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ABSTRACT

Special dilemmas confront reform organizations that rely on financial support from their parent structures and on political support from the individuals they serve. The history of the Educational Opportunity Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara, offers a case in point. Inaugurated in the wake of the Watts riot in 1965, and strengthened by later demonstrations on campus, the program began to suffer from administrative cutbacks and re-shuffling as minority power to stage impressive political acts waned. This study describes events from a framework of institutional racism, a subtle process that can lend discriminatory attitudes to ostensibly impersonal bureaucracies. Crisis mobilization, crisis management, and the dilemma of the reform organization are key concepts employed in the analysis. Research methods used include participant observation, in depth interviews, document analysis, and use of student newspaper files. (Author/KB)
RACISM IN THE UNIVERSITY: THE CASE OF THE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM

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Special dilemmas confront reform organizations that rely on financial support from their parent structures and on political support from the individuals they serve. The history of the Educational Opportunity Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara, offers a case in point. Inaugurated in the wake of the Watts riot of 1965, and strengthened by later demonstrations on campus, the program began to suffer from administrative cutbacks and re-shuffling as minority power to stage impressive political acts waned. This study describes events from a framework of institutional racism, a subtle process that can lead discriminatory attitudes to ostensibly impersonal bureaucracies. Three key concepts—crisis mobilization, crisis management, and the dilemma of the reform organization—help illumine its workings.
One can hardly have lived through the Sixties without noticing its air of turmoil and strife. Demonstrations, Vietnam, ghetto riots, and other disturbances filled the pages of our newspapers. But by the end of the decade, it appeared that all the trumpeting fury had really changed very little; the ghetto remained dismal and the wound in Vietnam suppurated on.

Yet, among other things, the Sixties saw a dramatic increase in the number of minority students and staff members on our college campuses. For in protest against Vietnam and assorted societal inequalities, students tended to vent their anger and frustration upon the nearest institutions at hand -- the college administrations and their buildings. Perhaps a bit daunted by lurid headlines and broken glass, campus officials in general yielded to student demands for reform or acceleration of reform. Hence the number and importance of minorities in higher education grew rapidly.

Newspaper articles as well as social science journals have described the salient events of this period, yet few studies have actually detailed the step-by-step process of reform implementation which gives these events practical significance. This study focuses on the Educational Opportunity Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara, an organization designed to recruit and admit minority students into academia. The fluctuations of its fortunes over the past ten years reflect not only shifts
of political power in the state and nation, but also the baffling difficulties faced by an administrative sub-structure charged with reforming the larger organization on which it depends.

**Research Methods**

I began my association with EOP at UCSB in September, 1970 some five years after the program started. A graduate student in sociology, I had obtained work tutoring undergraduates in my field, many of them EOP students. I became interested in their problems on campus, and during the 1971-72 academic year undertook an exploratory study of Chicano EOP college dropouts (León, 1975). In addition, I was appointed to an EOP orientation committee in the summer of 1972. I thus developed a direct, personal familiarity with the workings of EOP on the campus.

Between September, 1973, and September, 1974, I made on-the-spot investigations for this study, using the methods of participant observation and depth interviews (Becker, 1958; Cicourel, 1964; Denzin, 1970a, 1970b; Merton et al., 1956; Wiseman & Aron, 1970). I later supplemented these techniques with document analysis and use of newspaper files.

The student newspaper afforded me an excellent source of historical material. Examining articles pertinent to EOP from editions ranging from the fall of 1964 through the summer of 1974, I was able to create a clipping file of news stories that proved quite intriguing. For the paper not only revealed facts, but also strategic style in this organizational tussle. It functioned at once as a journalistic medium, a propaganda tool for all
sides, and a means of communication between warring factions. The student staff (generally sympathetic to EOP) and student letter writers wrote pieces designed to inform the campus community about the plight of EOP; hence help generate and sustain crises. University administrators wrote statements, granted interviews, and purchased space in order to explain their actions to the community, and thereby manage crises. And both adversaries learned of changes in each other's tactics from such publicity.

