The areas of language planning and the language of oppression are discussed within the theoretical framework of existential sociolinguistics. This tradition is contrasted with the contemporary models of positivism with its assumptions about constancy and quantification. The proposed model brings in social history, intent, consciousness, and other extensions of the data and combines them into a methodology of hermeneutics. These new perspectives not only ask different questions about how language is used in social terms, but it also makes radically different claims about how language is legitimized by the power elite who wield community power, and how people are socialized into external patterns of recognizable behavior that have salient values. The model accounts for many of the basic concepts regarding pluralism within the discipline of political science, and it provides a coherent treatment of such sociological endeavors as labeling theory, neo-symbolic interactionism, the sociology of knowledge, and phenomenological sociology. (54)
INTRODUCTION

There are two major trends of research which are characteristically associated with the politics of language. One is highly pragmatic and involves concerted attempts to resolve many of the complex problems of language planning among emergent nations (Rubin, 1962; Rubin and Shuy, 1973; and Fishman, 1972) or politically active minority groups (Valdes-Fallis and Garcia-Moya, 1976); and, the other is basically descriptive in that it provides a repertoire or a categorization of the misuses of language as an instrument of symbolic persuasion or oppression (Bosmajian, 1974; Lakoff, 1975; and Rank, 1974). Under the rubric of language planning there are scholarly works which deal with the political rights of non-standard dialects or languages (St. Clair and Ornstein, 1975), the study of minority languages (Leich, 1977; Stephens, 1976), the national policy on language standardization (Wood, 1977; DeFrancis, 1975), the use of Esperanto as an international auxiliary language (Zamenhof, 1963; Privat, 1923), bilingualism (Fishman, 1976; Haugen, 1973; and Cordasco, 1976), and language education (Ramin, 1974; and Castaneda, 1974). In contrast to the papers and research on language planning with its emphasis on social history, conflict resolution, and political implementation of language policy, the studies of a descriptive nature have usually dealt with the language of sexism (Lakoff, 1975); Indian derision (Bosmajian, 1975), government impression management (Rank, 1974), language attitudes (Shuy and Fasold, 1973; Giles and St. Clair, in press), code switching conflicts (St. Clair and Valdes-Fallis, 1975), labelling (Becker, 1973; Clinard, 1964; Manning and Zucker, 1976; Scheff, 1966) and the rhetoric of racism.

Unfortunately, the state of the art is still at the descriptive level with regard to linguistic research. Most studies about language planning or the language of oppression attempt to document and classify certain recurring phenomena. What is needed at this time is a model which demonstrates sufficient explanatory power in order to synthesize some of the insights regarding the politics of language as it has materialized across a broad spectrum of related disciplines. In essence, this necessitates an explicit and coherent metatheory that incorporates related findings among such diverse disciplines as political science (Garson, 1977; Schuman, 1977), social psychology (Brown, 1965; Stone and Faberman, 1970; Kaufmann, 1973; Lauer and Handel, 1977), phenomenological sociology (Psathas, 1973), and the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Curtis and Petras, 1972). The theory proposed in this essay is based on the foundations of these language-related disciplines.


and as an emerging paradigm it is best referred to as "existential sociolinguistics" (Douglas, 1973; Manning, 1973).

