The paper describes developmental theories pertaining to adults and considers the implications of these theories for political scientists. Specifically, the works of four developmental theorists are examined: Erik Erikson's theory of the eight ages of man, Daniel J. Levinson's developmental stages which characterize the life of the early and middle aged male adult, Jane Loevinger's concept of the ego as an organizing agent, and Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Common to these theorists is the concept of personality as dynamic rather than static in the adult years. For example, the theorists agree that the belief system changes more often than not during the post-adolescent life course; moral development, at least to the highest stages, takes place as a result of experiences in young adulthood; ego development makes its largest strides during adulthood and only as the result of an external stimulus; and feelings of self-esteem vary over the life course. Also, the focus of the Committee on Work and Personality in the Middle Years (Social Science Research Council) is outlined. Areas of study include intellectual functioning, sense of self, health and physical functioning, social networks and relationships, and work and retirement. Implications for political scientists are examined in terms of intervention approaches. Deliberate use of politically relevant stimuli may be successful in situations where a new mode of political thought is deemed desirable such as programs geared to adults in prison. The necessity to understand functional age (how well an individual performs physically, emotionally, and intellectually) as opposed to chronological age is emphasized. (Author/KC)
IS THERE LIFE AFTER ADOLESCENCE AND IF SO,
SHOULD POLITICAL SCIENTISTS CARE?

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Is There Life After Adolescence and If So Should Political Scientists Care?

Until recently it was practically a truism that human development stopped sometime soon after adolescence. The assumption was that all major change and growth - whether cognitive, social or emotional - took place before that time. Once individuals entered adulthood, they supposedly entered a time of relative stability. The middle years were largely ignored while old age, when it was studied at all, was considered more or less a disease one caught at some point, a disease quite disconnected from all that came before, and from which, of course, there was no recovery.

During the last ten years or so, this focus on the early years - even developmentalists had concentrated their attention on infancy, childhood and adolescence - has undergone something of a shift. Among psychologists there is an increasingly large and legitimate faction that proposes that individual growth and change is a life long phenomenon. Furthermore, adult development is seen as having three quite separate sources. First, it is the outgrowth and legacy of the earlier years. Middle adulthood, let us say, is only one era in a continual process; it grows out of what came before, and feeds into what comes after. Second, the middle and later years are now viewed as responding to new experiences and exposures. Heretofore, socialization was thought of as confined almost exclusively to childhood and adolescence. The newer research suggests that, in fact, the dramatic changes that increasingly occur during the later periods, have an impact. In a time when people are changing occupations, spouses, and locales all the time, the static image of what it is like to be fully adult must give way. And finally there is the increasing attention to change in our social, psychological, and biological performance. Even if left to live out our lives insulated from any outside influences, alterations insinuate themselves merely as the result of our advancing age.
The viewpoint of this paper, then, is obvious. In line with the fresher thinking on the subject, it supports the proposition that there is life after adolescence and that this life can be so different qualitatively from what came before, that to emphasize the early years at the expense of the later ones is a distortion. To put the point even more dramatically: adult experience and change can be the genesis of both personality dynamics and behavioral choices.

But what are the implications of this new focus on adult development? Should we as political scientists care? And if so, why? I would argue that at least those among us who concern ourselves with the dynamics of human behavior ought to be aware of change in adulthood on two quite separate levels. At the most basic, the life-course perspective illuminates the single life. To the extent that we focus our attentions from time to time on particular individuals in particular situations, this fresh slant must contribute. Heretofore, our "personality and politics" literature has been informed almost exclusively by the Freudian perspective; to study Woodrow Wilson, to take perhaps the most considered example, was to analyze his later life in terms of his earlier one (George, 1956). The point here, is not to denigrate the use of the Freudian perspective, but only to urge that we learn to supplement it with the more social-psychological orientation that typifies the study of the later life.

In my own study of Willy Brandt, to take the case with which I am the most familiar, it became clear after immersion into the details of his life, that some of his most outstanding characteristics as a political reader grew not out of what he had lived through as a child, but out of his young adulthood -- the ages 17 to 34 (Kellerman, passim).

On quite another level, the life-course perspective should also illuminate truths and possibilities about the body politic. It is the concept of, in Mance Olson's words, "the large, latent group" that I am addressing here, merely, at this point, to suggest that nations (of citizens) can experience growth, development and change just as individuals do, and that this raises
other questions that political scientists might do well to contemplate. What does it do to our traditional concept of political socialization — with its traditional agents of family and school. — if we admit to the possibility of equally powerful agents in adulthood? What about a whole political culture? Can it be altered as the result of what it has experienced en masse — especially if an effort is made to capitalize on that experience? (One would assume that any single culture-changing experience would have to be a mighty one such as a war, depression, revolution, etc.)

There are also more specific questions of public policy. Can it be that the new attention to life-span development has implications, or should have anyway, for policy areas such as health, housing, transportation, etc.? Can it be that straddling this new line between the psycho and the social, between the self and the society, suggests the possibility of new kinds of deliberately sought change? It is certainly true, that if it were the case that the awareness of adult development were taken into account by policy planners, it might be the very first instance in which there was a widespread practical affect resulting from the joint study of psychology and politics.

Political science already has, of course, a history of indebtedness to psychology. It was Harold Lasswell who initiated the interdisciplinary exchange. But it was also Lasswell who inadvertently saddled us with a Freudian legacy that we have been too slow to shuck. Now psychology is changing, moving away from its early monotheism to entertain the possibility of new gods (e.g. Piaget). And so it behooves us too to see what there is out there that we might use.

This paper is intended only to scratch a couple of surfaces. It is hoped that its primary audience will be political scientists who are not now actively involved in work on psychology and politics, but who feel a need to
be informed about what is going on in the new "in" domain of life span development. In that spirit it will review the work in this area of four major developmental theorists and also of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Life-Course Perspectives on Middle and Old Age. It will conclude with some thoughts on how all of this relates to the more traditional pieces of political science.

The Concept of Stages

The theorists are Erik Erikson, Daniel Levinson, James Loewinger and Lawrence Kohlberg. Since there are great differences between them, it is striking, but hardly an accident, that all four write of movement from one stage to the next. Each posits the existence of units of some sort that have their own integrity, in which or at which we rest at certain times in our lives, and from which we can in some cases, and must in others, move on. The trouble, or, depending on your point of view, fun, begins when we are reduced to defining these units more exactly, and also the rules by which we move from one to the next.

