This essay examines the relations between universities and governments in different countries, focusing on the determinants of increased government control and the extent of that power. Six recent books that address these themes are discussed. The most frequently cited determinant of increased government control of universities is system expansion. Newer institutions generally lack the power of more established institutions (the size, tradition, or alumni), and proliferation increases the need for active coordination. Expansion has also changed intra-university structures in a way that stimulates government involvement. Demands that universities meet social, economic, and political needs beyond the campus also affect government control. Government control over the university has increased as overall government control has increased in most socio-economic spheres. The extent of government control and patterns of control in different countries are examined. Centralized control; autonomy and academic freedom; the power of coordinating boards; and control over appointive, academic, and financial policies are considered. (SW)
December 1978

*Daniel C. Levy
Research Associate
Higher Education Research Group

The research reported in this paper has been part of the work conducted by the Yale Higher Education Research Group. It has been supported by research funds from the Lilly Endowment for the comparative study of academic organization and governance. The paper will appear as a review article in a forthcoming issue of Comparative Politics.

In the interest of fullest possible circulation of information and ideas, the Higher Education Research Group reproduces and distributes these Working Papers at the request of authors who are affiliated with the Group. The views expressed are those of the authors.

Content of this Working Paper is not for publication or for quotation without permission. A list of the Working Papers of the Group may be obtained from the address below.

Higher Education Research Group
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
Yale University
1732 Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520
The myth that the university is somehow above politics has been dying a belated and painful death. However noble the image of a community of scholars immune from the tainting influences of politics, we are increasingly forced to realize that there is, after all, a politics of higher education. But it has taken stark evidence of blatant government involvement, following hard on the heels of tumultuous intra-university politicization. Scholars have lagged behind government officials in adequately appreciating the political aspects of such functions as: training of government leaders, bureaucrats, technocrats and professionals, satisfaction of middle-class aspirations, research relevant to development or nationalism -- or simply expenditure of substantial public funds. Even when the politics of primary and secondary education began receiving attention, spurred by community power studies in the fifties and sixties, the university's "self-evident virtue, professional dignity and innocence" protected its sanctuary status from political scientists' scrutiny.
Notwithstanding important pockets of recent improvement, political scientists still lag behind their brethren in economics, history, and sociology in the study of higher education. Even in what should be our special sub-domain: "Until recently most of the work on the politics of higher education was carried out by scholars in education. Political scientists showed little interest..."\(^3\)

One reasonable explanation for this inactivity is the recency of the dramatic rise in government control. Study did not come until the university community itself perceived an imminently clear and present danger.\(^4\) But this timetable explanation has limited validity. In fact, strong government control is not so new as commonly portrayed. Emerging literature on government control in the U.S. too often ignores the legacy of strong state involvement.\(^5\) At any rate, government involvement is historically more marked in many other nations. One need only think of the Napoleonic model, accenting centralized control by the ministry, long prominent in Europe and, through export and adaptation, parts of Latin America. So there is a clear need for historical as well as contemporary research. Such research might help identify what sort of government control is indeed new, in scope or type.

This essay concerns itself specifically with relations between universities and governments, cross-nationally. Thus, it focuses on the least treated aspects within the literature. These aspects can be ranked in the following ascending order of neglect: the politics of education, the politics of higher education, university-government relations; the comparative study of those relations.\(^6\) Even by the time we reach the politics of higher education, there is so little study that it would be highly gratuitous to advocate any particular substantive issue or methodological approach for political scientists to pursue.
Comparativists have scarcely appeared on the scene. This may seem a bit surprising given the classic perception of the university as an eminently international institution, and, especially, given certain definite cross-national trends in higher education. But it is quite understandable given the dearth of work available on most nations individually. It follows naturally that, "in the comparative analysis of academic power, the state of the art remains primitive." "Comparison" still generally refers to interstate comparison within the U.S. The best attempts at such comparison deal with state coordinating or regulatory boards. Short of actual comparisons among nations, we have mostly edited volumes with highly individual chapters on particular nations — and even these focus only partly on politics.

Ironically, the politics of higher education would seem to offer a textbook example of the desirability of comparative analysis. First, in an era in which the efficacy of present practices is often questioned, one might well be interested in policy lessons from (or for) abroad. Many policy-makers in both North and South America favor movement toward certain European modes of central planning. Meanwhile, some European nations are themselves experimenting with the perceived virtues of greater system decentralization and university autonomy! Yet we know very little about different policy outcomes across different U.S. state systems, let alone different national systems. Second, appreciation and understanding of particular policies is enhanced when we know how general or idiosyncratic they are. Which elements of a given nation's politics of higher education are attributable to cross-national patterns in higher education and which to particular characteristics of that nation's politics? A related, third reason for comparative analysis is that such analysis is a prerequisite to accurate assessments of the extent of growing or actual government control. We cannot appreciate the individual
trees until we know something of the forest.

