth. It also appears that the in-school programs emphasize work experience less and counseling and classroom services more, thus appealing less to older students, who usually have more options for work than their younger brothers and sisters. In at least one sponsorship with high 14-15 year old enrollments, other forces have been at work. Although schools did not have an exceptionally large role in Boston's YETP program, the presence of an experimental youth incentive entitlement pilot project restricted to 16-19 year olds relieved some of the pressure on YETP program operators to enroll older youth. There, 14-15 year olds comprise nearly a third of the YETP enrollment.

Some local manpower administrators did not follow the Department of Labor's emphasis on in-school youth, enrolling instead dropouts and graduates suffering from acute employment problems. Nearly half the sponsors studied ran YETP programs that served the older youth traditionally served by CETA non-youth programs, out of habit and a lack of deliberate policy emphasis on any new programs that might reach out to an in-school population. In other areas the enrollment of out-of-school youth is deliberate. Lane County and Portland are both increasing enrollments of out-of-school youth and anticipate even larger enrollments among that group as more learn of the programs by word of mouth. Some big cities such as

Atlanta, San Francisco, and Detroit enroll relatively few in-schoolers because it is felt that out-of-school youth face more limited opportunities. In Durham, the trend towards serving more dropouts appears to be reinforced by the stigma attached to the Durham CETA programs in general. Severely criticized by the Durham mayor, the prime sponsorship has become a political football and is in no position to build the bridges with local education agencies that might help it increase in-school enrollments.

Exceptions notwithstanding, YETP is successful in reaching large numbers of in-school youth. Local administrators have taken the DOL mandate seriously and are implementing it. Where in-school youth are being underserved, it sometimes is because local officials have adopted different priorities and strategies and are downgrading the importance of serving high school students. More frequently, though, local economic and political conditions, a lack of good contact with local schools, and established service patterns impinge on the ability of sponsors to reach and enroll more students.

The Significance of "Significant Segments"

One of the trademarks of CETA legislation has been the inclusion of significant sements of the population singled out for special treatment. Continuing this tradition, YEDPA and the DOL regulations encourage sponsors to single out population subgroups suffering especially acute labor market problems or not being enrolled in sufficiently large numbers. Prime sponsors dutifully have been identifying "significant segments," sometimes setting enrollment target levels, and trying to enroll accordingly. Three patterns related to these national targeting directives have emerged. In one pattern prime sponsors merely identify in their plans significant segments and do nothing to assure they are adequately enrolled or served. In another, sponsors identify and enroll particular target groups. In a third, they identify and enroll target groups and adapt services to the needs peculiar to the target groups.

A high proportion of sponsors still fall into the first pattern. Although the Department of Labor began asking sponsors in fiscal 1979 to specify the rationale for identifying significant segments in their annual plans, the exercise appears to be as meaningless as the rest of the planning exercise. Sponsors frequently specify arbitrary proportions of different population subgroups without regard to the proportion they make up in the eligible pool. There is also an enormous amount of overlap between categories and little attention paid to why subgroups ought to be enrolled. One sponsor specified black youth, white youth, males and females as significant segments. Falling victim to the isolated advocacies of disparate interest groups, specification of significant segments is becoming in some areas a test of political influence.

Presumably, one of the reasons for identifying special target groups is to correct situations in which sponsors are underserving classes of eligible youth. In fact, where sponsors do specify plans for increasing enrollments of particular groups, they rarely specify how. For some, it is not a problem: they are able to identify and enroll target subgroups through their normal intake mechanisms. But for some subgroups that strategy simply does not work. Juvenile offenders and handicapped youth are not likely to be reached using conventional intake operations. Because special measures are not taken, these two categories of youth are consistently under-enrolled relative to their incidence in the universe of need. The areas that enroll sizeable numbers of these youths do so only after making special arrangements, with correctional facilities, for example.

With few exceptions, sponsors do very little to adapt program services to the particular needs of their selected target groups. There are a number of reasons for this. First, many of the significant segments are identified by demographic characteristics, not need characteristics, and so there is little need for differentiating services for them. The objective is not to meet particular needs but to serve greater numbers of particular groups.

Second, there are very real constraints on the variety and quantity of services that sponsors can offer. To a large degree, the client population must adapt to existing programs rather than the converse. The service mix that sponsors can offer to clients is determined first by existing program operation capabilities. Within a basic offering, services can be adapted, but an entirely new client group with totally different needs is probably not going to be able to obtain services tailored to those needs; at least not until sponsors have developed new capabilities.

A third reason sponsors have not come up with new categories of services adapted to particular needs of significant segments is that there is overlap among population subgroups and their needs. Many of the needs of juvenile offenders, handicapped, high school students or dropouts are not peculiar to any one of the groups. They all have need of labor market services and have something to gain from work experience. Moreover, because of the increasing reliance on centralized intake, assessment, and referral offices, and on individual career development plans, it is difficult and, some feel, inappropriate to create or designate separate service components for particular client groups.

None of these reasons is totally convincing. The process of identifying "significant segments" continues to be an empty exercise in many instances. Some population subgroups, such as dropouts and handicapped youth, have special needs for compensatory education, coping skills, and specialized skill training. For them, simply being assured that they will be enrolled in existing programs is not enough. For them, the process of identifying "significant segments" must also drive a companion process for planning additional services.

Youths As More Than Clients

As in other ventures in federalism, the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act encourages involvement of local players in formulating youth policy by mandating establishment of youth advisory councils. The councils are intended to provide a channel for citizen input in policy design, program planning, and program monitoring. The Department of Labor regulations also require youth membership on the councils.

From the beginning, it seemed that the ideas of youth councils and youth participation on them were in trouble. Experience since mid-1977 has not changed those early tentative conclusions. With a few exceptions, the councils themselves are not marginally effective in their planning and/or oversight role. Their significance is further diminished by the fact that the councils have not provided an effective forum for youth participation.

The Faulty Design of Youth Councils

Complying with the letter of the law, all CETA sponsors went through the motions of setting up youth councils. The councils in general have proven to be little more than an extension of the symbolic participatory democracy for which the full CETA advisory councils stand. The vast majority of the youth councils meet regularly, at least on a quarterly basis. They customarily review prime sponsor plans and modifications and, frequently, contract proposals. As a rule, their recommendations are subject to review by the full CETA councils, a review that is little more than a pro forma exercise since the youth councils are usually a subordinate body of the full councils with a great deal of overlap in membership.

The youth councils are not particularly effective in initiating or leading policy for a number of reasons. First, their members lack a familiarity and facility with youth manpower policy issues and YEDPA. This is a deficiency that time could cure were it not for other shortcomings of the councils. Like the CETA councils, the youth councils also are at the mercy of the CETA staff. Although the councils exist by right, under the law, they receive their information, and to a great extent their agendas, from the "supporting" CETA staff.

The lack of effectiveness of the youth councils restricts their advocacy role. Because of their perceived powerlessness, the councils have not proven to be effective mechanisms for marshaling local non-CETA resources for fighting problems of youth employment. They do not control any resources themselves and are hardly in a position to offer much more than moral leadership, if they are inclined to provide even that. Because of the overlap in membership between the youth councils and the full CETA councils, and subordinate relationship of the youth councils (Cook County, for example, simply added three youths to the CETA council to constitute its youth council), they cannot be relied upon as advocates for youth within the CETA system. The policies expressed by the youth councils have, in effect, already been fashioned to accommodate the priorities of the full council.

None of this is to imply that independent and activist youth councils do not exist. They do, but at the sufferance of CETA staff. Lansing, Rockford, Clark County, Sonoma County and DeKalb County are all sponsors with independent-minded youth councils that initiate ideas of their own and do not rubberstamp staff proposals. But in each case, that style appears to have emerged because local staff are committed to stimulating citizen input and have granted the councils decisionmaking authority that is not assured in the law or regulations. Chicago appears to be the only example of an activist council that effectively asserts its views without regard to CETA staff preferences. It does that apparently because of the political muscle of the youth council which grows in part from its membership representing all its funded subgrantees.

Perhaps the most important reason for the youth councils' relative impotence is not the circumscribed advisory authority they are granted by law and regulations, but the lack of decisions in which they can bring their opinions to bear. Lacking much advance notice on allocations, changes in regulations, and, as happened in the fall of 1978, changes in legislation, the youth councils have little range in the options they can discuss intelligently. As one CETA official complained: "DOL does not plan .... Because DOL doesn't plan, we can't." (Vernon Briggs, Page C-8).

Of course, much of the blame must fall on the Congress for moving legislation slowly and dragging its feet on appropriations. But the Department of Labor is also guilty. Regulations are rarely available far enough in advance to be useful (although YCCIP and YETP regulations were published more quickly than is usually the case with other CETA programs). The Department also failed to get legislative proposals for reauthorization of CETA (and the youth programs) to the Congress soon enough to have averted delays in the reauthorization process. Furthermore, the Department has consistently failed to ask for forward funding of any CETA activities--a measure that if adopted could eliminate at least some of the uncertainty over local allocations.

Lacking accurate and reliable information on local needs, as well as advance notice on the resources, many councils are hard-pressed to develop even a range of contingency strategies. To fill the void left by information gaps, councils, where they are active, push ahead, often making recommendations on the basis of political factors.

The Difficulty of Getting Youth Involved

Aside from focusing on youth as a client group, strategists at the national level have also encouraged local youth administrators to get youth involved as more than program recipients. DOL regulations require that the councils include youths as members, and the 1977 youth planning charter suggests that local sponsors employ youth in a staff capacity where possible.

In fact, the attempts to get youth involved in anything but a client capacity have been largely ineffectual and, in the opinion of an increasing number of local officials, wrong-headed.

There are a few isolated cases of effectual youth involvement on the planning councils. Not surprisingly, the only councils that can point to regular and active participation are the ones that themselves are effective. But most youth councils experience spotty and declining attendance among their youth members. The reasons vary. Frequently, the meeting schedules conflict with school schedules. The far-flung operations of balance of state prime sponsorships pose transportation difficulties for youth members. But the principal reasons seem to be more substantive. Much of the subject matter under consideration by the councils has been complex, requiring more time and attention than most youth--and adults--have been able to give. Many youths on councils lack confidence. Left to sink or swim, the youths have usually sunk. They have also been quick to catch on to the charade aspects of some council proceedings. Not having anything immediately at stake, as adult members representing CBOs, interest groups, and program agencies frequently do, the younger members have lost interest quickly. Even where youths do attend and participate, many have been intimidated by the one-on-one contact with adults.

Although the youth councils have not been very effective in getting youths involved, that has not been because of an aversion by CETA sponsors to youth participation. Some have made serious attempts to work with non-CETA youth groups and establish alternative mechanisms for youth involvement. Santa Clara's staff achieved some youth involvement in its deliberations by relying on the non-CETA Santa Clara Valley Youth Commission. The Rockford prime sponsorship set up an independent Youth Advocate Board (all youth) whose representatives had more to say in the youth council proceedings than the youth council. In Alamance, there is an unofficial group of high school students meeting twice weekly who forward their thoughts to the youth staff. There is some overlap between the group and the official youth council, but the former has proven more active and, in the opinion of the CETA youth staff, more effective. Other sponsors have tried everything from informal "rap" sessions to soliciting youth views from governmental youth commissions.

These alternative channels are, at best, provisional. But, relying entirely on youths, they appear to serve as more effective instruments for articulating the viewpoints of youths than almost any of the councils. The problem with them, as with some of the working councils, however, is what happens with those views once they have been presented.

In the youth planning charter distributed by the Department of Labor to prime sponsors in the fall of 1977, the Department suggests employing youth in a staff capacity whenever possible. Few sponsors have actually tried that, and the ones that have show mixed results. In 1978, a CBO in one sponsorship trained YETP enrollees to operate a youth employment service which proved fairly effective in placing non-YETP youth in unsubsidized jobs. When the project was tried in another area, it did not do as well. Other sponsors found that placing youth in supervisory positions was frequently a mistake because they lacked requisite job skills. Pushed too quickly, the youths were frustrated and lost interest in the work.