Erikson first wrote about the eight "ages" of man, and Levinson about "periods" and "eras". But the two have in common the fundamental point that each of these units marks a time during which specific developmental tasks arise. Each new unit is a new set of tasks. Each task is both internally and externally determined. And each must be met for the life to be successfully lived. Erikson speaks of "crises" that must be resolved; Levinson uses "task" to define the psychosocial hurdles that confront a man at various times in his life. Different crises and tasks characterize different stages, or periods, and there is the assumption that the satisfactory completion of early tasks improve the quality of the later life. The failure to meet the challenge of
one stage does not spare the challenge of the next, but the progression is cumulative, not hierarchical. In other words, later stages are, according to Erikson and Levinson, are not necessarily better, just later.

Loevinger and Kohlberg use the concept of stage more rigorously. They equate new stage with new-structure.* Following the cognitive-developmental work of Piaget, they assume that the progression from one stage to the next is defined by a qualitative change -- forward or upward. Such change is defined not by the content of thought, but rather by a wholly new way of looking at things, by the "form" or "organization" of the perspective. Kohlberg summarizes:

In addition to focusing upon quality, form, competence, a cognitive developmental stage concept has the following additional general characteristics:

1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in structures (modes of thinking), which still serve the same basic function (e.g. intelligence).
2. These different structures form an invariant sequence, order or succession in individual development.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a "structured whole." A given stage-response on a task represents an underlying thought-organization.
4. Stages are hierarchical integrations. Accordingly, higher stages displace (or rather reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages (Kohlberg, 1973, pp. 3, 4 of manuscript).

Clearly, the "stage-as-new-structure" (Loevinger, Kohlberg) concept differs from that of "stage-as-new-set-of-tasks" (Erikson, Levinson). To further clarify the distinctions, a few other comparisons. 1) On measurement (i.e., how do you know when a person is in what stage). The task theorists are vague here—although Levinson's tasks are more precisely age-linked. Conversely, the structuralists insist on precision in scoring and have labored for years to achieve it (See below). 2) On numbers of stages. Since Levinson's periods

*Each of Levinson's stages also has a new structure, a new "life structure." But his use of the term is peculiar to him. Usually psychologists use the word structure rigorously: to indicate a new organization along a scale which progresses hierarchically.
are correlated to age, we can count them exactly. Live a longer life, and you will pass through more periods. Erikson underemphasized (in terms of numbers of stages) the last 3⁄4 of the life span relative to the first 1⁄4. Five of his eight stages are in the first 20 years of life. Kohlberg both have a last highest stage which is more an ideal than anything else. The numbers of stages that precede it should, in theory, be precisely definable. But the debate over what is a level, a stage, a transition, goes on. 3) On overlapping stages. This gets us into the question of how transitions are defined, and what is the mechanism of change. At this point, it need only be said, that the transitions between stages are not clear in any of the four cases—nor, in fact, is the definition of a transition clear. 4) On regression to a previous stage. A structural developmentalist would claim that even a single case of regression would disprove the universality that is implicit in his theory. Erikson and Levinson do not even discuss regression. They consider it quite possible to be stuck at the wrong stage at the wrong time, but it is not possible to slip back. 5) On universality. All four claim that their theory is valid cross culturally. 6) On behavior. All four see a broad range of behavior as dependent on stage—although they differ on specifics.

For all their differences, the two approaches to stage are, in fact, compatible (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 47 of manuscript). Indeed, the four theorists are addressing questions that are enough different, so that they can all happily coexist. It is, in any case, the shared finding that is crucial: Changes take place during adulthood. These changes have a psychosocial origin.

More on that in the developmental theme heard in the four voices below.

Erikson

Erikson's person and work have spilled into the popular culture. His psychohistories of "young man" Luther and (middle-aged) Gandhi have upawed a genre and his scheme on the "eight ages" of man (from the cradle to the grave)
wan niven the ultimate accolade: it was animated for network television.

Although not usually linked, for our purposes it is useful to consider the psychohistory and "eight ages" contributions in tandem. The eight stages reflect the Freudian influence due, no doubt, to Erikson's own psychoanalytic training. That is, the first five stages cover infancy, childhood, and adolescence, and only the last three are concerned with adulthood (Erikson, 1950, pp. 247-274).

The innovation was in Erikson's proposition that there are crises unique to the adult years, and that the way in which these are resolved will define the quality of the adult life. Of particular interest to political scientists is the fact that Erikson's psychohistories stress the interrelationship between environment and personality in the creation of a leader. He goes so far as to suggest that unless the needs of the leader and the society in which he is to play out his role complement one another, the playing out of that adult leadership role will be impossible.

"Young adulthood," the first of three stages in the adult span, is marked by the crisis of intimacy vs. isolation. "Adulthood" contains the struggle of generativity vs. stagnation. And the battle of "old age" is between integrity and despair. (Erikson's age linkages are left for the reader to fathom. Roughly, "young adulthood" is from 20-40; "adulthood" is from 40-60; and "old age" is the time left after that.) But what precisely does Erikson mean by the word "crisis"? What does he imply when he pits the supposedly preferred state directly against its abhorred opposite? Although he is careful to say that crisis, as he uses the term, should not denote threat of catastrophe but rather a turning point, "a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential" (Erikson, 1968, p.96), he does allude to a "healthy" personality.

Indeed, he goes on to define one. At the least, the healthy person has an integrated sense of self, masters the environment, and perceives the world and
and self correctly. Erikson provides a model, then, or if you will, a series of eight, which, if not lived through well, will result in an "unhealthy," or unfulfilled personality. Thus, despite the disclaimer, each of the stages is a crisis in the sense that if left unresolved (i.e. no reasonable balance between the polar opposites is achieved), the personality will be unable to develop according to "predetermined steps."

Perhaps the crucial point concerns the interaction between the self and the environment. A crisis occurs, in fact, when the changing self encounters others. The inner laws of development "create a succession of potentialities for significant interaction with those persons who tend and respond (to the child) and those institutions which are ready for him" (Erikson, 1963, p. 93). The pattern does not alter in adulthood: throughout life, personality grows as the result of the quality of the interplay between the self and the "widening radius of significant individuals and institutions."

Let us look for a moment at each of the three adult stages. The crisis of intimacy vs. isolation, which marks "young adulthood," is one in which we do, or do not, learn to relate to significant others. Erikson speaks here of our capacity to love. This includes sexual intimacy, but it also implies a commitment that is characterized by a durable, morally aware attention. The counterpart of intimacy is distanciation, "the readiness to isolate and, if necessary, to destroy those... whose essence seems dangerous to one's own..." (Erikson, 1950, p. 264). The manifestation of distanciation is isolation, a state in which sharing is shunned.