The immediate usefulness of a review essay on the comparative politics of higher education, especially for comparativists not expert in the subject matter, lies in synthesizing some significant aspects of a small but extremely diffuse literature. Many works on higher education in particular nations now devote some section to politics. As interest in the politics of higher education gathers momentum, it is time to take stock of what has been said in scattered sources in the hope of structuring present (and even future) research around salient themes. Two major themes which preoccupy the literature are: the determinants of increased government power and the extent of that power.

Special attention is given here to six very recent books which deal substantially with these themes. Due to the proliferation of works which partially treat university-government relations, amidst the dearth of works which treat them as their central theme, the idea here is to establish important cross-national patterns more than to review a few "must" books closely. In fact, sad to say, there really are no "must" works in the recent literature. Thus, after a few summary comments on the six books themselves, the essay proceeds directly to an exploration of those patterns.

It would seem petty to belabor the obvious individual weaknesses of the six works in terms of social science scholarship. They are all highly descriptive. They rarely achieve systematic analysis or explanation. Even the few political scientists represented tend to deal somewhat superficially with central disciplinary tenets and hypotheses. Instead, some of the accounts by participant-observers (Nowlan, a former state representative, Gladieux, a legislative assistant, Gomez, a rector -- and then political prisoner), offer a crisp, lively quality. Other accounts draw heavily on secondary sources. Both types often lapse into tedious detail of formal provisions,
promulgated or simply proposed, often into bewildering repetition. Finally, there is very little effort at comparison. Only Van de Graaff et al., make a systematic effort. But one should not be too harsh on works appearing in a relative vacuum. We should not slag our young. Taken as a group, these six works are fairly representative -- somewhat better, certainly no worse -- of a still primitive literature. Thus they are most welcome contributions.

Possibly the closest we have to a "must" work is the seven-nation study by Van de Graaff et al. There are seven separate country chapters, giving good coverage of the industrialized democracies. Interesting contrasts develop between four centralized systems of state control over higher education (France, Italy, Sweden, West Germany) and three less centralized systems (England, Japan, and especially the U.S.). An interactive dynamic emerges between the conceptually-oriented introductory and (two) concluding chapters and the detailed country chapters. This imparts a cohesiveness too often lacking in multiple-authorship works. One can truly compare the countries analyzed. Unfortunately for our purposes, the authors devote substantial attention to matters of intra-university policy, but, happily, these are often related to university-government affairs.

The toughest country of the seven to analyze at the national level is the U.S., owing to the absence of an overarching federal structure. But Gladieux and Wolanin, focusing on the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, document the recent ascendency of a Federal role. By their own account (p. 249), the authors attempt little more than a traditional narrative case-study of a "fascinating slice of political life." But they do provide a rare look at the national policy-making process as it gains importance. Still, the preponderance of government authority remains at the state level. We therefore need more monographs like Nowlan's on Illinois. Nowlan explores
the role of the state legislature, especially the House Higher Education Committee. His study is insightful. Unfortunately, neither the Nowlan nor the Gladieux and Wolanin accounts, due to their focus on the legislative branch, gives a clear perspective on the overall growth of government power.

For all its shortcomings, scholarship on the politics of higher education in more developed countries fares well compared to scholarship on the less developed countries. Judging from its title, The Politics of Higher Education in Brazil might seem to offer more of an exception than it does in fact, since it actually limits itself largely to admissions policy. Nonetheless, the reader gains some understanding of the role of the authoritarian military junta which assumed power in 1964. A broader, if more subjective, account of even more repressive government policy in action is found in Gómez's analysis of Chile since its military coup in 1973. This work gives us a fearful look at something perhaps approaching the "extreme case" of government control in Latin America. It is more difficult to find a recent work principally devoted to African university-government relations. Most, like Ike's, really concentrate on university development or the role of the university in nation-building. Within this latter category, however, one does get a feel for how major political issues impinge on the university.

Drawing continually on these six and numerous other works, the essay now considers the two principal themes -- the growth and extent of government control over the universities -- selected to help synthesize the literature on university-government relations.

Determinants of Increased Government Control

Although the determinants of increased government control obviously vary from nation to nation, it is interesting for comparativists to note the
remarkable similarities found in very diverse settings. The most frequently cited determinant is system expansion. Fabulous post-war growth in enrollments, in more and less developed nations alike, eroded the traditional elitist aura of the university. Expanding numbers meant expanding needs, rising expectations—and greater dependence on government funds. The ivory tower facade crumbled. Skyrocketing costs ended the debate within many U.S. universities as to the desirability of seeking greater government aid. Responding to their ever-greater burden, government officials worldwide naturally concluded that more accountability was proper compensation. Concomitantly, many private sectors declined in proportional size, as in the U.S., or became "less private," as in Brazil and Japan. The Brazilian government first set a limit on the amount private universities could collect in exam fees and then offered compensating subsidies only if these universities joined the nationally-unified exam system. The Japanese government, breaking sharply with its post-war policies, assumed a major burden for private universities' expenses.