EXISTENTIAL SOCIOLINGUISTICS

Contemporary models of the sociology of language are patently positivistic (St. Clair, 1975) in that they are outgrowths of the natural science school founded by St. Simon (cf. Markham, 1964) and developed by Comte (cf. Ferre). During the early and mid 19th century, this group had established a school in France, L'ecole polytechnique, which not only advocated the tenets of Bacon's Nuova Scienza, but engaged in a form of scientism (Hayek, 1952). These prophets of Paris (Manuel, 1962) held the view that the natural science model of physics represented the acme of intellectual achievement and consequently should be the paradigm for all fields of endeavor which seek to become scientific. Comte (St. Clair, 1971) argued that all human knowledge must pass through three distinct stages of development: The quest for an understanding of knowledge, he adds, begins with the attempts to explain natural phenomena in terms of divine activity. This is followed by a later stage in which the forces of divinity are replaced by abstract forces within the control of humans, and the final stage of development culminates in a form of positivism in which all phenomena are explained in terms of the unchanging laws of nature. What is significant about Comte and his colleagues is that their model of Naturwissenschaft has continued until this day in the form of a covert ideology underlying the principles of science (Losee, 1972). It can be found, for example, in the underlying philosophy of Der Wiener Kreis (Kraft, 1968) with its mandates for a unified science based on quantification, verification, and a materialistic theory of reference. What the Neopositivists added to the model of Comte (1853) was to make the method of comparison and contrast consistent with the principles of logic. This concern with axioms, postulates, and formalization is evidenced in the work of Bloomfield (1926) and underlies the works of Harris (1951), and his student, Chomsky (1957). The pervasiveness of positivism is not limited to structural and neo-structural linguistics. It has even infiltrated the various schools of literary structuralism (Pettit, 1975), and the Russian school of formalism, in particular (Jameson, 1972). What this account of social history demonstrates is the fact that linguistics, even in its neo-structuralist form, is basically within the tradition of positivism, and as a consequence, the various schools of sociolinguistics are positivistic (cf. Labov, 1972). The only exception to this major trend can be found in the works of Hymes (1972).

Obviously, the model of existential sociolinguistics proposed here is not an intrinsic part of the tradition of positivism. Its genesis can be found in the counter movement to the positivism of Comte, i.e., in the Geisteswissenschaften movement of Dilthey (cf. Rickman, 1967; Makkreel, 1976). Dilthey disagreed with the pronouncements of the natural sciences as viable models for those working in the social and human sciences. He argued, for example, that in the natural sciences
the phenomena under investigation is regular, ahistorical, and predictable. By contrast, the phenomena of the humanities were unique and irregular. As a matter of fact, such events could only be understood post facto and by a form of methodology which differed substantially from the formalism of physics. The method that Dilthey advocated was, of course, the hermeneutic tradition of Schleiermacher. The differences between these antithetical models of assessing human knowledge were highly polarized, and as a consequence the controversy between those who favored the Naturwissenschaft model were in sharp contrast to those advocating the Geisteswissenschaft tradition.

Recently, these conflicting models of science have been combined within the tradition of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). This compromise across traditions has kept the strong methodological concept of the natural sciences and integrated it with the strong, theoretical and value-oriented practices of the social and human sciences (Mehan and Wood, 1975). Hence the special meaning attached to ethnomethodology. This coalescence, it should be noted, was not accomplished without a price. Upon closer investigation, the adherents of the Geisteswissenschaft tradition came to realize that they were not against all of the postulates or the verification hypotheses of the Naturwissenschaften. Their point of contention was that the Aristotelian laws of the excluded middle and identity were efficacious within the natural sciences, but their status was equivocal within the framework of the social sciences. To forego these postulates, they argued, would not only keep their research within the history of science, but it would also be in line with the nature of events studied by them. Well, what are these laws and why have they created problems for one group and not the other? The law of excluded middle is the first operation of logical division which separates entities into major classes such as p/ not-p. The rationale for this law is readily understandable. An entity, is argued, cannot belong to two classes at once; it cannot be two things at the same time. This way of thinking is not new to linguistics theory as it was the basis for the structuralist dogma about "once a phoneme, always a phoneme" and the controversy regarding phonemic overlapping. The second law deals with the concept of identity and is based on the premise that identical things all share the same properties (cf. St. Clair, 1974 a; 1974 b for a critique within phonological theory). Social scientists and humanists argue that the events in their lives are not consonant with these Aristotelian laws. Social events, for example, are not networks of caused events because in the everyday use of language concepts are not used in this way. Everyday objects do not display constant and stable properties such as the entities studied by natural scientists; and, furthermore, the meanings
of the real or socially constructed world are events which constantly shift (Cicourel, 1974). The law of identity holds that every word, for example, must mean the same thing to every person. Obviously, this quest for constancy does not hold within the phenomenology of language. People react to the same symbol differently and may even vary on their interpretations of the events over the course of a conversation. Hence, everyday meanings do not meet with the canons of Aristotelian logic; and because such logic distorts language use it must be abandoned. This approach to classification and methodology (Mehan and Wood, 1975) is consonant with the later works of Wittgenstein (1953) and his discussion of the role that family resemblances play in language games. Wittgenstein disagreed with the Aristotelian system of categorizing elements according to shared unique properties or by means of enumeration. The latter appears ad hoc and the former is too constraining. As a consequence, Wittgenstein argued for a third method of relating elements within a class, viz., the family resemblance theory. When one looks at a family portrait, he notes, there is no unique feature which all members of the family shares which entitles them to be designated as a family group. They do not share the same kinds of eye structure, shape of eyebrows, etc. What occurs is basically an overlap in shared features. Some have the same kind of nose shape, others may have the same color eyes, and another set may have the same jaw structure. This family resemblance model can also be found within linguistic theory as evidence by studies in speech chain phenomena (St. Clair, 1974 a; Quackenbush, 1970).

