This paper, the fourth in a series of five on the current state of citizen education, examines citizen participation in contemporary democracy. The content is presented in four parts. The first covers the areas of citizen participation and levels of analysis and includes the domains of citizenship, citizenship as behavior, and micro and macro levels of citizenship. The second part on the concept of participation deals with instrumental citizen participation, supportive participation, citizenship as compliance, and self-interest and consensus. The next part examines patterns of citizen activity, including modes of participation, dimensions of participation, and participation and community policymaking. The last part discusses participation and individual fulfillment. The appendix contains the comments of those who reviewed this paper. (EM)
KEY CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP: PERSPECTIVES AND DILEMMAS

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In recent years, writers on citizen education have urged educators not only to transmit civic knowledge and skills, but also to encourage citizen participation. This concern reflected, in part, the political activism of the late 1960's and early 1970's, as well as the desire to develop more meaningful citizen education curriculums through experiential learning. Participation was thus seen as both a means and an end of citizen education.

This view is well expressed by Dr. Dennis F. Thompson in his issue paper "Political Participation." Defining his topic as "a process in which individuals or groups attempt to influence or make political decisions," Dr. Thompson argues that participation has both intrinsic and extrinsic value:

Intrinsic purposes refer to the values that are promoted within the participatory process itself, more or less independently of the outcomes that participants seek to influence. Here we would locate educative values of participation, such as the development of political competence and knowledge, civic virtue, and a sense of legitimacy. Extrinsic purposes focus on the outcomes, and include the expression of individual and group interests, as well as general interests or the public interest understood in terms of the outcomes of decisions or policies.

In order to explore the validity of such recent discussions, the Citizen Education Staff asked Dr. Robert Salisbury, professor of political science at Washington University, to write an essay on the
idea and purpose of participation. In the following paper, Dr. Salisbury examines the philosophical interpretations of political participation, questions the extent to which participation has promoted individual and group interests, relates participation activities to the development of public policy, and concludes with reference to the intrinsic values of individual participation.

The Citizen Education Staff also sought comments about Salisbury's paper from several persons with substantial research or applied experience in the area of citizen education. Our purpose was to provide a critical examination of Salisbury's major points, as well as to amplify his remarks through, for example, discussion of the political experience of blacks or the transferability of participation skills.

In cases where reviewers' comments were specifically related to portions of Dr. Salisbury's paper, we have inserted excerpts from their remarks directly into the body of the paper. In other cases, where reviewers chose to write an extended statement on one or two issues raised by Salisbury, their full comments are printed in the appendix.

Citizenship education and participation incorporate a wide range of values and perspectives. Meaningful activities in this area demand discussion and debate. We hope that through this publication the Office of Education can stimulate a dialog on the major issues underlying citizen education.

I would like to express my thanks to Robert Salisbury for his perceptive analysis, and to Miriam Clasby, Carol Gibson, Edward Greenberg, Ira Katzenelson, and Milton Kotler for contributing
insights from five varied perspectives. Appreciation is also due to Larry Rothstein for his skillful editing, and to Karen Dawson for her conceptual guidance and critical reviews.

Prepared by the USOE Citizen Education Staff, this paper is one in a series designed to help raise issues and provide information about the current state of citizen education. Others in the series include:

New Directions in Mass Communications Policy: Implications for Citizen Education and Participation

Citizen Education in the Workplace

An Analysis of the Role of the U.S. Office of Education and Other Selected Federal Agencies in Citizen Education

Citizen Education Today: Developing Civic Competencies

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Debates over the proper meaning and role of citizenship in a democratic political order have a long, lustrous but often interrupted history. Plato and, especially, Aristotle devoted considerable attention to the nature of citizenship. The concept of citizenship was central to most Roman discussions of politics. At the end of the Middle Ages controversy revolved around the right of the individual to resist the claims of church and state. And certainly since the 17th century, the obligations and privileges of citizenship have been at the heart of discussions of political philosophy.  

The writings of such philosophers as Locke, Mill, and Marx contain a rich mixture of both descriptive and normative contentions. It is often difficult to sort out these two types of statements; sometimes they are so intertwined that to disentangle them may destroy their essential meaning. Nevertheless, it is important to note that modern social science has begun to transform this philosophical debate by systematically investigating the empirical aspects of citizenship.

While it would be foolish to contend that such research has conclusively resolved this argument, it has considerably clarified it. Moreover, it is now easier to identify the competing values involved in any philosophical argument concerning the role of the citizen. Because of such evidence, it is possible to think in terms of costs and benefits, as well as the trade-offs involved in one set of political arrangements as compared to another.

The growth of social science research has also expanded the concept of citizenship in another way. It is no longer thought of simply in terms of the American experience or even the Anglo-American tradition. Social scientists gather, compare, and contrast data on participation in many societies, from
workers' councils in Yugoslavia to the ombudsmen in Sweden to the cadres in communist China.3/

In short, it is now much easier to assess the possibilities of participation and to evaluate alternative conceptions of democratic citizenship. Although sufficient information is not available to arrive at a wholly confident judgment, there is a broad array of empirical evidence on how people think and act under various circumstances.

Later in this essay, I will note another area in which modern research has enhanced the capacity to think and act effectively on this problem -- how different patterns of educational practice work and how they affect people's capacity for civic responsibility. In order to grapple successfully with the problem of citizenship, education, both the meaning of citizenship and the processes of education must be examined.

I hope in this essay to raise questions and to clarify some problem areas in regard to citizenship in contemporary democracy. I shall begin by examining several concepts of citizenship and how each one takes on meaning in different institutions of modern life -- the family, the school, the workplace, the neighborhood, and the society. The concept may carry different meanings in these settings.

In the third part of this essay, I shall turn to some of the recent evidence regarding the patterns of participation and the consequences of various social and political experiments in stimulating citizenship activity. It must be emphasized that although social scientists now know a good deal more than they did about what citizens do and why, they do not know nearly enough to make confident and conclusive judgments. That is why in this essay I shall often raise questions and express doubts rather than announce what is the case.
Uncertainty may stimulate thinking about what is unknown, but it can also have a somewhat paralyzing effect. It may leave a gloomy feeling that since it is difficult to determine what participation will accomplish, for the individual or for society, it is not worth the effort. The final section of the essay addresses this problem. First, I shall examine the material bearing on the effects of participation on the individual. Here consequences are undeniably important. And second, I shall seek to remind the reader of the continuing vitality of the democratic faith and the effectiveness of that faith put into practice. For, as Winston Churchill said, "Democracy is the worst form of government known to mankind; except, of course, for all the others."

ARENAS OF PARTICIPATION AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

The Domains of Citizenship

Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the modern conception of citizenship is the extent to which it is located within a particular and well-differentiated institutional framework and set apart from other realms of life. That is, the primary meaning of citizenship today is to be found in the political realm. Although economic and social activities overlap and interact with political life, both for the individual and for society, the distinction between these realms is well established. It was certainly not so for Aristotle, nor for most commentators who wrote before the emergence of the modern state. When Aristotle asserted that man was a political animal he meant that human potential could not be achieved without full participation in the political community. That community embraced all types.
of public interaction, including what would now be thought of as economic and social activity.

Even today the notion of citizenship is applied to such sectors as the school, the family, the workplace, or the social club. Usually citizenship in this sense only implies that within all social institutions authority relations exist and that this involves obligations and rights for each member. In short, there is an essentially political element in every social institution. A good deal of contemporary argument has developed over matters such as the desirability of "democratizing the workplace" or increasing "student rights" in the school. These may be seen as desirable in and of themselves. Or they may be regarded as preparatory to some expanded citizen involvement and control over the more comprehensive political institutions of the state itself.

In any case, these institutional arenas are perceived to be distinguishable in a way that pre-modern philosophers implicitly denied. As a consequence, choices exist that would have seemed meaningless to them. One choice involves the question of citizenship preparation: Is there a connection between the attitudes and practices of citizenship in the school or the family setting and analogous attitudes and practices in the larger political arena? Much modern political thinking assumes that there is and that expanded citizenship (i.e., primarily participation in, and consequent control over, authoritative decisions) in any significant social area enhances the likelihood of participation in other arenas.

*Ira Katznelson explains "The American and French Revolutions fashioned for the first time a domain of citizenship separate and apart from that of 'civil society'. This divorce of citizenship and society opened up the most pressing concerns of the modern political agenda: how will the tensions between an unequal society and an equal realm of citizenship be managed? How can democracy and capitalism be made compatible?"
It is often argued that if schools become more democratic, authoritarian practices in the workplace will be undermined. This may be true, but there is very little evidence of it. There are many examples at both individual and societal levels where democracy in one domain lives congenially with autocracy in another. Participation in workers' councils in Yugoslavia, for example, does not seem to lead to broad citizen control over other political processes.

The issue really is whether and to what extent participation in one institutional realm prepares citizens for more effective participation in other realms. A priori it seems that it would, and there is some evidence to support this assumption. But a case can be made that the effects are rather minor. If this is true, it has two major implications. One is, of course, that if adolescent participatory opportunity and experience in the school or family settings have little to do with adult practices, the former cannot be justified by reference to the latter. Throughout this paper, where I say that information does not exist as to what connection there may be between two situations it does not necessarily follow that there is none. Rather, it is an implicit plea for more careful empirical investigation of a matter too often taken for granted.