I must note that, while I succeeded in gaining the confidence of the EOP staff, I cannot say the same thing about the campus administration. As a Chicano graduate student, I perhaps impressed officials as predisposed against them; on the whole they struck me as guarded in their comments while friendly and open in their demeanor. This analysis thus suffers from a bias of data access. But, as will become clear, the issues are far more complex than those of a crude morality play. I have tried, in the face of many obstacles, to be sensitive to the authentic dilemmas confronted by all actors in the context of bureaucratic organization. Hopefully this stress will at least partially offset the deleterious effects of the bias in data acquisition.

Theoretical Perspective

Three key concepts -- crisis mobilization, crisis management, and the reform dilemma -- will provide a theoretical framework which we can use to give structure to the history of EOP at UCSB. These notions should not only illumine strategy, but also suggest situations in which clash between reform and parent organizations would seem likely, if not inevitable.
Crisis Mobilization: A Strategy of the Have-Nots

Reform organizations like EOP which exist by virtue of strong extra-institutional support often mistake the limits of their mandate to effect change within the larger organization. Their relative autonomy shields them from the blunter effects of administrative displeasure, while at the same time their backers outside the institution may clamor for them to expand their functions. Hence, they may challenge the parent organization with strategies that circumvent normal bureaucratic channels.

Commonly they will use "crisis mobilization" -- the generation and maintenance of a crisis until promise of reform appears. Piven and Cloward (1971, 1974) identify this tactic as a means by which downtrodden or excluded groups can change existing inequalities in institutions. According to them:

By crisis, we mean a public visible disruption in some institutional sphere. Crisis can occur spontaneously (e.g., riots) or as the intended results of tactics of demonstration and protest which either generate institutional disruption or bring unrecognized disruption to public attention. Public trouble is a political liability; it calls for action by political leaders to stabilize the situation. Because crisis usually creates or exposes conflict, it threatens to produce cleavages in a political consensus which politicians will ordinarily act to avert. (1974: 99)

Use of crisis mobilization recurs again and again in the history of EOP at UCSB. Having witnessed its effectiveness in such campaigns as the national civil rights movement, EOP students borrowed it, soon finding it an equally powerful lever for social change in smaller arenas. Demonstrations, marches, proclamations, and seizures of buildings proliferated, and EOP's role grew.
Crisis Management: A Strategy of the Haves

Max Weber's model of the rational-legal bureaucracy has had profound effects on the sociological study of complex organizations. Weber imagined rationality to be the cornerstone of bureaucracy. Actors in the bureaucratic model considered all decisions carefully, and deliberately planned and coordinated all subsequent actions.

In real life, however, Weber's construct often falls short. Perrow (1972), for instance, argues that in times of rapid change within the bureaucracy, decisions cannot always receive due consideration, and thus planning and coordination slide. Similarly, Cyert and March (1963) propose that large bureaucratic organizations often forfeit deliberate decision-making to the solution of series of crises. Rather than act according to some well-thought-out, long-range plan, administrators roll up their sleeves and grapple with each crisis as it arrives. As these observers note:

Organizations avoid uncertainty: 1) They avoid the requirement that they correctly anticipate events in the distant future by using decision rules emphasizing short-run reaction to short-run uncertain events. They solve pressing problems rather than develop long-run strategies. 2) They avoid the requirement that they anticipate future reactions of other parts of their environment by arranging a negotiated environment. They impose plans, standard operating procedures, industry tradition, and uncertainty-absorbing contacts on that environment. In short, they achieve a reasonably manageable decision situation by avoiding planning where plans depend on predictions of uncertain future events. (1963: 119)

We can perhaps best view this organizational syndrome as crisis management administration. (cf. Rogers, 1969).

As parent organization, the University of California is a large, complex structure with sufficient differentiation to create sub-units when
pressed for reform. It employs numerous techniques of crisis management; it will co-opt reform leaders, juggle or terminate funding, re-arrange the reform sub-unit so as to hamstring its power, and, in a pinch, offer concessions. Such administrative practices resulted not only in the creation and expansion of EOP, but also in its later attempted dismantling.