Paradoxically, and this symbolizes the momentum toward government action, not only for increasing scale, but limited or stagnating scale, are rationales for greater control. African governments insist that limited enrollments and research capabilities make inherited traditions of university autonomy unaffordable luxuries. Governments which a few years back insisted that expansion required greater direction now argue that sharp reversals in enrollment rates, coupled with hard economic times, require imposed priorities and economies. Maurice Kogan's analysis of the English evolution from control predicated on growth to control predicated on stagnation, is illustrative.

Returning to factors associated with growth, multiplying enrollments often led to dramatic institutional proliferation, which, in turn, has led
to increasing government control. There are two basic ways in which proliferation is associated with control. First, newer institutions generally lack the size, tradition, alumni, or, in short, entrenched power which help shield more established institutions from external control. Moreover, a disproportionate percentage of these new institutions belong to the non-university sector. Where technical institutes are created largely out of government dissatisfaction with the manpower performance of traditional universities, and are charged with more "applied" tasks, greater external control is a logical consequence. England's "binary system," in which polytechnics labor under far greater government supervision than universities do, is a good example. Similarly, two-year institutions or "community colleges" have been gaining steam throughout the American. Within a decade after the big surge started in the late fifties, the U.S. had over 1,000 such institutions, with 30% of the higher education enrollment. Chile's "regional colleges," started in 1960, mark one important Latin American foray; Mexico's regional institutes, started in 1948, but proliferating rapidly after 1970, mark another.

The second basic reason that institutional proliferation may lead to increased government control is that it increases the need for active coordination. Smelser, probing the fundamental structural-functionalist issue of how systems change during expansion, finds that mass education (in California) has led to institutional diversification, which, in turn, has stimulated efforts at coordination, even standardization. Of course, the established prestige universities resist efforts at external coordination, especially when standardization or resource-sharing are implied. The issue then becomes whether the external authority has the power to impose its will. The State of California sometimes did with Berkeley, the East-African
Federation generally did not with Uganda's Makerere University College (the major constituent institution within the University of East Africa). Short of efforts at standardization, coordination may be deemed necessary to curb the "wasteful duplication" found in spontaneously proliferating systems. The Chilean junta provides an extreme example. Or, coordination may be a response to the complex and competing demands of an "ever-diversifying" higher education system, as Nollan shows for Illinois. Also, as institutions proliferate and compete against one another, the legitimacy of what had been considered their natural needs is thrown into question. This encourages closer scrutiny of such venerable institutions as the University of Illinois, the National University of Mexico or the Central University of Venezuela. In sum, institutional proliferation leads to greater efforts to control the established as well as the new institutions.

Expansion has also changed intra-university structures in a way that stimulated government involvement. In most of Western Europe and some of Latin America, expansion fueled demands for democratization, often leading to the breakdown of hierarchical decision-making centered around senior professors or "chairmen." Paradoxically, this created a vacuum into which not only junior professors and students but also governments would move. To take an example from another region, the multiplication of decision-makers within the university strained the Japanese emphasis on achieving consensus, weakening the institutional structure and in effect eliciting outside interference. Cross-nationally, growing unionization of professors and university workers has presented a particularly thorny problem, either as it leads to power which university administrations cannot themselves tame, as in Chicago's community colleges, or as it links personnel matters to national labor legislation, as is happening in Mexico.
Probably the most ballyhooed aspect of intra-university politics has been student activism. West German students, pursuing a quest popularized by Argentine students fifty years earlier, demanded "co-government" with strong student and junior faculty participation. And, around the world, activism has often spilled over into violence beyond campus enclaves. Many authors have argued that activism shattered the university-government "affair," demolished the university's special aura, and killed the myth of the university's dispassionated judgment. Specific examples of consequent government reactions abound. In many parliamentary democracies, the student disorders of the late sixties led directly to spates of government legislation. German laws which so recently had promoted autonomy and intra-university democratization, now (since 1973) have demanded reduced autonomy and greater state involvement. Japan's ministry of Education (1969) passed its first post-war law on internal university governance. The Brazilian junta, which upon its ascension had responded to student leftism by abolishing the National Union of Students, responded to renewed activity (1967-8) with renewed repression. Chile's University Reform Movement (1967-1973), which (reflecting turbulent national political events) involved unprecedented politicization, would be dealt with similarly by that nation's junta. Thus the abolition of all student political activity to eradicate the "marxist cancer." Compared to these cases, U.S. government reaction was minimal. But the Federal Higher Education Act of 1968, barring aid to students involved in disruptions, encouraged many state efforts to infringe on university authority; though most efforts never were promulgated, they sometimes compelled desired measures by "sending a message."

