Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, when applied to theories of teaching composition, support any method or material that refers to the age and prior experience of the writer and the newness of the task the writer is attempting. Rhetorical development and maturation in the ability to write and argue persuasively are partly conceptual and partly related to the ability to "decenter." College freshmen writers' responses to a classic moral dilemma problem all stayed between Kohlberg's Conventional stages 3 and 4. The content of their papers and its relationship to Kohlberg's stages show that the movement from egocentric to explanatory to persuasive discourse is a movement from the writer's assumption of union with an audience to the writer's recognition of another as an audience, and finally to the writer's analysis of a distant, unfamiliar, universalized series of values as an audience. (A complete sample of class responses referred to is appended.) (AEA)
RHETORICAL MATURITY: DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT

Those of us who study college-level composition and composing have for some time worked at a disadvantage because we still have no agreed-upon definition of what it means to be an able adult writer and no accepted model of how such ability is acquired during post-adolescent maturation. Without these guides, we have nonetheless asserted, claimed, hypothesized and attempted to demonstrate that various methods of teaching improve student writing. Whether these methods are located in course materials—textbooks and assignments—or in operations like outlining, brainstorming, free-writing, and sentence combining, their users have only rarely asked how such techniques serve a particular stage in the development of a proficient writer. Studies may demonstrate that the surface features of student prose have changed because of a method or an approach, but since no model for the evolution of the normal, healthy, maturing, proficient writer now exists, no one knows whether such changes in student writing are appropriate or liable to lead to even greater skills.

Those developmental studies we do have that acknowledge the rhetorical nature of written discourse by discussing various audiences, purposes, or writers' situations are surprisingly rare and are usually about the writing of the public school populations normally available for progressive descriptions over a number of years. Janet Emig's descriptions of the composing of twelfth-graders made the point that those students spent less time thinking, reforming and revising their work when it was school-sponsored than when it was personally motivated.¹ James Britton underlined the plural of The
Development of Writing Abilities, 11-18 by demonstrating that school children perform in various grades with different competencies depending on the purpose—expressive, informative, or conative—of the discourse. Mina Shaughnessy, who is the only widely read student of the development of adult writing ability, said frequently that very inexperienced adults could reduce 30 errors to 15 in five months of intensive instruction, and thus gave us a realistic expectation about the rate of improvement in adult writing for poor writers. Although composition theory currently relies on such studies and on others by Loban, Piaget, Brunner, and Vygotsky, few of them might validly be applied to a college population of developing adult writers.

These researchers have introduced context-specific variables into discussions that had previously been text-centered and monolithic in their definitions of writing ability. I want to use their work and some research of my own to suggest a definition of being able to write and a description of the process of becoming able to write. Both models are necessary because of the consequences of continuing to create new theory without them. As it is, some of the most ordinary questions about writing ability have gone unasked. While we may begin to know how long it takes a deficient writer to catch up, we still have no idea how long it takes a normal child in any particular setting to evolve into advanced literacy. We do not know whether "time" in such discussions would mean number of years or frequency and duration of practice. We only have clues about the quality of changes in writing abilities, and have no information about the sort of peak, or crisis, moments that may normally appear during
the progress of the writer's development. Although I suspect we would agree that regular writing practice in response to readers' reactions over twenty years would produce an able writer, we cannot now, or do not now, usually ask why this would work, how it works, or how to regulate it.

If we begin by establishing what we mean when we talk about adult writing competence, we quickly conclude that we must, as Britton has, discuss abilities, not a particular skill. Although those outside secondary and higher education may see the current crisis in writing ability as a sudden attack of aphasia about spelling (perhaps analogous to the equally sudden Great Vowel Shift of 1500), those of us who read student writing know that it is the inability to compose original responses to generally interesting questions that currently defines our perception of this crisis. While some researchers may measure syntactic maturity and sentence-composing practice may increase it, the kernel thoughts of which complex syntax is made must be produced by able writers themselves. Not only the syntactic or surface-feature limitations of adult students' prose concern us, but also their semantic and pragmatic development into writers able to solve increasingly complicated problems. And conceptual maturity—what might be called cognitive or inventive maturity—is not the only addition to syntactic facility or control of surface features that would complete a model of fully-developed writing ability. Able writers also communicate effectively to a large variety of more or less immediate audiences. They are able to identify with, to use Kenneth Burke's terminology, a variety of people they stand in various relationships to. They are adept in a number of writing situations, and write effectively under various formal, temporal and political constraints.
In sum, they are rhetorically mature, able to identify and respond to the various demands for perception, conception, and execution, that many writing situations create.