The Dilemma of EOP as a Reform Organization

Institutions of higher education have traditionally resisted change. Corwin (1973) proffers several explanations for this phenomenon:

First, innovations disrupt established routines in complex organizations. Second, a change might alter the status structure and benefit one individual or post of the organization over others. Third, many universities and most public schools exist in what is called a "domesticated" environment, where they do not have to compete strenuously for clientele and are guaranteed a certain level of funding and other necessary resources. Domesticated organizations are not compelled to adapt quickly to a changing environment. Furthermore, schools and colleges are trapped within a web of other organizations. Since elementary schools must mesh their activities with colleges and industry, their freedom to make changes in their procedures is reduced. (1973: 1-2)

Even when it must adapt to changing pressures, the university may choose to create a reform organization, thus attaching a new sub-structure to the burgeoning bureaucratic body rather than risking shake-up of that body itself. The reform organization ostensibly revises policies and practices of the parent organization in some way, often to allay external criticism and discontent.

Though not supposed to meddle with the basic makeup of the parent organization, the reform sub-unit commonly discovers that it must extend
its power and domain, that it must seek some sort of organizational re-
shuffling, if it is to effect the changes specified in its charter. It
hence drifts toward conflict with the parent organization. This sort of
friction, of course, can greatly endanger the life expectancy of the
reform unit. Herein lies the dilemma of an organization like EOP: by
pushing too hard for its goals it can forfeit those goals.

Such a dilemma suggests that reform organizations operate within a
context defined by crisis management. That is, they serve the parent
organization primarily as devices to head off crises of drastic nature,
and to enable the parent organization to predict and control change in its
milieu. In this sense, EOP at UCSB served the purposes of crisis management
well, for throughout its stormy history it never once triggered physical
violence directed against the university.

White Paternalism: The Creation of EOP

The Regents of the University of California inaugurated EOP on the
1
Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses in the academic year 1964-65, in reaction
to the growing demand by civil rights groups across the country that insti-
tutions of higher learning recruit and admit so-called "disadvantaged"
minority students. Despite an enrollment of 80,000 at the time, the
University system could show only the severest paucity of minority students
2
in proportion to their numbers in the state.

The program relied on the Regent Opportunity Funds, which stemmed
from gifts and grants rather than legislative appropriation or tuition.
Campuses could obtain this aid on a five-to-one matching fund basis; for each dollar the campus raised for EOP, the Regents would contribute five, up to a ceiling of $50,000. As "seed" monies, these funds were meant to get EOP both started and established; the Regents voted the monies to last from 1965 through 1973, after which individual campuses would presumably have become adjusted to the presence of EOP and continue to support it out of their own revenues.

At first a rather timid program, EOP received a "shot-in-the-arm" with the Watts riot of 1965; the minorities were restless. Among other things, this surge of "senseless violence" resulted in the expansion of EOP to other University campuses, including that at Santa Barbara. This town of 74,000, once known as an international resort for the wealthy, now presents the aspect of a retirement home for the well-to-do. Nonetheless, 16% of its population fails to make $4,000 a year; in addition, some 25% of its citizens have Spanish surnames, and 6% are black. (Census, 1970)

By way of contrast, in the fall of 1965, 1.5% (or 130) of the campus population had Spanish surnames, and 0.1% (or 12) was black. In the spring of 1966, EOP at UCSB commenced.

At the outset, the program exhibited a pontificating white paternalism. EOP administrators, all of them white, recruited and offered financial aid to minority students, especially blacks. The Dean of Students, the program's administrator, appointed a Coordinator to handle its day-to-day activities, and together they nurtured its early aims. As the Dean informed the student paper, "In view of the near all-white character of the UCSB student body, the (EOP) program will assist in developing a racially
pluralistic population which more nearly parallels that of present day America." Moreover, EOP would offer whites "the opportunity to become aware of the advantages of broader cultural and ethnic diversity" in their midst.

The "buddy system" exemplifies this sort of well-meaning condescension excellently. The brainstorm of the Dean of Students, this plan called for each minority student to pair off with a volunteer white "buddy," presumably so that he might better assimilate himself into the white social structure. Minority students, confronted with "buddies" both unsought for and sprung from very different backgrounds, reacted with a polite indifference that concealed suspicion and alienation. As a black from Watts remarked, "I like the opportunity to study here, but it's more or less an insult to be told you're being invited to Santa Barbara to broaden its cultural base."

A revealing assumption underlay the "buddy system": that minorities wish to leave their racial and ethnic identities behind like excess personal baggage, and merge with white culture, perhaps because therein lies the "road to success." And, in the meantime, they could function as exotica for sheltered white students from the suburbs. The "buddy system" thus sprang from a narrowness inherent in white paternalism; significantly, the minorities noticed its racist implications and the whites did not.