*An example of research being conducted on the question of whether and to what extent participation in one institutional realm prepares citizens for more effective participation in other realms is Edward S. Greenberg's work on plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest. Based on preliminary data, he has found a very strong relationship between active participation within enterprise politics (enterprises where the members are solely responsible for governing through attendance at meetings, election of a board of directors, and the hiring and firing of a general manager) and participation in conventional politics.*
The second point is that if increasing democracy in one area cannot be justified by its training effects for participation in another, then the question is whether increased participation in any particular arena is desirable for its own sake. This is a complicated question with no single answer. There are those who contend that every individual with more than some minimum threshold of competence should be a fully active citizen in every social system or subsystem of which he or she is a part.

Others, however, argue that the values involved and the costs and benefits of participation vary from system to system. If, as I shall later argue, there is very often a tension between the values of equity and efficiency in the operation of a social system and if expanded participation enhances equity values at some cost to efficiency, the net value derived may be very different if one is learning Latin, where equity values are slight, or American history, where they are central.

The example may be trivial, but the point is not. The values at stake in citizenship vary in type and in amount as we move from one institutional arena to another. There is no citizenship in general. It exists only in the particular domains of one's life. It is not clearly understood how the practices of one domain affect those of another, nor what precise values are at stake. Both sets of issues cry out for careful investigation and explication. At this stage, however, it is valuable to underscore the importance of such distinctions.

Miriam Clasby develops this point by her contention: "If we accept the generalization that citizenship exists, not in general but in particular domains of one's life, then the specification of those domains assumes critical importance. To limit the domains is to limit our understanding of citizenship and related skills and competencies. Exclusive focus on citizenship in sub-societal associations inevitably diverts attention from the role of citizens in formulating and evaluating public policies which expand or constrain personal and community choices."
That importance can be seen more clearly, perhaps, if we recall the political context in which a distinctly political meaning of citizenship emerged in Western political thought. We may place the critical period in the two centuries or so that begin with John Locke and end with Karl Marx. Even though many others, before and after, contributed to our contemporary understanding, it was roughly during this era that a delimited conception of specifically political citizenship, having to do solely with the institutions of the state, was articulated. Why? Surely one reason was the oft-noted desire of Locke and others to justify the Whig hegemony in England and its corollary, the reduction and subordination of State (i.e., Crown) authority over economic life. Political citizenship was the mechanism by which the state could be kept from unpopular intrusions into the business of the burgeoning bourgeoisie. In due course, political citizenship came to be the instrument of the liberal state, an instrument whereby those classes sufficiently numerous to muster enough votes could seek to redress through political action whatever imbalances might have developed in other arenas of life. And, further, if the effort at redress was ineffectual, the solution was to be found in expanded or more efficacious political action.

Conversely, one of the important tenets of Marxism is that the liberal distinction among the realms of citizenship is meaningless. Conventional citizen action to redress imbalances of socioeconomic power is futile, Marxists argue, because at bottom every structure of life is dominated by the same imperatives of power. Specifically, the class that dominates the economy must also control the polity. From this perspective, liberal conceptions of citizenship are mainly legitimizing the mechanisms. The ruling class justifies its dominance by arguing that the government results from the truly expressed "will of the people." It thereby persuades the underclasses to accept the status quo.
Clearly these are very large and complicated issues. My purpose here, as it is throughout this essay, is to raise for explicit attention some conflicts and uncertainties that often lie unexamined just beneath the surface of many discussions of citizenship. The issue to confront is this: "How does citizenship in one institutional arena compare with citizenship in another? When we think about citizenship training do we wish to employ the same calculus of values for teaching about citizenship in the workplace or the family as we do for the political order? Are the same values involved and in the same way? Or should they be more narrowly defined? Does freedom of speech mean the same thing in the classroom that it does in the newspaper? And, as some might argue, are the distinctions we draw among institutional sectors largely some kind of ruse, a ploy of the liberal state to disguise the realities of bourgeois hegemony in a capitalist world?

Citizenship as Behavior

Earlier it was noted that the idea of citizenship would be equated with participation in and control over decisions. This definition is suitable for the purpose of this discussion because it provides a behavioral reference by which to measure citizenship. Moreover, it is a concept of citizenship that can be bounded by law.

An important aspect of the emergence of the modern concept of citizenship is the unfolding of explicit rules regarding what the citizen might do (e.g., vote), must do (e.g., serve on juries), and could refuse to do (e.g., shout allegiance to the rulers). In every case, however, the elaboration of legal conceptions of citizen rights and citizen duties involved what people could or could not do, i.e., it involved their behavior. Hence, the idea that citizenship deals with behavior in addition to attitudes and values.
This is an important point. Much modern research on citizen participation and citizen education deals with attitudes, not behavior. Researchers have depended upon survey research methodology. This means that people are asked what they think and sometimes what they think they do. But behavior is not observed. For example, studies of American attitudes toward civil liberties find distressingly low levels of attitudinal support for the provisions of the First Amendment, but they do not indicate the extent to which these attitudes have been carried into action. An intolerant opinion does not inevitably result in behavioral expression of that intolerance.

By the same token, opinion research tells us that Americans are woefully ignorant of the basic processes of politics. But "when the shoe pinches" some of these same "ignorant" folk may know how to seek a political remedy. It may be that a certain political "street sense" exists among those who "test poorly" in the opinion surveys that have provided, until now, most of the information about citizenship.

As in so many areas of education, more awareness should be shown of the difference between education that prepares people for verbal testing, of which opinion surveys are one type, and education that prepares for effective action. One may wonder whether formal schooling has much to do with cultivating the ability to discern when the shoe pinches and what to do about it. Again, no definitive judgment can be made yet, nor should discussions be foreclosed even if it could.

The point is that there is a question to be asked of nearly every piece of research -- and this really means almost every statement of alleged fact bearing upon citizenship education. Does it deal with reported opinions and attitudes or with citizen behavior itself? If it is primarily about attitudes,
are they related to behavior, and if so, how? Often they are, and I do not mean to call into question the large body of work that assumes rough congruence between attitudes and behavior. My point is simply that we should never assume this congruence without examination.

Citizenship: Micro and Macro

Before examining other conceptions of citizenship and participation, another significant distinction needs to be introduced. Citizenship exists on two very different levels. On one level it is a matter of the individual citizen. How shall each person best be prepared to live as a participant in the modern world, understanding both it and himself so as to attain optimal self-actualization and self-interest through political action? On another level, citizenship is also a societal phenomenon. It involves the aggregate effects of individual participation. And these may turn out to be of quite a different character.

This issue will be considered later in reference to other problems, but one example here will indicate its general significance. Each individual is urged to vote, but if everyone voted would the results be beneficial? Would a society in which every member was a vigorously outspoken activist be one in which enough agreement could ever be reached to accomplish anything?10/

The dilemma may not be inevitable but there is often a genuine problem in squaring micro and macro level effects of participation. I shall return to this matter later.

THE CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION

Instrumental Citizen Participation

When citizens take an active part in political
processes in order to bring about some desired change in public policy or in some aspect of the political system, this is considered instrumental or purposive participation.11 From this perspective, participation is seen as a means of acquiring power, and power is regarded as a means, perhaps the means, for reallocating societal resources.

This concept involves a number of assumptions. One is that the essence of politics, and hence of participation in its processes, is conflict among individuals and groups over who should get what, i.e., the allocation of scarce resources. This is a venerable interpretation, running from John Locke through the utilitarians and down to much current political debate. It has surely provided the rationale for much of the effort to expand the suffrage in this country. Proponents of increasing participation have argued that it is important to give the propertyless, or blacks, or women, or 18-year-olds the vote so that they may reorder the priorities of the political system. More recently, those favoring participation have proposed enhancing neighborhood involvement in community development programs so that more money would flow to neighborhoods and less to downtown business interests.

Two other assumptions about instrumental participation, related to models of market economics, are that citizens pursue their self-interest, and that the aggregate result of individual political participation motivated by rational self-interest will be some reasonable approximation of the public interest. Clearly, difficulties are present in these assumptions. Is there any reason to support the idea that self-interested, individual political participation will result in optimum public policy? In short, does the "invisible hand" work?

It might be argued that to exclude or discourage any group from participation will severely deprive that group of its share of public policy benefits. Consequently, unless there is some acceptable basis
for exclusion (convicted felons? children?); no one should be denied an equal voice. This is essentially the argument for equal apportionment and universal suffrage, but at the societal level it is a negative argument. All can participate because no one can legitimately be left out.

It is at the group (or individual) level that the argument for instrumental participation is positive -- you will improve your share of what there is to get politically if, and only if, you participate fully. But your increased share will, to the extent that policy resources are scarce, be at the expense of some other group. And is it agreed that some now quiescent groups should step up their political activity in order to gain a larger share of the pie at the expense of those presently enjoying a favored position?