The reason why this approach has been labelled "existential" is because it is the truncated name for "existential phenomenology." The phenomenological approach of Dilthey, Schleiermacher, and Schutz (1967). It is the same tradition which ethnomethodologists have come to accept as being within the mainstay of their discipline, and it is the kind of sociolinguistics which is being advocated here. Existential sociology (Manning, 1973) deals with such concepts as "intent," "consciousness," symbolic interaction," "values," and "quality." It is not against the data approach of positivism, but merely expands data to include biographical history, perceptual strategies, and conflict theory (Lyman and Scott, 1970).

According to Lyman and Scott (1970), society is a structure of relationships which is essentially linguistic. This is because people come to understand how they are similar or different in their roles and social realities through the medium of language. In their theory, they have combined ethnomethodology, labelling theory, and symbolic interactionism under the rubric of a new term which they have coined - a sociology of the absurd. The world, they note, is essentially without meaning. All systems of belief are conventional and arbitrary. Hence, the meanings of everyday life must be carved out through interaction. Meanings must be designated upon objects and events, and human intentions must be inferred or attributed to others. For those who are within the social reality or the social role, the issues appear deterministic. However, by standing outside of the system, the existential
nature of human society becomes evident. The former involves a fatalistic time track whereas the latter is humanistic.

The reason why positivism and existential phenomenology stand apart as epistemologically concepts are rather obvious. The latter involves a designation of meaning onto objects and events. It requires that discernible units of action be carved out from social interaction in the form of episodes, encounters, and situations. It accepts alienation and conflict as normal and it emphasizes the hermeneutic nature of human information processing. Positivists find all of this variation and uncertainty unbearable. They seek constancy in the form of absolutes whether these be formal universals or substantive ones. In many ways, the counter tradition of phenomenology is more in line with such disciplines as history, literature, cultural anthropology (Tyler, 1969), the sociology of knowledge, and symbolic interactionism. The transition from structural linguistics to neo-structural transformational grammar was not as revolutionary as the transition from positivism to phenomenology which is advocated here.

LANGUAGE PLANNING

Language planning in the United States requires an understanding of social history. It necessitates an investigation into the dominant ideologies of the past and their forms of expression in legal terms, language policies, role-taking, role support, and symbolic action (Edelman, 1971). The ideology of total assimilation (Crevecoeur, 1782), for example, provides great insight into the nature of language and public policy over the last two centuries. The rhetoric of the melting pot hypothesis (Ramirez and Castaneda, 1974), was allegedly designed to create a new stock in America from the diverse flux of immigrants into this country. However, as Ramirez and Castaneda note, the melting pot was exclusive. It favored those from the Nordic countries such as the Swedes and Danes and excluded other Europeans such as the Poles, Italians, and Spaniards. The indigenous groups in the United States, it should be mentioned, were not even considered within this framework of assimilation. Hence, Chicanos, Blacks, and Native Americans were devalued and reclassified within the rhetoric of oppression. This ideology of total assimilation explains such linguistic policies as the downgrading of foreign language education as irrelevant because it was associated with alien cultural practices, and it also explains the teaching of English as a second language, or as it was called then - English for the foreign born, merely to provide communicational skills concomitant with the expectations of a laborer who needs to know enough of the language and culture to merely follow orders (Karier, Violas and Spring, 1973; Greer, 1970). The dominant ideology was also capitalistic in nature and espoused a framework of social darwinism (Hofstadter, 1944), anti-intellectualism (Hofstadter, 1962), and a corporate model of education (Katz, 1975; Feinberg, 1975).

