This is one of several study guides on contemporary problems produced by the American Association for the Advancement of Science with support of the National Science Foundation. This publication on Public Policy Analysis includes 11 sections: (1) The Purpose of this Study Guide; (2) Urban Reform Proposals; (3) Evaluating Reform Proposals; (4) Preliminary Steps in Developing a Method of Institutional Analysis; (5) A Preliminary Propositional Inventory Derived from the Traditional Literature on Metropolitan Reform; (6) A Propositional Inventory Derived from Community Control Proposals; (7) Propositions Derived from Two Traditions; (9) The Structure of Interorganizational Arrangements in Metropolitan Areas; (10) Scale of Production and the Problems of Service Delivery; and (11) Future Directions for Institutional Analysis. The major purpose of the study guide is to develop an analytical approach to institutional analysis. Readings and references are included to support the narrative. (RH)
Public Policy Analysis

by Elinor Ostrom
Since 1970 the American Association for the Advancement of Science has conducted the NSF Chautauqua-Type Short Courses for College Teachers Program with the support of the Education Directorate of the National Science Foundation. More than 7,000 college teachers of undergraduate students have participated in the courses which have dealt with either broad interdisciplinary problems of science or the applications of science and mathematics to college teaching. All of the courses are designed to make available the most current information. In view of the growing demand for course materials in published form and thereby available to larger numbers of college teachers and their students, the AAAS STUDY GUIDES ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, a part of the 1974-75 NSF Chautauqua-type Short Courses for College Teachers Program, are being prepared to test the feasibility of publication. After testing and revision, the following titles will be available from AAAS in the late fall of 1975:

1. Behavior-Genetic Analysis by Hirsch
2. Patterns in Problem Solving by Rubinstein
3. Public Policy Analysis by Ostrom
4. Alternatives in Science Teaching by Creager
5. Water Pollution by Kidd
6. Atmospheric Science by Schaefer and Mohnen
7. Conflict Regulation by Wohr
8. Mathematical Modeling and Computing by Cohen and Dorn

The Study Guides series is in keeping with the overall objectives of the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences: "... to further the work of scientists, to facilitate cooperation among them, to improve the effectiveness of science in human welfare, and to increase public understanding and appreciation of the importance and promise of the methods of science in human progress."
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS

BY

ELINOR OSTROM

STUDY GUIDE NO. 3

AAAS STUDY GUIDES ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Political science teachers are not unique among college faculty in their concern to continue their professional education. But political scientists who teach do have a particular need to be abreast of methods of inquiry and research in their disciplines, and of the application of these to current events and policies. One traditional educational responsibility of our profession is to teach young people and adults how to understand and assess governmental policies and political events as these unfold.

The American Political Science Association has established projects to assist teachers to learn about new methods and materials. In the early 1960's the Association, with the support of the Ford Foundation, organized an extensive program of regional seminars on sources of course materials and reports of research for faculty teaching in small colleges. Two years ago, with the assistance of a grant from the National Science Foundation, the Association established a Division of Educational Affairs to coordinate activities to improve political science education. Currently, the primary activities of the Division of Educational Affairs are to initiate projects about materials for undergraduate education in political analysis. We hope to assist teachers to develop their own course materials for students by giving them access to information about recent research methods, data sources and findings.

The Chautauqua-Type Short Course Program successfully brings such reports of research developments to several hundred teachers each year. Consequently, the American Political Science Association sought to secure the benefits of this program for political science instruction. We proposed that the American Association for the Advancement of Science offer topics of current concern about politics and public policy as short courses. Happily, the AAAS welcomed the recommendation from the Association. In 1973-1974, the AAAS selected two courses in political science for inclusion in the Short Course Program. Both courses and their instructors were well received and evaluated highly by the teachers who attended them.

The political science short courses are being offered again in 1974-1975. Moreover, the preparation of this Study Guide by Professor Elinor Ostrom, based on her course in Policy Analysis, represents a significant extension of the AAAS Program's efforts on behalf of continuing professional education. The Study Guide provides a means of reaching a wider audience with information about new research materials that are available for inclusion in the undergraduate curriculum. And, policy analysis is an appropriate subject for an initial political science study guide in the AAAS series. Faculty and student interest in the substance and assessment of public policies is extensive as evidenced by the increase in policy courses offered in the curriculum and the increase in student enrollments in these courses.

The cooperation of the American Political Science Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science in using the Chautauqua-Type Short Course Program to provide for professional education and the improvement of undergraduate education for political science should serve as a basis for further education projects by each Association.

Evron M. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
American Political Science Association
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PREFACE FROM AAAS

TO STUDY GUIDE REVIEWERS:

The test editions of the initial set of eight Study Guides were prepared on relatively short notice by the course directors during the summer of 1974. To provide as much information as possible to the authors for use in revising this study guide for publication, we ask you as a participant in the NSF Chautauqua-Type Short Course, or a colleague or student of a participant, to test these materials (as if they had been published) and provide your reactions. Your efforts will contribute significantly to the quality of the revised Study Guide.

If this Study Guide has been successfully prepared, upon completing it, you will: (i) have an overall comprehension of the scope of the problem, (ii) understand the relationships between aspects of the problem and their implications for human welfare, and (iii) possess a reliable guide for studying one or more aspects of the problem in greater depth. We ask you to evaluate the study guide on the basis of how well each of these objectives are achieved. Of less importance but most welcome are your specific editorial suggestions, including punctuation, syntax, vocabulary, accuracy of references, effectiveness of illustrations, usefulness and organization of tabular materials, and other aspects of the draft that are related to its function. Three copies of an evaluation form follow this page and additional copies may be reproduced if needed. Each evaluator should return a completed form to: NSF Chautauqua-Type Course Program, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Please type or print legibly. Feel free to include any additional comments.
you care to make. This evaluation is in addition to any evaluative requests made by the study guide authors; however, we do encourage you to cooperate with all requests from authors. Your efforts in evaluating this Study Guide are a worthwhile contribution to the improvement of undergraduate education—and we express our appreciation to you.

We hereby gratefully acknowledge the services of Joan G. Creager, Consulting Editor, and Orin McCarley, Production Manager for this series.

Arthur H. Livermore
Deputy Director of Education
AAAS

Howard F. Fenecannon
Associate Director of Education
AAAS
After completing this study guide, tear out one copy of this sheet, complete it, and mail. No envelope is needed.

Circle the response that best matches your feeling about the study guide. Also, please make specific suggestions whenever possible.

1. Did you achieve an overall comprehension of the scope of the problem?
   Satisfactory
   Unsatisfactory

   Suggestions for improvement:

2. Did you achieve an understanding of relationships between aspects of the problem and their implications for human welfare?
   Satisfactory
   Unsatisfactory

   Suggestions for improvement:

3. Is this a reliable guide for studying one or more aspects of the problem in greater depth?
   Satisfactory
   Unsatisfactory

   Suggestions for improvement:

4. Was the content of this study guide clearly presented?
   Satisfactory
   Unsatisfactory

   Please comment on specific pages and paragraphs, if appropriate. Use the back of this page and additional pages if necessary. Please type or print clearly.

5. Did you find the study guide informative?
   Satisfactory
   Unsatisfactory

   Please comment as specifically as possible.

6. Are there any topics in this study guide that you think should have been modified? . . . any that should have been added? . . . deleted?

7. Rate the study guide as a whole for the following situations:
   independent study by college teachers
   independent study by college students
   a basic text for a conventional course
   a supplement in a conventional course
   other:

   Satisfactory
   Unsatisfactory

   PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE
8. What was your background in the subject before using this study guide?
( ) none or little ( ) college courses ( ) teaching the subject
( ) other: __________________________

9. Your present position is: ( ) college teacher ( ) college student
( ) other: __________________________

10. What specific changes are needed to make this study guide more useful to
college students?

11. Please make any other comments you feel would be helpful (regarding
illustrations, tables, accuracy and availability of references, extent to which
objectives were met).

Please fill in your name and institutional address below, fold, staple, and mail.
Thank you for your assistance.
AAAS EVALUATION FORM

After completing this study guide, tear out one copy of this sheet, complete it, fold, and mail. No envelope is needed. Circle the response that best matches your feeling about the study guide. Also, please make specific suggestions wherever possible.

Unsatisfactory Satisfactory

1. Did you achieve an overall comprehension of the scope of the problem? 1 2 3 4 5
   Suggestions for improvement:

2. Did you achieve an understanding of the relationships between aspects of the problem and their implications for human welfare? 1 2 3 4 5
   Suggestions for improvement:

3. Is this a reliable guide for studying one or more aspects of the problem in greater depth? 1 2 3 4 5
   Suggestions for improvement:

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   Please comment on specific pages and paragraphs, if appropriate. Use the back of this page and additional pages if necessary. Please type or print clearly.

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   Please comment as specifically as possible.

6. Are there any mistakes in this study guide that you think should have been modified? ... and what should have been added? ... deleted?

7. Rate the study guide as a whole for the following situations:
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   independent study by college students 1 2 3 4 5
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Please fill in your name and institutional address below, fold, staple, and mail. Thank you for your assistance.
AUTHOR’S PREFACE

This study guide draws upon a group of materials prepared for the 1973-74 NSF Chautauqua-Type Short Course Program. In revising and adding to that earlier effort, I have tried to make this Study Guide as independent as possible of the Short Course itself. I have tried to address both those participants who will be in the 1974-75 Short Course on Public Policy Analysis and others who will not have taken the course itself. I am quite uncertain about the success of reaching both of these audiences at the same time. I am eager to gain the benefit of comments and criticisms both from participants and from others who may work their way through this test edition of a study guide.

The Study Guide draws upon work supported by the Center for the Studies of Metropolitan Problems at the National Institute of Mental Health (Grant Number 5 ROI MH 19911) and by the National Science Foundation (Grant Numbers GS-27383 and GI 43949). The Research Committee of Indiana University has also provided essential support for the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis which has assisted in the preparation of these materials.

I would like to thank MaryJo Wagner for helping me with the assembling and typing of both this Study Guide and the earlier notebook for the Chautauqua-Type Short Course. James McDavid did a search of recent literature which was invaluable in organizing Section V.
THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY GUIDE

The term "public policy analysis" conveys a variety of connotations among social scientists. To some, public policy analysis is the statistical analysis of the correlates of public policy outcomes. The task is to explain the factors which are associated with different expenditure patterns or with the adoption with particular types of legislation. Social scientists interested in comparative state politics and the determinants of city expenditures within the U.S. have led in the development of this tradition of analysis. (Dye, 1966; Dawson and Robinson, 1963; Sharkansky, 1969; Dye, 1972; Brazer, 1959; Campbell and Sacks, 1967)

A second broad tradition of scholarship frequently described as public policy analysis focuses on program analysis or the evaluation of the direct and indirect effects of establishing a particular type of program within an on-going institutional setting. (Dorfman, 1965; Hatry, 1973) Much of the developments in evaluative research during the last several years focused specifically on particular types of programs and their impacts. (Caro, 1971; Suchman, 1967)

Both of these traditions of public policy analysis have been oriented toward empirical analysis with minimal concern about underlying theoretical models. The first tradition has asked the question: Why are particular patterns of policy outputs selected? The second tradition has asked: What are the impacts of different policy outputs?

A third broad tradition in the public policy analysis field can be characterized as institutional analysis or the examination of the direct and indirect effects of establishing or changing particular sets of de-
cision rules about how public decisions will be made. (V. Ostrom, 1973; V. Ostrom, 1971) This has involved to some extent the empirical analysis of the differences associated with different types of decision rules. (Rae, 1971) However, a much more extensive analysis drawing upon the work of classical economics and game theory has focused exclusively on theoretical analysis. (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973; Coleman, 1973)

This study guide will relate directly to the third tradition of public policy analysis. It will focus on institutional analysis and on problems of institutional design and reform based upon institutional analysis. The specific empirical referent will be metropolitan areas where citizens and public officials are frequently engaged in institutional analysis and design as they serve on local government reform commissions, propose legislation to change the structure of local government and predict the changes likely to occur if a particular reform is adopted. When citizens are asked to vote on referenda relating to local government reform, they are engaged in institutional analysis. When social scientists are appointed advisors to legislative committees or local study commissions, they are even more actively engaged in institutional analysis. When undergraduate and graduate students attempt to predict or explain consequences associated with different types of local governmental structure, they are engaged in institutional analysis.

Institutional analysis can be thought of as the "underdeveloped area of public policy analysis." One of the effects of the "behavioral revolution" within the social sciences has been a marked reduction in the attention social scientists have paid to institutional analysis and design. The reaction against the predominantly legalistic approach of the more
traditional political science led to rejection of consideration of the direct or indirect effects of establishing or changing particular sets of decision rules about how public decisions will be made.

Until recently there has been a lack of conscious theoretical and empirical study of institutional analysis. However, the lack of serious academic work in this area has not precluded large expenditures of time, money and energies on institutional analysis in practice. Particularly in metropolitan areas, thousands of study groups have been appointed, have studied the problems their local areas are facing and have recommended structural changes in the decision rules affecting how public decisions will be made. Many academics have actively participated in these endeavors. An accepted body of traditional wisdom forms the basis for much of the deliberations concerning proposed reform. That much of the traditional wisdom has been subjected to little theoretical or empirical analysis has not concerned many of the participants. The strength of belief in the traditional wisdom has been great enough that doubts about its warrantability have not been entertained. Major structural reforms are proposed because there is strong agreement among those making the proposals that many beneficial consequences will occur as a result.

The approach taken in this study guide is that we do not know as much about the effects of different types of metropolitan reform as those who propose major reforms would lead us to believe. If our knowledge is incomplete—or wrong—then major structural reforms could lead to more harm than good. For those deeply concerned about human welfare, learning about institutional analysis may enable them to participate more constructively in efforts to improve the lot of citizens living in metropolitan areas.
The major purpose of the study guide will be to develop an analytical approach to institutional analysis. This approach will be characterized by the careful delineation of propositional structures underlying various proposals for institutional reform. Where multiple reforms are proposed, multiple theoretical structures should also exist. These can be looked upon as competing theories of institutional design. When competing theories exist, research can be undertaken at crucial junctures where competing theories predict diverse consequences. Findings from research specifically designed to test alternative hypotheses derived from competing theories can efficiently be used to decrease the warrantability of one or more traditions while increasing the warrantability of others. Major theoretical developments may then be needed to incorporate the findings from a research program tied back to the examination of competing theories. Eventually, such a program of research tied to theoretical concerns should provide policy analysts with an empirically warrantable theory of institutional design. Since such an empirically warrantable theory of institutional design does not yet exist, we cannot present the elements of such a theory in this study guide. We will, however, focus on the approach which should if applied by enough scholars and analysts, lead to development of an empirically warrantable theory of institutional analysis.

A second purpose of the study guide will be to illustrate this approach to institutional analysis and design with materials drawn from the literature related to metropolitan reform. It is difficult to understand a broad approach without a specific referent. This approach to institutional analysis and design is also relevant for analyzing problems of designing governing systems for nation-states, for supra-national organizations, for private groups of individuals, and for any problem where the
key focus is the effect of diverse decision rules on the decisions made by a collectivity. However, illustrations from a single area are presented in order to illustrate the method in some depth.

A third purpose of the study guide is to provide insight about the problems of metropolitan reform itself. By the consistent application of the approach utilized herein, it is hoped that some aspects of the theoretical underpinnings of diverse traditions recommending major metropolitan reforms will be rejected as not empirically sustained. Other theoretical structures should be considered to have greater empirical warrantability. We will not, of course, be able to "prove" that one theory is the best theory for understanding problems of institutional design related to metropolitan areas. However, we should make progress by the end of the study guide toward the elimination of at least some of the competing hypotheses about the effect of institutional arrangements on the well-being of citizens living in metropolitan areas.

The fourth purpose of the study guide is to encourage its readers to begin to engage in institutional analysis themselves. There is so much to be done! One can engage in many different types of activities which contribute to the development of an empirically warrantable theory of institutional design. One activity is the logical derivation of propositions about the effects of different types of decision rules from a set of simple assumptions. A second activity is the development of propositional inventories derived from different reform proposals. A third activity is the specification of where diverse theories lead to conflicting propositions. A fourth activity is the design of research projects which will shed light on such conflicting propositions. At times it is possible to undertake research at the time that a reform proposal is adopted where...
different theories of institutional design predict different consequences. Otherwise, research testing propositions about consequences of institutional arrangements will have to rely upon the wide variety of institutional arrangements already in existence. A fifth activity is the review of research undertaken for diverse purposes which may also shed light on conflicting propositions. As we move through the Study Guide, suggestions for further activities will be given so that some readers may be inspired to participate further.

The intended audience of this Study Guide includes faculty and students in the social sciences interested in gaining some analytical tools for explaining and predicting the likely consequences to be associated with the use of different types of decision rules to solve particular types of everyday problems faced by individuals in an urbanized society. A second audience includes citizens who have been appointed to local government study groups and are searching for a method which will help them undertake their task in an effective manner.

It is assumed that anyone working their way through this Study Guide will also have available two books: 1) Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government. Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973) and 2) Elinor Ostrom, William Baugh, Richard Guarasci, Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker, Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1973). It is also assumed that a faculty member or student reading this Study Guide has access to a library which has at least some of the materials referred to in the Study Guide itself. The Study Guide can be considered partly as a syllabus which gives assignments in other materials. When such assignments are given in either of
the two assigned books—or a set of materials available in your library—please do read them before going forward in the Study Guide itself. Otherwise, the discussion in the Study Guide will not be meaningful. The Study Guide will also contain some readings which supplement those contained in the assigned books or articles. Most of the readings contained herein are difficult to find in libraries, are important illustrations of the types of government commission reports concerning problems of local government reform, are classic methodological articles which are essential to read as a background to the development of a method of institutional analysis or are unpublished papers not generally available.

In addition to its function as an extended syllabus and a limited book of readings, the Study Guide will have several chapters which begin to apply the method of institutional analysis discussed in the Study Guide to the substantive focus of this course. These are preliminary efforts and can be extended and improved. Hopefully, you will participate in the efforts to expand and improve the steps taken here. Suggestions concerning projects of this type will be made throughout the Study Guide.
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR SECTION I


II

URBAN REFORM PROPOSALS

Since this volume will be devoted to the development of a method of institutional analysis applied to the consideration of various reforms of governmental structures in metropolitan areas, it is important that you obtain an understanding for the arguments utilized in the numerous reports written on this topic. A bibliography of relevant reports is included at the end of this chapter. However, many libraries do not have a good documents or monographic collection. Consequently, I have reproduced for you in this first section three chapters from a report entitled Building the American City. It is the Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems chaired by Paul H. Douglas and submitted to Congress and the President on December 12, 1968. The fourth part of the Douglas Commission Report was devoted to "Government Structure, Finance and Taxation."

You will find that the discussion in this report about the nature of current urban problems facing individuals living in metropolitan areas is representative of reports written by other national and local study commissions. Their summary of the problem occurs on their page 330 where they find that "the diffused pattern of local government in most metropolitan areas gives rise to many extremely serious problems and inequities. . . ." This diffused pattern of local government has often been called "the" metropolitan pattern. The traditional remedy proposed for many years for this problem has been total consolidation of all units of government serving a single metropolitan area into a metropolitan-wide government. Amos Hawley and Basil Zimmer, for example, argued in 1970 that:
A diagnosis of the metropolitan malady is comparatively easy and its logic is too compelling to admit disagreement. Given the diagnosis, the treatment seems just as apparent: consolidate the many political units under a single, over-arching municipal government. With one stroke the many conflicting jurisdictions could be eliminated and a fragmented tax base could be combined into an adequate source of revenue for an entire community. Nothing, it would seem, could be more obvious or more rational. (Hawley & Zimmer, 1970,3)

The Douglas Commission is not quite as certain as Hawley and Zimmer that total consolidation in all metropolitan areas is called for. The Commission report pulls back from an "all-or-nothing type of reform." The Commission argues instead that "tremendous improvement could come even from structural changes that fall short of the comprehensive amalgamation of all local governments in each metropolitan area." (Supra, p. 330) However, note the word "even" in the sentence. Note also that they would consolidate all units serving smaller metropolitan areas into a single comprehensive governmental unit.

You may wonder why I recommend reading a report written in 1968 when it is now the mid-point of the 70's. Many things have changed, but the broad argument presented in this report has repeatedly been restated by proponents of major structural reforms. Many of these proposals have been submitted to the electorate of metropolitan areas. From 1949 to 1972, 36 reorganization proposals have been submitted to the voters. Of these, ten have been successful and the other 26 have been defeated. As shown in Table 1, 14 of these elections have occurred after 1968. In addition, a major consolidation proposal was submitted to the voters in Portland, Oregon in May 1974. That proposal was defeated by a strong margin. The arguments used in the campaign prior to the Portland referendum were similar to many of the arguments found in the Douglas Commission report. Several sections from a brochure distributed to Portland voters by the Committee for Consolidation are reproduced in this section after the Douglas Commission Report to give you the flavor of the arguments as used by proponents.
<table>
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<th>Reorganization Referendum</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, La.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1959</td>
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<td>Cleveland-Cuyahoga County, Ohio</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Roanoke-Roanoke County, Va.</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winchester City-Frederick County, Va.</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Charlottesville-Albermarle County, Va.</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Columbus-Muscogee County, Ga.</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chattanooga-Hamilton County, Tenn.</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tampa-Hillsborough County, Fla.</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Augusta-Richmond County, Ga.</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, N.C.</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Athens-Clarke County, Ga.</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macon-Bibb County, Georgia</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Pierce-St. Lucy, Fla.</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Outcome</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Reorganizations Attempted</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Warwick, Virginia was a city at the time of the referendum. It had incorporated in 1952, but it was included in this analysis because of its suburban and rural character (in 1958) and because it was Warwick County just six years prior to the referendum.

The type of majority requirement is vital in consolidation referenda. In these two instances city-county consolidation was not possible despite the majority voting percentage in its support. In both of these attempts, the "double majority requirement" which stipulates separate approval by city voters and county voters resulted in defeat since a majority of county voter support was not achieved.

St. Louis-St. Louis County portions of the 1962 statewide referendum are reported in this Table.

Another reason for selecting these three chapters of the Douglas Commission report is that within the report itself there is evidence of considerable disagreement among the commission members about the effects of smaller-scale units within larger municipal governments. The majority of the Commission considered and voted against a recommendation to establish Community Advisory Boards within larger scale urban communities. Read very carefully Chapter Two of the Douglas Commission report and the Supplemental Views expressed by Johnson, Woodbury, Davis, Douglas and Ehrenkrants.

The question of whether smaller scale units should be created within larger metropolitan areas has come even more to the forefront during the last couple of years. A number of proposals for the creation of smaller scale units have been made since 1968. Milton Kotler’s book entitled Neighborhood Government was published in 1969. (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Company). Kotler’s book should be available in most libraries and if you can obtain a copy, please read Kotler’s book at this point. Kotler proposes the creation of neighborhood corporations within large cities as a method for developing political institutions that deal with problems at the neighborhood level. Several other books provide additional overviews of the literature on community control or neighborhood government. These include:


Altshuler's book reviews many of the issues pro and con about different types of proposals for community control. Both Zimmerman and Hallman propose a two-tier system of government with neighborhood units given few independent powers. The Frederickson volume contains a number of articles reviewing issues and experiences related to neighborhood control. Reading one of the above books will begin to give you an overview of this literature. You should also read the first two chapters of the Bish-Ostrom monograph on *Understanding Urban Government* at this time.
Part IV. Government Structure, Finance, and Taxation

CHAPTER 1

Modernizing Urban Government Structure

The Federal Housing Act of 1949 stated as a major national objective "the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family." Since most Americans live in or near cities, this means in large part a suitable urban environment. From direct observation, many hearings, and intensive research and analysis, our Commission is convinced: (1) That conditions in much of urban America fall far short of providing a suitable living environment; and (2) that remedial action urgently demands major improvements in the existing structure of urban government.

There are a number of compelling reasons why the improvement of urban government structure is an urgent matter. The quality of the urban environment depends heavily on services and facilities provided by local government. The rising needs and expectations of urban America have been outpacing local government performance, despite widespread valiant efforts evidenced by increasing levels of local public expenditure and taxation. Further drastic growth must be expected in the scale of local government, and with increased scale comes an increase in the complexity of problems. By 1985—only 17 years from now—the population of metropolitan areas will be up more than 30 percent from the 1960 level. During the same period, the population of metropolitan suburbia will have doubled. Inherited patterns of local government are a critical factor in the ability of local governments to deal effectively with increasingly large and complex problems. An uneven tax base among local governments, causing wide variations in local fiscal capacity; difficulties in coordinating public services; and diffused governmental responsibilities to the point of nonaccountability—these are among the consequences of structural weaknesses in urban government.

Present and prospective problems, then, cannot be met by local governments or communities in isolation from each other. Nor is the National Government equipped to deal with these problems directly. Our Federal structure, the vast continental spread of the United States, and the diversity of its urban areas all limit the direct role of Washington. The State governments, much closer to the local firing line, and with basic legal power over local government structure and financing, are in a more strategic position. However, most of the States also face other critical problems, and any effort they make to deal with urban government structure must somehow take account of the diverse conditions and attitudes of various communities.

Clearly essential, then, is a set of concerted and mutually reinforcing efforts involving all three levels of government—local, State, and National. Such concerted efforts, drawing upon the adaptive capacity of our Federal system, must be made promptly and vigorously if public responsibilities for an acceptable urban environment are to be met. Accordingly, the Commission urges a number of major steps to achieve more viable urban government. Our major proposals call for:

1. State legislation to provide machinery for, and continuing assistance to, responsible local efforts to review and adjust local government structure in present and prospective metropolitan areas;

2. Federal legislation specifically to encourage and assist such State-local efforts toward basic analysis and improvement of urban government structure; and

3. State constitutional and legislative action to unshackle and improve existing institutions of local government by various means, including authorization and financial aid for metropolitan councils of government; authorization of county-subordin-
nate taxing areas; elimination of requirements mandating excessive numbers of independent elective county officials; provision of reasonable standards for new incorporations in metropolitan areas; facilitation of local annexation and consolidation actions; and drastic curtailment of State limitations on local taxing and borrowing powers.

Action along these lines is most urgently needed. Unless widespread vigorous, and effective steps are taken to civilize the existing jungle of local government jurisdictions, the Nation faces the prospect of a further and drastic centralization of governmental power and a possible smothering of the grassroots of American democracy.

Evidence in support of this conclusion is provided in the following pages which describe existing patterns of governmental structure (with special reference to metropolitan areas), summarize resulting problems, and review past efforts toward structural improvement. The Commission's proposals are stated and explained in the final portion of the chapter.

THE NATURE OF METROPOLITAN AREAS

The U.S. Bureau of the Budget defines a metropolitan area as an integrated economic and social unit with a recognized large population nucleus. As of 1967, the Budget Bureau recognized 228 such areas in the United States, calling them standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's). Generally, an SMSA consists of one or more entire county areas that are primarily nonagricultural, and that are closely related to a central city, or cities, of 50,000, or more. (In New England, SMSA's consist of groups of cities and townships, rather than of entire counties.)

Nearly two-thirds of all Americans reside in metropolitan areas. About half of all metropolitan area residents live in the central metropolitan cities, but most of the increase in SMSA population is taking place in outlying-ring territory. A study of population trends done for the Commission indicated that by 1985, some 71 percent of all Americans will live in SMSA's.

Especially because SMSA's are generally defined in terms of whole counties, not all of their territory is closely populated. Most SMSA's include considerable territory that has only scant evidence of urban development. Nonetheless, in terms of people and their occupations, the formal definition of SMSA's is based on counties that are mainly nonagricultural and central-city-related.

Metropolitan areas range widely in population, from under 100,000 to more than 10 million for the New York City SMSA. New England, where SMSA's consist of groups of cities and towns, has 23 such areas. The 205 SMSA's in the rest of the country are distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Counties</th>
<th>SMSAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 county</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 counties</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 counties</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 counties</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more counties</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are 20 inter-state SMSA's with a total population (in 1960) of 20 million persons; and also two broader standard consolidated areas, which are intrastate in nature and altogether include six SMSA's. Adding these, one arrives at a total of 36 SMSA's with major inter-state relationships. Altogether, these areas have 115 entire counties plus parts of 14 others (in New England); in 1960, they had over 41 million residents, or nearly one-fourth of the Nation's total population.

Local government numbers and patterns

Metropolitan areas, as of 1967, were served by 20,745 local governments, or about one-fourth of all local governments in the Nation. This means 91 governments per SMSA—an average of about 48 per metropolitan county, including in addition to the county itself, 12 school districts, 12 municipalities, seven townships, and 16 special districts. But these aver-
ages cover great variations. There are 20 SMSA's with fewer than 10 local governments each—13 in the South, live in New England, and two in the West. At the other extreme are such SMSA's as Chicago, with 1,113 local governments (186 per county); Philadelphia, with 871 (109 per county); Pittsburgh, with 704 (176 per county); and New York, with 551 (110 per county).

The overwhelming majority of these local governments are relatively small. For example, two-thirds of the municipalities in SMSA's have a population of less than 5,000 and one-third of the total number have fewer than 1,000 residents. Similarly, of the 3,255 townships in SMSA's, over two-thirds have a population of less than 5,000. Most of the SMSA's special districts also involve only small-scale operations. Of all the school districts in metropolitan areas, about one-fourth have fewer than 300 pupils, and about one-third operate no more than a single school.

In terms of geography, many of the local governments in metropolitan areas are extremely small. For example, of all the municipalities in SMSA's about one-half have less than a single square mile of land area, probably 60 percent are smaller than 2 square miles, and four-fifths have a land area of under 4 square miles; i.e., corresponding to a square 2 miles on each side. Fewer than 200 SMSA municipalities include as much as 25 square miles of land.

The local governments in metropolitan areas are administered by some 134,000 elective officials, including 87,000 members of their governing bodies (county governing boards, city councils, school district boards, etc.), and 47,000 other elective officials. Municipalities account for over 45,000 of the total number of elective officials—an average of nine per city. Elective officers average as follows for the various other types of local governments in SMSA's: 31 per county government; nine per township; six per school district; and three per special district. Thus, the average metropolitan county has nearly 350 elective local officials.

In most instances there is no direct relationship of boundaries between the several types of local governments in SMSA's. For example, less than one-fifth of the 5,062 special districts and only 13 percent of the 7,062 special districts within metropolitan areas correspond geographically to the area of a particular municipality, township, or county.

Most residents of metropolitan areas, then, are served by at least four separate local governments; i.e., a county, municipality, or township, and a school district, plus one or more special districts. The average SMSA central city has more than four overlying local governments. Less layering and complexity appear in some SMSA's, but far more—ranging up to 10 separate overlying governments—occur in parts of other metropolitan areas.

**Historical background**

These characteristics—multiple layers and generally unrelated boundaries—reflect the separate historical background of various kinds of local governments. The entire territory of most States is divided among areas served by counties, which developed mainly to carry out State-delegated responsibilities. In States that provide for public education through school districts, these units are also generally statewide in their total coverage; that is, no part of the State lacks such a local government "layer." Also, since the duty of providing free public education is usually vested constitutionally with the State itself, school districts resemble counties in having specifically delegated powers.

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The text discussion of geographic size of municipalities is based mainly upon a tabulation of individual-county data appearing in the published series of Individual-State Area Government Reports of the Bureau of the Census. Those reports include figures as of 1960 for all municipalities of 1,000 inhabitants or more. It has further been assumed here that substantially all of the under-1,000 municipalities have an area of less than one square mile. The 1960 Census of Population recorded only 177 municipalities with land area of at least 25 square miles, while the 1950 Census of Population recorded only 177 municipalities with land area of at least 25 square miles, while the 1950 Census of Population recorded only 177 municipalities with land area of at least 25 square miles. No doubt annexation activity has since increased this number to some extent.
In most of the States with town or township governments, these are typically comprehensive in total geographic scope, except that at least the larger incorporated municipalities are excluded.

The other two kinds of units—municipalities and special districts—developed differently and, unlike counties, school districts, and townships, do not add up to any comprehensive geographic coverage of particular States. The municipalities—cities, towns, and villages—were set up to provide for the additional public service needs of closely settled local areas: fire protection, sewerage, water supply, refuse collection, public health, and hospital services, and the like. Special districts make up the most recent and rapidly increasing class of local governments. Their growth has been stimulated by various factors, including State limitations upon the financial powers of counties and municipalities, and in some instances other geographic or structural limitations of those governments. Although most special districts are relatively small, some have extensive territory; of the 7,062 such units in SMSA’s, 333 are countywide and 637 operate in two or more counties. Unlike the other types of local governments, not all special districts have property-taxing powers; nearly half of those in SMSA’s can raise revenue only by imposing benefit charges or special assessments, although they also have borrowing power, and can receive intergovernmental grants.

This is the factual background, then, for the increasingly heard comment that metropolitan local government is Balkanized, a patchwork, and a wilderness. For some metropolitan areas, this would be an exaggeration. However, it is clear that: (1) most local government units are too small to provide effective and economical solutions to their problems; (2) extant overlapping layers of government create confusion and waste the taxpayers’ money; (3) popular control over local government is ineffective because of the excessively long ballots and the confusions caused by the many-layered system of government; (4) policy leadership is typically weak, if nonexistent; (5) America’s administrative organizations are totally inadequate to the functional demands made upon them; and (6) the professional services of highly qualified personnel are typically not attracted to local government.

The same study generalized from these six points, with special reference to metropolitan areas, by stating that—

Why governmental diffusion matters

Local governments can be characterized as typically small, overlapping, and duplicating. The question remains as to whether it matters enough to engage our best efforts to change the existing pattern. Perhaps the most forceful assessment of the problem in recent years was done by the highly respected, privately supported research group, the Committee for Economic Development. The CED’s six-point assessment of “why it matters” may be paraphrased as follows:

(1) Most local government units are too small to provide effective and economical solutions to their problems;
(2) Extant overlapping layers of government cause confusion and waste the taxpayers’ money;
(3) Popular control over local government is ineffective because of the excessively long ballots and the confusions caused by the many-layered system of government;
(4) Policy leadership is typically weak, if nonexistent;
(5) America’s administrative organizations are totally inadequate to the functional demands made upon them; and
(6) The professional services of highly qualified personnel are typically not attracted to local government.

The most pressing problem of local government in metropolitan areas may be stated quite simply. The bewildering multiplicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative, overlapping local jurisdictions cannot cope with the staggering difficulties encountered in managing modern urban affairs. The fiscal effect of duplicative suburban separations create great difficulty in provision of costly central city services benefiting the whole urbanized area. If local governments are to function effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have sufficient size and authority to plan, administer, and provide significant financial support for solutions to area-wide problems.

It has been questioned whether the numbers and layers matter. After all, the argument goes, metropolitan areas are also served by many thousands of separate business establishments. Most of these, as in the case of local governments, are relatively small. They also have developed “like topsy,” without any comprehensive overall design. Yet altogether this great array of businesses give a high living standard for metropolitan residents. If multiplicity and unplanned evolution serve us well in the field of private enterprise, why not in local government in metropolitan areas?

The suggested analogy between local government and private business is a poor one. Many local government services involve important economies of scale; i.e., they can be carried out more economically (or can only be performed

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+ Ibid., p. 44.

= There are over 3 million business establishments in the Nation (stores and wholesaling, service, and manufacturing establishments), or more than 40 times as many as the total number of local governments.
at all) above some minimum scale of operations. In this respect, local governments are much more like privately owned utilities that supply electricity, gas, and telephone service than they are like private business generally. Such private utility services are commonly provided in urban and metropolitan areas (on a regulated-monopoly basis) by a few firms, rather than by large numbers of separate competitive establishments.

Some efforts at local government reorganization have probably put too much emphasis on this matter of economies of scale. There are other even more important reasons why local government structure must reflect considerations differing from those that influence private business patterns. The regulative and policing duties of local government are uniquely public, because of their coercive nature. Also, some of the most costly services of local government, including education, health, and welfare activities, are of a social nature. These, as well as the protective functions, obviously cannot be provided on a consumer-choice pricing basis; they must be financed mainly from taxation and from borrowing that in turn is tax financed. But taxation is also coercive—a means for exacting a portion of private resources for public purposes. Thus, in lieu of the voluntary consumer-choice price system that applies to private business, governments must and do rely heavily for its financing upon mandatory measures that must be applied uniformly, rather than being tailored in detail to the wishes or preferences of the individuals served or taxed.

If the coercive powers of government for regulation and taxation are to be responsibly exercised, they must be subject to control by the affected area or community. This purpose is served, of course, by provisions for popular election of officials, and requirements for their public accountability. But if officials are to be elected, and if taxes are to be imposed, these arrangements must apply to particular geographic areas. Thus, local governments exist for particular defined areas which differ significantly from the less precise trading or service areas associated with commercial establishments, and governments must serve such areas in a socially responsive and accountable fashion.

The case for order and simplicity in the pattern of metropolitan government is based, then, upon far more than the economy and efficiency argument. Local governments perform many services which differ widely in the minimum geographic or population size needed for their effective performance. If only operating economy were involved, public services in metropolitan areas might be supplied by having many separate sets of particular function units, with each set reflecting a scale of operation suited to the particular service involved. But such an arrangement would not provide means for: (1) determining how much money should be supplied by taxation for all local government purposes in particular areas; (2) determining how such revenues should be allocated among various needed services; and (3) promoting coordination and cooperation among locally related public activities. Furthermore, such an arrangement would confront the citizen with the need to choose a variety of officials to serve him with respect to many different services; in this situation public accountability and responsiveness would be more form than reality.

Such a specialized-function approach to local government exists to some degree, as reflected by school districts and special districts. Some proposals for the establishment of separate units to handle certain metropolitan-wide functions run in this direction. The more traditional approach, however, involves reliance mainly upon such multiple-purpose governments as counties, townships, and municipalities. Each of these can, within its own range of responsibility, provide a means of weighing priorities and coordinating related activities. Also, where such a government is so large that some of its services can be provided on a decentralized basis, this can be done through such devices as police precincts, local health areas, and neighborhood city halls—all without precluding larger scale or centralized handling of other functions that can be so performed.

At the time of development there was a reasonably clear division of functions among multipurpose governments. Counties and townships usually handled State-delegated services of the kind needed everywhere; and the municipalities, with more locally determined flexibility, assumed responsibility for the added public-service needs of closely settled communities. Even then, however, State laws were often used to set bounds upon competition for local tax resources through various types of tax-limiting provisions.

With urban sprawl and metropolitan development, the distinction between the conditions and needs of central and of fringe territory has diminished, and so has the demarcation between traditionally municipal responsibilities and those that might be provided on a larger area basis by county governments.

In the typical metropolitan area, then, each county government affords a device for determining priorities and fiscal allocations for services under its jurisdiction, and each municipality can also do this with regard to its particular functions. But no effective method exists for weighing the respective requirements of these two types of multipurpose governments against
each other, or against those of school districts and special districts. And there is no means for insuring that closely related activities of these various governments will be planned and carried out on a consistent and reinforcing basis, rather than in conflicting ways.

Pressures by local, civic, and business organizations and by acknowledged community leaders often are helpful. Also, cooperation among the officials of separate local governments—both informally and in a more organized fashion, such as through metropolitan councils of governments—is an important means for some coordination. Lacking, however, is any placement of responsibility—short of the State legislature and Governor—to promote coordination of interrelated services of local governments, and to set priorities for the financially competitive needs of various public services within the metropolitan area as a whole, or for any particular portion of it.

These seemingly abstract concepts may be more meaningful if considered from the standpoint of the ordinary citizen who thinks his local taxes are too high. With property taxes levied separately by three to six separate local governments, to which should his protest or inquiry be addressed?

Or consider the citizens or civic group concerned about some problem in a particular community. Perhaps the matter is clearly subject to handling by one specific unit of government. But where this is not the case and innumerable examples might be cited—the chances for delay, frustration, indecision, and conflict are multiplied. Illustrative of the kinds of problems involved are:

1. Policing near schools (involving the school district and municipality—or, in suburbia, perhaps county or township);
2. The interrelated neighborhood effects of street cleaning and refuse collection, placement of schools and school playgrounds, placement and maintenance of public housing, location of clinics and welfare service centers (functions generally handled separately by municipalities, school districts, special districts, and county governments);
3. Health care for schoolchildren, or the school's relation to community social welfare and recreation programs (involving school district, and municipality or county); and
4. New roads, extensions of water and sewer lines, and land-use determinations (often involving county, special district and municipal governments; and perhaps even the State).

It would be vain to hope that structural change might end official conflict and indecision. As every President, Governor, mayor, and city or county manager knows, there is constant pressure within any multipurpose government for increased support of various services, and a continuous need to minimize functional overlapping or conflict. But generally today, the diffusion and layering of local government inhibits effective efforts to deal with its problems. Nobody can truthfully say, as President Truman said about the President's role in the executive branch of the Federal Government—"The buck stops here."

Ways of "packaging" government services

The desirability of having all or most urban government services jointly packaged under a single jurisdiction that is highly visible and definitely accountable to the particular community it serves seems clear. But this goal has little meaning until one considers the questions. What is the optimum community to be served by such a broad-purpose government within a metropolitan area and how to coordinate the interdependence of its life? Practically by definition, such an area is relatively large, with much diversity and specialization of economic activity, variety of land use and population density; and usually has a great deal of within-area communication, travel, and transportation. To take but one example: one might assume a metropolitan area served by only a half-dozen comprehensive local governments, each responsible for substantially all urban public services within its particular territory; it is clear that each such unit, in providing streets and highways, must take into account the highway layout of its neighboring local governments. Streets and roads have to connect, in orderly fashion.

But there is a great difference in the degree of geographic relatedness for various governmental services. This has led some thoughtful people to attempt a distinction between area-wide and local area functions, proposing that the former be assigned to a metropolitan unit of government while the latter are left with numerous smaller units. Such efforts generally result in the conclusion that only gradations of functional difference exist, so that objective and reasonable people would (and do) arrive at different proposals for what should be moved up to area-wide government. Such an approach also, of course, leaves unanswered the problem...

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3 An excellent analysis of this subject appears in the report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide. That source suggests seven criteria bearing upon minimum or optimum size for providing public goods and services, and discusses 15 governmental functions in the light of the suggested criteria.
described above as to the need for comparative budgeting and effective coordination between functions.

Another kind of proposal, then, would aim at the comprehensive packaging of local government services into a single unit to serve an entire metropolitan area. This approach seems especially attractive for metropolitan areas of small or moderate size (e.g., consisting of only a single county), especially those not immediately next door to another metropolitan area. But for very large metropolitan areas, this approach immediately raises serious questions:

1. How such a very large government can be really accountable and responsible;
2. Whether the inevitable layering within it would add to costs and bureaucracy;
3. Whether some of our biggest cities, counties, and school districts do not already face serious difficulties of adaptation and responsiveness to the diverse needs of their component neighborhoods and communities.

The alternatives suggested illustrate the difficult conflicting purposes that must be kept in mind in any effort at the restructuring of metropolitan government; concern for localized as well as arc-wide needs; and means for responsiveness as well as for orderly planning, equitable financing, and effective coordination of related public services.

However, the choice to be made is not necessarily all or nothing; i.e., between one large comprehensive metropolitan government on the one hand, and the multilayered array of local governments on the other. It can easily be shown for example, that the overwhelming majority of municipalities in metropolitan areas fall far short, geographically, of embracing whole communities in any meaningful economic sense.