Generativity vs. stagnation, the crisis of "adulthood," links the psycho to the social through the medium of the next generation. Erikson speaks of the need to establish a concern for the young, the still-to-be-taught, in order to avoid the stagnation that inevitably descends on the self-centered. To be generative, we need not ourselves reproduce. But there must be, Erikson claims, some kind of
devoted attention to those who come after. (Generativity is tied to "productivity" and "creativity." But while the last two can be incorporated by the first, they cannot replace it).

The crisis of "old age," integrity vs. despair, is more elusive. This eighth and final stage, really the precursor of death, is seen to be the sum and even substance of the seven earlier parts. As such, it is the culmination of the accrued interaction between the self and the outside world. More generally than specifically, more implicitly than explicitly, Erikson makes the point:

Integrity is the ego's accrued assurance of its proclivity for order and meaning—an emotional integration...It is the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle...and an acceptance of the fact that one’s life is one’s own responsibility. It is a sense of comradeship with men and women of distant times and of different pursuits who have created orders and objects and sayings conveying human dignity and love...(Erikson, 1968 p. 139 ff).

Erikson's words are eloquent testimony to the independent spirit of man—but the independence is clearly forged from a participation in the past, present and future world of others. And if old age is a time to be more quiet, a time for integrating and coming to terms with one's own history, the success of this assembling, indeed the joy in it, depends finally on the resolutions of earlier crises. This view from the finish line is clearly contingent on the quality of psychosocial development that has taken place along the way.

Levinson

Like Erikson, Levinson is biographical in his approach. But Levinson has drawn his own attention to the differences between his periods and Erikson's stages.

We regard adult development as the evolution of the life structure; our developmental periods are successive phases in the process of building, modifying and rebuilding that structure. Erikson's mode of analysis, too, is concerned with the interconnectedness of self and world. He regards development, however, as a series of stages in ego development....Erikson's ego stages refer to the self as it is engaged with the world, but their primary focus is within the person.... Our approach makes use of Erikson's, but it shifts the focus somewhat. The concept of the life structure is centered more directly on the boundary between self and world. It gives equal consideration to self and world as aspects of the lived life. (Levinson, et al., early draft of The Seasons of a Man's Life)
There are, of course, important similarities between the two schemes. But we are concerned here with the central difference: Levinson's shift away from Freud and the early years, and toward a theory of life-span development that stresses equal importance on the internal self and the external world. This altered focus results in a new theory of adult male development. It speaks of a life cycle which, from birth to old age, unfolds according to a universal pattern.

Levinson's theory grew out of a study of 40 men. He proposes that: (1) the adult life is composed of eras of about twenty years each, and (2) within these eras there are developmental periods that are specifically age linked.

The developmental period is based on the assumption that a man's life structure changes and moves through a predetermined sequence of stages. Levinson considers the concept of the life structure "pivotal," and refers to it as the "underlying pattern or design of a person's life at a given time." (Levinson, 1978, p. 41). The structure has several components, occupation and marriage and family are the most important. Any major changes in these imply a major change in the overall life.

Three characteristics of the developmental periods indicate why Levinson sees them as constituting a "basic source of order in the life cycle." First, the periods are said to be universal. Although careful to note that variations in how the periods are lived through are "infinite," Levinson hypothesizes that, since "the eras and periods are grounded in the nature of man as a biological, psychological and social organism" (p. 322), the differences are variations within a basic pattern. Second, the periods are age-linked. This chronology is not vague, as is Erikson's. Levinson's periods are quite precisely defined. And third, the periods occur in a fixed sequence. Men proceed in the prescribed order through all the developmental periods that their life span supports. They cannot continue to develop normally unless the tasks of each period are at least fractionally fulfilled.
Levinson asserts that the "primary task of every stable period is to build a life structure . . . and of every transitional period to question and reappraise the existing structure. . . ." If we glance back at the elements of life structure, we see that the task is, at least during stable periods, to fashion a day-to-day existence that allows the self to interact comfortably and even creatively with the world in which it functions. Levinson's tasks are mundane, concrete. In fact, the stuff of the "life structure" and the developmental period is nothing more elegant than what fills our daily life.

According to Levinson, the following developmental periods characterize the life of the early and middle male adult.

The Early Adult Transition begins at age 17 and ends at 22. The task is twofold: to move out of the pre-adult world, and to start moving into the adult world. The period ends when the adult world encroaches more definitively. Entering the Adult World extends from about 22 to 28. The primary task is to "fashion and test out a provisional structure that provides a workable link between the valued self and the adult society" (Levinson, p. 57). It is a time to experience and test initial choices in the personal and professional realms, just as the next period, the Age Thirty Transition (age 28-33), is the time to reevaluate those early selections. To the extent that these were flawed, this transitional period allows space for adjustment and change.

Settling Down begins at about age 33 and ends at 40. It is the culmination of early adulthood and is, therefore, primarily concerned with the tasks of establishing a "niche" in the society, and "making it." The Mid-Life Transition (40-45) provokes in the large majority of men (about 50% of the subjects), a "moderate or severe crisis." The past is under intense scrutiny; some change is inevitable. The study ends with Entering Middle Adulthood (40-45).
The central task of this period is to form the life structure appropriate for the remainder of middle adulthood.

Levinson claims that the cycle of alternating stable and transitional periods continues into late adulthood. Each period is independent in that it has its own characteristics within its own time frame. They are interdependent, however, in that the quality of changes made now reflects the quality of changes made earlier. Interdependent too, are the self and the world. Development is stimulated socially, and it is reflected back on the society. Levinson pays a most singular attention to this "interpenetration." It is, in fact, at the core of the whole.

Loewinger

Loewinger's domain is ego development. Her conception of the ego, by her own testimony, differs from that of others. She sees "the striving to master, to integrate, to make sense of experience," as the primary function of the ego, as its essence. This synthetic function of the ego "is not just another thing the ego does, it is what the ego is" (Loewinger, 1976, p. 5). Her emphasis on the ego as organizing agent is in tandem with the developmental perspective: each time the ego masters more, integrates more fully, it does so according to the model of structural-development. To repeat, this model focuses not on the context of change, but on the structures and patterns that define it. The organizing agent or ego, therefore, must change according to the laws which constitutes structural developmental theory.

What precisely is meant by "structural"? First, the term suggests that the whole is composed of different parts, and second that these parts are
not randomly aligned, but rather that they are interrelated in a particular order. A structural change will occur if the relationship among the interdependent components itself changes. "Development" implies that the change just-referred to is not "merely" change, but, in an irreversibly way, progress. Loevinger does not herself make this explicit; she does not make claims of betterness for later stages. But if we examine Loevinger's ten stages, and remember the earlier admonition that stages are hierarchal integrations (i.e. new structures at higher stages displace those at the lower stages), it becomes clear that movement is not horizontal but vertical—upward. A normative element is thus inherent in the developmental scheme. At the highest stages, we are provided with no less than a vision of what the adult should be—should in terms of social value and should in terms of personal contentment.