If we agree upon this definition of proficiency as an ability effectively to vary perspectives on many writing tasks, we can begin to agree about the goals of a complete academic writing curriculum. Such instruction would not teach only a list of rules or formulae about good writing, nor emphasize one or another motivations or audiences for writing. It would instead progressively teach how to discover both the explicit and implicit agendas for any writing situation.

I am of course echoing the emphases of any proponent of a student-centered curriculum, and taking further the work that has begun to discriminate ability appropriate to the developmental level and purpose of a writer. By so doing, virtuosity--the ability to write with varying degrees of authority and varying senses of an audience's knowledge and prejudices about a subject and a writer--rather than any product-related quality of the writer's prose becomes the mark of an able writer.

This definition allows new questions about how proficient adults have learned to write, and theorizing not only about the process of a good writer writing one effective piece, but also about how writers who become proficient have moved toward virtuosity.

The stimulus that began my own search for a theory of adult rhetorical development occurred when I was Director of Freshman English at Ohio State University. While there, I wrote and supervised teaching from a syllabus.
for 30 new teaching assistants each year. The progress of that syllabus was conventional; students moved from early descriptive assignments through expository tasks of comparing, explaining a process, classifying, and solving causal problems to persuasive discourse. And they produced essays that re-enacted my teaching experiences for some 10 years. That is, while they moved as a group with what their teachers perceived to be relatively steady improvement from one to another mode, and could toward the end use Rogerian argument well enough to write persuading me to buy a gramputer to fumigate their essays, they could not, within the space of a week farther along, write coherent, well-informed, satisfying arguments either for or against a universal topic, in this case euthanasia. Their poor papers on the argumentative assignment were not so competent, either in substance or form, as their writing had been just a week earlier. The organization became mechanical rather than organic, thesis statements rang false, and the reasoning, while not illogical, was labored and tense. The papers from my class were, in my view, juvenile and extraordinarily innocent of complication.

Had this failure been only my own, not the shared disappointment of 30 young teachers who reported the same sudden lowering of quality in the same sequence of assignments, I might have let it go. Argumentation itself, as others suggest, might have seemed too difficult a logical mode for this homogenous 17-18 year-old poorly prepared open admissions freshman class. But given my generalized responsibility, I instead assigned the next week an argument to some other teacher that some feature of a course procedure should be changed. Again results were similar throughout the classes: students were generally reported to be able effectively to persuade this much more immediate
audience about a much more personally important topic with much more skill and control. Moving from the universal to the immediate audience, from the hypothetical to the actual experience of the writers, and from vaguely to intimately known information about the content of the piece immediately improved their control. But since practice could also have contributed to the improvement, I tried to relate this event to relevant research about the development of writing ability.

First, I had supervised research in an investigation of the problems of remedial college writers scoring below 15 on the English ACT test that demonstrated that inexperienced readers and writers in an experimental remedial course had enormous difficulty in disagreeing with each other or with anything that they read; the notion that discriminations among ideas were available to them personally was strange and had to be fostered slowly. They also tended, as Minä Shaughnessy said her students did, to write either at the level of homey folk wisdom based on what Johnson called "received systems," or to lapse immediately into detailed personal examples related to a generalization only by the faith of the reader. Confronted with apparently foreign levels of verbal sophistication, these students fell back into narrations either of their own experience or their family's maxims. They withdrew from conflicts of ideas or adversative relationships they were not accustomed to. As Andrea Lunsford characterized them in a recent Basic Writing essay, their thinking and writing was not yet "de-centered."