The point is that instrumental participation is, to some extent, redistributive. Some people win and others lose as a consequence of changing the level of activity. And given the near-universal findings that at present the poor, the less well-educated, and generally the disadvantaged participate less, to advocate an increase in citizen activism is, in large measure, to advocate redistribution of society's resources to these disadvantaged. Of course, that is precisely the object of much current writing about participation. To urge participatory democracy or the involvement in policymaking of "the areas and groups affected" has a political purpose and it is in behalf of the poor. 

"Milton Kotler believes that "Intellectual opinion has long amputated the 'invisible hand'; Proposition 13 has shown that increased participation does not necessarily help the poor."

12
It must be recognized (citizenship education efforts often do not) that insofar as participation is redistributive it always involves winners and losers. It follows that some of those who participate will nevertheless lose. They will fail, and democratic theory does not prepare them for failure. Participatory democrats of recent years have often been shocked at this discovery. Believing their cause to be just and in the best interests of the more numerous classes of the people, it did not seem possible that active mobilization would not prevail. Citizenship education must teach that instrumental participation almost invariably presupposes conflicting interests or it would not be needed in the first place. And conflict means that some will win and others lose.*

Another, rather different, dilemma results from invisible hand assumptions about participation. This one, however, does not have a clear class bias attached. It involves the argument that private self-interested political action will not lead to the production of public policy for collective benefit. Let us suppose that a strong national defense or clean air is of benefit to us all. Nevertheless, my self-interest and yours tell us both that we should not pay for these policies if we can help it. Rather we should let others pay while we take a free ride, enjoying benefits from which we cannot be excluded even though we did not pay for them.

*As Carol Gibson reports, black citizens expected their participation to be redistributive. Their expectation, however, was not fulfilled. "My hypothesis is that once the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed and implemented, black citizens expected maximum results and received instead comparatively minimal changes. I am suggesting that the extent to which apathy exists is related to a sudden realization that electoral politics is not very relevant to policy outcomes."
A customary solution to this problem is some degree of compulsion whereby the state forces us to contribute tax money even though we would rather escape. Philanthropic motives can also ease the harsher consequences of the invisible hand in politics (Mr. Justice Holmes said, cheerfully, "With taxes I buy civilization"). As in economics, so also may a widely shared commitment to some notion of the "common good" which serves to guide the participant. In any case, there are important limits on the sufficiency of instrumental citizen participation for achieving satisfactory public policy.

Supportive Participation

Supportive participation occurs when citizens take part in their political system. They thereby legitimate the decisions of government and of the political system. By these means they give consent. But if they are excluded they cannot consent and, for them, the system has no legitimate claim to their loyalty. For John Locke and other political philosophers, citizen participation has both instrumental and supportive features. Indeed, the supportive meaning attached to participation may provide a degree of commitment to the system, its rules and values. And this, in turn, may be essential to the system's stability.

Take a person who works very hard to accomplish a public policy goal (instrumental participation) and loses decisively. What binds him to the system, secures his loyalty, and inhibits either his emigration or his use of illegitimate means to achieve his policy ends? Sometimes nothing does. But if the individual does remain within the system, how is this to be explained in terms of participation? One way is for the person to continue to think about participation as instrumental but assume that at some future time what was lost today can be won.
Another way, however, is to regard participation as having an important support component. Thus, even a losing struggle helps cement devotion to the system and its rules. We often hear defeated political candidates, for example, affirm their increased admiration for the American political process and for the people who have just rejected them. This need not be mere political eyewash. Citizen action probably promotes a general tendency to be supportive of the political system.

There are, in fact, some empirical questions involved in these matters to which we have few reliable answers. Are active participants more supportive of the American political regime than those who remain outside the community of functioning citizens? The evidence of McCloskey and others suggests that they probably are.13/ But if those presently inactive were to be mobilized, would they then also become more sympathetic to and happy with the regime? Perhaps they would, but it might depend on whether their interests were served effectively. A good many blacks and radical students insisted that following the failure of their activism of the 1960's to transform public policy they were "turned off for good." (We should note, however, that there may be an important difference between expressed attitudes and behavior. Quite a few of the "disillusioned" have reappeared as active citizens.)

We may clarify this matter somewhat by examining some of the subtle distinctions regarding participation. For example, many people vote with very little sense of purpose but out of a vague sense of duty as a citizen. Many parents attend PTA meetings not because they wish to change school policies but to show their children (and their neighbors) in a general and quite uncritical way that they support the schools.14/ Some participation, in short, is supportive in intent, while other manifestations that take the same form, voting or going to meetings, are purposive.
Doubtless a stable and satisfactory society requires both kinds. But efforts at citizenship education should not blithely assume that there is no difference. People are apt to know better. If they are taught that participation is instrumental, the discovery that much of it is really only supportive may lead to antagonism and hostility. And if public policy creates participatory mechanisms, expectations of influence may be developed that are difficult, even dangerous, to meet.

The role of citizenship education in shaping expectations is especially well demonstrated in the People's Republic of China. Here the concept of participation is almost entirely devoted to supportive activity whereby the people actively implement the policies of the regime. The notion of active citizen involvement is crucial but it carries no connotations of instrumental participation.

Citizenship as Compliance

An additional dimension can be introduced as belonging to the discussion of participation. This is the idea of compliance. A person who obeys the law, reports his property value, pays his taxes, and generally complies with the law's dictates may be thought of as a participant citizen. After all, he or she has done all that political society has required, both positively and negatively. Who could ask for anything more? Indeed, it is important to carefully consider the extent to which citizen education attempts to convey a sort of Little Lord Fauntleroy conception of citizenship wherein the individual behaves in an uncritical, supportive, obey-the-law fashion guaranteed never to upset the status quo, always respecting official edicts of the state, and
I do not suggest that this is the true state of citizen education, but I wish to emphasize that there may be tension, even outright conflict, between the instrumental activist citizen and the obedient, compliant citizen. It is probably desirable to have suitable portions of both elements in citizenship training and behavior. That is, citizens should actively pursue their own values while at the same time respecting established policy and accepting society's standing decisions, at least to the extent of adhering to "legitimate" processes rather than extra-legal means. But accomplishing an appropriate balance is surely not an easy task, either for the more narrowly defined educational processes or in the operation of societal norms.

It may be that the course of wisdom lies mainly in acknowledging that there is a tension. Different groups with opposing interests will seek different equilibrium points. Those who are comfortable with the status quo may urge a heavier emphasis on compliant citizenship; those who are disadvantaged may wish to stress the importance of purposive activism. The fully competent citizen will understand this dimension, and often find it ironic as particular social groups shift position. Blacks, for example, emphasize direct action such as sit-ins to change an unfavorable law, but when the law is on their side, urge compliance upon recalcitrant whites. But the competent citizen will also understand how effectively to pursue or defend his own interests.

Kotler, in questioning the difference between compliant and supportive participation, comments: "It would have been much more helpful if he discussed compliance in terms of the deep human need for law and the existential fear of chaos."
Self-Interest and Consensus

A return to the concept of self-interest raises an additional and quite fundamentally different meaning that adheres to the terms citizenship and participation. How do we know what our interests are? The entire process of political education in its broadest terms is involved in the inculcation and articulation of values and needs, and I cannot begin to cover it all. Two points can be made, however.

One point is that, although there are diverse theories regarding how values are formed and what factors are most significant in shaping them, conceptions of self-interest are not always and necessarily selfish in the narrow sense of the term. Some citizens might be persuaded that their true, long-run self-interest requires them to pay considerable amounts of money to clean up the environment or to fight a war, even though they personally might not receive much discernible benefit. The active citizen may thus sometimes be pursuing values that benefit the whole community, not just one class or group.

On the other hand, both a Marxist and an old-fashioned, curmudgeonly capitalist might deny the reality, or at least the likely pervasiveness, of altruism as the basis of participation. Which is the valid picture? In thinking about what citizenship education should be, the question of what values are being sought through participation and how those values themselves are shaped ought to be confronted squarely.

The second point is that in some classic formulations of citizen action, participation itself is held to be a solvent of social conflicts. As people become active, their conception of self-interest changes and a common purpose emerges. Both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill argue that the conceptions of self-interest that people have will be
altered by their taking an active part in public affairs. Rousseau talks of the "general will," a shared conception about what is to be done that emerges after people have been sufficiently involved to appreciate what is required. Similarly, Mill stresses the educative effects of participation whereby the citizenry would come to understand the common good.

If active participation generates public policy consensus (or would do so under certain conditions, such as Rousseau's small city-state inhabited by people of substantial social equality), it gives a very different flavor to arguments about citizen education. For one thing, it could mean that in a society where some are active and others are not, it is the active strata that truly understand society's needs and those who are inactive and of a contrary opinion are simply wrong. To urge increased participation may be a way of seeking to minimize social conflict to the benefit of the active elite. As the unwashed become active -- so the argument goes -- they will appreciate the wisdom of their betters and accept as their own the values of the participant class.