Adjusting the focus a bit, there are certain basically extra-university factors which, while interrelated with other factors, deserve separate
attention as determinants of government control.

Van de Graaff and Furth write of the growing belief in the "politicization" principle that university performance should be gauged by national needs and social standards. Governments increasingly demand that universities meet needs beyond the campus. The sanctuary principle is in general disrepute, nowhere more starkly evidenced than in those Latin American countries, like Venezuela, where the traditional claim to "extraterritoriality" has been suppressed. Many Third World governments, such as the Mexican and the Tanzanian, have decreed that all graduates devote some specified time to social service, decrees which inevitably lead to university protests and only sometimes (Tanzania) to apparent government success. Those governments, such as the Tanzanian and the Cuban, which demand that their universities produce "new" or "socialist" citizens, have obvious rationales for great control. Throughout the world, less intense but still significantly increasing government pressure is found, again often despite university resistance, for programs of "lifelong" or "recurrent" or "open" (non-classroom) education. Even in the U.S., not generally cited to illustrate active government involvement for egalitarian social ends, the trend is clear. Gladieux and Wolanin (p. 95) describe the evolution of legislation aimed at "equal opportunity" or even "college as a matter of right." And everybody is talking about court pressures for affirmative action or "reverse discrimination."

Beyond such social ends, governments worldwide are increasingly pressing their universities to achieve definite political and economic ends. In Africa, as Ike shows for Nigeria, the watchword is nation-building. Until independence, Nigeria's "university colleges" were intimately tied to the University of London, attempting to replicate curriculum rather than to adapt
to local exigencies. Dependency continued to manifest itself during nationhood, as reflected in the predominant role of foreign scholars and advisors. And the problem of nation-building persisted as regional divisions, reaching tragic proportions in the 1967 Civil War, obstructed the junta's centralization policies. Whatever the frustrations, however, widespread progress toward Africanization has taken place; the main point here is that it generally came first in the government sector, which then authoritatively demanded it in the university sector. Similarly, Rudolph and Rudolph cite the nationalistic pressures aimed at making Indian higher education "less like an exotic transplant from an alien culture." 33

Meanwhile, many Latin American governments have been insisting on nation-rebuilding. Gómez and Haar detail the application of the Chilean and Brazilian juntas' counter-revolutionary ideologies to higher education. The university must be a spearheading force to create a strong, centralized, technocratic, "moral" society. Of special interest is the role of Brazil's Superior War College. Its training not only in warfare but administration, management, planning -- yes and even social science -- contributed to the military's self-perceived readiness to rule. 34 To a lesser extent, national regeneration has spurred government involvement in the more developed nations also. A common example is the U.S. National Defense Education Act in response to Sputnik; likewise, the English government soon became concerned lest its universities not keep scientific pace with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Recently, a number of governments have become more extensively involved in manpower policy, and therefore in university admissions policies. The premium is on sound "articulation" between manpower needs and university career enrollments. Meanwhile, a number of Latin American governments have been impressed with planning models focused on human capital.

A final cross-national determinant of increased government control has
received distressingly little treatment in the literature. Perhaps it is too obvious. Probably the literature simply has not paid due attention to distinctly political variables. Government control over the university has increased as overall government control has increased in most socio-economic spheres. The last few decades have witnessed a secular growth in governments' welfare-state powers in most Western industrialized nations. But the secular growth of government power in the mdc's pales in comparison to the dramatic growth of government power in many ldc's. Ike describes how English advocacy of autonomy for Africa's newly independent universities was rendered impotent not only by the quest for Africanization but, more definitively, by the advent of authoritarian one-party states and then military juntas. The Nigerian government moved in increasingly determined fashion after the 1966 coup and the 1967 Civil War. Similarly, there is no more prominent cause of the growth of government control over universities in South America than shocking regime transformation. Expansion, proliferation, politicization, and the ideology of development doubtless would have stimulated significant changes in control in any case—but nothing like the repressive grip felt today in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, or, for that matter, Cuba. It is interesting to note, in Haar's and Gómez's accounts, how highly overall government repression correlates with repressive university policies. The Brazilian evolution to increased authoritarianism, 1964-1968, included university purges and depolitization. The Chilean junta's initial counter-revolutionary wrath focused on the particular personnel, curricula and universities associated with the marxist left, while its evolving repression of middle-class democratic sectors inevitably intensified control over, for example, the Catholic universities associated with the "recessed" Christian Democratic Party. How fascinating it would be to explore what both Haar's and Gómez's work are already too dated to do: how government control may be receding
as the regimes become somewhat less repressive.