As a rule, prime sponsors had their hands full just developing programs under YCCIP and YETP. Th· · had little time, inclination, or incentive to work seriously on pumping youths for their ideas or placing them in staff positions. Over time, such lower priority activities may be feasible. But, at a minimum, it appears that getting youths involved as more than participants is not a cut-and-dried process of program development and enrollment. It requires more time and attention to detail than sponsors can currently afford.

THE PRIME SPONSOR LEARNING EXERCISE

One of the most important distinguishing characteristics of YEDPA is the premium it puts on increasing understanding about the nature of youth employment problems and the effectiveness of different strategies for dealing with those problems. The hope of YEDPA architects and Department of Labor administrators is that a few years' work of well-documented experiments will prove a useful investment, yielding more effective programs in the long-run.

There is a dual focus to the YEDPA learning component, or "knowledge development" as it has come to be known: a national and a local focus. At the national level, the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Youth Programs is supporting demonstration and research projects funded with discretionary monies. A few CETA prime sponsors have been selected to operate highly structured pilot projects testing the effect of guaranteed jobs on high school dropout rates and youth employment behavior. Other demonstration projects are being funded to test the relative effectiveness of different program deliverers, possible approaches to linking education with employment, and strategies for increasing job opportunities in the private sector for youth. Additionally, research is being done to examine causes of youth unemployment, to determine who it affects, and how it affects them over time.

The other aspect of knowledge development activities, of particular interest for the purpose of this report, is the evaluation, research and demonstration work all sponsors are expected to carry on in implementing their youth programs. It is hoped that these initiatives will provide CETA operators with immediately relevant lessons on how to deal with youth employment problems. A secondary objective is that knowledge development activities will spur local administrators to institutionalize processes for assessing programs and utilizing evaluation findings in new policy formulation.

Selling "Knowledge Development"

Knowledge development at the national level is attracting a great amount of resources and attention. The first two years of research, demonstration and evaluation activities are costing an estimated $500 million (this includes more than $220 million for the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects) and are at center-stage as the Carter administration and the Congress consider what to do for an encore to YEDPA (which expires September 30, 1980).

The energy that has gone into planning national knowledge development activities has not been matched by attempts to provide guidance for those planning local knowledge development activities. Prime sponsors have been almost entirely on their own when it has come to developing research, demonstration or evaluation initiatives, or testing innovative program ideas. There was some irony to this. Sponsors usually find themselves trying to get out from under the yoke of what they see to be heavy federal regulation. Under the knowledge development mandate, they were given a great deal of discretion, but then started looking desperately for federal guidance. In fact the freedom to innovate was illusory in many respects. Sponsors were bound by the same statutory and regulatory requirements explicitly governing any other program not specifically geared to "knowledge development." Amid the growing public concern over fraud and abuse in CETA, sponsors were understandably circumspect about trying anything too far out of the ordinary without knowing exactly what the rules of the game were.

The "Youth Planning Charter," distributed by the Department of Labor in the fall of 1977, provided the bulk of what little guidance sponsors received. The grant applications that sponsors must complete before receiving funding require sponsors to describe knowledge development activities, but the instructions accompanying the grant application provide no guidance about what activities are allowable or recommended. The only mention of knowledge development in the regulations refers to the experimental conditions under which sponsors can allow up to 10 percent of their enrollees to be from families above YEDPA eligibility levels (the "10 percent mixed income test"). Moreover, the regional offices--the national link with local sponsors--although briefed by national office representatives on the subject of knowledge development, were not adequately equipped nor, in some cases, disposed to guide local implementation of the mandates.

Vague guidance notwithstanding, local youth administrators were burdened with a mandate for a local "knowledge development plan" for their youth programs. Under the gun to do <u>something</u>, most sponsors responded. Some repackaged evaluation work they had already been doing and called it knowledge development. Most made an attempt at some kind of explicit evaluation exercise; some were quite elaborate. A few got away with doing nothing.

On the balance, though, the blunt and ambiguous mandate produced a surprising amount of new local activity, as much, it might be argued, as the detailed and overly-prescriptive fiats usually handed down by the national office. What is especially promising is the fact that in the second year of the youth programs, local sponsors, still lacking specific national office guidance, took the initiative in judging the merits of their knowledge development projects and frequently completely revamped them.

The Prime Sponsor Response

Prime sponsors were not particularly receptive in the fall of 1977 to the DOL requirement for local knowledge development. Not only was it another requirement they had to satisfy, but it was very unspecified. Dulled by the detailed instructions they had been receiving from Washington practically since the inception of CETA, they were not prepared for exercises in creative thinking. Confused by the term, "knowledge development," sponsors frequently toyed with the idea of elaborate social experiments, including treatment groups of program clients and non-participating control groups. More than a fourth of the sponsors studied attempted fairly sophisticated assessments. More than half of the elaborate plans were some variation of the "10 percent mixed income test." Among the others, Somona County opted for a two-part research project designed first, to determine whether the overtime work of local employers could be restructured so as to create entry-level skill jobs for youth. The second part of the project was then to try placing youth in any restructured job that could be created. The project never got past the first stage, however. When prime sponsor representatives found neither employers nor workers receptive to job restructuring, they discontinued it. Muskegon established an elaborate battery of achievement, aptitude and attitude tests to administer to enrollees before and after participation in YEDPA programs. The objective was to determine which tests would be useful assessment tools.

Rockford undertook what was perhaps the most ambitious of the knowledge development ventures. The youth staff tried to build knowledge development components into everything they did. For assistance, they brought in a planning team from Northern Illinois University and recruited a part-time graduate student. They adopted pre- and post-tests of self-concept and mock job applications. Project activities were structured with an eye towards facilitating evaluation. Program agents were thoroughly briefed on the importance of knowledge development and their role in it. The ultimate objective was to use information about agency and program effectiveness for a handbook on career preparation. However, the Rockford knowledge development initiatives fell short of the mark. Some of the LEAs slated to participate backed out; the client subgroups envisioned by planners did not materialize and local administrators found it unpardonable to arbitrarily exclude some youth from participating for the sake of setting up control groups. Eventually, the parent CETA organization, alarmed by the independence and ambitious plans of the youth office, wrested some of the decisionmaking authority away from the youth program director, further undercutting the plans for experimentation.

As a rule, the mixed income tests were not especially fruitful exercises either. It was not practical to attempt careful experimentation in sprawling, decentralized balance of state sponsorships. Even more centralized sponsors encountered difficulty in setting up sufficiently large control and treatment groups. In some cases, local experimenters asserted that the small absolute size of the programs and number of enrollees prevented them from coming up with credible results. Others found their experimental models awkward and unrealistic when they were unable to control for or even adequately measure non-income variables.

Design and management problems also plagued the 10 percent mixed income tests. In Charlotte, school officials responsible for enrollee intake found out belatedly about the need to enroll "non-eligible" participants for the evaluation, and were never able to get enough participants into the experimental project. In Lansing, there were similar problems when some program operators failed to get institutions to enroll participants above the eligibility threshold. The Marin County project started too late in the program year to provide any conclusive results.

A few sponsors trying the 10 percent mixed income test ran the projects long enough to get some results, but because of faulty design and late starts, they are of questionable significance. Officials in Corpus Christi, for example, simply compared program performance of CETA eligibles to non-eligibles and found the former to have a higher completion rate, and found the latter to receive higher job ratings. But the experiment could demonstrate nothing about the benefit of mixed income classes. Sponsor officials in Oakland set up comparisons between a mixed income group and one composed of only YEDPA-eligible youth. They found no difference between the groups. Lansing was the only sponsor to set up an appropriately designed mixed income test, and, despite problems, run it to full term. Officials found the mixed group to show better attitude changes than the unmixed group.

It appears that most of the sponsors that tried sophisticated knowledge development strategies were not aware of what they were getting themselves into. The more seasoned CETA administrators avoided fancy plans. But less experienced administrators, ambitious to conform to what they perceived DOL policy to be, did indeed learn something. Frustrated by methodological and managerial barriers to careful social experimentation, nearly all the sponsors that tried to implement elaborate plans for 1978 fell back to less ambitious goals for 1979. They realized they were not in a good position to conduct sophisticated research projects. But more importantly, they appeared to reject the notion that such experiments would provide them with useful information they would feel confident incorporating in new policy.

Only two sponsors extended their mixed income tests into 1979. One, DeKalb County, revamped its 1978 plan, but still is having trouble with its experimental design. Lansing, however, had more success with its first year effort and has enlarged its experimental and control groups for 1979.

Most sponsors did not respond to the DOL knowledge development order with such sophisticated projects. Some, inured to flutters in national policy, were not inclined to overreact to what they saw as a whim of the national office. Others imply were not confident going ahead with elegant experiments and chose to stick to more basic approaches. Although it is difficult to document neatly, there seems to have been better developed prime sponsor priorities and policies among those opting for modest knowledge development activities than among the sponsors opting for ambitious plans. In the absence of firm local agendas, many of the latter seemed too willing to go full speed ahead into areas they were ill-equipped to enter.

The sponsors in the first group, however, committed to their own way of doing things, were less inclined to undertake activities radically different from their usual fare. What they did in the name of knowledge development was less ambitious on paper, less a departure from established policy. In some cases, "knowledge development" was merely a matter of stretching definitions; sponsors launched activities they would have launched anyway, but put them under the rubric of knowledge development. San Francisco's knowledge development plan was a modest one that established a centralized youth intake, assessment, referral and placement function. According to one staff member, the purpose was "to demonstrate that two agencies, separately funded for different roles, or the same roles serving different populations, can serve jointly and cooperatively." (John Walsh, Page K-4). The sponsor also labeled two programs conducted in cooperation with local painting and construction trade unions as "innovative." Apart from their respective mixed income experiments, both Oakland and DeKalb County set up evaluations to compare the relative effectiveness of YETP training and Title I training that had similar objectives but employed different approaches. Both sponsors are continuing the projects in 1979.

In 1978, the Santa Clara sponsor decided to complete a youth services inventory (which was required of all sponsors, anyway) and identify successful alternative methods for serving the vocational needs of students not adequately served by traditional education. Lane County, at a loss for new ideas, recycled a model first attempted under its summer youth program, and paired trainable mentally retarded youngsters with other YETP enrollees. The purpose was first, to develop training techniques and job restructuring approaches for trainable mentally retarded youths and, second, to develop training packages for the paired workers.

Waterbury declined to undertake new activities in the name of knowledge development, partly because administrators there presume an inductive process encouraging generalizations is not productive in a climate where programs are so dissimilar and dependent on non-reproducible variables. Administrators there also felt that "knowledge development" must be an implicit process, and no amount of formal structure can make it work if it is not an integral part of overall management. Interestingly enough, like Moliere's hero who spoke prose all his life and never knew it, Waterbury has already been engaged in evaluation exercises that would rival those of ambitious prime sponsor plans. The sponsor does one-, three-, and twelve-month follow-up interviews on participants and also sends out questionnaires to supervisors, program operators and guidance counselors.

Kitsap County adapted its knowledge development plans to document and evaluate the untried process of collaboration with the local education agency. Local evaluators examined in-school programs with reference to performance goals, the effectiveness of competency-based training plans, completion rates, the award of academic credit and other operational considerations, and the effectiveness of the sponsor efforts in encouraging dropouts to return to school. Alamance County, faced with the mandate to serve a new target group--ex-offenders--tried to learn something about why ex-offenders got into trouble and what could get them out. Chicago, constrained by interest groups that had no interest in elaborate experiments, and skeptical about what new could be gained from experiments (it already had an established evaluation capacity), adopted a pragmatic, but acceptable (to the DOL regional office) evaluation strategy that, in the name of innovation, changed the YCCIP program content and boosted the number of supervisors on projects.

These less elaborate evaluation approaches proved fruitful more frequently than the sophisticated ones. They were more likely to be manageable, to provide immediately useful information to prime sponsors, and to serve as building blocks for expanded and/or more sophisticated projects. The proof of their advantage over the more elaborate studies is that they were more likely to be extended after the first year.