The first five stages of Loevinger's model of ego development refer to the child. Much more importantly for our discussion, it is the sixth stage that is thought to be "the model level for adults in our society."4 Forty percent of the model, therefore, deals with stages that most adults do not achieve. Loevinger states:

A fully realized contemporary conception of ego development has the following four characteristics: firstly, stages are potentially fixating points and hence define types of children and adults. Secondly, the stage conception is structural; that is, there is an inner logic to the stages and to their progression. Thirdly, there are no specific tests, experiments or research techniques that become the instruments for advancing knowledge in the domain. Fourthly, the conception is applicable to all ages. (Loevinger, 1976, p. 11)

We have dealt with the second point. The third point is discussed in some further detail below. It is points one and four that concern us now.

The first provides those of us who study adults in a social scientific context with a new and important way of looking at people. The fourth asserts
with deceptive simplicity the validity of the stage concept of ego development for all ages: movement from stage to higher stage is theoretically possible at any moment in the life.

Thus, the essentials of adult development: (1) the assertion that adults can be categorized according to the particular stage they use in and that this classification will, per se, divulge broad information; and (2) the claim that change -- here in the underlying structure of the ego--is possible. (This second point fosters the debate on whether the institutions of the society can and should try to stimulate that change.)

Before proceeding to examine what might trigger ego development, a brief description of Loevinger's chart of ego levels (she refers to the different stages as "milestones") with an exclusive attention to the five adult stages.

The **Conscientious-Conformist Level** (stage) referred to above as "probably the modal level for adults in our society", is differentiated from the preceding stage by an increase in self-awareness and the appreciation of multiple options in open situations. "Interpersonal style" is typified by a fresh perception of self-in relation to the group, cooperation with the group, and a new effort at adjustment. The **Conscientious Stage** is the first that contains the elements of an adult conscience. These include "long-term, self-evaluated goals and ideals, differentiated self-criticism, and a sense of responsibility" (Loevinger, 1976, p. 22). The person at this stage understands that emotional dependence does not need to undercut the hard won sense of identity, a discovery that is
dependent on but not identical to an increased ability to tolerate concrete and conceptual complexity. Loevinger's next stage is labelled the Autonomous Stage. It is most efficiently seen as a refinement of the Individualistic Level, in particular an increased ability to "see reality as complex and multifaceted." Autonomy is cherished and recognized as a legitimate need in others. Its attraction is counterbalanced, however, by an acute awareness of its limitations, the recognition, again, of the need for emotional interdependence. The highest stage of the paradigm is the Integrated Stage. Careful to note that description of this stage is difficult because it is so rarely found, Loevinger portrays it as a transcendence of the Autonomous Stage. Incorporating the characteristics of the earlier stage, the Integrated individual will have formed a sense of identity, and worked at reconciling the conflicts perceived earlier into a renunciation of the unattainable. This individual is perhaps most effectively viewed as an abstraction, the imagined personification of what the process of ego development would lead to if it had a finite end.

It is clear from this structural-developmental scheme that change in stage of ego development in adulthood is possible. But how likely is it? According to Loevinger, not very. She does not directly address the issue of which stimuli would instigate developmental change, and under which conditions. She does, however, note the tendency of the ego to stabilize at a particular level, and infers, thereby a resistance to change.

The ego tends to remain stable, Loevinger claims, "because the operations by which the person perceives his environment effectively admit only those data that can be comprehended already, hence are compatible with current ego structure" (Loevinger, 1976, p. 310). The suggestion is that, only under the circumstance of "mental turmoil," is change (i.e. progress) likely to occur. An alternative scenario in which ego development may be a continuous process
based on accumulated smaller changes is also suggested. But the fact that the "vast majority of the population stabilises at some stage far below the maximum compatible with their intellectual and other development" (Loevinger, 1976, p. 311), suggests that the system maintaining forces are strong indeed.

Loevinger does, though, proffer the "pacer." The pacer is a teaser: it is any stimulus from the environment that tempts the ego to change by exposing attributes of higher levels without intimidating the person (ego) still at the lower level. Implicit in this notion is the assumption that under optimal conditions, persons will opt for change to higher levels. These conditions include having models of higher levels made available, and understanding that the disequilibrium induced by the now attractive shift will not be too costly.

The pacer, of course, emanates from outside the self. Thus, structural-developmental change of ego level must be externally induced. Small wonder that Loevinger draws a parallel between her conception of ego development and Erikson's of psychosexual development (Loevinger, 1976, pp. 3, 4). Once again, the self, the adult self and the world, have a reciprocal interaction.

Kohlberg

Kohlberg, much more than the others, has played an active role in exploring how adult development theory might be put to practical use. His decision to venture into the "real" world armed only with theory had to be based on three fundamental assumptions: first, that developmental stages—here stages of moral development—in adulthood exist; second, that a person can be stimulated to move from one stage to the next and third, that these changes can be seen in moral reasoning, and probably also in moral behavior.

The idea that structural change can occur in adults is new not only generally, but also to Kohlberg. His early inquiries into moral development
were based on the cognitive structural model of Piaget and were focused, there-
But now Kohlberg postulates that the highest stages of moral development are *typically not reached until the late twenties or later* (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 20 of manuscript). In one interview he was quoted as saying that "People's moral awareness can continue to change well into their thirties." Thus, the adult no less than the child is subject to experiences that might precipitate structural development according to the rigorous definition of stage change given above.

Kohlberg's conclusions are carefully confined to the area of moral development. (This ostensibly limited domain reflects his own preoccupation with morality as a philosophical concept - Kohlberg, 1971.) He used his subjects' resolutions of hypothetical moral dilemmas to define six stages subsumed under three levels. Most adults are to be found in the middle range, at the "conventional level." Here, I will list the three levels and six stages but will include descriptions only of the levels.

I. Preconventional level. The child is responsible to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. Stage 1--the punishment and obedience, orientation and Stage 2--the instrumental re-
orientation.

II. Conventional level. Maintaining the expectations of the individual family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate or obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining.
supporting, and justifying the other, and of identifying with the persons or groups involved in it. Stage 3—the interpersonal concordance of "good boy-nice girl" orientation and Stage 4—the "law and order orientation.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level. There is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. Stage 5—the social-contract legalistic orientation and Stage 6—the universal ethical principle orientation. (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 16 or Bank and McCarl, 1976, pp. 887, 888).

The most controversial section of the above scheme is the postconventional level. For it is only when the fifth stage of moral development is reached, that the possibility of self-conscious moral philosophy is allowed. Thus, ethical resolutions to mankind's most basic sociopolitical problem, if they are to appear at all, will have to come from those who are developmentally capable of formulating them—from the select (elite) group that has moved beyond the conventional level.