Historically, this meant that the middle class co-opted the lower class, achieving a consensus on public policy that was defined by middle class values. This is very often what happened in the Progressive-Era, when the structures of local government were altered to minimize partisan conflict and introduce "good government."17/ The creation of non-partisan, at-large election systems for choosing local officials was often designed to encourage working class voters to accept "non-political" candidates and "citywide" conceptions of the public interest, conceptions which generally coincided with those of downtown business and middle class values.18/ More recently, school principals have used PTA's to mobilize parents in behalf of the school program.19/
Again, this discussion raises the question of what citizen participation should accomplish. More active citizenship may ameliorate hostility; working together may overcome differences of values and promote common understanding. Note that I say "may" because very little is known about whether and to what extent shared participation leads to shared values. But even if it does, which values will prevail? Who wins from consensus? Which of the previously contending parties, now emerged and no longer distinguishable, derives the larger share of the benefits contained in the newly articulated general will? Citizenship education should prepare citizens to ask these questions of social criticism about the political meaning of their participation and that of their neighbors.

Clearly, there are circumstances when greater activation increases the intensity of social conflict. In some instances this may involve a process of escalation, not unlike the arms race among nations where the activity of one group stimulates an opposing group until momentous conflict has spread through the system. One thinks of the American South two decades ago where black activism begat white citizens' councils and vice versa. In other cases, con-

Edward S. Greenberg comments on current antipathy toward citizen participation: "I believe it is worth nothing that there is a deeply hostile climate toward efforts to encourage citizen participation in various areas of democratic life. Many politicians and scholars are warning of the dangers of participation, proclaiming the need to decrease the demands and lower the expectations of citizens. The idea seems to be emerging among important sectors of the opinion-making public that a serious erosion in the legitimacy of the political and economic system has taken place in recent years, contributing to heightened social instability, economic inefficiency, and governmental malaise."
flict results more from the means of participation employed, as when street action or riots are used. Here again, however, it must be recognized that "legitimate means" carry their own biases. It is the comfortable classes in society who can best afford to limit the means of participation.

PATTERNS OF CITIZEN ACTIVITY

Some Modes of Participation

I have been talking about different ways of thinking about citizenship and participation. Now it is time to consider some of the different ways of acting, what Verba and Nie refer to as the different modes of participation. For many years, often without quite realizing it, scholars and philosophers tended to equate participation with voting. For them, apart from obeying the law (compliant citizenship), the principal obligation of citizenship was voting. Likewise, voting was the central process of democracy, and elections were the central mechanisms by which leaders were kept responsible and responsive to the wishes of the populace.

At the societal or macro level, the health of a political system was often thought to revolve around, or at least be revealed in, a single indicator -- voter turnout. Too small a turnout indicated disaffection, even alienation; too large a vote might reflect high intensity of demands and presage revolt by the electoral losers. In the United States the problem of "excessive" voter turnout has seldom presented itself. Rather, the generally expressed view has been one of alarm over low voter participation. Germany in the 1920s seemed to provide an example of "democratic overload." Participation and political mobilization were so intense that the fragile Weimar Republic finally gave way to Hitler. So the argument was plausible. Many democratic governments and other systems that use voting for plebiscite purposes adopted compulsory
voting or other devices that reduced the voluntary component. This made voting a less reliable guide to how much citizen participation there might be and to what its effects were.

Western conceptions of citizenship participation emphasize voluntary action as the only valid indicator. Accordingly, participation in all forms of voluntary association have sometimes been used to assess the rate of citizen activism among various groups and in the nation as a whole. The United States compares more favorably to other nations by this criterion than by the voting standard. But it appears less distinctively the "nation of joiners," solving its problems through voluntary action, than Alexis de Tocqueville seemed to suggest in the 1830's.

Voluntary associations present a number of complex issues that citizenship education needs to take more fully into account. One function of such associations is to provide a medium through which to bring more effective pressure on government than would be possible by individual action alone. This is a classic pressure group conception of voluntary action. As such it falls comfortably into the set of mechanisms for active citizenship that includes elections, demonstrations, and other forms of direct action.

Another use of associations is to provide benefits, goods, and services to its members, either in competition with, or in addition to, the state. This, the classic English pluralist conception, is a central activity of such diverse groups as church auxiliaries, bridge clubs, grocery co-ops, and professional societies. That many such benefit groups may become involved in pressure activities is true enough, and, as Olson has shown, this may be the principal route by which they become active in the political arena. But participation in organizations of this second type need not, and often does...
not, have much to do with political citizenship. Thus it is important to consider whether voluntary association activity should be viewed as citizenship participation or as something else, less community-spirited and often irrelevant to the central purposes of participation.

There is another approach to voluntary action, however. Voluntary group participation may be part of a learning process, whereby the skills necessary to effective citizenship are acquired and perfected. The fraternal lodge may be a proving ground for the community, the union hall for the alderman’s race. John Stuart Mill was perhaps the most articulate exponent of the view that citizenship was learned and that, especially for the less well-situated who lacked formal education, taking part in smaller group settings was necessary preparation for the larger.

What is, in fact, the case? Does participation involve a set of skills? Does one learn them best by doing? Can doing be simulated effectively in a classroom so that the learned skills can be carried over to real life settings? Or is the cognitive component -- knowing where, with, and to whom, to do things -- most of the answer? Clearly, our educational strategies will depend on our answers to these questions, and at this stage we need much additional research before we can be confident about our answers.

The Dimensions of Participation

With the rise of survey research, data were gathered about other facets of citizen activity besides voting and voluntary association membership. Such items as membership in political organizations, giving money, attendance at electoral meetings and rallies, working for candidates, and, of course, candidacy itself were inventoried and distributions noted. In general, it appeared that these several acts, all revolving around partisan elections, in-
evolved a single dimension. They could be arrayed on a continuum ranging from easy to difficult according to how costly or troublesome they were to the citizen. Thus, voting was easy, candidacy was difficult, going to rallies was in between.

As a result of this work, participation for both individuals and societies was thought of in terms of more or less and assessed accordingly. Differences could be mapped between highly participant nations or groups and less active ones, and these differences could be related to other factors in order to determine what caused the differences and what effects followed from them.

More recent research has revealed that this is much too simple a view. In their major survey of American political participation, Verba, Nie, and Kim asked people about 12 different kinds of activity. They found that these involved four basic dimensions: voting, more extensive electoral activism, communal activity, and personal contacting. Each of these modes bore only a modest relationship to the others. There were some people who did all of them (the complete activists, 11 percent of the total), and others who were entirely inactive (22 percent). Electoral activists were different from communalists, and essentially this kind of differentiation was found to be true also in several other countries Verba, Nie, and Kim have investigated.

What these researchers really demonstrated was that participation was a much more complicated and variegated phenomenon than most previous discussion had generally recognized. They did not, however, provide a definitive list of the modes of participation. For example, they did not ask about media participants -- those people who write to newspaper editors or call open-line radio programs. They also did little with such politically meaningful talk as back-fence gossip, saloon arguments, and other types of discussion that may sometimes constitute influen-
tial participation and not just a kind of political spectatorism.

A firm empirical assessment of the types and amounts of citizen participation may be quite difficult to do with the usual methods of survey research. The fraction of people engaging in some kinds of activity may be too small to show up clearly in a sample, yet less than 1 percent will still involve some two million people in the United States. In addition, some kinds of participation, such as back-fence political talk, may be difficult to recall with any accuracy when a pollster comes around. But a richer and more accurate sense of what is involved in citizen participation requires increasingly subtle and delicate probing of participatory experience, better questions, and more refined observational techniques. Here, at least, the beginning steps have been taken.

There is yet another kind of complication besetting research on political participation. Not only are there different kinds of activities, there also are different institutional settings in which participation occurs. Verba, Nie, and Kim uncovered this fact without realizing it. Two of their modes, electoral and communal, were really different institutionally. But there are other institutional settings which they did not investigate: schools, courts, administrative agencies, and the streets. With a broader definition of participation, unions, churches, and voluntary associations as well as the more private world of primary groups might be included.

Although the kinds of politically relevant participatory behavior inside a friendship group are not the same as that of a court (the latter is highly formalized and rigidly controlled, while the former is informal and consists mainly of talk and perhaps some role modeling), both are important to those involved and have effects on political outcomes. The point is that participation never occurs in general. It is always specific to a particular institution,
Unanticipated results may follow from the realization that participation is institution-specific. Concern about the decline in voting turnout should be weighed with evidence of involvement in voluntary associations. Neighborhood groups may flourish, even as political party organizations in the same neighborhoods are moribund. The assessment of democracy must rest on the whole array of participation and all of its mechanisms in the society.

In short, there are many institutional arenas where participation may be fruitful. In some cases, people excited about a particular issue may move from one arena to another in their efforts to influence the outcome. Blacks, for example, have found the most effective place for political activity to be sometimes the courts, sometimes the electoral process, sometimes pressure group lobbying, sometimes neighborhood groups, and sometimes direct action in the streets. Citizenship education, if it is to be meaningful, must recognize and deal with the complexity and variety of activities that make up participation and the institutional arenas in which they occur.