Mobility factor

A Bureau of the Census study indicates that, of the employed persons living in the outlying (noncentral city) parts of metropolitan areas in 1963, more than one-half traveled at least 6 miles each way in their regular home-to-work journey; and four-fifths traveled at least 3 miles. Given the very small geographic size of most outlying metropolitan municipalities, it seems clear that only a small proportion of all suburban workers are employed in their own home-towns. Nearly all of them cross municipal boundaries to and from work, and many of

them travel each day through several municipalities.14

Other census data further emphasize the mobility factor. In large metropolitan areas, even for noncentral cities with a population of 50,000 or more, there is a high level of in-and-out travel between residence and place of work. In 1960, 19 percent of all the persons employed in sizable satellite cities came from a residence outside the particular satellite where they were employed. At the same time, 46 percent of the workers residing in these cities were employed outside the city boundaries.12

Such facts point up the limited meaning of the word "community" as it is often used with reference only to particular local areas where people reside and are counted for population-census purposes. Individual and family ties to such residential areas are understandably strong and important. But most people in metropolitan areas also have an important stake in the public facilities and services provided in areas where they work or visit. Furthermore, local governments in metropolitan areas must serve not only their resident nighttime populations, but also the differing daytime populations resulting from the ebb and flow of metropolitan activities. Yet when these local governments are very small in territory and population, only a limited part of the total population that each government thus serves has any voice in choosing the officials or determining the spending and tax policies that are involved. In turn, these scattered electorates lack an effective tie to the jurisdictions that so strongly affect them. In both directions, one finds taxation, regulation, service, and protection without representation. As was stated in a recent conference on local government problems:

"... The suburbanite is likely to have scattered and confusing civic ties. He looks to his particular outlying municipality for various services associated with his residence there. ... Usually, however, he must depend for public school operation upon an entirely separate unit of government; and the same may be true for certain other public services handled through special districts. Furthermore, for his daily trip to work and for similar journeys by other mem-

15Based on data presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Journey to Work, 1960 Census of Population, Volume PC (2)-6B. This source includes detailed cross-tabulations of employed persons by residence and place of work for each of the 191 SMSA's that had a 1960 population of 250,000 or more. It includes separate figures for municipalities of 50,000-plus. of these SMSA's. Nearly every SMSA had more than a single city of 50,000-plus. Thus, in addition to their respective largest central cities, these areas altogether included 84 "satellite" cities of over 50,000. The figures reported in the text pertain to these 84 satellite cities. For the 34 central cities of these areas, the proportion of resident workers employed outside averaged 30 percent, and the proportion of all workers engaged within the 34 central cities who were residents elsewhere averaged 28 percent.
bers of his family, he depends upon the highway, traffic control, and parking regulation services of various other municipalities.

At his place of employment and that of his wife or other working members of his family, fire and police protection, street cleaning and lighting and other essential services are usually provided by some government other than that which serves his home neighborhood and over which he has some influence by his local vote. Such alien units also control sanitary conditions in the restaurants where he or other family members eat lunch, or where they less frequently dine out. These governments also generally police the area and regulate many of the places of amusement visited by this suburbanite and his children. Typically also, the central city and sometimes other neighboring municipalities provide public recreational and cultural facilities which could not conceivably be made available by this suburbanite's own particularly municipal government.

Fiscal-aspects

Another problem of minute splitting of metropolitan area local government results from the wide range in fiscal capacity of small-area units. Taken as a whole, the typical SMSA has vast resources and productive capacity, usually a higher average level of personal income than that found in rural areas or non-metropolitan communities, and large private investments in taxable property. But these resources are not uniformly distributed, nor are they closely related geographically to the location of needs for local public services. Thus, when fiscal capacity is measured in terms of population (or public school enrollment, or some other measure of need) per available property tax base, great disparity will commonly be found among various local governments having parallel responsibilities. A range of 10 to 1 or more in relative fiscal capacity often appears within a particular metropolitan area.17

This situation provides incentives for intense competition among the many governments in metropolitan areas, extending sometimes to undercover tax or zoning favors designed to attract or retain business establishments. Even more widely one finds “fiscal zoning”; i.e., efforts to use local land-control powers in a way to attract economically “profitable” development and to restrict land uses (such as for low- or moderate-income housing) that might add relatively more to public service needs than to the tax base. The extreme result of such incentive may be found in various metropolitan “tax islands” or industrial enclaves—small governmental principalities that have some large business establishments but few residents. These are able to operate with extremely low taxes because most of the public service needs for families whose livelihood comes from a job in the tax island area must be provided by other nearby jurisdictions.18

These incentives operate in a reinforcing rather than self-correcting direction. The local unit which can either operate with lower taxes or provide more and better services at a comparable tax rate has more potential appeal for further development than do competing units. Splintered governments thus operate toward increasing disparity in fiscal capacity, as well as toward narrow and parochial local policies of municipal government service, and taxation.

Such variations and incentives do not entirely disappear, even in the exceptional metropolitan area that has a simple local government structure with relatively few separate jurisdictions. Under such conditions, however, the problem is likely to be far less serious. The several larger component areas will typically have some reasonable “mix” of economic activity and land use, so that their relative fiscal capacities will fall within a limited range. Furthermore, they are far more likely than tiny jurisdictions to contain enough social and demographic variety to generate internal forces against discriminator fiscal zoning practices. And because special treatment for individual establishments is likely to have less benefit in relation to the larger tax base of such sizable areas, officials should be better able to resist pressures for improper favoritism.

In summary, from a fiscal as well as political standpoint one finds: (1) that the diffused pattern of local government in most metropolitan areas gives rise to many extremely serious problems and inequities; but also (2) that adequate dealing with these difficulties does not necessarily dictate some all-or-nothing type of reform; tremendous improvement could come even from structural changes that fall short of the comprehensive amalgamation of all local governments in each metropolitan area.

18 See Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax, ch. 12, p. 134. 135. For example, in per capita property tax base: 1957, 10 to 1 among 91 municipalities in the Chicago area; 1955, 10 to 1 in 164 local units in the New York SMSA; 1955, 32 to 1 among 30 local units in northeastern New Jersey in 1960. While such comparisons are usually made by reference to taxable property values, similar results would generally appear over a wider personal income or business transactions, but the latter kinds of data are less generally available for small areas.

Few if any “tax islands” are more notorious than Teterboro Borough, New Jersey. This municipality, with an area of 1 1 square mile and a resident population in 1960 of 41 persons had a property tax base (equivalent assessed value) in 1955 of $60 million, or more than $3 million per capita. In four neighboring jurisdictions, each with several thousand inhabitants, per capita tax rates that ranged from about $8,000 to $23,000—and each of them, most understandably, had a tax rate several times as high as Teterboro’s. The problem of tax islands is also illustrated in Cook County, Illinois, in 1956, among the 12 county public-school districts in that county, there was a range of 30 to 1 in the property tax rate per pupil—i.e. from $243,000 down to $8,000 per pupil.
Limiting the problems of governmental diffusion

The question remains as to what can and should be done about governmental diffusion. Our approach will be to draw from the experience of various States and metropolitan areas to illustrate some of the most promising ways to deal with the complex problem. The listing below is illustrative rather than exhaustive. The various devices are interrelated in nature. However, they have been grouped under three headings: (1) structural—affecting the existence, area, or powers of various kinds of local government; (2) financial; and (3) coordinative.

**Structural devices**

The number of local governments in metropolitan areas may be reduced, or the responsibilities and relationships of various units may be redefined to minimize problems. First, it is instructive to examine the pattern of local government that would result in metropolitan areas if it were somehow possible, in each SMSA, to replace existing arrangements by a set of comprehensive units of at least 50,000 persons each responsible for all public services in its territory.

Such an arrangement can be tested by reference to 1960 population figures for the 228 SMSA's as defined in 1967. On this basis, the metropolitan areas would have a total of approximately 1,300 local governments, or an average of less than six per area, as compared with the present average of 90 per SMSA. If thus reorganized, about one-fourth of the SMSA's would each be served by only a single local government, and nearly as many by two local governments each. At the other extreme, the approach would involve more than 30 governments for each of seven very large metropolitan areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of Local Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-Long Beach</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The indicated count of "restructured" metropolitan local governments is based upon simple mathematical calculations for each SMSA dividing by 50,000 the area's 1960 population residing outside cities of 50,000-plus to ascertain the maximum number of potential "new" county-city units, and adding this figure to the count of existing municipalities of 50,000 or more. In effect, this assumes that each present major municipality, as well as each prospective new comprehensive unit, would operate as a composite city-county, with responsibility also in its respective area for functions presently assigned to any school districts, special districts, and township governments.

Such figures are, of course, only illustrative. Any real effort at restructuring of local government would be carried out on an individual area basis. Furthermore, this example makes no allowance for areawide units that would probably be needed in major SMSA's. Under this mechanism, each metropolitan area would have only a set of multipurpose governments serving various component areas. Nonetheless, the results of the exercise do show how greatly the present diffusion of governmental responsibility differs from a simplified pattern.

The structure of metropolitan government assumed for these calculations does not contemplate the creation of huge, remote entities, the prospective new comprehensive governments would average around 50,000 in population (as of 1960), with none of them over 100,000 when first established. The kind of pattern assumed for this exercise offers so many advantages that it could serve as a guideline for efforts toward structural improvement, in particular SMSA's.

**Structural devices** for limiting the problems of governmental diffusion that the Commission has found worthy of emphasis are listed below:

(a) **Direct State performance** (by original retention, or recapture) of some functions commonly delegated to local governments. Examples include: in **Hawaii**, public school operation, property tax assessment, and land zoning; in **Kentucky**, Virginia, and **West Virginia**, provision and maintenance of most local roads; in **Florida** and **Virginia**, most public health services; in numerous States, most public welfare services.

(b) **Authorization for counties or townships to provide urban-type services for unincorporated territory.** Availability of such power to townships in New England and to counties in various Southern States has helped limit proliferation of small municipalities and special districts in those areas.

(c) **Provision of higher minimum standards of population and/or geographic area for new incorporations and special districts, at least within metropolitan areas.** Action in this direction has recently been taken in **Colorado**, **Florida**, **Kansas**, **New Mexico**, and **Oregon**.

Most of the devices listed are recommended, or favorably discussed, often with extensive background information, in various reports of the **Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.** Successive annual reports of that Commission identify states where legislative action has been taken along the lines of its various recommendations on these and other matters.
(d) Review and supervision, through State or county boundary commissions, of proposed new incorporations and municipal annexations within metropolitan areas. Examples include recent action by California and Wisconsin.

(e) Explicit size classification of municipalities, with special limitations placed upon powers available to relatively minor units. This principle is applied in many States, and is also reflected in various reform proposals; for example, in the recommendation by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that zoning powers in metropolitan areas be reserved to counties and major municipalities, only.

(f) State-authorized or mandated transfer of particular functions from municipalities to county governments.

(g) Subordination of some semiautonomous entity—counties or other general-purpose governments. Examples include: provision for dependent school systems associated with townships, or counties, instead of entirely independent special districts—a device used to some extent in 21 States.

(h) Establishment of major special districts to provide services for a relatively large area, such as an entire SMSA or much of its urbanized territory. Examples include: the New York Port Authority, and various other sizable special districts; as of 1967, there were 557 multicity districts in metropolitan areas.

(i) Simple and convenient procedures for municipal annexation of unincorporated territory. Examples include: annexation provisions in such States as Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.

(j) Workable procedures for consolidation or merger of neighboring municipalities.

(k) Workable procedures for consolidation or merger of special districts performing similar functions, or for the replacement of existing districts through assumption of their duties by county or municipal governments. State legislation of this kind has been recommended by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

(l) Authorization for major municipalities to exercise planning and zoning powers for adjacent fringe territory.

(m) Authorization for local governments to contract for joint or delegated performance of particular services. Examples include: pupil-transfer arrangement widely, used by school systems, sometimes extending to the transfer of all pupils living in nonoperating districts; the Lakewood plan in Los Angeles County, where the county provides certain services on a contract-reimbursement basis for various municipalities; and numerous other specific intergovernmental arrangements for joint-agency or delegated operations.

Financial devices

Some of the methods that have been used or recommended to minimize the effects of fiscal disparities which result from the proliferation of local governments in metropolitan areas are listed below:

(a) Intergovernmental fiscal aid. Included in this category are State grant-in-aid and revenue-sharing programs, and the relatively smaller programs of direct Federal-local grants. If the distribution involves a large portion of State financing—at least for poor or high-effort units—intergovernmental aid may considerably reduce the impact of local fiscal disparities. This is often the case for State educational and public welfare grants. At the other extreme, in this respect are some State tax-sharing arrangements (e.g., Wisconsin’s return-to-origin system for distributing part of its income-tax revenue) that have little or no equalizing effect. Various other State-aid programs generally fall between these extremes.

(b) County-distributed taxes. In every State, taxes imposed for school purposes by local school-operating units are supplemented by State grants. About one-third of the States also make some use of another financing device—countywide taxes, of which the yield is distributed on a per-pupil or other formula basis to the school-operating units. In most instances the amounts involved are relatively small, but in six States, in 1962, they supplied at least one-tenth of all local school revenue. Since educational costs typically make up a considerable part of all local public spending, this kind of arrangement can help considerably to even out local variations in fiscal capacity. Its equalizing effect, however, applies only within individual counties, rather than having the statewide equalizing effect of State-local grants.

(c) Local nonproperty taxes. All municipalities and most counties obtain some revenue from licenses and other nonproperty taxes. In recent years, local nonproperty taxes have grown in relative importance. This has resulted in good part from the development of systems by which municipalities or counties can impose a piggyback rate for addition to State-collected sales taxes. Whether in this way or directly through locally collected nonproperty taxes (such as payroll or earning taxes, used locally in a few States), the result is to reduce, at least relatively, local reliance on property taxation. Such a shift will not necessarily help to overcome differences in fiscal capacity among minor jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. For example, local areas that are relatively rich from...
the standpoint of taxable property are also likely to rank high in retail sales volume, but the correlation is not perfect; payroll or earnings taxes especially may involve a rather different geographic influence than property taxes. However, such taxes in the metropolitan context encounter the difficult question—What is the revenue claim of the jurisdictions where earners live as against the claim of the jurisdictions where they work?

(d) Benefited-user charges.—Some services provided by local government can be financed at least to a considerable degree from charges upon the persons they benefit. This approach has little relevance for some of the most costly public services, such as public education, welfare, police protection, fire protection, and public health activities. Benefit charges, however, are widely used to finance water supply, sewerage, refuse collection services, public parking facilities, publicly provided transit services, and some degree public hospital care. To the extent that user charges can substitute for taxation, the need mentioned above for direct comparative budgetary balancing of various public services may be less urgent. Also, the burden for support of services that are entirely charge financed applies geographically according to the location of the persons served, rather than upon a specific taxable area. In these ways, charge-supported services may be better candidates than other local government services for assignment to separate special purpose units, if that seems desirable from the standpoint of efficiency. However, such separation may still be highly undesirable because of close interfunctional relationships; for example, between charge-financed water and sewer operations and land zoning; between parking, facilities and local highways and traffic control; and between refuse collection and street cleaning.

Coordination devices.

Several means which have been widely used or urged to limit conflict or competition or to stimulate coordination among independent local governments in metropolitan areas are listed below. The listing does not include some other significant devices aimed at effective coordination within particular governments, such as the short ballot (limiting the number of elected administrative officials), effective budget systems, and the employment of professionally trained administrators.

(a) Metropolitan councils of governments.—Stimulated by Federal financial help and certain grant-in-aid requirements, COGs have recently been organized in several score metropolitan areas. Made up of representatives chosen by and from elective officials of local governments (primarily counties and municipalities) each such COG provides an organized forum for discussion of programs and problems of areawide or intergovernmental concern. Employed staff prepares comprehensive metropolitan plans and related studies, and means are available for the conduct of various facilitative services (such as employee training or joint purchasing).

(b) Metropolitan planning agencies.—Although some metropolitan area or metropolitan-county planning bodies had previously been in existence, many more have been stimulated by Federal enactments of 1965 and 1966. Where responsible to a metropolitan COG made up of representatives of elected local officials, each planning agency has a mandatory review power (but, no veto) over applications made by local governments for Federal grants and loans with a wide variety of projects. Additional aid is available if the project promises to be carried out “in accord with metropolitan planning.”

(c) Technical assistance relationships.—State governments have traditionally provided guidance and help to local governments with respect to particular services—schools, roads, health, property tax assessment, and the like. In most States, for example, a county school superintendent serves as an intermediate agency for coordination of local public education. More recently, these function-oriented relationships have been supplemented, in about half the States, by an agency for urban affairs or community affairs, responsible more broadly for technical aid to local governments. Direct Federal-local relationships have been less common, and in the past have also mainly concerned only particular functions. Recently, however, especially in aid-related efforts such as the poverty program, economic development grants, and the Model Cities program, more attention is given to the close interrelationships among various public services within urban and metropolitan areas.

Understandably, in view of the complex problems involved, none of these ameliorative devices has provided a dramatically effective solution to the difficulties encountered with governmental layering and diffusion within metropolitan areas. Most of them involve some limitations or drawbacks, along with potential advantages. For example, some observers have questioned whether councils of governments can be expected to overcome selfish parochial
attitudes of constituent minor governments. Some coordinative control can be exercised by metropolitan planning agencies over proposals for various federally aided projects and some local public improvements. However, such co-

ordination relates only to capital outlays and does not directly affect current operations of local governments.

Many of the devices above involve some curtailment in the freedom of action of nominally independent local governments. Even when generous intergovernmental grants give more financial elbowroom, this is likely to involve control relationships limiting the autonomy of the aided units. Thus, at least three major ques-
tions need to be asked about most such amelior-

ative efforts to deal with the problems of governmental diffusion in metropolitan areas:

Will they really have the desirable results intended in particular instances? Will such benefits be outweighed by offsetting disadvantages; for example, such impairment of autonomy that "local self government" is more mythical than real? Will actions that merely patch up an inherently poor situation tend to delay the accomplishement of the more basic structural improvement that is urgently needed.

Obstacles to major structural reform

Despite the need for a simpler and more ra-
tional pattern of local government in metrop-

olitan areas, there have been few important developments in this direction. A marked re-

duction in numbers of school districts has taken place (as discussed below under "Lessons from Successful Efforts"), but the total count of other kinds of local governments has increased by more than one-fifth between 1942 and 1967, and much of this change has involved metrop-

olitan areas. During this 25-year period, only a handful of city-county or intermunicipal mergers have occurred in such areas, and more basic structural reforms have been similarly few. It may be useful, then, to consider why the

record of major change is so discouragingly sparse.

One major factor, surely, is the use of various kinds of stopgap devices, or ameliorative actions such as those described above. For example, the proliferation of special district governments has served to make available needed urban-type services in the suburban portions of many metropolitian areas—often as an alternative to the geographic expansion of major municipalit-

ties, or the provision of such services by county governments. New State and Federal programs of fiscal aid have helped to even out local fiscal disparities, and some of these programs have included pressures toward better coordination of planning and operation among separate local governments. Increased use has also been made, as already noted, of large area special districts for the provision of some kinds of local govern-

ment services.

Another limiting factor has been the understand-

able statewide orientation of State govern-


ments. It is no accident that all or nearly all of the recent major changes in local government structure in metropolitan areas have occurred in the South. In that region, it is generally possible or even customary for the State legislatures to enact local laws of a sort commonly barred by constitutional provisions in other parts of the country. Accordingly, it has generally been more feasible in the South than elsewhere to obtain needed State action focused directly upon the unique problems of particular areas where there was strong local backing for change.

A related factor, of course, has been the marked lag in adjustment of State legislative representation to the rapid urbanization trend of recent decades. Drastic changes on this score have been stimulated by the Supreme Court's one-man-one-vote decisions, beginning in 1962. As is well known, prior to these developments, in many States—suburban voters (and in some instances major city voters also)—were grossly underrepresented in the legislature.

Another factor discouraging structural re-

form is the sheer complexity of the inherited pattern of metropolitan local government, in conjunction with the durability of public institutions. The very concept of full faith and credit debt reflects this latter element; such debt involves the pledge of a government's resources, including the use of its taxing power, for debt service. These and other local government bonds ordinarily run for an extended time period; once a complex set of such obligations has developed, extremely difficult problems are likely to be involved in adjusting them (and the rights to related public property holdings) to a simplified pattern of local government. Again, in this respect, it is probably no ac-
cident that the most notable recent changes in governmental structure in metropolitan areas have involved southern counties where, at the outset, there was a relatively far simpler and less layered pattern of government than that often found elsewhere.

Even where major structural changes have been proposed and voted on, the voting outcome has often been unfavorable. A study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reviewed 18 efforts at local government restructuring in metropolitan areas which involved local referendums between 1950 and 1961, to see how various community interest groups were lined up. Eight of the 18 proposals were popularly approved; two others received an overall majority but failed to receive all the separate majorities required; the other eight fell short of even a total majority vote. Support for restructuring efforts generally came from community elements concerned with the area as a whole or with the central city; e.g., metropolitan news media, the League of Women Voters, business groups, central city officials, and academic groups. Opposition was most commonly and strongly voiced by outlying area elements: residents, county and suburban government employees, and officials of fringe area local governments. In some instances, groups such as volunteer firemen played a strong opposition role.

Any major overhauling of local government structure in a particular metropolitan area is likely to involve damage to some existing interests; for example, by potential leveling of tax burdens, or, elimination of some traditional public offices. Those adversely affected can often enlist support from many others who merely fear the uncertainty of change, or who instinctively prefer known evils to unknown possible new problems. Moreover, as the ACIR study emphasized, any particular reorganization plan must compete for favor with not only the status quo but also with possible alternative kinds of change. To quote:

**The task of the would-be reorganizer is not merely to arouse public concern with existing conditions—that are undesirable **•• but also to be prepared to demonstrate that his proposal is better than any available alternative.**

The ACIR study also found that most of the reorganization efforts analyzed were up against a largely apathetic public. Typically, only one in four persons of voting age cast ballots on the proposals involved.

City-county consolidation proposals provide an even more striking measure of the difficulties involved in achieving major structural change. The four successful city-county consolidations occurring before 1950 had one thing in common. Each was accomplished by legislative act, not by affirmative vote of the people concerned. From 1950 to the end of World War II, every effort to bring about a city-county consolidation was unsuccessful, from a 1923 Seattle effort to a Jacksonville-Duval County effort in 1935. A partial consolidation in Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish (County) occurred in 1947, but the period 1950 to 1962 was marked by a series of failures in consolidation efforts. Twelve such proposals went down to defeat during this period. Finally, two successful consolidations occurred in Nashville, Tenn., and Jacksonville, Fla., in 1962 and 1967 respectively. These efforts are discussed in some detail below.**

One might ask whether efforts to change local government structure have not in some instances suffered from overemphasis upon efficiency or economy, rather than upon the need for understandable accountability and responsiveness of local government. The dearth of meaningful data by which operating economy can be soundly measured further inhibits such efforts.

In reviewing the limited record of recent attempts at significant restructuring of local government in metropolitan areas—the handful accomplished and also the unsuccessful efforts—one feature stands out: each was primarily a local undertaking, initiated and pursued uniquely in the area concerned, even though basically authorized by State constitutional or statutory provisions and sometimes, especially in the South, involving specific State action. This record is consistent with the propositions that every metropolitan area has its own particular problems and attitudes, and that major structural changes should enlist the active interest of the local public directly affected by them. The generally passive role of the State, however, seems hardly consistent with four other facts:

(1) That State constitutional and statutory provisions are responsible for much of the present diffused and layered pattern of local government;

(2) that the States themselves are often harpered (e.g., in arrangements for fiscal aid and in promoting various functions of statewide concern) by present conditions; (3) that a major and growing proportion of the people in most States reside in metropolitan areas; and

(4) that extensive local governmental restructuring in such areas is likely to call for some explicit State action of at least an enabling nature.

Thus, the traditionally passive stance of the State governments is badly out of date. The
widespread failure of States to play a vigorous and innovative role with regard to the structure of local government in metropolitan areas has been a major factor in the limited record of accomplishment to date. This conclusion is supported by experience with school district reorganization, in which the States have played a significant role, as discussed below.

Lessons from successful efforts

School district reorganization

By far the most significant widespread change in local government structure during recent years has involved the reductions in numbers of school districts—from more than 108,000 in 1942 to less than 22,000 in 1967. This trend has been widespread, involving all the States that formerly had large numbers of school districts. The number of States with over 2,000 school districts has been cut from 15 in 1952 to one in 1967. While rural areas have been especially involved, metropolitan areas have also participated: the number of school districts in present SMSA's dropped from about 9,000 in 1957 to 5,682 in 1967. All this contrasts so sharply with the general trend toward proliferation of other kinds of local governments that it is useful to ask: What factors have made school district reorganization widely feasible while other efforts at restructuring have been few and faltering?

At the outset, it is useful to summarize present patterns. Public schools are state administered in Hawaii and partly so in Alaska. Elsewhere, three patterns of local school systems predominate:

1. County-related—Involving 12 States (10 in the South and two in the West), with all or most school-administering units either countywide or largely so (e.g., with units for major cities and balance of county areas);

2. Township-related—Involving nine States, with most school systems related to township or town and city areas, and in many instances directly tied to those governments;

3. Special-area districts—Involving the other 27 States, where most school systems consist of areas differing from those of other types of local governments.

School system arrangements in States with county-related and township-related patterns in most instances took their present form in the 19th century, generally by mandatory State legislation, and have since involved relatively few changes. Most school reorganization of recent decades has involved the other 27 States, where school systems are still relatively numerous (though far less so than in the past), averaging 699 per State as against 106 per State for the county-related, and 357 per State for the township-related group.

Various approaches have been used to accomplish widespread reorganization of school districts in most of these States. In some instances, the State role has been relatively passive; i.e., with legislation that authorized, but did not specifically require, any reorganization efforts locally. However, even in these instances state grant formulas sometimes have provided a financial incentive for the establishment of larger school-administering units. More commonly, there has been legislation (enacted by at least 18 States since 1911) that specifically requires some local steps toward school reorganization. Such legislation has typically required that each county set up a committee to analyze existing school system arrangements, and develop a proposed reorganization plan to be submitted to the voters for approval or rejection. Requirements for adoption differ from State to State. In some cases, a simple majority of the total vote cast will suffice, but others require separate majorities in towns of more than a certain population. Some State laws provide that if a reorganization proposal does not pass, the county committee shall continue to function to prepare and submit another proposal. Local studies and reorganization efforts under such legislation have generally had technical help from staff of State offices of education.

In general, the obstacles to extensive revision of urban government structure resemble those that have confronted school system reorganization. In each instance there is likelihood (or at least some fears) that particular interests and local areas will suffer. In fact, it is hard to imagine a significant reorganization that does not materially impair the position of some taxpayers, public employees, elective officials, or service beneficiaries. However, several factors have probably tended to make school district reorganization—with all its difficulties—more feasible than the substantial restructuring of local government units in major urban areas has been. Such differential factors include these:

(a) Public education is widely recognized (often constitutionally) as mainly a State responsibility. While this is also increasingly the case for welfare, health, and some other local services, it is emphatically not so for most other functions of local governments, particularly those provided only in urban areas. Thus, there is a strong precedent for explicit State controls over school system structure, and considerably more State financing of educational costs than is the case for other elements of local government—giving the State both a special stake and potential leverage in the public school field.

(b) The need for school reorganization has appeared initially and most obviously in thinly
populated areas, which often account for only a minor part of a State's population. On the other hand, proposals for legislation relating mainly to governmental structure in metropolitan areas may expose many State legislators to strong pressure from opposing interests.

(c) The public school function is far less diverse in its makeup than the numerous functions handled in metropolitan areas by nonschool governments. It is easier, then, to measure and compare public school needs, offerings, and fiscal requirements than to develop such evidence for the far broader spectrum of other local government services.

(d) Elective officials are likely to be a more serious obstacle to urban government reform than to school district reorganization. Most elective officials of nonschool units receive pay (full or part time), while schoolboard members predominantly do not; nonschool officials are far more numerous and they are more likely than school board members to be active in political parties.

(e) Existence of a large group of teachers and educators, with at least much of its leadership in favor of school reorganization, has been a favorable factor. For other urban governments and services, however, there is far more diversity; leadership and groupings tend generally to center on particular functions or particular types of governments. It is possible, in fact, that the strongest resistance to major restructuring may appear where organizations of municipal and county governments, as such, have been especially vigorous and effective.

(f) Most States with numerous school districts have also had an intermediate level of responsibility—a county board and/or school superintendent. This provided a potential instrument for planning and promotion of structural change. Aside from the recently developed councils of governments, there has been no corresponding state instrumentality to serve as a continuing point of leverage toward governmental restructuring in metropolitan areas.

(g) Similarly, until the recent development of offices for urban or community affairs in a number of States, there has generally been no central point for State promotion of urban government restructuring.

For all these reasons, and perhaps others, it would be overoptimistic to assume that methods effectively applied to school district reorganization would be similarly successful in widespread basic restructuring of local government in metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, the school reorganization record does demonstrate at least four points:

(a) The need for direct, affirmative, State government action, taking account of the States' major stake in having responsible, effective, and adequately financed local governments to serve their expanding metropolitan areas;

(b) The value of some official mechanism to stimulate local attention to problems of existing governmental structure, and to develop specific recommendations for changes appropriate to the particular conditions and attitudes of various areas;

(c) The need to recognize the close relationship between structural and financial problems of urban local government, and to use fiscal aid programs as one element in any concerted effort toward desirable structural changes;

(d) Perhaps above all, the need for institutional arrangements that might help to assure continuing attention to the development and maintenance of a desirable pattern of local government for major urban areas, rather than only sporadic or one-shot efforts in this direction.

**Particular area accomplishments**

Among the handful of successful efforts at metropolitan government restructuring that have occurred in recent years, two are especially noteworthy—the establishment of city-county governments centered in Nashville, Tenn. (adopted in 1962), and Jacksonville, Fla. (in 1967). Although differing in background, these two efforts were similar in many important respects. Each involved a county area of about a half-million population, with a large central city and relatively few outlying municipalities. Each area also had few other local governments. Each effort required specific legislative action as well as local referendums. And each proposal finally received a majority of "yes" votes from both central-city and outlying-area voters. These areas also resembled each other and many other central metropolitan counties in major population characteristics; most of their recent growth had taken place outside of the central city boundaries, and a much higher proportion of Negroes were living in the central cities than in outlying fringe territory.

The main thrust of each of these successful efforts was to deal with the "layering" problem discussed above—particularly by merging the respective county and central-city governments. In each instance there are some exceptions to complete amalgamation of previous city-county patterns developed for Nashville and Jacksonville resemble that adopted in 1947 by state constitutional action and local referendum for Baton Rouge East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. There are various other cases also where the customary overlapping of county and municipal governments does not exist. Throughout Connecticut and Rhode Island, which have no county governments, and for all the "independent cities" of Virginia (including all major municipalities in that state), as well as several major cities elsewhere, of the 49 largest cities in the Nation, 18 are served by city-county governments. Most of these arrangements resulted from state constitutional or legislative action in the 19th century, generally without any local referendum vote.
governments, including the retention with limited powers of a few small outlying municipalities. However, each of the resulting city-county governments is responsible for the bulk of all local government activities within its respective area (although the Jacksonville-Duval school system, with an elected board, apparently has more legal autonomy than the school system of Nashville-Davidson).

Intensive study and planning, followed by effective efforts at civic education and promotion, were involved in each of the reorganization efforts. The plans submitted for referendum included some specific provisions designed to allay fears of adverse effects upon particular groups; for example, provision for retention of certain separately elected administrative officials and carryover of employment rights for government personnel. Also, each plan provided for: (1) A relatively large governing body for the new city-county government, with a majority of members selected on a district basis (in Nashville-Davidson, 35 from districts and five plus the presiding "vice mayor" at large; in Jacksonville-Duval, 14 from districts and five at large); and (2) differentiation of property taxes to apply within and outside of urban-service district portions of the county; this to take account of the additional services, such as fire protection, street lighting, sewerage, street cleaning and refuse collection, provided for the urban-service districts.

These two features, according to informed local officials who testified before our Commission, undoubtedly contributed a great deal to public acceptance of the reorganization proposals.

Prospects for metropolitan restructuring.

The likelihood of widespread major changes in local government arrangements within metropolitan areas appears dim indeed if one takes account only of the scanty record of past accomplishments on this score. However, more optimism about the prospects for change is justified by numerous factors, including those described below.

Intensity of problems

The difficulties that result from diffusion and layering of local government have been increasing and can be expected to spread and grow. Some of the factors compounding the problems include—(1) the rising needs and expectations for local government services, outpacing general economic growth and requiring higher taxes; (2) the rapid geographic spread of urbanization in metropolitan areas, and the growing interdependence of life within them; (3) stubbornly increasing fiscal and social disparities in metropolitan areas, not only between central-city and fringe territory as a whole but among various parts of the fringe area; (4) the growing inadequacy of stopgap arrangements for urban services through various types of special districts; and (5) reduced opportunity for adjustment through municipal annexations as incorporated places grow directly together.

Public awareness

Until recently, concern for the problems of local government structure has been largely limited to political scientists and "do-gooder" civic groups. Even where specific restructuring efforts were undertaken, as indicated by the 1962 review by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, they often encountered a seemingly apathetic electorate. But concern and discussion have been spreading outside academic halls. Noted newspaper columnists now frequently emphasize the relationship of "the urban crisis" to local government structure. Articles on the subject have appeared in popular magazines. Business groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Committee for Economic Development have issued studies in this field, and are strongly urging that the State governments and particular communities take action.

Public awareness has also been stirred by the problems of poverty, segregation, and civil rights, so explosively reflected by recent unrest and disorder in many cities. Such problems do not directly promote popular desire for restructuring local government; in fact, for at least some people the initial effect may be just the opposite, adding to their distrust of change. More widespread awareness of the so-called urban crisis, however, should surely tend to overcome public apathy about governmental conditions in major urban areas and provide a more attentive audience for those who feel that structural changes are essential.

State and Federal Government developments

Many factors have been increasing the official concern of the states with governmental structure.
ture in metropolitan areas. These include: increased urbanization and suburban expansion; legislative reapportionment; and pressure for larger State fiscal aid to local governments to help meet needs that arise in part from the fractionated tax base of metropolitan areas. Similar influences have been felt by the Federal Government. At both levels, there have been efforts to deal with some of the problems of atomized metropolitan government. Numerous States have set up new agencies for urban affairs; many have expanded their planning and development services; some have tightened provisions that permit new small municipalities and special districts to come into existence, or have taken other steps to slow or reverse governmental diffusion. The Federal Government has provided financial incentives for metropolitan councils of governments, and has also been groping toward better coordination of interrelated programs it assists. The expansion of grants to local governments makes more evident the need of the States and the Federal Government to deal with viable units at the local level, and by fiscal leverage, to stimulate local efforts toward desirable restructuring.

Adjustment of objectives

There are signs, also of more realism and sophistication by the proponents of structural reform. With some areas of the country growing together into large megalopolises, earlier all-or-nothing arguments for the creation of a comprehensive local government to serve each metropolitan area have somewhat subsided. There is also greater awareness of the problems of civic participation and identification that may confront extremely large local governments. Recent comments emphasize the need to tailor structural change proposals to the characteristics of particular metropolitan areas, and, where possible, to build upon inherited patterns; for example, by city-county consolidation, even where such action might involve several major governments for a particular metropolitan area, rather than only one comprehensive entity.40

Mechanisms for change

It is sometimes said that the historic rigidity of local government structure reflects a strong attachment by most of the public to inherited patterns. Yet, school district reorganization has received widespread popular acceptance—because an effective State local mechanism offered the voters a choice between the status quo and a planned alternative. Because of the general lack of any such mechanism to develop tailored plans for metropolitan government restructuring, and the complexity of the problems and issues involved, the public has had no such option on this score. Only when there are effective means to develop and propose explicit alternative forms for metropolitan local government will the public actually have a choice, and the popular acceptability of major change be subject to accurate assessment.

Inter-area learning

Often, innovative methods, first demonstrated in one area, are adopted by others; e.g., many States' school reorganization programs of the past 3 decades.50 It is reasonable to hope that even a limited number of breakthroughs which clearly improve local government structure in particular metropolitan areas will stimulate other efforts.

Altogether, then, it would be unduly pessimistic to judge the prospects for basic restructuring of local government in metropolitan areas by the limited record of accomplishment thus far. However, the need for change is too urgent to permit complacency, and the issues and problems involved are so complex as to merit concern by responsible officials at local, State, and Federal Government levels, as well as increased attention from the general public.

Recommendations

In the light of the background given, in the preceding pages, the Commission offers three major recommendations for action toward more viable urban government, as stated and explained below.

Recommendation No. 1—Machinery for structural change—A road to local self-determination

The Commission recommends that State governments promptly set up effective machinery to improve local government structure in present and prospective metropolitan areas. As a minimum, each State should:

(a) Assign to an existing or newly-created State agency a specific mandate to: (1) analyze existing conditions and

40 Emphasis on various kinds of approaches to restructuring appears in reports of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and in the local government study sponsored by the Committee on Economic Development (cited in footnote 9, above). Various reasons why counties should be used increasingly to meet the local government needs of metropolitan areas are summarized in excerpts from a presentation by Bernard F. Billingham, Executive Director of the National Association of Counties, in the National Civic Review, April 1969, pp. 213-18.

50 Many instances can be cited of the intergovernmental spread of institutional and fiscal devices. An early example involved Benjamin Franklin's successful promotion of a public fire department for Philadelphia, based on his observation of a Boston system. Numerous constitutional and statutory provisions have been largely "copied" from state to state. Other more recent widespread developments have included: state budget systems and structural reforms; the city manager plan; state and local accounting systems; state grant-in-aid programs; state registration and licensing of vehicles; and various tax provisions, such as state income and sales taxes, local payroll taxes, and authorized local supplements to state sales taxes.
problems of governmental organization in metropolitan areas; (2) prepare proposals for appropriate State constitutional and legislative changes; (3) aid official local commissions established in particular areas to develop governmental reorganization plans; and (4) provide special technical assistance to local governments in areas where reorganization plans are adopted, to help insure an orderly transition to the revised system.

(b) Provide procedures for the establishment of temporary local commissions to appraise and prepare explicit recommendations concerning governmental structure in particular areas; require that such commissions be set up for each metropolitan area, and that they prepare and publish their findings and recommendations within some specified interval; and provide funds to finance the work of such local commissions.

(c) Provide workable procedures for prompt official action upon recommendations for restructuring of local government that are developed by local commissions for particular areas, with adoption either: (1) by State legislative action, subject to cancellation before the effective date by local referendum; or (2) directly by local referendum, with the results in either case determined by a majority vote of the entire area affected.

State action of this nature would make available to the residents of metropolitan America an opportunity they now substantially lack—to exercise a choice between inherited patchwork patterns of local government and an alternative arrangement responsibly planned and appreciated with conditions within particular areas. A significant precedent is available from the joint State-local area efforts that have been so successful in school district reorganization.

WHY A LOCAL-STATE AGENCY?

This recommendation is based on the assumption that the States have a major stake in the viability of local government in major urban areas. In most States, a majority of the population lives in metropolitan areas, and this proportion is growing everywhere. Furthermore, the States are largely responsible for present problems of urban government structure, and major change is likely to require some specific legislative or constitutional action on their part. The recommendation also assumes that the traditionally passive and patchup tendency of the States with regard to urban government will not meet the increasingly critical problems involved.

Because of the diverse conditions and attitudes of various areas, as well as the crucial importance of local self-determination, structural reform cannot and should not be provided by direct State imposition of blanket changes. On the other hand, the historical record shows all too clearly that isolated and sporadic local efforts cannot apply to this issue. The momentum it so urgently needs. Moreover, since inherited governmental arrangements are generally similar among the major urban areas of a particular State, an approach considered desirable in one such metropolis may well be found useful for others in the same State.

Geographic coverage

We recognize that serious problems of local government structure exist widely for rural as well as major urban areas, and that recommendations for State legislation often cannot be specifically limited in their scope to metropolitan areas. At least in highly urbanized States, therefore, it may be desirable for the proposed agency assignment to be statewide in its prospective coverage, and for the machinery which is provided for local study commissions to be available to all parts of the State. Generally, however, we believe that the proposed State-local program for structural improvement should apply only, or initially, to present and prospective metropolitan areas, or major urban counties. Such a limitation should minimize the range of problems involved and focus attention upon sections where proliferation and layering of local government are most serious.

The established Federal concept of metropolitan areas (SMSA's) is extremely useful for many purposes, including the summary and comparison of data for major urban communities, as presented in various parts of this report. The areas thus defined offer a convenient reference point for States enacting the type of program proposed here. However, individual States may well wish to take account of prospective future metropolitan areas as well as present ones, or to use some alternative standards of coverage to ensure that additional populous counties are included. Another optional factor is the extent to which local charter commissions may be authorized specifically on county lines or for larger areas. The county has typically been the basic geographic area for the school reorganization efforts mentioned above, and a similar approach may be suitable for many metropolitan areas. However, where larger metropolises are involved, provisions should be made for areawide commissions.
Placement of State agency responsibilities

A State agency concerned with urban governmental structure should be equipped both to develop recommendations for relevant legislation and to assist and advise local commissions dealing with this subject in particular areas. The former task can, in many instances, draw upon studies carried out by the respective State central legislative research agencies and other special or interim commissions. However, focusing of responsibility for this subject matter should help to increase the concerted attention it receives and the chance for greater consistency in State policies and programs affecting urban government.

About half the States have recently established a department or agency for urban or community affairs. One principal duty of such agencies is to provide technical assistance to local governments. Specific responsibility with regard to urban government restructuring may well be assigned to such agencies, subject to one important qualification. The suggested concern for urban government reorganization demands a future-focused, exploratory, and innovative emphasis. This is unlikely to be appreciated by local officials dealing with day-to-day problems, with whom it is obviously important for the State agency to maintain effective working relations. Thus, if current technical assistance and the proposed duties concerning urban government structure are put under the same agency roof, a definite effort should be made through internal organization and specialized staffing to limit the chance that the two kinds of assignment might be mutually damaging.

Local study commissions

States will need also to devise appropriate standards of size, composition, and selection for the proposed local study commissions. Such commissions might best be limited to persons chosen by local popular election, preferably on an equal-population-district basis; but inclusion of a limited minority of members appointed by the Governor and, perhaps, by the mayor of the central city and by appropriate county officials, may be found advantageous. We believe, however, that ex officio membership by incumbent local government officials or employees should definitely not be authorized. While effective performance by the study commissions may depend heavily upon sympathetic interest and counsel from incumbent officials, their direct membership could well create serious problems if divided loyalty.

In view of the complexity of problems involved, the proposed local study commissions should be given sufficient time (perhaps 1 to 2 years) to carry out their duties, including allowance not only for background research but also for orderly consultation with interested community groups and appropriate public hearings. For the same reason, and in view of the States' strong concern for competent local efforts, we urge that fully adequate financing be provided by State appropriation for such study commissions. Any costs that might reasonably be incurred would at most represent a tiny fraction of the large sums going into urban government operations. In other words, the size of the stakes involved—financially as well as from the standpoint of the general public welfare—merit an intensive and adequately supported undertaking. It should not be necessary for the study commissions to cut corners or to seek private financial help in order to carry out their assigned functions.

The States may wish to consider, for the proposed local commissions, a provision that has been used in some State programs for school district reorganization. Under that provision, when a particular school reorganization plan fails to receive popular acceptance by referendum, the study commission does not go out of existence. Instead, it has the duty of preparing and submitting an alternative proposal. Such an arrangement, it can be argued, should limit delays, effort, and cost that would be involved in starting completely from scratch where perhaps only modest changes in the plan first submitted are necessary to make it publicly acceptable.