Comparative Extent of Government Control

Fundamentally similar problems emerge in considering the cross-national extent as well as determinants of increased governmental control. Again there is a proliferation of scattered information but woefully little systematic analysis. One searches in vain for criteria or methods by which to assess relative degrees of autonomy and control. In fact, the literature scarcely attempts anything approaching an operational definition of autonomy. There is only ad hoc consideration of different relevant issues. Consequently, there is a decided lack of objectively comparable data. Thus it is understandable that the literature has generally refrained from attempting cross-national assessments. But it is also lamentable. Only very broad statements about high or low autonomy are possible. Invidious ordinal ranking aside, we can rarely compare different patterns of government control. A reading of Ike on Nigeria and Haar on Brazil, for example, allows us to compare patterns only where there are infrequent coincident emphases. What is more disturbing is that a reading of Ike on Nigeria and, for example, Okafor on Nigeria, produces so little common ground. In fact, Okafor seems to imply a wider range of government control -- despite the greater recency of Ike's account, covering years in which the government's role has expanded.

Again, the unusual value of the Van de Graaff et al. study is evident. While it does not allow for any definite one-seven national ranking, it does give us certain grounds for distinguishing cases of relatively greater and lesser control, and, more importantly, for comparing patterns of control. The authors establish general and specific differences between the "statist" political-educational systems and the more autonomous ones. A good deal of diverse
literature tends to support their broad conclusions. Traditional respect for autonomy in England and the U.S. certainly contrasts with continental faith in centralized administrative planning. Similarly, the U.S. or even Japanese emphasis on vibrant private sectors finds no parallel in the continental bias for higher education as an integral part of the public welfare sector. Excepting only West Germany's Land structures, those European nations have concentrated government power at the national level. Excepting, to some extent, Brazil and Mexico, the same is true of Latin America. The contrast again is sharp to the U.S., perhaps even sharper to Canada. And as in so many policy areas, the plural checks and balances among U.S. branches of government impose limits on government control which appear quite unusual in cross-national perspective.

But numerous qualifications to these broad comparisons have now led some scholars to speculate about "convergence": systems with centralized control experiment with autonomy, while more autonomous ones move toward the "Swedish model." Much attention has focused on France's 1968 "Orientation Law," ostensibly geared to increase institutional initiative and autonomy, and on Sweden's 1977 Reform as a "far-reaching attempt to decentralize authority." Perhaps there is some relevance here to the general hypothesis, suggested by Huntington and others, that certain political systems which had previously pursued centralized power in order to harness energies will consider partial decentralization in order to achieve the flexibility necessary to cope with increasing complexities. But even after a full decade, decentralization in French higher education is probably not fundamental. If cross-national convergence is occurring, it still seems destined to take place far closer to the government control pole than to a median point.

A particularly dramatic, and much-noted, manifestation of increased government control over universities (at least in the previously less centralized
systems) is the growing power of coordinating boards. The literature's classic case is Great Britain's University Grants Committee (UGC). Originally established as a buffer between the universities and the government, a mechanism by which external coordination could be imposed by professional peers cognizant of government needs, it could forestall imposition by government officials themselves. There is, however, growing despair in academic circles that the UGC is evolving into that most sinister of all institutional creatures -- a government bureau. "It appears to many that the UGC now merely puts an acceptable face upon a broad policy decided in Whitehall." This fate would represent a particularly dire symbol for the cause of university autonomy because the UGC has been so widely heralded as an alternative to government control.

The clearest cases of UGC institutional transference naturally involve commonwealth countries. Nigeria established a National Universities Commission in 1962. In the ensuing decade government representation increased and the Commission's powers expanded; Canada and Australia face similar prospects for their UGC-like buffers, found at the provincial level. Despite important limits on its power, India's UGC "is by far the most important influence at the national level on higher education." But even the U.S. seems to be turning its back on its cherished pluralist beliefs in competition among autonomous institutions as it "closes the frontier." There is a definite evolution of state coordinating boards from advisory, to regulatory bodies. Also remarkable is the advent of strong coordinating boards in nations, such as Brazil and Chile, with histories of extreme isolation among universities. Brazil's Federal Education Council, comprised of twenty-four members nominated by the President, has broad powers over academic policy. The Chilean junta has tried hard to transform the previously ineffective Council of Rectors into a potent coordinating body. New boards in less repressive Latin American
settings have followed less certain trajectories. And there are some real efforts, in many nations, at voluntary inter-university coordination to stall the government offensive.