The level of development depends on the degree to which the social role is assumed. This, in turn, depends on the ability to take on the role of others. "A universalizable decision is a decision acceptable to any man involved in the situation who must play one of the roles affected by the decision, but does not know which role he will play" (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 2,3). Thus, moral development is dependent on both subjective and objective factors.
The individual must be able to hear, as it were, cues from the environment. But by the same token, no matter how primed individuals are to hear, if they lack something to listen to (a stimulus emanating from a propitious environment), they cannot move (progress) from one stage to the next.

Kohlberg concludes that there are two sorts of experiences important in the movement to principled thought. In our culture, both of these tend to occur only after high school. The first involves leaving the family. The new setting, typically, in his sample, a college community, will expose people to a new spectrum of values while, at the same time, demanding that they evolve a firmer commitment. Kohlberg stresses the importance of the college experience by noting that none of his subjects who did not attend college, but went directly into the army and/or to adult occupations, developed principled thinking (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 37 of manuscript). The second experience that may lead to principled thinking occurs when the individual is exposed to the demand that he undertake a sustained responsibility for the welfare of others, or that he make an irreversible moral choice (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 39 of manuscript). In short, Kohlberg suggests that movement from conventional to principled thought needs to come from both the experience of moral choice and the impetus to moral reflection. Only adults are likely to have experienced this mix.

The Evidence and the Critics

Erikson, Levinson, Loevinger and Kohlberg have been presented in their "pure" state, that is, as they presented themselves. But because of the nature of their evidence, they are easy prey. Consider their data and some of the criticisms.

Erikson's theory on the eight ages of man is based on a soft mix of hard evidence. The underlying construct is psychoanalytic theory. Plugged
in are the materials Erikson accrued as a clinician. But he took on other roles as well. There is Erikson the physician (his stepfather, with whom he has a "strong identification," was a pediatrician), and the resulting evidence on biophysical maturation and function. There is also Erikson the anthropologist, the student of other cultures, and from this guise stems the references to various tribes, religions, and social patterns. In short, it is a tribute to Erikson's brilliance that he was able to command such a wide and respectful attention with so few credentials*, and such random data. It suggests that his genius is more intuitive than scientific—a point to which I shall return below.

The psychohistories can be more closely monitored. The central theme of the "identity crisis" in Young Man Luther is the more credible because Erikson tells us that he spent five years studying "emotional disturbances of people in their late teens and early twenties." In addition, there is ample evidence of his submersion in the history of Luther and the problems of faith and politics in sixteenth century Germany. Similarly, Gandhi's Truth reflects an intimate knowledge of the life of the man, and of the country, history, and culture that spawned him. Plunging into the specifics of two lives, Erikson did his homework. Indeed, without his firm control of the hard data, the forging of what some consider a wholly new enterprise—psychohistory—would have been impossible.

Levinson based his theory of adult male development on materials derived from "biographical interviews" with forty men. No doubt to deflect skeptics

*Erikson began to study psychoanalysis with Anna Freud and Heinz Hartmann in Vienna during the late 1920's and early 1930's. He had had no medical training or advanced degree of any kind.
who are bound to question the universal applicability of a theory derived from such a small sample that is also culture bound (all subjects were Americans born between 1923 and 1930), Levinson takes great care to delineate the methodology and how it evolved. He explains the decision to limit the study to the forty who were then all between 35 and 45 years old, and equally distributed among four occupations: hourly workers in industry, business executives, university biologists, and novelists. (The sample was diverse in social class, racial-ethnic-religious origins, and education.) The interviews, which stretched anywhere from a total of 10 to 20 hours, were designed to "construct the story of a man's life." Levinson describes the biographical interview as having the qualities of "a research interview, a clinical interview, and a conversation between friends." The result: "a systematic reconstruction" of 40 life histories from adolescence to middle adulthood. He claims support for his theory from two other sources: a "secondary sample of men whose lives have been depicted in biography or imagined in fiction, poetry and theater," and also documents from ancient Hebrew, Chinese, and Greek civilizations. Although all of these last materials are touched on only very superficially, they do lend credence to Levinson's central claim that there is a basic life cycle, and that although individuals proceed through it in infinitely varied ways, the cycle itself is always the same.

At some point, though, one would hope that Levinson will address the following question: If a man does not attend to the tasks of each of the periods as outlined in The Seasons of a Man's Life, what happens? Does he become mentally (or even physically) ill? Or is he less successful, or weaker, or more unhappy than the next man? To what extent, in short, does omission or uneveness imply disaster?
Loevinger offers a disclaimer at the outset: she is no clinician and her research has been almost "entirely a paper and pencil exchange with my subjects."

But before we can attack, she marshals the support:

The empirical support for the conception of ego development presented is that it represents a common thread in the work of many authors: psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, philosophers, psychologists and others...Their experience is not limited to one country or even to one century...Nothing any of us can do by way of laboratory of psychometric research can compare with what emerges from the communality of their observations... (Loevinger, 1976, p. x)

Loevinger's main assumptions grow out of her synthesis of observations by others. Nonetheless, in creating her own hierarchy, she is compelled to deal with measurement. (Loevinger, 1976, pp. 203-240). Here, there is space only to say that she seems most satisfied by scoring based on both quantitative and qualitative techniques. But once, again, she hastens to offer a caveat: none of the tests are "as convincing as the underlying construct."

Basically, Loevinger deflects skeptics by inserting her own doubts about just how far the purely scientific method can take us, and about a scoring system that is less than hard science. But there are even more fundamental questions about her structural-developmental approach to ego development (Hauser, 1976, p. 952)—for example, what exactly are the criteria for the presumed superiority of the highest stages?

Kohlberg, aware of the detractors, comes forearmed. His roots are in philosophy, his professional life is in psychology. He understands the clamor for methodological precision. The earliest charge was that what he, Kohlberg, considered "moral," was merely thought or behavior "congenial to his predilections" (Alston quoted in Kohlberg, 1971, p. 153). But Kohlberg countered that his concept of moralities came from both the "Piagetian psychological traditions and from traditional ethical analysis." He had spent over 15 years culling data from several different cultures (U.S., Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey), and he had a conclusion:
"The same basic ways of moral valuing are found in every culture and develop in the same order." (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 174) Again, we are obliged to fly over the problem of measurement. But Kohlberg does not. In fact, the moral judgment interview and the procedures for scoring are the focus of a large publication (note 15). It would be fair to say of Kohlberg that early in his professional life he hatched his ungainly but formidable egg, and later on he sought to modify it, revise it, and refine it.