Adoption of reorganization plans

We are proposing that structural plans developed by local study commissions be adopted either by direct State legislation (subject to effective-date cancellation by local referendum), or specifically by local referendum, and that in either event approval should not require separate favoring majorities by subordinate parts of the area concerned.

There is ample precedent for direct State legislation of this nature. The boundaries of practically all counties in the Nation; and of most of the limited number of city-county governments, were set by State constitutional or legislative action, without being dependent upon individual area referendum votes. The same is true for the county area school systems that prevail in a number of States. Most such State actions occurred in the 19th century. It seems strange that, with today's far greater population and complexity of government, there should appear to be widespread suspicion of structural action by responsible elected representative bodies, and a yearning for direct democracy under conditions which make such an approach even less feasible and desirable than in earlier days.
Our recommendations that any local referendum action stand or fall by a single overall majority rests primarily upon the proposition that inherited local government patterns are not sacrosanct, and do not merit special legal protection. Prospects for significant change would be effectively stifled by requiring separate majorities for all existing local jurisdictions. This is amply evidenced by the near zero record of spontaneous merger of neighboring municipalities under permissive State laws; by similar evidence from school reorganization arrangements of a few decades ago; and, for that matter, by the disastrous effects of the unanimous consensus rules under which the old League of Nations tried to operate. Less fatal would be a requirement for separate central city and remaining area majorities; various urban reorganizations efforts have surmounted such a hurdle. But such a requirement also should be avoided if possible—not only because it would obviously load the odds heavily against prospective change; but also because it would tend to encourage the divisive we-and-they attitudes which already plague so many metropolitan areas. The provisions that apply to local governmental restructuring should be designed to reduce rather than to recognize and encourage such cleavages.

There is a far better way—consistent with American traditions of government at every level—to take account of the legitimate interests of various parts of a major urban area for which governmental restructuring is at issue. That is to make sure that the body preparing recommendations is geographically representative, so that attitudes of various subordinate areas can be adequately considered. In turn (as suggested by experience with the recent Nashville and Jacksonville reorganizations), this is likely to result in a proposed governmental form that also provides specific representation for various component parts of the entire area.

Problems of transition

We have urged that the State agency concerned with urban governmental structure have the duty of providing technical assistance to local governments where reorganization plans are adopted, to help ensure an orderly transition to the revised system. This proposal is of major importance, in view of the complexity in most metropolitan areas of inherited patterns of governmental indebtedness, property rights, fiscal relations, and operating responsibilities. Uncertainty about how much relationships can be justly unscrambled is without doubt a major barrier to basic restructuring of local government in many areas. This uncertainty needs to be reduced, and orderly and equitable means of adjustment need to be provided. The city-county governments recently installed in Nashville and Jacksonville were to supplant relatively simple (though unsatisfactory) earlier structures. Even they, however, have faced extremely difficult problems of transition, which would be even more complex in many other metropolitan areas. Clearly, the States should provide backup help to deal with the pressing requirements for orderly and equitable transition.

Recommendation No. 2—Improvement of local government arrangements

To encourage intensive reexamination, and, where found desirable, the improvement of local government arrangement in major urban areas, the Commission recommends:

(a) That Congress promptly adopt legislation—under which, beginning 5 years after its enactment, the eligibility of local governments in any metropolitan area to participate in Federal grant programs would be contingent upon there having been completed, within the preceding 10-year period, a comprehensive official study of local government structure within the area, carried out either directly by the State or States concerned or by a public agency authorized by State law to carry out such a study, and including the publication of findings and recommendations; and

(b) That Congress promptly amend section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 so as specifically to authorize Federal aid under that section for the financing of official studies of governmental structure in metropolitan or major urban areas that are undertaken by State agencies or in accordance with State authorizing laws.

This recommendation takes account of the strong interest of the National Government in having a viable set of local governments in major urban areas. It is intended to provide a direct incentive to States and metropolitan communities to make an intensive review of their inherited urban government arrangements, along the lines proposed in recommendation No. 1, and to underwrite from Federal resources a part of the costs of such State-local efforts.

NATURE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Most Federal intergovernmental expenditure is to help finance public services in metropolitan areas. While the bulk of this money is paid in the first instance to State governments, a
rapidly growing portion (nearly $3 billion in 1967) consists of direct Federal-local grants paid under numerous separate programs. The bewildering layers of local governments in most metropolitan areas create tremendous difficulties for these aid arrangements. For example, the fiscal capacity and effort of particular local governments cannot be reasonably measured without attention also to other units which overlay them in various ways. Most Federal-local grants, therefore, do not rely mainly on objective formulas (such as are extensively used in Federal-State grants), but are on a particular-project basis. This multiplies paperwork and the opportunity for intergovernmental friction, with attendant charges of favoritism and detailed Federal “domination.” Similarly, the prevailing local separation of responsibility for various interrelated services is a serious obstacle to the desirable grouping of Federal aids for such services.

More basically, the widespread failure of local governments to keep pace with urban area needs and expectations for essential public service-stemming partly from the diffusion of responsibility among numerous small and layered local units—has created a strong pressure toward direct Federal provision of services which it is poorly equipped to supply.

On both these grounds, the Federal Government and the Nation as a whole would have much to gain by widespread simplification of local government structure in major urban areas. But the specific nature of restructuring must properly be left for State and local determination, in view of the diverse conditions and traditions of various parts of the country, and the States’ constitutional responsibility. Accordingly, this recommendation would not make continuing Federal aid contingent upon any particular-structural arrangement or even upon specific legislative action or referendum votes. Rather, the suggested incentive is to stimulate intensive locally-focused studies and recommendations, with the expectation that these will lead to desirable basic change, at least in many instances.

Timing provisions

The Commission urges that the State governments take the earliest possible action, by legislation or, if necessary, by the amendment of their constitutions to—

(a) Authorize and help finance effective councils of local governments in present and prospective metropolitan areas;

(b) Permit counties to provide urban-type services through subordinate “service areas” with appropriate means of financing, where this is a feasible alternative to independent special districts;

(c) Eliminate provisions requiring numerous independent elective county officials which diffuse responsibility and prevent effective control by county governing boards.

The foregoing recommendations aim mainly at extensive fundamental restructuring of urban government. Even if they are acted upon soon, as we deeply hope, it will be several years before they produce widespread effects. Meanwhile, increasing urban government functions and costs and further metropolitan growth will mean still more, governmental diffusion and layering.

This is a dismal prospect. But it also is a challenging one—particularly to the States, which in large degree have the legal capacity to stem the prevailing trend toward further Balkanization of urban government.

Thus, we see no need to choose between prospective long-range basic restructuring efforts as proposed in the foregoing recommendations and various actions that promise more immediate impact; there is a need for both. From inherited institutions in some States, steps undertaken recently in others, and certain major proposals of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, one can observe key elements for a desirable program that should help to deal with certain increasingly urgent conditions without damaging the prospect for more basic future changes.

Recommendation No. 3—Actions by State governments

The Commission urges that the State governments take the earliest possible action, by legislation or, if necessary, by the amendment of their constitutions to—

(a) Authorize and help finance effective councils of local governments in present and prospective metropolitan areas;

(b) Permit counties to provide urban-type services through subordinate “service areas” with appropriate means of financing, where this is a feasible alternative to independent special districts;

(c) Eliminate provisions requiring numerous independent elective county officials which diffuse responsibility and prevent effective control by county governing boards.

(d) Eliminate onerous tax and debt limits which so impair the capability of municipal and county governments as to
stimulate the creation of separate special district units;

(e) Review and revise laws concerning special districts to facilitate their merger, dissolution, or “taking over” in appropriate cases by county or municipal governments;

(f) Enforce minimum-size standards for proposed new municipalities, at least within present and prospective metropolitan areas; and

(g) Provide flexible procedures for annexation of territory by municipalities, intermunicipal mergers, and functional transfers between municipalities and counties.

Not all of these actions are called for in every State, but most of them are widely and urgently needed.

METROPOLITAN COUNCILS OF GOVERNMENTS

As already mentioned, numerous metropolitan councils of local governments have been created during the past few years. When such bodies meet certain conditions, they qualify for Federal aid and can exercise a significant role in areawide planning. We believe that those States which have not yet done so should move promptly to authorize such councils, and to participate in their financing.

Such action is not offered as a substitute for steps toward more basic restructuring of local government in metropolitan areas, which we have specifically urged in Recommendations 1 and 2 above. As was stated by an official of one such body in testimony to our Commission:

As a voluntary association of governments, rather than a government itself, our organization and others like it must rely on persuasion and on the achievement of consensus as a means of implementing its decisions. * * * Few political scientists—and few public administrators would * * * argue seriously that the voluntary councils of governments as we now know it is a device which can provide the ultimate solution to our metropolitan problems.

(However, he continued:)

[Such observers also would] point to the fact that councils have for the first time opened up channels of systematic communication between the central city and its suburbs * * * to the improved coordination which councils have brought about in the attack on regional problems; and to the fact that increasingly councils are showing their desire to deal with the tough problems which have brought themselves so forcefully to our attention during the past 2 years. * * *

Some citizens would argue that this is not enough. And it is true that it is only a beginning. But, we would all agree, it is too soon to seek to begin.

In similar vein, another qualified observer expressed the following views:

One of the most hopeful aspects of the councils is what appears to be, at least among a number of them, the capacity to evolve from a sort of defensive league of municipalities and counties around activity by the State, or anybody else that might act to do something, into institutions which begin to have a vested interest in the prerequisites of local governments when it comes to handling regional problems.

So for the short term I would argue that our choice is not between councils of government and general governmental reform, which I also tend to look favorably towards, but rather, between councils of government and ad hoc approaches through special districts.

As a minimum, then, metropolitan councils of governments can provide a politically feasible instrument to promote communication and cooperation among neighboring governmental jurisdictions. Basic structural reform should, over time, provide an even better basis for area-wide action in many SMSAs. However, especially for very populous metropolitan areas and those which cross State lines, there will still be a need for the type of voluntary cooperation and coordination which councils of governments are intended to promote.

Strengthening urban counties

In most of the Nation, there has been relatively little use of the county, in modernized form, as an alternative to the proliferation of additional layers of minor governments in urban-fringe territory. Our proposals are designed to remove various State-legislated obstacles to that approach, such as: requirements for area-wide uniformity of county taxes; excessive numbers of elective county officials; and onerous tax and debt limitations.

Recent court decisions that extend the one-man-one-vote principle to local governing bodies promise an early end to the rotten borough conditions that have made many county boards unrepresentative. But the average county still has about a score of separately elected administrative officials who are often substantially independent of the county board. State action is needed to eliminate such intracounty dispersion of responsibility, or at least to allow a more workable framework. While such a change would also be desirable for rural counties, it is of particular importance for urban counties.

Municipal size standards

In many States, statutory provisions for new incorporations date from an era when most settled communities were widely scattered, so that it was not unreasonable to permit the creation of a separate village or town for even a few hun-
dred people. But the traditional minimum-size standards are irrelevant and potentially damaging for today's prevailing pattern of urban development, which mainly involves territory around sizable cities. At worst, they permit the creation and maintenance of tax havens, and at best, they often spawn nonviable units that have little relation to the economic framework of the urban area as a whole, and obstruct efforts toward an improved governmental pattern. The States should promptly revise their laws so as to prevent the creation of very small municipalities within metropolitan areas, or in proximity to sizable present cities. Existing conditions will be hard enough to modify metropolitan areas already have 2,700 municipalities of under 2,500 population, most of them covering less than a square mile; it is high time to end further proliferation of this nature.

Other proposals

Additional background concerning the various types of state action we are urging appears in early portions of this chapter, and with more detailed information in reports of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The main thrust, throughout, is to increase the capability and flexibility of the two additional major types of multipurpose local governments-counties and municipalities-so that they may better meet the needs of modern urban life.

If the States widely and effectively taken such action two decades ago, the recent near-explosion in numbers of special purpose districts would not have occurred, and problems of local government Balkanization would be far less serious than they now are. Our proposals for State review and adjustment of laws concerning special districts should not be viewed as a blanket condemnation of this device. It has served needs that could not otherwise be served, and will continue to have a potentially useful role. This is clearly the case where a metropolitan area includes several counties and large municipalities. In such a case, a limited-function metropolitan district would be an appropriate device. A desirable long range policy for urban government, however, will surely aim at the maximum possible grouping of local public responsibilities under viable, relatively comprehensive, multipurpose governments.
CHAPTER 2

Urban Services:
Steps Toward Neighborhood Regeneration

As our cities have grown larger, and as governmental services have become increasingly professional and specialized, the psychological distance from the neighborhood to city hall has grown from blocks, to miles, to light-years. With decreasing communication and sense of identification by the low-income resident with his government have come first apathy, then disaffection and now—insurrection.

Lack of widespread citizen participation in municipal government in our large cities contrasts with the situation in many suburbs. The affluent or middle-class suburbanite may not involve himself regularly, but he is at ease with his local government. He knows he can influence it; he knows how to get things done (or stopped), and with this potential participation comes a sense of pride and protectiveness toward the instruments of local government. Thus, one of the fiscal and political competitors of the central city—the small and affluent suburb—can count upon citizen participation while the government of the city, beset with eroding resources and rising revolt, can count less and less upon the interest and loyalty of its people.

We believe it necessary and urgent to take immediate steps to reverse the disastrous rise in alienation between big city government and its disadvantaged citizens. We must revitalize the neighborhood; we must contribute to the citizen sense of self-respect and self-reliance; and we must open a two-way communication between the poor and city hall or the county building.

THE OVERWHELMING CHANGE

The figures presented in Part I of this report show the great change in the character of our Nation, from overwhelming rural to predominantly urban, especially in the last half-century.

What the shift from country to city has meant for the people involved is an overwhelming, continuous upheaval. The Negro in particular has had a difficult time in his move to the city, has found the traditional immigrant ladders out of poverty restricted, both because of his color and because he has made his migration in the last few decades, when the physical growth of the city has slowed, and the job market for unskilled labor has declined. Nor has he been able, in most cases, to move beyond the city line to where the jobs for the unskilled increasingly are located. For many Negroes, the slums which were only ports of entry for America’s earlier immigrants have become prisons.

The Negro’s problem is the most severe, but cities are still attracting immigrants from other ethnic groups as well, notably Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and white Appalachians. Their problems are the same in kind if not in degree, and in some pockets, or in some cities—for example, in the Puerto Rican areas of Manhattan—there is no distinction in levels of misery.

The pace of immigration to the cities is slackening now; there are, compared to earlier days, so few left on the farms that they cannot supply the same flood of emigrants as in the past. The suburbs probably attract what national migration there is; not only from rural areas but even from the older central cities. The natural increase from the excess of births over deaths keeps the population of the central city at a steady high level, in spite of this loss to the suburbs.

Part I also stressed, however, the separation of low-income (especially nonwhite) residents and upper-income residents, into different political jurisdictions. The handicaps that deprivation causes are visited on many of the children of the earlier immigrants by the fact of isolation in one political jurisdiction—the central city.

Breakdown of the family

Thrown into the city to sink or swim, the poor family begins to show the strain of continued inability to get work. The institutions that in other societies have played a cementing role have been tested to their utmost, and sometimes cannot meet the need.

The church in rural society has always played a dominant role in creating socially acceptable
behavior patterns. But families that had remained together in rural areas found other influences working on their children in the crowded slums. Many parents from rural areas, who continued the strict observance of their religious beliefs, have become estranged from their children, who now think of them almost as religious fanatics. Many families were unable or unwilling to change their values in terms of child rearing, and now have much less influence on the children’s behavior, or have lost them to the street entirely.

Elementary and secondary schools have been unable to cope effectively with the changing neighborhood population, particularly in terms of the special needs of the new residents. In an average-size school, teachers may be able to work constructively with pupils; in inner-city schools of overwhelming population, where the children’s own personal problems are added to those of instilling an education, the staff must spend much of its time and energy acting like wardens rather than teachers. Moreover, in some of New York’s classrooms, 50 percent of the pupils born in Puerto Rico are unable to speak Spanish. Barriers like these are not confined to New York but operate also in Boston, Washington, Los Angeles, and wherever the Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexican-Americans have arrived.

Another alienating factor may be associated with the high turnover of residents in the inner city—even under normal conditions, unrelated to urban renewal or code enforcement. High turnover characterizes the modern suburb, too—all America has become more mobile than it was 20 years ago. However, suburban families tend to wait till the end of the school year, whereas the principal of an inner-city elementary school in Washington, D.C., once estimated that 40 percent of his student body at the end of the school year were new children. These children had replaced others, entered in the fall, whose families had simply picked up and moved to another school zone, or put of town entirely. In those neighborhoods of hardcore deprivation, in his opinion, there is no community. The children on the block may know each other, but the mother usually knows just one or two people.

Alienation from the city government

What this indicates is the detachment of the low-income resident from his own local government. While great changes have been occurring in racial and ethnic residential patterns, local institutions too often have plodded along with little response, becoming less relevant to the problems and needs of the new residents of the neighborhoods.

Discrimination in city services

It is often said that slums are expensive for the city administration. Usually, this cost reflects high welfare, police, and fire department activity. In other normal services, however, such as schools, garbage and trash removal, snow removal, street surfacing and repair, replacement of old and inadequate water and sewer lines, the slums are usually at the bottom of the list.

Large cities have great problems in keeping the streets clean, but in the slum neighborhoods sanitary conditions are often intolerable. Practically all are characterized by junk- and garbage-littered lots, abandoned cars, broken bottles and scattered debris. Cleanup campaigns have been mobilized among local residents, often with good immediate results, but the lack of sustained followthrough by the city usually frustrates these local efforts, and the citizens lose hope of keeping their area neat.

Lack of ability to express needs

The processes and techniques of problem solving are obscure to the majority of ghetto residents, who seldom have had the opportunity to participate in civic and political affairs.

Observers have speculated that much of the organizational turmoil in the ghetto today reflects the decades of political vacuum in central city neighborhoods. The director of a study of Local Community Structure and Citizen Participation undertaken for this Commission feels that rioting and acting out behavior may be the functional equivalent of community organization for the most frustrated groups in our society.

Distance from city hall

The sheer size of the larger cities today has made it difficult for neighborhoods to develop an effective relationship with the city government. Neighborhoods discover that city departments of sanitation and public works, the school system, the public welfare department and so forth are accountable not to the people they serve but only to the city administration. As a result, the personnel of these departments can, and frequently do, ignore local complaints about existing services and suggestions for improvements.

Even public social agencies have not always served their clients well, partly because, it is widely felt, their attitudes are skeptical and
suspicious; such an approach, in turn, may well arise because of the anxiety of the public servants in their employ to avoid spending the taxpayer's money on handouts to the undeserving poor. However, as columnist William Raspberry has pointed out, the handout renamed the subsidy, or support payment, is not unknown to the large corporate farmer with excess land, to the owners of oil wells, or to the builders of ships and planes.

Absorption within the city

The neighborhoods in the cities were unable to absorb comfortably the numbers of new immigrants, white and black, who arrived from rural America. By the end of one decade, a one-family house sheltered three families; by the end of another, the same house was cut up into single rooms and contained 12 units. The flood of people overwhelmed the old schools and the existing welfare and medical services.

Assimilation failures

Moving into nonwhite ghettos, Negro immigrants could find relatives or friends from back home with whom they could socialize. This taught them a great deal about the ghetto but very little about the city. Pockets of white Appalachians provided similar havens, but rarely aided the new families from the hill country to adjust to city life.

The concentration of nonwhites within the city has been shown in part I. Middle-class as well as lower-income Negroes have been forced to remain in the central cities, middle-income families on the outer fringe of the slum, seeking better housing as its income rises, and the lower-income family in the inner core, suffering most acutely the effects of unemployment, deplorable housing, and the lack of city services. Even upper-income Negroes who have achieved professional, economic and political status frequently remain part of the ghetto, the identifiable and clearly bounded area of solid Negro residence.

The Cuban refugee resettlement program

By contrast, what can be done to help immigrants adjust to a new life was described to the Commission during its hearings in Miami in August 1967. By extention, this could apply to the deprived rural immigrants as well.

Between the time of the Castro revolution in Cuba in January 1959, and the October 1962 cutoff of direct flights from that island, Miami received 1,800 refugees per week. The schools and public services were inundated, and by late 1962, counting the potential refugee labor force of 50,000, the unemployment rate in Miami/Dade County neared 10 percent. A massie humanitarian effort was mounted by the Federal Government to cope with this flood, and to assist metropolitan Dade County in coping with the problem.

Each family receiving public assistance was individually interviewed, and interviewed again by one of four national volunteer agencies concerned with resettling Cuban refugees. More than half had been moved out across the United States by the time the second wave of immigrants, relatives of those already here, began in September 1965. Two-thirds of these later refugees are women and children, and all arrive destitute. They are given a medical examination, and three-fourths of them leave for other U.S. communities without even setting foot in Miami proper.

The following elements appear to have made the program so successful; their possible application to the urban immigrant problem is indicated:

(a) Insistence on resettlement.—The director of the Cuban refugee program told the Commission:

A firm, policy was established and implemented by my office calling for the loss of financial assistance eligibility by any Cuban who refused a reasonable offer of resettlement. • • • A Cuban refugee is not given financial assistance simply because he is in need. He has to be both needy and unresettleable—for the American you would substitute unemployed. • • • I mean, we don't force any Cuban to leave Miami. We try to sell them on the job and try to convince them that this is the best thing for them to do. This, I think you could do:

(b) One-hundred percent Federal funding, and popular support.—Congress has supported the program with adequate funding since it began. The director also noted consistent support by the Conference of Governors, the fullest cooperation of State and local governments throughout the country, and a vast outpouring of good will toward the refugees on the part of Americans everywhere.

The director noted that the Federal Government had spent about $1,000,000 on aid, retraining, and relocation, per refugee; an amount probably matched by monetary and material aid from the private sector, and commented:

I think this emphasizes a basic principle. One has to spend money to obtain solid and effective results in this field as in other fields • • • a concentration on training programs cost money but the amounts expended came nowhere near the amount we would have had to expend on providing welfare services to 75,000 refugees rather than to the 12,000 we ended up with.

(c) Coordination at all levels.—A task force established in Washington worked with all the agencies involved, through liaison officers. In Miami, according to the director, we have had a
multi-purpose service center or, if you will, an ersatz neighborhood center from the very beginning of the program. The entire family was taken into consideration from the start, with attention to the health problems of every member as well as the training and employment needs of the breadwinner. The center itself offers English language and vocational training, tailored to meet the labor needs in areas of resettlement.

(d) Involvement of the private sector. In relocating the family, the refugee program arranged for a “catcher” in every community to which it sent a family:

We work through a voluntary agency that has a counterpart in the area of relocation. This counterpart may be a church group, a diocese office, a synagogue, or any type of community agency interested in helping newcomers to the community unless we have got the (receiving agency) there on that other end to meet that person and they will have a flat—most likely—for them. They will have some food in the refrigerator or they will have winter clothing for the kids if they need it, and they will show the wife how to get to the supermarket and how to register the kids in school. They are not alone, and this is the kind of thing I think that we, somehow or another, need to find a way of translating into migration.

The director pointed out differences between the Cuban refugees and many U.S. migrants: by and large the Cubans generally came from a better educated class and many were professional people; they suffered little of the cultural prejudice that afflicts other minority groups in this country, and there were no social outcasts among the immigrants. But he said:

Our Nation failed miserably when we turned our faces away from the migration from the South to the North. Today we compound that mistake. I firmly believe that a national program funded by the Federal Government, supported morally, financially, and materially by the American people working through their community counterparts; i.e., churches, synagogues, and other motivated citizen’s groups, could go a long way in meeting the greatest crisis of our time, in time. One need not be a professional prophet of doom to see what will happen to a people who do not care.

The Ordeal of the Local Administration

The human problems of the people in the city are real—and they are mirrored in the frustrations and difficulties of those who administer the urban places of today. All too often, the rage and frustration of the disadvantaged city dweller leads him to denounce all politicians in blistering phrases, yet in the opinion of many observers of the political scene, the quality of administration of American cities and towns has never been higher. In the complex world of urban administration today, there is little room for ineptness or corruption.

A mayor today faces demands for expensive services which rise even faster than the city’s economic capacity. From the point of view of the resident, city services are not sufficient; from the point of view of the harassed mayor and city council, services provided to the slum sink in with little trace. The city is caught in a vise.

Recommendations

In the immediate future, the Commission proposes an increase in improvement of the services to which residents are entitled. For some cities, however, given the problems of the residents and the overload on the administration, this is equivalent to a pious exhortation. Accordingly, the Commission also recommends the decentralization of certain services to the neighborhood level through neighborhood “city halls.”

Better Service in the Inner City

Recommendation No.1—Accelerate improvement in poor neighborhoods by providing adequate city services

The Commission urges the governing bodies and key administrative officials of cities, urban counties, and major school districts to examine intensively the relative quality of the services and facilities they provide to neighborhoods of differing economic and social characteristics; to develop, publicize, and apply standards designed to assure equity on this score, and especially to insure that the particular needs of low-income neighborhoods are fully recognized and served; and (c) to move as rapidly and vigorously as possible to remedy deficiencies in public services and facilities that contribute to neighborhood deterioration.

We urge unions of municipal employees and members of professional groups to accept, with appropriate safeguards, the principle of compensation differentials among neighborhoods in order to achieve these objectives. Finally, we recommend that the States, through their urban affairs agencies or otherwise, encourage and assist urban local governments in these efforts.

The Commission urgently directs the attention of the officials of major urban governments to the repeated testimony at our hearings that low-income neighborhoods are discriminated against in the provision of public facilities and services, that present policies often result in local areas which need the most service receiving the least, and that such governmental practices contribute to urban blight and social unrest. Both a description and an explanation were
DECENTRALIZATION OF SERVICES

For the larger cities—those over 250,000—the Commission recommends that more basic action be taken over the next 2 years to improve the delivery of services, and to aid the inner city to achieve a social sense of neighborhood and community.

*Professor Herbert Kaufman, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Yale University, Hearings Before the National Commission on Urban Problems, Vol. 1 p. 178.

Recommendation No. 2—Decentralization of municipal services to neighborhood city halls

The Commission proposes that large city governments take prompt and affirmative steps to decentralize appropriate municipal services to the neighborhood level, and to establish channels of communication with neighborhood residents.

By decentralization we mean that the municipal government would provide certain aspects (chiefly information, informal counseling, and referral) of certain municipal services, through local offices set up in neighborhoods. In the several proposals and operating examples which already exist in American cities, these service offices are grouped, and the local quarters are often nicknamed "little city halls."

History

The provision of public services at a district or neighborhood level is an old and honorable practice. Settlement houses have pioneered in many of the services that were later taken over by city administration. The precinct captain of two generations ago provided services to voters and potential voters. In the 1960's, the Office of Economic Opportunity added imaginative provisions to the settlement house idea, and the network of over 700 neighborhood service centers, with their local advisory bodies, now forms part of all OEO-funded community action programs. There are over 800 settlements or neighborhood centers or houses in the United States, each offering services to their neighborhood clientele.

One of the most advanced and imaginative proposals is that set up by Executive Order 11297 of August 30, 1966, in which the President called for 14 pilot centers. The purpose of these experimental projects was to work out methods of coordinating the services of Federal agencies at the neighborhood level, and four agencies—HEW, OEO, Labor and HUD—provide funds for the services and the operating costs.

Each center is expected to reach out to residents of the neighborhood, welcome them and obtain full information on their problems. Seeking services from all three levels of government, the centers aim at working out a program that will make each family self-sufficient. The experience of...
these 14 pilot centers should exemplify and form the basis for the expanded use of such city halls that the Commission recommends.

Area and population

It is likely that existing barriers will become boundaries in many cases—a park, railroad, or a heavily traveled expressway. Size is also a flexible matter. Generally, the decentralization of municipal government is not so urgent in cities or urban counties of under a quarter million as in the large metropolises. Consequently, city hall areas might range from 25,000 to 50,000 in population, but this would necessarily vary from city to city and from neighborhood to neighborhood. Also, the problems caused by centralization and lack of communication are most pressing in the economically and socially disadvantaged neighborhoods. It may not be desirable to divide the whole city into decentralized administrative units.

Service functions of the city halls

Chief candidates for decentralization are the health and welfare agencies; but, partly depending on the size of the districts, the following municipal services could also operate on the neighborhood level: job recruitment and certain training programs, building and housing code inspection, police-community relations work, some recreation activities, and an office to entertain citizen complaints and problems (variously titled an ombudsman, human relations council; or review and appeals board). The city might even find it helpful to have collection of some fees done on a decentralized basis. Periodic property tax and utility payments are examples.

Welfare programs could include food stamp distribution and programs involving day care, including Head Start; public health clinics if not specialized health care. All such offices should be located close together to lessen the confusion and strain on the unsophisticated client, who may well be trailed by several small children as she makes her visits.

The proposed city halls would be funded to enable their aids to reach out to the residents. They would have one staff to welcome and interview them—a coordinating effort by itself. This would save the time of several agency intake people, and save the applicant from telling her story over and over to a series of strangers.

Many city services are already decentralized in a sense—fire and police precincts and schools—but their administration is not. In many cases the boundaries of neighborhood city halls can usefully correspond with the existing school or police districts, lending better identification to the community in the eyes of the city as well as the neighborhood.

It should be stressed that wherever possible the decentralized services—police, public welfare, and the like—should be encouraged to hire local residents. This would mean removal or modification of restrictive requirements, such as those found in employment merit systems. Such indigenous employees could serve as receptionists, clerks, switchboard operators, and aids to case workers, relieve the skilled professionals for more substantive work.

Washington, D.C., is considering this specific idea, in connection with a directive from the mayor to develop ways to implement the recommendations of the National Commission on Civil Disorders. The city’s personnel director has proposed that neighborhood personnel centers be opened to hire residents for jobs with the city, and that 1,000 jobs a year be established for the “hard-core unemployed.”

Communications functions

Neighborhood city halls can also open up new opportunities for communication between local government and the residents of neighborhoods. The Commission recognizes the great need for a feeling of participation in decisions by the neighborhood residents whom the decisions will affect. We urge that the development and maintenance of such new channels of communication be a major function of the decentralized neighborhood city halls.

At the same time, the Commission is aware that the idea of institutionalizing communication is more easily praised than achieved. The way is lined with traps. One major pitfall is the problem of obstructiveness. Many administrations in large suburban areas and even, lately, in some cities, have had to deal with the group of angry, organized citizens, protesting the location of a new school, the demolition for an urban renewal project, the rerouting of a sewer line, or the laying down of a freeway.

The right to protest governmental action peacefully is part of the American philosophy, and such groups and such protests will continue to emerge as long as we are a democratic society. But the Commission feels that organized social protest should remain the province of the private sector. The touchy history of OEO-financed community action has been described as a sort of guerrilla warfare financed by the Government against itself, and strikes us as demonstrating that trying to institutionalize protest under the very auspices of the city government will not succeed.

The Commission feels that participation does not mean that a little local area has the right to obstruct all actions of which it disapproves; but
that the neighborhood has the right to (1) a full explanation of information on which public decisions must be made and (2) a vehicle to express to the decisionmakers its reaction to the action to be taken.

Are the advantages of communication worth the dangers of citizen participation? We think that they are.

One of the aims of our recommendation is to create a sense of community where none exists. Many times an emergency can evoke an area-wide response, and a feeling of community develops along with the organization to conduct the response. Examples are the campaign against demolition on New York's West Side, or the battle against the effects of Hurricane Diane in Waterbury, Conn. The loss of identity and the feeling of helplessness and abandonment of innercity residents are a kind of chronic emergency.

Achieving this limited form of communication is a delicate business. No one method can serve in all circumstances. Advisory councils of various kinds are an obvious device; the appropriate use of neighborhood individuals is another. Local residents hired by the city halls would be a source of information. Whatever the device, the important purpose is to relieve the feeling of hopelessness in the face of giant government that has too often characterized neighborhoods in our large cities.

Advisory councils, however, present a problem of selection. Usually, those in charge of appointing advisory committees of various kinds make a conscientious effort to include most of the individuals or groups active in an area; but undeniably there is less likelihood, through appointment, of reaching the more disaffected, inactive members of a community. Moreover, there is no certainty that those chosen will remain in touch with the community.

Many voluntary neighborhood civic associations do an effective job of communication and neighborhood work now, but in too many cases their activities dwindle into window-box competitions and letters to the editor. Too often they cease, after the initial impetus which formed them, to be representative of the age and economic groups in their area.

We would suggest that the views of the neighborhood be sought in the very beginning, in the process of planning the city hall, so that the residents can feel that this is their center. But in all actions involving advisory councils at whatever stage, certain rules of the game must obtain. As outlined in the study made for the Commission:

**First, the actual policymaking group needs to be frank in stating the limitations on the authority of the advisory group instead of implying that it has more power than in the case. Second, the administrator must appoint a group that is reasonably representative of the community or it cannot obviously will not be worth having. Third, he must create the conditions under which he is likely to get that control; the group must meet, it must be given information, it must be afraid to speak frankly. It must be heard by those who can make decisions. And fourth, the questions with which it is asked to deal should primarily be those having to do with the effective delivery of services, rather than with community action.**

The inclusion of an "ombudsman" function in the city hall was mentioned above. The type of complaint likely to reach such an office will very probably be petty, but might play a considerable role in community pride.

Neighborhood appearance is one such issue. A block decorated with three bars, two liquor stores, a service station and a vacant lot can have a demoralizing effect on the neighborhood, no matter how desirable each individual component. The city halls could relay the opinions of residents on these items to the central administration.

The type of activity permitted in a neighborhood can be another sore point. There are commonly over 200 types of activity for which a license is required, ranging from bars to barbershops, and although the wishes of the neighborhood should not govern, they should certainly be taken into account as the quality and intensity of activity permitted. For example, following the April 1968 disorders, residents and businessmen in affected areas of Washington, D.C., went on record with a request that when the areas were rebuilt, fewer liquor stores should be permitted per block.

In connection with relaying such opinions of residents, on matters wholly within their own area, the city government might delegate other minor functions to the neighborhood level and reap a considerable harvest of popularity. One such area of activity would cost the city little but would enlist the immediate enthusiasm of the residents. This is the power to make, or direct the making, of small neighborhood improvements. Examples are addition of more trash receptacles, minor repairs to public property, and tree and flower planting. Still more popular would be better lighting of streets and alleys, more frequent trash pickup, stop signs at certain intersections and so on. Readers of the action-line type of column run by many city newspapers will recognize these complaints immediately.

This is the kind of small improvement that is easily made, but which unsophisticated residents simply do not know how to obtain. Slight as it seems, the knowledge of area residents that they have an accessible means of affecting their...
own immediate environment can have a multiplier effect on citizen self-confidence and involvement.

Many times only bureaucratic inertia prevents the taking of small steps with big effects. One example is a block party. A simple afternoon party can require the approval of a surprising number of officials. Permission to close off a block for the afternoon, the question of noise, the assignment of a policeman, the right to conduct a bingo game, to sell takeout dinners and so on can become the subject of ponderous consideration by several levels of bureaucracy, and require weeks to obtain approval. The neighborhood city hall could be authorized to issue temporary 1-day permits for such activities, after due notice to the local police, precinct, and other appropriate authorities.

Orientation centers

We also suggest that neighborhood information and referral centers be established within such neighborhood city hall areas to orient low-income residents and migrants to the opportunities, demands, and responsibilities of an urban society and assist them in meeting immediate social and economic needs. A great range of services is possible in this kind of program, and if properly managed such a center can avoid giving its clients a "hick" or immigrant stigma. Some services would be appreciated by long term as well as new residents. One might be a family budgeting course; another a course in housekeeping techniques.

Supplementary Views on Community Advisory Boards

The Commission discussed at length the question of whether or not certain limited administrative, regulatory and/or advisory powers could be given to duly constituted community or neighborhood boards in designated neighborhoods of large cities. Such power could be granted through statewide enabling legislation and would, in theory, be applicable to neighborhoods comprising 50,000 people or more in larger cities. After much deliberation on this point, the Commission voted against making such a recommendation on the grounds that such a delegation of power would further fragment the decisionmaking machinery of urban government, would lead to an even more chaotic and time-consuming procedure for community development and would tend to run counter to other Commission recommendations that certain powers be shifted from localities in metropolitan areas that are already too small to function effectively.

Landlords' complaints are not always baseless; families unused to central heating have been known to regulate indoor weather by turning the thermostat up full blast and opening or shutting windows. Some tenants stuff too many items down a flush toilet, break windows, crack plaster, ignore leaks and so on, or exhibit uncleanliness when their children do so.

Civic organizations often strongly resist proposals for such tenant education, regarding them as discriminatory, or fearing that acceptance would mean an admission of total tenant responsibility for damage and dirt. Such a program backed by an arm of the city government, however, and coupled with other positive programs of assistance, might be more easily accepted and would pay benefits to owner and tenant alike.

Effect on the city administration

In the previous chapter the Balkanization of the metropolitan area was deplored, and remedies were suggested to group its units, or some of their functions. There is an apparent contradiction between consolidation of the suburbs and the seeming fragmentation of the inner city represented by our recommendations for decentralization. But the situations are different. The suburbs are suffering from rampant separatism; the inner city from loss of identity. The suburbs everywhere display a pattern of overlapping functional districts, and we suggest that this be remedied. The inner city is one administrative district, and we suggest vertical sectioning of it into manageable areas.
2. Even with a thoroughgoing metropolitan area plan of government, there are many functions that will still reside with the smaller communities in the suburban areas. It seems logical, then, that certain similar functions should reside with inner city communities. This, then, would mean that the taxpayer and voter in the inner city of a metropolitan area would have the same kind of leverage on the policies that affect his neighborhood growth, redevelopment, or maintenance, as his fringe area counterpart.

3. The Commission has recommended an approach to the decentralization of municipal offices and services in the so-called little city hall approach. The formulation of neighborhood boards that constitute an arm of the citizenry that would operate through these little city halls seems reasonable and logical. This is not to suggest that community groups would at all times be harmonious with city hall policies; but it does mean that the citizens of some of our larger neighborhoods, which in many cases would rank in the top 200 of American cities in population, would have a stronger sense of participation in urban government. The creation of such community boards could counter the argument posed by the opponents of metropolitan government that metropolitan government dilutes the political strength of the inner city population.

It is with these things in mind that we submit this supplementary view that there is some merit in the concept of neighborhood boards that have limited powers over city functions and agencies, and direct access to the power centers at city hall or at the top of the metropolitan government pyramid.

As of the writing of this report, several moves in this direction in antipoverty efforts, model city neighborhoods, school board decentralization, and decentralization of other urban services are in most cases accompanied by much conflict and turmoil, arising mostly from ill-defined powers and responsibilities. But, this is to be expected because the concept, while evolutionary in the normal democratic process, is almost revolutionary in effect and the concept is new. We must not lose sight of the worthiness of the idea because of the difficulties that are presently being encountered in these early and tentative efforts around the Nation.

Jeh V. Johnson.
Coleman Woodbury.
Lewis Davis.
Paul H. Douglas.
Ezra Ehrenkranz.
CHAPTER 3
The Crisis of Urban Government Finance

Metropolitan areas, with about two-thirds of the Nation's population, make up an even larger part of the American economy. Moreover, they account for most of the recent growth in population and economic activity, with a similar trend anticipated for the next two decades; careful projections prepared for this Commission show that 90 percent of the increase in American population between 1960 and 1985 is likely to occur within present metropolitan areas. Personal income averages about half again more per person in these areas than elsewhere, and taxable property values per capita also average higher in metropolitan areas. In the light of such facts, one might ask: Is there really a crisis in urban government finance? Or, perhaps, are the widely heard claims to that effect merely the exaggerations to be expected from a democratic society in the throes of adjustment to urban growth and change?

Surely the term crisis might be questioned if it were to imply some immediate financial catastrophe, or an early approach to some absolute fiscal limit upon the provision of public services and facilities in urban areas. But in terms of a more temperate definition, there is extensive evidence of a present and growing crisis for urban government financing. This conclusion can be reconciled with the facts cited above concerning the comparative economic position and growth patterns of metropolitan areas, on at least three grounds:

1) More public services are needed and considerably higher governmental costs are incurred in metropolitan areas than elsewhere;

2) Serious financing problems are faced by State and local governments as a whole—as evidenced by the rapid rise in their expenditure, indebtedness, and taxation—so that the possibly stronger economic position of metropolitan areas must take account of this general situation; and

3) Inherited institutions of urban government and its financing are not well designed to tap the economic capacity of entire metropolitan areas; instead, they deal with numerous subordinate parts of such areas, seriously limiting effective and equitable capture of the large sums that are needed for public purposes.

Following is a summary of illustrative evidence on these and related aspects of the urban financing crisis.

THE SCALE OF URBAN FINANCE REQUIREMENTS

Expenditure by local governments in metropolitan areas is now running at an annual rate of about $370 per capita, or about one-tenth as much as the average income of metropolitan area residents. More than 40 percent of such spending supports education—mainly for public schools but including some amounts for local colleges and junior colleges. Social welfare takes about 17 percent of the total. Roughly 10 percent supports each of three categories—water and sanitation, highways and other transportation, and police and fire protection. All other urban expenditures make up the remaining minor fraction.

Urbanization results in a large expansion of local government costs. In 1962, per capita expenditure of local governments was one-third higher in metropolitan areas than elsewhere. This is partly because metropolitan pay rates are higher: in 1962, earnings of full-time local government employees averaged 28 percent more in SMSA's than elsewhere. Also, with population growth taking place mainly in metropolitan areas, they have a particular need for additional public facilities and thus for more capital outlay. But the main reason for higher urban spending is the wider range and more intensive nature of public services in areas of concentrated population. This appears in the relative volume of local government employment and expenditure for all major functions except
two—education, and streets and highways. For education, per capita spending runs about the same for metropolitan and other areas; for highway purposes, the average is lower in metropolitan area. However, data for 1962 show local public expenditure per capita averaging: 4

Over 200 percent higher in metropolitan areas than elsewhere for public housing and urban renewal, nonhighway transportation, refuse collection, and parks and recreation; From 100 to 200 percent higher for three costly functions—police protection, fire protection, and sewerage; and From 35 to 90 percent higher for such other functions as public welfare, libraries, water supply, health and hospitals, and interest on debt.

The net result of all these differences is that total local government spending averages about one-third more, per person, in metropolitan areas than elsewhere. Some of the extra load may apply through charges, or initially through borrowing for capital outlays, but the major portion depends upon taxation, and it is thus not surprising to find that per capita local taxes average far higher in metropolitan areas than elsewhere—in 1962, $130 as against $82 per capita.

This comparison is not offered as evidence of inequity. It is reasonable to expect higher taxation in areas that require and receive more public services than are necessary in less closely populated territory. This helps to explain some of the rapid growth that has been taking place in domestic public expenditure. It also indicates that further urbanization will continue this expenditure trend. And it points up the resulting present and prospective strain upon public financing arrangements which were largely developed for a far less urban society.

FINANCING TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Local public spending, taxation, and indebtedness have been rising rapidly ever since World War II—far outpacing the growth of the economy as a whole. Consistent figures specifically for urban government areas are available only for the 38 largest metropolitan areas, covering the interval from 1962 to 1966. During that recent 4-year period, such areas experienced a population rise of only 7.3 percent but an increase of one-third in total local government general expenditures and similar increases in local government revenue and indebtedness. As a result, per capita amounts of local govern-

ment finance in the major SMSA's rose considerably: revenue and expenditure by about one-fourth, and outstanding debt by about one-sixth.