Later, with the advent of the Jazz age, there was a new espoused ideology in which an ecology of life styles were allegedly permitted to
coexist peacefully. The concept of cultural pluralism was conjured up by Kallan (1915) as an ideal to counteract the unrealistic constraints of a total assimilation mentality. Although this concept has been in existence for over a half a century, it is only now becoming a political reality (Greenbaum, 1974). The reason for this slow development is clearly documented by Greenbaum who notes that only recently have the various minority groups countered the power structure of those who have either implicitly or explicitly advocated an ideology of total assimilation. According to most findings in the area of community power (Hawley and Wirt, 1974; Ricci, 1971), the use of power is reciprocal in that those who are subjected to the abuse of it are guilty by acquiescence. As Jacobson (1972) notes, power is costly and is only used on those who do not fight back. Whenever there is a counter-force, the power structure is proportionately attenuated. Hence, it is because of this equalization of powers that the ruling ideology has been severely lessened and is being replaced by a new framework of cultural pluralism.

Another model of language planning is that of cultural democracy. This view was presented by Drachsler (1920) and has recently found favor among some scholars in bilingual education (Ramirez and Castaneda, 1974). What Drachsler envisioned was a time in America when people would be free to choose their own life styles, i.e., they would be able to determine on a personal level as to whether or not they wish to remain in contact with the mainstream culture or return to their ethnic enclaves. Although this liberal view is idyllic, it is, nevertheless, completely unrealistic politically at this time. First there must be a solid tradition of cultural pluralism even before the possibility of cultural democracy can be seriously considered as an alternative. Hence, those who advocate such a stance at this time are politically naive about the realization of their quest for a better America.

There is an unwritten and unspoken assumption that with the advent of cultural pluralism, many of the abuses against minorities would vanish. Many who advocate a move toward cultural pluralism have this view in mind. Unfortunately, studies of language planning in other countries clearly demonstrate that the issue is not merely one of a policy of language change, but also a conscious shift in the power structure. Although the United States still represents a melting pot ideology, it is interesting to note that China already has a system of cultural pluralism and Russia is now under an official policy of cultural democracy (Fishman, 1968). In China, for example, all citizens are requested to be educated in the Han dialect which is the official language of the government. They may be schooled in any of the 50 or more official languages in the country, but they must learn the Han dialect. Now ask yourself if China is experiencing any greater freedom than the United States because of her official policy of cultural pluralism. Obviously, it is not! What about Russia? It allows its citizens to learn any of its 50 or more official tongues and the government will provide both teachers and textbooks in those languages. But, it should be asked if this highly liberal policy of cultural democracy has brought any more freedom to its inhabitants. What is at issue, then, is the use of power. Cultural
pluralism per se is not the road to justice, but a fragmentation of community power. Just how that power is to be fragmented and manifested depends upon the political structures involved (Cohen, 1976). Theodore Lowi (1969, 1971) has argued, for example, that decentralization in the United States may appear liberal, but it merely obscures legislation to local communities where policies are carried out at the whim of the established groups.

Having considered the social development of language planning and bilingualism in the United States, it is now time to approach the issue from a theoretical framework. How, in particular, does a theory of existential sociolinguistics account for this phenomenon of changing ideologies? An insightful approach to this problem can be found in the works of Peter Berger and his associates (Berger, Berger, and Kellner, 1974; Berger and Luckman, 1966; Berger, 1969; Berger, 1976). They provide a theoretical framework based on the sociology of knowledge which means, in essence, that not only is knowledge socially constructed, but it is also socially distributed. In this Gesellschaft model of society there is a great division of labor (Durkheim, 1933; Fonnies, 1957) in contrast with more tribal communities where the Gemeinschaft model is the norm. The difference between these models is best understood by reference to the metaphor of shoe making. In the Gemeinschaft commercial establishment, for example, each and every person is involved in the total creation and production of a pair of shoes. They must follow the production from its inception and add on to it until they arrive at the final commodity. Hence, they share in the total production. In the Gesellschaft factory, by contrast, each worker is separated from the others and has been relegated only one small portion of the total production process. A worker, for example, may merely attach the heels onto the shoes and do nothing more. It is in this type of organization where alienation is a natural byproduct of the job (Schacht, 1970).