Although the students writing about euthanasia in OSU's regular freshman program, which was limited to students scoring between c. 15 and 23 on the English ACT, had not lapsed into detailed stories about a dying pet, their responses
emulated the remedial students' withdrawal into stiff positions that were not written in a natural voice, from internalized points of view. Wondering whether I had simply asked for an answer beyond their level of rhetorical ability, I also reviewed the evidence I could find that adult levels of writing ability may be discriminated according to age groups. For instance, Kellog Hunt has demonstrated that the syntactic maturity level of 12th graders is two whole steps below that of the skilled professional writers who usually address universal subjects. According to James Britton, students have only begun to deal adequately with instructing, persuading, and speculative discourse at the age of 18. And Walter Loban, in a study of 211 children from kindergarten through grade twelve, found that a marked spurt of syntactic complexity occurs in better, college-bound students in the 12th grade, but the poorer students' writing tends to level off and remain static at that age. Additionally, both Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner have argued that real concept formation, the ability to originate complicated solutions to verbal problems, occurs after pubescence, which appears also to be a developmental crisis time in language acquisition. Both inexperienced adults and prepubescent children appear to be unable to divorce their egos from written language enough to hear it, and thus to produce it, from another's point of view.

What all of this evidence suggested to me was that the suddenly more poor persuasive papers might have been a signal that these students had been thwarted against a developmental or stage demarcation when they were assigned persuasion about a universal topic that would require them to assume a number of perspectives on their audience and an ethical subject. The ability to vary perspectives on such conceptual problems, and to control writing about such problems with ease and virtuosity, might simply not be normal in the average student of the age and test scores of the freshmen in our classes. I hypothesized that these relatively
unpracticed freshmen writers were still actively learning to originate and express in writing concepts and attitudes divorced from their personal experience, and perhaps should not be expected to perform well in this writing situation.

The developmental models of adult change in non-school populations that do exist are located not in descriptions of verbal or rhetorical skill levels, but instead in descriptions of emotional and social development. In the absence of studies about adults progressively writing or solving logical problems, I turned to the developmental theory of Harvard's Lawrence Kohlberg, whose model of cognitive/moral stages describes six possible stages of growth from childhood through maturity that in their season determine a person's perspectives on questions of value. Kohlberg's work specifies Piaget's division of progress from "subjective" to "objective" morality. It diverges from the work of social psychologists who believe that moral judgments are culture-specific, positing instead (and controversially) universal stages of moral/cognitive growth. I chose Kohlberg's model not for its relevance to "right answers" about euthanasia, or any other such topic, but instead for its analogies to the rhetorical skills of analyzing, accepting, and identifying with a number of audiences and points of view.

Kohlberg's six stages may be thought of as three groups of 2: Preconventional, Conventional, and Post-conventional thinking. In Preconventional stages 1 and 2, children (and many adult criminals) see values only in terms of tit for tat physical consequences. The morality of Chaucer's Prioress, ("I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine"), is the most sophisticated reasoning available to them.

In the Conventional stages, 3 and 4, individuals maintain the expectations of family, a group, or their country. In stage 3, one conforms to stereotyped images of what the majority do, and being a "nice" person is highly valued. In stage 4,
the maintenance of law, order, and the social system dominates. Right behavior consists of doing your duty, respecting authority, and maintaining the social order for its own sake. Most adults reason at one of these Conventional levels. In the Post-conventional stages, 5 and 6, the individual separates values from the systems of authority, law, or tradition. Stage 5 thinkers define right in terms of general individual rights, are clearly aware of relativism, and emphasize due process. Stage 5 thinking is the official moral process of the American Constitution. Emphasis is given to personal values and "opinion," so problems are no longer referred to received systems, an officially right or wrong answer to a question. Very few people reach stage 6--Kohlberg cites Martin Luther King, Jesus, and a few others. Here "right" is associated with universal principles of justice, equality, reciprocity, and individuality.

The next year I asked a few teachers to assign one of Kohlberg's classic moral dilemma problems in the same week of another Fall term of the same writing course in order to test whether they would as a group display similar approaches to a question of value which might be identified with a particular level of ability to control their rhetorical flexibility. The population of freshmen was the same, and these teachers had all given the same early assignments that I had given in my course the year before. Their students were as well-prepared to respond to a problem in argumentation as mine had been. The problem was the following:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to
make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. The druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? Why?