There were some sponsors who, for a number of reasons, did not take the knowledge development mandate seriously and have done little or nothing. Clark County made some half-hearted plans to determine whether its YCCIP project could increase school retention but attached no priority to the undertaking, and nothing came of it. Greene County, intimidated by th idea of launching a complicated social experiment, chose to do nothing. Cook County laid out plans to test the effectiveness of certain programs in reducing dropout rates and in placing dropouts in jobs; however, it put the onus for such studies on community-based organizations delivering the programs; little came of the efforts. Little appears to have changed in the 1979 plans of these sponsors. Clark County is indefinite. Greene County stated in its plan that it intended to compare the records of two YCCIP programs--one with support services and one without. But staff are still scared off by the prospects of a design that would require control and experimental groups.

For the prime sponsors not trying ambitious knowledge development undertakings, the mandate is probably not having much effect. Many of their "experiments" are experiments in name only, part of a charade to keep the Department of Labor happy. Perhaps, with t e benefit of more time, knowledge development will catch on in these areas; but that is not automatic. The San Francisco prime sponsor director articulated a position--echoed elsewhere--against prime sponsor experimentation. Recalling manpower program experiences during the 1960s, the sponsor director claimed that one of the most important lessons from that era was that mixing action programs with research caused problems, because the two got in the way of each other.

What More Can Be Expected?

YEDPA's middle name is "Demonstration," and there is no escaping the fact that the Act was passed and has been implemented in the hope that definitive lessons will be forthcoming to shed some light on the nature of youth employment problems and the relative effectiveness of possible solutions to those problems. But the knowledge development mandate does not mean locally what it means nationally and federal policy guidance should recognize a differentiation between federal and local purposes. Federal expectations about local knowledge development should be cast more clearly to de-emphasize the content of particular experimental findings. Instead, the emphasis should be on the process by which prime sponsor programs and procedures are reviewed for the purpose of supporting locally initiated policy change.

The most interesting and active participation in knowledge development and most year-to-year continuity and cumulative progress has been in sponsorships trying relatively unsophisticated data collection and analysis and demonstrations. Those kinds of projects have been manageable and, more importantly, the information they have produced has been useable because they have focused on variables under control of the prime sponsors. In contrast, the mixed income tests have proven to be difficult to design and implement. Furthermore, their lessons--if any are forthcoming--are not likely to be useable by local administrators. Without some kind of ratification by national policymakers, local sponsors cannot independently opt to mix client groups, for example, as a matter of ongoing policy. Although it is unfair to form a complete judgment about the utility of mixed income tests for local decisionmakers, more than a year of local knowledge development initiatives does show them to be of little use. Word about the problems with mixed income tests appears to travel fast. Most of the few sponsors that tried them discontinued their efforts for 1979, and there was only one sponsor that, not having tried them in 1978, tried to launch any in 1979.

In general, it appears that the central determinant of how knowledge development is received locally has been how useful it was seen to be locally. Where it pertains to matters within the control of sponsors, it is accepted. But in the areas where experiments are investigating questions of only academic interest or issues (such as income mix) that can be settled only at the federal level, the initiatives are either falling under their own weight or are being sustained thanks mainly to the muscle of dedicated local researchers and a prime sponsor willingness to go along in the interest of placating the Department of Labor.

STRETCHING THE IMPACT OF NEW RESOURCES

When it was passed, YEDPA represented a major financial commitment by the federal government to alleviating youth unemployment problems. But policymakers in neither the Congress nor the Department of Labor had delusions about what the new law might accomplish if the initial YCCIP and YETP allocations were simply added to local programs. It was anticipated that local decisionmakers might succumb to pressures for diverting resources already serving youth away from them and letting the new monies fill the void.

Consequently, the Congress and the Department of Labor took steps to assure that CETA sponsors would maintain their previous level of effort in serving youth and assure that the new YEDPA resources would provide net additional resources for youth. Congress spelled out its intent in both the law and legislative history. Sections 331 and 341 of the Act stated that the new programs were to be "supplementary to but not replacing opportunities available under Title I of [CETA]." Section 346(a)(2) went further, stating that "services to youth under [Title I] should not be reduced because of the availability of financial assistance under [YETP]." Language in the legislative history further reflected a presumption that prior Title I youth services ought to provide a baseline to which YCCIP and YETP were intended to add.

Enforcing the Maintenance of Effort Mandate

The Department of Labor Office of Youth Programs echoed the Congressional intent in the regulations and planning charter it published before YEDPA start-up. In communications to the DOL regional administrators and local CETA administrators, the Department ordered sponsors to assure that Title I services to youth stay at the same mix and level as in 1977. In order to eliminate the abnormal bulge in the baseline Title I youth enrollments produced by sponsors financing the 1977 summer youth program with Title I funds, the Department specified enrollment levels through March 31, 1977, as the minimum level of service to youths which sponsors had to meet or exceed. The Department was especially emphatic about maintaining the Title I youth service patterns and levels. Because youths had typically commanded such a large proportion of Title I resources nationally (youth enrollments had always exceeded 50 percent, although they were steadily declining), even small percentage declines in Title I youth enrollments would drastically limit the net impact of the smaller youth programs.

Indeed, the Department of Labor's fears were probably not entirely groundless. The Department reported that by mid-1978 there was a 3.4 percent decline in the youth share of Title I enrollments which offset the participant build-up under YCCIP and YETP by an estimated 14 percent. Corrective actions--and possibly the fact that the same sponsors may have reached a degree of enrollment stability not possible in March 1978--eased the situation somewhat in the subsequent first full year of experience. By March 31, 1979, the Title I youth share was only 2.8 points lower than the

March 1977 levels. But the Department, concerned with the growing number of sponsors with serious declines (7.5 percent or greater) in Title I shares for youth, adopted even stricter maintenance of effort standards. In a mid-May (1979) communication to prime sponsors, the Department ordered sponsors to maintain Title I (II-B under the 1978 amendments) enrollments at the same level as for all of 1977. This move upped the ante for youth over the 1977 level to abnormally high levels in some sponsorships because of the 1977 Title I youth enrollment bulge. Two months later, following a vociferous prime sponsor outcry against the new and stiffer standard, the Department of Labor reversed itself, readopting the Title I youth enrollments as of March 31, 1977, as the benchmark for comparison.

The Extent of Substitution Under YCCIP and YETP

In the first year of YEDPA, it would have been reasonable to expect an especially large dip in the end-of-year Title I enrollments, relative to prior years, for two reasons. First, before YEDPA, sponsors had routinely utilized Title I money to support early summer youth program operations when funds earmarked for the summer programs were late. Secondly, the youth share of Title I enrollments had also been steadily declining.

Indeed, using the end of the second quarter of fiscal 1977 as the benchmark, 24 of the 36 sponsors for which useable data were available showed declines in the percentage share of Title I services going to youth over the first two years of programs. But, only a third of those sponsors showed the largest drop in the first year. Of those, two, Detroit and Albuquerque, had large discretionary-funded youth programs that were already creating pressures for sponsors to reach enrollment levels quickly and encouraging sponsors to divert youth from Title I in order to maintain enrollments in the battery of new youth programs. A third sponsor, Cook County, although posting a 4.9 point drop in the youth share in the first year, actually increased the number of youth served when its Title I allocation was increased. In the second year ending March 31, 1979, Cook County increased the Title I youth share slightly over the first year and, thanks to an increase in its Title I allocation, increased the level of Title I services to youth by a fifth.

The other two-thirds of the sponsors showing a drop in Title I service to youth from March 1977 through March 1979 are hard-pressed to blame it on start-up disruptions because the biggest drops came in the second year. Moreover, only one, Charlotte, had a net increase in Title I allocations in the second year (and thus had to increase Title I youth enrollments in order to keep the youth share from slipping). Instead, the problem of a declining youth share seems to have been associated with general instability in overall Title I enrollments, usually in the form of drastically falling Title I enrollments. Two-thirds of the 25 sponsors with reduced Title I shares for youth had net losses in their total Title I enrollments. The aggregate two-year drop in overall Title I enrollments for the group showing reduced Title I enrollments for youth was 23 percent. The sponsors with more than a three percent drop in the Title I youth share showed a 26 point drop in their total Title I enrollments, with nine undergoing cuts of more than a third. The sponsors experiencing the largest drop in Title I youth enrollments also showed the largest drop in overall Title I enrollments. In contrast, for the sponsors that maintained or increased the Title I share for youths, the drop in Title I enrollments was only five percent.

A slightly different perspective bears out the same story of disruption attributable to sudden decreases in Title I enrollments. Of the 24 sponsors that had their Title I enrollments cut over the two-year period, only 9 were able to maintain or increase the youth share in percentage terms and only one was able to maintain the youth share in absolute terms (More than half of the sponsors with increased Title I service levels maintained or increased the service level to youth). Apparently, the precipitous drops in Title I allocations may have contributed strongly to staff instability and administrative disruptions. One result may have been a lack of attention to the maintenance of effort imperative.

The concern of the Congress and the Department of Labor with substitution was well intended. But, the slavish attention to numbers and mechanical indicators of compliance diverted attention from what substitution can buy. Indeed, it does appear to have offsetting benefits, increasing the marginal impact of resources for youth.

To facilitiate adinistration of the new youth programs, most sponsors set up separate "youth offices" that, in fact, handled YCCIP, YETP, and SPEDY funds exclusively. Title I funds--even those providing services for youth--were handled in separate administrative units. This had the effect of creating dual youth tracks--a YEDPA intake/referral/ placement track and a Title I track. In a few areas such as Muskegon, the separate tracks are being utilized to serve different groups of youth; YEDPA is for 16-19 year olds and Title I is for 20-21 year olds. But usually the programmatic differences and the client groups for the separate tracks are not so deliberately planned. Title I services are more likely to provide work experience or minimal training (isolated from one another) and are more likely to serve as income transfer programs. Services in the YETP and YCCIP track, on the other hand, are more likely to be adopted to the needs of youths. Consequently, the effect per dollar spent in YCCIP or YETP appears to exceed the effect when it is spent on a teenager in Title I.

The varying marginal impact of YEDPA and Title I dollars undermines the premise underlying the Title I maintenance of effort mandate because it means that a reduction in Title I resouces for youth does not necessarily offset the total services available to youth by an equivalent amount. Consequently, in order to maintain the 1977 level of Title I services to youth, sponsors ideally should take the dollar resources represented by the prior service level and combine them with the new YCCIP and YETP resources. Portland provided perhaps the best example of how to do this. The fact that new YCCIP and YETP service deliverers were also Title I deliverers made the transition all the easier. Portland's record reflects the success of the strategy. Despite a two-year cut in Title I enrollments of more than 30 percent, Portland actually increased the youth share over that time by 6 percent.

In fact, that may be happening increasingly. It is hard to discern the pattern from the data and evidence available so far. But the trend in that direction has to buck local politics where local operators divide resources, functions and power according to CETA Titles. It also creates turf and resource battles where service deliverers are funded and their programs designed not around service groups or functions, but around funding sources.

Substitution: Deliberate Policy or Accident?

From the national level, there is a single overwhelming concern regarding the substitution of YCCIP and YETP resources for Title I (now Title II-B) resources: the impact such substitution has on the net job creation effect of the new youth programs. If the programs are to create the maximum number of net new employment and training opportunities, such substitution must be kept to a minimum. But the legislative provisions and Departmental edicts on maintenance of effort, and the regional office enforcement of those edicts come close to mistaking the effects of substitution for the causes. Substitution is not the product of only a deliberate decision to substitute YEDPA funds for other CETA funds. It is also the product of other forces, not easily controlled by federal prescriptions. Although these forces may hardly provide justification for substitution in the eyes of congressional overseers or DOL administrators, they do call into question the neatness of current legislative and administrative mandates regarding substitution. They also imply that severe limits on substitution impose certain costs.