Gibson suggests that societal pressures may also be responsible for the particular kind of participation in which blacks engage: "...society usually responds to the black citizen's individual participation through group remedies. This has led to black citizen participation often being expressed by groups rather than the more traditional individual participation. While most organized group activity developed in this country as a supplemental technique to increase the influence of distinct segments in the society, it was for blacks the principal avenue by which the policy interests of the group could be effectively articulated."
The agenda of citizenship participation is now apparent: a rich array of participatory acts, pursued in a complex of institutional settings, by people with diverse and dynamic conceptions of self-interest. Indeed, all of the components are dynamic. For instance, one's stake in the public schools is maximized by having children enrolled and this variable greatly increases the likelihood of school-centered participation. But it is a variable, which is to say that some parents (well-educated?) may be more likely than others to perceive and pursue their stake. Children grow up so that parents usually do not remain active in school-related affairs indefinitely. As they get older they may shift from PTA meetings to civic organizations and eventually perhaps become active members of the Grey Lobby.

A great many combinations of activities are possible and concepts of citizen participation must take that variety into account. Otherwise, the danger will be a misreading of the signs of democratic health and a misunderstanding of the tasks of citizenship education. It is one thing to urge children to become active citizens by voting; it is quite another to encourage expression of the citizenship obligation through organizational work.

Self-interest can readily be discerned as the motivational basis for organizational involvement, but many of those who vote in national elections may be quite unsure of their personal stake. Self-interest should not be attributed too readily, however. A skeptical indifference toward the self-interest relevance of many kinds of participation obviously pervades much of the society, and, in far more cases than cheerleading civic texts acknowledge, it is thoroughly justified. By disaggregating the settings and modes of citizenship, perhaps the case
can be made more persuasive that at certain times and in certain settings people ought to participate actively. *

Participation and Community Policymaking

Another dimension of citizen education is the macro effect of participation. This dimension can be understood most easily by considering the effects of increased neighborhood group participation in community development programs. The neighborhood is not, of course, the whole of society, but it is a complex social structure. Federally mandated participation has existed since the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which required "maximum feasible participation" of the areas and groups affected by the program. Many Federal programs affecting cities have tried to build in some form of citizen participation component, partly in order to gain community level support for the programs, and partly to enable policy administrators to discover what, at the grass roots level, would really work. 34/

The 1974 Community Development Act further encouraged the formation and expansion of neighborhood associations by requiring their active contributions to each community's plans for allocating the large

*An additional perspective is suggested by Clasby: "A reliance on a utilitarian tradition of individualism and self-interest precludes alternate analyses of instrumental citizenship rooted in value commitments; it restricts the benefits of participation to self and/or group rather than to the polity. Finally, it transforms citizenship as a public function to citizenship as a private good. There are multiple ways in which a case can be made for citizenship based on value commitments; the pursuit of justice for others may be as powerful a motivating force as drive for personal benefits; tangible evidence of institutional inequities may trigger participation directed at securing for others as well as the self."
sums of money involved in the program. What have been the consequences of the act?35/ First, citizen participation has undoubtedly increased, fueled by the money involved and by the competition for funds among neighborhoods. There is an instructive contrast between the vigor of such neighborhood involvement and the comparatively indifferent response in the 1960's to the efforts to elect representatives to community action program advisory boards.36/ The latter appeared to involve few tangible interests, and most people did not care much about merely giving advice through participation unless it would truly affect them directly.

A second result involves the way money is allocated as a consequence of extensive citizenship participation. It appears that either of two main patterns can emerge. One is that neighborhood self-interest predominates and through a log-rolling process each neighborhood gets its share, more or less, of the pie. Thus, each area may secure a health clinic, a park, street lighting, or housing assistance according to whatever priorities the area establishes and within the overall limits imposed on this barrel of pork. Moreover, under this pattern, the allocations take immediately tangible and pleasant forms. "Nice" items such as housing prevail over distasteful items such as prisons or incinerators. Industrial parks are difficult to develop through this process because while everyone might want more jobs available they would prefer to locate them and their potentially blighting effects in another part of town.

The results of this pattern of resource allocation growing out of active citizen participation are certainly not all undesirable. Often the neighborhood does know better than the planner what is good for it, and more housing may be better than more jobs or more expressways. But economic development strategy for cities may sometimes require investment in the central business district, too, or the hard
choice of making a massive financial commitment to one area of the city which will have beneficial spillover effects elsewhere. An equal share for every area may produce less net well-being than a larger, more focused, effort. Essentially, this is the kind of conflict that not infrequently arises in public policy between equity and efficiency. Efficiency in generating long-run benefits may be incompatible with equity in short-run allocations. Maximum participation is likely to increase the political strength of the equity criterion and weaken the claims of efficiency of investment.

The other main pattern of citizen participation occurs when there is vigorous neighborhood participation but no mutual back-scratching. In short, stalemate. Sometimes the problem is a zero-sum conflict in which the sides are irreconcilable, and each is opposed to the other's policy interest. School busing comes to mind. Increased citizen activism does not make it easier to resolve that kind of issue. In some cases the problem results because resources are scarce rather than abundant. Logrolling is a feasible process for allocating benefits, but it works less smoothly for apportioning costs. If a city has two public hospitals, one on each side of town, and must close one for financial reasons, activated citizens are likely to make any decision painful and perhaps politically impossible.

Immobility may result from high intensity participation because the principles or reasoning that dominate the terms of discussion do not permit bargaining or compromise. How difficult it is for people to agree about how to divide the money, for example, if it can be allocated only according to the public interest. For Rousseau this problem was resolved by his confidence that with sufficient participatory experience each member of the community would come to share the same values so that the public interest would, in fact, coincide with the "mature" views of each participant. Rousseau's optim-
ism might run into a powerful counterargument in the realities of neighborhood group participation in contemporary American cities.

The purpose of this excursion into current urban politics is to illustrate a much broader theme: That there are fundamental conflicts of value very often involved in citizen participation and that, for society, it is not an easy task to decide whether to opt for equity or efficiency. It is an old, old argument between the appeals of the dictator, however wise, and the appeals of democracy. Extra participation may sometimes get in the way of doing what works most effectively, but without participant involvement policymakers may not really know what will work. The dilemma that society faces does not necessarily carry over to the individual citizen, however. It is at that level that one final, and perhaps least controversial, justification of increased participation rests.

THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION

Participation and Individual Fulfillment

During the 1960's the debates over participatory democracy brought to the foreground a number of ideas and arguments that for a long time had been obscured. Participation had overwhelmingly been considered in terms, first, of its instrumental use as a route to power and power's rewards, and second, of its significance and possible danger to a stable and effective democratic policy. These emphases overlooked another very different value of participation, its value to individual growth and self-realization.

Self-realization through active citizenship was, of course, what Aristotle had been talking about all along. Radicals of the 1960's discovered the so-called "young Marx" with his emphasis on alienation and the importance of active commitment in overcoming
And from such diverse traditions as Christianity and John Dewey, one could derive the notion that whatever else participation might mean, it was intrinsically beneficial for the participant. It expanded cognitive horizons, it imparted skills and the confidence to use them, it widened social interactions, it made a more complete, a more fully human, person. And, from the point of view of participatory democrats, this result was worth almost any cost in instability, disorder, or inefficiency.

There is a major empirical uncertainty surrounding this perspective, however, and citizenship education must take account of it. The problem is this: To what extent is it really true that participation is an effective way to enhance our personal capabilities? Does anyone really believe that, for example, simply voting -- the classic criterion of participation -- makes people more fully human? Are ward-level political activists better, more knowledgeable people than carpenters or preachers whose political involvement is minimal?

For some participatory democrats the question is essentially one of definition. Those who participate are virtuous since that is how virtue is defined. But for the rest it must be regarded as an open and serious question. Of course most would agree that self-realization is desirable. And there may be little dispute over the proposition that apathy will not lead to individual growth. But how much participation, in what forms and in what arenas, is required to bring about the desired result? There is no complete answer yet. What research has been done indicates that growth in individual self-confidence and understanding does result from participation. It is seldom dramatic in its macro-social impact, but for the individual citizen it may make a world of difference.

As Clasby points out: "If the prize of citizenship in a society is self-realization, it must be available to all citizens; all citizens, therefore, have a right to expect social arrangements that will satisfy basic needs so they can aspire to self-realization."
Citizenship has many facets and dilemmas. Difficulties attend them all. The mature citizen will recognize and, without being paralyzed, seek to balance the competing values and interests at stake. In a viable democracy, education must seek to foster mature citizenship. What this really means is that education, which encompasses not only the schools themselves but also the family, the media, and all the other social mechanisms through which we learn, must recognize and deal with these difficult issues and at the same time keep the democratic faith clearly in view. And that faith rests squarely on a commitment to the importance of active individual participation.

However citizenship may be conceptualized -- as instrumental, supportive, or compliant -- it entails the obligation to be active and not simply passive or accepting. Even though there may be some costs entailed, some things that do not work out so well, the democratic faith urges that decisions be made by, or according to the articulated preferences of, majorities of citizens, not experts seeking efficient social results, but citizens expressing their own desires and interests.*

The democratic faith does not guarantee success. In a participatory society people may, as Rousseau thought, come to a common understanding of what needs to be done. But they may not, in which case there will be winners and there will be losers, all of

*Another point of view is raised by Greenberg in looking at the mature citizen: "If one conceives of society as a deeply divided class structure in which the interests of opposed classes are incompatible or irreconcilable, then a citizen who recognizes value conflict yet accepts perpetual loss is not mature. One might say that a mature citizen is one who does not accept the status quo but seeks to change the regime itself."
whom were active. Perhaps the most difficult task of citizenship education is to persuade people that they should continue to be active in behalf of their values even though they seem never to be on the winning side.