Only Erikson and Kohlberg have been around long enough to draw much ire in print. Erikson has been more voraciously criticized for what he did not do, than for what he did. What he did not do—item: he did not uncover a way to integrate the intrapsychic and social levels of analysis. Item: he did not offer a way to verify his theories. Item: he did not strive to achieve precision in his terminology. Item: he did not strive to achieve precision in his concept. Item: he did not undertake to prove adequately the universal claim for his psychological model of eight stages (Fitzpatrick, 1976, pp. 16-27).

The criticisms of Erikson all tend to be under the same umbrella: his labor is too impressionistic, too intuitive. It lacks the rigor of real science. This supposed flaw is particularly offensive to social scientists who would wish to use Erikson and know that they could depend on him to deflect attacks on themselves. Alas, he offers no easy truths. Perhaps it is useful to remember him as one who, in his first incarnation, was an artist. Very simply, Erikson has produced a body of work in which science has never managed to fully displace art. Side by side, sometimes to the discomfort of social scientists, they coexist.
Kohlberg has faced two important charges. First, there is the claim that what he asserted was moral was nothing much more than reasoning or behavior in accordance with his own particular preferences. Second, there was the charge that his theory is based on faulty conceptualization and methodology. Kurtines and Grief make the second argument:

A systemic review of the published research literature suggests that there are several conceptual and methodological problems with the approach. The problems include the derivation, administration, and scoring of the model's primary measuring device, the lack of evidence for both the reliability and validity of that device and the absence of direct evidence for the basic assumptions of the theory (1974, p. 453).

Kohlberg rebuts the first argument by referring to the sources for his notions of moral categories (see above), and also to the cross cultural nature of his data. The second criticism has been attended to by that massive effort to develop an explainable, teachable, replicable, and reliable scoring system. Now, people from all over the world send protocols to the Harvard Center for Moral Education to have them scored. The Center also offers training in learning the scoring technique, and a manual on scoring is available for the asking (and paying). Of course, there are detractors of even this newly rigorous scoring system. Still, Kohlberg has listened to his critics.

The Work of the Social Science Research Council

Fertile minds working more or less alone are not the only source for those who would maintain that there is life after adolescence. Indeed, no less an establishment organization than the Social Science Research Council has, for some years now, invested resources in the proposition that to study the middle and later years is both a fruitful end in itself, and may well also have considerable policy implications. The Council formed the Committee on Work and Personality in the Middle Years, and most recently put together a new Committee on Life-Course Perspective on Middle and Old Age.
this is an organisation that cannot be said to act hastily, consider their reasons for this continuing exploration into development in adulthood.

The Council was motivated by the last decade in which "various new social patterns and policy issues have shaken the rather static prevailing image of the later years." It points to the increasing numbers of people who are changing occupations, divorcing, retiring early or extending employment beyond normal retirement age as evidence that social and psychological changes in adulthood may be much more common than heretofore thought. Defining "middle age" as roughly the stage between the chronological ages of 40 and 65, and "old age" as 65 and above, it proceeds to postulate that these areas can be most fruitfully pursued from a life course perspective.

The central premises of this perspective are that (1) developmental change and aging form a continual process not limited to any particular stage of life, (2) change occurs in various interrelated social, psychological, and biological domains of human behavior and functioning, and that (3) life-course development is multidetermined. Thus, according to this viewpoint, to understand a particular stage of life including middle and old age - it is necessary to place it within the context of the preceding and following developmental changes and stabilities and within its historical context (Abeles and Riley, p. 3).

The Committee on Life-Course Perspectives on Middle and Old Age plans to do its work through an interdisciplinary approach, ("Many of the characteristics of later life could become more understandable to the extent that artificial disciplinary barriers are overcome through the life-course approach,) and a cohort analysis approach ("Cohorts born recently differ from earlier cohorts in education, in nutrition, in exposure to potentially harmful food additives, in the income level at which they began their careers, and in the political Zeitgeist surrounding their first voting experience.") It intends to focus particularly on the following substantive areas: Intellectual functioning. The effort will be to determine more precisely how different dimensions
of intelligence vary in how they respond to the aging process. Furthermore the Committee will foster exploration of the conditions under which intellectual functioning stabilizes or even improves with increasing age. Sense of Self. New evidence suggests that a single static dimension such as "self-esteem" cannot do justice to the complex ways in which people come to see themselves as their lives unfold. Our life experiences, in particular our successes and failures in work and love, must mediate our sense of self, and this, in turn, will affect the experiences still to follow. Health and Physical Functioning. The decision to explore this area is based on the simple assumption that, to a degree, the disability experienced in middle and old age will depend on the quality of the earlier life course. Social Networks and relationships. As we go through life, there are changes in the size, composition, and functions of the social networks within which we function. The quality of these networks, particularly the extent to which they lend us social support, has much to do with our objective and subjective well-being. The question is how to grow older and still maintain a large network in which we also continue to play a contributory role. Work and Retirement. How does our earlier life affect the changes we make in middle age - sometimes to another career, sometimes to an early retirement? What of women who now more than ever are shifting throughout their lives between work and family? And how do economic fluctuations over the life course affect our lives in middle and old age?

Not everything that interests the Committee on Life-Course Perspective on Middle and Old Age will interest political scientists. But most of it should. As if to underscore the point, Abeles and Riley, in the article for the SSRC's annual report, conclude with a section on "implications for public policy."
The conceptual strength of a developmental approach to the study of aging is evident in designing and evaluating intervention programs aimed at optimizing aging or correcting disfunctional aspects of aging. This view is based on at least three assumptions: (1) aging is, at least, in part of a consequence of processes of life history; (2) some of these life-history processes are subject to modification; and (3) treatment of dysfunctional aging is most effective if designed in a preventive manner, rather than with a reliance on simple corrective methods (p. 12).

Should Political Scientists Care?