In the absence of earlier comparative urban finance data and related economic measures, it is necessary to refer to comprehensive nationwide figures. However, larger metropolitan areas account for about three-fourths of the totals, and other smaller urban areas for much of the rest; the indicated trends are still highly relevant to the status of urban financing.

During the two decades from 1946 to 1966, when the gross national product rose about 250 percent, there was a sixfold growth in local government revenue, expenditure and debt.

With a corresponding trend for States, there was a similar multiplication of State-local financial totals. Meanwhile, Federal Government debt rose very little, and Federal revenue and expenditure at a lesser rate than gross national product.

But since the 1916-66 interval included the immediate post-World War II years, when adjustments toward a more nearly normal economy were taking place, it is better to deal with a more recent period; i.e., the 9 years from 1957 (when benchmark data were obtained from the census of governments) to 1966, the latest year for which data have been published. Between 1957 and 1966, there was a rise of about two-thirds in gross national product (up 67.9 percent) and personal income (up 66.2 percent), but a doubling in total revenue, expenditure, and indebtedness of local governments, and a corresponding rise in State finances. The changes for Federal Government finances were far less—revenue up 65 percent, expenditure up 75 percent (or, excluding grants to State and local governments, 67 percent), and total debt 18 percent. The strong upward trend in local and State-local financial scale was highly consistent during this period, and considerably outpaced the growth in the Nation's total product and income, year after year.

With State-local tax revenue rising about 8 percent annually (as compared with 4.5 percent for Federal tax collections), the result has been a material shift in the composition of the total tax take, and its relationship to personal income. Federal taxes in fiscal 1966 equaled 17.8 percent of all personal income, as against 19.9 percent 9 years earlier, while State and local taxes moved up during this interval from 8.3 to 9.7 percent of personal income. Or, to express the shift in another way, the State-local proportion of total taxes increased from 29.2 percent in

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1957 (having risen from 21.5 percent of the total in 1946) to 55.1 percent in fiscal 1966.

This State-local tax record is striking evidence of the strong pressures that have applied to these governments for the extension and improvement of public services, especially when one takes account of the nature of the taxes involved. The State-local revenue system is relatively sluggish in its response to economic growth. Various studies strongly indicate an income elasticity for State-local taxes averaging around unity; i.e., with a rise of 1 percent in gross national product or personal income likely to result in an automatic rise of about 1 percent in total State-local tax revenue. Assuming such a relationship it would appear that, of all State-local tax revenue in 1966, more than onefifths was supplied by tax-increasing action by these governments in the previous 9 years, and more than four-tenths resulted from such action in the 20-year period 1946–66. Stated in another way: the average effective rate of State-local taxation in relation to personal income, was enlarged through tax-increasing efforts by nearly one-half between 1946 and 1957 and by another 18 percent between 1957 and 1966. Similarly, a recent study by staff of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations estimates that about one-half of the increase in State-local tax revenue between 1950 and 1966 resulted automatically from economic growth, with the rest coming from new or broader taxes or tax-rate increases.10

This is in sharp contrast with the Federal tax picture. Particularly because of the National Government’s heavy reliance upon income taxation, Federal revenues are less sluggish in their response to economic change, so that a 1-percent rise in national product or income automatically results in a proportionately larger increase in tax revenue. Thus, with the economic growth that was occurring between 1957 and 1966, the Federal tax proportion of income—would have risen materially (instead of dropping off from 19.9 to 17.8 percent) if it had not been for various rate reductions made during this interval. (Federal tax cuts had also occurred between 1946 and 1957, to provide the slight drop in the Federal tax-to-income relationship that occurred during that interval.)

As noted above, these different developments with regard to Federal and State-local tax rates have considerably increased the State-local share of all tax revenue. They have also involved a shift toward more reliance upon regressive types of taxes; i.e., those which involve a larger burden in relation to income for the poor than for the prosperous. Of the two major regressive components—property tax and sales taxes (both local and state, i.e., and including excises)—made up 33.3 percent of the Federal-State-local total in 1966, as compared with 32.9 percent in 1957; individual income taxes, the one big progressive part of the tax system, changed from 37.9 to 37.4 percent of the total; the proportion from corporate income taxes dropped from 22.5 to 20 percent; and all other taxes moved from 5.7 to 6.3 percent of the total between 1957 and 1966. The record for the property tax alone is especially notable—its yield made up 15.3 percent of the all-government tax total in 1966, as against 13 percent in 1957 and less than 11 percent 10 years earlier, in 1946.11

It is impossible to predict with any precision the future course of State-local finances, or to say how long it may be until the rate of increase in this sector might taper back nearer to the pace of general economic change. The actual rate of further rise, of course, will depend considerably upon the performance of the economy as a whole, including price level developments. It is possible, however, to make several observations about the prospects:

(1) The strong recent upward trend in local and State government finances shows no sign of slackening. Rather, if anything, there is some evidence of acceleration: State-local tax revenue was up 8.9 percent in calendar 1967 from the previous year, as compared with an average of 7.8 percent for the previous 5-year period, and State-local construction expenditure increased 10 percent in calendar 1967, including a whopping 13-percent rise at the local government level.12

(2) Various underlying basic elements that have contributed to the recent upward trend can be expected to continue, though perhaps with some changes in pace or composition. These include population growth, increased urbanization, rising price levels and generally higher income levels, providing added leeway for a net expansion of the public share of total consumption.

(3) Public expectations continue strong for better governmental services and facilities, particularly in major urban areas. Despite concern and controversy about methods for footing the bill, there seems even more widespread recognition of unsolved problems and needs; for example, with re-

10 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State and Local Taxes: Political and Economic Contributions to Revenue Growth. (Report in process of publication.)

11 For supporting data, see ch. 8, p. 411, table 8.
of urban local government will continue to
State and local government and particularly
most likely to outpace growth in the financial
nance). Similarly, a continuance of recent
tergovernmental system of public assistance by
There seems little reason to expect any
ning for about two-thirds of such spending.
sonal income with local governments account-
State-local expenditure can be expected to
ther rise of about one-sixth in the

decade continue for only another 5 years, a

to these public needs.
product and income must somehow be devoted

economic development. In turn, this
outrun by a considerable margin the pace
ern for domestic governmental re-
1966 and the 8.2-percent level of 1957.
11 percent of total personal income in
velopments will demand further tax broadening
aid."

g the 38 largest SMSA's had $7.8 billion more revenue
in 1966 than in 1962, but only $246 million of
his difference was increased direct Federal aid.13
Of all tax revenue of urban governments, about five-sixths comes from property taxation. In
most metropolitan areas the proportion is considerably higher, since there is only scattered
local use of other highly productive taxes. On
the other hand, there are some areas where
local general sales taxes (generally State-coll-
ected and returned) or payroll or earnings
taxes supply a sizable fraction of all local tax
revenue.
Heavy reliance upon property taxation is
widely seen as an important element in the urban
financing crisis. Sometimes the property tax is
blamed for conditions or problems that are not
inherent in this particular revenue device itself but instead arise from the governmental
fragmentation of metropolitan areas. In other
words, such a governmental pattern—rather
than the property tax as such—deserves most of
the blame for the intrametropolitan "fiscal dis-
parities" which are described below. There are,
however, some defects which seem to be inherent
in the property tax and which limit its desir-
ability as a primary means for urban govern-
ment financing. As it is now so widely used, the
property tax—

1. Imposes a disproportionately heavy burden
upon housing, an essential and socially
desirable form of private consumption;
2. Tends to deter the adequate provision and
sound maintenance of urban housing;
3. Operates regressively, so as to involve a
larger burden in relation to income for poor
families than for those better off; and
4. As presently administered, commonly in-
volves serious departures from the legal in-
tention of the law, that all taxable property
in any particular locality should be bur-
dened uniformly in relation to its value.

The heavy load which property taxation so
widely places upon housing is a result of (1)
the large sums needed for essential public ser-
ices in urban areas, where this type of tax is
generally the predominant financing source, as
already noted, and (2) the fact that residential
property makes up about half of the total tax
base in such areas.14 As a result, it has been

11 See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Local Government
Finances in Selected Metropolitan Areas in 1966-68.
12 See Dick Netzer, "Impact of the Property Tax—Effect on
Housing, Urban Land Use, Local Government Finance (Na-
Valuations for General Property Taxation (Preliminary Re-
port No. 4, 1961 Census of Governments), tables 3 and 4.
pointed out in a study prepared for this Commission:

- Property taxes—average about 19 percent of the rental value of nonfarm housing in the United States, currently, our national average tax of nearly 24 percent on rental value, excluding property taxes.

- The percentage of actual cash outlays for housing range, excluding the South—24 percent on rental value, excluding property taxes.

- The rental value of nontaxable housing properties in the United States is exempt from property taxes, just as many levels of consumption tax are.

- More likely, we would exempt housing entirely from taxation, just as many levels of consumption tax are.

- The property tax is unique among major American revenue sources in the degree to which its base is determined by official action (subject, of course, to possible taxpayer appeal) rather than primarily by "self-assessment" as in the case of the income and sales taxes. This is understandable. Unlike most of the income flows or transactions reached through those other kinds of taxes, the value of individual parcels or items of taxable property is not (except for the small proportion of properties currently changing hands) directly reflected in any relevant source. Present value must therefore be calculated or inferred from other evidence, often involving some uncertainty or, inexactness.

- Thus, absolute correctness and uniformity of valuations for property taxation is an impossible target, which may be approached but not fully attained.

- The problem of accurate valuation is especially serious for business property. The other extreme, it is generally agreed that a close approach to uniform assessment should be possible for single-family houses. Nevertheless, wide assessment variations appear in most areas for even this class of property.

- The problem can be seen in data provided by the census of governments. The uniformity test is the pattern of consistency (or inconsistency) within taxing jurisdictions in the ratio of assessed to market value of surveyed properties. The 1967 data reveal that in 192 large cities the ratios for half of all houses deviated at least 14 percent up or down from the average. Worse, in 18 of these cities, the deviation for half of the houses was at least 20 percent.

- For supporting data see Table I, pp. 412-413. Extensive earlier evidence of assessment variations for single-family houses appears in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Taxable Property Values (Volume 2, 1962 Census of Governments).
An illustration clarifies what this 20-percent deviation means. In one of the 18 cities just cited, take three houses (and lots), each worth $20,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market value</th>
<th>Assess. ratio</th>
<th>Assess. ratio (percent)</th>
<th>Tax rate (percent)</th>
<th>Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High house...</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>$7,200</td>
<td>$76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average house</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low house....</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example city, the average assessment ratio for all houses is 30 percent of market value. But one-fourth of all houses are assessed at 20 percent more than that ratio (24 percent) or higher, and another fourth are assessed at 20 percent less than that ratio (24 percent) or lower. Thus three example houses, high, average, and low are assessed respectively at $7,200, $6,000, and $4,800. Applying a typical tax rate, their annual tax payments, in the same order, are $756, $480, and $384. The high pays $196—or 51 percent—more than the low.

Widespread persistence of excessive variation in property tax valuations can in part be traced to unsound assessment arrangements. We offer in the next chapter several recommendations for action on this problem, which should, if carried out, bring property tax assessments far nearer to an acceptable standard of equity and uniformity.

Most of the revenue obtained by urban local governments from nonproperty taxes is from general or selective sales taxes. These, like the property tax, tend to operate regressively to the particular disadvantage of poor households.

Altogether, then, it is part of the crisis of urban government finance that so much of the large and growing sums required must now come from revenue sources that place an especially heavy burden upon the poor—in particular the property tax, which is not only regressive but tends to deter housing construction and maintenance and in many areas is inequitably administered.

**FISCAL DISPARITIES WITHIN METROPOLITAN AREAS**

The problems outlined above appear most vividly in the core cities of metropolitan areas—particularly the major older cities of the Northeast and Midwest, but increasingly also in other parts of the Nation. There is a serious and growing disparity in the relative fiscal capacity of the central cities and their respective suburban fringe areas.

parts of the Nation) tremendously increases of many central cities is actually below that of adjacent metropolitan-fringe territory. As has been pointed out:

- In nearly all the larger metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest, per capita taxable property values (corrected for differences in assessment levels) in the central cities are well below those in the outlying parts of the same metropolitan areas. In nearly all the larger metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest, per capita taxable property values (corrected for differences in assessment levels) in the central cities are well below those in the outlying parts of the same metropolitan areas.

This is a relatively recent development, differing sharply from conditions of 30 or 40 years ago. As the same writer notes:

- In the past, nearly all the economic activity in metropolitan areas was concentrated in the central cities and could be reached by central city taxes. Today, taxable wealth and capacity have dispersed throughout metropolitan areas—beyond the reach of central city taxes—while needs for special public services continue to be concentrated within the central cities.

However, it is the higher public expenditure needs of the central city, rather than an absolute deficiency in its tax base, that especially demand attention. At least three factors contribute to the additional requirements of the central city:

1. Above all, this is where the poor and disadvantaged tend mainly to be concentrated. There are more high-cost citizens from the standpoint of such poverty-linked services as public assistance, public health and hospital care, housing, other social services, and education of disadvantaged children.

2. The fact that population concentration (as noted above in the contrast between metropolitan areas as a whole and other parts of the Nation) tremendously increases the necessary scope of such costly services as police and fire protection, parks and recreation, and sanitation. For most central cities, furthermore, these services—as well as the local highway system and traffic control activities—must meet the needs of an expanded daytime population which includes a net inflow of nonresident suburban commuters.

3. Since the central cities developed before suburbia, their public facilities—schools, hospitals, water supply and sewerage systems, and the rest—typically include a far higher proportion of deteriorated structures and equipment, in need of replacement or major renovation. Expanding suburbia, of course, also must provide for new public plant, but these needs are in the context of present and prospective growth, rather than—as in the case of many central...
cities—of a stable or declining population and sluggish economic development.

As a result of these factors, most metropolitan central cities have higher taxes than the average for their respective suburban-fringe areas. Furthermore, given the fragmented structure of local government, most metropolitan areas include some territory with tax rates far below that of the core city. As a result, local financing conditions add to the many other forces that are encouraging fringe-area growth to the relative disadvantage of central cities. This process is not self-correcting, but self-reinforcing. As has been observed:

"If the central cities must impose higher tax rates on their more limited tax bases ... there is likely to be some inducement to residents and businesses to move to lower-tax jurisdictions in the same metropolitan areas. ... This migration in turn further weakens central city tax bases, setting the stage for a new descent on the fiscal and economic spiral."

Similar conclusions are reached in a recent major study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, entitled "Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System." Part II of that study, dealing with "Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities," was based upon a detailed comparative analysis of data for the 37 largest metropolitan areas in the Nation for the years 1957, 1962, and 1965, and led to conclusions that may be briefly summarized as follows:

There is a growing concentration of high cost citizens in central cities. The paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty emerges most strikingly in the central cities of large metropolitan areas. The decline in absolute poverty is overshadowed by economic disparities between large central cities and their suburbs.

The deepening fiscal crisis reflects the exodus of middle- and high-income families and businesses from the central city to suburbia.

In central cities, the burden of local taxes averages 7.6 percent of personal income compared to only 5.6 percent of income for residents outside central cities.

Central cities nevertheless increased their relative tax effort during a period when their property tax base experienced a deceleration in rate of growth or an absolute decline.

In the 37 largest metropolitan areas, current public school expenditure in 1965 averaged $449 per pupil in the central cities, compared with $374 per pupil in suburbs.

"Children who need education the most are receiving the least."

State aid to school districts aggravates this situation by favoring rural and suburban districts.

Per capita noneducational (municipal) outlays of $232 per capita were made by the 37 largest central cities in 1965—$100 greater than their suburban counterparts.

Of growing significance are fiscal disparities among rich and poor suburban communities in many metropolitan areas.

IN SUMMARY

It is all too clear, then, that—

There is a crisis of urban government finance.

This crisis is most strikingly evident for central cities of the largest metropolitan areas but also affects other large cities and an increasing number of suburban communities.

The crisis is rooted in conditions that will not disappear but threaten to grow and spread rapidly unless major shifts occur in recent demographic trends (especially that which has concentrated so many disadvantaged people within the central cities and other poverty pockets of metropolitan areas, or unless significant changes are made in traditional patterns of governmental structure, responsibilities, and financing.

The crisis is of mounting proportions and feeds upon itself.
Vote on May 28
Stop Waste
Consolidate
Yes on 7

On May 28 remember these facts about City-County Consolidation

Paid for by the Committee for Consolidation
Michael Z. Olds, Treasurer
P.O. Box 1389, Portland, Oregon 97207 5/4/74
Consolidation will save you money.

Consolidation will eliminate costly duplications and mean more efficient use of your tax dollars. The result: An actual savings to you. Currently, inflation reduces the buying power of your tax dollar by about 10%. City and County governments have three choices: raise taxes, cut services, or consolidate for efficiencies. Consolidation has saved taxpayers money in 14 other communities nation-wide as it has with our own court consolidation. It stands to reason that paying for 48 different governmental units costs you more money than paying for one.
Consolidation will eliminate waste and inefficiency.

Currently City residents are paying taxes for two sets of overlapping governments that deliver only one set of services. That means waste and inefficiency in the way your tax dollar is spent. Why pay for both police and sheriff departments, for two maintenance shops, for two park bureaus, for two planning bureaus, for two public works shops? This kind of senseless duplication costs you money. Consolidation will eliminate this waste and inefficiency and provide you better service for your tax dollars.
Consolidation will give you more responsive local government.

Have you ever had a complaint and tried to find the right City or County office to call? Say the problem is with litter in a neighbor’s yard, or you want a stop sign for your street. Do you call the City Neighborhood Environment Bureau or the County Health Department? Is it a County road or a City street? With two governments, chances are all you get is the run-around. Consolidation will solve that problem. One government will mean that you will know who is responsible for delivering services, for more responsive local government.

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...or just one.
Consolidation will end City taxpayers' subsidy to the County.

Currently City residents pay nearly three-quarters of the property taxes collected in the County. In return, City taxpayers receive less than one-half of County services. City taxpayers alone built and now operate the zoo, civic auditorium and the coliseum. At the same time, City tax dollars which go into County parks, planning and public-works are spent largely outside of the City. For example, City residents support the County Sheriff's office with tax dollars, but County sheriff's deputies pass right through Portland without patrolling. Consolidation will put an end to City taxpayers' subsidy to the County.
Consolidation works! Look at the record.

In December, 1971, Portland and Multnomah County voters overwhelmingly approved consolidation of the City's Municipal Court with the County's District Court. Voters were promised that consolidation would mean better service for the same tax dollars. And that promise has been kept! Consolidation has resulted in a speedier handling of more cases with the same number of judges and staff. And merging of the City and County jails has freed more than 12 policemen for patrol duties. Consolidation works!
Consolidation will give you sensible planning.

It makes no sense to have separate City and County planning departments. You can see the result when four-lane County roads meet two-lane City streets. Or the crazy quilt pattern of zoning and development along the border at 82nd Avenue. Or the maze of decision-making on the Mt. Hood Freeway that is paralyzing two local governments. Two planning departments can mean no planning at all. Consolidation will mean one planning department that all County residents will have a voice in.
Consolidation will give you open and honest government.

Compare the charters. Which charter provides that councillors who are paid a full-time salary actually have full-time duties? Which charter requires full financial disclosure by elected officials? Which charter establishes district elections to cut the cost of campaigns, so the average citizen can afford to serve? Which charter limits the terms of office of elected officials? Which charter requires circulation of ordinances and agendas in a newspaper which comes to your door? The consolidated charter. Neither of the current charters offers this opportunity for citizens to take control of their own government.

Consolidation has a broad base of support.

Consolidation has always been favored by citizens who believe that it makes good sense. Thousands of volunteers who are concerned about better government are working for consolidation. The Committee for Consolidation is made up of the following individuals:

Co-Chairpersons
Joe Edgar
Elaine Cogan
John Gray

Finance Chairman
John Piacentini

Rep. Earl Blumenauer
Jane Cease
Rep. Lloyd Kitsey
Frank Roberts
Ruth Hagenstein
George Joseph
Loyal Lang
Joseph Labadie
Lou Perry
Hardy Myers

Rick Gustafson
Mort Winkel
Herb & Mary Park
Rep. Howard Willis
Rep. Keith Skelton
Rep. Mary Reke
Rep. Vera Katz
Sen. Keith Burns
Grant Nelson
George Casterline
Polly Casterline
Sed Stuart
Hon. Trem Schrunk
Rep. Steve Kafoury
Ted Cassell
Marlene Bayless
Tom Walsh
Rep. Bill McCoy

Alice Boozer
Allison Belcher
Carol Waters
John Platt
Comm. Ben Padrow
Comm. Don Clark
Mayor Neil Goldschmidt
Lloyd Anderson
Comm. Mildred Schwab
Harold Hirsch
Rep. Howard Willis
George Sheldon
Charles Crews
John Tobin
Al Lewis
R. P. "Joe" Smith
Leonard Gionet
Forrest Jenkins

Blanche Schroeder
Ronald Buel
Mike Powers
Molly Ransom
David McCammon
Claudia Powers
Laurie Robbins
Sen. Ted Haloek
Don Tate
Nancy Stevens
Barbara Sanders
Steve Roso
Sharon Roso
Norm Hemwood
Peg Hemwood
Herman Brane
Phil McLaunn
Mr. & Mrs. Ron Kawamoto
FURTHER READING


The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is currently engaged in a major study of "Substate Regionalism and the Federal System." Two volumes have recently been published which relate directly to the question of metropolitan reform. The second volume of the series in Substate Regionalism and Federal System is entitled Regional Governance: Promise and Performance. In it are contained several case studies including:

1) Southern Regionalism, 2) Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis, 3) Bay Area Regionalism: Institutions, Processes, and Programs, 4) Governance in the Twin Cities Area of Minnesota, 5) Federally Encouraged Multi-jurisdictional Agencies in Three Metropolitan Areas and 6) The New York Interstate Metropolis. Volume Four of the series issued in February, 1974 is concerned with Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide. The major question addressed in this volume is which urban services should be performed by metropolitan-wide agencies and which should be performed by neighborhood level agencies.

D. C. Heath & Company, 1973) which describes and analyzes a number of experiments with different forms of decentralization particularly in the northeast. An article by Eric A. Nordlinger and Jim Hardy entitled "Urban Decentralization: An Evaluation of Four Models" in Public Policy 20 (Summer 1972) reviews and assesses four different types of decentralization plans and focuses in particular on the Little City Hall movement.

The literature describing and assessing different forms of metropolitan reform is rather extensive. A selected bibliography on this topic is included at the end of this section for those who wish to pursue the topic still further.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON METROPOLITAN REFORM


Bell, Daniel and Virginia Held (1969) "The Community Revolution," The Public Interest (Summer), 142-177.


Clark, Terry N. (1976) "On Decentralization, Polity 2 (Summer), 508-514.


Kristol, Irving (1968) "Decentralization for What?" The Public Interest 11 (Spring), 17-25.


Imagine, if you will, that you are appointed as an advisor to a local government study commission in a single-county metropolitan area of approximately 750,000 people of which 400,000 live in the center city and the remainder live in a welter of small to medium sized municipalities or unincorporated subdivisions. Further, the metropolitan area is served by a large number of small to large-scale special districts providing such services as water, sewage disposal, parks and airports. You prepare a reading list for the Study Commission including the three chapters from the Douglas Commission Report plus some of the other assigned readings of Section II.

At the first meeting of the Study Commission after the materials have been read, you are called upon by members of the commission to tell them as a policy analyst what they could expect if they were to undertake the following reforms:

1. Merge the center city with the county to create one general purpose governmental unit serving the entire metropolitan area.
2. Eliminate all special districts and reallocate their functions to the new city-county governmental unit.
3. Eliminate all suburban municipalities within the county.
4. Create 15 neighborhood units within the new city-county with advisory powers concerning some aspects of local zoning but no independent sources of funding.

The commission members are interested in the potential effects of the above on the effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and equity of a reformed local governmental system. They are not now concerned with whether this plan is politically feasible. They want to know if it were adopted what effects would it be likely to have.

From the readings you have completed, do you feel that you could give
such a commission relatively solid advice about the likely effects of such major structural reforms? Go back and re-read some of the materials assigned in Section II. Do you find a clear statement of exactly what effects are likely to follow from preferred reforms? Do you find references to previous studies which have provided evidence about the likelihood of such effects? Again, remember, the information the study commission wants is not how to make a successful effort at achieving reform—but rather, what consequences will follow.

Outline your findings with specific statements about expected consequences and any evidence supporting these statements presented in the literature. Do you feel you can make a coherent argument to the commission? Do we have an empirically warrantable base for making policy recommendations to such a commission? I am afraid I must predict that you will answer "no" to those two questions, but how do we, as policy analysts, approach the problem of evaluating the effects of different proposed reforms and thus recommend which reforms should be instituted and which should not. It is, of course, always possible that a reform might cause more harm than benefit. If we are concerned about the welfare of people, we should have at least some confidence that future reforms will produce more benefits than harm.

The approach taken in this study guide is that in evaluating reform proposals, one must attempt to understand and elucidate the theoretical framework underlying a reform proposal. This is not always easy to do. As you have seen, the logic of a reform may not be well specified by those making a recommendation. However, one can begin to convert the language of reform proponents into propositional form (see Sections V and VI). Then, one can attempt to link these propositions into a logical form as possible. This latter effort will show whether the underlying framework possesses a con-
sistent logical argument. Unless this is the case, one would seriously question whether reforms based upon an illogical series of propositions should be given serious support. If there is logical coherence, then one can begin to juxtapose alternative theoretical explanations and to attempt to design empirical studies which examine propositions from one or another theory.

The reliability of any problem-solving effort depends upon the body of knowledge and supporting evidence which is used to identify the cause and effect relationships underlying the analysis. Theory is simply the use of elemental terms and postulated relationships to think through complex problems which are not intuitively obvious. The average citizen does not think of himself or herself as a political theorist. Yet, the same person uses concepts or ideas to assist him in interpreting the news he reads in the newspaper or views on television. He assumes that the President's decision to impound funds, a mayor's decision to establish little city-halls, and a legislature's decision to consolidate city and county governments will make some differences, and that he can distinguish between rhetorical promises and realities that he will experience. It is a rare person who simply absorbs what is read or heard without reinterpreting it, questioning its credibility, or inferring conclusions that were not directly presented to him. All of these processes involve the use of theory--theory not formally stated, perhaps not even logically integrated--but theory as a "way of looking at the world" and drawing conclusions from bits and pieces of scattered and unrelated visual or audio messages.

Any effort to improve the functioning of governments in metropolitan areas should be self-conscious of its use of a theoretical framework for
analyzing problems and reaching conclusions. This is particularly important for research efforts. Without the self-conscious development of theory, the collection of empirical data will not serve as evidence and contribute to a cumulative knowledge of the relationship between conditions and consequences about metropolitan government. When inferential reasoning is used to derive conclusions and formulate hypotheses, antecedent conditions can be viewed as independent or intervening variables and consequences can be treated as dependent variables. Empirical research can be used to organize evidence for either supporting or rejecting the association among variables derived from a theoretical framework. Where a theoretical explanation is consistently supported by evidence, we can begin to have some measure of confidence in its warrantability.

Explanatory theory can, in turn, be used as a tool to diagnose the association between conditions and consequences in problematic situations which are judged to be harmful or pathological. If those conditions can be identified, theory provides a method for arraying alternative conditions which will evoke different consequences and a choice of alternative courses of action or reforms become available to decision makers. It is the choice from among alternative possibilities that characterizes policy decisions. Theory, if supported by empirical research, can thus provide a critical basis for policy analysis.

The approach taken in this course is very similar to that discussed in the philosophy of science literature as crucial testing or the method of multiple working hypotheses. This tradition stresses the need to array alternative theories as fully as possible. Then, one can begin to assess where different theories would tend to predict different results. It is at such junctures that empirical research plays its most effective role.
in simultaneously reducing the warrantability of one theory and increasing
the warrantability of another theory. In the relatively "soft" social
sciences, we will probably never be able to conduct "the" crucial exper-
iment which destroys with one blow an entire theoretical structure and
provides strong support for another. Rather, we will probably have to
pick away at a series of inter-related studies which have a cumulative
impact. If the studies are theoretically linked and have consistent re-
sults, then, over time, we may be able to sort out from the array, those
theories which have the highest levels of warrantability. With warrant-
able theories, policy analysts can then help sort out the likely conse-
quences to flow from the design of institutional arrangements or the pro-
posed reform of current institutional arrangements..

There are two readings included in this section. The first is a re-
print of a recent re-issuie of an article written by T. C. Chamberlin in
1890 on "The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses." The second is a
more recent article by John R. Platt on "Strong Inference." The Cham-
berlin article stresses the need for keeping more than a single hypothesis
in mind when designing or evaluating any research. Chamberlin argues that
the posing of several working hypotheses reduces the probability that a
ruling theory will linger on after evidence is accumulated which con-
stitutes an empirical challenge.

The Platt article goes one step further. In addition to the deriv-
ation of alternative hypotheses, Platt urges that research be conducted
where evidence will simultaneously provide evidence about more than one
hypothesis. Platt is particularly concerned about designing research which
can negate at least one out of a set of alternative hypotheses.
Pages 3/III-6 through 3/III-18 removed prior to being shipped to EDRS for filming due to copyright restrictions.
Arthur L. Stinchcombe in his book *Constructing Social Theories* also discusses the methods of multiple hypotheses, strong inference and crucial testing. You will find Chapter Two particularly relevant. Stinchcombe illustrates the idea of crucial experiments by drawing on Durkheim's study of suicide which simultaneously disproved some of the prevailing theories of the era while giving increased warrantability to Durkheim's own theories.

In addition, I strongly recommend reading several works by Donald T. Campbell. The first is a short monograph he wrote with Julian C. Stanley entitled *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966). It originally appeared in N. L. Gage, ed., *Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963). The focus is primarily on experimental research and as such describes a number of research designs that are very difficult for policy analysts to accomplish. We can rarely create "true" experiments in the sense described by Campbell. However, what is very important about this monograph is their discussion of sources of invalidity or "rival hypotheses" which exist for any type of research design. In other words, regardless of the type of research design chosen, alternative methodological hypotheses always exist which threaten either the internal or external validity of the results. Internal validity asks the question: "Did, in fact, the experimental treatments make a difference in this specific experimental instance?" (Campbell & Stanley, 1966: 6) External validity is concerned with the problem of generalizability. "To what populations, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables can this effect be generalized?" (Campbell & Stanley, 1966: 6) While, all research designs are
potentially threatened by at least some sources of internal or external validity, Campbell and Stanley assess the strength of different research designs in helping to eliminate rival hypotheses.

The concept of rival hypotheses used by Campbell and Stanley is different though related to that of multiple working hypotheses of Chamberlin. Chamberlin is concerned with a conscious development of a series of alternative working hypotheses prior to the design of research or in the interpretation of research. Campbell and Stanley are concerned that generalized processes other than those consciously thought of in either a working hypothesis or in a series of working hypotheses could conceivably be the cause of the results observed in an experiment. Designing research with multiple working hypotheses in mind as well as rival methodological hypotheses, insures a higher level of both internal and external validity.

The research designs discussed by Campbell and Stanley are also discussed by Edward A. Suchman in Evaluative Research. Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967). You will find here that the discussion of research design is applied to public policy problems and thus more relevant to the concern of this Study Guide. However, the discussion of rival hypotheses is not as extensive in Suchman as it is in Campbell and Stanley.

Another excellent source for a discussion of rival hypotheses is Donald T. Campbell's article "Reform as Experiments" in American Psychologist 24 (April 1969), 409-429. It has also been reprinted in Readings in Evaluation Research edited by Francis G. Caro (New York: Russell Sage, 1971). The nine threats to internal validity described in this article include:

1. History: events, other than the experimental treatment, occurring between pretest and posttest and thus providing alternate explanations of effects.
2. Maturation: processes within the respondents or observed social units producing changes as a function of the passage of time per se, such as growth, fatigue, secular trends, etc.

3. Instability: unreliability of measures, fluctuations in sampling persons or components, autonomous instability of repeated or "equivalent" measures. (This is the only threat to which statistical tests of significance are relevant.)

4. Testing: the effect of taking a test upon the scores of a second testing. The effect of publication of a social indicator upon subsequent readings of that indicator.

5. Instrumentation: in which changes in the calibration of a measuring instrument or changes in the observers or scores used may produce changes in the obtained measurements.

6. Regression artifacts: pseudo-shifts occurring when persons or treatment units have been selected upon the basis of their extreme scores.

7. Selection: biases resulting from differential recruitment of comparison groups, producing different mean levels on the measure of effects.

8. Experimental mortality: the differential loss of respondents from comparative groups.

9. Selection-maturation interaction: selection biases resulting in differential rates of "maturation" or autonomous change.

PRELIMINARY STEPS IN DEVELOPING A METHOD OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In Section III a method of institutional analysis is posed as a way to evaluate competing reform proposals. This method involves several steps including:

1. Converting the statements justifying reform proposals into propositions which assert specified relationships among variables.

2. Attempting to array each set of propositions into a logical form or theory.

3. Arraying diverse theories in such a manner that the major differences between the theories are made explicit.

4. Developing clear, operational definitions for the major terms used in diverse theories.

5. Undertaking research where data can be used as evidence to reduce the warrantability of one theory and increase the warrantability of others.

Such an approach to institutional analysis is an ambitious undertaking which will take the efforts of many people working for a number of years. The remainder of this Study Guide is devoted to some preliminary steps toward the development of an empirically warrantable theory of institutions as applied to the substantive area of metropolitan reform. It must be stressed that the task is incomplete. Work is progressing on all of the above steps and can be illustrated in the next section. However, much more needs to be done. Your own efforts can contribute to this process in a significant way.

Section V and VI are both efforts toward the first step mentioned above—that of converting the statements justifying reform proposals into propositions. Section V was prepared for the 1973-74 NSR Chautauqua-Type Short Course program. A participant in that program, Michael P. 

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Smith of Tulane University prepared the propositional inventory presented in Section VI first as an interim project for the course and then in revised form for this Study Guide. Both of these sections could be expanded. An interesting project would be to take the Douglas Commission report reproduced in Section II and examine it closely for the propositions it contains. You should find some propositions similar to those presented in both Sections V and VI since the report simultaneously presents several views on urban problems. You should also find some new propositions not stated in either section. Another interesting project would be to search for related or new propositions in the literature discussed in Section II but not referenced in Section V or VI. Joint efforts by many readers and participants will eventually enable us to have a rather complete propositional inventory from the diverse reform traditions.

An effort toward steps two and three mentioned above is presented in Section VII. There, two theoretical traditions are presented in propositional and flow-chart form. Some evidence is presented concerning several of the alternative propositions. Section VIII turns to the question of how to design research about propositions and their alternates derived from diverse traditions. The next two sections turn to each of the major independent variables discussed in Section VII: 1) the size of a governmental unit and 2) the number of governmental units operating in a metropolitan area. Section IX discusses the problem of defining and measuring the number of governmental units present in a metropolitan area as well as other structural attributes of interorganizational arrangements within metropolitan areas. Section X reviews a series of studies conducted relative to neighborhood policing which examine the effect of size on output.
A PRELIMINARY PROPOSITIONAL INVENTORY DERIVED FROM THE TRADITIONAL LITERATURE ON METROPOLITAN REFORM

Introduction

The first part of this section is devoted to a preliminary propositional inventory relating size of jurisdiction, fragmentation or overlap to outcomes. The propositions represent a re-wording in propositional form of statements found in the traditional literature on metropolitan reform or in survey articles describing this literature. Each proposition cites at least one source and many of them cite multiple sources. Specific paragraphs presenting the original language of the sources are then presented in the second part of this section. Full citations are given so that you and your students can return, where desired, to the original works to read them in full.

The list of propositions is relatively long. However, no pretense is being made that it is complete. The propositions represent only the "diagnosis side" of the traditional metropolitan reform movement. They describe the relationships which were thought to exist in the world. Thus, the diagnostic propositions are the easiest to begin examining empirically.

There is an additional set of propositions not listed here which represents the "prescription side" of the traditional metropolitan reform movement. Examples of such propositions would include: "Consolidation leads to the equalization of the tax burden for services received in a metropolitan area." "Consolidation leads to reduced costs of providing public services in a metropolitan area."
Empirical examinations of the prescriptive propositions are somewhat more difficult to undertake than empirical examination of the diagnostic propositions. The problem is in finding appropriate empirical examples for the prescriptive propositions which will satisfy proponents of these reforms. Obviously, if one can do a before-after study of a large-scale consolidation, then one could examine the results of that consolidation. One can also utilize very large center cities as examples of what a consolidated structure would look like at least within their boundaries. However, many proponents of consolidation will not judge this as an adequate empirical investigation of effects of consolidation since there are still multiple units existing in the metropolitan area.

Since this propositional inventory can be extended to include the set of prescriptive propositions as well as extended to include other diagnostic propositions, several participants in this course may want to undertake a further examination of the literature to extend the list and/or to modify the wording of propositions to insure that they conform closely to the intent of the proponents. I have purposely numbered the propositions in steps of 10 in order to facilitate the addition of new propositions.

The current inventory presents propositions in their most elementary form so that the specific variables involved and their simplest relationships could be clearly identified. This is a crucial step in elucidating a logic and in forming a foundation for preliminary empirical examination of the propositions. Further refinements and extensions of this set of propositions will involve stating propositions in more complex form.

Two types of relationships are presented in the list. First is the
set of propositions which relate size or fragmentation to specific direct outcomes (such as the increase in the costs of public services or the decrease in citizens' capacity to fix responsibility). Propositions of this type are presented first in the list and identified as a proposition specifying a direct relationship (i.e. Size-D_{10} or Frag-D_{30}). Secondly a set of propositions is presented which relate either size or fragmentation to some kind of intervening variable which is, itself, assumed to produce either good or bad outcomes. Examples of such intervening variables are "modern methods of management" and "professionalization of public officials." It is frequently assumed that the effects of these intervening variables are known. For example, it is assumed without much question in this literature that professionalization of public officials does improve the quality of public services. For every proposition which posits a relationship with an intervening variable (i.e. Size-I_{20} or Frag-I_{20}), there is an implicit hypothesis that the intervening variable has a positive or negative effect on the performance of metropolitan institutions. I have not here attempted to enumerate the predicted consequences for these intervening variables--that is another potential interim project. However, some of these relationships were specified in the article entitled "Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions," reproduced in the first section of this volume.

One further comment is in order prior to presenting the propositions themselves. Considerable confusion exists in the literature about the meaning of the terms "size of jurisdiction" and "multiplicity of jurisdictions" or "fragmentation." The size of a jurisdiction can mean any of the following
four definitions:

1. The geographic extent of a jurisdiction.
2. The population of a jurisdiction.
3. The size of the operating unit itself measured by the number of employees or the size of the budget.
4. The scale of the unit producing services measured by the number of units of output produced.

The second meaning is probably the most frequent referent in the following propositions, but the other three are also meant from time to time and are reasonable substitutes.

Jurisdictional multiplicity or fragmentation are also indefinite terms in the literature. There appear to be two somewhat distinct concepts involved in the more general term of multiplicity. The first concept would seem to be equivalent to horizontal differentiation within a metropolitan area. When the concept of horizontal differentiation seemed to be the referent, the term "fragmentation" has been used in the following propositions. Thus, governmental fragmentation or fragmentation among units producing a particular set of services (police, for example) refers herein to the fact that a number of units exist contiguously and for the most part do not overlap.

The second concept would seem to be equivalent to vertical differentiation. When this has seemed to be the referent, the term "jurisdictional overlap" has been utilized. Thus, to speak of jurisdictional overlap among units herein describes a situation in which governmental units overlay each other—in effect, sharing part of the same geographic space.

There is a close inter-tie in the literature between propositions about
the size of a jurisdiction and propositions about fragmentation. In sheer volume, more propositions are stated about fragmentation than about size. However, the propositions relating to size appear to me to underlie many of the propositions about fragmentation. The close inter-tie between these variables (as well as the lack of empirical evidence to support them) is well reflected in the following statement by Wilbur R. Thompson (from his A Preface to Urban Economics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, pp. 257-259)).