Democracy cannot assure instant gratification. But a mature citizen will recognize that in a complex political world it is often unclear who has won. The political process continues: alignments, coalitions, and changing tides of fortune. So, too, do our notions of what it is that we want and seek through citizen participation. Remaining active permits citizens to experience and perhaps to take advantage of what tomorrow's political circumstances may bring. If, however, citizens withdraw they will deny themselves that chance.*

Finally, the mature citizen recognizes that the measure of democratic achievement is not ultimately to be found in the material well-being of society, the efficiency with which social problems are resolved, or even the extent to which particular social majorities are able to secure their interests.*

*As Kotler argues: "Fears that the machine of participation may stop are unwarranted. Democracy, with its rapid shifts of opinion and its sudden reversals of fortune, teaches people very quickly about failure. Where people fail at this or that moment, they continue to participate and redouble their efforts because of a hope that they will succeed in the future. Faith in the future keeps participation going."

*Kotler observes that "Citizenship, as an ideal, has always been concerned with men and women's responsibility to their country and to other people. Mature citizenship is not going to depend on abstract behavioral process but on the moral choices that children are taught, and on their courage of action in being responsible to their fellow citizens and the strangers among them."
In the last analysis it is the fulfillment of their potential by individual human beings that counts the most, and no one has ever persuasively refuted the ancient argument that the human potential can only be fully realized through active participation in the political community.

NOTES


2. For a particularly interesting examination of the place of citizen participation in the history of political ideas see Lawrence Scaff, "Participation in the Western Political Tradition," Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975.


4. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba made their assumption when, having observed international differences in school participation, they sought to infer a relationship to adult citizen attitudes. It was a courageous inferential leap not very well supported by closer studies. See "The Civic Culture," Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.


This criterion of democratic capacity was articulated by A. D. Lindsay, "The Modern Democratic State," London: Oxford University Press, 1943.


This discussion is drawn from my article, cited in note 6. See also Scaff, op. cit., and Parry, op. cit.


See the references cited in note 7.
14 A recent study of the motives and expectations affecting school-centered participation of parents is my "Citizen Participation in the Public Schools," forthcoming.

15 See Thompson, op.cit.


25 Almond and Verba, op. cit.

26 "Democracy in America," written in 1830, first translated into English in 1835.


30 See the discussion of Mill in Pateman, op. cit.


32 See note 22.


35 This discussion is based mainly on observations of the processes at work in the St. Louis metropolitan area.

36 See J. David Greenstone and Paul Peterson.


38 This is a central finding of my research on school participation. See note above.
Any response to Professor Salisbury's essay must at some point wrestle with the paradoxes embedded in the presentation. How did we begin with a masterful reminder of a Graeco-Roman citizenship which was co-extensive with all aspects of public life, and yet find ourselves, in the end, locked in a private cell of self-realization? How did the rich summary of competing Whig, Marxist, and liberal interpretations of the purposes of political action bring us finally to a simple faith in democracy defined as "self-expression"? How did we escape from the troublesome recognition of class bias in majority rule to a comfortable affirmation of the value of participation in the political community?

Limiting the Domains of Citizenship

The essay opens with a crucial observation on the narrowness of contemporary concepts of citizenship which focus primarily on the political realm. But the subsequent definition of the domains of citizenship deals exclusively with sub-societal associations -- the family, the school, the workplace, the social club.

If we accept the generalization that citizenship exists, not in general, but in particular domains of one's life, then the specification of those domains assumes critical importance. To limit the domains is to limit our understanding of citizenship and related skills and competencies. For example, we live within local, State, and Federal structures; we exercise our citizenship in one or more of these domains, either recognizing or ignoring their interrelatedness. Furthermore, we live in a large-scale, technological society with complex institutional structures that function, at least theoretically, to
set public policies (political arena); to produce necessary goods and services (economic arena), and to serve human needs (social service arena). Exclusive focus on citizenship in sub-societal associations inevitably diverts attention from the role of citizens in formulating and evaluating public policies which expand or constrain personal and community choices. A young couple may adopt democratic procedures in arriving at a decision about placing their 4-year-old in a day care center so the mother (or father) can return to work. This is, however, a decision-making process of a totally different order of significance from the exercise of citizenship in supporting or opposing a public policy to establish a national day care program.

To ignore structures and policies is to run the risk of reducing citizenship to interpersonal relationships. To attend to policy formulation and implementation processes exposes multiple roles and responsibilities of citizens at various levels of governmental operations and in a range of institutional structures. Individuals and groups initiate, veto, implement, utilize, monitor, facilitate, obstruct, circumvent, or revise public policies. There is little empirical research to throw light on these formal or informal roles, or to differentiate what kinds of activities are influential on what arenas of public life.

At an analytic level, social commentators as different as Robert Dahl and Michael Harrington pose remarkably similar suggestions for extending citizenship rights. Dahl identifies five historical commitments which constitute impediments to democracy in the United States today. One, granting private property rights to corporations, developed with the shift from an agrarian socio-economic order to corporate capitalism. Dahl rejects the illogical extension of Locke's ideas on property to business corporations. He argues that business corporations must be seen, in principle, as a form of public or social,
not private, activity and urges systematic study of a range of alternative arrangements for control of corporate decisionmaking.

In a similar vein, Michael Harrington calls for complete democratization of basic investment decisions as the only long-run solution to balanced growth.4 He draws on analyses of the London Economist and the Congressional Budget Office to illustrate the ways in which corporate decisions contribute to unbalanced growth in the world markets, as well as in urban policy. He rejects as utopian pragmatism the view that balanced growth will be achieved with a little good will and intelligence and without the inconvenience of change in any of our economic structures. Both commentaries point to an alternative understanding of the domains of citizens. They challenge both imagination and courage to invent and assess new institutional arrangements for fuller expression of procedural democracy.

Limiting the Concepts of Participation

The body of Salisbury's essay offers a variety of views: a succinct summary of political theories that produced a state-dominated conception of citizenship; a pointed critique of the limits of opinion research studies which ignore behaviors, and teasing glimpses of assumptions related to power, redistribution of scarce resources, and the equity and efficiency struggle. The bedrock position, however, is unswerving allegiance to the principles of individualism and self-interest which finally reduces to a single, simple view: "The agenda of citizenship participation includes the following: a rich arrangement of participatory acts, pursued in a complex of institutional settings, by people with diverse and dynamic conceptions of self-interest."

This allegiance to individualism and self-interest serves quite adequately to delineate three
concepts of participation: instrumental or purposive, supportive, and compliant. Instrumental participation is a means of acquiring power, competing for scarce resources. Supportive and compliant citizenship derives from commitment to the system and its values and contributes to social stability. The sharp dichotomy between the win/lose competition of instrumental citizenship and the passivity of the other two groups is, however, too sharply drawn; it leaves no room for an alternative concept of citizenship representing goal-oriented activism. A reliance on a utilitarian tradition of individualism and self-interest precludes alternate analyses of instrumental citizenship rooted in value commitments, it restricts the benefits of participation to immediate benefits for self and/or group rather than to the polity. Finally, it transforms citizenship as a public function to citizenship as a private good.

The ultimate justification of citizen participation as individual fulfillment saves us from failure and frustration, from complexity and confusion. It also kills our vision. The celebration of self-realization, of complete and full personhood has much less to do with Dewey or Christianity than with Maslow's hierarchy of needs and related patterns for growth and development. But if we take Maslow's paradigm seriously, we see that self-realization is dependent on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs of physical well-being and safety. If the prize of citizenship in a democratic society is self-realization, it must be available to all citizens; all citizens, therefore, have a right to expect social arrangements that will satisfy basic needs so they can aspire to self-realization. It is not necessary to accept this piece of sophistry to recognize that there are multiple ways in which a case can be made for citizenship based on value commitments; that the pursuit of justice for others may be as powerful a motivating force as drive for personal benefits; that tangible evidence of institutionalized inequities may trigger participation di-
rected at securing goods for others as well as for self. Research questions to test these hypotheses could help us to create a concept of participation appropriate to the global village we inhabit.

Playing the devil's advocate is especially hazardous within the confines of a few paragraphs. Obviously these comments have had to ignore a variety of sensitive, insightful, and provocative observations on contemporary democracy. Obviously, too, the paradoxes have provoked a struggle to move beyond surface agreements to more fundamental issues, which, of course, is precisely what discussion papers are intended to do.

NOTES

1 The Institute for Responsive Education is currently engaged in a 3-year study of citizen participation funded by the National Institute of Education. Related publications include: Lois Sternberg, "Social Science Theory and Research on Participation and Voluntary Associations": A Bibliographic Essay; and Don Davies and Ross Zechykov, eds., "Citizen Participation in Education: Annotated Bibliography." Future publications will include a report on "Federal and State Impact on Citizen Participation in Education." The role of governmental agencies in generating public participation in the area of human services is also illustrated by Federal legislation establishing a network of health planning councils.