The community mentioned in the first instance shares a sense of solidarity. They share the same values, hold the same things sacred, and all feel the same emotions. In the case of the society, however, there is a great division of labor where, as a group, people express a greater degree of differentiation in their emotions, values, and the things they hold sacrosanct. Berger has characterized the community concept in his study of The Sacred Canopy (Berger, 1969), and the industrially complex and alienated society in his co-authoring of The Homeless Mind (Berger, Berger & Kellner, 1974).

What is important about the division of labor in society is that not everyone has the same knowledge of reality nor the same access to knowledge. It must always be seen from a particular perspective (McCall and Simmons, 1966). Furthermore, since knowledge is socially constructed and since people never undergo complete socialization of roles or identities (Hewitt, 1976), there will always be gaps in what constitutes knowledge in that society. However, reality is apprehended in everyday life in terms of prearranged patterns in which language signifies one's intent through the use of verbal signs, and typifies through the use of labels or names which subsume experiences under broad socially salient categor-
ties, and mediates between disparate socially constructed realities (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). In this model of social interaction (cf. Lyman and Scott, 1970) conflicts over values which are salient lead to a threat of one's self concept resulting in a state of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The conflict, Festinger notes, can be resolved in several ways: (1) There could be an avoidance reaction on the part of the person being threatened, and apparently, this is a common strategy for coping with dissonance. (2) The source of the threat could be attenuated by some form of devaluation. This is a form of projection whereby the opponent is made to seem less than human in one's eyes. (3) The person being threatened could acquiesce and accept the new form of social reality. This approach, it should be noted is rare. For Piaget (Gruber and Veneche, 1977), however, this is the only mode of operation and this is a major weakness in his theory. (4) There could be a state of anxiety in which the one being threatened remains in a double bind only to experience further alienation and anxiety.

Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue that when members of a society share a community of interest, they tend to form groups which seek some form of identity through rituals and other forms of reality confirmation, and labelling and accusations of deviance as a means of reality maintenance. In the case of the ideology of total assimilation, this was a community of interest that dominated the agrarian society of the time (Hofstader, 1955). The values of the White Anglo Saxon Protestants, and covertly also Male, because the power structure ideology, in part, because the British were brought into America as high salaried and much needed textile workers who shared a similar cultural heritage and linguistic abilities. Their advantages over other immigrant groups were enormous. However, as a dominant group, they began to use their power to legitimate their value system. After all, this is one of the privileges of power. It enables those in command to label others as deviant (Becker, 1973), to socialize in the form of role models (Hewitt, 1976), to define time tracks and spatial parameters (Lyman and Cott, 1976), and to administer through a power elite (Mills, 1955). Those who are being labelled as deviant by the power structure soon come to accept their new self concepts, and enter into a fatalistic time track (Lyman and Scott, 1970). Over the last two decades, and particularly during the 60s, America underwent a radical change in consciousness (Berger, Berger, and Kellner, 1974) which soon materialized in the form of political action such as Black Power, Bronze Power, etc. It is because of this upsurge in new quests for power, that the advent of cultural pluralism became visible on the horizons of language planning groups, thereby creating the new pluralism (Greenbaum, 1974).