Under any conditions, the benchmark for determining whether effort is being maintained is almost invariably a matter of arbitrary choice. There is an attractive logic to choosing as a benchmark the status quo achieved with old money, and trying to assure that all new money is a net addition. But even that standard, which was adopted in the implementation of YEDPA, is not unequivocal. It certainly invites an evaluation of (1) what an appropriate maintenance of effort enforcement policy is, and (2) what changes in the Title I youth share really signify.

The Title I maintenance of effort directive was formulated to keep sponsors from pursuing a policy of reducing Title I services to youth and thereby assure that all YEDPA funds would provide net new opportunities for youth. Yet YEDPA arrived in the midst of a steady decline in the Title I youth share. Fiscal 1975, the first year of CETA, marked the highpoint of the youth share of Title I enrollents, at 62 percent, a share that declined to 57 percent in 1976 and 52 percent in 1977. Considering the rate of decline prior to YEDPA, the 3.4 percent decline from 1977 to 1978 appears to have marked an improvement in the trend. At the very least, it was not an unambiguous deterioration in local service patterns.

The decline appears to have been less a product of deliberate policy by prime sponsors and more a product of changing conditions that had an incidental impact on enrollment patterns. Through 1975 and 1976 prime sponsors in the CETA system received a number of directives to increase hiring of Vietnam era veterans, a group predominantly over age 22. At the same time, there was increasing emphasis on raising enrollments of welfare recipients, older workers, and women--all groups whose marginal impact on client mix was to increase the adult share of Title I resources because they too were predominantly over 22.

Programmatic changes also probably had some effect on depressing youth enrollments. When the Department of Labor introduced performance indicators in 1977 that put a high premium on job placements, it appears that sponsors may have curtailed activities involving no job transition--those kinds of activities in which in-school youth are typically enrolled--in order to improve performance as measured by the indicators. Furthermore, as the new CETA programs had the bugs worked out of them, it is possible that the turnover rates for young enrollees--which are typically the highest--dropped faster than for adults, thus giving the illusion of a relative drop in the proportion of youth enrollees, but not necessarily a drop in the level of youth service hours.

There were other twists in local programming and conditions that also had a material effect on measured substitution among the sponsors studied in this evaluation (See Table 2). For example, YEDPA arrived in Greene County at the same time local administrators started paying attention to who was being served. They had been providing Title I services on a first-come-first-serve basis. But as local planners started establishing priorities, they put in-school youth low on the list since it was presumed they were less in need and had more options than dropouts and older out-of-work persons. And so, despite a net increase in Title I enrollments over the next two years, both the level of youth enrollments and the size of the youth Title I share fell. The City of Boston, which showed a 20 percent decline in the Title I youth share over two years experienced a 42 percent drop in overall Title I enrollments during that time. Anticipating the cuts in the fall of 1977, the city asked--and received--the Department of Labor's permission to simply backfill on their Title I resources with the new youth monies.

It is unlikely that any of these factors alone could have much discernible impact on reducing the youth share of Title I services nationwide. But, individually, they probably had a depressing effect on the youth share and their combined cumulative effect probably accounts for a great deal of the decline through 1977.

Against this backdrop, the maintenance of effort provisions written into YEDPA appear particularly inappropriate. They address only the prime sponsor policymaking structures and rely too heavily on the ability of sponsors to implement policy. Yet there was little evidence of deliberate prime sponsor policy to shift away from serving younger clients (nor has there been much evidence of sponsors taking steps to prop up sagging youth enrollments in Title I). At the same time, the provisions do nothing to counteract the underlying forces that have an effect on enrollment patterns.

Table 2

Proportion of Youth Enrolled in Title I Programs--2nd Quarters FY 1977, 1978, and 1979

	Prime Sponsor	1977-II Percent Youth	1978-II Percent Youth	Percentage Point Change 1977-II to 1978-II	2nd Qtr. 79 Percent Youth	Percentage Point Change 1978-II to 1979-II	Percentage Point Change 1978-II to 1979-II
1.	Alamance	70.7	56.6	-14.1	73.2	+16.6	+ 2.5
2.	Albuquerque	51.4	47.7	- 3.7	54.2	+ 6.5	- 2.8
3.	Atlanta	37.7	36.0	- 1.7	39.6	+ 3.6	+ 1.9
4.	Boston	47.1	47.3	+ .2	26.8	-20.5	-20.3
5	Cambridge	45.1	32.9	-12.2	27.7	- 5.2	-17.4
6.	Clark Co.	50.6	47.0	- 3.6	35.7	-11.3	-14.9
7.	Chicago	33.8	--	--	37.7	--	+ 3.9
8.	Charlotte	68.8	74.8	+ 6	66.0	- 8.8	- 2.8
9.	Coastal Bend	49.0	66.4	+17.4	59.8	- 6.6	+10.8
10.	Cobb Co.	67.0	58.7	- 8.2	67.0	+ 8.3	0
11.	Columbus/Franklin	45.8	53.9	+ 8.1	49.0	- 4.9	+ 3.2
12.	Connecticut BOS	45.3	45.5	+ .2	46.8	+ 1.3	+ 1.5
13.	Cook Co.	49.4	44.5	- 4.9	45.0	+ .5	- 4.4
14.	DeKalb	52.5	49.2	- 3.3	45.2	- 4.0	- 7.5
15.	Detroit	56.5	51.7	- 4.8	51.4	- .3	- 5.1
16.	Durham	55.5	48.9	- 6.6	47.6	- 1.3	- 7.9
17.	El Paso	57.2	56.7	- .5	53.6	- 3.1	- 3.6
18.	Grand Rapids	60.4	59.8	- .6	42.6	-17.2	-17.8
19.	Greene Co.	43.0	29.9	--	29.5	- .4	-13.5
20.	Hartford	65.7	61.2	- 4.5	56.2	- 5.0	- 9.5
21	Kalamazoo	46.5	56.1	+ 9.6	55.4	- .7	+ 8.9
22.	Kitsap	35.9	44.0	+ 8.1	26.7	-17.3	- 9.2
23.	Lane	29.6	31.9	+ 2.3	28.9	- 3.0	- .7
24.	Lansing	43.4	41.2	- 2.2	40.4	- .8	- 3.0
25.	Marin	35.0	38.5	+ 3.5	34.4	- 4.1	- .6
26.	Muskegon	61.5	70.0	+ 8.5	41.0	-29.0	-20.5
27	North Carolina BOS	59.4	60.2	+ .8	60.4	+ .2	+ 1.0
28.	Northeast Georgia	--	--	--	--	--	--
29.	Oakland	57.2	55.1	- 2.1	42.4	-12.7	-14.8
30.	Oregon BOS	59.0	61.1	+ 2.1	52.1	- 9.0	- 6.9
31.	Portland	42.3	42.2	- .1	48.3	+ 6.1	+ 6.0
32.	Rockford	40.5	40.6	+ .1	37.0	- 3.6	- 3.5
33.	San Francisco	48.3	41.5	- 6.8	50.0	+ 8.5	+ 1.7
34.	Santa Clara	44.1	48.3	+ 4.2	37.5	-10.8	- 6.6
35.	Sonoma	50.8	43.0	- 7.8	43.3	+ .3	- 7.5
36	Waterbury	57.2	60.7	+ 3.5	60.9	+ .2	+ 3.7
37.	Worcester	50.6	51.[illegible]	+ .7	48.8	- 2.5	- 1.8

A Matter of Misplaced Emphasis

After the experience with CETA public service employment, the concern in the Congress and the Department of Labor over limiting substitution of YEDPA money for Title I (now Title II-B) resources serving youth was understandable. But rigid guidelines to limit such substitution were imposed with too little consideration given to the dynamics of local conditions and program decisions. Furthermore, national policymakers ignored the in[illegible]tional change that substitution can buy.

Although the federally imposed maintenance of effort guidelines may have had the immediate effect of checking short-run drops in Title I youth enrollments, they have not addressed the underlying forces that drive substitution and provide little promise as permanent solutions.

THE UNEVEN PARTNERSHIP

The central assumption underlying the CETA partnership is that federal manpower objectives are compatible with state and local objectives, i.e., that state and local governments have a reason to join the federal government in establishing manpower policies. There is a collateral assumption that there exists at the state and local levels the administrative and technical capacity to implement federal manpower policies, i.e., that state and local governments are capable of holding up their end of such a partnership. Experience under YEDPA has shown both assumptions to be neither entirely true nor entirely false. Analysis of implementation, however, sheds some light on the evaluation of these assumptions by examining the effect federal sticks and carrots had on shaping sponsor policies, and the effect of uncertainty on prime sponsor administrative and program capacity.

Sticks and Carrots

The analysis so far has focused on how prime sponsors have been meeting the federal objectives of YEDPA. No attention has been given to how or why local policies and practices developed in reaction to different federal cues and change mechanisms utilized as YEDPA was implemented, or to evaluating the effectiveness of these mechanisms in accomplishing change.

Administrators in the Department of Labor have employed both "sticks" and "carrots" to get their way with prime sponsors. The sticks include the statutory provisions of YEDPA, the departmental regulations governing its implementation, and additional departmental directives. The Department has relied to a lesser extent upon carrots--incentives to steer state and local policies. These include discretionary grants awarded for programs that featured model designs or special institutional linkages, and relaxed eligibility standards for programs with special experimental features built into them. The Department also provided prime sponsors with a great deal of technical assistance and ideas for program models in the form of research and evaluation materials.

Forcing Change With Sticks

The federal mandates, though not always carried out very well, in some cases stimulated serious initiatives that put prime sponsor operations on a track pursuing the larger goals behind specific mandates. This divergence between the primary and secondary responses to the federal mandates is attributable to the fact that the mandates embody a goal--client participation in the case of youth councils, for example--and specify means for achieving that goal that are not always appropriate. Prime sponsors react with a nominal response to particular requirements for a youth council, for example. But, if they are in agreement with the basic federal goal and circumstances permit, they take further actions as well. In these situations, it might be argued that the federal requirements are overly prescriptive and divert energy from more constructive steps that sponsors might take. All sponsors set up youth councils, though a number of them were convinced that the prescribed councils were ineffective forums for making decisions or for incorporating youth views and the policymaking process. Serious attempts to obtain the viewpoints of young participants did not evolve directly from the required youth councils, but from alternative mechanisms set up by sponsors for tapping youth perspectives and bringing their views to bear on decisions.

The countervailing argument, however, is that a requirement to pursue certain goals which does not specify some means, invites vague policy responses that may yield even fewer results than the nominal responses. This happened occasionally in response to the knowledge development mandate.

The test for whether the federal policy mandates should be made more or less prescriptive hinges on an assessment of what drives and impedes the secondary responses to those mandates, and speculation about what would happen if the mandates were changed. The two most important determinants of whether and how prime sponsors respond in more than a nominal way to federal mandates are the degree to which they are in agreement with the goals of those mandates and the degree to which they have the time and operational capacity to pursue those goals.

Though YEDPA was not popularly acclaimed by all prime sponsors, its principal features were implemented. Many prime sponsors went beyond nominal compliance with its prescribed objectives because the overall goals were shared by state and local policymakers. The emphasis on serving youth was not welcomed universally, but the emphasis on providing more than work experience was enthusiastically endorsed. For the sponsors still trying to cope with the problems of getting a sponsorship moving, the knowledge development mandate triggered very little. But for the more experienced sponsors that had mastered the basics, the notion of self-evaluation and even experimentation holds great appeal, and prime sponsor officials pushed "knowledge development" activities beyond what was required.

In contrast, there were aspects of the new youth initiatives that did not set well with sponsor administrators and although the letter of the law may have been followed, the mandates had no material effect on sponsor policies or practices. Sponsors resented the highly categorical approach of YCCIP and its competitive award process, criticized its project approach in some cases, and widely rejected the no-supportive-service policy. Sponsors went through the motions of soliciting proposals and setting up no-frills jobs, but a large proportion added extra program features to bring the services more in line with what it was felt clients needed. A few sponsors, not wanting local schools involved in manpower programs, obtained pro forma sign-offs and established programs that differed in few respects from anything going on before.