Turning more specifically to what governments have actually come to control, the literature is especially unorganized. There are hopelessly ad hoc references to control over some particular aspect here, some particular aspect there. It seems useful, tentatively at least, to categorize the major issues in academic governance according to three broad policy areas. Appointive, academic, and financial policies appear to form pretty inclusive, if not so mutually-exclusive, categories for a range of issues diffusely discussed in the literature.

The appointive category deals mostly with the selection of students, professors and administrators. Of these, no single issue has attracted as much attention as student admission, especially in those democracies with nationally-based, rather than university-based, policies. The continental tradition of fairly open admissions and career choice for secondary-school graduates has largely given way to "government-determined enrollment capacities and controlled access and admissions." The Swedish government has gone furthest toward explicit linking of access to manpower policies. Certain other systems are becoming increasingly nationalized, government-style. In Japan, recent laws limit admissions to provincial universities and impose a standardized entrance exam for national universities. Similarly, as Haar analyzes in detail (pp. 65-149), Brazil has moved from university exams to a single nationally-standardized exam. Perhaps the most striking example of government control over access policy, found in Brazil, or especially Chile, is the emphasis on restrictive political-ideological criteria. Of course, Cuba now has nearly two decades of experience with such criteria, its adaptation of "red and expert."
With certain modifications; many of these comparisons seem to hold for the hiring (and firing) of professors. Whereas professors are hired as employees of the national civil service in the centralized systems, they are hired as employees of the individual universities in the less centralized systems. Again certain authoritarian cases show the extreme pattern of strong government intervention according to highly politicized criteria. But, judging from the Brazilian case, professorial appointments still usually remain within the university's purview.  

Not so with administrative appointments. Most authoritarian governments control these very carefully. Each of Chile's eight university rectors is a military officer. In a vivid illustration of blunt authoritarian coercion, a Nigerian military governor, lacking the constitutional means to fire a university vice-chancellor (chief executive) simply called him into his office and "showed" him his gun; the vice-chancellor resigned. Even in the U.S. there is considerable government representation on public university governing boards, let alone on statewide coordinating boards.  

Three related cross-national hypotheses merit suggestion here. The first is that governments generally exert stronger control over important administrative appointments than over ongoing academic policy. By vesting authority in officials they can trust, governments need not attempt to deal with the complexities of specialized academic tasks. The second is that governments insist on direct control over appointments or ongoing governance. Thus one author, perhaps excessively influenced by the Swedish case, goes so far as to suggest an inverse relationship between the two concerns. The third hypothesis is that strong university administrations are inversely related to strong ministerial rule. Thus U.S. and English universities head off government involvement by lodging responsible, coordinating, bureaucratic authority
in university-wide authorities -- precisely the opposite of European practice, where universities are controlled simultaneously by individual "chairs" and national ministries. Perhaps it is in this context that recent French and West German attempts to strengthen university rectors accompany attempts to lessen ministerial control. Of course, as our authoritarian cases show most clearly, strong university-wide authority may go hand-in-hand with strong government authority. There is a pronounced need for further investigation of these three hypotheses relating appointments and ongoing academic autonomy.

The category of academic autonomy could encompass academic freedom from external control, as well as university authority over degree-granting, curriculum, careers and the like. Academic freedom warrants somewhat special analysis, however, because it does not necessarily constitute a part of institutional autonomy. In many West European nations, an enviable degree of academic freedom of individual thought and expression traditionally has been coupled with considerable ministerial control over institutional policies. Only at certain points does the distinction between the concepts of academic freedom and institutional autonomy actually blur to the point where a violation of one is a serious violation of the other. For example, ministerially-imposed standardized curricula in France and Italy necessarily restrict individual professors' freedom.

Academic freedom and institutional autonomy over academic policy correlate more strongly both in authoritarian settings, where each is limited, and in less ministerially-oriented democracies, where each is substantial. Our authoritarian cases show clear violations of one which simultaneously violate the other. Brazil's "cornerstone" 1968 Reform abolishes student and professor dissent, imposes stiff penalties for acts of subversion, and demands intra-university reorganization with increased government regulation of curriculum
Thus, for example, the junta determines disciplinary enrollments, eliminating "marxist" or "superfluous" courses, especially in the social sciences, and substituting courses consistent with its "national security" doctrine. The general blueprint has been xeroxed for export to Chile, little lost in handling or translation.

So it is only in certain democracies, those where education ministries do not play very strong roles in higher education, that one finds relatively high levels of both individual academic freedom and institutional autonomy over academic affairs. Universities usually set academic policy, while academic freedom has been relatively respected, when assessed in cross-national perspective. (This is not to overlook significant abuses, not only by governments but by other extra-university powers such as private donors, professional associations or external examiners.)