THE LANGUAGE OF OPPRESSION

At the other end of the spectrum of language and politics there is the covert and insidious use of language as a means of institutional labelling and symbolic control. Examples abound in this area, but one
of the more informative uses of political symbolism can be found in Mein Kampf (Hitler, 1924) where the unsuccessful revolt of the Putsch war in 1923 is discussed and where it is decided that Hitler was no longer to risk a physical war when the power of symbolism could accomplish control far more effectively. The tactic which Hitler employed is now recognized as a common tactic in labeling theory (Becker, 1973). His first act was to redefine those who he considered to be his enemies. He called them creatures. Now this term may not warrant concern. It appears innocently as almost a non-pejorative label. However, once it became clear to the Jews what Hitler meant by this term, it immediately grew as an ominous term. As Hitler specified, creatures are those who must be treated like parasites, vermin, and other bacilli. They cannot be seen. They are everywhere. Hence, they warrant separation. They must be suppressed. They must be eradicated. And, since they are invisible they can only be detected by those who are especially trained in their detection. Needless to mention, the last comment by Hitler referred to his OSS troops. The use of language for public labeling in this case is now a part of the dismal history of modern Europe.

The language of white racism provides another instance of labelling. Slave owners found it necessary to convince themselves and others that slaves were inferior. After they convinced themselves, they tried to clear their consciousness by convincing other Americans, and finally, the irony of it all, they also were compelled to make the slaves believe that they were inferior. They called them heathens, which is a highly overt religious society is a mark of an outsider. They also called them savages, and animals. By means of their laws, in particular the Dred Scott decision of 1857, they helped to institutionalize racism in this country. In addition, they created laws against intermarriage across racial boundaries. These miscegenation laws have only recently been repealed as unconstitutional.

In the area of Indian derision, the same kinds of labeling can be found. The Native Americans were defined as savages. They were separated at such a great social distance that they were not even considered to be in the same societal framework. They were deprived of their citizenship and it was only with the 14th Amendment to the Constitution that citizenship was reinstated. At the turn of the century, there was a movement to civilize those very Indians who were the victims of derision. They were made to attend schools for savages, give up their Indian names, and learn about the new America of the white man.

In the area of language and sexism, the arguments have become a little more subtle. The labelling has taken the dimensions of markedness theory. The normal and regular state of affairs, for example, was unmarked, but that which deviated from the norm was considered to be marked lexically. A nurse, as a case in point, is unmarked for female gender. A male nurse, on the other hand, is definitely abnormal as tactically defined by society. This tacit use of language has been discussed by Lakoff (1975) and others. It is interesting to note, however, that in terms of the social history of the United States, the
concept of the male as a leader, positive role figure, etc., was un-
marked. Women did not have the right to vote, and only gradually won
that battle only to find other battles regarding who could or could not
assume high political office.

Finally, in the area of the government's use of language for manage-
ment impression, the most glaring case can be found in the change of the
Department of War to the Department of Defense after the Second World
War. The implication, of course, is that America is no longer fighting
a war, but defending itself. This use of political propaganda was merely
a carry over of the philosophy of the Creel Commission which was estab-
lished after the First World War to rebuild the image of America (Garson,
1977). Hence, Watergate (Rank, 1975) is not a new tradition in American
politics. There has always been euphemisms for acts of cruelty during
wartime, and there has always been overselling of positive images to
save face and guarantee a return of the incumbents.

When these abuses of language are viewed within the proposed model
of existential sociolinguistics, an interesting discovery is made. These
misuses are not the exception, they are the rule. The only difference is
one of degree and not kind. For a better understanding of why this should
be the case, consider the conflict model of social interaction proposed
by Lyman and Scott (1970). They claim as a part of their theory that con-
lict is normal. In this way, they differ substantially from the drama-
turgic model of Goffman (1959). This difference is highlighted by their-
choice of the first candidate for the sociology of the absurd, Niccolo
Machievelli. They agree with him that life consists largely of deception,
lies, and broken promises, and that people must be made to believe in
illusions. Since the world has no objective and absolute meaning, they
argue, one must impute meaning on to these illusions. They must con-
struct their own social realities from the various fragmented expres-
sions and memories which they come across in encounters, episodes, and
situations. Language for them, then, is the mechanism by which desires
can be symbolized and communicated as in the case of management im-
pression (Goffman, 1959), interaction rituals (Berger and Luckmann,
1966), and public behavior. Whether they are dealing with face games,
relationship games, exploitation games, or information control, the
nature of conflict, anxiety, and existential angst always figures prom-
nently in the foreground.