No phrase in urban affairs is encountered more frequently than "political fragmentation." One interpretation is that the local public economy is made less efficient by being divided into too many political subdivisions too small to capture the many potential internal and external economies of scale. Water and sewage systems are either too small or, if of optimum size, are underutilized; police communication systems and street networks are uncoordinated across a maze of city boundaries. The presumption is that the case for larger political scale is obvious and overpowering, so much so that only apathy, vested interest, or plain cussedness could account for opposition to enlarged local government--ideally metropolitan-area-wide "local" government. What is usually absent is any quantification of the purported economies foregone and/or the public service quality presumably sacrificed by retaining fragmented local government, and this is a gap in the case for bigness because political consolidation cannot rest easily on some trivial gain in scale economies. A small sacrifice in efficiency will not offset a strong need or preference for either personalized political participation or intimate political control. At the moment we are not able to say with any assurance whether our pattern of political fragmentation in metropolitan areas is due to the fact that substantial economies of scale (a) do not exist, (b) are thought not to exist, (c) have not been thought about by the electorate, or (d) are not large enough to exchange for the luxury of retaining intimate small local government.
Propositions

Size-D

Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with economies of scale in the production of public goods and services. (Haar, 1972b:51)

Size-D

Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with the number of services available to residents. (Hawley and Zimmer, 1970:139)

Size-I

Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with citizens' satisfactions with governmental services. (Hawley and Zimmer, 1970:139)

Size-I

Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with the application of modern methods in solving current and future problems. (CED, 1966:11)

Size-I

Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with a well-developed bureaucratic structure. (Hawley and Zimmer, 1970:139)

Size-I

Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with professionalism of public employees. (CED, 1966:16; CED, 1972:30)

Size-I

City size is positively associated with the presence of long-range planning. (CED, 1966:16)

Frag-D

Fragmentation causes urban sprawl. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:87)

Frag-D

Fragmentation causes the deterioration of central cities. (Citizens Advisory Committee, 1962:254)

Frag-D

Fragmentation leads to the inability of central cities to finance their service provision adequately. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91; Lineberry, 1970:676)

Frag-D


Frag-D

Fragmentation decreases the political capacity of local governments to acquire resources. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91)

Frag-D

Fragmentation produces inequities in the administration and distribution of services. (Lineberry, 1970:676; Zimmer and Hawley, 1968:19)
Frag-D70  Fragmentation produces variations in service levels in metropolitan areas. (Lineberry, 1970:676; Greer, 1961:193)

Frag-D80  Fragmentation results in higher per capita costs for providing governmental services. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91; Adrian, 1972:59)

Frag-D90  Fragmentation produces variations in the efficiency of different units. (Greer, 1961:193; Zimmer and Hawley, 1968:19)

Frag-D100 Fragmentation leads to inefficient production processes. (Adrian and Press, 1972:59)

Frag-D110 Fragmentation results in higher taxes. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91)

Frag-D120 Fragmentation leads to generally low levels of some services throughout an area. (Greer, 1961:193)

Frag-D130 Fragmentation encourages an irresponsible attitude toward center city problems by citizens of high-income suburbs. (Grant, 1968:105; Haar, 1972b:5; ACIR, 1969:10)

Frag-D140 Fragmentation reduces a citizen's capacity to fix responsibility and hold government officials responsible. (Grant, 1968:105; Hanson, 1970:206; Citizens Advisory Committee, 1962:254)

Frag-D150 In fragmented settings, governmental units cannot cope with many problems which extend beyond the boundary of the unit. (Lineberry, 1970:676; President's Commission on Law Enforcement, 1967:119; McCausland, 1972:63; Hawley and Zimmer, 1970:2; Haar, 1972a:5)

Frag-D160 In fragmented settings, policies undertaken by local governments tend to have spillover effects. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91; Lineberry, 1970:676)

Frag-D170 In fragmented settings, new suburban governments cannot provide the services for which they were created. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91; Hawley and Zimmer, 1970:3)

Frag-I10 Fragmentation deters area-wide planning. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91; Rosenbaum and Henderson, 1972:430)

Frag-I20 Fragmentation leads to an inability to coordinate efforts among local governments. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91; Lineberry, 1970:676; Adrian, 1972:59; Gorvine and Margulies, 1971:270)
Fragmentation reduces the quality of leadership in metropolitan areas. (Schlitz and Moffitt, 1971:91)

Fragmentation tends to isolate the most able leaders from the core city's problems. (Grant, 1968:105; ACIR, 1969:10)

Fragmentation tends to segregate the most able leaders in separate political entities. (Grant, 1968:105)

Fragmentation leads to an immobilism of political decision making in a metropolitan area. (Hanson, 1970:216)

In fragmented settings, few police departments are permitted to cross jurisdictional boundaries. (McCausland, 1972:63)

In fragmented settings, coordination of activities among contiguous police agencies tends to be informal. (President's Commission on Law Enforcement, 1967:119)

In fragmented settings, coordination of activities among contiguous police agencies tends to be sporadic (infrequent). (President's Commission on Law Enforcement, 1967:119)

In fragmented settings, coordination among functions such as police, fire and water does not exist. (Lineberry, 1970:676; Gorvine and Margulies, 1971:270)

In fragmented settings over time, decision-making centers tend to be created at an increasing rate. (Barber, 1971:243)

As fragmentation increases, the proliferation of coordination units increases exponentially. (Barber, 1971:243)

As fragmentation increases, the incidence of conflict increases. (Barber, 1971:244)

As fragmentation increases, the degree of jurisdictional overlap increases. (Barber, 1971:245)

As the degree of jurisdictional overlap increases, conflict incidence increases. (Barber, 1971:245)

As fragmentation increases, the intensity of conflicts decreases. (Barber, 1971:245)

As fragmentation increases, energies are channelled into problems of inter-unit relations and away from problems of substantive program evaluation. (Barber, 1971:246)
As fragmentation increases, the number of proposals initiated increases. (Barber, 1971:246)

As fragmentation increases, the number of proposals adopted decreases. (Barber, 1971:246)

As fragmentation increases, the probability increases that proposals will be adopted, when adopted, in bunches. (Barber, 1971:247)

Jurisdiction overlap leads to higher taxes for both homeowners and business. (Citizen's Advisory Committee, 1962:253)

Jurisdictional overlap leads to inefficiencies in the production of public services. (CED, 1972:30)

Jurisdictional overlap causes confusion and disinterest among citizens in metropolitan areas. (CED, 1966:13)

Jurisdictional overlap generates competition to tap existing revenue sources. (CED, 1966:11)

Jurisdictional overlap obscures lines of authority. (CED, 1966:13)
The situation for most central cities takes on an even more dismal case because there is little prospect for a voluntary solution arising from within the metropolitan area. Suburban political leaders can generally be counted upon to oppose stoutly any proposal that would call for a significant redistribution of resources such as an area-wide tax with a strong equalization twist to aid the central city. By the same token, suburban leadership can be expected to view with a jaundiced eye any major redistribution of burdens, i.e., the rezoning of suburban land to permit low income central city families to obtain public or low cost housing in suburbia.


Suburbs tend to become intensely jealous of their independence, and encouraged by local office holders—they attribute ulterior motives to all suggestions of cooperation with the core city or even with other suburbs. This attitude is likely to decrease coordination and lead to inefficient use of plants and equipment.


Pluralization is self-reinforcing. That is, the process tends to acquire momentum of its own, stimulating the creation of separate but interdependent decision centers at an increasing rate. Each event thus multiplies the number of relationships which must be coordinated to produce action. In time the "load" on coordination channels tends to increase and to reach a point at which it becomes useful to regularize them.

By proliferating new relationships among separate but inter-dependent decision centers, pluralization provides an increasing number of occasions for conflict.

However, the proliferation of decision centers also tends to reduce the intensity of conflicts.

Conflict incidence is also increased by the inevitable overlapping of jurisdictions, which accompanies unit proliferation.
The more units there are involved in a policy process, the more necessary and difficult it is to predict and manipulate their reactions to proposals. Questions are thus increasingly posed in the form "How will units X, Y, and Z receive this proposal" and "How can we best insure a favorable response?" rather than "What would this program do if put into operation in the field?"

The fluidity of the situation both within and without the unit stimulates individuals and the agency as a whole to capture attention by suggesting innovations. For all these reasons, a flow of proposals is likely to spring from newborn units.

But as units proliferate, the number of proposals adopted—that is, actually put into operation—declines, due to changes in the aggregate character of the system.

By increasing the opportunities for vetoing and delaying broad government action, pluralization tends to allow social problems to build up to crisis proportions. A point is reached at which failure to act threatens to bring about relatively marked social or political upheavals, demands for redistributing power in the system, and agitation for changing the rules of the game. Frustrated in their programmatic efforts, interests turn on the structural characteristics of the system, thus challenging established habits and prerogatives. At this point, many units may suddenly suppress their differences and agree to cooperate.


Local government in Washington was designed for a simpler day when people were fewer and the line between city and county was clear. It has grown by patchwork additions of cities and special purpose districts and is now a crazy quilt of overlapping jurisdictions, costly in higher taxes to the homeowner and businessman alike.

Such fragmentation is sapping the strength of local government. No citizen, no matter how civic minded, can inform himself of the affairs of a dozen or more local governments. No voter can keep track of the performance of 50 or more local elected officials. Citizens have lost control of their local affairs when they are unable to place responsibility for faulty decisions or inaction.

Nor is this divided government responsive, for it cannot respond to major problems which ignore its boundary lines. Time, energy and money are being wasted in mounting traffic congestion; water and air pollution grow; downtowns are in trouble, older neighborhoods blighted, and social problems rise. Each of the hundreds of local officials of the metropolitan area is alert to see that no action to remedy these ills

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falls too heavily on his jurisdiction; none is responsible to see that there is action. Frustrated by local inertia and confusion, the citizen turns increasingly to state and federal programs for urban needs.

Fragmentation damages the financial as well as the political health of local government. Fragmentation of the metropolitan areas separates benefits and burdens in ways which are often basically unfair.


11/Very few local units are large enough—in population, area, or taxable resources—to apply modern methods in solving current and future problems. Less than half contain as many as 1,000 people; less than 10 per cent have more than 10,000 inhabitants; and less than 1 per cent have over 100,000 inhabitants. Even the largest cities find major problems insoluble because of limits on their geographic areas, their taxable resources, or their legal powers.

Overlapping layers of local government—municipalities and townships within counties, and independent school districts and special districts within them—are a source of weakness. These layers, in some cases numbering ten or more local units with power to tax the same parcel of land, compete in a struggle for revenue sources.

15/Confusion from the many-layered system, profusion of elective offices without policy significance, and increasing mobility of the population all contribute to disinterest.

Antiquated administrative organizations hamper most local governments. Lack of a single executive authority, either elective or appointive, is a common fault. Functional fragmentation obscures lines of authority. Organizational concepts considered axiomatic in American business firms are unrecognized or disregarded in most local governments. The quality of administration suffers accordingly.

16/Each local unit must be sufficiently large—in population, geographic jurisdiction, and financial resources—to make long-range plans, to attract professional staff and to manage modern services.


30/Fragmentation of police forces is extreme; there are $2,000 separate police departments. Wasted energy and lost motion due to overlapping, duplication and noncooperation are not the worst consequences of the fragmentation. Large areas of the United States—particularly rural communities and the small jurisdictions in or near metropolitan areas—lack anything resembling modern, professional police protection.

In the New York area, there are over 1,400 political geographic jurisdictions, units too small to solve their own problems, yet unable and unwilling to participate in a consistent way in regional solutions. The evolution of intergovernmental relations--grants-in-aid, single purpose districts, annexation and others have two characteristics in common--they are cumbersome and voluntary. Typical of their operations are overlapping and conflicting lines of jurisdiction and a lack of horizontal coordination and communication.


Area-wide coordination of the human resources of the metropolitan community is needed and may ultimately be the most serious need of all. Failure to coordinate these human resources tends to segregate the most able leaders in separate political entities--frequently suburbs--and to isolate them from the core city's problems. Such a political structure tends to encourage an irresponsible attitude by citizens of high-income suburbs. Furthermore, the fragmented governmental structure of the metropolis tends to make the fixing of responsibility by citizens an impossible task. If the essence of democracy is fixing responsibility and holding governmental officials accountable, the fragmented structure constitutes a very real obstacle to democracy in the metropolis.


It was hypothesized that this conglomeration of heterogeneous and overlapping governmental units would produce these results:
1) Great variation in output, or service levels, among the different units.
2) Great variations in the efficiency, or cost benefit ratio, among the units.
3) A generally low level of some services throughout the area, due to the deleterious effects of poor services in one governmental unit upon the services in other, interdependent units.


A real hope for improvements in the governance of metropolitan areas may lie, paradoxically, in the possibility that the problems are greater than they have yet seemed--that they are so severe that unless they are dealt with on a metropolitan basis, and with the combined resources of the entire area coherently arrayed, the roof will fall in on everybody.
urbanites and suburbanites alike. For the dominant underlying theme of the 1970's in America may well be the irresistible emergence of underlying interrelationships that have up to now been determinedly ignored.

A great deal of unavoidable "new evidence" has become available in both physical and social terms, and in many different functional areas. It points directly to the need for a revamping of the distribution of responsibilities and powers within metropolitan areas to allow for unitary response at appropriate levels of scale to problems that are inherently indivisible--indivisible in the sense that they require just such a unified approach to make solutions even possible.


57/The inescapable counterpart to the high level of civic services that suburbanites want and sometimes get is a high level of public expenditure. Heavy public costs are augmented, moreover, by diseconomies of scale since many suburbs are too small to achieve the economies available through the use of heavy equipment, large plants, and automatic systems. On the other hand, of course, many suburbs are able, by divorcing themselves from the political confines of central cities and metropolitan areas, to avoid (or, it might be said, to shirk) the costs of supporting the poor and underprivileged left behind in the central cities and, indeed, not infrequently excluded from the suburbs by their own land-use restrictions. And still worse from the standpoint of fiscal equity, suburbs are able, as we have shown, to enjoy unduly high levels of fiscal subsidies from state and federal government.


206/In sum, the present system of governance in metropolitan areas contributes to economic pluralism at the expense of more rational distribution of resources, and, however, desirable, the system's political pluralism produces a diffused distribution of political power. Furthermore, the system is self-reinforcing; structure and economic advantage interact with civic culture to resist institutional changes that might alter substantially the existing balance of jurisdictions, finances, and power thus far developed in most metropolitan areas. It is hardly useful to condemn this arrangement out of hand or to assert that it is inefficient, unresponsive, or otherwise deficient. It may not meet the values and specifications of modern reformers, but it obviously meets the specifications and purposes of some, who perceive it as effectively serving their values and interests.

213/As do all governments, local governments have as a major function the authoritative resolution of conflicts, and the structure provided for this
purpose contributes to the resolution of some and virtually precludes the resolution of others. It should be evident that the governmental pluralism of the metropolis, as well as the municipality itself, runs counter to values suggesting rational and comprehensive processes for resolving conflicts. In fact, pluralism enhances values more closely associated with local community independence and laissez faire among various economic or functional groups. Repeated unsuccessful attempts at metropolitan unification suggests how strong a hold these values have on the citizens of metropolitan areas.

The immobility in the metropolitan political system tends to contribute to disrespect and distrust for the institutions, processes, and officials of local government. Far more even than overt corruption, mediocres to wretched performance of services, indifference, and failure to act on matters perceived as urgent provide fuel for a conspiracy theory of politics.


2/ metropolitan growth has divided among many governmental units what are actually indivisible problems. Problems of water supply and sewage disposal, of health and environmental pollution, of transportation and traffic control, of police and fire protection, of planning and development recognize no parochial boundaries. The central city's ability to deal effectively with its service needs is progressively impaired by a shrinking tax base. Its difficulties are further aggravated by the use of its institutions and facilities by increasing numbers of non-contributors to its revenues, the suburban residents. On the other hand, there is great unevenness among suburban governmental units in their capabilities to finance the capital equipment urban services require.

Size of area is, of course, a gross indicator of other characteristics. The smaller the area the less developed is the governmental organization in suburban zones. More specifically, the smaller the area the fewer were the urban services available to the residents and the greater was the dissatisfaction with those services that were available.


Disease, crime, pollution, transportation, congestion, physical deterioration, and other problems however, do not respect municipal boundaries. Critics of the non-congruence and multiplicity of local government have identified four major dimensions to the metropolitan problem: externalities, fiscal and service inequities, political non-responsibility and lack of coordination.
Law Enforcement. The distinctive suburban problem here, as in so many other areas, is fragmentation. In the Detroit metropolitan area, for example, there are 85 police agencies. Most suburban police forces are too small to handle major disturbances or criminal investigations, or problems that require special expertise such as organized crime, narcotics and vice. They are too small to support adequate training programs, or be equipped with the latest electronic communications and computer equipment. Such suburban crime crosses jurisdictional lines, but few police departments can.


The machinery of law enforcement in this country is fragmented, complicated and frequently overlapping. America is essentially a nation of small police forces, each operating independently within the limits of its jurisdiction. The boundaries that define and limit police operations do not hinder the movement of criminals, of course. They can and do take advantage of ancient political and geographic boundaries, which often give them sanctuary from effective police activity.

Nevertheless, coordination of activity among police agencies, even when the areas they work in are contiguous or overlapping, tends to be sporadic and informal, to the extent that it exists at all.


Comprehensive consolidation also concerns us because it is one of the few urban governmental reforms that appears to attack directly the problem of fragmented local governmental units. Urban specialists have amply demonstrated how this fragmentation impedes area-wide planning and becomes increasingly grave as the need for such planning becomes imperative.


The most frequently cited and perhaps most obvious effect of governmental fragmentation is known as the urban sprawl; the process by which the urban center slowly but surely expands with reckless abandon across the country side, consuming farmers and cows in the process, seemingly without any remorse.
Most notable among the assertions regarding the evils of fragmentation are the following:

The central cities cannot adequately finance their activities and new suburban governments cannot provide the services for which they were created. Fragmentation makes it difficult to achieve area-wide planning to meet area-wide problems. Various local governments play a gigantic game of chess by "exporting" their problems to other governmental units rather than trying to solve them until the problems are eventually sent to the less urbanized areas of the fringe. The mass of governments deteriorate the quality of leadership in metropolitan areas. Fragmentation perverts local motives and results in futile and expensive projects. Cities become increasingly isolated from political access to resources. Fragmentation disallows economies of scale and results in higher taxes. The need for coordinated activity rises as the ability to reach coordinated effort fails. Eventually, fragmentation results in diffusion of power and dilution of responsibility which in turn causes rigidity.


School and municipal problems have reached acute form in many metropolitan areas throughout the country. The consensus among qualified observers is that many of the difficulties confronting public education in metropolitan areas are traceable to the multiplicity of small-scale governments in suburbia. Yet efforts to effect change to a more efficient and equitable administrative arrangement have met with uniform failure. Local residents resist reorganization even when by all objective standards, it would be to their own self-interest to accept such a proposal.
Introduction

The movement for community control may be viewed as a reaction against the bureaucratization of urban social services that emerged as traditional urban political machines declined in significance. It is thus also a reaction to many of the key tenets of the metropolitan consolidation tradition, particularly those relating to the presumed value of administrative centralization, large-scale political jurisdictions, and public policy formation by "disinterested" professional civil servants. This chapter is devoted to the presentation of an inventory of theoretical propositions drawn from the literature on community control. The propositions relate four key variables -- professionalization, administrative decentralization, political participation, and political decentralization (community control) -- to a variety of political, psychological, and policy outcomes envisaged by community control proponents.

Unlike the previous chapter on metropolitan government, which analyzed only the diagnostic side of the consolidationist literature, this chapter
presents both diagnostic and prescriptive propositions. The propositions which follow are organized sequentially in the following way: first, propositions relating professionalization to various outcomes, all of which are diagnostic; secondly, propositions dealing with administrative decentralization, most of which are diagnostic; thirdly, those dealing with political participation, many of which are prescriptive; and finally, those dealing with the expected relationship of community control to outcomes, most of which are prescriptive in nature.

Because of the scarcity of pure examples of the kind of decentralized neighborhood government envisaged in the literature, the researcher may find it difficult to test the latter type propositions such as: "Community control increases citizens' loyalty to the political system." or "Community control will institutionalize the sense of community in affected neighborhoods." In contrast, there are abundant opportunities to research the diagnostic propositions concerning the professionalization of urban-service bureaucracies, which community control advocates depict as the root cause of inadequate service delivery and urban alienation. The researcher, thus, may find it easier to investigate the diagnostic side of the community control literature than its prescriptive side. Nonetheless, it is possible to seek out "functional equivalents" of small scale neighborhood governments (such as ethnically homogeneous suburbs or OEO sponsored community development corporations) in order to test the prescriptive propositions presented below.

Definitions and Distinctions

Before presenting the propositions themselves, it is necessary to review briefly the key definitions and distinctions contained in the
community control literature. First we shall examine the concept of political participation. The discussion of participation will also be used to illustrate the way in which the relationships contained in our inventory are posited. Then we shall compare the two principal definitions of community used in the literature. Next, the scope of control envisaged by proponents of administrative decentralization will be compared with the scope of control envisaged by proponents of total community or neighborhood control. Finally, the uses of the concept of professionalization in the community control literature will be examined. Once these key definitions and distinctions are understood, it will be possible to turn to an analysis of the propositional inventory itself.

Political Participation

As has been suggested by Henry Schmandt (1973:26-31), the goals sought by proponents of community control vary considerably and include the following types of objectives: individual therapy for alienated and powerless citizens; improved neighborhood service delivery; increased political power by heretofore powerless groups; or any combination of these three. Because of this multiplicity of reform objectives, several different types of relationships between structures and outcomes are posited in this chapter's inventory.

First are those propositions directly relating professionalization, decentralization, participation, and control to each of the above three outcomes -- therapy, service, and power. Using the concept of political participation for illustrative purposes, the community control propositions predict positive relationships between increased political participation and all three of these goals. For example, the literature predicts that
greater individual participation increases the individual's sense of personal worth (therapy), that greater citizen participation in policy-making will increase the flexibility of administrative operations (service), and that greater participation by neighborhood residents in the political process will lead to a significant devolution of authority to neighborhood groups (power).

In addition to such directly posited relationships, listed first in our inventory, this chapter contains several propositions that involve indirect relationships between each of the four independent variables, some intervening variable, and a predicted psychological, political, or policy outcome, to which the intervening variable is assumed to be directly related.

Staying with our illustrative variable, political participation, examples of such indirectly posited relationships would include the expectation that increased citizen participation in administrative decision-making, by improving "organizational intelligence" and expanding the pool of information and talent available to policy makers, will lead to more effective and innovative problem-solving.

In the above instance, it is assumed, a priori, that the intervening variable -- a better information processing system -- will automatically improve the quality of urban public services. Yet this relationship too is one which ought to be subject to empirical investigation rather than assumed a priori. Accordingly, in the propositions which follow, whenever possible the full chain of linkages between independent, intervening, and dependent variables have been spelled out, to enable the researcher to design projects that take into consideration the full complexity of the posited relationships. The indirect relationships are listed following the direct relationships in the inventory.
The Meaning of Community: Ethnicity vs. Neighborhood

The clearest indication that a consensus on the meaning of "community" has not been reached by community control advocates may be seen by comparing the definitions advanced by two leading proponents of community control, Leonard J. Fein and Milton Kotler. In *The Ecology of the Public Schools: An Inquiry into Community Control*, Fein (1971: 77-78) defines community as a shared organic (ethnic, racial, and/or cultural) bond which unites a people regardless of their geographic locale. It is this type of organic community which Fein feels must be preserved by political means, lest it be destroyed by the twin threats of mass society and the pervasive individualistic ideology of 19th Century Liberalism.

In contrast, Milton Kotler seeks the devolution of political power to neighborhood jurisdictions. Kotler thus avoids the sticky problem of operationalizing the concept of community. Instead he contends that full political autonomy ought to be granted to urban neighborhoods, defined as territorial units with historically determined physical boundaries. Kotler argues that there are several different ways to determine the domain of a neighborhood: a) neighborhoods have names dating back to their founding; b) they have social and physical boundaries and social and physical centers; and c) these boundaries and landmarks are well known to the residents of a neighborhood and can be determined by asking them. (Kotler, 1969: 62-74) Kotler seeks to develop deliberative political institutions within each of these
neighborhood jurisdictions, to expand the political liberty of local residents. He seeks to do this whether or not the neighborhoods are ethnically, racially, or culturally homogeneous.

In some cases of course, such as in black urban ghettos, where economic and racial discrimination have locked a relatively homogeneous group within clearly delineated geographic boundaries, the problems raised by the lack of consensus on the meaning of community are not readily apparent. However, Fein is well aware that simply extending political power downward to the neighborhood level will not necessarily preserve the organic community. As he has said (1971:77), "Clearly to give sanction to ethnicity would be very different from merely providing some measure of autonomy to people who live near each other. For physical proximity is only sometimes coterminous with the boundaries of the organic community."

Although we need not deal at length here with the potential difficulties to which the distinction between neighborhood control and organic community control might lead, it is well to note at least one potential conflict in passing. In concrete situations, those community control proponents who seek the expansion of individual political liberty and rational deliberative skills through the creation of institutions which facilitate procedural democracy (whether direct or representative) may find themselves disagreeing with those proponents seeking the fraternity and social solidarity believed to be found in the non-rational folk-bond of the organic community. In brief, the principle of individual liberty (and by extension of individual and minority rights) often has been found to be incompatible with the full development of social solidarity, which requires group
conformity to the dominant social values reflected by the community's majority.

**Administrative Decentralization vs. Political Decentralization**

While no proponents of community control favor greater centralization of power, a distinction can be drawn between those who favor administrative reform alone and those who support administrative reform only if it is also accompanied by political restructuring. In point of fact, much of the community control literature is implicitly or explicitly critical of administrative reformers who believe that the plight of relatively powerless urban constituencies can be significantly improved simply by delegating more decision-making authority in urban social service bureaucracies to neighborhood level field offices, little city halls, and the like. Community control proponents share the administrative decentralists' disdain for remote, hierarchical, and basically unresponsive central bureaucracies. Nonetheless, they fear that unless local governing boards, chosen by the consumers of urban social services, become the principal political authority to which administrative field officers are held accountable, the creation of administrative access points alone, may be a counterproductive reform. Thus, they seek political as well as administrative decentralization.

Advocates of political decentralization point out that although administrative decentralization alone may initially lead to greater flexibility and improved service delivery, such an administrative reform provides no guarantee that improvements will continue in the future, since ultimate political authority is still vested in central political and administrative authority. In short, they argue that what central authority giveth,
central authority can take away. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that administrative decentralization, if adopted alone, would function to co-opt community residents to the administrative point of view, by symbolizing accessibility and a willingness to listen to the citizen's point of view, while still leaving citizens relatively powerless to determine and control the nature, scope, and impact of bureaucratic policy.

In specific policy arenas, such as in the case of police protection, community control advocates further contend that too much unchecked power in the hands of the street level bureaucrat (i.e., the policeman on the beat) would lead to undesirable policy consequences. They argue that present personnel recruitment and training procedures would be maintained if administrative decentralization alone were to become the focal point of reform efforts, and that these procedures discriminate against blacks and other ethnic groups who do not happen to control the municipal police unions dominant in a particular locale.

This reservation about staffing procedures in administratively decentralized bureaucracies carries over into other policy areas and provides the thrust of the argument that only political restructuring which devolves significant power down to the neighborhood level, can redress these administrative biases. It is argued that political restructuring is necessary, lest the white middle-class and professional biases that permeate central city bureaucracies continue to be reflected in the personnel recruitment and staffing of neighborhood level field offices, street level bureaucrats, and little city halls.
Despite the above misgivings, even those most strongly critical of piecemeal administrative reform seem willing to consider seriously the principle of shared power between lower level administrators and local community residents. (See, for example, Frederickson, 1973: 267-272). Such an arrangement is seen as combining the administrative flexibility derived from administrative decentralization with the political responsiveness and accountability derived from political decentralization.

Professionalization

The uses of the concept of professionalization in the community control literature tend to be normative, expressive and symbolic. Although all language is abstract, and therefore symbolic, the distinction can be drawn between referential and condensation symbols. (See, Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964), ch.1). Referential symbols are words used in a given language which are intended to stand for relatively clear-cut, concrete, and specific phenomena. Thus professionalization as a referential symbol can be taken to stand for and refer to such specific operational measures as: number of years of training in a specialized field; the existence of organized professional associations; a recognized credential granting procedure; and the like.

In contrast, a condensation symbol is a word or expression used to stand for and condense a whole host of pejorative or laudatory meanings, which reflect the emotional hopes and fears, dreams and nightmares of the speaker and his intended audience. Any political reform literature
contains many such condensation symbols, which attempt to condense in one small word or phrase a wide variety of social evils or social benefits. In the literature on metropolitan consolidation, the term "fragmentation" and the phrase "duplication and overlap" are often used to condense and symbolize a variety of sins including waste, inefficiency, bossism, unresponsiveness, ineffectiveness, and irresponsibility.

In the community control literature the concept of professionalization is similarly used to symbolize a host of evils assumed to be characteristic of civil service bureaucracies staffed by persons claiming to represent an organized profession. As used in the propositions which follow, the concept "professionalization" can be taken to designate symbolically one or more of the following five situations.

1. Routinization and lack of innovation.
2. Careerism and bureaucratic protectionism.
3. Ineffectiveness of service delivery.
4. Professional value biases (Thorsten Veblen's "Trained incapacity").
5. Biased service delivery, favoring one or more of the following:
   a) White middle-class interests and cultural values.
   b) The interests of the most powerful and well organized groups.
   c) Organizational survival and expansion.

All five of these meanings are used as equivalents of professionalization in the propositions which follow, although careerism and ineffective service delivery resulting from class, race, and cultural discrimination are the meanings used most frequently.
Propositions

Professionalization

Prof-D10 Professionalization of urban bureaucracies is positively associated with the political autonomy of those bureaucracies. (Kotler, 1969:70)

Prof-D20 Professionalization increases the cultural gap between administrators and clients. (Schmandt, 1973:22)

Prof-D30 Professional recruitment procedures in the urban civil service discriminate against selected racial and ethnic minorities. (Altshuler, 1970:156-167)

Prof-D40 Professional insulation and autonomy in the public service results in a breakdown in the bureaucracy’s political neutrality. (Altshuler, 1970:158)

Prof-D50 Professionals tend to co-opt representatives of the poor. (Davis, 1973:63)

Prof-D60 Professionals downplay rapport with clients as a measure of administrative competence. (Altshuler, 1970:159)

Prof-D70 The more concerned a group is with its professional status, the greater the likelihood it will claim immunity from popular participation in decision-making. (Fein, 1971:63)

Prof-D80 Resistance to neighborhood control is centered in the central city professional bureaucracies. (Strange, 1973:174; Altshuler, 1970:197)

a) Resistance by professionals to community control is positively associated with membership in strong public service unions. (Altshuler, 1970:158; Strange, 1973:176; Frederickson, 1973:268)

b) Resistance by professionals to community control is positively associated with acceptance of conventional civil service rules and traditions. (Strange, 1973:175)

c) Resistance by professionals to community control is positively associated with fear of job loss (Strange, 1973:176)

Prof-I10 Professionalization is inversely associated with the degree of employment of poor people in the public service. (Frederickson, 1973:271)
Professionalization is inversely associated with the frequency of radical departures from routine administration of policy. (Frederickson, 1973: 269)

Professionalization impedes accurate measurement of the social and political productivity of an agency. (Frederickson, 1973: 269)

Professionalization is inversely associated with successful agency-clientele rapport. (Altshuler, 1970: 158)

Professionalization, in the face of political demands from lower class clients, results in various protectionist "goal displacements." (Schmandt, 1973: 20-22)

Administrative Decentralization

A.D.-D_{10} Administrative decentralization increases city hall-neighborhood contact. (Kotler, summarizing Little City Hall Model, 1969: 35)

A.D.-D_{20} Administrative decentralization is positively associated with a well-developed set of neighborhood clientele groups functioning as supports for professional administrators. (Kotler, 1969: 35)

A.D.-D_{30} Administrative decentralization will not greatly disturb traditional public administration practices such as the merit system of appointment and professional specialization of functions. (Frederickson, 1973: 267)

A.D.-D_{40} Administrative decentralization increases citizens' knowledge of their rights. (Schmandt, summarizing advocates' position, 1973: 19)

A.D.-D_{50} Administrative decentralization fosters flexible adaptation of programs and services to local consumer or clientele needs. (Schmandt, summarizing, 1973: 21)

A.D.-D_{60} Administrative decentralization increases citizen access to the decision making process. (Schmandt, summarizing, 1973: 21)

A.D.-D_{70} Administrative decentralization legitimates programs in middle class neighborhoods. (Schmandt, 1973: 22)

A.D.-I_{10} Administrative decentralization is positively associated with improved service delivery. (Kotler, summarizing LCH Model, 1969: 35)

A.D.-I_{20} Administrative decentralization increases the political power of the following types of professional administrators: advocacy planners, ombudsmen, and sub-professionals. (Kotler, summarizing LCH Model, 1969: 35)
Administrative decentralization increases community planning input by local residents. (Kotler, summarizing LCH Model, 1969:36)

Administrative decentralization increases the fairness of city service delivery. (Kotler, summarizing LCH model, 1969:36).

**Participation**

1. **Part-D 10** Individual political participation is positively associated with an increased sense of personal confidence (efficacy). (Schmandt, summarizing advocates' position, 1973:27)

2. **Part-D 20** Individual political participation is positively associated with an increased sense of personal worth, (Schmandt, summarizing, 1973:27)

3. **Part-D 30** Individual political participation is inversely associated with feelings of powerlessness. (Schmandt, summarizing, 1973:27)

4. **Part-D 40** Individual political participation is inversely associated with feelings of alienation. (Frederickson, 1973:272)

5. **Part-D 50** Individual political participation increases the individual's commitment to the neighborhood organization in which he participates. (Kotler, 1969:85)

6. **Part-D 60** Individual political participation is positively associated with a citizen's sense of "well-being." (Lipsky, 1973:110)

7. **Part-D 70** Increased popular participation in community policy making is positively associated with the generation of new political issues. (Kotler, 1969: 48-49)

8. **Part-D 80** Increased popular participation in community policy making is positively associated with the generation of new leadership cadres. (Kotler, 1969:48-49)

9. **Part-D 90** Increased popular participation in community policy making leads to greater acquisition of deliberative political skills by citizens. (Kotler, 1969: 48, 59-60)

10. **Part-D 100** Increased participation by blacks in the political and economic lives of their cities will lead to a significant devolution of authority to black neighborhoods. (Altshuler, 1970:14)

11. **Part-D 110** Increased black participation in the political and economic lives of their cities will lead to the significant representation of blacks in public service employment. (Altshuler, 1970:14; Frederickson, 1973:272; and cross-index with Prof D30 and I10)
Increased black participation in the political and economic lives of their cities is positively associated with the direct representation of the black community on the following policy making organs of city government: a) city councils; b) school boards; c) the police commission; and d) "other significant policy bodies." (Altshuler, 1970:14)

Increased black participation in the political and economic lives of their cities is positively associated with black representation in labor forces that contract with local governments. (Altshuler, 1970:14)

Increased black participation in the political and economic lives of their cities is positively associated with the vigorous use of public power to foster black controlled business enterprises. (Altshuler, 1970:14)

Citizen participation in administrative decision making increases the sensitivity and flexibility of administrative operations to diverse cultural values and local contingencies. (Davis, 1973:65-66)

Citizen participation in administrative decision making adds to the legitimacy of programs and helps gain general public support for programs. (Davis, 1973:61)

Citizen participation in administrative decision making introduces values in policy formation that are distinctively different from those of the professional expert. (Davis, 1973:61)

Participation by blacks in running neighborhood services is positively associated with the development of more moderate black spokesmen and leaders. (Altshuler, 1970:113, and cross-index as C.C.-180)

Increased community participation in educational policy making is positively associated with improved student performance. (Fein, 1972:23).

Citizen participation in administrative decision making, by improving "organizational intelligence" and "feedback," is positively associated with bureaucratic innovation. (Davis, 1973:71)

Citizen participation in administrative policy formation, by expanding the pool of information, experience, and talent, contributes to effectiveness in problem solving. (Davis, 1973:62)

Political Decentralization
(Community Control)

Community control alters the assumptions of dispensers of social services. (Lipsky, 1973:110)
Community control is positively associated with administrative efficiency in overly extended administrative systems. (Lipsky, 1973:110)

Community control increases the political responsibility and accountability of social service bureaucracies. (Lipsky, 1973:110)

Community control increases the access to governmental influence by relatively powerless groups. (Lipsky, 1973:110)

Community control is positively associated with raised ethnic-racial consciousness. (Altshuler, 1970:125-126)

Community control provides greater accuracy of information in determining community needs. (Kotler, 1969:60)

Community control increases popular support for government in affected neighborhoods. (Kotler, 1969: ch. 9)

Community control will institutionalize the sense of community in affected neighborhoods. (Fein, 1972: 76, 81-82)

Community control in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods directly challenges the following basic values of classical liberal doctrine:

a) Secularism (Fein, 1972:ch.2)
b) Individualism (Fein, 1972:41)
c) Rationalism (Fein, 1972:43-44)
d) Impersonal rules (Fein, 1972:47)
e) Universalism (i.e., the eschewal of the legitimacy of sub-cultural value systems) (Fein, 1972:40-41, 44)

Community control of schools is positively associated with a restoration of the educational system's legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents, particularly blacks. (Fein, 1972:76)

Community control is positively associated with decreased demands for revolutionary change. (Strange, 1973:173)

Community control is positively associated with decreased political violence directed against established political institutions. (Strange, 1973:173)

Community control will provide inner city residents the same political opportunities that are presently available to suburban dwellers. (Strange, 1973:171; Altshuler, 1970:26; Fredericksen, 1973:275).
Community control is positively associated with improved bureaucratic performance in social service bureaucracies. (Lipsky, 1973:110)

Community control increases the citizen's sense of well being. (Lipsky, 1973:110)

Community control increases citizens' loyalty to the political system. (Lipsky, 1973:110)

Community control is positively associated with decline in the number and intensity of protest demonstrations. (Strange, 1973:173)

Community control increases social peace in the city. (Kotler, 1969:52)

Community control is positively associated with pressures for community economic development. (Kotler, 1969:ch. 4)

Community control is positively associated with increased rates of local popular political participation. (Kotler, 1969: ch. 4)
When black spokesmen demand greater participation in the political and economic lives of their cities, their specific agenda of reform typically includes the following: (1) devolution of as much authority as possible to neighborhood communities; (2) direct representation of such communities on the city council, the board of education, the police commission, and other significant policy bodies; (3) black representation at all levels of the public service in far more than token numbers; (4) similar representation on the labor forces of government contractors; and (5) the vigorous application of public resources to facilitate the development of black-controlled businesses.

Responsibility for the operation of complex services would be likely to sober the successful candidates in neighborhood elections and absorb much of the ghetto's political energy.

Advocates of community control...tend to argue as follows. The 'merit' criteria defended by public service unions bear little or no relation to the achievement of agency goals. They are typically products of ingrown traditions and status-striving rather than of research on the qualities associated with competent on-the-job performance. The oral examinations are frequently used to discriminate against members of ethnic groups not already well represented in the service.

To community control proponents, the objectives of public personnel policy should be civil service subservience, not autonomy. It is vital, they believe, to bring the public bureaucracies under democratic political control.

White resistance to massive desegregation and redistribution is overwhelming, and it comes from all segments of white society. The resistance to community control, by contrast, is centered in the big city public bureaucracies. Many other whites are hostile...but they really have no stake in who governs the ghettos.

"Administrative officials . . . may think that a citizen participation component is essential to gain sufficient public, group, and legislative support for programs they want to carry out. Providing something in the way of citizen participation may be a part of building a winning coalition, a way of gaining consent."

63/"A demand to participate in the decisions and programs of an organization is in effect a demand that power be shared or given up. Such demands are likely to be resisted by many who think that their position or influence would be detrimentally affected . . . . Considerers will summon up arguments ranging from the need to maintain professional standards and organizational moral to the danger of proceeding precipitately toward unknown consequences."

65/"Responsibility and authority may be delegated by administrators to citizen groups, with the possible result of decentralization: many decisions made by smaller groups rather than all decisions made in a single- headquarters. This use of citizen participation suggests that it may be a way of achieving some flexibility in administrative operations, a way of trying to insure that administrative operations are responsive to varying conditions in different locales."


41/ "Many liberals, however, remain thoroughly committed to the secular city and accept as axiomatic that society ought to be an aggregate of independent individuals rather than an organic compact of groups. Such a view necessarily points to a polity in which all legitimate authority is vested in the State. Assertions that a 'sacred' entity, such as an organic community, should be viewed as a legitimate partner to the embracing secular authority threaten not only the institutions of liberal society but its assumptions as well. The call for community control is hardly less a challenge to these assumptions than attacks against the separation of church and state."

63/ "In general, the more concerned a group is with underscoring its status as a profession, and the more plausible its claim to professional status, the more likely it is to assert that it deserves immunity from popular participation."

76/ "Community control seems a plausible response to the present need of the educational system to restore its legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents—particularly black constituents—and to endorse institutionally the enduring sense of community which many Americans appear to share."

160/"If we are for community control, therefore, we are for it as a way of restoring integrity to the school system, by having the school system be about what the society is about, and not only about what the State says the society should be about."

267/ "The values attributed to administrative decentralization include the maintenance of administrative forms such as appointment on the basis of merit, political neutrality, highly developed specialization or professionalization (hierarchy, impersonality, and control via auxiliary staff functions such as budgeting and personnel procedures). All of these values can be accommodated by administrative decentralization."

269/ "The essential homogeneity of training of most public service professionals is such that any radical departure from customary ways of carrying out public business is simply precluded."

271/ "The participation of the poor in public employment has gradually withered, in part because of the emergence of the public service professions and their utilization of the civil service procedures and in part because of the withering away of political parties at the local level."

272/ "Participation is an indication of the absence of alienation and of the belief that by participating the citizen can see the connection between public policies and his own political, economic, or social situation."


35/ "At one level it is supposed that community power can achieve its demands if public administration is decentralized in the neighborhoods. The closer contact between the neighborhood and city administration would insure a better delivery of services that people need. But this is a superficial view, since no decentralization of an administration which is based on a government that aims to rule the neighborhoods for the interests of downtown will ever have the resources or disposition to deliver public services to any equitable and just degree. . . . Only on this basis of independent bureaucratic power can administration ever become just, and this would include such devices as advocacy planning, ombudsmen, subprofessionals and various methods of involving the community in the decisions of professional administration. . . . While it is conceivable that the new class of administrators could run a good government were they to triumph over the present oligarchic power of downtown, there is no reason for the neighborhoods either to assume their triumph or to trust their goodness, so as to cease their independent action for local power."
"Within the ECCO Community Development Corporation in Dayton, Ohio area, the politics of democratic constitution over the past few years has enabled the residents to function as deliberative citizens. For the first time, the residents legally decide certain matters of community life. They are steadily practicing the art of political decision-making and living with and learning from the consequences of their decisions... and new leadership is always generated by the political expression of new problems."

"Participation is so poor in present-day centralized programs simply because they are developed on the basis of an abstractly deduced need precluding community involvement in its deduction."

"The amount of bureaucratic resistance will be an indicator of the extent of professional organization and resources of the social administration of the city. Where these are large, opposition will be great, and bureaucrats will forcefully oppose neighborhood claims for independent authority."

"If a man shares in the deliberative authority of public life, he will commit his own power to defend the corporate body, even though he may be in the minority on many decisions... but he is not apt to defend it if all decision is left to one executive or to an elected council."


"Advocacy of neighborhood control has recently revolved around five kinds of possible changes in the present organizational arrangements. It has been variously held that neighborhood control would (1) increase loyalty to the political system by providing relatively powerless groups with access to governmental influence; (2) increase citizens' sense of well-being as a result of greater participation; (3) provide greater administrative efficiency for overly extended administrative systems; (4) increase the political responsibility and accountability of bureaucracies currently remote from popular influence; and (5) improve bureaucratic performance by altering the assumptions under which services are dispensed."


"The mechanism most frequently proposed for solving the problem of citizen involvement in program planning and development is the advisory committee of representative residents. A wide gulf..."
exists, however, between the administrator's conception and the constituents' conception of the role of such a body. The former, stimulated by the persistent threat of clientele insurgency, tend to look upon the role of the advisory committee as a device for winning consent and legitimacy from the target groups. The latter, increasingly unhappy with what they regard as bureaucratic high-handedness, look upon it as a means of gaining access to the decisional process."

22/ "Favorable results are less likely in disadvantaged areas where the administrator is brought face to face with a suspicious, if not hostile, clientele whose cultural values conflict with his own and whose tactical styles are often alien to his notion of proper behavior.

27/ "The analyses which support decentralization for therapeutic ends start from the assumption that residents in deprived neighborhoods are suffering from feelings of powerlessness and low personal and political efficacy. This pathology prevents them from obtaining and utilizing opportunities that are available through the institutions of society. Delegating governmental responsibilities to the neighborhood, so the argument runs, will stimulate participation in political affairs and self-help programs, and these activities, in turn, will give the residents feelings of confidence, individual worth, and power."


173/"One final benefit that can be maximized if community control is attained is the reduction of violent attacks upon the existing political system and the curbing of demands for revolutionary action and radical change. . . . Large numbers of those who presently have no stake in the existing system will acquire status and power and their accoutrements. This will result in lessening of vigorous, violent complaints."

174/"Another inexpensive way to pursue neighborhood control is to maximize citizen employment, and employment of the poor, in community action programs. This concept, which has drawn much opposition, has now acquired a degree of legitimacy that could enable it to be applied, more or less effectively, to other private and public programs."

175/"Many people would benefit from the retention of the system in which neighborhoods have little influence in policy development, program planning, and provision of services. . . . One major group benefitting from the present arrangement are employees of city government who are afraid they will lose their jobs with the advent of neighborhood government. Many of these employees are protected by civil service rules and traditions, strong unions, and an apathetic and unaffected white majority."
For Further Reading


VII

PROPOSITIONS DERIVED FROM TWO TRADITIONS

The article reproduced in this section, represents a beginning effort to array two theoretical traditions in such a manner that the major differences between the theories are made explicit. This is the third step of the method of institutional analysis outlined in Section IV. The theoretical underpinnings of community control reforms are not arrayed in this article. You may want to take the propositional inventory written by Michael P. Smith and integrate some of those propositions (or others you have found in the community control literature) into a third set of related propositions. This would enable one to compare the structure of three traditions instead of two. Alternatively, you may want to expand the range of propositions arrayed to include others listed in both Section V and Section VI.