2 The State of Florida initiated one of the few efforts to trace the impact of State legislation in a recent study of the implementation of three 1973 education laws reported in "Improving Education in Florida: A Reassessment." A Summary of the Consultant's Report Prepared for the Select Joint Committee on Public Schools of the Florida Legislature, February 1978.


5 The Federal mode of maintaining exclusive control of economic policies stands in sharp contrast to Federal incentives for public participation in the human services areas. Some stirrings of citizen challenge to this stance are illustrated by Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, "Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity," Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, which presents practical proposals to stabilize the world economy and to reduce the negative domestic and international effects of current U.S. trade policies.

Edward S. Greenberg

There is much in Professor Salisbury's essay, "Key Concepts of Citizenship: Perspectives and Dilemmas" that is commendable. It is as good a purview of the participation literature and its relevance to the central issues of democratic theory as I have seen, and it is unusually sensitive to nuance and to the careful qualifications necessary in this area of scholarship. Nevertheless, there is much in the essay that is disturbing. It compels me to respond, not because of its tone or content, but because of several assumptions and unconscious biases it shares with contemporary scholarship. These assumptions and biases strongly color thinking about citizenship education.

Before discussing Salisbury's essay, I believe it is worth noting that there is a deeply hostile climate toward efforts to encourage participation in various arenas of democratic life. Many politicians
and scholars are warning of the dangers of participation, proclaiming the need to decrease the demands and lower the expectations of citizens. For instance, every major candidate for the Presidency in 1976 had as his central campaign theme the notion of lowering popular expectations about the ability of government to provide a context for the good life. Both Jimmy Carter and Jerry Brown propounded small government themes, usually the preserve of Republican politicians. This same trend can be seen in the academic world.

Influential intellectual publications such as Commentary and the Public Interest and leading social scientists such as Daniel Bell, and Samuel Huntington have become almost obsessed with the need to lower expectations and the participation closely connected to it. The idea seems to be emerging among important sectors of the opinion-making public that a serious erosion in the legitimacy of the political and economic system has taken place in recent years, contributing to heightened social instability, economic inefficiency, and governmental malaise. They believe this state of affairs has been spawned primarily by an excess of popular participation, particularly from the most disadvantaged sections of the population. The task for the immediate future, from their point of view, is to re-invest public authority with the sparse resources, and popular support necessary for the governance of the social order. (The most powerful and disturbing statement of these views may be seen in Michael Crozier, et al., "The Crisis of Democracy," New York: New York University Press, 1975). This is possible only by greatly weakening popular participation.

These remarks are not meant to suggest that such views are necessarily triumphant, but that powerful trends in this direction seem to be evident among important sectors of political and intellectual life. As such, they help to define a particularly inhospitable.
table context for programs which seek to train people for political participation. The appeal of participation is not self-evident. Programs to encourage it, in whatever form, will be faced with a hostile response from extremely powerful social forces.

As to my reactions to the content of Salisbury's paper, let me begin by asking two fundamental questions: First, how is it possible to justify a role for the schools in citizenship training? Frankly, I have never seen it adequately done. And second, what elements of democratic theory justify a role for the State (either National, State, or local) in the training of its own citizens? To be sure, schools have at all times, and in all places played such a role, but that empirical fact, in no way, serves as a persuasive justification.

To be perfectly blunt, it strikes me that an effort by government to socialize and train its citizens with respect to matters of citizenship is surely a curious and not altogether comfortable reversal of democratic theory. Central to all democratic theory is the conception that government is, in some fundamental way, a mere reflection of its citizens and their desires and interests. The reverse proposition, that citizens, or rather the particular behaviors of citizens, are in some fundamental way a reflection of the training of their government, may be supportable by some arguments but is most certainly not a legitimate part of the democratic tradition. While much of the mood of this complaint may seem to arise from the ground staked out by the political right, it strikes me as valid nonetheless and worthy of some serious thought. Most of us simply assume that such a role exists and focus our attention on matters of technique. Surely, that is not sufficient.

Let me extend this complaint and suggest what there is to be feared in state sponsorship of citizenship training. Simply put, citizenship training is
never neutral. Although my observation may be obvious there is a need to be specific about this point. There is no phase of such training that does not embody some set of political values and principles. Take "participation." It never exists in a vacuum. Training for participation, a point Salisbury makes but fails to develop, never hangs in the air free of referents, a neutral tool useful at all times and places, a mere technique. Training for participation always articulates a view about values, about acceptable forms and arenas of participation, and about appropriate and approved behavior. With few exceptions, what is considered proper at any given time is that which is conventional and that which poses no threat to dominant interests. No educational institution, for instance, is about to train people for insurrectionary, anti-regime activities, whether violent or non-violent.

Now such a complaint makes no sense if society is conceived as a relatively homogeneous entity, where basic matters are not at issue, and where the regime is not only considered legitimate but provides an arena by which minor interest conflicts are adjusted. If one holds to a contrary view, then political reality becomes more complicated. Let me develop the point.

At issue, I believe, is the idea put forward by Salisbury that the central role of citizenship education is to help produce a mature citizen. He suggests that "the mature citizen will recognize and, without being paralyzed, seek to balance the competing values and interests at stake. In a viable democracy, education must seek to foster mature citizenship...to persuade people that they should continue to be active in behalf of their values even though they seem never to be on the winning side." Why? Such a view does not strike me either as obvious or neutral. While the view is very comforting and familiar, I would submit that it embodies a particular view of the nature of the political system that may or may not be true.
It assumes that there exists, in Salisbury's words, a "political community."

From my view, this notion of political community, or the public interest, or any other such conceptualization is a mystification serving to cloud the uneven conflict that lies at the heart of society. If one conceives of society as a deeply divided class structure in which the interests of opposed classes are incompatible or irreconcilable, then one surely arrives at a very different judgment about a citizen who recognizes value conflict yet accepts perpetual loss. Such a citizen, while "mature" from the vantage point of a dominant class, looks less commendable or even silly from another. One might even make the case that the mature citizen is one who does not accept the status quo but seeks to change the regime.

My ideas on this matter may strike the reader as fairly extreme (I attempt to demonstrate their validity in two books, "Serving the Few: Corporate Capitalism and the Bias of Government Policy" (1974) and "Understanding Modern Government: The Rise and Decline of the American Political Economy" (forthcoming)) but that is not the point. It merely serves to demonstrate that the issue of citizenship training is amenable to quite different interpretations. Such training is never neutral. It embodies particular political biases and should be recognized for what it is: political indoctrination supportive of the regime in power. Now such a social process may well be justified on a variety of grounds, and there may be ample reason to turn more resources in its direction. We should not, however, be deluded about the business we are about.

Relative to the question of "transferability" of participatory training from one environment to another, let me point out that preliminary analysis of data from my National Science Foundation funded re-
A search project among plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest shows a very strong relationship between active participation within enterprise politics and participation in conventional politics. This is evident in two sets of data.

First, in comparing plywood cooperatives (enterprises in which the membership is solely responsible for enterprise governance through general membership meetings, election of a directly responsible board of directors, and the hiring/firing of a general manager) with conventional firms, we found workers in the former industrial settings to be far more active in conventional politics than their counterparts in the latter.

Workers in the self-governing cooperatives, besides being more likely to attend meetings and to hold responsible elected positions within their own enterprises, are also much more likely than workers from conventional plants to attend city council meetings, to attend hearings of various government agencies, to contact a public official, and to work with others to solve some community problem.

Second, from among the sample of cooperative members themselves, preliminary analysis of the data suggests that it is those members who are the most active within the enterprise who are also the most active in political activity. Rather than the one detracting from the other, the experiences seem to be mutually reinforcing.

I must stress that these conclusions are based upon the most preliminary stages of my analysis, and that the above relationships may not hold once the analysis is carried further. Nevertheless, and with this caveat in mind, it appears that the "transferability" of political training is real and demonstrable. I will be happy to supply further documentation as my work proceeds.
Much of the literature on the politics of education has been concerned with the existence and the character of the exchange relations between the schools as autonomous organizations and the larger political and social system. Political scientists have emphasized the isolation of education from politics, and the creation of a highly autonomous, self-reproducing set of school professionals and institutions.

With a longer perspective on such matters, historians of education have grasped that what this portrays is timebound, and, therefore, have identified exchanges between school and society as a continuous feature of school politics. They have failed, however, to agree about the character of these exchanges. Progressive historians have identified the schools as democratizing institutions -- part of the expanding realm of social citizenship -- while revisionist scholars have seen the schools as mechanisms for securing elite control over a potentially unruly mass, thus negating the promises of citizenship.

Discussions between these two "camps" have been flawed, in my view, by inordinate attention to elite pronouncements and activities, and by a failure to locate exchanges between school and society in the context of larger patterns of citizenship. It is important to look at the exchanges between school systems and working class citizens as they are mediated by such working class institutions as political parties, unions, churches, and voluntary organizations within the context of a distinctively American culture of citizenship. It is the latter issue that I address.