But even in these less ministerially-oriented democracies, rising government intervention chips away at institutional autonomy over academic affairs. UGC guidelines "strongly favor" careers like computer sciences while they "strongly discourage" careers like architecture. Kogan writes that the UGC imposes disciplinary distributions by institution within national percentages fixed by the ministry. If central control over disciplinary choice and human resources emerges as one of the most salient manifestations of rising government control, the comparatively minimal government role in the U.S. probably reflects on the relative strength of the market system.

Finally, we may speak of financial policy. No other realm of government control seems so omnipotent. And yet, despite the fact that certain financial matters potentially lend themselves more than other governance matters to quantitative empirical analysis, there is less literature on them. Particularly striking is the lack of study on the political ramifications of
different forms of financing. Tuitions, loans and subsidies are more often treated as economic or equity issues. But even before one considers the ramifications of who pays, the very question of who determines who pays merits greater attention than it has received. Within Latin America, for example, it would be interesting to compare the dramatic government imposition of tuition in Chile to the moderate government actions in Brazil and Colombia, to the relative failure in Mexico. 60

For those cases in which government subsidies sustain the universities, the literature's widespread assumption is that funding means control. The correlation seems especially clear-cut for the more authoritarian regimes and the state systems of the continent. Haar writes (p. 163): "In sum, the federal government did not hesitate to utilize both sanctions, and rewards... to pursue its policy goals." European ministries have generally involved themselves directly in line-budgeting, even to the extreme, in France, of pre-auditing expenditures. But it is not clear that government funding, even in ministerial systems, actually leads to the degree of control commonly supposed. 61 Some of the European countries are tentatively moving toward greater autonomy over distribution at the lower levels of the governance structure, and for example, the French Treasury now demands only post-auditing. 62

There are, however, sure signs of increasing government financial control in the previously more autonomous systems. Kogan notes the importance of the UGC's shift away from Treasury, "notoriously bad at controlling anything directly," to Education, where "there is now hardly a category of university expenditure that is not conditioned by UGC prescriptions." 63 Similar comments could be made for many of the UGC offspring. And U.S. state governments insist on significantly increased financial oversight. Even the federal
government, via the GAO, now has gained the authority to assess the cost-effectiveness of programs it finances.  

Still, we do not in fact know the degree and type of control accompanying government financing. Surely there is abundant, and growing, evidence of a correlation. At the extreme, universities in Communist countries suffer great external control with their 100% government financing, while certain private universities in Mexico and the U.S. suffer little such control in receiving only token aid. Within a single nation, South Africa's black universities receive 100% government financing while the more autonomous white universities derive 75% of their income from the government.  

But while he who pays the piper often calls the tune, there are also dramatic examples which defy the assumed correlation. The most authoritarian governments in South America have cut their proportional financial contributions as they substantially increase their control. Meanwhile, national universities in countries like Mexico and Venezuela maintain relatively high levels of autonomy despite nearly total dependence on government funds. Many Latin Americans would dispute the pluralist logic, so self-evident to most North Americans, and repeatedly sustained by the Carnegie Commission and, for that matter, endorsed by England's Robbins Committee on Higher Education, that a multiplicity of donors helps insure institutional autonomy. They argue instead that multiplicity may lead to duplicity. Responsibility is not clearly fixed. Each of the donors can be fickle, evasive or punitive. Thus, if funding necessarily implies some degree of control, it is not at all clear that a linear correlation holds. Even if governments giving 80% of the university's income wield more influence than governments giving 20%, it does not follow that governments giving 95% wield the most. Furthermore, linear correlations still would not prove causal relationships.
Focusing as it does on the growth of government power, emerging literature on the politics of higher education in different nations presents a bleak picture for university autonomy. It suggests powerful explanations for increased government control, and compelling manifestations of it. Unfortunately, however, it has devoted far too little attention to the limits to this growth. A fair overview of current literature conveys the impression of an almost inexorable rise of government power, of a one-way dynamic: what the government does to the university. Digging deeper into the subject matter itself, however, one finds intriguing evidence that government power generally is limited. To take an example discussed above: institutional proliferation clearly stimulates increased efforts at active coordination, but by increasing the system's scope and complexity it could conceivably produce proportionately less coordination. Perhaps it is worth suggesting a few relevant hypotheses for future research.

Difficult to deal with, as always, would be a range of political culture variables. What are the diffuse effects of cherished traditions of autonomy (Latin America), or deep-seated fear of government control (U.S.), or beliefs in consensual rather than imposed decision-making (Japan)? What limits derive from decentralization within the government or from vibrant private sectors? Can government, especially in those less developed nations with notoriously inefficient ministries, marshal the capabilities necessary for control? To what extent are universities safe, and their lobbyists' powerful, because few governments can hope to cope with the kind of specialized information and work tasks that are part and parcel of the academic enterprise? How politically powerful is the university's (usually middle-class)
constituency of students, professors, and alumni? Are these privileged
constituencies and specialized tasks especially conducive to cooperative,
even "corporatist," rather than subordinate, relations with government elites? How much strength does the university derive from its vital role
not only in primary functions like scientific research, but secondary ones
like political recruitment? To what extent do all the above factors add
up to greater university strength which at least slows government efforts at
increased control to an incremental pace?