Labelling in the view of Lyman and Scott (1970) provides a way of
creating boundary markers and maintenance markers so as to distinguish
the insiders from the outsiders. They see the various domains of social
also in terms of such markers and their territories. The public domain,
for example, is that which has been legitimized and defined as accessi-
ble by the ruling ideology. In direct opposition to this marking off of
space is the private territory which is controlled by the individual,
and in between these two extremes are the interactional territories
where minor skirmishes are fought constantly to maintain an enclosure
and reject newcomers.
Language use, Lyman and Scott note, are accounts that people give for social action. Excuses, for example, are used when an action is admitted to be wrong but the responsibility is distinctly denied. Justifications are used when the responsibility for an action is accepted, but the pejorative connotations of the deed are denied as a means of face saving (Goffman, 1959). They also discuss how accounts are avoided by appeals to mystification ("It's a long story and too complicated"), referral strategies ("Tell John about it, he is the specialist"), and the switching of identity ("Well, I guess you really don't know me. I am not like that").

Before dealing with the examples of labelling, the concept of deviance needs to be explicated. Becker (1973) has argued quite successfully that deviance is not a trait which is intrinsic to one's personality. There is no "bad seed" theory of deviance. Lemert (1951) is in consonance with this assessment and has argued independently that deviance is not a quality to be found in a person. Many people, he notes, break social rules and are not labelled as deviant. Furthermore, many people are deviant by all standards but are not labelled so by the members of their society. Hence, deviant acts depend on how people react to them (Kitsuse, 1962). An interesting account of how deviance works can be found in the writings of Malinowski (1926) where he discusses the death of Kimai'i, a 16-year-old Trobriand Islander:

One day, while walking along the beach, Malinowski saw a young Trobriand Islander fall from the height of a coconut tree to his death. He was dressed in formal regalia and appeared to have slipped and met with this accidental death. Later, at the funeral, Malinowski noticed the hostility between the two factions of Kimai'i's family versus another group. Upon closer examination, he learned that Kimai'i had broken the rule of exogamy and was having an affair with his maternal cousin (i.e., the daughter of his mother's sister). Of course, everyone knew about the affair, and so this perplexed Malinowski even more. Finally, he learned that his rival for the girl's love had openly accused him of incest within the hearing range of the whole tribe. Kimai'i was publicly accused. He was shamed! There were only two alternatives open to him. He could remain among the members of the tribe labelled as a deviant or he could escape. He chose to escape by death.

What this account clearly demonstrates is that deviance is a social act. It requires a moral entrepreneur and others who enforce the accusation. Becker has characterized four kinds of deviant behavior:

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<tr>
<th>Obedient Behavior</th>
<th>Rule Breaking Behavior</th>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived as Deviant</td>
<td>FALSELY ACCUSED</td>
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Not Perceived as Deviant  

Obedient Behavior  

Rule Breaking Behavior

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Of particular interest are the categories of FALSELY ACCUSED and SECRET DEVIANT. The former usually turn out to be minority groups who have been devalued by the moral entrepreneurs. Most of the examples discussed earlier fit into this category. The secret deviants are usually the privileged classes whose eccentricities are excused because they are the holders of power, and are able to label others rather than be labelled themselves. They are usually the moral entrepreneurs.

Becker's discussion of moral entrepreneurs and enforcers are of special concern to educators because they are the tacit enforcers of the system. They are the upholders of someone else's ideology. Enforcers, Becker notes, are merely trying to keep their jobs. They feel obligated to demonstrate that some problem exists and that they are well on their way toward controlling it. Such enforcement, it should be noted, is always applied differently to different people and in different situations. After all, once the crusading act becomes institutionalized, the social enforcer merely wants to demonstrate its existence as a problem. Of course, personal biases, and interpersonal relations of power (Jacobson, 1972) direct the nature of this enforcement in favor of the powerful and the mainstream and against the powerless and the minorities. This situation is documented by Roy (1952) in his study of accepted violations among union and management workers. When there is an equalization of power, he writes, one group will not publically call attention to the wrong doings of the other. Hence, if both groups share a balance of power, they also share a balance of goals and interests in the name of self-preservation.