The North Hall Incident: Crisis Mobilization

As minorities grew more numerous on campus, they felt encouraged to demand broader institutional changes that had rarely occurred to whites.
Talk in black and Chicano circles centered on minority control over EOP, the hiring of more minority instructors, and the introduction of Black and Chicano Studies Departments.

On Monday, October 14, 1968, an event took place which rocked the normally placid campus. Around 6:30 a.m., a squad of 12 to 16 blacks from the Black Student Union (BSU), moving quickly according to plan, took over campus computer facilities in North Hall. The capture utterly surprised the Chancellor, the Dean of Students, and most of the white students.

Its daring met with reward. The student paper, in a banner headline article, announced, "Sixteen black students (sic) took over North Hall yesterday, and then gave it up after the Associated Students Judicial Committee recommended suspended suspensions for all those involved. At six p.m. last evening, (the) Chancellor accepted the recommendations."

Moreover, the blacks had demanded -- and the Chancellor granted -- a commission to investigate racism on campus, a college of Black Studies, and the hiring of more minorities in staff and faculty positions.

It was a crucial event, a classic demonstration of the power of crisis mobilization. For the North Hall takeover brought in its train an overhaul in the structure and an upgrading in the status of EOP. First, the post of Coordinator was abolished. Now heading the reform unit was a Director of EOP, also an Associate Dean of Students who, though still under the general supervision of the Dean of Students, enjoyed more prestige and authority than the old Coordinator. Two counselors (one black, one Chicano) added to the EOP staff just prior to the takeover, took on wider roles in the formulation of EOP policy. Rounding out the staff was the Administrative
Assistant, who handled clerical work (the same person, incidentally, who had been Coordinator for the previous three years, a fact which gives some idea of the importance of that post). Hence, EOP now had four full-time employees (FTE's) to service minority students' problems.

On the whole, these changes benefited minority students. First, the enlarged staff allowed for a more efficient, well-run program, in keeping with the growing number of EOP students. Second, minority personnel had invaded a heretofore all-White bailiwick, an act vital to reshaping EOP to minority students' needs. And third, the program attained a new degree of autonomy with the grant of greater authority to the Director.

The incident and its repercussions clearly taxed the brightly scrubbed "sun-and-surf" image of the campus. Articles and letters appeared in the paper for weeks afterward, praising or reviling the takeover, the suspended suspensions, the concessions. In addition, the Chancellor took some flak from politicians and other figures of influence in the conservative Santa Barbara community, who accused him of knuckling under to "law-breakers." He appears to have paid some attention to this verbal abuse.

For, despite his alterations in the structure of EOP, minority students saw him as "dragging his heels" on other promises wrested from him at the time of the North Hall incident. Piqued by this apparent procrastination, students from diverse backgrounds -- blacks from BSU, Chicanos from United Mexican American Students (UMAS), whites from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) -- coalesced into an organization called the United Front in the winter of 1969. This alliance operated to sustain a crisis atmosphere on campus, and thereby extract further concessions from the administration.
After staging repeated demonstrations in front of the administration building, the United Front arranged a public meeting with the Chancellor in 300-seat Campbell Hall, the largest auditorium on campus. Before a packed house, the Chancellor sat with six representatives of the Front -- two from each ethnic segment -- and confronted minority demands. Blacks pressed once again for the formation of a Black Studies Center, along with active recruitment of black staff and faculty members. Mexican American students demanded, likewise, a Chicano Studies Center, with a Department of Chicano Studies to offer courses relevant to the Chicano experience and a community organization to aid Chicanos in the Santa Barbara area; they also argued for an active quest for Chicano staff and faculty members. In addition, the United Front sought to augment the power and autonomy of EOP on campus, and demanded the hiring of two more counselors, the expansion of number of special action slots from four to 10 percent, and the admission of 500 additional blacks and 500 additional Chicanos.

The Chancellor consented to some of these proposals. He allocated four faculty positions -- two for Black Studies and two for Chicano Studies -- to spur development of ethnic study programs. He also added 150 extra student slots to EOP for the coming year, thus increasing the number of students in the program by over 60 percent. Moreover, he altered the structure of EOP significantly. First, he removed it from the jurisdiction of the Dean of Students and placed it immediately under his own, by creating the post of Assistant to the Chancellor for Minority Programs (later split into Black Assistant and Chicano Assistant). EOP once again moved up a rung in the hierarchy.
In addition, he provided EOP with three more FTE's -- two female counselors (one black, one Chicana) and a financial aids counselor.