Aside from being affected by sponsor policy preferences, implementation of the federal mandates was affected by the technical and administrative capacity at the state and local levels. To the extent limited capacity was a factor restraining prime sponsor response to the federal mandates, however, it was not so much an absolute inability to respond, as an inability to respond in the limited time available. In implementing YCCIP, for example, prime sponsors went through the motions of establishing open process competition for selecting deliverers, but frequently failed to achieve the effect of open competition because they lacked the time to adequately announce it and potential deliverers could not respond quickly. Time limits put even greater constraints on schools and prime sponsors when they were trying to arrange agreements for spending the YETP 22 percent set-aside. In the areas where cooperative arrangements were already in place, the precious little time available was devoted to substantive program details. But in other areas with few precedents for CETA-school collaboration, the limited time was spent opening channels of communication, with little attention to the substance of the cooperative ventures.

There are some mandates that have not been carried out, but in which time was hardly a factor. The planning/grant application process required for funding under YCCIP and YETP proved to be a charade because it required data that were not available on a reliable basis, and it presumed a planning model that rarely conformed to local practices. In a few cases knowledge development plans were completely abandoned because administrators felt their operations lacked the technical know-how to design and carry-out social experiments.

Generally, the sticks that federal administrators had at their disposal to "force" implementation of YCCIP and YETP forced some prime sponsors to react. It is not clear whether the federal mandates have induced changes in those sponsorships that would not have occurred otherwise. But they almost certainly speeded the process of change.

Coaxing Change With Carrots

Aside from the formula allocations prime sponsors receive under YCCIP and YETP, they can apply for discretionary funds to support experimental and demonstration programs.

These projects were intended to be experimental ventures to test program models, including joint programs with local schools, career exploration and job sampling programs, and large scale conservation projects. Sponsors were also permitted to enroll up to 10 percent non-disadvantaged youth in formula-funded YETP programs if they set up an evaluation design to test the relative effectiveness of programs serving mixed income client groups. The largest of the incentive grants were available under the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects to test the effect of a guaranteed job on keeping students in school and encouraging dropouts to return.

Besides testing different program designs, it was hoped these extra projects would provide incentives for some sponsors to take the initiative and try innovations over and above what was required under YCCIP and YETP, and thereby provide another mechanism for leveraging changes in the CETA prime sponsor system.

In a climate in which prime sponsors had sustained policies and a stable base of programs, a menu of demonstration programs and their accompanying extra funds might have had a controllable and positive impact on prime sponsor policies and procedures. In the frantic climate and near hysteria that marked YEDPA implementation, however, such control was not possible. Disregarding the merits of the various demonstration projects, the strategy of encouraging change with incentive grants probably was not given a fair test. The policy or procedural shifts that sponsors had to make to implement demonstration programs were swamped by the general upheaval associated with implementation of formula-funded programs and demands associated with other CETA programs.

There was little "rub-off" effect from applying for the demonstration projects because the application procedures were usually handled entirely separate from YETP/YCCIP program planning and implementation. To the extent demonstration projects had any effect on regular programs, it was about as likely to be negative as it was positive. In one sponsorship that was awarded an entitlement project, relations between local schools and private employers have been developing remarkably well, and YETP programs are also benefiting. But in another sponsorship that lost on its Entitlement application, the early planning with local public agencies and private employers raised expectations; though there had been no guarantee of funding, when the application was rejected the credibility of the CETA youth office was undermined and relations with the private sector set back.

The availability of incentive grants had other, larger ill effects on the YETP and YCCIP programming. Prime sponsor administrators considered YETP and YCCIP funding to be automatic; discretionary funding was not. The main planning effort, quite understandably, therefore, went to the demonstration applications. Had the demonstration projects been launched sometime after the critical first-year planning had taken place, more attention might have been given to innovation under YETP and YCCIP. As it was, the discretionary projects sapped an enormous amount of energy from YETP/YCCIP planning and programming in the areas where sponsors went for the extra money, and the basic formula-based programs show the lack of attention.

About three-fourths of the sponsors studied chose not to apply for discretionary money because staff were swamped with work already; they did not consider themselves to be in a competitive position or, as in at least one case, they did not even know about the funds available. But the sponsorships that did not apply were either small or sprawling balance of state sponsorships, and were not under constituent pressure to grab every dollar available.

Many sponsorships, however, had little choice and would have been committing political suicide if they had passed up a shot--no matter how remote--at extra resources. Virtually every major city reviewed in the case studies applied for an Entitlement grant. About half won. Staffs were told they would be fired if applications for extra funds were not submitted. But money, not innovation, was the issue.

The Cost of Uncertainty on Prime Sponsor Capacity

State and local CETA administrators have learned to expect uncertainty in their partnership with the federal government, even if they have not always learned to live with it. The vagaries of the Congressional authorization and appropriations process and the vicissitudes of Department of Labor policymakers subject prime sponsors to sudden changes in legislative mandates and priorities, last minute guesswork about the level and timing of funds from the federal spigot and constantly changing and occasionally contradictory regulations.

Implementation of YEDPA has been no less plagued by these problems. YEDPA was enacted in August 1977 and the Department of Labor set a furious pace for implementation in early 1978. As start-up lagged behind schedule, the Department applied intense pressure on sponsors to increase enrollments. But by mid-1978, when it became apparent that funds available for fiscal 1979 would be less than anticipated, the Department urged sponsors to carry substantial amounts of their 1978 funds into fiscal 1979. There was so much slack in the CETA system at the time that most sponsors were able to make do with only minor adjustments. But a few were forced to lay off enrollees and staff.

The expiration of CETA (and authority for the youth programs) in September 1978 caused further tensions. Some cautious sponsors backed off from all commitments until new legislation was enacted in October. Others used up some of their reserve of good will among other agencies by borrowing funds and continuing programs on a handshake. CETA's national reputation has also hurt the standing of prime sponsors.

The constantly changing signals that state and local CETA administrators have been receiving have taken a toll, no doubt, in reducing the ultimate effectiveness of employment and training programs. But there have been more immediate and observable costs as well. In the course of observing YETP and YCCIP implementation, the prevailing climate of uncertainty seems to have exacted especially heavy costs on both the staff structure of sponsorships, and the relationships of sponsors to other state and local agencies.

Staff Instability

In the year and a half after YEDPA's enactment, about two out of every five prime sponsors studied had gone through at least one prime sponsor director or youth director. Many more had serious lower level staff turnover problems. In late 1978 one sponsor had more than seven relatively inexperienced employees for every one with two or more years experience.

Because of staff turnover, the institutional stability of CETA operations suffers. Understaffed operations cannot afford to give staff the time away from their jobs that is necessary for training. Where staff development is provided, turnover washes away its benefits. Institutional memory is limited and "routine" operations never really become routine. Since only limited experience can be accumulated, the quality of local operations depends more heavily on charismatic leadership than sound national or local policy.

Of course, the uncertainties with which prime sponsors must live is not the only set of factors impinging on staff stability. The tensions created by having to serve both state/local and federal masters, the lack of consensus about what makes good manpower programs, and the constant critical public scrutiny that sponsors suffer further aggravate working conditions for CETA employees. But the constantly changing signals from Washington are the source of staff discontent most consistently identified.

Uncertainty and Institutional Bridges

One of the most important objectives of YEDPA was to encourage prime sponsors to establish working relationships with non-CETA agencies, especially education agencies. This objective suffered in the climate of uncertainty. It curtailed the maneuvering room for prime sponsors genuinely interested in establishing collaborative arrangements, and, in the end, damaged the credibility that sponsors had with other players.

State and local education agencies with little prior CETA experience had a difficult time adapting to the last minute planning and programming demands of YETP and YCCIP. Although some sort of agreement between schools and prime sponsors was always put into place, follow-through was lacking frequently because programs got off to a bad start. The second year of joint CETA-LEA programming showed the effects of rocky starts. In some cases, first year programs were left entirely untouched because they had never really been implemented. In other cases uncertainty led sponsors to attempt only modest change in the hope that it could be sustained even through fluctuations in funding and changes in policy. One sponsor turned down a proposal from the local chamber of commerce to do something for 14-15 year olds because youth planners were not confident about funding levels for the coming year.

Besides weakening the joint programs that sponsors have established with non-CETA agencies, the climate of uncertainty has hurt the credibility of prime sponsors as partners in long-term relationships. Though CETA sponsors have, in fact, fared well financially since the advent of CETA in 1974, the chronic sense of crisis over funds and policies have undermined their perceived staying power to the point that some local offices are seen as being forever on the brink of collapse. This is one reason educators cite for the reluctance of schools to establish CETA youth programs as mainstream programs. There is an interest, instead, in keeping them compartmentalized and easily separated if funding is abruptly discontinued.

The nature of the CETA beast makes a degree of uncertainty inevitable. When an operating agent must report to both a federal and state or local master, there are more decision points where plans can be disapproved, funding denied, or policy shifted. When federal perogatives are overlaid on local or state perogatives, tension and sudden change are unavoidable. Any major national initiative subject to the constant scrutiny of the press and Congress is bound to be volatile at times. None of this is likely to change, no matter how devastating the costs of uncertainty. But, although the causes are not likely to change, the effects ought to be better identified and recognized. They are a fact of life and ought to be a major consideration when national policymakers are forming implicit expectations against which prime sponsor partners and CETA are to be judged.

AREA SUMMARIES

The sample of prime sponsors included in the ten case studies was chosen, not as a random one, but to represent a cross section of important prime sponsor characteristics. The selection purposely focuses on clusters of sponsors to permit analyses of common patterns and variations among them.

The thirty-seven prime sponsors included in the study are receiving about a tenth of all the allocations made under the Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP) and Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP). Two are receiving Youth Entitlement grants for saturation projects, and one is receiving an Entitlement grant for a more limited test. The sample includes four balance of state (BOS) prime sponsors, and eight consortia; there are seven big-city sponsors and nine that cover largely rural areas. The sponsors represent 12 states and 7 federal regions. They reflect a mix of social and economic conditions. Overall unemployment rates for the areas range from about 11 percent to more than 60 percent. Racial mix in the areas runs from less than 2 percent minority population to more than 50 percent. Total CETA allocations in 1978 ranged from a high of more than $180 million in Chicago to less than $5 million in Durham (See Table 3).

Information on specific areas and prime sponsor operations is contained in the area descriptions which follow. The material is organized by case study and is identified by the state and/or states in which the case studies took place.

Analyses of YCCIP and YETP implementation in each area are in the full report which is available from the Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.

Case Study Areas

California Area Study by John J. Walsh

The five California prime sponsors are located in the San Francisco Bay Area--a fragmented metropolitan area covering 19,337 square miles and split into nine counties, all of which border on San Francisco Bay. There are four SMSAs within the Bay Area, nine departments of social welfare, and eleven CETA prime sponsors. San Francisco city and county (the boundaries are coterminous) is the area's largest prime sponsor and Oakland, just across the Bay in Alameda County, is the third largest. To the North lie Sonoma, Napa and Solano Counties, principally known for their vineyards and rural settings, although Sonoma contains a sizeable trade and service center, and Solano is the site of a shipyard employing several thousand workers. Santa Clara, which borders Alameda and San Mateo Counties on the South, has become an important manufacturing and population center (the San Jose SMSA).