The results from a complete sample class are attached as an appendix: repeatedly, persistently, the level of response stays between Kohlberg's Conventional stages 3 and 4. The students are torn between valuing codified morality by doing what the law and "society" say, and approving of Heinz's personal needs. The content of these papers shows that these students at the end of the first quarter of freshman instruction, taught not only by me, but by a random selection of teachers using the same material, would regularly produce similar, and to a reader of professional essays, disappointing, responses to universal questions that demand sophisticated, highly distanced, perspectives. Whether we explain their similar approaches by references to their relatively homogenous ages, test scores, and Ohio high school preparation (which is remarkably uniform), or by references to developmental theories of neurobiology, or both, we can reasonably infer their uniform inability to originate and write persuasively from a highly relativistic rhetorical stance.

The conclusions that I drew from this experiment should interest a teacher anxious to lead students toward Post-conventional processes and rhetorical virtuosity because they offer an alternative to the teacher's traditional com-
plaint that "students can't think." Obviously these freshmen could think, but not within the same frame of reference that I expected and my assignment required them to use. Preparatory work with the syllogism or set theory would not have forwarded the level of the freshman responses given the students' lack of practice and their inexperience as independent adults.

The content of these papers and its relationship to Kohlberg's stages also shows me now that the movement from ego-centric, to explanatory, to persuasive discourse is indeed a movement from the writer's assumption of union with an audience to the writer's recognition of another as an audience, and finally to the writer's analysis of a distant, unfamiliar, universalized series of values as an audience. Kohlberg's work is controversial because it implies to non-rhetoricians a universal series of right actions or "good" values. To those interested instead in fostering rhetorical maturity, it outlines the progress of valuing, the development of the Aristotelian ethos toward trustworthy, creditable, and authoritative persuasive content. Given the family-centered experience of these young college writers who had not had their personal choices reacted to by strangers, rhetorical maturity—virtuosity with perspective, tone, voice, and the grounds of appeal—is not a reasonable expectation. Aristotle's warning to young orators, that they must use specific examples rather than the maxims appropriate to older speakers, was a result of his understanding the different vibrations of experience and authority each age group would be able to bring to bear on evidence. The writers producing these excerpted samples of conventional thinking had not yet internalized the rhetorical skill of kairos, "the adaptation of the speech to the manifold variety of life." They had not yet experienced and internalized that manifold variety. We have, by virtue of this
demonstration of student limitations, a clearer notion of the union of conceptualizing, feeling, and executing that rhetorically mature writers bring to bear on any writing task.

This demonstration also suggests a description of the process of achieving such full rhetorical maturity. Kohlberg notes that while his subjects could progressively understand and postulate a stage one level above their own, they could not go beyond that one stage difference with understanding. For example, stage four thinkers can understand the process, but find stage six selfless, universalized compassion impossible to believe or explain; children may understand that games have rules, but still cheat when they can because they can win that way. Multiple perspectives on an event are acquired step-by-step, so for student writers moving ahead would be the process of progressively enlarging the number of points of view the writer can identify with. Our traditional writing curriculum does this; we habitually teach expressive, then explanatory, then persuasive discourse. Thereby we emulate progress toward rhetorical maturity by demanding new abilities to write for others. Demands to address increasingly distant audiences, to impersonate and thus write effectively for increasingly discrete groups whose self interest is not our own, guide progress toward virtuosity. But curricula that concentrate on one audience—for example secondary programs that limit students to "creative" writing that is in practice only expressive writing—will fail to foster rhetorical growth in adolescents who are ready, if only newly ready, to be led toward it. Such programs inadvertently retard the capabilities of their adolescent students by failing to lead them out of themselves and toward identification with a wide variety of perspectives on universal questions.

Kohlberg also noted a pattern of moving ahead and falling back in progress
through the necessary sequence of stages that suggestively echo current descriptions of the recursive process of writing any particular piece of prose. I am similarly struck by the congruence between the problems of beginning writers and those of more advanced students who are struggling toward new levels of rhetorical development. That is, the abstract platitudes of basic writers elaborating a generalization are more blatant versions of the "vague," "wordy," or "over-inflated" writing of better-prepared students dealing with new demands that they cannot comfortably compass within their rhetorical abilities. I think that a complete developmental model of the process of learning to write would note that writers withdraw from newly difficult problems in similar ways at whatever level of development they may be. Given an unprecedented level of difficulty to deal with in the form of a newly complex rhetorical situation, a writer's ability to transcend and control rhetorical strategies disintegrates, while these problems may be easily solved if the complexity of the conceptual and rhetorical situation that must be mastered when writing is reduced. I am reminded of feeling completely in control of my senior papers in college, but then inadequate to write graduate school papers, and then of losing the control I had learned in graduate school when writing my first journal article.