While the Chancellor had not responded to all their demands, minority students were delighted with their gains. Further, and perhaps more importantly, they had learned the tactical value of political disruption and crisis mobilization in seeking redress of grievances. The demonstrations, rallies, speeches, proclamations, and building takeover had paid off.

Peak and Slide: Crisis Management

Minorities won many concessions as a result of their political tactics in the academic year 1968-69, but after this high point the university administration began to whittle slowly away at these boons. First, at the request of the minorities, the Chancellor bifurcated EOP into black and Chicano components. Though it may not have seemed vital in the flush of the times, the dichotomy weakened EOP crucially by pairing one half against the other. Rivalry between the groups would later result in strife.

Second, in 1970 the Chancellor created the post of Executive Vice Chancellor, and instructed all those formerly reporting directly to him, including the two Minority Assistants, to go through the Executive Vice Chancellor instead. The Chancellor justified this administrative interposition by stating that it would free him to concentrate on external, most probably meaning political matters. These matters derived from the Isla Vista riots.

In the winter and spring quarters of the 1969-70 academic year, a series of events took place which shook the campus community far more profoundly than the North Hall takeover. It was a time when students,
simmering at oppressive drug and alienation and alienated by injustices committed in the name of law and order and had developed a low violence threshold. Touched off by the firing of a popular young assistant professor of anthropology, a string of demonstrations in winter quarter led to the first Isla Vista street riots, beginning on February 26th. In a second sequence of street violence, students torched the Isla Vista branch of the Bank of America, burning it to the ground and bringing international publicity to the campus. A sheriff's deputy shot and killed an undergraduate in the aftermath of continuing police-student confrontation. The riots reached such proportions that local law enforcement agencies were to receive aid from the National Guard, sheriff's departments in adjacent counties, and the special tactical squad of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office. Damage to local property ran into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. (cf. Flacks & Mankoff, 1970).

These events had dual import for EOP. First, they hurt the program strategically. By mobilizing and maintaining a crisis of this magnitude, white students succeeded in usurping the prime power minority students possessed. Since minority students would have had great difficulty creating as much trouble as the whites did, they suddenly found themselves overshadowed by the Isla Vista spectre in the minds of university administrators. The latter now directed their attention to problems that were thought relevant to the riots, while problems facing minority students went "on the back burner." Second, the riots resulted in substantial political pressure being placed on the campus administration to deal more firmly with such crisis situations. Ronald Reagan, then Governor of the State,
characterized protesters as "bums", patience as futility, and tolerance as weakness. Officials began taking tougher stances toward those precipitating crises. The entire technique of crisis mobilization began to lose its effectiveness, as the price became stiff fines, and court costs, police violence, jail terms, and possible death.

Shock waves from the riots persisted through the next academic year, 1970-71. White students continued to demonstrate against the War in Vietnam both on and off campus, and riots flared up once more in the student community.

In that year UCSB experienced a decline in enrollment for the first time in its history. Number of students dropped from 11,269 in 1969-70 to 11,232. University administrators blamed the decrease on the Isla Vista riots, and they may have been partly correct. However, despite the riots, the University admitted about 182 minority students via EOP during the year. The total EOP population reached 642 with a racial breakdown of blacks (301), Chicanos (283), and others (58). Blacks still comprised a plurality of EOP students, with Chicanos trailing a close second.

The University administration made two important decisions during the year concerning the admission of students. First, the Chancellor restricted the percentage of EOP students who could enter UCSB without meeting the normal requirements from 70% to 60%; as EOP functioned largely to funnel such students into the university and to give them a chance they otherwise would not have had at obtaining a degree and respectable livelihood, this decision struck at the base of EOP's purpose. Second, the Chancellor placed a ceiling on financial aid funds available for the program, again
restricting the number of students who could enroll at UCSB under the EOP program.

EOP "boom times" came to an end with the academic year 1971-72, the second year in a row that UCSB experienced a drop in enrollment. As total number of students declined from 11,232 to 10,587, EOP obtained only 21 new slots. Again, the University administration blamed the Isla Vista riots and the subsequent publicity, for the decline.