After you have finished reading this section, read Chapter III in the Bish-Ostrom monograph. There the authors present a brief overview of the underpinnings of the public choice approach. Then read the rest of the monograph before starting the next section. The logical foundations of this approach are also presented in Vincent Ostrom's The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. There you will also find a thorough discussion of the intellectual foundations of the mainstream in American Public Administration. You will find this work highly congruent with the literature related specifically to a traditional approach to metropolitan reform. The bibliography presented at the back of The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration will also enable those who wish to pursue rather intensively the logical foundations of these several approaches to institutional analysis.
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VIII

DESIGNING RESEARCH RELEVANT TO THE EVALUATION OF COMPETING REFORM TRADITIONS

Introduction

A central focus on this course has been the analysis of competing recommendations for reforming local governmental institutions. We have been asking the question of how do we as social scientists approach the problem of evaluating which reforms should be instituted and which should not. We have outlined a multi-staged answer. The first stage involves elucidating the theory underlying competing reform proposals. The second stage is the evaluation of the consistency of the logical structure underlying these proposals. The third stage is the design of research projects which are as efficient as possible in the sense of resolving key questions of controversy between competing theories underlying alternative proposals.

This a rather ambitious program of action and cannot be accomplished all at once. In the previous sections, portions of the task have been outlined. Section V presents an inventory of propositions stated in proposals for consolidating local governmental units. Section VI presents a similar inventory derived from the community control literature. A similar inventory derived from the public choice tradition is needed, and hopefully, some of you will contribute to this effort. The full theoretical structures have not yet been elucidated. The underlying assumptions of the public choice tradition are stated in the Bish-Ostrom monograph. A preliminary sketch of the underlying assumptions of the
traditional metropolitan reform approach is presented in the article reproduced in Section VII. A fuller treatment of the monocentric political theory underlying this approach is presented in Vincent Ostrom's *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*.

The careful empirical examination of any of these propositions will aid in the cumulative process of evaluating the underlying theoretical structures. However, the most efficient research program will be directed at those regions where the propositions from different theories are clearly divergent. The divergences between two of these traditions is graphically presented in the article "Metropolitan Reform: Propositions from Two Traditions" reproduced in Section VII. The two figures displaying the posited relationships among variables in the metropolitan reform and public choice tradition are reproduced on the next page of this section. One major difference between the two traditions is the presence of the concept of public goods in one and not the other. Thus, propositions relating size to output, efficiency and distribution of costs in the public choice tradition depend upon the type of public good being considered and do not so depend in the other tradition. One major area of disagreement, therefore, is the posited effects of size on output, efficiency and distribution of costs for some types of public goods--particularly police, education, local roads, fire protection and other neighborhood level public goods and services. The series of studies we have undertaken were designed to examine these conflicting propositions in regard to police. The consistency of the
results in Indianapolis, Chicago, Grand Rapids, St. Louis and most recently in a replication conducted in Nashville-Davidson County begins to undermine the empirical warrantability of the traditional metropolitan reform theory as it relates to the provision of police services. Considerably more work is needed in examining these propositions for education, fire protection, local roads and other municipal services.

Another area of disagreement between these two theoretical traditions involves the posited relationships between size of jurisdiction and citizen participation and the responsibility of public officials. The posited effect of the intervening variable--hierarchy--on citizen participation and responsibility of public officials differs in each theory as does the posited effect of decreasing fragmentation (or overlap) on citizen participation and responsibility of public officials.

While it would be nice to dream about "the" crucial test of these competing theories, such an economical approach to the evaluation of competing social science theories is probably not possible. However, the persistent work of a number of scholars attempting to devise careful research projects at various points in the logical structure of several competing but partially overlapping theories will eventually lead to a reformulation of the theoretical underpinnings from the diverse traditions into an empirically based theory upon which we can make policy relevant predictions about future performance of diverse institutional arrangements.
Some Steps in Designing Research

The design of a study is one of the really creative aspects of doing social science research. There is no single way to do any project. However, many scholars shy away from doing their own research because they feel that it requires very high levels of training. It does require good common sense, some technical knowledge, painstaking attention to details and most important a clear specification of a limited number of questions which the particular research will attempt to answer.

It is my hope that a number of participants will want to undertake a research project with their own students related to one of the propositions discussed in the earlier sections. In order to facilitate the process, I have outlined a very-simplified set of steps which one might take in moving from one of the propositions through the design phase of a project. The steps include the following:

1. Take a general proposition apart and identify each variable in it.
2. For each variable determine what unit of analysis is involved.
3. Examine the relationship posited in the proposition and determine whether it is possible to examine the relationship as stated—restate if necessary.
4. For each general unit of analysis, assign a specific universe of units to which your particular study will be related.
5. Develop a sampling frame for the units identified.
6. Develop operational measures for each variable.
7. List rival hypotheses which might explain the data you will be examining.
8. Plan methods for examining alternative hypotheses and for
eliminating irrelevant ones.

9. Select the appropriate modes of data analysis.

In order to illustrate this process, let us take two propositions from Section V--Size-D$_{30}$ and Frag-D$_{80}$--and sketch in the steps.

Size-D$_{30}$: Size of jurisdiction is positively associated with citizens' satisfactions with governmental services.

Frag-D$_{80}$: Fragmentation results in higher per capita costs for providing governmental services.

**Step One:** Take a general proposition apart and identify each variable in it.

Size-D$_{30}$: $V_1$ - Size of jurisdiction.
$V_2$ - Citizens' satisfactions.
$V_3$ - Governmental services.

Frag-D$_{80}$: $V_1$ - Fragmentation.
$V_2$ - Higher per capita costs.
$V_3$ - Governmental services.

**Step Two:** For each variable determine what unit of analysis is involved.

Size-D$_{30}$: $V_1$ - Jurisdictions are the units of analysis.
$V_2$ - Individual citizens are the units of analysis.

Citizens living in at least two jurisdictions will need to be included.

$V_3$ - The services provided by the jurisdictions are the units of analysis.

Frag-D$_{80}$: $V_1$ - Regions (metropolitan area, rural area, natural resource area) which can be well specified are the units of analysis. At least two regions will need to be included.
\( V_2 \) - Per capita costs of jurisdictions within the regions defined in \( V_1 \) are the units of analysis.

\( V_3 \) - Services provided by the jurisdictions within the region are the units of analysis.

**Step Three:** Examine the relationship posited in the proposition and determine whether it is possible to examine the relationship as stated — restate if necessary.

**Size-D:** The relationship stated is "positively associated." Any cross-sectional design would enable one to examine this type of relationship. An over-time design would also be appropriate.

**Frag-D:** The relationship stated is "results in." A cross-sectional design would not enable one to examine this type of relationship. If a cross-sectional design is the only feasible design, given other constraints, then the proposition would need to be restated somewhat like the following:

Fragmentation is positively associated with higher per capita costs for providing governmental services.

However, an "over-time" design in which there was an increase in the level of fragmentation in some region or regions might enable one to examine the original relationship. A more conservative restatement of the proposition for an over-time design would be:

An increase in fragmentation is positively associated with an increase in the per capita costs for providing governmental services.
Step Four: For each general unit of analysis, assign a specific universe of units to which your particular study will be related.

Size-D30: V1 - For size of jurisdiction you will need to determine which universe you want to examine. You might select at a minimum two jurisdictions of varying size. You might select all of the jurisdictions in a metropolitan area or in a state or in the country. Or, you might select one jurisdiction which has changed in size over time (better yet, you might select in addition a second jurisdiction similar to the first which has not changed in size over time).

V2 - For citizens' satisfactions you will need to determine specifically which citizens you want to include— all over a certain age? All voters? All residents?

V3 - For governmental services you will need to specify exactly which services you will ask citizens to rate—all governmental services provided by the jurisdictions included? A set of services provided by one agency?

Frag-D80: V1 - For fragmentation you will need to select at a minimum two regions of varying fragmentation or one region which has changed in degree of fragmentation over time (again, it would strengthen the design to select a second matched region which did not change).

V2 - For per capita costs you will need to select which type of costs will be included and over what time period.
V₃ - For governmental services—same as for Size-D₃₀.

Step Five: Develop a sampling frame for the units identified.

Size-D₃₀: V₁ - If you have selected two jurisdictions as your universe, you will have no sampling problems for this variable. However, if you have chosen a larger universe (say all cities within a state or metropolitan region), efficiency and financial considerations will probably require the development of a careful sampling method from that larger universe.

V₂ - Unless all jurisdictions are extremely small (and then your variation on the size dimension would not be very great) you will need to develop a sampling frame for the citizens in each jurisdiction.

V₃ - You will probably make an arbitrary decision as to which services to include. Selecting services randomly would not enable you to generalize back to all services provided since services differ from each other significantly.

Frag-D₈₀: V₁ - If you have selected two regions as your universe, you will have no sampling problems for this variable. However, if you have chosen a larger universe (say all metropolitan regions in the U.S., all river basin drainage areas) efficiency and financial considerations will probably lead you to develop a careful sampling method from that larger universe.

V₂ - Cost data is probably not so extensive that you would need to develop a sampling method.
Step Six: Develop operational measures for each variable.

Size-D 30\textsubscript{3} - As noted in Section V, the size of a jurisdiction can mean any of four definitions:
1. The geographic extent of a jurisdiction.
2. The population of a jurisdiction.
3. The size of the operating unit itself measured by the number of employees or the size of the budget.
4. The scale of the unit producing services measured by the number of units of output produced.

You may decide that you wish to use multiple methods for operationalizing this concept and include several of the above measures.

Size-D 30\textsubscript{2} - You will probably need several questions on a survey instrument to operationalize this variable.

Size-D 30\textsubscript{3} - Each of the questions used to operationalize \textsubscript{2} will need to clearly relate to the specific governmental services chosen to be included in the study.

Frag-D 30\textsubscript{1} - As noted in Section V, the term fragmentation refers to the number of units which exist contiguously and for the most part do not overlap. However, you will need to determine a method to count the units in an area. This may sound silly until you try to make a definite determination of exactly how many units of a particular type exist in a specific region. Do not expect the Census of Government figures to agree with other methods of
determining the number.

V₂ and V₃ - You will need to specify exactly which costs to be located on which documents. For the costs of police services, for example, you will need to specify whether police pensions will be included as costs or not. Police pensions are frequently not included in the official police budget. If you want to measure the costs of providing general governmental services, you will need to carefully specify the full range of included and excluded costs. If reporting systems differ among jurisdictions (and they usually do), you will need to be extremely careful in specifying how this variable is to be measured.

**Step Seven:** List rival hypotheses which might explain the data you will be examining.

**Size-D₃₀:** Some of the rival hypotheses would include:

1. Age is negatively associated with citizens' satisfactions with governmental services and the age distribution differs between jurisdictions.

2. Wealth is positively associated with citizens' satisfactions and the wealth distribution differs between jurisdictions.

3. Previous unpleasant experiences with public officials is negatively associated with citizens' satisfactions with governmental services and the distribution of unpleasant experiences differs between jurisdictions.
4. Parochialism is positively associated with citizens' satisfactions and the distribution of parochialism differs between jurisdictions.

Some of the rival hypotheses would include:

1. Density of population is positively associated with higher per capita costs for providing governmental services and the density distribution differs between regions.

2. Quality (quantity) of output is positively associated with higher per capita costs for providing governmental services, and the distribution of quality (quantity) differs between regions.

3. Wealth of the community is positively associated with higher per capita costs for providing governmental services and the distribution of community wealth differs between regions.

Step Eight: Plan methods for examining rival hypotheses or for eliminating irrelevant ones.

Size-D: One would need to gather information on as many of the variables included in the rival hypotheses as possible so that one could examine each rival at the time of data analysis. It would also be possible to match areas so that they were very similar in terms of some of the variables included in the rival hypotheses such as age, wealth, education, length of residence. If the matching were quite close, differences in the satisfaction levels
of citizens would not be attributable to those variables.

Frag-D80: One would want to develop measures and gather data on as many of the variables included in the rival hypotheses as possible so that one could examine each rival at the time of data analysis. It might be possible to match regions on such measures as density or wealth, but it would be extremely difficult to do so. A "most similar systems" design is not as appropriate for this proposition as it might be for Size-

D30.

Step Nine: Select the appropriate modes of data analysis.

For both propositions, you will need to examine the types of measures you will be able to obtain for each of the variables and in light of that determine which parametric or non-parametric modes of analysis will be most appropriate.
The Structure of Interorganizational Arrangements in Metropolitan Areas

One of the major independent variables presented in Section VII on propositions derived from two traditions is that of multiplicity of production units. Propositions derived from the traditional metropolitan reform movement and the public choice approach differ substantially in the expected consequences of having large numbers of producers for a particular type of public service. Terms such as fragmentation, multiplicity and overlap are frequently used to describe a structure of interorganizational arrangements that is presumed bad. However, these terms are frequently not well defined and little empirical research has been undertaken to examine the effects of different structures of interorganizational arrangements.

We are currently undertaking a large research project for the RANN Division of the National Science Foundation in which the effects of multiplicity, fragmentation and overlap can be examined. Consequently, we have had to face up to the problem of defining these terms in an operational manner. A paper written with Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker discussing these definitions and illustrating their use is reproduced in this section to provide you with an illustration of one approach to the operational definition of these key terms. The research design for this project will be a cross sectional design.
DEFINING AND MEASURING STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS IN INTERORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

by

Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker

*Elinor Ostrom is a Professor of Political Science, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Roger B. Parks is a Research Associate, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University and Gordon P. Whitaker, is a Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Their research is funded by the Research Applied to National Needs Division of the National Science Foundation under Grant Number GI-43949. They would like to thank Francie Bish, Vernon Greene, John Hamilton, John McIver, Nancy Neubert, Vincent Ostrom and Martha Vandivort for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
Indiana University

Introduction

Fragmentation of police services is extreme: there are 32,000 separate police departments. Wasted energies and lost motion due to overlapping, duplication, and noncooperation are not the worst consequences of this fragmentation. Large areas of the United States—particularly rural communities and the small jurisdictions in or near metropolitan areas—lack anything resembling modern, professional police protection.1

Fragmentation, multiplicity, and duplication are terms which are frequently utilized in a perjorative sense to describe the relationships among local governmental units in metropolitan areas. Fragmentation, multiplicity, and duplication are repeatedly cited as causes for many of the ills facing police forces in such areas.2 The presumptive knowledge accepted by many is that the presence of a large number of small police agencies within a metropolitan area results in inefficient performance and harmful consequences. Many recommendations have been made to decrease the number of police departments operating in a metropolitan area and to eliminate all small departments, where "small" can range from "less than 10" to "less than 50" sworn officers.3

However, for all the use of the terms "fragmentation," "multiplicity," and "duplication," they have rarely been defined with care. How many units need there be for "multiplicity" to exist? If multiplicity results in inefficiency (as is often charged) does this mean...
that all federal systems must, by definition, be inefficient? What does it mean to say that units of government duplicate each other? Is such duplication harmful? If careful empirical research is to be conducted at a metropolitan level of analysis, utilizing the operating units of government providing services within metropolitan areas as the analytic units, then many of these terms will need to be defined and operationalized carefully.

Research at the metropolitan level which employs such defined and operationalized terms can also be important from a public policy perspective. Many reform proposals are initiated on the basis of an assumed positive relationship between the fragmentation of governmental units in a metropolitan area and increased costs or lowered output. However, little empirical research has been conducted which has specifically examined propositions associated with these reform proposals. In research efforts which have examined propositions derived from the traditional metropolitan reform literature much of the evidence produced has not supported propositions which are presumed to be true.

In undertaking an NSF (RANN) sponsored study "Evaluating the Organization of Service Delivery: Police," we are attempting to examine the relevant effects of the structure of interorganizational arrangements among police agencies serving a common metropolitan area. In designing this research, we have found it necessary to define such terms as fragmentation, multiplicity, and duplication and to develop empirical operationalizations for them.

In this article we shall first describe our general approach to the problem of conceptualizing interorganizational arrangements among police agencies in a metropolitan area. This approach is based on the
concept of a public service industry. Secondly, we shall describe the use of service structure matrices to delineate the service by service configurations of a police industry. Third, we shall illustrate the use of service structure matrices to describe the interorganizational arrangements among police agencies within a single metropolitan area. Fourth, we shall define six measures of metropolitan structure to be derived from service structure matrices. These measures are Fragmentation, Multiplicity, Duplication, Independence, Coordination, and Dominance. The use of such measures enables comparisons to be made across metropolitan areas. The fifth section of this paper will then utilize these measures to compare the structure of the police industries in three metropolitan areas with respect to four types of police services. The last section will focus on the use of structural measures in public policy analysis.

Police Agencies Viewed as Firms in Public Service Industries

Instead of thinking of each police agency in a metropolitan area as a department or bureau within a general governmental structure, we prefer to conceptualize the various police agencies as producers in a public service industry serving the metropolitan area. We start, that is, by considering each agency in terms of what it does rather than in terms of its relationship to some governmental unit. Our initial step is to identify those agencies which provide police services. The agencies may be public or private.

One of the problems in developing the conceptual underpinnings for research of this nature is how to limit the subject at hand. There is
no intrinsic feature of an agency that in and of itself places it definitely in one public industry rather than another. A police department, for example, may be considered in the health industry if it provides ambulance service, in the fire prevention industry if it inspects buildings and in the recreation industry if it sponsors a softball league. Like all taxonomies our limits and boundaries necessarily have elements of arbitrariness. If consistent limits are established, however, structural comparisons across metropolitan areas can be made and the effects of structural variations assessed.

Since we are interested in answering questions about the effects of different ways of organizing police agencies in metropolitan areas, we consider a metropolitan police industry to consist of those agencies—public or private—which provide a specific set of services. These will include direct services to citizen-consumers in the metropolitan area and intermediate police services to agencies providing direct police services. There are a number of activities undertaken by police agencies which could be classified as direct police services. We will restrict our focus, however. We will include any direct service agency within the bounds of our analysis if that agency supplies one or more of the following services: patrol, criminal investigation or traffic control—and if its officers can exercise the power of arrest in rendering that service. Similarly, there are a great many intermediate services required by police agencies which produce these three types of direct services. We will, however, limit the intermediate police services examined in this study to the following services: basic training, detention, dispatching and criminal laboratory facilities. The
configuration of the police industry thus may differ from service to service. In one SMSA there may be many producers of patrol and only one producer of criminal investigation services. In another metropolitan area the situation could be reversed: This way of conceptualizing the industry allows us to examine these service by service patterns.8

The Use of Service Structure Matrices for Representing Interorganizational Arrangements in a Metropolitan Area

Having bounded the scope of what will be called a police industry within a metropolitan area by defining direct and indirect police services, we can then delineate the service by service configuration of a police industry by developing service structure matrices for each metropolitan area.9 All police agencies which produce a given service in its metropolitan area will be arranged as rows in the structural matrix for that service. For the direct services, columns in the matrix will be the organized consumption units within the metropolitan area. For the indirect services, the matrix columns are those producers of direct services which are now consumers of the indirect service in question. These will include agencies which receive intermediate services from internal units (e.g., a municipal police department with its own dispatcher) as well as agencies receiving the intermediate service from another agency (e.g., a municipal department which relies upon the county sheriff for detention service). The general form of the service structure matrix is shown in Table I.

Some police services are provided regularly to consumers. By regular provision we mean that the producer makes the service available
to individuals within the consumption unit on a routine basis. Other services are provided irregularly. By irregular provision, we mean that the producer makes this service available only in unusual circumstances. A distinction between regular and irregular service provision would arise in cases where the detective squad of a municipal police department investigates all reported crimes in the city, while the state police provide criminal investigation in that same city only upon rare occasions. The former is the regular producer while the latter is the irregular producer. While we will determine the presence of irregular producers, most of our attention will be devoted to regular producers of each service.

Several producers may simultaneously provide the same service on a regular basis to any one consuming unit. There are three types of regular, simultaneous production: alternation, coordination, and duplication. Service flows between producers and consumers will be shown by entries in the service structure matrix. They will be categorized as Irregular, Regular Coordinated, or Alternative. (See Table II)

Alternation results when each agency serves a restricted clientele or geographic area or provides services only during restricted periods of time. Detention facilities are frequently provided by two agencies alternatively: i.e., one agency provides detention for juveniles and another for adults. The attributes of the clientele determine which agency will provide the service. Alternative geographic provision of traffic control occurs where a city police department exclusively patrols all streets within its jurisdiction with the exception of interstate highways where traffic is regulated by the state highway patrol. An alternative provision of service by time exists when a small town police department does all
Table I

Service Structure Matrix for
Service $k$ ($1 \leq k \leq L$)

Consuming Units\(^b\) ($1 \leq k \leq M_k$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$j$</th>
<th>$M_k$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population(^b)</td>
<td>P_{ij}</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area(^b)</td>
<td>a_{ij}</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For direct services the Consuming Units will be Organized Consumption Units, while for intermediate services the Consuming Units will be direct Producing Units.

\(^b\)Applicable for direct services only.
Table II

Definitions of Matrix Terminology

Nk -- Number of producing units for service k.
MK -- Number of consuming units for service k.
Pj -- Population of consuming unit j (1 ≤ j ≤ Mk) stated in ten thousands (i.e., 1970 population x 10^-4).
aj -- Area of consuming unit j in square miles.
P -- ∑ j Pj - SMSA population in ten thousands.
A -- ∑ j aj - SMSA area in square miles.
Sijk -- Service Flow Indicator with the following possible values (see definitions of terms in the text):

R = Producing unit i regularly provides service k to consuming unit j without coordination or alternation.
I = Producing unit i irregularly provides service k to consuming unit j.
C = Producing unit i regularly provides service k to consuming unit j in coordination with some other producing unit for service k.
A = Producing unit i regularly provides a portion of service k to consuming unit j, that is, unit i is an alternate provider (in terms of either time, space, or clientele) of service k to consuming unit j.
0 = A zero or a blank indicated that producing unit i is definitely not involved (even irregularly) in providing service k to consuming unit j.

SPik - Serviced population for producing unit i and service k. This is the sum of p_i over row i for columns where sijk is equal to R, C, or A.
NPjk - Service density for consuming unit j for service k. This is simply a count of entries in column j, which are either R, C, or A, that is, the number of producers who regularly provide service k to unit j in some fashion.
dispatching for itself during the day while relying on the county sheriff for dispatching at night. Alternative producers will be indicated on the service structure matrix by entering A's in the consuming unit column at each alternative producer's row.

Coordinated production occurs when two or more regular producers interact in the planning of the day to day operation of service provision for the same consuming unit. Coordinated patrol, for example, exists when several police departments jointly provide organized surveillance within the boundaries of a single consumption unit through the use of a common communications network. Criminal laboratory facilities are used in a coordinated way when their activities are pooled in supporting a single criminal investigation. On the matrix, C's will be entered for each of the producers which coordinate service to a consuming unit.

Duplication occurs when two or more regular producers provide the same service at the same time, in the same places to the same people without joint consideration of the activities. Two producers of patrol services are duplicative when they serve the same consumption unit without consultation on patrol practices and day to day maintenance of radio contact. Two producers of adult detention are duplicative when they independently provide jail facilities to the same police department for the same clientele. Duplication will be shown on the matrix by the entry of two or more R's (for regular producer in a consuming unit column.

Service Structure Matrices for a Metropolitan Area

To illustrate the use of service structure matrices, we will
construct police service matrices for the Fayetteville, North Carolina Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). The Fayetteville SMSA encompasses 654 square miles and had a 1970 population of 212,000. The area has eight organized consumption units for direct police services. Cumberland County is the largest of these. In addition to the city of Fayetteville (population 54,000), there are three small towns within the SMSA (each with fewer than 4,000 inhabitants.) The U.S. Army's Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base are also organized consumption units. These two installations together have a population equal to that of Fayetteville. They have tended to dominate the entire metropolitan area although industrial expansion has recently been quite extensive in the southern end of Cumberland County. The remaining consumption unit is the Fayetteville State University campus in Fayetteville. For those services which it receives independently, it constitutes an enclave in the city. The resident population on campus is under 1000. Half of the total SMSA population lives outside the seven smaller consumption units in unincorporated areas of Cumberland County. The map in Figure I shows the geographic arrangement of the organized consumption units.

In this section, we will present the service structure matrices for four police services as they are organized in the Fayetteville SMSA. Table III depicts the arrangements for patrol. Each of the eight organized consumption units for police service has a distinct legal arrangement with a regular producer of patrol services. The entries in the main diagonal reflect these relationships. Military Police from Ft. Bragg also provide patrol services in areas of Fayetteville frequented by military personnel. Because they have a restricted clientele, they have been classified as alternative producers of patrol services in
Table III
Patrol Services Matrix
Fayetteville, North Carolina, SMSA

Organized Consumption Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Producers</th>
<th>Fort Bragg</th>
<th>Pope A.F.B.</th>
<th>Fayetteville State Univ.</th>
<th>Fayetteville City Police</th>
<th>Spring Lake Police</th>
<th>Hope Mills Police</th>
<th>Stedman Police</th>
<th>Remainder of Cumberland County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg Provost Marshal</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope A.F.B. Provost Marshal</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayetteville State Univ. Campus Police</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayetteville City Police</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Lake Police</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope Mills Police</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stedman Police</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland County Sheriff</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fayetteville. The Fayetteville Police are also classified as alternative producers of patrol services because they focus their attention on the civilian population of the city.

Both Cumberland County and Fayetteville contain organized consumption units which are enclaves. Within Cumberland County, there are seven organized consuming units served by their own patrol service agencies. The county sheriff's department patrols in the remaining areas of the county. The far right-hand column on Figure III represents this "remainder." Fayetteville State University is a separately organized consuming enclave for patrol within Fayetteville. For each enclave, special legal arrangements for patrol have been established.

As shown by the double entries in several columns, some areas in Fayetteville have multiple agencies simultaneously providing regular patrol services. Both the Sheriff and the Fayetteville Police Department provide regular patrol services to some of the patrol enclaves. Stedman receives regular patrol support from the Sheriff's Department. Fayetteville State University is regularly patrolled by the Fayetteville City Police Department.

Criminal investigation activities in Fayetteville SMSA are organized somewhat differently from patrol as shown in Table IV. There are only six organized consumption units for criminal investigation because Stedman and Fayetteville State University have no unique legal arrangements with a producer of this service. However, there are nine different producers of criminal investigation serving this SMSA. Only Fayetteville and the Cumberland County "remainder" unit rely regularly on their own investigative services. The military installations each call in specialized criminal investigation units from off-base. Spring
Table IV

Criminal Investigation Matrix

Fayetteville, North Carolina, SMSA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Producers</th>
<th>Fort Bragg</th>
<th>Pope A.F.B.</th>
<th>Fayetteville</th>
<th>Spring Lake</th>
<th>Hope Mills</th>
<th>Remainder of Cumberland County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg Provost Marshal</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Criminal Investigation</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope A.F.B. Provost Marshal</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.A.F. Criminal Investigation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayetteville Police Department</td>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Lake Police Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope Mills Police Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland County Sheriff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C. State Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lake and Hope Mills regularly coordinate with the Sheriff's Criminal Investigation Unit. The State Bureau of Investigation provides additional services to civilian agencies on request. It is not considered a regular producer of this service.

Turning to intermediate police services provides an opportunity to explore additional facets of the structure of service provision in the police industry of the Fayetteville SMSA. Our interest here is in seeing which agencies provide certain intermediate services to those agencies providing direct police services to citizens. The consuming units for intermediate services are police agencies which utilize those services in providing direct police services to citizens. Criminal laboratory services are used to assist criminal investigation. Thus, nine units are listed as consuming this intermediate police services, as nine units are listed in Table IV as producing criminal investigation. For adult detention the consuming units are eight police departments which provide patrol services and therefore require adult detention services. As a comparison of Tables IV and V indicates, the number of producers of police services can vary considerably from service to service. For adult detention there are only three producers. The County Sheriff provides adult detention facilities for all local police units. Each of the two military installations maintains its own detention facility. Military personnel taken into custody by civilian departments are usually remanded to their base for detention. Civilians arrested on one of the military bases would be sent to the County Jail for detention. Civilians arrested on one of the military bases would be sent to the County Jail for detention. Thus, the three producers can be viewed as providing alternative services restricted by clientele.
### Table V

**Adult Detention Matrix**
Fayetteville, North Carolina, SMSA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organized Consumption Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope A.F.B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland Co. Sheriff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VI

**Crime Lab Matrix**
Fayetteville, North Carolina, SMSA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organized Consumption Units</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope A.F.B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayetteville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Lake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope Mills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C. State Bur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Crim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.F. Criminal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Producers
  - Fayetteville-Cumberland Co. Crime Lab
  - N.C. Bureau of Investigation
  - Army Criminal Investigation Division
  - A.F. Criminal Investigation Division

**Producers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Producers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope A.F.B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland Co. Sheriff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are four producers of crime laboratory services. The Fayetteville Police Department and the Cumberland County Sheriff have established a joint crime lab which serves all civilian criminal investigation agencies in the SMSA. The North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation maintains its own crime lab which is utilized by these same agencies for more sophisticated work. Given the coordination of work between the local and state agencies, the provision of services is coded as coordinated. Each of the military criminal investigation units has its own laboratory facilities which are used by its investigators.

Direct examination of the matrices themselves provides considerable insight into the difference in the structure of interorganizational arrangements across different services within the same SMSA. However, direct examination of the service structure matrices is not as helpful when one is comparing across metropolitan areas of varying sizes and complexity. One of the advantages of defining measures of metropolitan structure derived from service structure matrices is that such measures allow careful comparison across metropolitan areas.

**Measures of Metropolitan Structure**

We have defined a series of measures of metropolitan service structure which can be operationalized with the information contained in the service structure matrices. Wherever possible we have attempted to use definitions of terms which are consistent with previous usage, although this has been difficult in some cases. At present we have identified six conceptually distinct measures, each of which can be dealt with in either absolute or relative terms. These measures are: Fragmentation,
Multiplicity, Duplication, Independence, Coordination, and Dominance.

Students of metropolitan reform will undoubtedly recognize such terms as ones which are frequently bandied about in the literature, but which are rarely defined. It is our intent to provide a series of operational definitions for these terms. We believe they will be useful in our own current research and also provide a consistent basis for discourse about metropolitan organization.

We have operationalized fragmentation as the number of distinct organized consuming units for the service in question. For direct services these units will be for the most part governmental jurisdictions, although as noted above, we intend to include other organized units wherever appropriate. For the intermediate services consuming units are themselves producers of direct services. A simple count of the number of such units will then be our absolute measure of fragmentation. For the direct services a relative fragmentation measure will also be obtained by dividing the absolute measure by the population of the metropolitan area stated in ten thousands. That is, relative fragmentation for the direct services will be the number of organized consumption units per ten thousand metropolitan inhabitants. The absolute and relative measures of fragmentation may vary considerably for the same SMSA. As Thomas M. Scott has pointed out, "the number of local governmental units per capita increases as the total population size of the SMSA decreases", i.e., the largest SMSAs have less relative fragmentation per capita than do the smaller SMSAs.

Multiplicity is operationalized as the number of service producing units in the metropolitan area. This absolute measure is the same as the lists or counts of police agencies often used by national commissions.
and others when lamenting the lack of unified law enforcement systems. However, a simple list does not control for the size of the metropolitan area, nor for the political arrangements in that area. Accordingly, we have defined two relative measures of multiplicity for the direct services and one for the intermediate ones. For both direct and indirect services relative multiplicity will be measured as the number of producing units for the service divided by the number of consuming units for that service, i.e., the average number of producers per consuming unit. For the direct services, relative multiplicity will also be defined as the number of producing units for the service per ten thousand residents of the metropolitan area. Our measures of absolute and relative multiplicity are similar to those utilized by Hawkins and Dye in a recent study. Campbell and Sacks used a measure of multiplicity which was population per government and area per government which they called fragmentation. Ostrom and Parks used both the absolute and population relative measure of multiplicity. Critics of current police organization have usually argued that multiplicity results in inefficient provision of low quality service. However the evidence presented in the latter study runs counter to that argument when relative multiplicity is used as the measure. Campbell and Sacks did not find any significant relationship between their measure of population or area per government and expenditure patterns.

Duplication will be operationalized in absolute terms as the number of consuming units in the metropolitan area which regularly receive the service in question from more than one producer. However, those cases in which one producer alternates with another in time, space, or clientele will not be counted as service duplication. Similarly, instances
where two or more producers coordinate in the provision of a service to a consuming unit will not be counted as duplication. By our definition, duplication in service provision exists only when two (or more) producing units are regularly providing service to a given consuming unit and the producing units do not either alternate or coordinate their activities. While such a definition will result in our finding much less service duplication than is commonly claimed, we believe that it sticks more closely to the common meaning of the term. The service duplication seen by most critics will be picked up by our other measures. Having defined absolute duplication, we can go on to state relative duplication for direct and indirect services as the ratio of the number of consuming units receiving duplicate service to the total number of consuming units for that service. Additionally, for the direct services, we define relative duplication as the sum of the population of the consuming units which receive duplicate service divided by the total population of the metropolitan area.

Independence is defined as the number of organized consumption units which receive the service in question regularly and solely from their "own" producing unit, that is, from a producing unit directly under their control (a municipal police department patrolling all of a municipality, for example). For this measure, irregular service provision by a different producing unit (as for example, when the State Police cruise through the municipality once or twice a month) will not be counted as reducing independence. In general, alternating or coordinated service provision will be counted as reducing independence. Relative independence for a metropolitan area on a particular service can then be stated as the ratio of the number of independent consuming
units to the total number of such units, and for direct services, as the population in independent units divided by the metropolitan population.

**Dominance** is defined by the extent to which the consuming units for a particular service are served by the dominant producer of that service. The dominant producer of a direct service is that producer having the largest serviced population; while for indirect services, the dominant producer is that producer providing the service to the largest number of consuming units. In both cases, instances of alternate or coordinate service provision will be included in the computations. Absolute dominance is measured as the count of consuming units receiving the service from the dominant producer. Relative dominance is then the ratio of this figure to the total number of consuming units. For direct services, relative dominance is also measured by the ratio of the serviced population of the dominant producer to the total population of the metropolitan area.

It should be noted that fragmentation, independence, and dominance taken together tell us additional information about the structure of a metropolitan area. A highly fragmented metropolitan area might show a low degree of independence and a high degree of dominance for a service—say patrol. This would then indicate that while the metropolitan area is divided into a large number of units providing their own patrol, many of those units also receive patrol service from one major producer, say the County Sheriff. High independence together with high dominance (in relative population terms) in a fragmented metropolitan area would indicate that there are many small independent consumption units, but that most of the metropolitan population was served by a single producer.
But the small independent units are served by their own police force; not the dominant producer.

Our final measure, Coordination, is defined as the number of consuming units receiving service from a coordinated arrangement between two or more producers. Such arrangements are often found where, for example, a county sheriff dispatches for both its own patrol car(s) and township police department car(s), both of which patrol a township simultaneously. In such cases the dispatcher will coordinate the movement of both producers' vehicles so as to avoid having them play "follow the leader" down Main Street. Arrangements of this nature may tend to result in higher quality service for the same number of units assigned than in the pure duplicative situation. This is a proposition which can be empirically examined. Related coordination, as with the other measures, can be stated as the ratio of the number of units receiving coordinated service to the total number of consuming units, and, for the direct services, as the ratio of the population of units receiving coordinated service to the total population in the area.

Comparing Metropolitan Structures

Now that the measures of metropolitan structure have been defined, we can illustrate their use by comparing the police industries in three metropolitan areas: 1) the Fayetteville SMSA which was described in some detail above, 2) The Durham, North Carolina SMSA, and 3) The Hamilton-Middletown, Ohio SMSA. All three had a 1970 population of approximately 200,000.

Let us first examine the measures for patrol and criminal investigation services. As shown on Table VII, these metropolitan areas differ
### Table VII

**Structural Measures - Direct Services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fayetteville</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Durham</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Hamilton-Middletown</th>
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<td>Pop</td>
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<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Relative C.U.</td>
<td>Pop</td>
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<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.50</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.07</td>
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</table>
significantly from one another both in absolute fragmentation and in relative fragmentation. The Hamilton SMSA has 20 consuming units for patrol services, while Fayetteville has only eight. Because they have approximately the same populations, an increase from eight to twenty consuming units raises the population relative fragmentation score from .38 to .83. In both the Hamilton and Durham SMSAs there are as many organized consumption units for criminal investigation as for patrol. Therefore, each has the same fragmentation score for both services. The difference in the fragmentation scores in the Fayetteville SMSA reflects the fact that neither Stedman nor Fayetteville State University have unique legal arrangements with a producer of criminal investigation service.

The difference between fragmentation of consumption units and multiplicity of producing units is also illustrated in the Table. Fragmentation refers to consuming units, while multiplicity refers to producing units. The multiplicity score in Fayetteville for criminal investigation is higher than the fragmentation score in the same area for the same service: while there are only six consuming units for criminal investigation in that SMSA, there are nine units producing for this service (see Table IV). Where the number of producing units equals the number of consuming units for a particular service, the multiplicity score relative to consuming units will equal 1.0 as it does in Hamilton for both patrol and criminal investigation and in Fayetteville for patrol. Where there are more producing units than consuming units this score will exceed 1.0. The measure will be lower than 1.0 where there are fewer producing units than consuming units.

For patrol or criminal investigation little duplication exists in
any of the three metropolitan areas. Only in the Fayetteville SMSA is there any duplication for either of these services. As shown in Table III, two of the columns of the Fayetteville patrol matrix contain multiple "R" entries indicating regular, non-alternating, non-coordinating producers.

The independence of production units varies considerably in these three metropolitan areas. While in Durham, all ten organized consuming units receive patrol regularly and solely from their "own" producing units (a score of 1.00 for both relative measures of independence) only five of the eight consuming units (63%) in Fayetteville receive patrol regularly and solely from their own patrol units. However, these four consuming units comprise about 75 per cent of the population in the SMSA. While only seven out of twenty consuming units have patrol independence in the Hamilton-Middletown SMSA, these seven constitute about 82 per cent of the population.

In regard to dominance, only one of the ten consuming units in the Durham area receives patrol services from the dominant producer, the Durham City Police. That agency patrols for almost half of the population living in the SMSA. In the Hamilton-Middletown SMSA, fourteen out of twenty consuming units receive services from the dominant producer. These consuming units represent only 34 per cent of the population, however. The Butler County Sheriff's Department is the dominant patrol agency in the Hamilton-Middletown SMSA, serving fourteen organized consuming units. No other producer in the SMSA patrols for a larger population. Thus, the Butler County Sheriff's Department is more dominant than the Durham Police Department in terms of consuming units served, while it is less dominant in terms of total population served.
We have noted that duplication of patrol for the Hamilton-Middletown SMSA is zero and that the dominant producer serves fourteen of the twenty consuming units. Is this an inconsistency? We have also noted that only seven of the consuming units in Hamilton have independent patrol service. How are the other thirteen to be categorized? As the coordination measure indicate on Table VII, each of these units is patrolled by multiple agencies which coordinate service provision so as to avoid duplication of effort. Neither of our other example SMSAs have coordinated patrol provision. All three SMSAs do have some coordinated criminal investigation. However, in the Fayetteville SMSA, all consuming units receive coordinated criminal investigation. Seventy per cent of consuming units in the Hamilton-Middletown SMSA have coordinated criminal investigation although these are small and include only 20 per cent of the area's population. Fifty per cent of the consuming units in the Durham SMSA have coordinated criminal investigation, but only seven per cent of the population is included in those units.

Turning to intermediate services in Table VIII we no longer have two relative measures for each type. Since the consuming units are in this case the producing units of direct services, all relative measures are in terms of the number of consuming units served. For fragmentation, only an absolute measure can be computed for indirect services. On multiplicity, the number of units producing adult detention and crime laboratory services is much lower than that of patrol and criminal investigation. While there are multiple producers
Table VIII

Structural Measures - Intermediate Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMSA</th>
<th>Fayetteville Absolute</th>
<th>Fayetteville Relative</th>
<th>Durham Absolute</th>
<th>Durham Relative</th>
<th>Hamilton–Middletown Absolute</th>
<th>Hamilton–Middletown Relative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Detention</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of these services, only in the Hamilton SMSA is there any duplication. Hamilton City Jail and Middletown City Jail are duplicative in the sense that the police departments which utilize them also utilize the Butler County jail.

There is considerably less independence for the intermediate services than for direct services. Few jurisdictions are solely served by their own crime lab or jail facility for adult detention. On the other hand, the dominance measures are much higher for intermediate services than for direct services. In both Fayetteville and Hamilton-Middletown the largest producer of jail services provides for the entire county while in Durham the largest jail services about half of the consuming units. The largest crime lab in Durham and Hamilton-Middletown also serves the entire SMSA. There is no coordination in the provision of adult detention in any of the three SMSAs while coordination of crime lab services ranges from low in Durham to high in Hamilton-Middletown.

Use of these structural measures enables an analyst to be quite specific about the ways in which one metropolitan area is similar to or differs from other metropolitan areas. When many metropolitan areas are simultaneously being considered, the structural measures can be used as variables in statistical analysis to ascertain what other factors are associated with a particular type of structural arrangement among units in a metropolitan area.
The Use of Structural Measures in Public Police Analysis

Many assertions exist about the effects of fragmentation and other terms used to describe the structure of interorganizational arrangements in metropolitan areas. The use of service structure matrices and the structural measures derived from these matrices will enable scholars to examine these assertions empirically. Consideration of future reforms will then have a firmer grounding.

The first step in utilizing these measures is the derivation of causal statements from literature on metropolitan government. Fragmentation, for example, is thought to be the prime cause of many of the problems facing urban areas. The following statements about fragmentation have been made in the metropolitan literature:

1. Fragmentation leads to the inability of central cities to finance their service provision adequately.

2. Fragmentation produces inequality in tax base.

3. Fragmentation decreases the political capacity of local governments to acquire resources.

4. Fragmentation produces inequities in the administration and distribution of services.

5. Fragmentation produces variations in service levels in metropolitan areas.

6. Fragmentation results in higher per capita costs for providing governmental services.

7. Fragmentation produces variations in the efficiency of
different units.

8. Fragmentation leads to inefficient production processes.
9. Fragmentation results in higher taxes.
10. Fragmentation leads to generally low levels of some services throughout an area.
11. Fragmentation encourages an irresponsible attitude toward center city problems by citizens of high-income suburbs.
12. Fragmentation reduces a citizen's capacity to fix responsibility and hold government officials responsible. 17

A similar set of statements exist concerning the effects of multiplicity, overlap, duplication, coordination, and independence.

The second step in utilizing these measures is the operationalization of the other terms used in the above statements. Terms such as "inequality in tax base," "variations in service levels," and "inefficient production processes," etc., will need careful definition and specific procedures for their measurement. The third step in utilizing these measures is to convert causal statements into a more testable form. Advocates of reform for example, have freely used causal language but most testable propositions will need to be stated in a language of association. Thus, statement 2 above could be restated in a testable form to read: "Fragmentation is positively associated with inequitable tax bases." Statement 6 could be restated as: "Fragmentation is positively associated with higher per capita costs for providing government services." The latter proposition would probably be best stated as it related to specific types of services rather than to a general spectrum of services.