The American and French Revolutions fashioned for the first time a domain of citizenship separate and apart from that of "civil society." Citizens, irre-
respective of wealth, income, or status were now free and equal units of the political system. This divorce of citizenship and society opened up the two most pressing concerns of the modern political agenda: How will the tensions between an unequal society and an equal realm of citizenship be managed? How can democracy and capitalism be made compatible? Given these questions, it is important to ask what are the distinctive features of the "American solution" to these tasks created by the development of democratic citizenship; and what are the consequences of this solution for the connections Professor Salisbury discusses between participation, the definition of interests, and government politics?

Juridical citizenship makes political participation possible, but it does not by itself define the social bases and mass understandings of participation. Nor are such matters given automatically by the arrangements of the social structure. Rather, such definitions are at the heart of what I shall call the culture of citizenship. This culture which joins society and citizenship, although obviously conditioned by objective political and social arrangements and rules, is a highly contingent construct which varies from one capitalist democracy to another.

Throughout the West in the late 18th and in the 19th centuries, as the autonomous domain of citizenship was fashioned, the worlds of work and home also underwent wrenching transformations. Under the impact of industrialization, workplaces developed outside the home and, more generally, apart from residence communities. The household, formerly a place of production as well as of consumption, became in economic terms exclusively a unit of consumption. More and more people came to labor outside of their homes.

In most western societies, this division was seen as the consequence of a single process of capitalist development. The social classes created by this pro-
cess, broadly speaking, became politically relevant in both the domain of work and the domain of community relations. In time, workers constructed political parties with organizational roots in both domains, while trade unions and constituency party organizations promoted political participation based on class identities and interests. This holistic institutional and ideological construct reflected and developed what may be called a global class culture of citizenship.

The American pattern was different. More than in any other western society, the content of citizenship in the United States has been defined in separate ways in the domains of work and community. The links between work and nonwork understandings, conflicts, demands, articulations of interest, and organizational forms have been very tenuous. Trade unions have organized workers as “labor” at the workplace. Political parties and voluntary organizations have organized the same people outside of work on the basis of communal and territorial affiliations. Each set of organizations has encountered government and public policies with its own vocabulary and priorities. Our culture of citizenship is one concerned with class, but only as class pertains to labor relations at work, and to the immediate economic concerns of unionized workers; and it is concerned separately and distinctively with the ties between government and citizens in their residence places, including such matters as the delivery of public services of policing, welfare, and schooling.

The sources of this segmented, American culture of citizenship may be located in the intersection of the dynamics of capitalist development and the democratization of the state in the three decades before the Civil War. In this period, the creation of a modern working class principally in the older, predominantly mercantile cities of the East entailed the physical and social separation of work and community, and was accompanied by a number of reinforcing polit-
ical trends which defined the terms by which workers would be linked to the polity: Federalism, franchise extension, a modern national-party system and its neighborhood machine affiliates. Citizenship, in this crucial formative era, principally intersected community, not work. In this way, citizenship and its bases were given communal meanings, separate from work relations. At least for white males, access to the regime by the 1830's was established on communal, institutional, and ideological bases at the very moment, paradoxically, when class schisms were beginning to sunder notions of "one people" at the point of production.

This special culture of citizenship has had an enormous impact on the conduct of American politics and the making of public policy. It is a commonplace to observe that the size of Government has grown spectacularly in this century. Total Government expenditures, which accounted for 12 percent of national income in 1929, and 32 percent in 1954, took 42 percent in 1976.1/ One of the most common explanations for this growth has been to emphasize the importance of modern citizenship. The classic statement of this position, of course, is by T. H. Marshall. He argues that the granting of civil citizenship, the provision of rights necessary for individual freedom associated with the French and American Revolutions, produced successful demands for political citizenship in the 19th century. In turn, the right to participate in political power through the franchise produced a politics of social citizenship, covering "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage."2/ Democracy, capitalism, and the welfare state have thus marched hand in hand, as citizenship has been given the content of a social minimum. The principal causes of state expansion are political. The motor of the process is party competition, since it compels bids for mass support.
As an explanation of growth of government activity in a single society, or in all the western societies, this explanation is entirely plausible. But what it does not permit is an understanding of the variations between the capitalist democracies in the character of their public policies, even as they all share in the dramatic growth of the state. Such variations, I argue, are less the product of citizenship than of distinctive national cultures of citizenship.

Consider the qualitative differences between the United States and European welfare expenditures. In 1949, the United States ranked last among industrial capitalist states in social welfare expenditures (4.4 percent of the gross national product (GNP)). The United States remains at the bottom of such comparative rankings. The size of the American state sector as a proportion of GNP remains relatively low at 33.2 percent, compared to 33.8 percent for France; 40.5 percent for Germany; 43.4 percent for Britain; and 47.4 percent for Sweden.

This general pattern holds for spending on income transfers; of the European and North American states, the United States spent the lowest proportion of GNP on transfers in this period, and, with the exception of France, had the lowest rate of increase.3/

With regard to non-education public services and benefits in kind, such as health services and public housing, Heidenheimer writes, "where markets have been dominated by private suppliers, U.S. programs have lagged behind European ones by as much as two generations. These programs long remained in the non-takeoff category, exhibiting low growth rates compared to their European equivalents." Only programs of social insurance have grown at rates which have closed the gap between Europe and America. Further, U.S. expenditures on education at all levels have been relatively high.4/
These patterns are explicable, in part, by the terms of the U.S. culture of citizenship. The divisions between work and community understandings dating from the ante-bellum period have been, in my view, the major obstacle to the formulation of class-based party politics. The absence of even a moderate social democratic party, with an institutional and ideological need to push for welfare state expansion, limits pressures for social innovation to the activities of bureaucrats, humanitarian reformers, ad hoc disruptive mass movements, trade unions; and businessmen fearful of disorder. The very breadth of this condition diminishes its consistency and impact.

These considerations may inform the research agenda for the politics of education. For the working class institutions of party, union, church, and voluntary organization types are rooted in the process of differentiation of social life into work, community, and state relations discussed above. This segmentation makes it especially important that studies of school and society exchanges focus on each of these kinds of working class institutions, rather than on just one or two, because the relations between them and the relative importance of each in different settings and in different periods are so historically contingent.

Much remains to be done, for serious research on the links between these institutions and school systems has hardly been undertaken. The functions of the political machine have been described in general terms, but comparative research on the efficacy of party organizations for the generation of school-related issues is badly underdeveloped. Much has been written about the role of churches in religiously-related school controversies, but they have seldom been conceptualized as mediators of working class needs and concerns. And while it is true that unions have never played as central a role in formulating the educational concerns of the working class in
the United States as they have played in Europe, they have attended to educational concerns periodically. But the limits of their impact have yet to be systematically established.

Empirical mappings of the relationships entailed by the connections between these institutions and schools over time would of necessity be informed by a portrait of what is distinctive about the U.S. culture of citizenship; and, in turn, these studies would give weight and substance to a very old and broad agenda that asks what is distinctive or exceptional about the American experience of citizenship and class.

NOTES


Salisbury Rejoinder

Reading the comments of Clasby, Greenberg, Katznelson, and Kotler and rereading my own paper have helped me recognize more clearly than before what I was trying to say. In this brief rejoinder, let me
stress three of the points I wanted to make the first time around but perhaps did not communicate effectively.

First, I have sought to emphasize the breadth of the concepts and phenomena of citizen participation. There is no arena of life from which it is excluded. But that does not mean that it is the same in every arena; that economic citizenship is identical with political citizenship, or that participation in school affairs carries over full blown into other civic arenas.

My point is that the character of participation in diverse institutional settings and the relationships among the different types and modes of participation are problematic. We know very little about these interconnections, and before we make assumptions and develop policies about transferability and such matters we had better find out. In large measure I agree with Katznelson in holding that the differentiations and interrelationships within the overall structure of citizenship, especially in the United States, are of crucial importance.

My second point is much like the first. I stress that we know relatively little about the impact of participation on public policy or on the participants. In their rather different ways, Clasby, Greenberg, and Kotler are all firmly convinced of the virtues of participation, but none of them offers evidence of how much and what kind of difference will result. I contend, however, that regardless of participation's effects, or lack of effect, on society, individual self-fulfillment can still be enhanced. Far from regarding that as some sort of comedown, as Clasby seems to, I hold the full realization of each individual to be the supreme good of any social order. And it is of special importance given the uncertainties surrounding the social costs and benefits associated with participatory citizenship.
My third point has to do with the politics of essays on citizenship and participation. Greenberg says that citizenship training is never neutral, and he is quite right. Neither, however, is his view that the world is divided into warring classes, nor Clasby's conviction that citizen participation is good and more would be better. The position I tried to set forth is that insofar as participation does make a social difference, some people will be better off and some may be less so. Participation is very often redistributive in its effects, and so are the implications of most writing about participation.

I have suggested that the "mature citizen" should come to recognize these "political" dimensions of his participation and of the speeches and essays that variously exhort and analyze his activity. The "mature citizen" will recognize that the taxpayers' revolt is every bit as much a product of citizen action as equal rights for women and minorities. The practice of citizenship in a democracy is full of ironies that are themselves the fruit of human variety in ambition and complexity in motive. I regard this ultimately as a matter calling for celebration, but meanwhile for recognition and careful study.