The changes in EOP admissions and financial aid policies helped create an atmosphere of suspicion and contention between the two major EOP components, black and Chicano, as they competed for the now scarce resources. Though blacks still comprised a plurality among EOP students, Chicanos were gaining on them.

Within the black component, rapid administrative turnover at this time exacerbated divisive tendencies within EOP. In 1971-72, the black EOP component was recovering from the loss of its two top staff members, the Black Minority Assistant and the Black Associate Director, both of whom had resigned the previous year. Moreover, the newly hired Black Associate Director himself resigned only after serving twelve months. The instability of the black EOP staff, coupled with the economic squeeze, adversely affected the recruitment and retention of black students on campus.

Chicanos, however, had their own rather different problems. An ideological rift had widened within the Chicano student community, splitting it into two rival groups -- MECHA (formerly UMAS) and La Raza Libre. The latter group created discord within the Chicano component, aiming scorn primarily at the Associate Director, a supporter of MECHA. The internal
squabbles and feuds that sprang up threw the Chicano component into some measure of disarray.

The enrollment statistics for the next academic year, 1972-73, show that the wave of prosperity had indeed ended for EOP. The program received only five new slots. The University experienced a drop in enrollment for the third year in a row. The administration used this fact to counter EOP complaints about the slowdown in growth rate.

In this year, for the first time in EOP history, Chicanos came to outnumber blacks; the Chicano total reached 314, that of blacks 298, and of others (Asians, Native Americans, and whites) 56. Without a doubt, the Chicano component became the dominant one within EOP. Success invites attack, however. In this case, a coalition of minority groups within EOP -- blacks, Asians, and Native Americans (all aided by La Raza Libre) -- sought to undercut the Chicano component's power by garnering more student slots for themselves.

The Executive Vice Chancellor obliged, dividing the 90 slots available for the next year 30-30-30: 30 to Chicanos, 30 to blacks, and 15 each to Asians and Native Americans. Angered, Chicano students from MECHA marched on the administration building, demanding restitution of student slots. The Executive Vice-Chancellor not only refused to re-consider his decision, but announced that the incessant in-fighting among minority students had prompted him to undertake a "thorough study" of EOP. This pronouncement shocked all the minority groups; they correctly understood it as the polite beginning of an attempt to phase EOP out of the Santa Barbara campus.

During the following academic year, 1973-74, the Vice Chancellor,
Student Affairs, commissioned by the Executive Vice Chancellor, drew up a proposal for the administrative dismemberment of EOP. This document became known as the Smith Proposal, to the irritation of its eponymous author. It recommended: 1) an end to minority control over EOP recruitment, admission, and support of minority students; 2) elimination of the minority components with staff members to be re-assigned to other administrative posts; 3) either termination or re-assignment of the two Minority Assistants, the top-ranking officials in EOP. Its drastic nature seems clear.

EOP staff members reacted swiftly and sharply to the Smith Proposal. The Chicano Associate Director, in a memo to the Executive Vice Chancellor, fairly summed up their feelings: "The Smith Proposal, if adopted, represents the conclusion of the EOP effort on the Santa Barbara campus." Other component leaders pointed out that EOP had enjoyed a functional life of only three years, hardly enough time in which to form a smoothly-running operation, given the special and volatile problems EOP faced. But, as they must have sensed, the Smith Proposal represented not an exercise in justice, but one in crisis management. Too many crises had clustered around EOP; if the administration could atomize it, its strength would be vitiated, and its potential for crisis mobilization greatly reduced.

In winter quarter of 1974, the Executive Vice Chancellor, claiming insight from the barrage of minority protests, disavowed the Smith Proposal. But on April 12th of that year, two weeks after spring quarter had begun, the two Minority Assistants received a memorandum entitled "Educational Opportunities Program at UCSB: Guidelines for Planning." Issued by the Executive Vice Chancellor, these "guidelines" proved a reorganization plan
differing only slightly from the much maligned Smith Proposal.

We may gain some grasp of the nature of these guidelines from their tepid commitment that "EOP should continue in one form or another." The plan suggested that EOP be segmented according to function, and that each segment be placed under a related agency in the administration; for instance, EOP admissions would fall under the authority of the campus Admissions Office, EOP financial aid under the Financial Aid Office, and so on. The guidelines further suggested the elimination of the two Minority Assistant posts, with responsibility for EOP to shift to the Vice Chancellor, Student Affairs, a very busy man and one not friendly to EOP goals. Minority students suspected he would act more as a policeman than a promoter.