Table 3

CETA and CETA Youth Allocations -- Fiscal Year 1978

Prime Sponsor	Total Allocations All Titles	Allocations for Youth
California		
Marin	$ 7,644,280	$ 862,958
Oakland	28,199,348	3,343,913
San Francisco	59,524,514	6,474,043
Santa Clara	52,021,869	5,665,238
Sonoma County	13,451,192	1,437,000
Connecticut		
Connecticut BOS	81,524,000	8,030,000
Hartford	16,489,000	3,565,000
Waterbury	7,597,000	925,000
Georgia		
Atlanta	41,819,000	6,229,000
Cobb County	5,512,000	1,248,000
DeKalb County	14,034,000	1,276,000
Northeast Georgia BOS	7,588,000	1,112,000
Illinois		
Chicago	180,990,185	33,172,988
Balance of Cook County	60,332,413	6,609,198
Rockford	14,137,856	NA
Massachusetts		
Boston	NA	NA
Cambridge	NA	NA
Worcester	NA	NA
Michigan		
Detroit	84,961,113	12,006,550
Grand Rapids	30,752,063	3,284,003
Kalamazoo	8,956,508	1,056,508
Lansing	17,370,375	2,270,398
Muskegon/Oceana	11,768,696	1,231,035
North Carolina		
Alamance	5,343,759	671,261
Charlotte	12,376,136	1,368,222
Durham	4,752,442	938,164
North Carolina BOS	139,040,989	18,765,449
Ohio		
Clark County	6,966,101	849,799
Columbus/Franklin	34,824,532	4,151,567
Greene County	3,666,895	328,595
Oregon-Washington		
Kitsap County	5,869,805	455,947
Lane County	15,182,666	1,344,821
Oregon BOS	53,762,742	4,923,994
Portland	NA	NA
Texas-New Mexico		
Albuquerque	20,438,477	2,132,829
Coastal Bend	15,790,296	2,371,733
El Paso	19,706,927	2,568,238

The prime sponsors selected for inclusion in the Bay Area case study were chosen to reflect the diverse conditions existing in the area's sub-regions. Three of the prime sponsors--San Francisco, Oakland and Marin--are located in the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA. San Francisco and Oakland are the Bay Area's largest cities, both of which have lost population since the 1970 census, have large percentages of minorities (50 percent in San Francisco and 60 percent in Oakland), relatively high unemployment rates (both youth and adult), and central city areas with severe unemployment problems. Marin County, on the other hand, is primarily a bedroom community for San Francisco commuters. Marin has the highest per-capita income in the Bay Area (third highest in the nation), and one of the area's lowest unemployment rates.

The two remaining prime sponsors--Santa Clara and Sonoma Counties--were also selected to reflect specific conditions which could have an effect on youth employment. The San Jose SMSA (Santa Clara County) is an example of a new and burgeoning manufacturing area, with an unemployment rate lower than those of the Bay Area's older cities, but which nevertheless faces severe structural unemployment problems. By contrast, Sonoma County, one of the nation's greatest wine producing areas, has the highest unemployment rate in the Bay Area and faces problems of seasonal employment (and unemployment), and lack of business and industrial development which are peculiar to most rural areas.

CETA always has been a highly visible and politically sensitive program in the Bay Area but, since the passage of Proposition 13, CETA's importance at the local level has increased considerably, as have pressures to use CETA funds to replace funds lost because of the lid put on local tax revenues by the Jarvis amendment.

Bay Area CETAs, especially those in the larger cities, are also extremely vulnerable to political maneuverings, and have a propensity to undergo periodic radical changes in personnel. Since the commencement of this case study, three of the five Bay Area CETA Directors whose operations have been under review have been either fired or left their jobs for other reasons. In addition, CETA Youth Directors in Oakland and Sonoma have left their jobs. Oakland's Youth Director merely resigned, but the Sonoma Director was fired, allegedly for showing favoritism (in hiring CETA employees) to members of his religious sect.

Connecticut Area Study by Peter S. Barth

The Connecticut case study analyzes experience in three prime sponsors: Hartford, Waterbury, and Connecticut Balance of State.

The Hartford sponsorship serves the City of Hartford plus 23 surrounding towns covering a total area of 670 square miles. Hartford is an old northeastern city suffering from many of the problems of other central cities in the region. It has a growing minority population, a shrinking white population, and a relatively fixed tax base. The surrounding towns, on the average, have lower tax rates, growing populations, and much smaller percentages of minorities.

The estimated population for the City of Hartford dropped from 158,000 in 1970 to 138,150 in 1975. The primary employers in the region are the insurance industry, United Technologies (manufacturing), and state and local governments. In 1976 employment in the city was 125,800 and accounted for 37 percent of metropolitan area employment. The most common sources of jobs for youths (16-19) are farm and non-farm laborers (25 percent), followed by services (10 percent) and sales (7 percent).

In the late spring of 1978 the CETA agency, which was already operating under a cloud, was rocked by public disclosures of having overspent its budget by about $1.5 million. Previously, the agency had been involved in a bitter political struggle that left it seriously crippled; the almost daily media attention to its problems following the financial disclosures rendered the agency virtually inoperative.

In 1979, the CETA agency was rebuilding itself with a largely new staff and a new planning council. The agency operates under the close scrutiny of both the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and other public agencies.

The Connecticut Balance of State (BOS) contains 120 of Connecticut's 169 towns, none of which is very large. The BOS office is housed in the State Department of Labor and works through 13 regional planning areas. The towns deal through these areas, rather than working directly with the BOS office.

Connecticut is very small geographically (it ranks 48th in size) and was 24th in population at the time of the 1970 census. This compactness masks the tremendous diversity found in the BOS. The towns in Fairfield County are among the wealthiest in the United States. By contrast, Northeastern Connecticut is characterized by high unemployment, relatively low income levels, net-outmigration by younger persons, and a stagnant or declining industrial base. The state is highly dependent upon manufacturing for employment.

The CETA program in the BOS has maintained a low profile. While a number of prime sponsors in the region have received very poor publicity during the past year, e.g., Hartford and Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Springfield, Massachusetts, the BOS has been unscathed in the media. YEDPA has received very little publicity and references to it frequently do not link it to CETA.

Waterbury was recently identified by a legislative study as the poorest of Connecticut's 169 towns (and incorporated cities). The prime sponsor represents only the City of Waterbury--all suburbs belong to other consortia. Waterbury's population is approximately 110,000, making it one of Connecticut's largest cities.

The city has a lengthy history of industrialization but recently has experienced factory closings and declines in its industrial employment base. As is common in the older declining industrial cities of the Northeast, in recent years there has been an in-migration of significant numbers of minorities. Blacks currently constitute about 12.5 percent and Hispanics about 5 percent of the total population. The current unemployment rate is about 6.5 percent. Local CETA officials say that jobless figures may be misleading because some people have left the area and many others have abandoned the search for employment. It is estimated that youth unemployment is about 28 percent.

The CETA agency in Waterbury is managed by a young and intelligent group that seems capable of weathering any potential storm that may hit the program. The mayor of Waterbury is supportive of the agency and the operation appears to be removed from any political controversy in the city. The agency has not been treated badly by the local media, and has not been under attack from any source during YEDPA's first year. The Regional Office does not appear to monitor Waterbury's activities as closely as it does other prime sponsors. For example, during one nine month period, the "fed rep" did not pay any visits to the sponsor.

Georgia Area Study by Gretchen E. Maclachlan

The four prime sponsors covered in the Georgia case study are located in the City of Atlanta, Cobb County, DeKalb County, and an area of ten counties, the Northeast Area of the Georgia Balance of State. Although the two county prime sponsors adjoin Atlanta, they are as different from Georgia's capitol as they are from each other. The Northeast area is rural except for Clark County in which Athens and the University of Georgia are located.

Atlanta has nearly one-half million inhabitants (in an area of 131 square miles), 60 percent of whom are black and about one-sixth poor. At the time the youth programs were being implemented the unemployment rate was 8.5 percent. The economy is dominated by activities related to the strategic location of the city--transportation, trade, and regional headquarters of public and private employers. Manufacturing is also a prominent sector.

Cobb County lies across the Chattahoochee River from Atlanta and the chasm between them is wider than the river. White, strong in manufacturing, and politically conservative, CETA functions in an atmosphere of bare tolerance for federal money.

Primarily suburban DeKalb County is also located adjacent to Atlanta. It has the highest income in the state and its best schools. Its industry is predominately white collar and small manufacturing. Though statistically showing little poverty among its half-million inhabitants, it has pockets of severe as any in Atlanta.

A population of about one-quarter of a million is spread throughout the ten counties of the Northeast area of nearly 3,000 square miles. Of this total 22 percent is black, with considerable variations among counties, and 15 percent is poor. The unemployment rate early in 1978 was 7.1 percent. Apparel firms and other manufacturing are increasingly dominant in this once-agricultural area, with Athens serving as an education and professional service area. Since Northeast is only one of sixteen areas of the BOS, only the area's CETA planner is located within the region in Athens. All other administrative operations are performed at the Georgia Department of Labor (GDOL) in Atlanta.

Illinois Area Study by Myron Roomkin and Janet Weeks

The Illinois case study includes the Rockford Consortium, the City of Chicago, and the Balance of Cook County (wherein Chicago is located).

The Rockford Consortium is a three-way union between the City of Rockford, Winnebago County, and Boone County. Rockford, with a population one-twelfth of Chicago's, covers 803 square miles. Half the population lives in Rockford, the second largest city in Illinois and the site of most of the consortium's CETA activity.

The area is the largest maker of machine tools in the country. The presence of a quality labor force permitted industrial expansion to satisfy the World War II demand for technical products. Recent area-wide forecasts anticipate significant growth in manufacturing and construction, reinforcing the demand for high skilled labor.

Chaired by Rockford's mayor, the Executive Board of the CETA Manpower Planning Council is active in defining consortium policy according to the expressed wishes of the local Advisory Board. The Board's interest and involvement have drawn national attention. Before YEDPA's requirement of a Youth Planning Council, an almost entirely inexperienced body was formed. In effect, policy setting for youth programs passed to the CETA youth staff.

The City of Chicago is one of the largest urban prime sponsors in the nation. Occupying 228 square miles, the city is composed of ethnic neighborhoods which fan out from the core business district and wealthy lakefront residences. Some neighborhoods maintain their historical independence by choice; others, usually black, are isolated by the arrangement of expressways and the locations of public housing. In general, neighborhoods in the second group are populated by the CETA targets.

The Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET)*, whose director is an Assistant to the Mayor, is a well-oiled employment and training program delivery machine. Established a decade ago, MOET has historically funded manpower programs through eight local program agents who, in turn, may subcontract. Thus the program agents serve as a buffer between MOET and a large, demanding clientele, for it is to the agents that small CBOs submit proposals.

*Formerly the Mayor's Office of Manpower (MOM).

MOET is often viewed with the same skepticism that political pundits usually reserve for City Hall. It is widely assumed that some share of CETA funds is allocated to Chicago's political patronage system. Noting that "$4.2 million" had "slipped into Chicago," one columnist wrote:

> Has anyone ever heard of money going directly to a grantee without passing through some City Hall hands? The money is to help finance job-training for inner city youths ..., but everyone knows about Chicago, and jobs and job-training for inner city youths.*

Nonetheless, Chicago's CETA staff is committed to federal purpose, sophisticated about the barriers to its translation in Chicago, and ably directed.

Cook County resists summary description. The 754 square mile prime sponsorship is a composite of 129 diverse cities and villages: overlays would show other sets of govermental units, bound together into, for example, township high school districts.

In general, the demographic pattern of Chicago radiates to the suburbs, where class lines are often drawn by formal boundaries rather than expressways. The diversity of the jurisdiction is sometimes a barrier between CETA's intent and its target. The situation particularly plagues the south and southwest areas, a patchwork of extreme low income municipalities, occasional villages of great influence, and an assortment of ethnic and blue collar communities.

The County's manpower apparatus--the President's Office of Manpower--is part of the Bureau of Administration reporting to the Cook County Board President. A central office handles planning and administration and reviews summaries of the monitoring activities conducted by the three regional offices. The outposts are maintained because of the County's large size.

The County's CETA services keep a low profile. Several explanations have been offered: (1) ostrich-like residents ignore the presence of poverty, for it tarnishes the affluent image they prefer; (2) the County is able to serve all applicants, so none is left to protest and attract publicity; or (3) there are relatively few community manpower organizations to serve as advocates for the population in need.