The stops and starts that so often produce sentence fragments in basic writing papers are, I think, imitated by such stops and starts in moving toward the expression of increasingly abstract though to new and more distant audiences in a variety of new formats. At both Ohio State and the University of Wisconsin, I have repeatedly found that students in beginning writing courses begin to produce more errors as they begin to take greater risks with newly complex syntactic structures and new modes of discourse. The rhetorically limited
student writing about Heinz strongly suggests that sentence-level errors are echoed in later states of development in the form of new, unexpected artificiality and vagueness. Patterns of risk and retreat that clearly correlate increases and decreases in number of words written to increases and decreases in number of errors/100 words imply that all of the features of prose—content as well as surface text—reflect the stage of mastery at which the student begins any newly difficult rhetorical task.

Now this second model, that of the normal progress of a mature writer, is obviously not so well-developed or evident as a definition of an able writer as a virtuoso. It theorizes that learning to write first re-enacts stages of decentering like those found in childhood language acquisition and then, when post-pubescent conceptualizing becomes possible, depends on situational stimuli that will evoke a recursive pattern of proficiency and deficiency as new audiences and genres are attempted. Piaget, in an essay about cognitive development between the ages of 15 and 20, says much the same thing. He acknowledges that from adolescence onward, interest, aptitude and experience rather than innate and invariant evolutionary patterns will determine the level of verbal or other abilities an individual develops.

One of the values of this adult developmental model of attaining rhetorical maturity is, I hope, stimulating a new view of research, one that would never support any method or material without reference to the age and prior experience of the writer and the newness of the task the writer is attempting. I wish to go back to the end of Kellog Hunt's 1965 study of syntactic structures, which is a more wise book than some of its practical applications, in, for example, sentence-combining techniques. In his last paragraph, Hunt offered some questions...
that should no longer be ignored:
Perhaps, the older students' proficiency comes only as a result of years of psychological and experiential maturing. It may come only with the development of all thought processes. In that event, attempts to force the growth will be futile. It is possible that injudicious forcing is worse than futile. The centipede who ceased to crawl because he never knew which leg it was best to move first is no fiction. 16
APPENDIX

"By stealing the drug, Heinz not only committed an illegal feat, but he also performed an act exhibiting emotional instability and a distorted conception of moral obligation."

"When an illegal action is performed on the basis of morals, it is always hard to judge whether or not it is wrong if you look at it from a moral standpoint. However, if you look at it practically and in terms of the law, which in almost every case you should, one would not have much difficulty in making a judgement."

"Laws were made as the fairest possible set of rules and regulations for which all people could lead their lives. If you start making exceptions for some cases you will have to make exceptions for other cases to balance things out, otherwise people will say the laws are prejudiced and would have little respect for them."

"In conclusion, had Heinz thought about the consequences of the actions he took before he took them, he would have seen that they would get him into a great deal of trouble, and would not aid in saving his wife."

"There are always going to be times when one man's morals or beliefs will differ from the law, and as a result, there will always be conflicts."

"The man was right in taking the drug for his wife, because he followed his moralistic values."

"No matter what type of pressure society would put on the man, he upheld his beliefs and what was important to him. Therefore he disregarded honesty
and stealing verses his wife's life; mainly because his wife's life held more importance to him than the consequences he faced. The man simply did what he believed was right, he risked receiving tangible consequences, such as imprisonment, to keep the intangible property of life. Not only did he hold a high regard and love for his wife and her life by obtaining the drug, but he showed a love and regard for himself. He stole the drug to be at peace with himself, happy knowing he saved his wife's life. He did what he thought was right, ignoring society and respecting his values.

"Although he probably felt guilty for stealing, that guilt would have been nothing compared to what he would have felt if he had let his wife die without giving her the chance the drug gave her. Ethically, Heinz was wrong. Morally, however, he was right and your morals are what you have to live with."

"One thousand dollars is practically nothing compared to the money the druggist could have received by selling his idea to research or to a manufacturer."

"Stealing is a crime against society, but to deny life is a crime against God. Heinz should protect his wife's life, even if it means stealing."