On May 3 these guidelines became public, and minorities reacted with immediate hostility. Even the Minority Assistants, who had heretofore functioned more as liaison men between minorities and administration than as leaders of EOP, put out a statement criticizing the wisdom of these plans. Consequently, a few days later the Executive Vice Chancellor issued both identical letters of termination. The irate Chicano Assistant took his letter, marked "personal and in confidence," to the student newspaper and had it printed in full.

By this act he successfully sparked the crisis mobilization efforts of EOP students. On May 15, as the student paper put it, a crowd of 500 marched on the Administration Building to protest the recent decision to phase out the position of Assistant to the Chancellor for Minority Affairs. The crowd left Storke Plaza and marched peacefully to the Administration Building, where they successfully demanded to see (the Executive Vice Chancellor). He reaffirmed that he had no intention of diminishing the EOP program, insisting rather that his intent was to strengthen it by reshuffling the upper management positions.
Even an impartial, unknowledgeable observer might have wondered why, if the Executive Vice Chancellor desired to strengthen EOP so much, the whole EOP staff was fighting him so strenuously.

Four days later, blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and Native Americans resurrected the old United Front and arranged a meeting with the Chancellor and his Vice Chancellors in Campbell Hall. This event proved the bitter climax of a crisis-ridden year. Minority students in the hall exchanged angry jibes with the Chancellors seated on the stage, and, though many participants raised serious issues, few received the dignity of thoughtful consideration. In the end, this dramatic confrontation settled very little at all, for two main reasons. First, the activist mood of the late 60s had passed; hence the hall was only 1/3 full, when a few years prior it would have been packed. Lacking committed popular backing, the minorities found themselves in a weaker bargaining position. Second, the school year was nearing its close. With time at a premium, many students who might have appeared at the confrontation otherwise apparently thought it wiser to study for finals. Moreover, with the campus scheduled to shut down in less than a month, minorities had little time to mobilize concerted resistance. The Chancellor let the 1973-74 year end without responding specifically to United Front demands.

When students returned for the fall quarter of the 1974-75 year, they discovered that the May 3 guidelines had already been implemented. The two Minority Assistants stepped down September 1 and EOP found itself transferred from the Executive Vice Chancellor's office to the office of the Vice Chancellor, Student Affairs.
However, more trouble loomed quickly for the minorities. The Black and Chicano Studies Centers were coming up for administrative reevaluation, as part of a standard five-year review of all research units on campus. Minority students felt the administration might take advantage of this review to dissolve the Centers, in much the same manner as it had reorganized EOP.

A confidential report on the fate of the Black Studies Center fell due in fall quarter. The selected committee failed to meet this deadline, and minority students, staff, and faculty anxiously awaited its appearance through winter quarter and into the spring, it occurred to more than one of them that another Year-end Squeeze might be in the offing. Indeed, on April 21, 1975, the Chancellor unveiled his "reconstituted" version of the Center -- a "community service" facility stripped of research responsibilities.

Minorities reacted to the Chancellor's bulletin swiftly and critically. On April 28 the BSU began a vigil in Storke Plaza to call attention to the threat to the Center; El Congreso, the recent Chicano soldering of MECHA and La Raza Libre, also joined the watch. Later, other student groups lent it their support also.

Angrier demonstrations followed. On April 30 some 200 students marched on the Administration Building, and on May 2 about 250 repeated this gesture. The crisis reached a peak on May 4, when members of the Students for Collective Action (SCA), a revitalized United Front, occupied the North Hall computer center for three hours. The combined forces of the Santa Barbara Police, the Campus Police, and the County Sheriff later arrested these students, and the SCA promptly added to its list of demands both amnesty for all participants in the takeover and the recruitment of an "impartial
third party" from Governor Jerry Brown's office to study minority problems on campus.

Following the takeover, minority students staged daily demonstrations in front of the Administration Building. Generally, at least 20 helmeted police officers greeted them, and the protesters confronted a locked-up Administration Building. On May 9, after a week-long siege of demonstrations, the Chancellor issued a statement in which he refused to meet SCA demands, but established a "communications committee" to maintain dialogue of sorts during the crisis.