Though the authors find no satisfactory reasons, they note that the County's subcontractors are distinguished from those in Rockford and Chicago by their dissatisfaction with the CETA office. A major complaint is directed at new CETA personnel who are said to hold rigidly to memorized regulations and will not honor a tradition of negotiating.

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*"Charlie Cherokee," Chicago Defender, August 15, 1978, p. 15.

Massachusetts Area Study by Paul Osterman

The Massachusetts case study focuses on three prime sponsors: Eastern Middlesex, Boston and Worcester. Boston is the largest of the three primes with allocations of $1.2 million and $240,000 for YETP and YCCIP, respectively, and slot levels of 1,130 and 62. The city, which covers 49.4 square miles, has a population of 616,218, 76.8 percent of which is white. Blacks make up the city's largest minority group, although in recent years there has been a substantial influx of Puerto Ricans. Although an unemployment rate for youth is not available, it is estimated to be twice that of the city's overall unemployment rate of 8.5 percent.

Eastern Middlesex is a consortium of several towns and cities, including Cambridge, Somerville, Arlington, Belmont and Watertown. The prime sponsor allocates funds to each jurisdiction (subgrantee) which in turn funds programs. Cooperation in program design and implementation occurs occasionally between the several jurisdictions, but it not mandatory, and the towns and cities frequently go their own separate ways. The area, which covers 24.6 square miles, has a population of 296,649, 95.7 percent of which is white. It is estimated that approximately 7.7 percent of the area's residents are below the poverty level. The overall unemployment rate for Eastern Middlesex is 7.3 percent; the corresponding figure for youth is 18 percent.

The Worcester prime is also a consortium, but is completely dominated by the city of Worcester, both numerically and in terms of policy. The prime spon or has a population of 306,610. The population is 98 percent white. Approximately 8 percent of the area's residents are below the poverty level and the area unemployment rate is about 5.8 percent.

Michigan Area Study by Peter Kobrak

The Michigan study includes five prime sponsor areas: the Lansing Tri-County Regional Manpower Consortium, Kalamazoo County, Grand Rapids, the Muskegon Consortium, and the City of Detrot.

The Lansing Tri-County Regional Manpower Consortium (LTCRMC) consists of Lansing, the major city in the region and the state capitol, and three predominantly rural counties. The Tri-County area is the mid-Michigan manufacturing, trade, and distribution center, and is dominated by the auto industry and state government. As of the inception of YEDPA in 1977, its 3,462 minority group youths constituted 4.4 percent of the region's 78,609 youth population between the ages of 15 and 21. A total of 25,327 persons within the region were estimated to have family incomes of less than the OMB poverty guidelines, or 70 percent of the lower living income standard, and ,540 youths were living in families with incomes below the poverty line.

Kalamazoo County is a predominantly white collar, professional, and middle class community thanks to the presence of four educational institutions plus the headquarters and research and plant facilities of the multinational Upjohn Pharmaceutical Corporation. The City of Kalamazoo is a regional center for the southwestern Michigan area, while the remainder of the county beyond the metropolitan area is involved primarily in agriculture. The County is supported by a well-balanced industrial mix that includes a heavy representation from the metals, auto, and paper industries. Of the 201,550 population within the prime sponsor jurisdiction, 17,187 persons in 1977 were living below the poverty line; 3,492 youths are included within this figure. The overall unemployment rate for the County is generally below that of Michigan generally and it tends to be less severe in its cyclical swings than the rest of the state. Nevertheless, its unemployment rate for youths between the ages of 16 and 19 was 17.5 percent before tapering off markedly for youths between the ages of 19 and 21 to approximately 6 percent.

The Grand Rapids Area Employment and Training Council (GRAETC) encompasses an area of 3,014 square miles that includes Grand Rapids (the second largest city in the state), the balance of Kent County, and three largely rural counties. Of the 596,759 people within the Consortium in 1979, 99,410 were between the ages of 14 and 21. The proportion of families with incomes below the poverty level as of the 1970 census ranged from 6.6 percent in Kent County to 10.1 percent in Montcalm County. In a similar vein, unemployment ranged from 4.7 percent in the balance of Kent County to 13.2 percent in Montcalm County. The largest number of manufacturing jobs are found within the fabricated metal industry in the metropolitan area, while retail trade jobs account for one-third of the private non-goods producing sector. The proportion of unemployed youths in the 16 to 19 age group within the Consortium was a relatively low 9 percent in 1977. Of the 53,191 persons living below the poverty line, 17 percent were in the 14 to 21 year age group.

The Muskegon Consortium (Muskegon and Oceana Counties) is grappling with youth unemployment rates which are among the worst in the state. Adult unemployment has remained at a critical level for several years and there are actually more unemployed than employed youths--to say nothing about the disproportionate number who are not in the labor force. Of the 175,411 persons living within the Muskegon Consortium jurisdiction, 7,540 are youths living in families with incomes below the poverty line. Approximately one out of every five youths in the Muskegon area is in that predicament. Such problems have been exacerbated periodically, because Muskegon's blue collar workforce has found itself highly vulnerable to the cyclical nature of Michigan's economy.

The demographic characteristics for the City of Detroit are too well-known to bear repetition in the limited space available here. Suffice it to say that of the 1,511,482 persons in its population, 172,509 are living below the poverty line. The latter figure includes 32,930 youths. The unemployment rate is approximately 21 percent for youths between the ages of 16 and 21 and, in the case of minority group youths, is over 30 percent for both males and females. The dreary statistics depicting the plight of Detroit are certainly accurate, but they somewhat distort the considerable vitality found within the southeastern portion of the state. The central city is now surrounded by a string of highly successful satellite cities and other communities. The ascendancy of the auto industry in the area as a whole is symbolized by an electric sign on the main highway into the city that provides a running total on the number of cars built in Detroit that year. When times are good, the number on the sign changes every few seconds, and represents an awesome reminder of the economic clout that the city maintains.

North Carolina Area Study by R. C. Smith

The North Carolina case study covers four prime sponsors representing maximum diversity. It includes the balance of state prime sponsor, the state's largest city, Charlotte, a consortium consisting of a smaller city and two counties, and, finally, the medium-sized county of Alamance.

Special mention must be made of a change in this alignment. The consortium of the City of Durham and the counties of Durham and Orange was dissolved at the end of fiscal 1978, with the two counties being absorbed into balance of state and Durham city emerging as a prime sponsor in its own right. This fact must be considered in any comparison of allocation, program goals, or other absolute measurements for the two fiscal years. In every case, fiscal 1979 figures and information pertain to the Durham city prime sponsorship alone.

Circumstances of the dissolution of this consortium deserve brief comment here. The mayor of Durham, a man of some influence in the community, has been a severe and frequent critic of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act nationally and in his city. He has at times seemed to suggest that the city withdraw from involvement with the Act. He did in fact manage to dismantle the Durham-Orange consortium to create what he conceived would be a more effective CETA operation for Durham.

Not surprisingly, the atmosphere of official suspicion and incrimination has left its mark on program morale, if not on operations. It would be fair to say that CETA in Durham is a "political football," with the director of CETA operations a frequent object of the mayor's criticism.

The city has a population of 105,000 and an unemployment rate of 3.3 percent (in contrast to the consortium's population of 200,000 and unemployment rate of 2.9 percent). Its youth unemployment rate is 10.3 percent compared with the consortium's rate of 11.3 percent. The reduction in size from consortium to the City of Durham has been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in total CETA allocations. The City of Durham has $2.6 million for fiscal 1979, only 54 percent of the fiscal 1978 consortium funding of $4.7 million.

Forty miles to the west of Durham lies Alamance County, 434 square miles and a largely agricultural-rural area whose major city is Burlington. Alamance County has a population of 101,000, of which 18,399 (18.1 percent) are minorities. Its unemployment rate is 5.1 percent, with a youth unemployment rate of about 14.7 percent. Whereas Durham remains a "tobacco" city, Alamance County's economy is securely bound up with the textile industry--textiles, trade and services comprise 61 percent of all employment there.

One hundred and fifty miles southwest, near the South Carolina border, is the City of Charlotte--the largest city in the Carolinas with a population of over 300,000. Charlotte covers 72 square miles and is the heart of a 12-county area called Metrolina, which is one of the major industrial regions in the Southeast. The city itself is a major commercial, transportation, and distribution center. Its unemployment rate has been dropping steadily since the recession of 1976 and is projected at 3.7 percent for fiscal 1979.

Charlotte's youth population (ages 14-21) is 40,414, of whom 14,798 (37 percent) are blacks or other minorities. Of these youth, the total number estimated in poverty (by OMB guidelines) is 4,421, of whom 3,183 (72 percent) are blacks or other minorities.

The balance of state operation in North Carolina administers 88 of the state's 100 counties, mainly the rural ones. In a state with a population of 5,469,000, a total of 3,329,353 live in the balance of state area. While unemployment is estimated at 5.8 percent in the state, it is 6.1 percent in the counties covered by the balance of state. Funding for CETA programs in the balance of state is $120 million.

These figures do not begin to suggest the magnitude and difficulties of a balance of state operation which attempts to monitor program operations in 88 counties with a central staff of seven. Despite apparent interest on the part of the governor of North Carolina, the balance of state prime sponsorship suffers from a remoteness between its funding source and its program operations which--if nothing else--makes it extremely difficult to get much of a feeling of how well programs are running in a study such as this one.

Ohio Area Study by Randall B. Ripley

Ohio's prime sponsors include Greene County, the City of Columbus/Franklin County Consortium, and Clark County.

Clark County's population is just about evenly split between that of the City of Springfield (80,000) and the remainder of the county, made up primarily of small towns and rural areas. The principal industries, primarily located in Springfield, include: transportation equipment, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, fabricated metals, and primary metals. There is also considerable agriculture in the county, especially cattle and hogs.

In 1970, seven percent of the county's families were below the poverty level and four percent were on welfare. Per-capita income in 1972 was just over $3,600. The civilian labor force in December 1978 was almost 71,000. Average monthly unemployment in 1978 was 5.3 percent, just below the Ohio average of 5.4 percent. Prime sponsor staff estimate that the youth unemployment rate is more than three times that of the overall rate, or 16 percent or more.

CETA in general seems to be well accepted in the community, even though it is traditionally a conservative area. A scandal that broke about three years ago in which a minor CETA employee was convicted of embezzling in order to play the ponies seems to have been forgotten. In general, the local media give limited, but favorable coverage to CETA.

Close to two-thirds of the population of Franklin County live in the City of Columbus (with a population of about 550,000). Most of the remainder reside in suburbs; only 14 percent live in the county's unincorporated areas. There is notable diversification of employment in the county; no single industry or employer dominates. As a result, there is a good mix of jobs and employer types, although white collar work in finance, education, and government, and jobs in light industry are the most numerous. Unemployment has been traditionally low relative to state and U.S. averages. In 1978, the average monthly unemployment rate was 4.7 percent. The civilian labor force in December 1978, was just short of 435,000. Per capita income in 1972 was close to $4,000 and, in 1970, seven percent of the county's families were below the poverty level and five percent on welfare.

The health of the local economy needs to be stressed. The prime sponsorship was not faced with crippling unemployment rates, factory relocations, or similar problems. Indeed, the reverse was true; in the 1970s the county was a growth area--its popoulation increased, the percent of families in poverty decreased, and in December 1978, the county's unemployment rate declined to 4 percent. The unemployment rate for all youth was 7.5 percent; the corresponding figure for black youth was 12.9 percent.

The prime sponsorship is a consortium of the City of Columbus and Franklin County (CFC). The county has no active role--it delegates all responsibility to the city. The Department of Community Services (DCS) Director is the Director of CETA as well as all other city social services programs. The DCS CETA staff are responsible for both administration and program operation.

The morale of DCS CETA staff is incredibly low, primarily because of years of poor communication and limited delegation of decisionmaking authority from the Director's office to other staff units. Other staff problems include poor communication among staff units, low trust among staff, poor coordination among staff units responsible for shared program operation or administration, lack of leadership from the Director's office, and lack of forward planning and thinking. Operations and administration are typically dominated by dealing with daily crises.