Part of the reason that the emerging literature on university-government
relations has neglected inherent university strengths is that it has concentered disproportionately on "recent reforms" and changes. The sobering
fact is that we cannot properly contemplate changes until we understand what
is changing. The literature readily demonstrates that government power,
cross-nationally, is on the rise — significantly so. But a review of works
on different nations also sensitizes us to the relatively primitive state of
this literature — its laundry list approach to explaining the growth of
government control, its ad hoc assessments of the extent of that control,
and, of course, its meager coverage of the field. It still lacks the sort
of common language, methods, and historical and comparative data to put
observable trends into perspective. Whatever constraints all this imposes
on studies of particular nations, it imposes far greater constraints on cross-
national analysis.
FOOTNOTES


6. Although this essay concentrates on the government role, it should be clear that there are other important external actors impinging on autonomy. Among the very best books on intra-university governance is Graeme Moodie and Rowland Bustance, *Power and Authority in British Universities* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974). Leon Epstein analyzes "university government" broadly; a rare attempt by a political scientist. *Governing the University* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 1-2. Especially in Latin America, most work has focused on student politics, sometimes related to national politics. See, for example, the review article by Dani Thomas and Richard Craig, "Student Dissent in Latin America: Toward a Comparative Analysis," *Latin American Research Review* 8, no. 1 (1973), pp. 71-96.


13 Gladieux and Wolanin, p. 22.


15 Haar, pp. 92, 160-63.


18 Hugh Livingstone, The University: An Organizational Analysis (Glasgow: Blackie, 1974), p. 105; Van de Graaff, "Great Britain," in Van de Graaff, p. 86. On France's University Institutes of Technology see John Van de Graaff,

19 Gladieux and Wolanin, p. 19.


25 Gladieux and Wolanin, p. 26; Nowlan, p. 76; King, p. 66; Kogan, p. 198.

26 Van de Graaff et al., passim. The definitive work should be Hans Daalder, ed., Legislatures and Universities (forthcoming).

27 Haar, pp. 64–65.

28 Gómez, pp. 47–49.


33 Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 5.


35 Ike, p. 206, and pp. 204-220, passim.


43 Livingstone, p. 108.


45 Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 72.

46 Berdahl, Statewide, p. 252.

47 Haar, p. 38; Gómez, pp. 54-55.


50 A distinctly anti-Revolution account is given by Luis Boza Domíquez, La situación universitaria en Cuba (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacífico, S.A., n.d.).

51 Haar, p. 61.

52 Ike, p. 175.

53 Jan-Erik Lane, "University Autonomy—A New Analysis," a working paper of the Center for Administrative Studies, Umeå University (1977), p. 46. Perhaps the second hypothesis seems more applicable than the first to European countries where rectors have been selected by university faculties, while ministerial control over e.g., curriculum has been substantial. But one would have to probe the role of "out-stationed" administrative officials of the ministry.


56 Haar, p. 67.

57 Embling, p. 88.
58 Kogan, p. 200.


61 Burton R. Clark, Academic Power in Italy, p. 50.


63 Kogan, pp. 196-97.

64 Gladieux and Wolanin, p. 229.


69 See, for example, Guy Benveniste, Bureaucracy and National Planning in Mexico (New York: Praeger, 1970).

70 See, for example, Nowlan, pp. 14-15.

71 See, for example, Darcy Ribeiro, "Universities and Social Development," in Elites in Latin America, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Sopari (London: Oxford University, 1967), pp. 343-381.

72 See, for example, Dietrich Goldschmidt, "Sweden," in Van de Graaff et al., pp. 69-74.
73 See, for example, Joel D. Barkin, *An African Dilemma: University Students, Development and Politics in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda* (Nairobi: University of Oxford University, 1975).

74 See, for example, Jacques Fomerand's thesis, in "Policy Formation," on incrementalism in policy-making in French higher education.
The mission of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies (ISPS) is to encourage and undertake multidisciplinary research and education. The ISPS is oriented to the exploration of social problems rather than to the refinement of discipline-based methodology. In recent years, ISPS research has focused on the problems of the city, education, health service delivery, and on the modeling of social systems. Currently, research is also being developed on criminal justice, governmental reform, environment, income distribution, aging, the policy-making process, and value problems in public policy. ISPS is not a consulting organization but an instrument for enriching the social sciences and related disciplines in the University.

Higher Education Research Group
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
1732 Yale Station (36 Mansfield Street)
New Haven, Connecticut 06520