On May 13, this committee reached an unprecedented decision. For the first time in the history of the University of California -- or, conceivably, any major university -- disputants agreed to submit a problem to an outside mediator. Minority students could thus negotiate with administrators from a position of parity. Crisis mobilization had succeeded, and by May 29 the parties involved in the controversy had reached an agreement. Both the Black and the Chicano Studies Centers would retain their research capacities.

Why did the administration consent to an outside mediator, when it could have ignored the protests, as it had in the past, or suppressed them? The answer seems to lie in changes at the highest levels of state politics. California voters had recently elected a liberal Governor, as well as a black Lieutenant Governor with a well-known history of advocacy of minority issues. Moreover, I learned from reliable sources that the Chancellor had throughout received phone calls from unnamed black assemblypersons, inquiring about the status of campus minority programs. Thus, ironically, it appears that the administration was responding, not to pressure from below, as in
the 1969 crisis, but to pressure from above, from administrators with more power than they. And some of the latter were minorities.

Institutional Racism: White Devils or Banal Routine?

Who is to blame for the attempts to undermine the power and autonomy of EOP at UCSB? Or, rather, is there a "who" at all? Some might argue that the campus administration could make no firmer commitment to minorities because racism is built right into the institution.

The concept of institutional racism has received much scholarly attention in the field of minority group relations (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1974; Blauner, 1972; Molotch & Wolf, 1970; et al.). For our purposes, we may define it as: a policy of racial discrimination formalized into the operations of an organization, hence existing independent of any actor in the structure.

The trajectory of EOP at UCSB affords us an intriguing instance of the initiation of institutional racism. Whatever the intentions of the campus administrators, their implementation of the Smith Proposal constituted de facto racism, of an individual and peculiarly subtle sort. However, once effected, the Proposal warped the institution in such a way as to make its daily operations racist. Well-meaning men and women would commit racist acts merely by following the rules. In such circumstances the word "racist" loses its overtones of viciousness and depravity, and takes on the neutral hue of the gray workaday world. Once cannot blame individuals for racist policies; one must blame organizational structure.

Institutional racism may, however, condition one's notions of morality.
Prior to 1964, the University of California practiced easily discernible institutional racism. Few minority students trod its hushed halls, and the University defended their exclusion by citing concern for "quality" while downplaying its obligation to educate the poor in the state. Echoes of this rationale seem to have affected UCSB administrators. They may have seen EOP as a possible funnel for minority students upward from the vocationally-oriented community colleges (cf. Karabel, 1972), and hence as a threat to University prestige. Human motives are usually mixed and complex, and we hesitate to ascribe such fears to the administrators. If, however, officials did act upon them, we face an interesting spectacle: institutional racism triggering individual racism, in turn creating institutional racism.

Conclusion

EOP at UCSB made vital gains in minority student recruitment and numerous other minority concerns. Once inside the university, however, students became a part of an organizational system which had existed before they arrived, and which had never made any provision for dealing with their needs. Conflict was perhaps bound to ensue. Since EOP represented a form of crisis management in the first place, reform here entailed admission of a new group into the institution, but not alteration of the structure of that institution.

In EOP at UCSB we can see perhaps the fate of most reform organizations which must work within the context of either hostile or apathetic parent organizations. Their achievements seem directly proportional to the amount of outside support they can muster either from an indigenous client group or from an external elite. As organizations subordinate to a main administration, they can, without prodding it, hope for very little progress toward their goals.
Footnotes

1. For an in-depth study of EOP at the UC and state university campuses, see Kitano and Miller (1970).

2. At that time, the University did not keep racial or ethnic records of its students.

3. According to an EOP report, there were about 130 people with Spanish surnames at UCSB at this time. However, it is impossible to determine how many of these individuals were foreign students from Latin America, rather than Chicanos.

4. Prior to 1965, the campus administration reserved special action slots for athletes and progeny of influential state figures who would not have gained admission into the University through their scholastic achievement alone. The Chancellor allocated them as he saw fit. With the advent of EOP, minority students gained a sizable percentage of these slots. In 1968-69 a total of 4 percent of both the entering freshman and transfer classes gained academic ingress thanks to these slots.
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