CETA is reasonably well treated locally in terms of press coverage, proportion of PSE slots in city and county government employment, and proportion of CETA dollars among all local budgets. The CFC program has a reputation for being "clean" and it manages to stay clear of visible controversy (partially by avoiding change).

About a quarter of the Greene County population lives in Fairborn and another fifth lives in Xenia. These two towns have populations in the 25,000-35,000 range; most of the rest of the population lives in unincorporated rural or semi-rural areas. Over 45 percent of the workforce commutes to other counties for jobs. The major local employer is an air base. There is some light manufacturing and considerable agriculture, especially hogs.

Five percent of the families in the county were below the poverty level in 1970 and only one percent was on welfare. Per-capita income in 1972 was just over $4,000. The civilian labor force in December 1978, numbered almost 61,000. The average monthly unemployment rate in 1978 was 4.6 percent.

Prime sponsor staff estimate that about 1 percent of the population is Hispanic, 8,500 people are CETA-eligible, and youth unemployment is running about double adult unemployment at 8 percent.

Oregon-Washington Area Study by Bonnie Snedeker

Four prime sponsors were selected for the Oregon-Washington case study: Oregon Balance of State, Lane County, Oregon; the City of Portland, Oregon; and Kitsap County, Washington.

Oregon Balance of State is comprised of 27 counties, grouped into 11 administrative districts, with a land area of about 86,500 miles. Population is estimated at 739,000, with the largest city, Corvallis, registering a population of over 25,000. The relatively sparse Balance of Oregon population is largely white. The largest minority group, Hispanics, accounts for less than 1.2 percent of the total labor force. Less than 0.5 percent of the labor force is black, and other minorities--mainly Indians and Orientals--comprise about 1.3 percent of the labor force. Approximately 8 percent of the adult population's income level is below OMB poverty guidelines, and about one out of every 10 Balance of Oregon families is thought to be living below the poverty level. Unemployment has been decreasing over the past three years; the unemployment rate for fiscal 1978 was estimated to be 9.1 percent in the Balance of State. Unemployment is not computed separately for youth; but if past trends hold true, over 9,000 youths (under 22) are probably unemployed in the prime sponsor area.

Oregon's economic trends have tended to follow U.S. patterns. While still chiefly a rural producer of primary economic commodities (on which other wealth producing and consumer activities depend), BOS Oregon is becoming a more population dependent economic area. Since Oregon's economic outlook is closely tied to nationally influenced variables, such as federal energy policy and demand in the housing industry, as well as to natural variables like weather, it is difficult to make accurate industrial/occupational projections. Expansion of the lumber industry and tourist related activities during the past three years has had a favorable impact on the economy.

The administration of BOS CETA programs is the responsibility of the Manpower Planning Division of the State Executive Department, but major program planning and management functions have been decentralized through direct contracts to consortia of county governments or other agencies capable of delivering full CETA services to local geographic areas. CETA funds are allocated to 11 BOS subgrantees on a formula basis.

Lane County, located in central Oregon, covers a diversified geographic area, including 11 incorporated cities and a number of unincorporated suburban and rural areas. Lane County has approximately 250,000 residents, who comprise about 10 percent of Oregon's population. The majority of the County's largely white population is concentrated in the Eugene-Springfield metropolitan area. Rapid local growth rates and an urban/rural population mix make the planning of employment related services a challenge for the Lane County prime sponsor.

Lane County's growing population tends to be young. Over half the growth rate during the past ten years is attributable to new immigration, and these immigrants tend to be between the ages of 18 and 24. The influx is due, in part, to the presence of the University of Oregon and Lane Community College. Youth make up a estimated 17 percent of the population. About 16 percent of Lane County youths (14 to 21 years), or just over 5,000, are thought to be living in households with incomes below the poverty level. Over half these young people are not living with their families.

Unemployment in Lane County has historically risen with increases in the labor force. Lane County's economy has been unable to generate enough jobs for its population. This is largely due to the area's rapid population growth, particularly in the early and peak employment age groups, and a high degree of dependence on one industry--lumber and wood products. Unemployment statistics are not available by age, but youth unemployment is clearly higher than overall unemployment.

Lane County was one of the first local jurisdictions to establish a comprehensive social services agency. CETA youth services were administered under this umbrella agency and were delivered separately from adult CETA services. Lane County evolved a social service oriented program model that focused on a high risk/out-of-school population. During fiscal 1978, Lane County reorganized its employment and training systems. Title III youth programs were consolidated organizationally with Title I under a new employment and training department.

Portland, Oregon's largest city, is located at the confluence of the Williamette and Columbia Rivers. The City of Portland is the major center of employment within a four-county SMSA. Most of the city lies within Multnomah County, but small portions of it extend into both Clackamas and Washington Counties. Portland has a population of 385,000 and the largest concentration of minorities in Oregon. Of a labor force of over 200,800, about 10,000 are black, 3,000 Hispanic, and 4,200 other minorities. The number of youth (14 to 21 years) estimated to be living in households with incomes below 85 percent of the lower living standard is 6,940. Nearly one-third of this population is comprised of non-white youth.

Employment data relevant to the City of Portland are compiled on a regular and frequent basis only for the broader SMSA. The fiscal 1977 unemployment rate was 9 percent; non-white unemployment was higher at about 13 percent. The current economic outlook for Portland is generally favorable. Based upon available job market projections, the following occupations were thought to provide the greatest opportunity for youth employment: (1) assembly, (2) medical careers, (3) clerical, (4) food service, and (5) retail sales/marketing.

In the years just prior to YEDPA enactment, Portland managed to develop and operate an effective and innovative youth program system. Under the City Human Resources Bureau, the Youth Services Division established a network of youth career training centers. These city operated centers provided comprehensive employment and training services for out-of-school youth--with a strong emphasis on career planning and vocational training. Central youth staff worked with a variety of educational agencies and other institutions to develop specialized career training projects. The city also maintained linkages with Portland Public Schools to provide part-time work experience for high school students. While the youth system has continued to operate during the first two years of YEDPA, its momentum and capacity have been somewhat eroded during a period of managerial neglect subsequent to reorganization. Administrative responsibility for adult and youth CETA services was consolidated under a new employment and training division in fiscal 1978. City priorities are heavily focused on economic development linked goals, and the previously established youth system has received little management support since reorganization.

Located in the Puget Sound region of Western Washington, Kitsap County is surrounded on three sides by salt water with a resulting 232 miles of shore line. Land access to the County is from the South, via Mason and Pierce Counties. Access from the Seattle SMSA is by water via the Washington State Ferries. This geographic semi-isolation results in Kitsap County's socioeconomic system being somewhat independent from the rest of the Puget Sound region. This independence is further supported by the heavy federal government employment, which constitutes the largest economic sector.

An estimated 116,000 people reside in Kitsap County and the population is growing rapidly. Bremerton is by far the largest incorporated city with a population of about 37,100, or 32 percent of the County's total. Approximately 44 percent of the County's labor demand and 57 percent of the major employers are located in or around the City of Bremerton. The much smaller cities of Port Orchard, Poulsbo, and Winslow (on Bainbridge Island) collectively account for about seven percent of the population and 19 percent of the major employers. Suburban and rural unincorporated areas account for 49 percent of the population and 24 percent of the major employers.

Kitsap's immediate economic outlook is good. Its fiscal 1978 unemployment rate of 6.5 percent was the lowest among the areas studied in the Northwest. Youth unemployment, however, was about 20 percent in fiscal 1978. An estimated 1,563 youths (16 to 21 years) are unemployed in Kitsap County. Kitsap's youth population is over 95 percent white, but non-whites are overrepresented in the unemployed and economically disadvantaged population. An estimated 1,901 youths (14 to 21 years) reside in households with incomes below the poverty level. The number of youths in households with incomes below 85 percent of the lower living standard is estimated to be 2,473.

Texas-New Mexico Area Study by Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.

The case study for the Southwestern region of the country examines experience in the City of Albuquerque and the encompassing County of Bernalillo, New Mexico; the Coastal Bend Area Manpower Consortium, Texas (administered by the City of Corpus Christi, Texas plus 12 additional counties most of which are very rural in character); and the City and County of El Paso, Texas. Although widely separated in their geographic location and significantly diverse in their industrial composition, the three prime sponsor areas share several key common characteristics. All have large minority group populations (mostly Hispanic); have large youth populations; are characterized generally as low wage labor markets; are largely non-union areas; and have serious poverty and unemployment problems. As wages are low and employment opportunities are limited for adult workers, adults and youths are in more direct competition in the local labor markets than is generally the case elsewhere in the nation. It is true, however, that the aggregate unemployment rate declined in all three labor markets during the first year of YEDPA's operation. Only in El Paso did the aggregate unemployment rate remain substantially higher than the national rate.

In each locality, there is one city that numerically dominates the service area. The City of Albuquerque accounts for approximately 77 percent of the population of Bernalillo County; the City of Corpus Christi accounts for approximately 85 percent of Nueces County; and 48 percent of the twelve county consortium; and the City of El Paso accounts for 94 percent of El Paso County.

The Albuquerque labor market is dominated by the government sector. Approximately 28 percent of the labor market is employed by various government agencies. Most government employees are federal--associated with various military installations and missle testing facilities as well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Aviation Agency. In addition, the University of New Mexico is located in the city. The private sector is composed largely of service industries with the manufacturing and construction industries being too small in numbers and small in operational size.

The Coastal Bend area of Texas contains one major city, Corpus Christi plus an additional twelve counties. Aside from Nueces County, which contains the City of Corpus Christi, the remaining counties are quite small in population (e.g., five had a population of fewer than 10,000 people in 1973). Five counties have lost population since 1970. The remainder have shown slight population increases due essentially to natural growth factors. The population of the area is increasing, but at a much lower rate than is that of the State of Texas. The local economy is geared heavily toward retail and wholesale industries (partly reflective of the fact that the City of Corpus Christi is a major seaport on the Gulf of Mexico). The trade sectors combine to account for 34 percent of all employment in the whole area. Personal services account for an additional 19 percent of employment. It is these low wage and labor intensive sectors that are sustaining the greatest employment growth and, based on the projected growth of tourism, will expand most rapidly in the future. Manufacturing, although accounting for 12 percent of total employment, is substantial only in Nueces County. Manufacturing is dominated by chemical and petroleum products. These enterprises tend to be highly capitalized operations which do not hold much prospect for employment expansion.

The El Paso labor market is heavily influenced by its location directly on the U.S.-Mexico border. Due to this factor, it is not surprising that the retail and wholesale trade sectors would dominate the local labor market. They account for approximately 23 percent of total employment. Manufacturing comprises a large part of the local economy (about 18 percent of total employment) but this aggregate figure masks the fact that the low wage textile industry accounts for half of all jobs in manufacturing. The government sector, as is the case all along the border, is a substantial provider of jobs with over 20 percent of all employed persons in this sector. Although the population of the city and county are among the most rapidly growing in the State of Texas, the local labor market has not been able to provide a commensurate number of jobs. The local labor market is in a state of considerable surplus. The presence of a substantial number of daily commuting workers and illegal aliens from Mexico in the workforce contributes immensely to the prevailing low wage structure and the shortage of jobs.

Thus, for different reasons, all three areas under study tend to be characterized as low wage labor markets. All are sustaining some measure of growth but all have serious employment and income problems. Each also has a population which has a very high proportion of minority group members and a high proportion of people (both adults and youths) in need of manpower services.

In addition to regular CETA programs, both Albuquerque and Coastal Bend have Skill Training Improvement Programs (STIP) and the Coastal Bend was the recipient of a substantial planning grant for the Employment Opportunity Program (i.e., a welfare reform demonstration program) that could provide an additional 3,200 public service employment jobs.

In each of the communities, the prime sponsors and CETA are highly visible. In Albuquerque, the present mayor is a former prime sponsor director. Due to high poverty levels more attention is given to CETA in these communities than is normally the case by both the media and local politicians. The actions of all three prime sponsors tend to be highly visible in their local areas.