Now, consider the abuses of language mentioned earlier in this section of the language of oppression. How can they be explained. From the point of view of Lyman and Scott (1970), they are extensions of a highly active conflict situation in which language is used to establish boundary markers to protect the ingroup from outsiders who do not share their community of interest. The tactics employed by those who label others as deviant, they note, are not much different from the normal uses of excuses, justification and other kinds of verbal accounts of social interaction. In the framework of Berger and Luckmann (1966), the spreading ideology of one group to maintain power over others is manifested in the use of labels and rituals to maintain one's social reality and to proselytize others to their beliefs so that they can find safety in numbers. The most interesting account of deviance, however, is that of Becker (1967) who views labelling as a means of human devaluation. What is missing in all of these studies, and this fact is surprising considering the sophistication of the literature, is the nature of the devaluation process within the framework of cognitive
dissonancy (Festinger, 1957). After one has tried to avoid a threat from outside of the group, the next step is to try and minimize the cost of the accusation by demeaning others or devaluing the source of the threat. In this regard, the kinds of labels used to stigmatize others can be informative as they provide insight into the kind of self concept the group wishes to front as their persona. In the Western cultures, for example, the value of intelligence is an over-riding factor in one's self concept. As a consequence, those who are devalued are frequently referred to in erotic terms or with reference to bodily functions. Humanity is another cherished term and those who hold this as a salient characteristic of their own group refer to those whom they despise as animals, savages, etc. The religious self-concept is manifested in the use of the term "heathen" and "pagan" and the priority of adulthood has its counterpart in such labels as boy, girl, and child. Finally, national pride finds its pejorative label in such terms as alien, foreigner, and outsider.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>BAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Erotica, bodily functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humane</td>
<td>Animal, savage, vermin, microbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Heathen, pagan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Alien, foreigner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What this chart demonstrates is not only that there is a rationale behind labelling and deviancy, but that there is also a structure to the whole process. The kinds of hatred expressed by whites against blacks in this country, for example, is similar in structure and intent to the kinds of labels used by Protestants against Catholics in Ireland.

CONCLUSION

The areas of language planning and the language of oppression have been discussed within the theoretical framework of existential sociolinguistics. This tradition has been contrasted with the contemporary models of positivism with its assumptions about constancy, and quantification. The proposed model, by contrast, brings in social history, intent, consciousness, and other extensions of the data and combines them into a methodology of hermeneutics. These new perspectives not only ask different questions about how language is used in social terms, but it also makes radically different claims about how language is legitimized by the power elite who wield community power, and how people are socialized into external patterns of recognizable behavior which are imbued with salient values.

The explanatory power of this model is also greatly enhanced. It enables us to account for many of the basic concepts regarding pluralism within the discipline of political science, it provides a coherent treatment of such sociological endeavors as labelling theory, neo-symbolic interactionism, the sociology of knowledge, and phenomenological sociology. Although all of these areas may not immediately appear to be related to the politics of language, they are. Language planning is, after all, a political act. This term is usually conceived of in pejo-
rative terms, but politics can also be defined as an interested group of people who share a community of interest and which to effect change in their behalf. If there is a more sinister use to politics, however, it can be found within the rubric of the language of oppression. However, as Lyman and Scott (1970) admonish, these characteristics are also to be found in the normal, everyday, use of language. After all, people do stage a front (Goffman, 1959), they do argue for certain vested interests (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), and they do participate in boundary maintenance as a means of avoiding cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).

Traditional linguistic theory is restricted to the formalism of mathematics (Chomsky, 1957), and theories built on the parameters of the sentence in some idealized social context (Labov, 1972). Although there is the illusion of safety and comfort in this approach, this tradition fails to relate to the larger parameters in which language plays a restricted role. Hence, there is a definite need for linguists to continue to investigate how language is used politically, socially, and psychologically. In particular, more research needs to be done in the areas of symbolic interactionism, social psychology, cognitive sociology, and existential sociolinguistics.
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