Aging, it has been said, does not mean growing old -- only growing older. Implicit in this process, as in all processes, is change. The change is in different areas, and it happens at different rates of speed. Not many would argue with Flavell, for example, when he states that "the physiological changes that occur in normal adulthood do not lead to or support cognitive changes of the constancy, size and kind that are mediated by the childhood growth process" (Flavell in Goulet and Baltes, p. 249). But, similarly, not many would now argue with that considerable contingent that insists that human behavior can only be understood within the context of the entire human life cycle. In this essay we have touched on the following approaches to this cycle: biological, sociological, psychological, and functional. Now let us consider some ways in which these approaches -- and also the value approach to aging -- can be connected to our political life. That they must do so on the most basic level is obvious. Politics is practiced in a social setting. Thus, to the extent that political behavior is merely one aspect of human behavior, it must reflect those influences to which the broader phenomenon is subject. To get hold of the loose strands running through the new work on adult development, I will divide this section into two parts: the impact of life development theory on how we think about leaders, and its impact on how we think about followers (i.e., the rest of us). The categories are mainly for heuristic.
Leaders and Life-After-Adolescence. It was Barber who first drew attention to the possibility that experiences after adolescence might have an important influence on the performance of our own political leaders (Barber in Greenstein and Lerner, pp383-408). But it was Erikson who explored more fully the proposition that the way one resolves crises in adulthood has much to do with the quality of the leadership. Especially in his book on Gandhi, the ties between the lived life of the young adult, and the political performance of the later adult, are made explicit. What is most striking here, and indeed in all these departures from the more strictly Freudian approach, is the implicit possibility of growth and change in adulthood. We have moved away somewhat from the model that asserts, "once one, forever one," and toward a paradigm that suggests that what held true at age 10 does not hold altogether true at age 38, 58, or 78. Although Erikson, Levinson, Loevinger, and Kohlberg, do not write about the same kinds of change, they do share the notion that it is the self coming into contact with the world that induces development. We have seen that both ego development and moral development depend on experience with others, and both the "tasks" of Levinson and the "crises" of Erikson are very explicitly tasks that we must undergo in a social context. Thus, whereas we used to ask only what is the effect of personality on politics, we must now pose another question: how does politics imprint on personality?

In line with all the thinking on life span development, personality is not static. The construct changes, because its parts - not all of them, of course, but some - change. A few examples: the content of the belief system changes more often than not during the post adolescent life course; moral development, at least to the highest stages, takes place as the result of
experiences in young adulthood; ego development also make its longest strides during adulthood and only as the result of an external stimulus; feelings of self-esteem (linked to so many aspects of political attitudes and behaviors) will vary over the life course depending on—and we might use Levinson's terminology here—how successfully the tasks of the various periods have been met; and feelings of political efficacy in leaders will vary over the life course and may well find their most dramatic expression during the mid-life transition when the leader is confronted with a "now or never" push to political power.

Since so many of the world's political leaders are in "old age," the ramifications of exercising control over large numbers of people and resources during this era might also benefit from a new attention. More than half of the Soviet Union's full Politburo members are 68 years old or more. And in China the situation is not much better: more than half of the 234 full Politburo members are 65 or older. Both Brezhnev and Teng Hsiao-p'ing are in their early 70s. What this means in part is that we need to inform ourselves about the concept of functional age. Functional age is in contrast to chronological age in that it suggests that we look at how well an individual performs physically, emotionally and intellectually, rather than at the year of birth. Konrad Adenauer, we do well to recall, began the most illustrious part of his career in his 70s and continued to act vigorously as father and leader of Germany until his late 80s. But more commonly there are biological and psychological characteristics of old age that have an impact on the exercise of leadership. Post has suggested that the following psychological manifestations of hardening of the arteries and other cerebral degenerations of old age might affect public performance: rigidity of thought, impairment of intellect and judgment, emotional liability, good days and bad days, and denial of disability (pp. 10-14).
There is also a more subtle influence at work here, one that would cause some worry if we were to become convinced that it came into play in those leaders Etheredge defines as "dominating, competitive, and ambitious" (1978, Abstract), or "Tough, ambitious, and shrewdly calculating" ("Hardball Politics" 1978). This is the feeling among those who are old, that time is of the essence, that the time left is short to realize all those goals and dreams of glory. "This sense of urgency in reaction to the perception of diminished time imparts an exaggerated quality to personality needs and drives, so that long-standing personality patterns and preexisting attitudes appear to be intensified" (Post P. 10).

What affects our leaders must affect us. It behooves us, then, to incorporate adult development theory into our labors on leaders. Those who look at individual lives, and worry about them, must finally accord change equal time with stasis.

Followers and Life after Adolescence. Although Sniderman was not addressing himself to any of the new work on adult development, this statement gets to the heart of our matter: "What may well matter most in explaining political belief and behavior is neither the influence of personality nor the impact of the situation but the interaction between the two" (p. 321).* What is becoming clear is that the interaction between personality and situation is a life long phenomenon and that a change in either can produce a result in which political behavior and/or belief is quite different from what the same individual exhibited sometime before.

*Sniderman's argument that the relationship between personality and democratic values is most importantly connected to the individual's capacity for social learning is also relevant to the point of this paper.
What this all means is, at a minimum, greater attention to the affects of adult socialization. It seems clear now that some of the situations that we might encounter during our adult lives can socialize us to new patterns of thought and behavior (although the political ramifications of these encounters remain to be more precisely explored), and new demands on self and others, changes in role or status; entry, exit or shift in occupation; changes in family situation; geographical mobility; and upward or downward mobility in socio-economic status — all of these are powerful stimuli to change.

But what is even more exciting about adult development theory is that it introduces the possibility that stimuli that are out of the ordinary, that is, not simply a part of what we would normally encounter, might be deliberately employed to induce a political affect. Merelman laid some of the developmental groundwork in his study of adolescents; "Political thinking proceeds primarily by genetic maturation when no intense politically relevant stimuli intersect the development of the mode of thought in question... By contrast, political thinking may be a function of politically related stimuli alone when such stimuli are intense, visible, and unequivocal" (1971, p. 1046). He also found that politicized students, defined by him as those who were well informed about politics and to some extent politically active, had more coherent, structured policy thinking styles (1973, p. 166). Spiderman took the same point, in essence, but put two different twists on it: 1) he suggested that intense politically relevant stimuli might be applied to adults to inculcate a commitment to democratic values, and 2) he introduced the notion that these stimuli might be deliberately used. Indeed, he specifically suggested that radical intervention, and procedures such as remedial education be tested in situations where a whole new mode of political thought and behavior was deemed desirable.
It is not too far a leap from these more general statements to the hypothesis that theories such as Loevinger's and Kohlberg's in particular, might have politically relevant applications. Stages of ego development are almost certainly connected to political attitudes and behavior just as they are connected to every other aspect of self. But although we can guess about how they connect - surely, for example, someone at Loevinger's "autonomous stage" is far removed from what political scientists identify as an authoritarian personality - the stage of the science is too young to be very precise.

Yet through a series of "interventions" in schools and prisons, Kohlberg has made a notable beginning at forging a connection between his theory and practice. A half a dozen high schools in the country, for example, are attempting to expose and eliminate the pervasive "hidden curriculum" by establishing separate "Cluster Schools" committed to implementing Kohlberg's concept of a "Just Community School." The attempt is to stimulate moral growth by exposure to: cognitive moral conflict, role taking, consideration of fairness and morality, the next higher stage of moral reasoning, and active participation in group decision making. In line with the thinking exemplified also by Merelman and Sniderman, there is an active effort to have these schools function as a "viable participatory democracy." The assumption, of course, is that this early experience will eventually transcend the school and manifest itself in the larger sociopolitical arena.