As restated and with operationalized measures for both the independent variables (the structural measures) and the various dependent
variables mentioned above, these propositions can then be subjected to empirical examination by a number of different scholars in different research settings. Our own research project will specifically examine propositions relating structural measures to expenditure levels and patterns of manpower utilization in 200 SMSAs. For example, we will be able to examine propositions of the following types:

1. Fragmentation of consuming units in metropolitan areas is positively associated with expenditures per capita.

2. Multiplicity of producing units in metropolitan areas is positively associated with expenditures per capita.

3. Duplication of producing units in metropolitan areas is positively associated with expenditures per capita.

4. Coordination of producing units in metropolitan areas is negatively associated with expenditures per capita.

These propositions will be subjected to empirical testing in regard to each of the direct and indirect services of the police industry with a large enough data base to enable one to have confidence in the findings.

The use of these structural variables in research related to other service areas should contribute to the cumulative knowledge of the effects of different patterns of intergovernmental and interorganizational relationships upon performance in federal systems of government. The defining characteristics of federal systems of government necessarily include fragmentation, multiplicity and duplication. Coordination, independence and dominance are additional measures for specifying interorganizational structures. The performance of federal systems as systems of government can be assessed only if we can deal explicitly with different patterns of interorganizational arrangements with such consistent, operational measures.
Footnotes


6Patrol is defined as organized surveillance of public places within a defined territory and response to reports of suspected criminal acts for the purpose of preventing crime, apprehending offenders and maintaining public order. Criminal investigation is defined as activities undertaken to identify the perpetrators of alleged criminal acts, to gather evidence for criminal proceedings and to recover stolen goods. Traffic control is defined as the monitoring of vehicular traffic, the investigation of traffic accidents and on-site traffic direction.

7Basic training is defined as the provision of department required entry level training for a direct police producing unit. (By department required, we do not mean to exclude state requirements. However, many departments have higher requirements than the state in which they are located.) Detention is defined as the holding of an individual up to the time of an arraignment, formal court order, or other dismissal. Dispatching is defined as the receipt and processing of calls for police service. Criminal laboratory facilities is defined as the maintenance and operation of a technical support facility for the processing of evidence.

8We will not in this paper attempt to provide a method for measuring...
the structure of an entire police industry within a metropolitan area.

While our use of matrices for representing the structure of inter-organizational arrangements with metropolitan areas is relatively novel, it draws its intellectual base from two traditions. First, this form of representation draws on the work of Wassily M. Leontief in input-output analysis. (See Wassily M. Leontief, The Structure of American Economy, 1919-1939, Second Edition. Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press, 1951.) Input-output analysis arrays producers and consumers of a service as we propose to do but fills in the cells with the amount of goods flowing from one to the other. Our entries will represent presence or absences of certain types of service relationships rather than flows of goods. The second related tradition is the work of sociologists interested in the relationships among individuals in small groups represented by matrices or directed graphs. (See, for example, Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman and Dorwin Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs.) In a recent article, Paul Craven and Barry Wellman of the University of Toronto discuss the potential use of matrices (or networks) for describing the relationships among communities within a region. "Such matrices can be constructed for any type of relationship between communities. We should then be able to analyze, for example, information exchange among communities, comparing the process to commercial transactions, or to intercommunity friendship links." (See Paul Craven and Barry Wellman, "The Network City," Sociological Inquiry 43, 1973, pp. 57-88.

If one were to include the federal criminal investigation units that serve the area, the number of producers would of course be considerably greater. However, since the operation of the F.B.I., and U.S. Postal Service, and the Internal Revenue Service, and other 'federal investigative units' are relatively invariant across SMSAs, they are not being included within the frame of this analysis:


See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, op. cit., McCausland, op. cit., and Skoler and Hetler, op. cit.


Ostrom and Parks, op. cit.

Campbell and Sacks, op. cit.
SCALE OF PRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEMS OF SERVICE DELIVERY

The other major independent variable presented in Section VII on propositions derived from two traditions is that of the size of a jurisdiction. Members of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis have undertaken a large number of studies which have focused specifically on the size of police departments as a major independent variable. This summer I was asked to prepare a paper for a Conference entitled "Serving the Public in a Metropolitan Society". In that paper I reviewed the series of studies which have focused on size as an independent variable. Consequently, I thought you would be interested in having this paper reproduced as a companion to the paper presented in Chapter IX. The research designs discussed herein are primarily "most similar systems" designs.
SCALE OF PRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEMS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

by

Elinor Ostrom

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
Indiana University

Paper to be presented at the Conference on "Serving the Public in a Metropolitan Society," the third "Toward '76" Conference of the Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University, held at the Valley Forge Hilton, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Research reported on in this paper has been supported by the Center for Studies of Metropolitan Problems, National Institute of Mental Health in the form of Grant 5 RO1 MH 19911, the National Science Foundation in the form of GS-27383 and the Indiana University Research Committee.

Vincent Ostrom and Roger Parks commented on the first draft of this paper and their help was extremely valuable.
SCALE OF PRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEMS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

by

Elinor Ostrom
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
Indiana University

The Questions to be Addressed

Eight sets of questions were posed for consideration at this Conference on "Serving the Public in a Metropolitan Society." Among these questions are two which relate to research which we are conducting at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. They will be the subject of this paper. In a slightly modified form, these questions are:

1) What have we learned in the last decade about the relationship between costs and benefits (economic, social, and political) in the provision of [urban] governmental services? How can we best profit from these lessons? (Conference Question 2)

2) To what extent should constitutional and jurisdictional questions be considered in evaluating the specifics of governmental services to the public? How can existing jurisdictional divisions and constitutional claims be utilized to [increase] the responsiveness of government to public needs and interests? (Conference Question 6).

These two questions can be considered as complements to
one another. Some of the critical issues debated over the last several decades and about which we now have a growing body of evidence relate directly to the effects of constitutional or jurisdictional arrangements on the relationship between costs and benefits in the provision of urban governmental services. The effect of jurisdictional arrangements on costs and benefits in the provision of urban governmental services is a central issue in debates over metropolitan reform. These debates are of long standing both in academic journals and in public affairs.¹

For all the volume and intensity of the debates, little of it has been informed by empirical evidence. Bert Swanson, summarizing the efforts to achieve metropolitan government, concludes that "a major lesson that should have been learned by almost everyone is how little we really know about urban politics, metropolitan reform, or how to construct or rebuild a political or community system as a metropolis." (Swanson, 1970: 155)

In 1972, Erie, Kirlin and Rabinovitz undertook an extensive review of what was then known about the effects of metropolitan reforms. They concluded that while a great deal was known about the avowed purposes of various reform proposals, "our understanding of metropolitan governance would be vastly improved by more research on the consequences of institutional changes." (Erie et. al., 1972: 8-9) They indicate that "our ignorance is greatest about the impact of reform on the lives and opinions of the citizens who are supposedly better governed
under the new regimes." (Erie, et al., 1972: 9) After reviewing the existing, though scant, empirical evidence, they reached the following conclusions:

1. The increasing impact of professionalism upon policy making has been a nearly universal effect of metropolitan reform.

2. In general, few scale economies have been associated with reform, except for the metropolitan special district.

3. In the short run, the access of minorities is guaranteed, but may in the long run be diluted.

4. The roles and norms of official decision makers do not guarantee any substantive conception of the area-wide public interest. All that is guaranteed is a more minimal, procedural definition governing public policy making.

5. Performance levels tend to rise, but so do the fiscal burdens accompanying increased expenditures.

6. The functional emphasis upon tangible goods, rather than upon amelioration of social problems, remains unchanged.

7. There is no immediate, short-term impact upon the distribution of power and wealth.

8. By and large, restructuring is associated with reduced citizen participation in the local electoral process.

9. The character of citizens' understanding of and attitudes toward the local and metropolitan political process remains largely unchanged, being more a function of life styles and experiences. (Erie, et al., 1972: 36-37)

However, the scant empirical evidence that has been amassed about the effects of various forms of metropolitan government has not deterred people from advocating major structural reforms in jurisdictional arrangements for metropolitan areas as these affect the provision of urban services. In fact, many do not see a need for evidence. The predominant
Doctrine of metropolitan reform has asserted certain relationships for so long that they are assumed to be true. Such an assumption of empirical validity led Bernard L. Garmire, Chief of Police in Miami, Florida to make the following observation about the need for major structural reform in the provision of police services for metropolitan areas.

An outstanding example of such a problem—one of the most persistent and frustrating problems confronting our municipalities and states—is the Balkanization of the police forces. There are approximately 40,000 police agencies ranging in size from one man to 30,000 men. It is not necessary to elaborate on the disadvantages of such a fractured system; they are too well known. Perhaps only cities of 50,000 or more should be allowed their own police agencies; the state should police the smaller cities and the rural areas. In the metropolitan areas there should be consolidation of the smaller police agencies. If this were done, the number of police agencies could be reduced from 40,000 agencies to roughly 400-plus agencies—with clear gains in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. (Garmire, 1972: 9; my emphasis).

There could hardly be a more major structural change affecting the constitutional and jurisdictional arrangements of providing police services in urban areas than this proposal made by Chief Garmire. Similar proposals to curtail drastically the number of police jurisdictions and create metropolitan-wide police forces in most metropolitan areas have been made by a number of study commissions. The assumption that increases in size will improve the performance of police and lower the costs of providing urban police services is the accepted wisdom. Consequently, continuous efforts are made to consolidate smaller police departments.

In the 1974 report of the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators entitled State of the
States on Crime and Justice, one of the program objectives discussed was consolidation of police services. The report indicated that "many states are beginning to study the efficacy of plans to assimilate smaller law enforcement agencies into larger, more efficient local, county or state units." (National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, 1974: 43) Specific actions of some State Planning Agencies (SPA's) were enumerated:

In Vermont, the SPA requires a ten-man minimum for police agencies for funding eligibility.

In Idaho, between July 1, 1971 and October 1, 1972, 13 communities consolidated their police departments with their county sheriff's department or contracted for law enforcement services with a nearby community.

The Nebraska SPA has provided funds for 13 county law enforcement consolidations. (National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, 1974: 43)

The accepted dogma has, however, been challenged. One of the first challenges occurred in 1961 when Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren raised substantial questions about the effectiveness of large scale jurisdictions for organizing the provision of all types of urban public goods and services. (V. Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961) Drawing both upon the theory of public goods in economics and upon John Dewey's concept of the public, they argued that appropriate scales of organization should vary depending upon the type of good being considered and the range of people jointly affected. Multiple units of government with different scales of operation are potentially capable of supplying a diverse mix of public services and of being a more effective and efficient service delivery system than a single, large-scale unit providing all urban goods and services.
to the same region.

At about the same time Werner A. Hirsch conducted a series of studies which investigated the relationship between the size of producing units and average costs of production for a variety of urban public goods. Hirsch found that the average costs of production for primary and secondary education, police protection and refuse collection were unaffected by the size of the producing unit. He found that the minimum cost of providing fire protection occurred around 100,000 population with increasing costs on either side of that point. Several other studies conducted during the 60's and early 70's did not find the expected economies of scale predicted by the traditional reform proponents. (See Bahl, 1969; Brazer, 1959; Gabler, 1969, 1971)

Robert Dahl also raised some substantial questions concerning the long-run effects of moving to larger jurisdictions in urban areas upon democratic practices. He feared that the larger the jurisdiction, "the longer and more indirect must be the channel of communication from the citizen to his top leaders." (Dahl, 1967: 957) Milton Kotler's call for "neighborhood government" and other demands for community control also represented a challenge to the accepted dogma. (Kotler, 1969; Altshuler, 1970) Advocates of community control argued that large city bureaucracies were insensitive and unresponsive to the needs of local residents.

Given the lack of evidence supporting some of the basic assumptions underlying the traditional metropolitan reform
proposals and the multiple challenges to this accepted dogma, it appeared to us, in the early 70's, that two steps should be taken. The first step in ascertaining the warrantability of the underlying assumptions of the traditional metropolitan reform movement was to make the structure of inferential reasoning explicit by organizing it in propositional form. Related to this was the effort to make explicit an alternative logical structure. (E. Ostrom, 1972) The side by side presentation of propositions derived from two traditions—in this case the traditional metropolitan reform and the public choice approach—helped to clarify exactly where the two theories conflict so that future research could focus on those areas of conflict. The second step was to proceed with a research program that examined a core set of hypotheses derived from the traditional metropolitan reform theory which conflicted with alternative hypotheses derived from public choice theory.

We have proceeded with both of these steps—the theoretical and the empirical. The second section of this paper will present a simplified model of the relationships between the size of a police department and police output and costs derived from proposals to consolidate police forces serving metropolitan areas. This will be called a "consolidation" model. An alternative model derived both from the public choice and community control literature will also be presented. It will be called an "alternative" model since it is consistent with both public choice theory and community control literature. The third section of this paper will briefly report on the
The results of five studies which examined the hypotheses in the consolidation model and its alternative. Since full reports of these studies are available in published form, the discussion here will focus on the similarity of the findings across studies and the composite effect of the group of studies on the empirical warrantability of the consolidation model and the alternative model.

The fourth section of this paper will describe a much larger study recently undertaken in the St. Louis metropolitan area which also provides evidence concerning the simplified model. A number of additional questions can be addressed concerning the effects of several intervening variables, including the level of training and education of police officers serving a neighborhood. A more complex model of relationships will be presented and examined with data from the St. Louis study. Finally, a question concerning the comparative performance of very small police departments (ten full-time officers or less) will be addressed. The final portion of this paper will return specifically to an analysis of the two questions posed at the beginning of this paper.

The Consolidation Model and Its Alternate in Simplified Form

Underlying the repeated calls for consolidation of urban police forces serving metropolitan areas is an assumption that larger police forces will provide higher levels of police services more efficiently than will smaller police departments.
Such an assumption can be presented as a simple theoretical model of predicted relationships as in Figure 1.

### Figure 1

**The Theoretical Consolidation Model**  
(Simplified Form)

- Police Output
- Size of Police Department
- Costs for Equivalent Service Levels

This simple model could be examined directly if there were an accepted method for measuring police outputs and if all police output were the same. However, such is not the case.

The problem of measuring police output was met operationally in this series of studies by first narrowing the range of police services examined to those provided to a neighborhood. These include all direct responses to calls for assistance, criminal investigation, general patrol and related supportive services such as dispatching. Services such as metropolitan traffic patrol were excluded because the appropriate level of measurement differs significantly from that of neighborhood level police services. Given this range of services, survey instruments were designed to obtain two types of information about police output. First respondents were asked about their direct experiences with police and with criminal victimization. Secondly, respondents were asked to evaluate their local police on a number of attributes. Thus, the theoretical model presented in Figure 1 can be translated into an operational model.
for testing as in Figure 2.

Figure 2

The Operational Consolidation Model
(Simplified Form)

Citizen Experiences with Services Rendered

Size of Police Department

Citizen Evaluations of Local Police

Costs for Equivalent Service Levels

Given such a model, one would expect to find the following types of relationships in regard to citizen experiences with services rendered:

H₁ Citizens living in neighborhoods served by large police departments should:
   a) report less victimizations,
   b) report victimizations at a higher rate to the police if they occur,
   c) receive higher levels of police follow-up to a victimization,
   d) call upon the police for assistance more often,
   e) receive more rapid response to their calls for assistance,
   f) receive more satisfactory levels of police assistance.

In regard to citizen evaluations of local police, one would expect to find the following types of relationships:

H₂ Citizens living in neighborhoods served by large police departments should more frequently:
a) rate the job being done by the police as outstanding,
b) rate police-community relationships as good,
c) indicate that police do not take bribes,
d) indicate that crime is about the same or decreasing,
e) indicate that police respond very rapidly,
f) agree that local police treat all equally.

In regard to costs, the following relationships would be expected:

\[ H_3 \] The costs of providing similar levels of police service should be lower in larger jurisdictions than in smaller jurisdictions.

All dependent variables in \( H_1 \), \( H_2 \) and \( H_3 \) are jointly referred to as performance variables.

This simple model was selected for study for two reasons. First the posited relationships in the simple model must be empirically supported if the consolidation of police agencies is warranted. If larger police departments do not perform better or more efficiently, the major argument in favor of police consolidation is not empirically sound. Second, alternative theoretical formulations predict that the size of police departments is either negatively related to citizen experiences and evaluations. Further, an alternative theoretical approach would predict that the size of police departments is positively related to the costs of providing police services at least over a large range of existing departments.\(^6\)
Consequently, empirical examination of this set of relationships would simultaneously provide evidence concerning the warrantability of two models—the simplified consolidation model posited in Figure 2 and an alternative model presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3

The Alternative Operational Model
(Simplified Form)

Size of Police Department

Citizen Experiences with Services Rendered

Citizen Evaluations of Local Police

Costs for Equivalent Service Levels

An alternative set of hypotheses to those stated above also exists. The set is not repeated here to avoid the repetitious nature of such a listing. For each of the three hypotheses, the alternative hypotheses posit the opposite direction.

It is our belief that the most efficient method of tying empirical research to relevant public policy issues is to undertake research in those areas where hypotheses derived from different approaches diverge significantly in direction. In this way, empirical research can simultaneously provide evidence related to different theoretical traditions. With sufficient and consistent evidence, the empirical warrantability of one theoretical tradition is cast in doubt and increased confidence is merited in the other.
The Empirical Studies

The theoretical and operational models to be examined in these studies focus on the size of a police department serving a neighborhood as the independent variable. However, other variables also affect citizen experiences, citizen evaluations and the costs of equivalent service levels. In particular, research efforts have identified a number of socio-economic variables, such as the patterns of wealth, density, education, race and age among neighborhood residents as affecting costs, experiences and evaluations. Any research which attempts to examine the effect of the size of police departments on performance variables must take into account the potential effect of these socio-economic variables on the performance variables to be examined. Research designs which ignored the potential effect of such socio-economic variables, would be seriously vulnerable to criticism that variations in neighborhood socio-economic status, not size of the police department serving a neighborhood, are affecting citizen experiences, citizen evaluations and costs of services. In essence a rival methodological model exists which posits that any effect of size upon performance variables results from variation in socio-economic status of the neighborhoods included in the study rather than variation in size. Such a rival methodological model is shown in Figure 4
Given such a rival methodological model, research on the effects of size must either control for the effect of socio-economic variables either by 1) the careful selection of research sites which minimize the difference in socio-economic status among the sample areas selected or 2) include sufficient areas in the study that the potential effect of socio-economic status can be handled at the data analysis stage through statistical controls.

The first four of the studies to be reported on in this section utilized a "most similar systems" research design as the means of controlling for the potential effect of socio-economic variables upon performance variables. (see Przeworski and Teune, 1970) A most similar systems research design requires that all other factors, which affect dependent variables be neutralized by selecting study areas which are matched on all relevant factors except for the independent variables under examination. Thus, in the four studies utilizing the "most similar system" design, neighborhoods are matched in terms of such socio-economic variables as racial characteristics, density, age distributions and wealth. In each study, some of the matched neighborhoods were served by
relatively small scale, independent police departments while others were served by larger departments.

The first study was conducted in Indianapolis in three small independent communities immediately adjacent to the jurisdiction of the Indianapolis Police District and in three matched neighborhoods within the Indianapolis Police District. (E. Ostrom, et al., 1973) The independent communities were Speedway, Beech Grove and Lawrence with populations of 12,000 to 16,000. They were served by police forces composed of from 18 to 25 sworn officers. Each of the three Indianapolis neighborhoods was located immediately adjacent to one of the independent communities. The socio-economic characteristics, housing patterns and living conditions of all six areas were very closely matched. They were predominately white, middle-class residential areas with single family residences. The Indianapolis neighborhoods were served by a highly professionalized city police force composed of some 1,100 sworn officers serving a total population of nearly 500,000. The Indianapolis Police Department has an excellent reputation as a competent, efficient and innovative police force.

The data from the Indianapolis study did not support $H_1$ or $H_2$ from the simplified consolidation model. As shown on Table I, citizen reports of experiences indicated that the performance of the larger department did not exceed that of the smaller. Citizens in matched neighborhoods served by a larger department did not rank the performance of their department better on any evaluation indicator that citizens
served by the smaller departments. Where there were differences in output levels, the consistent pattern is that the small police department serving the independent communities produced at a higher level than the larger department. Thus, the alternative hypotheses were supported by this study. The findings in regard to \(H_3\) were somewhat ambiguous. While the per capita expenditures of the City of Indianapolis averaged $21.33 for the city as a whole, resources worth approximately $10.72 per capita were devoted to the provision of police services within the Indianapolis Police District neighborhoods included in this study. Police expenditures in the independent communities averaged $12.76 per capita. Thus, the cost of the resources devoted to police services in the sample Indianapolis neighborhoods were less than the per capita costs in the independent communities. This finding does not provide adequate evidence for any conclusion concerning the relative efficiency of the two types of departments since the residents of the smaller communities—while allocating more to police services—were also receiving higher levels of service. Without an interval measure of output, no efficiency conclusion can be reached in this case.
### TABLE I

Comparison of Citizen Experiences and Citizen Evaluations in Indianapolis, Grand Rapids, Nashville and Chicago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiences</th>
<th>Indianapolis (White Residents)</th>
<th>Grand Rapids (White Residents)</th>
<th>Nashville (White Residents)</th>
<th>Chicago (Black Residents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Who Called for Assistance</td>
<td>79% (336)</td>
<td>60% (311)</td>
<td>56% (142)</td>
<td>45% (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Who Received Assistance 5 Min.</td>
<td>24% (235)</td>
<td>27% (235)</td>
<td>26% (258)</td>
<td>17% (105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Stopped</td>
<td>31% (369)</td>
<td>23% (330)</td>
<td>23% (230)</td>
<td>13% (106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Police Do Not Take Bribes</td>
<td>86% (334)</td>
<td>95% (273)</td>
<td>82% (230)</td>
<td>85% (110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Crime About Same or Decreasing</td>
<td>77% (331)</td>
<td>79% (341)</td>
<td>79% (557)</td>
<td>88% (397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Agree Police Treat All Equally</td>
<td>66% (323)</td>
<td>43% (276)</td>
<td>38% (230)</td>
<td>88% (337)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of the expenditure patterns of the two types of police departments did indicate some important differences in resource allocation. The smaller police departments allocated proportionately more of their police budget to patrol services while the Indianapolis department allocated proportionately more to detective and supervisory services. It would appear that the smaller communities were devoting proportionately more effort to crime prevention and immediate response activities where the larger department was devoting more resources to investigation of crime after it has occurred.

A replication of this study was undertaken in the spring of 1971 by Samir Ishak in the Grand Rapids, Michigan metropolitan area. (Ishak, 1972) The independently incorporated cities of East Grand Rapids, Kentwood and Walker are located immediately adjacent to the City of Grand Rapids. Three neighborhoods within the City of Grand Rapids, immediately adjacent to the independent communities, were selected for comparative study. The population of Grand Rapids was approximately 200,000 while that of the independent communities ranged from approximately 12,000 to 20,000. The police departments serving these communities varied from 9 to 17 sworn officers while that of Grand Rapids employed 313 sworn officers. The Grand Rapids neighborhoods were very similar to each other and to those studied in Indianapolis.

The data from this replication did not support either $H_1$ or $H_2$ listed above. The pattern in the two studies is very similar as shown in Table I. Based on both the experiences,
of citizens and their evaluations, one would have to conclude that the larger department was not providing higher service levels. Moreover, the findings in regard to $H_3$ were more clear cut than those in Indianapolis. The per capita expenditure of the City of Grand Rapids was $20.00 and the per capita expenditures for police within the three separately incorporated communities ranged from $5.81 to $16.13. When one examines the resources devoted by the Grand Rapids Police Department to provision of police services in the neighborhoods under study, the average for the three neighborhoods is $16.88 per capita while the average for the three independent communities is $10.67. Thus the larger department provided lower levels of services at higher costs. Similar production strategies were also found in Grand Rapids to those in Indianapolis.

A second replication of the Indianapolis study was undertaken by Bruce D. Rogers and C. McCurdy Lipsey in the Nashville-Davidson County metropolitan area in the spring of 1973. (Rogers and Lipsey, 1974) Within Davidson County are six incorporated communities which voted in 1962 not to consolidate their governments with that of the urban services district of Nashville's Metropolitan Government. They are, however, part of the general services district and thus pay for such county-wide services as the Nashville metropolitan police department. One of these communities, Berry Hill, is located immediately adjacent to the Urban Services District and to a closely matched neighborhood called Woodbine, which
is served by the Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Police Department. Berry Hill provides its own police services, and park services and contracts for other municipal services even though its total 1970 population was only 1651 individuals. Both Berry Hill and Woodbine are working class neighborhoods composed predominantly of white residents living in single-family residences.

The Nashville-Davidson County study did not support H₁ and H₂. In fact the findings against H₁ and H₂ are even stronger in this study than in the Indianapolis and Grand Rapids studies. Information regarding H₃ is not yet available. Bruce Rogers and Barbara Greene are currently in the planning stages of a much larger study to be conducted in Nashville-Davidson County in 12 to 18 matched neighborhoods with varying arrangements for the provision of police and other urban services. In this study the question of resource allocation and costs can be thoroughly examined.

A related study to the three described above was conducted in two poor, black communities in south suburban Cook County served by their own police departments in comparison with three relatively similar black neighborhoods within the city of Chicago. (E. Ostrom and Whitaker, 1974). In this instance, the differences in resources allocated to the different types of neighborhoods were extreme. More than fourteen times the resources were devoted to the provision of police services in the Chicago neighborhoods than were devoted in either Phoenix or East Chicago Heights. However, for all
the difference in resources, the service levels as shown on Table 1 did not differ significantly between the services provided by the two types of police departments. Thus, again there is no support for $H_1$ or $H_2$. Given the same levels of output and the drastically different levels of costs, the evidence is strongly contrary to $H_3$.

We have also reanalyzed data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1966. (Ostrom and Parks, 1973) This data base of approximately 2000 respondents, residing in 109 cities over 10,000 in population provided data on citizen evaluations of their police, citizen feelings of safety and their confidence in their police. We added information from the Municipal Year Book concerning city size and expenditure levels. The relationships found among these variables provided consistent evidence for rejecting $H_2$ and $H_3$.

Thus, in each of four separate studies a comparison of levels of services provided by large departments with small to medium sized departments for similar neighborhoods shows a consistent finding to indicate that the larger departments do not provide higher levels of services as measured by citizen experiences or evaluations. These findings were substantiated in a nation-wide study of police services in 109 cities ranging in size from 10,000 population to 7,000,000 population. Two of the within-metropolitan area studies established that the costs of police services to similar
neighborhoods was higher in the larger jurisdiction. One of the studies had ambiguous findings in regard to costs. The fourth study did not examine $H_3$. The nation-wide study found higher per capita costs for providing constant levels of police services in larger police jurisdictions.

The cumulative impact of this series of studies should lead to a serious questioning of the empirical warrantability of the assumptions underlying the traditional metropolitan reform proposals as they relate to the provision of police services in urban areas. If larger police departments do not provide higher output or similar levels of output more efficiently than smaller departments, there would appear to be little reason to eliminate smaller departments.

However, each of the studies described above were designed to begin an exploration of the relationships between the costs and benefits of providing police services under varying jurisdictional arrangements. Only the simplified consolidation model and its alternate could be empirically examined. However, given the consistent lack of empirical support for the simplified consolidation model, it then became essential to delve more deeply into potentially more complex relationships between the size of police departments and performance variables.

Proponents of consolidation often argue that it is only larger departments which can afford to provide extensive training for police personnel and to employ officers with college education. It is assumed that both higher levels of formal
police training and education to higher levels of performance. Given the lack of empirical evidence for these assumptions it is important to trace out the effect of size of police departments upon levels of formal police training and college education present among officers in police departments. It is also important to examine the effects of formal police training and college education on the performance of police departments. These more complex relationships could not be examined in the earlier studies, but were one of the major research questions in a much larger study which we have recently conducted in the St. Louis metropolitan area. The next section of this paper will describe the study conducted in St. Louis. A series of questions are presented and then answered by reference to data from this study.

The St. Louis Comparative Study of Police Performance

Research Setting

The St. Louis metropolitan area was chosen as the site for this study because of the wide variety of relevant organizational arrangements within one area. The St. Louis City Police Department with 2,200 officers provides an example of a large, consolidated force recommended by traditional reformers. The St. Louis County Police Department of 436 officers provides an example of a large county-wide department capable of supplying a full complement of police services, supplementary services or contract services. Within St. Louis County there are 93 independently incorporated commu-
nities of which 63 have their own police departments, ranging in size from zero full-time officers (employing only part-time officers) to 76 full-time officers. The remaining jurisdictions contract for their police services with either the County Police Department or with another municipal department. This variety of jurisdictional arrangements enabled us to examine the effects of the size of police departments on their performance as well as many of the intervening variables which may affect police performance.

Research Design

We again utilized a "most similar systems" research design in the selection of neighborhoods within the St. Louis area. However, we included more than one strata of similar neighborhoods. A neighborhood is defined for this study as consisting of either:

1) an independently incorporated community in St. Louis County with a population in 1970 less than or equal to 28,900;

2) a census tract within an independently incorporated community in St. Louis County with a population in 1970 of greater than 28,900;

3) an urban place as designated by the 1970 census within the unincorporated portion of St. Louis County; or

4) a Planning Neighborhood (as designated by the St. Louis City Planning Commission) within the City of St. Louis.
Using these criteria, over 170 neighborhoods existed in the City of St. Louis or St. Louis County.

Neighborhoods were eliminated from the sample frame where:

1) the percentage of population over 65 years of age exceeded 20%;
2) the percentage of population under 21 years of age exceeded 45%;
3) the median value of owner-occupied housing was $25,000 or more;
4) less than 60% of the dwelling units were owner occupied (this criterion was relaxed slightly in two cases to allow inclusion of two predominantly black communities).

The remaining relatively homogeneous neighborhoods were then stratified along dimensions of neighborhood wealth on the one hand and size of police department where size of community initially stood as a proxy for size of department. The three strata of neighborhood wealth and the seven strata for size of police department produced a matrix with 21 cells. For seven of these logically possible cells there were no existing cases given the criteria for inclusion stated above.

From the fourteen remaining cells, we chose 45 sample areas. In choosing from the potential neighborhoods for each cell, we first dichotomized these into neighborhoods with greater than 30% black population in 1970 and those with less than or equal to 30% black population. Sensitivity to this dichotomy
in selecting neighborhoods for inclusion ensured—to the extent allowed by the existence of appropriate neighborhoods—that we would include a significant black sample.

Having determined those neighborhoods which were of interest through use of the criteria described above, we proceeded to choose among them on the basis of contiguity into clusters of neighborhoods. These considerations allowed us to choose sample areas in such a way that variation existed along the dimensions of both size and organization for provision of police service, individual wealth within the community, and the presence or absence of a sizeable black population. Variation in other factors affecting police performance was controlled for by matching. Figure 5 is a map showing the spatial location of our sample areas. For each of the neighborhoods in our sample frame we obtained data from five types of sources, 1) interviews with citizens residing in the neighborhoods, 2) interviews with police officers serving the neighborhoods; 3) internal police records and published reports on police services pertaining to the neighborhoods, 4) published and unpublished data relating to the neighborhoods from agencies external to the communities studied and 5) unobtrusive observation of neighborhood conditions.11

For the analysis presented in this paper I will draw upon data gathered from the citizen survey, the survey of police officers serving the neighborhoods included in the study and from census data. All data has been aggregated or disaggregated to the specific neighborhoods included
Figure 5
Sample Areas in St. Louis and St. Louis County

City of St. Louis
Sample Areas
within the study. A complete data set is available for 43 neighborhoods and all analyses in this paper will examine relationships within those 43 neighborhoods. One of the questions considered will utilize a data base of 44 neighborhoods.

Research Questions:

Given the larger and more diverse data base of the St. Louis study, a number of more complex questions can be asked about relationships between the scale of production and police performance. The first question which should be addressed is, of course, whether the simple relationships found in earlier studies between the size of police department serving a neighborhood and citizen experiences, citizen evaluations, and per capita costs remains the same. The second question is whether the introduction of neighborhood level socio-economic variables affects the relationships between size and citizen experiences and evaluations. The third question is whether there are positive relationships between the size of a police department and the level of formal police training and/or college education of its officers. Further questions are whether formal police training and/or college education for officers on a police force have an independent effect on citizen experience and/or citizen evaluations. Another question to be explored is whether citizen experiences operate as intervening variables affecting citizen evaluations. Given answers to these questions, we can then explore the question of whether there is a more complex model of the relationships.
between size of police department and citizen evaluation of police performance which is more empirically warrantable than the simplified consolidation model or its alternate. The final question to be considered in this section is whether police departments which are ten full-time officers or smaller are less effective than larger departments.

**Question One:** Are There Bivariate Relationships Between Size of Police Department Serving a Neighborhood and Citizen Experiences, Citizen Evaluations and Per Capita Costs of Providing Police Services?

As shown in Table 2, there is a significant relationship between the size of the police department serving a neighborhood and many of the indicators of citizen experiences and evaluation used in this and earlier studies. Size here is measured by the number of full time officers employed by the police department serving a neighborhood. Size is positively related to the victimization rate in a neighborhood and to citizens' indication that crime is increasing. Size is negatively related to: 1) the percentage of citizens assisted, 2) the percentage of citizens indicating that police respond "very rapidly" in their neighborhood, 3) the percentage of citizens rating the job being done by their police as "outstanding," 4) the percentage of citizens rating police-community relations as "outstanding," 5) the percentage of citizens strongly agreeing with the statement that police are "honest," 6) the percentage of citizens strongly agreeing that "police treat all citizens equally." Size is also positively related to the per capita expenditures.
Table 2

The Correlation Between Size of Police Department and Experiences, Evaluations and Costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X₁ Size of Police Department</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X₆ Percentage Victimized</td>
<td>.43&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₇ Percentage Assisted</td>
<td>-.35&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₉ Percentage Stopped</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₀ Percentage Know Someone Mistreated by Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₁ Percentage Know One or More Policeman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Experiences**

| X₁₂ Percentage Indicating Crime Increasing | .51<sup>a</sup> |
| X₁₃ Percentage Indicating that Police Response is Very Rapid | -.64<sup>a</sup> |
| X₁₄ Percentage Rating Job of Police Outstanding | -.49<sup>a</sup> |
| X₁₅ Percentage Rating Police-Community Relations Outstanding | 1.25<sup>c</sup> |
| X₁₆ Percentage Strongly Agreeing that Police Are Honest | -.38 |
| X₁₇ Percentage Strongly Agreeing that Police Treat All Citizens Equally |    |

**Evaluations**

| X₁₈ Per Capita Costs of Police Services in Neighborhood | .77<sup>a</sup> |

*p = .001, *<sup>b</sup>p = .01, *<sup>c</sup>p = .05*
for police services in the neighborhoods.¹³

Question Two: Do the Relationships between Size of the Police Department Serving a Neighborhood and Citizen Experiences, Citizen Evaluations and Costs Continue When Socio-Economic Variables are Introduced?

Since the St. Louis study utilized a multi-strata research design which allowed variation in the wealth of the neighborhoods chosen for study and in the proportion of black residents living in a neighborhood, it is necessary to ascertain the independent effect of these socio-economic variations on citizen experiences and evaluation. The statistical technique used to ascertain the independent effect of size and socio-economic variables is multiple regression. Table 3 presents the standardized regression coefficients (betas) for each of three independent variables:

\( X_1 \) = the number of full time officers employed by the police department serving the neighborhood.

\( X_2 \) = the median value of owner-occupied housing in the neighborhood.

\( X_3 \) = the percentage of black residents living in the neighborhood.

The \( R^2 \) for each dependent variable are also reported.¹⁴

As can be seen by a comparison of Tables 2 and 3, the signs of all relationships between size and the dependent variables remain the same even though the introduction of two additional independent variables does in some cases reduce the size of the coefficient. The socio-economic variables also have some interesting relationships with citizen
Table 3

Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variance Explained for Relationships Between Size, Socio-Economic Variables and Experiences, Evaluations and Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiences</th>
<th>X1 Size</th>
<th>X2 Median Value of Owner Occupied Housing</th>
<th>X3 % Black Residents</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X6 % Victimized</td>
<td>.29b</td>
<td>-.30b</td>
<td>.49a</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X7 % Assisted</td>
<td>-.35c</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X9 % Stopped</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.31c</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X10 % Know Someone Mistreated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.34b</td>
<td>.49a</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X11 % Know 1 or More Policemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.48a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X12 % Indicate Crime Increasing</td>
<td>.42a</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.28c</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X13 % Police Respond Very Rapidly</td>
<td>-.64a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X14 % Rate Job Outstanding</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.47a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X15 % Agree Police Honest</td>
<td>-.30c</td>
<td>.43b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X16 % Agree Police Treat All Equally</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.35b</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X17 Per Capita Costs of Police in Neighborhood</td>
<td>.72a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.33c</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a_p = .001
b_p = .01
c_p = .05
experiences and evaluations. The median value of owner occupied housing in a neighborhood is negatively related to victimization, knowing someone mistreated, knowing one or more policemen, and indicating that crime is increasing, while it is positively associated with rating the job of police as outstanding, rating police-community relationships as outstanding, agreeing that police are honest, and agreeing that police treat all equally. The percentage of black residents living in a neighborhood is positively related to victimization rates, to being stopped by police, to knowing one or more policemen, to indicating that crime is increasing, and to the per capita costs of providing police services, while it is negatively related to agreeing that police treat all equally.

In no instance does the sign of the relationship between the size of a police department serving a neighborhood and citizen experiences, citizen evaluations and per capita costs correspond to the predicted direction derived from the original consolidation model. (Figure 2 above) Thus, the findings from this study are completely consistent with the findings from the earlier studies discussed previously and support the alternative model which predicts either no relationship between size and output measures or a negative relationship. In most instances, a negative relationship has been found.
Question Three: What Are the Relationships Between the Size of Police Departments and the Levels of Formal Police Training and College Education among Sworn Personnel?

One of the reasons cited for recommending consolidation of police departments into larger units is that larger police departments can afford to train their personnel more effectively and to hire college educated personnel. The simple relationship between the size of police departments and median weeks of training of sworn personnel is positive \((r = .45)\) while the simple relationship between size and the proportion of officers who have some college education is negative \((r = -.44)\). When size, percentage black residents, and median value of owner-occupied housing are combined in a multiple regression equation, only size has a significant effect on the levels of training \((\beta = .45)\). When combined with size and percentage black residents, median value of owner occupied housing is most important in explaining the proportion of officers having some college education \((\beta = .47)\), size of police department is next \((\beta = -.39)\) and the percentage of black residents is third \((\beta = .26)\).

Thus, there is a definite and positive relationship between the size of police departments and the level of formal training among sworn personnel on a force. In the St. Louis area, the two largest departments have for many years required their officers to attend a 16 week training program at a joint City-County police academy. A recent state law now requires all new police officers in St. Louis County to attend the same City-County academy. However, at the time of
our study, the new legislation had been in effect for only a few months and the level of training in most departments had not yet been affected by the legislation. Over time, personnel in the smaller departments will have a similar level of training to those in the two larger departments.

On the other hand, the level of college training among sworn personnel is negatively related to the size of police departments. Many of the smaller and medium size departments employ a higher percentage of officers with some college education than do the larger departments.

Question Four: What Are the Independent Effects of the Levels of Formal Police Training and College Education Among Police Personnel Serving a Neighborhood Upon Citizen Experiences?

For all of the interest in increasing the levels of training and education among police personnel, few studies have attempted to examine what effects these variables have on police performance. In a preliminary analysis of this question with data from the St. Louis study, Smith and E. Ostrom found that training was not positively associated with either more "professional" attitudes on the part of individual officers or with more favorable citizen experiences or evaluations. The level of college education was, on the other hand, weakly associated in a positive direction with more "professional" attitudes but had little impact on citizen experiences or evaluations. (Smith and E. Ostrom, 1974)

This analysis, however, was bivariate in nature and did not explore the independent effects of training and college education when other factors were controlled.
When the median weeks of formal training among officers in a department is added to each of the multiple regression equations for experiences shown in Table 3, it has an independent effect (beta = -.22) in only one equation—that for the percentage of citizens knowing one or more policemen. Thus the level of training is negatively related to the likelihood that citizens will know one or more policemen. Median value of owner occupied housing is still the most important variable explaining the percentage of citizens knowing police (beta = -.47). The $R^2$ value for the equation is raised from .23 to .28 by the addition of median weeks of training to the equation.

In regard to the independent effect of the percentage of sworn personnel having some college education on citizen experiences, it affects only the equation for the percentage of household victimizations in the year prior to our survey. Four variables have an independent effect on victimization rates: 1) percentage of black residents (beta = .44), 2) median value of owner occupied housing (beta = -.40), 3) size of police department serving the neighborhood (beta = .37), and percentage of officers having some college education (beta = .20). The addition of this variable to the equation increases $R^2$ from .63 to .65. The relationship between victimization rates and level of college education among police serving a neighborhood is thus weakly positive.
Question Five: What is the Independent Effect of the Level of Formal Police Training and College Education Among Police Serving a Neighborhood upon Citizen Evaluations?

When variable $X_4$ - median weeks of training of police personnel serving a neighborhood is introduced into a multiple regression equation with $X_1$ - size of police department serving a neighborhood, $X_2$ - median value of owner occupied housing units in neighborhood and $X_3$ - percentage of black residents in neighborhood, its independent effect on the six evaluation variables is negative in five equations and non-existent in the 6th. The negative coefficients vary from weak to moderate as shown on Figure 6. Median levels of formal police training is most strongly (and negatively) related to the percentage of citizens likely to rate police community relations as outstanding ($\beta = -0.33$). Thus, controlling for size of police department and the socio-economic status of a neighborhood, the median level of formal police training among sworn officers serving a neighborhood is inversely related to citizens' evaluations of police performance. While the size of a police department serving a neighborhood is positively related to median levels of training, this intervening variable does not have a positive effect on citizen evaluations of police performance.

When variable $X_5$ - percentage of officers having some college experience is introduced into a multiple regression equation with the size of the police department and the two background socio-economic status variables, its independent effect on the evaluation variables is negligible for five of
Figure 6

The Independent Effects of Training Levels on Citizen Evaluations Controlling for Size of Police Department and Socio-Economic Status of Neighborhood

X₁ Size of Police Department
X₂ Median Value Owner Occupied Housing
X₃ % Black Residents

Median Weeks Training of Police Personnel

X₁₂ % Crime Increasing → .75 R
X₁₃ % Response Very Rapid → .75 R
X₁₄ % Job Outstanding → .74 R
X₁₅ % PCR Outstanding → .80 R
X₁₆ % Police Honest → .82 R
X₁₇ % Police Treat All Equally → .77 R

R = .87
the dependent variables. The percentage of officers having some college is related only to variable $X_{15}$ - the percentage of citizens rating police-community relations as outstanding ($\beta = -.19$) and then in a negative direction. Thus, the level of college training of police officers serving a neighborhood does not appear to have any general effect on citizens evaluations of police performance.

**Question Six:** What are the Independent Effects of the Level of Citizen Experience in a Neighborhood Combined with Levels of Training, Size of Police Department and Socio-Economic Variables Upon Citizen Evaluations?