"He knew it was wrong to steal, because a person who robs a bank, or steals a car will go to prison. This is different, Heinz reasoned, his wife's life could depend on this drug, and he could not let her die. The right to life is more important than money, and this druggist is not going to let my wife die, thought Heinz. Finally out of desperation Heinz broke into the store and stole the drug."

"Stealing the drug was a criminal offense. Society punishes those who do not conform to the established rules. Heinz knew all of this, but he still
went against society. The act was socially unacceptable but the circumstances prompting the act were morally unjust. I'm not implying that stealing is right, but Heinz was ready to accept the consequences. If the drug saved his wife's life, the punishment would be worth it to him."

"Nor did he really steal anything (attempted only)."

"Heinz really loved his wife. He did break a law, but he felt he had a reason to... Of course he was wrong for what he did."

"He only stole some drugs to help his wife. No, this is impossible because once someone becomes a criminal he will always be a criminal. He may have stolen for his wife's good, but once a crime is committed it is even easier to do it another time when it may come in handy."

"Laws, such as the one against stealing, were made to bring order into society, protecting every individual's rights; this includes both the druggist's and Heinz's. In stealing, Heinz was legally wrong."

"Finally through his actions, Heinz showed his distorted conception of moral obligation by resorting to theft to try to save his wife. He must have felt it was his duty to acquire the radium at any expense, to prove his loyalty and love for his wife. This indicates that if he had not been under pressure, Heinz possibly would not have gone to such extremes as thievery. Therefore, if it was not considered a normal occurrence that was performed, then he was wrong for doing it."

"Heinz stole a drug which was wrong. He had very good reason for stealing it but that is beside the point. The drug was not his, he should not have taken it and he should be punished. 'There can be no two ways about it.'"
"What Heinz did was wrong, that cannot be argued. But what can be argued is whether or not his actions can be justified either ethically or socially."

"It is all a matter of morality and value for human life."

"Yes, Heinz should break into the shop and steal the drug. He has no other choice. He needs the drug soon or his wife will die. Heinz is left with nothing else to do."

"Therefore he disregarded honesty and stealing versus his wife's life, mainly because his wife's life held more importance to him than the consequences he faced. The man simply did what he believed was right, he risked receiving tangible consequences, such as imprisonment, to keep the intangible property of life. Not only did he hold a high regard and love for his wife and her life by obtaining the drug, but he showed a love and regard for himself. He stole the drug to be at peace with himself, happy knowing he saved his wife's life. He did what he thought was right, ignoring society and respecting his values."

"On his moral scale of priorities the preservation of human life was much higher than the practice of obeying society's rules and regulations. Heinz must have been a basically good man, and I feel he was right in committing this act to save the life of the woman he loved more than anything."

"Collecting money from those he knew was certainly not the only legal means whereby Heinz could have obtained money for the radium drug. Why didn't he attempt to borrow the money from a bank or for that matter from several different banks if necessary? Certainly a thousand dollars is not an unusually large sum of money for a bank to loan out in a life and death matter such as this."
"At this point then, it seems clear that Heinz's illegal act of breaking and entering was hastily resorted to and uncalled for in light of legal alternatives available to him."

"The moral issue stems from the Bible. In the book of Exodus, chapter 20, or in the book of Deuteronomy chapter 5, we find the Ten Commandments. Ten laws set down by God that cannot be ignored. One of these laws is: Thou shalt not kill." (Euthanasia)

"Justice cannot prevail where the law is weak enough to allow any escape from punishment to go unattended."

"Heinz is a beautiful person who wants to help people. He worries more about other people than himself."
Notes


4 The papers produced during the first year (1976) referred to were not rated by any of the standardized tools of holistic or analytic rating; the criticisms of the thirty teachers who met weekly in a training course were, however, universal. The attached appendix from one of ten sample classes the next fall (1977) is a whole sample; no student essay failed to yield the result discussed.


6 Shaughnessy, pp. 226-44.

8 Grammatical Structures Written at Three Grade Levels (Champaign, IL: NCTE, 1965), p. 56.

9 Britton, pp. 158-73, passim., 182, 192, 201-02.

10 Language Development: Kindergarten through Grade Twelve (Research report 18, NCTE: Champaign, IL, 1976), p. 80.


16 Hunt, p. 158.