Similar programs are geared to adults in prison. Here the impetus for change is expected to come from the "moral pressure of the group on its members and the moral evaluation of the individual by the staff and other members of the group." Again, the expectation is for more than short range
change. It is hoped that the intervention will induce structural, here
moral, development which, by its very nature, will endure in any subse-
quent setting. Of course, the supposition is also that a change in moral
reasoning will lead to a change in behavior.¹⁹

We should return, at this point, also to Levinson. He, more than any
of the others talks about us (particularly men) as we move through our everyday
lives. Of course, he does not address us as political animals. The elements
of the life structure - a man's woman, or job, or family - are basically apoli-
tical. Yet there are at least two connections to make between the "seasons
of a man's life" and the political universe. First, we do well to remember
that there is a symbiotic relationship between even the most apolitical of
men and the political system in which he lives. The most dramatic political
events clearly do affect our lives: a ruined economy or a war must, for ex-
ample, impinge on the cycle of leaving the family and making a new one. But
even in quieter times, there is a reciprocal impact between the self and the
political world. A whole slew of public policies, ranging from child care to
social security will influence the degree to which the tasks of the various
periods can successfully be met. Any government that lays even the smallest
claim to implementing programs for the welfare of the people will inevitably
affect the quality of the life. And the modern welfare-state may have an
impact that is indeed developmentally significant.

On another level, Levinson, and those such as the Committee on Life Course
Perspectives, have drawn a fresh attention to the work that needs to be done
in both the public and private sectors to take account of the changing needs
of adults in different periods. Our public policy has finally begun to take
slow account of the aged, and their particular needs in the areas of income,
housing, transportation, health, nutrition and so forth.
Moreover, the time might now also be ripe to focus a very first attention on the rapidly growing percentage of the population in middle adulthood. Can it be that those in this era have special needs that even political scientists might start attending to? How, for example, do those in middle age perform politically? Are there programs that might be initiated geared especially to those between 40 and 60 to shake this group of some of its apathy? Can we devise the kinds of intervention that might make them more participatory citizens, and more creative leaders.

Yet another aspect we might look at is how structural-developmental theory might have an impact on the leader-follower relationship. One implication of the structural work is that people make sense of the same content in different ways, depending on the stage they are in. One might almost say that shrewd politicians have always been intuitive structural-developmentalists. A presidential candidate, for example, tries (usually) to appeal to a broad base. So he speaks in broad terms in order to appeal to those at different stages of development in such a way that he does not betray any one stage. The trick is to find themes that allow people to hear what they want to without realizing that other people who like it hear something quite different. Carter's primary run was quite brilliant in this way. Several of his themes - the outsider, human rights, a new honesty, etc. - were appropriate on a number of levels, and each had a lot of salience. Some four years earlier, on the other hand, George McGovern's themes were far more narrow in their appeal. Those to whom McGovern did speak became ardent converts. But the majority of the population got the (perfectly accurate) impression that they were not being addressed.

In other words, stage theory opens up in a whole new way the political idea of grabbing people where they are at -- not just the content of their concerns, but the actual structure, its "truth" in terms of what is subjectively experienced and learned.
Another example of how developmentalists are concerned with leader-follower reactions is in the normative area. The stage theories, especially Kohlberg's, but also Loevinger's, suggest philosophically justifiable goals consistent with the principle of American democracy. They, in fact, chart a quite clear map of where people "ought" to be led by leaders who would help us forge a more adequate construction of realities rather than pandering to the conservative, defending, "law and order" side.

The notion of adult development has swiftly and surely become a part of our popular culture. The term "mid-life crisis," to take one striking example, has become so entrenched that we need to think hard to remind ourselves that a few short years ago even the idea of one was unheard of. (Remember how long Gail Sheehy's Passage was on the best seller list?). Clearly what she and the more serious theorists have had to say about the differences in us, at different periods of our lives, has touched a nerve. There is a truism here that many of us have just begun to ponder. Surely political science won't be caught one step behind.
REFERENCES


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1. To his credit, James David Barber was an early exception.

2. Levinson's empirical work was done only with men.

3. Erikson italicized the word "healthy" but nonetheless used it—as well as Marie Jahoda's definition thereof (Erikson, 1968, p. 92).

4. Although the theory is concerned only with men, Levinson suggests that women follow similar, albeit not identical, patterns.

5. The concept of the alternating stable and transitional period is important but space does not allow for a more detailed treatment here. See Levinson.

6. All timetables are ± two years.

7. For earlier formulations of the Levinson study, see Levinson, et al., 1974 and Levinson, 1976.

8. This quote of Loewinger's and all which follow, are from Loewinger, 1976. This book departs in some ways from her earlier work, but is regarded as the culmination and, therefore, the most accurate representation of her current thinking in this area.

9. The reference to the Conscientious Conformist Level as the "sixth" stage is my own. Loewinger studiously avoids ordinal numbers (Loewinger, 1976, p. 19).

10. Loewinger does not touch on the social implications of a projected increase in the modal level of ego developments. She explicitly denies that the order of the ego stages is a reflection of social values—or of those held by the author (Loewinger, 1976, p. 27).

11. Loewinger makes a distinction between "levels" and "stages" which need not concern us here.

12. Piaget's highest stage is reached in early adolescence.

13. The most obvious question is, If structural change occurs in moral development, why not postulate it for other areas of development?

14. The most commonly used dilemma is found in most of Kohlberg's publications. It was quoted by Bank and McClellan, 1976, p. 890. A major work on scoring by Kohlberg and associates is now available from the Center for Moral Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 (Assessing Moral Stages: A Manual).

15. Much of the discussion here is based on Kohlberg, 1973. For a detailed investigation of the impulse to commit during the college years, see Perry, 1968.
16. Considerable data on this subject has been collected by the Social Science Research Council project headed by Brim. Also see the still outstanding book by Brim and Wheeler.

For a complete description, see Wasserman, 1976.

There is an unpublished pamphlet available on this project by L. Kohlberg, P. Schacht, and J. Hickey ("The Justice Structure of the Prison: A Theory and an Intervention"). All Kohlberg reprints are available for purchase from the Center for Moral Education (Note 14). The Center will also provide information on the work of the following four theorists—all of whom utilize the concept of the structural developmental stage: John Broughton (self reflective reasoning), James Fowler (faith reasoning), Robert Kegan (emotional processes and constructions of the self), and Robert Selman (reasoning about interpersonal relations).

17. For an early attempt to make this kind of link in political science, see ibid., 1978.