A series of multiple regression equations are presented on Tables 4, 5 and 6 in which each experience variable is introduced separately into an equation with median levels of training, the socio-economic variables and size of police department and regressed against each of the citizen evaluation variables. Several of the experience variables have an independent effect on citizen evaluations. The percentage of citizens victimized in a neighborhood has a positive effect on citizen response that crime is increasing in their neighborhood, a negative effect on citizen evaluation of the job being done by police, and on citizen evaluation of police-community relationships. The percentage of citizens who know at least one policeman has a consistently positive effect on all evaluation variables except whether citizens strongly agree that police treat all equally. The percentage of citizens assisted and the percentage of citizens stopped in a neighborhood did not have independent effects on more
Table 4

Independent Effects of Victimization and Assistance Rates When Combined with Training, Size of Department and Socio-Economic Status Variables on Evaluation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>X6 % Victimized</th>
<th>X4 Median Weeks Training</th>
<th>X2 Median Value Owner Occupied Housing</th>
<th>X3 % Black Residents</th>
<th>X1 Size of Police Department</th>
<th>R2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X12 % Crime Increasing</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X13 % Police Respond Rapidly</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X14 % Police Job Outstanding</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X15 % PCR Outstanding</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X16 % Police Honest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X17 % Police Treat All Equally</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>X7 % Assisted</th>
<th>X4 Median Weeks Training</th>
<th>X2 Median Value Owner Occupied Housing</th>
<th>X3 % Black Residents</th>
<th>X1 Size of Police Department</th>
<th>R2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X12 % Crime Increasing</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X13 % Police Respond Rapidly</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X14 % Police Job Outstanding</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X15 % PCR Outstanding</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X16 % Police Honest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X17 % Police Treat All Equally</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I

Independent Effects of Percentage of Those Who Know Someone Mistreated and Who Know One or More Policemen when Combined with Training, Size of Department and Socio-Economic Status Variables on Evaluation Variables

| X₁₂ | %Crime Increasing | X₁₃ | %Police Respond Rapidly | X₁₄ | %Police Job Outstanding | X₁₅ | %PCR Outstanding | X₁₆ | %Police Honest | X₁₇ | %Police Treat All Equally | X₁₀ | Know Someone Mistreated | X₄ | Median Weeks Training | X₂ | Median Value of Owner Occupied Housing | X₃ | Black Residents | X₇ | Size of Police Department | R² |
|-----|-------------------|-----|--------------------------|-----|-------------------------|-----|------------------|-----|----------------|-----|--------------------------|-----|-------------------------|-----|-------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----|-----------------------|
| .23 | .26               | .30 | .47                      | .44 | .49                     | .45 |                 | .29 |                | .58 |                         | .31 | .40                     |     | .33                     | .33 | .38                     |     | .35                     | .31 | .34                     |
|     |                   |     |                          |     |                         |     |                 | .26 |                |     |                         | .27 | .63                     |     | .25                     |     | .29                     | .22 | .29                     |

R² = 2.9
Table 6

Independent Effects of Percentage of Those Stopped in Neighborhood when combined with Training, Size of Department and Socio-Economic Status Variables on Evaluation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>%Crime Increasing</th>
<th>X9</th>
<th>X4</th>
<th>X2</th>
<th>X3</th>
<th>X16</th>
<th>X17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X12</td>
<td>%Police Respond Rapidly</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X13</td>
<td>%Police Job Outstanding</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X14</td>
<td>%PCR Outstanding</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X15</td>
<td>%Police Honest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X16</td>
<td>%Police Treat All Equally</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
than one or two evaluation variables.

Even with the introduction of several additional variables, the size of the police department serving a neighborhood continues to have a consistently negative effect on the evaluations made by citizens of the police serving their neighborhood. The relative wealth of a neighborhood--measured by the median value of owner occupied housing--also seems to have a consistently positive effect on citizen evaluations. One can only surmise that citizens living in relatively wealthier neighborhoods do consistently receive better service from police regardless of the size of the department involved.

Question Seven: Is There a More Complex Model of the Relationship Between Size of Police Department and Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Which is More Empirically Warrantable Than the Simplified Consolidation Model or Its Alternate?

Implicit in the set of questions which have been pursued in this section has been an assumption that the evaluation of police performance is best explained by a more complex model of relationships than the simplified models presented earlier. This more complex model would include the size of a police department and the socio-economic status of a neighborhood as exogenous variables. Endogenous variables which would operate as intervening variables would include such factors as the production strategies utilized by a department, the resources available to a department to allocate for police services, the college education and formal police training levels of police personnel and the types of experiences or perceptions that citizens had concerning their police. While the St.
Louis study provides a very extensive data base for the empirical examination of a more complex model, the number of cases involved does not enable one to explore simultaneously, the additive effect of all of the above variables. However, given the limitations of the data, it is possible to examine the empirical fit of a more complex model such as that presented in Figure 7.

The number of cases in the St. Louis data set preclude the simultaneous consideration of the patterns of all citizen experiences on citizen evaluation, but we can examine a path analytic diagram of the above model utilizing victimization rates as the citizen experience variable and the percentage of citizens indicating that crime is increasing as the citizen evaluation variable. As seen on Figure 8, the size of the police department serving a neighborhood has a sizeable direct effect on citizens' responses that crime is increasing ($P_{12-1} = .39$). However, the rate of victimization in a neighborhood has an even stronger direct effect ($P_{12-6} = .47$). Since size is also related to the rate of victimization ($P_{6-1} = .29$) it has an indirect effect on this evaluation variable through victimization ($P_{12-6} \times P_{6-1} = .14$). Size also has a small indirect effect through training ($P_{12-4} \times P_{4-1} = .07$).

One method to test the adequacy of a path model is to decompose the correlation coefficient between variables in all relevant paths and then add the computed relationships of all simple and compound paths. If this sum closely
A More Complex Model of the Relationships Between Size of Police Department and Citizen Evaluations
Path Analytic Diagram with Victimization as an Intervening Variable and Citizens' Indication that Crime is Increasing as a Dependent Variable

\[ X_1 \quad \text{Size of Police Department} \]
\[ X_2 \quad \text{Median Value of Owner Occupied Housing} \]
\[ X_3 \quad \% \text{Black Respondents} \]
\[ X_4 \quad \text{Median Weeks of Training} \]
\[ X_6 \quad \% \text{Victimized} \]
\[ X_{12} \quad \% \text{Indicate Crime Increasing} \]

- \[ X_1 \rightarrow X_4 \quad 0.49 \]
- \[ X_1 \rightarrow X_6 \quad -0.44 \]
- \[ X_2 \rightarrow X_6 \quad -0.30 \]
- \[ X_3 \rightarrow X_4 \quad 0.29 \]
- \[ X_3 \rightarrow X_6 \quad -0.19 \]
- \[ X_4 \rightarrow X_6 \quad 0.47 \]
- \[ X_4 \rightarrow X_{12} \quad 0.39 \]
- \[ X_6 \rightarrow X_{12} \quad 0.61 \]
- \[ X_{12} \rightarrow R \quad 0.72 \]
approximates the original correlation coefficient, then the model is well specified. The bivariate correlation coefficient between the size of a police department and the percentage of citizens indicating that crime was increasing in their neighborhood was .51. When all simple and compound paths of the model presented on Figure 8 are added the result is .52. Thus, this model would seem to specify rather well the complex relationships between size of police department serving an area, background socio-economic status variables, the median weeks of formal training obtained by officers serving a neighborhood, the level of victimization in a neighborhood and citizens' evaluations concerning the increase of crime in their neighborhood.

The model also explains a much higher level of variance than does the simple bi-variate relations. The variance explained by the simple relationship between size of police department and percentage of citizens indicating that crime is increasing is .24. The variance explained of the dependent variable in Figure 7 is .47.

A second path model is presented in Figure 9. In this case Variable $X_7$ - Percentage Assisted is utilized as the experience variable and the percentage of citizens indicating that police respond very rapidly is the evaluation variable. Again, size of police department has a direct effect on the evaluation variable which is larger than any of the compound path through either training or assistance. ($P_{13-1} = -.47$) The two compound paths from size of police department
Figure 9

Path Analytic Diagram with Percentage Assisted as an Intervening Variable and Percentage Indicating Police Respond Very Rapidly as a Dependent Variable

- $X_1$ Size of Police Department
- $X_4$ Median Weeks of Training
- $X_{13}$ Indicate Police Respond Rapidly
- $X_{7}$ % Assisted

Path Coefficients:
- $X_1$ to $X_4$: 0.49
- $X_4$ to $X_{13}$: 0.87
- $X_{13}$ to $X_{7}$: 0.17
- $X_{7}$: 0.93
- Total Path Coefficient: $X_1$ to $X_{13}$: 0.71
to percentage of citizens indicating the police respond rapidly--through training and through assistance--are almost equal in size \( (P_{13-7} + P_{7-1} = .08; P_{13-4} + P_{4-1} = .10) \).

This model is also an adequate representation of the relationship between \( X_1 \) and \( X_{13} \). The correlation coefficient between size of police department and percentage of citizens indicating that the police respond very rapidly is \(-.64\) while the sum of all direct and compound paths in the model is \(-.65\). The variance explained by this model is \(.50\) while the variance explained by the simple relationship was \(.41\).

Question Eight: Are Police Departments With Ten Full-Time Officers or Smaller Less Effective than Larger Departments?

While the consistent relationship between the size of a police department and diverse measures of police performance has been negative, it may be the case that a curvilinear relationship exists. If this were the case, very small departments would have lower performance than somewhat larger departments, even though the dominant direction of the relationship would be negative. The presence of a somewhat curvilinear relationship would not be exposed with the linear regression techniques utilized in the above analysis.

Some evidence of a curvilinear relationship was found in an earlier study discussed above (Ostrom & Parks, 1973).

A more detailed analysis of the performance of police departments which have ten full-time officers or less is important given the frequent judgment by study commissions that the very small departments are the most ineffective departments. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice...
Standards and Goals in its Standard on Combined Police Services, for example, recommended that: "At a minimum, police agencies that employ fewer than 10 sworn employees should consolidate for improved efficiency and effectiveness" (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973: 108). As evidence in support of its recommendation for the "recombination and consolidation of police departments with less than 10 full-time sworn officers" (Ibid., 110) it cited an earlier report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations entitled Report on State-Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System (1970) which observed:

Small local police departments, particularly those of 10 or less men, are unable to provide a wide range of patrol and investigative services to local citizens. Moreover, the existence of these small agencies may work a hardship on nearby jurisdictions. (Ibid., 110)

The National Commission was sensitive to the problem of creating police departments that are too large but did not specify what size was considered to be in that range. The Report states: "Most police and government administrators recognize the dangers inherent in extremely large police agencies and agree that the very small agencies present much greater problems to the effective and efficient delivery of police services." (Ibid., 110, my emphasis) Thus, the Commission, and others, argue that the very small agencies have the poorest performance of all police departments regardless of size.

The data from the St. Louis study can be used to provide...
at least a preliminary answer to the question whether the very small departments are less effective than all other departments regardless of size and if so, how serious that difference is.

Among 44 neighborhoods for which we have performance measures, 9 of the neighborhoods were served by departments which had 10 full-time officers or less. On the other extreme, 11 of the neighborhoods were served either by the County with 436 officers or the City with 2200 officers. Twenty-four of the sample neighborhoods were served by municipal departments which ranged in size from 11 to 76 full-time officers. Given the small number of cases, each performance variable was dichotomized at or near the mean to produce an even distribution of high and low values. For example, the mean percentage ranking the job being done by a police department as outstanding was 25%. Dichotomizing this variable at the mean into those departments receiving a high ranking and those departments receiving a low ranking results in 21 departments being ranked high and 23 departments being ranked low. These dichotomized experience and evaluation variables were then run against a recoded size variable which placed all departments with 10 or less men into a "very small" class, departments with 11 to 76 full-time officers into a "medium" class and the county and the city into a "large" class.

Table 7 presents the proportion of each size class which ranked either high or low on each experience and
evaluation variable. The choice of above or below the mean was made in order that for the entire table, a higher ranking would mean that the departments in that size group had a "better" performance on each relevant variable. Thus, for victimization, below the mean was chosen since the proportion of departments have less than the mean victimization rates would indicate better performance. On the other hand, for the evaluation variable--citizens rating the job of police as outstanding--above the mean was chosen since those receiving the mean or above on that variable would have a better performance.

For the experience variables, the very small departments compare rather favorably with the other sized classes. For victimization, 7 of the 9 departments in this class had lower than mean victimization rates while only 40 to 45 percent of the other size ranges had low victimization rates. For assistance the middle size range would appear more effective than either the very small or large departments. The middle-sized departments also appear to stop a larger proportion of their citizens than do either the very small or the large departments. A curvilinear relationship is thus evident for both assistance and stop rates. In regard to citizens knowing someone mistreated, the large departments would appear to be performing better than either of the two smaller groups. However, it should be pointed out that four of the six neighborhoods above the mean on this variable are served by the County Department. In regard to citizens
Table 7

Proportion of Departments in each of Three Size Classes which Rate Above the Mean for Experience and Evaluation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiences</th>
<th>10 Full-Time Officers or Less</th>
<th>11 to 75 Full-Time Officers</th>
<th>435 or 2200 Full-Time Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X₆ % Victimized (Below Mean)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₇ % Assisted (Above Mean)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₉ % Stopped (Above Mean)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₀ % Know Someone Mistreated</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Below Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₁ % Know 1 or more Police</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Above Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₂ % Indicate Crime Increasing</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Below Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₃ % Indicate Police Respond</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Rapidly (Above Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₄ % Rate Police Job Outstanding</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Above Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₅ % Rate PCR Outstanding</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Above Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₆ % Strongly Agree Police</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest (Above Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₁₇ % Strongly Agree Police</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treat All Equally (Above Mean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 9  N = 24  N = 11
knowing police officers, a larger proportion of citizens in both the very small and medium-sized departments know police than in the large departments. Thus, for the experience variables, there is some evidence of a curvilinear relationship for two out of the five variables. For four out of the five variables the proportion of very small departments performing above the mean is larger than or approximately equal to that of the larger departments.

In regard to the evaluation variables, some evidence exists for a curvilinear relationship in regard to two variables \(X_{13}\) and \(X_{14}\). For the other four variables either the very small department is most effective or the two smaller size classes are about equally effective. In no case does a larger proportion of the bigger departments perform above the mean than is present in the very small class of departments. In several instances the difference in proportions between the very small and the large department is quite large even for so small a number of cases.

This evidence does not support the contention that "the very small agencies present much greater problems to the effective and efficient delivery of police services" than all other sized departments made by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Given that victimization rates are lower than average in 78 percent of the neighborhoods surveyed where police services are delivered by a department of ten full-time officers or less, these departments would not appear to be creating "spill-over" problems for other surrounding departments.
On the cost side, the per capita costs of the very small departments are indeed very low. They range from $7.20 to $20.56 per capita. The per capita costs of the small to medium sized departments range from $12.78 to $36.87; and that of the large departments range from $19.29 to $52.77. Consequently, given the relative performance levels, it would be difficult to argue that the very small departments are less efficient. While an efficiency ratio cannot be computed given the nature of our performance measures, departments spending less per capita and performing as well or better than departments spending more per capita can definitely be evaluated as more efficient. One can not determine how much more efficient.

The evidence presented in this section should not be interpreted to support a contention that all efforts to consolidate police departments are likely to lead to less effective or efficient performance. That some of the relationships appear to be curvilinear suggest that departments in the 10 to 76 range may have higher levels of performance on some variables than either the very small or the large departments. Thus, consolidation of several very small departments into a medium-sized department may indeed increase effectiveness. However, the a priori judgement that very small departments are necessarily ineffective and should be eliminated is not supported by this evidence. In fact, this evidence points to more severe problems of law enforcement as occurring among the large departments. If future study commissions wish to
focus on the most ineffective segment of the police industry, they should shift their focus from the very small to the very large.

What Have We Learned?

The first question posed in the introduction to this paper was:

What have we learned in the last decade about the relationship between costs and benefits (economic, social and political) in the provision of urban governmental services? How can we best profit from these lessons?

Evidence Concerning the Effects of Size

During this last decade, we have in the studies described above, a consistent pattern of evidence that is contrary to the underlying assumptions made by proponents of consolidation that consolidation affords "the" solution to "the" urban problem. Both in simple bivariate analysis and in multivariate analysis the size of a police department serving a neighborhood has either a negative relationship or no relationship to a diverse set of performance measures. The studies have been undertaken in five metropolitan areas and have included a nationwide study of 109 cities. For consolidation of police departments to result automatically in improved performance, the evidence should indicate the opposite pattern of relationships.
How Should This Evidence be Interpreted

The lack of findings concerning a positive effect of size of police departments upon the performance of neighborhood level police services should not be interpreted as evidence that all proposed police consolidations should be rejected. The evidence should lead us to be skeptical of automatic acceptance of an assumption that larger scale always leads to improved performance. The data from these studies does not provide evidence one way or another concerning some types of police services including traffic patrol on major metropolitan thoroughfares or the provision of crime laboratory services for example. We have stated in earlier reports that the "most appropriately sized unit for providing one type of service may not be the most appropriate for other types of services." (E. Ostrom and Parks, 1973: 397)

However, proponents of consolidation rarely make this distinction. While pointing to the possibility of economies of scale in such services as the provision of crime laboratories, they frequently go on to assume that such economies occur across the entire range of services. Or, they assume that to gain the potential economies for one service, all services need to be consolidated. While passing reference is made to contracting by smaller departments with specialized agencies for some of their services, the major focus has been on consolidation across all or most services for areas as large as full counties or full metropolitan areas. For example, the range of proposed options that "every local
government and every local police agency should study," according to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, includes the following:

a. Total consolidation of local government services: the merging of two city governments, or city-county governments;

b. Total consolidation of police services: the merging of two or more police agencies or of all police agencies (i.e. regional consolidation) in a given geographic area;

c. Partial consolidation of police services: the merging of specific functional units of two or more agencies;

d. Regionalization of specific police services: the combination of personnel and materiel resources to provide specific police services on a geographic rather than jurisdictional basis;

e. Metropolitanization: the provision of public services (including police) through a single government to the communities within a metropolitan area;

f. Contracting for total police services: the provision of all police services by contract with another government (city with city, city with county, county with city, or city or county with State);

g. Contracting for specific police services: the provision of limited or special police services by contract with another police or criminal justice agency; and

h. Services sharing: the sharing of support services by two or more agencies. (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973: 109)

Half of these options—including the first two mentioned—relate to full merging of all police services. All of the options to be studied suggest that "every local government and every local police agency" may find improved effectiveness or efficiency either by increasing the scale of all police services or some specific services. None of the options
mention, the possibility that larger units might improve their effectiveness by decreasing their scale of operation for at least some services.

The evidence presented above should, it seems to me, support the contention that with regard to regular patrol, immediate response to reported crimes, criminal investigation, the provision of emergency services and other neighborhood level police services, very small to medium sized police departments consistently perform more effectively and frequently at less cost than large police departments. Given these findings, the consistent negative reaction of voters to proposals for total consolidation of all services agencies into larger units may not be as irrational as supporters of consolidation may think. When very small departments combine to provide neighborhood level police services in a small to medium sized department, the effectiveness of their performance with regard to neighborhood level services may increase for some performance indicators. However, sufficient evidence to determine at what size performance may again decrease does not exist. The performance of even the smallest police departments does not approach the crisis proportions that is so frequently asserted. Instead, the consistently poor performance levels occur in neighborhoods served by the large departments.

The Use of Evidence by Study Commissions

In addition to evidence about the effect of size on performance, we also have gained considerable evidence about
the lack of evidence used by national study commissions to support their recommendations. Their reports provide us with considerable insight into how they utilize assertions that serve as proxies for evidence in the preparation of their recommendations. Unfortunately, very little evidence is amassed to support recommendations.

Let us turn first to the Report of the Task Force on Police of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (Task Force on the Police, 1967) In their chapter on "Coordination and Consolidation of Police Service" the Task Force asserts that: "Formal cooperation or consolidation is an essential ingredient in improving the quality of law enforcement." (Ibid., 1967: 68) For the first part of the chapter, various methods of providing staff and auxiliary services through cooperation are explored. When the Task Force turns to its discussion of "Police Service and Jurisdictional Consolidation" it observes:

Thus far, this chapter has considered methods of ameliorating the effects of decentralized local police administration through the coordination or consolidation of staff, auxiliary, and certain field functions. It has not considered coordination or consolidation in relation to basic patrol services; yet, if these services are not considered, it must be on the assumption that every police agency, regardless of size is capable of providing them effectively if staff, auxiliary, and certain field services are available on a coordinated or consolidated basis. Such an assumption is not valid. (Ibid., p. 98)

The Task Force goes on to state its preference for partial or complete consolidation rather than the mixed coordinative devices described earlier in the study.

Partial or complete consolidation of police services reduces conflicts over jurisdiction; with consolidation
there are fewer jurisdictions with which to contend. The more compelling reason for consolidation is the elimination of the law enforcement powers of jurisdictions that do not provide quality law enforcement because of administrative deficiencies or financial inadequacies. (Ibid., p. 99)

What evidence is cited to support this contention? The only evidence cited in the Report are lists of departments indicating their size or manpower employed. For example:

A recent survey of police manpower in two counties in the Chicago metropolitan area revealed that many of the small departments employ more part-time (not auxiliary) police officers than full-time officers. Indeed, one department was entirely so staffed.... A similar survey in Onondage County, Syracuse, N.Y., showed that there are 13 towns and 17 villages employing a total of only 34 full-time police officers and that the bulk of police service is provided by 104 part-time officers. (Ibid., p. 98-99)

Lists of agencies and the number of officers employed tells us nothing about their comparative performance. The reason given for the assumption that part-time police officers are less effective than full-time officers is that part-time officers are assumed to be less well trained. We have seen that the data from the St. Louis study does not provide evidence that training automatically improves performance. Further, depending upon state law, part-time officers may be as well trained as full-time officers. There is no necessary connection between the level of training and the employment status of an officer.

The data from the Chicago study mentioned above compared the performance of two of the departments which employ large numbers of part-time officers. In the Task Force's compilation, East Chicago Heights employed 5 full-time and 4 part-
time officers and Phoenix employed 7 full-time and 13 part-time officers. However, these police departments which the Task Force finds "distressing" were shown in our data to perform at least as well as the Chicago Police Department in serving similar neighborhoods. It should also be observed that when the Police Chiefs from these two departments sought federal or state funds to increase their financial resources, the only grants for which they were eligible (because of their size) were Planning Grants to consider consolidation with adjacent communities. Given that adjacent communities in both instances were populated primarily by white residents, consolidation was politically infeasible. Their joint proposal to consider consolidation of some of their staff services was rejected because the communities were located 7 miles apart. Somehow it is efficient to have one crime laboratory in an entire metropolitan area to serve all municipalities regardless of distance; but it is inefficient for two departments located 7 miles apart to share joint facilities.

Several places in the Task Force Report: The Police the staff appears to have relied upon a single and interested respondent to supply information on controversial questions. For example, in discussing criminal investigation services the Report discusses several arrangements including that in Suffolk County, New York and that in the Metropolitan Police Department in Nashville-Davidson County. In Suffolk County they found that the County provided only follow-up criminal.
investigation within separately incorporated communities. They then go on to report:

The Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville-Davidson County provides a similar service, but there is an important difference resulting from the way the police services in the two jurisdictions are organized. The Nashville-Davidson department provides complete police service to all Davidson County including the areas served by three small municipal departments, none of which employs criminal investigators. If a citizen in an area served by a separated department needs immediate service, he may call either the metropolitan police or the independent department; but even though it receives the initial call, the independent department usually relays it to the metropolitan department. Thus, the metropolitan department assumes complete control of cases from initial through followup investigation. (Ibid., p. 94)

The source of this information was an interview with Hubert O. Kemp, Chief Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville-Davidson County. This information was apparently not verified with any of the other three police departments involved.

When Rogers and Lipsey undertook their study in 1973, they asked respondents living in Berry Hill (the incorporated community) and in Woodbine (the adjacent neighborhood) "What Police Department has Jurisdiction in this neighborhood?" Ninety eight of the 106 Berry Hill respondents indicated Berry Hill alone while the remainder (other than one "don't know") indicated some joint or individual responsibility by the Metro police force. Of those living in Woodbine who were formally served only by Metro, 15% indicated that Berry Hill had either sole or joint responsibility for police services in their neighborhood. (Rogers & Lipsey, 1974: 23) These findings surprised Rogers and Lipsey and they asked to ride with the Berry Hill police to see why respondents
outside the jurisdiction of Berry Hill had indicated service by the small adjoining department. In the normal course of patrol, they found the Berry Hill police routinely patrolled into the adjacent area as well as within Berry Hill itself. Further, they found that Berry Hill Police at times answered calls for the Metro Police Department in adjacent areas due to the thin coverage offered by the Metro police generally and the absence of all Metro patrols from the streets during roll call three times each day.18 Thus, information to the effect that the Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville-Davidson county pursues most calls in the independent communities from the beginning appears not to be substantiated when the residents involved are interviewed and observations are made concerning day to day operations.

At a later juncture in the same report, the Task Force indicates that the continued existence of private police forces and small municipal police departments has been a problem for the Nashville-Davidson County area.

This is unfortunate because of some overlapping jurisdiction and because the residents of areas served by the metropolitan department and the private or small municipal agencies, as a matter of local choice, are paying more for police protection than is necessary. As has been noted, however, jurisdictional problems are minimized by the unquestioned authority of the metropolitan department. As a practical matter, the chief of the metropolitan department feels that the independent departments served a useful purpose in the period following the reorganization before the metropolitan department could adequately cover the suburban and rural areas. This situation has now been remedied through the addition of personnel and an increase in patrol coverage. (Task Force on Police, 1967: 102)

The Task Force on Police relied for information both about
interjurisdictional arrangements and about comparative performance levels upon an interview with one Chief of Police in the larger jurisdiction.

The evidence they use to support their analysis of the performance of large and/or consolidated departments generally does not appear to be any better than the evidence used to support their evaluation of the performance of the Metropolitan Department of Nashville-Davidson County in particular.

Even more startling, when one thinks about it for a while, is the circumstance that the parent body of this Task Force—the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice—did expend a large sum on empirical research. It contracted with the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago to conduct a nationwide victimization survey and a general survey of citizen attitudes toward the local police. However, neither the President's Commission nor NORC included information about the size of jurisdictions nor the number of jurisdictions rendering police services to respondents in each sample area. We subsequently added some of this information and our data supplied evidence to reject several of the Commission's recommendations as being empirically unwarranted. (Ostrom & Parks, 1973)

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals does not appear to have utilized evidence any more effectively than its predecessor. In its list of References for its chapter on "Combined Police Services" no empirical studies of the relationship between size and
costs or performance are listed. Several textbooks, articles describing innovations in *The Police Chief* and various reports of local study commissions or local police departments are listed.

In describing the recent consolidation of the City of Lexington and Fayette County, Kentucky, the National Advisory Commission reports:

The city and county police departments have merged and the chief of the merged department reports to the chief executive of the urban county government.

Combining police responsibilities under one agency permitted the consolidation of such functions as communications, records and identification, investigation, and traffic and patrol. The result has been greater overall efficiency. (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973: 113, my emphasis)

There is no citation of any evidence utilized to support this assertion about "greater overall efficiency."

The Report continues to discuss the Jacksonville consolidation:

The Jacksonville consolidation demonstrated that although consolidation may be more efficient, it is not necessarily more economical. Consolidation may require more personnel to bring all areas up to the level of desired service; it may involve salary increases to equalize the salaries of personnel involved in the merger, and it may cost more to equip and house the larger staff. Consolidation is much less likely to save money than to improve effectiveness. (Ibid., p. 113, my emphasis)

Again, no citation or evidence is presented to support these claims of improved effectiveness and increased efficiency.19

The National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators in its 1974 report on the State of the States on Crime and Justice indicates as cited above that many states are studying the need to assimilate smaller
Police departments into larger units. In prefacing this report of state activities, the report observes:

Several recent studies have indicated that small police departments—those with fewer than ten officers are usually cited—often provide inadequate services and are not cost effective. (National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, 1974: 43)

Even though the report is generally footnoted, no references are cited for this statement.

Each of the groups whose reports I have discussed in this section is willing to recommend rather sweeping reforms of our current jurisdictional system for the provision of police services in the United States. However, little real concern has been given to evidence concerning the effects of the suggested reforms. Is the traditional paradigm of public administration which assumes big is always better so engrained that consideration of evidence would be too confusing? (V. Ostrom, 1973) The evidence presented in this paper would lead one to question the assumptions that the real crises of performance occurs in the very small departments and that consolidation is the key to improved performance in law enforcement. Indeed, the provision of some police services by larger agencies may indeed be more cost effective. However, there is no reason a large agency must be a "consolidated" agency. The provision of some neighborhood services may be improved if some very small departments were combined to form a small to medium sized department. However, this possibility should not be used as the basis for recommending county-wide police forces to serve most metropolitan areas.
Evidence Concerning the Effects of Formal Police Training and College Education

In addition to the evidence presented concerning the effects of the size of police department, data from the St. Louis study also provides evidence concerning the effects of formal police training and college education on the performance of police departments.

With regard to formal police training, the data indicate that levels of formal police training are positively associated with the size of a police department. However, when size of police department is controlled (as well as background SES variables), training consistently has a weakly negative effect on a series of evaluation variables and no consistent effect on experience variables. Thus, some of the assertions in the police literature that better trained police will perform better are not supported by evidence. (However, data on the levels of training was obtained only in the St. Louis study, so that this evidence is not based on multiple studies.) In fact, the strongest relationship between training and an evaluation variable is with police-community relations. The more training, other factors held constant, the lower the evaluation of police-community relations given a department by the citizens served.

College education did not have any consistent impact on either experience or evaluation variables.

How Should This Evidence be Interpreted

The evidence concerning the negligible negative effects
of training should not be interpreted as meaning that "all training is bad or worthless." The key question that needs to be asked about the training of police or other public officials, is what kind of training will most effectively help public officials do their job best. Unfortunately, this question is rarely asked. Advocates of more training talk about the minimum number of hours of training needed without attention to what is taught and with what results.

There are a number of different types of training strategies. In a study of the New York Police Department, John A. McNamara focused on one of the major dilemmas faced by all departments in preparing recruits for duty in the field. The question McNamara posed is whether a department should "emphasize training strategies aimed at the development of self-directed and autonomous personnel or ... emphasize strategies aimed at developing personnel over whom the organization can easily exercise control." (McNamara, 1967: 251)

McNamara found that the New York department had emphasized the second strategy by stressing command supervision over the work of patrolmen and negative sanctions which can be applied against patrolmen found in violation of the department's massive, 400-page Rules and Procedures. As a consequence, recruits ranked the Rules and Procedures handbook their most useful study materials over all other items, including the Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedures, lecture notes, and all technical literature. At the same time, 60
per cent of the recruits disagreed with the statement, "Patrolmen who rely entirely on the Rules and Procedures of the Department are probably excellent police officers." (Ibid., p. 240) After two years in the field, 80 per cent of the patrolmen interviewed agreed with the statement, "It is impossible to always follow the Rules and Procedures to the letter and still do an efficient job in police work." (Ibid., p. 241) However, of the patrolmen who had served two years in the field, 55 per cent agreed that a "patrolman, for his own good, should never deviate from the provisions contained in the Rules and Procedures." (Ibid., p. 241)

Given the findings from our St. Louis study, it would seem important to begin a serious effort to determine what type of training programs do effectively prepare police officers for high performance in police work when evaluated by different performance criteria. Simple acceptance of the notion that trained officers perform better or that more training leads to higher performance ignores the question of what type of training and whether it adequately prepares an officer for the problems he faces in his work.

The relationship of formal training, formal college education and learning while coping with practical problems in a work situation is a problem meriting serious investigation. Presumably the marginal value of added expenditures for formal training will decline to some point where costs exceed benefits. Beyond that point, added increments of learning will occur primarily in the context of work experience.
Formal training necessarily relates to generalized relationships. Skill in the practice of an occupation or profession depends upon a consideration of discrete time and place variables that apply in considering general relationships. General relationships take on different values in relation to specific time and place variables. Learning to solve problems in discrete time and place circumstances requires more than formal training or formal education.

The structure of institutional arrangements involves the allocation of rewards and penalties in relation to the patterns of conduct that are carried on in a work situation. In this sense, institutions provide the mechanisms for operand conditioning that apply to conduct involved in the delivery of a public service. An appropriate set of institutions presumably would facilitate learning that leads to improved performance and would deter learning that leads to poor performance. A factor of size would be expected to affect relative dominance of particular types of institutional constraints that give expression to supervisory authority, consumer satisfaction or dissatisfaction, articulation and aggregation of citizen voice in collective decisions, and exposure to external review processes. Patterns of organization, thus, become sets of relationships that condition learning. One might expect that the larger the size the more reliance is placed on internal supervisory authority and the less on either direct citizen voice or the articulation of citizen preferences through the process of representation. Some forms of organization may condition learning in the
direction of poor performance rather than good performance.

Constitutional and Jurisdictional Questions Involved in Increasing the Responsiveness of Local Government

The second question posed in the introduction to this paper was:

To what extent should constitutional and jurisdictional questions be considered in evaluating the specifics of governmental services to the public? How can existing jurisdictional divisions and constitutional claims be utilized to increase the responsiveness of government to public needs and interests?

Jurisdictional Arrangements and Governmental Services

For many years, the predominant wisdom has held that particular types of jurisdictional arrangements are conclusive evidence of a low output of governmental services and inefficient utilization of public resources. In a chapter entitled "Defective Institutions," the CED, for example, severely criticizes the criminal justice "non-system" which, though in "dire need of modernization," will not be helped by "piecemeal tinkering". (CED, 1972: 13)

One major obstacle to broad national reform lies in the complex nature of American federalism as it relates to crime and justice, making evasion of responsibility easy. Citizens who desire better protection for persons and property become confused over which level of government or which agencies are primarily at fault. Wherever they turn, they find a resistance to change traditional in both bureaucratic and political circles. The result is continuing deterioration—a trend that must be reversed, promptly and decisively, to secure a viable society. The main constitutional responsibility for crime prevention and control rests upon the states, an assignment they have botched. They have
failed to keep their criminal codes up-to-date, and they have turned responsibility for enforcement over to a welter of overlapping counties, municipalities, townships; and special districts. Despite the obvious and urgent need, the states have neither straightened out their tangled and ineffective patterns of local government nor assumed direct responsibility for law enforcement. (Ibid., p. 14)

The CED is in essence arguing that law enforcement services are grossly inadequate in the US. They see "the complex nature of American federalism" as a major cause of this inadequacy. In their chapter proposing solutions, entitled "Clearing the Hurdle of Federalism" they argue that:

Piecemeal reform of the patchwork structure of criminal justice will fail; a more fundamental approach must be taken. The highly complex multilevel federal system, evolved from simpler beginnings, has its merits--but an ability to solve the American crime problem is not among them. The present intricate division of responsibilities, functions and financial support among national, state and local levels is the chief barrier to acceptable patterns of criminal justice. Drastic changes in these arrangements are needed, but our proposals, while overcoming existing obstacles, would retain the basic element in the federal concept--a close cooperation between the nation and the states. (Ibid., p. 64)

This view of American federalism as "the chief barrier" to acceptable levels of governmental services is not confined to analysts focusing only on police services. Congressman Henry S. Reuss, for example, has argued:

The fragmentation and overlapping of local government spells inferior services, waste, and the high taxes that necessarily follow. Little towns, villages, and counties have inefficiency built into their smallness and lack of human and financial resources. They cannot attract experts or specialists or take advantage of the savings accruing from automation and data-processing that are within the financial reach of larger units of government. (Reuss, 1970: 56)

Reuss proposes, in his book and in proposed legislation, a "marriage of revenue-sharing and of state-local government
modernization." (Ibid., p. 124) Reuss would tie a block grant program to the creation within a state of a "modern-governments program" which "must include plans and timetables for a whole series of reforms." (Ibid., p. 125) He describes these reforms in the following manner:

The laundry list of possible reforms is derived from recommendations over a long period of time by such good-government organizations as the Committee for Economic Development, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the Council of State Governments, the National Municipal League, the National League of Cities, the Mayors' Conference, and the National Association of Counties. (Ibid., p. 125)

He sees the possibilities for a "centralizing and regionalizing revolution in local government" which would be distinguished by several new developments. The first he points to is:

Fewer local governments. The number of counties, towns, villages, and special districts could be drastically reduced from its present 81,000 in order to enable local government to obtain adequate geographical powers and revenue sources effectively to solve local problems and to eliminate wasteful Lilliputs. Many rural counties too small to be efficient could consolidate with their neighbors for regional cooperation. Archaic township governments--17,000 of them--could be steadily abolished. All told, it could be the greatest decimation of redundant governments since the consolidation of rural school districts under the pressure of state governments in the 1950's. (Ibid., p. 145)

The other possibilities he sees include metropolitan government, home rule, the short ballot and the merit system. He too is concerned about the major handicaps of a federal system and argues that his proposal for federal revenue-sharing "as a device to induce states to modernize local governments could be what is needed to make federalism work." (Ibid., p. 147)
In its recent report entitled *American Federalism: Into the Third Century. Its Agenda*, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations adopts a similar perspective though somewhat modified from some of their own earlier reports. Fragmentation of local government structure is considered "tragic for urban America." (ACIR, 1974: 8) ACIR urges a policy upon the states to discourage "non-viable" units.

For a variety of reasons—to dodge city taxes, to entice industry, and to avoid certain kinds of neighbors—thousands of independent political subdivisions have been incorporated in the absence of strong state boundary supervision. These areas contribute heavily to metropolitan fiscal disparities, to urban sprawl and to the overlapping metropolitan jurisdictional map.

ACIR seeks State action to discourage the formation of new units and the merger of existing non-viable units with viable general purpose governments. . . . (Ibid., p: 10)

Jurisdictional arrangements are considered by most "good-government organizations" as the primary factor affecting the quality of governmental services in metropolitan America. Large numbers of jurisdictions serving an area are equated automatically with inferior governmental services. Complex structures are presumed to be bad. The consistent solution in this diagnosis of "inadequate" governmental services is to move toward a more unitary system and away from the more polycentric system which has developed in the American federal system. Federalism by its very nature implies multiplicity, fragmentation and overlap. However, it is these "hurdles" which the "good-government organizations" wish to eliminate in order to make federalism work.
The State of California is frequently cited as one of the states in which problems of fragmentation and overlap are most severe. In 1973 there were 4,703 units of local government in California including 58 counties, 410 cities and 4,235 special districts. (Task Force on Local Government Reform, 1974: 6) Reforming the local governmental structure in California is an issue which has frequently been raised. In the early spring of 1973, a Local Government Reform Task Force was appointed by the Governor to explore the effects of jurisdictional arrangements on governmental services. The Task Force undertook an extensive research effort on the relationship between fragmentation and scale, on the one hand, and costs and performance levels on the other. Its research focussed on California data. It also made an extensive review of the literature on empirical research about these relationships.

The Task Force did not adopt the assumption stated by ACIR that political subdivisions have been created only "to dodge city taxes, to entice industry and to avoid certain kinds of neighbors." The Task Force argued that "the number of local governments must be seen as a function of citizen demand for certain services and the kinds of governments that provide them." (Task Force of Local Government Reform, 1974: 8)

Thus, the number of units seems to increase with an area's need for specialized services, either technical (and often agricultural) services such as irrigation, land reclamation, or limited urban services like sewage, lighting and water supply. Only 20% of all independent special districts are found in the 12 most
populous counties, which represent over 72% of California's population. Indeed, taken to its logical (but, in this case farcical) conclusion, as measured by number of governments per capita, Alpine, Modoc and Sierra are the most "fragmented" counties, while Los Angeles, Alameda and Santa Clara counties are least "fragmented." (Ibid., p. 8)

In addition to a large number of supporting empirical studies, the final report of the Task Force presented a rather extensive summary of empirical data related to the effects of size and fragmentation on services costs and economies of scale. Minus references to specific data, the Task Force outlined its findings in the following manner:

1. Service Costs
   a. Per Capita Expenditures
      1) In a given area total per capita local government expenditures do not rise as the number of units increases.
      2) Per capita costs increase along with the size, rather than the number, of government units.
      3) Per capita expenditures by function also increase with size.
   b. Economies of Scale
      1) The Task Force found no statistically significant relationship for labor intensive services between the size of government unit and the cost of performance. The Task Force conducted studies on the relationship of size to cost for the following services: County Assessor's Services, County Tax Collection, County Elections, Municipal Fire Protection, County Road Maintenance, Municipal Street Maintenance, Sewage Treatment, Education, County Welfare, County Medical Assistance.
      2) Research has suggested that public agencies and particularly large ones may not capture economies of scale.
c. Public and Private Service Contracting

1) Contracting for service provides local governments with a choice of service producer and allows small units to realize cost savings where they exist.

2) Private service provision also offers local governments an excellent opportunity to reduce service costs for many functions. (Ibid., pp. 10-15)

After a consideration of the evidence, the Task Force concluded that:

a system of highly flexible and independent local government units is as capable or more capable of providing the quality of service that people expect than a centralized and consolidated government system. In fact, our evidence on functional costs, on economies of scale and on the impact of professional influence indicates that a reduction in the number of governmental units, through consolidation of local units, would produce a system less likely to provide public services of a quality and at a cost that suit the diverse preferences of the citizens of California.

The assumption that poor service levels are associated with small scale and fragmentation has little support in empirical evidence. Reiteration of assertions, accepted on faith by "good-government organizations," does not establish the empirical warrantability of those assertions. Decision making that is uninformed by evidence about basic relationships will not help to improve performance.

The Constitutional Issue of Neighborhood Government

Jurisdictional arrangements may indeed be critical elements in the improvement of local governmental services. However, the most serious need may be for more jurisdictions in our most highly consolidated cities. Milton Kotler in the Epilogue to his book on Neighborhood Government calls for
new constitutional arrangements within cities of the United States to provide residents of urban neighborhood with political power and the resources to cope with problems they jointly face in the context of their neighborhoods. It may well be that the most important constitutional issue of the next decade is a realignment of jurisdictional authority in urban areas to allow citizens concerned with problems of varying scales--large and small--to develop institutional arrangements whose boundaries encompass the scale of the problem concerned. This means the capability of solving problems which primarily affect a neighborhood with decision making arrangements based within that neighborhood. It also means the capability of solving inter-neighborhood problems with decision making arrangements encompassing several neighborhoods.

This constitutional issue--unlike those that affect the nation as a whole--cannot be resolved by action of the Federal government. What is needed is an opening of the institutional options so that those affected can utilize the mix of institutional arrangements most suited to their common needs. These constitutional questions need to be settled by processes of constitutional choice in ways that are appropriate to particular problems of collective action. Neighborhood problems call for neighborhood solutions.
FOOTNOTES

1See Elinor Ostrom (1972) for extensive citations to this literature.

2See, for example, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), CED (1972) and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973). See also Skolnick and Hetler (1970).


4However, Walzer (1972) has recently reported a negatively sloped average cost curve for a small sample of Illinois cities for traffic investigation and criminal apprehension activities.

5Several recent studies have discussed the problems of measuring police output or police effectiveness and concluded that most of the currently used measures -- i.e., reported crime rates or arrest rates -- are inadequate (See National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973:151-153); Advisory Group on Productivity in Law Enforcement (1973:7-12); American Bar Association, 1972). These same reports see victimization surveys as a more accurate method of obtaining information about incidence of crime than reported crime rates. Further, there is a more general acceptance of other indicators derived from citizen surveys than was present a few years back. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals reports: Perhaps the most controversial group of new indicators of police effectiveness are those that are products of citizen feelings toward the police. The extent to which the police are successful in alleviating citizens' fear of crime reflects police productivity. Consequently, the percentage of the population having feelings of insecurity about police protection should be measured, perhaps as part of a victimization survey.

Conversely, public acceptance of the police could enable the agency to be more effective in deterring crime and apprehending criminals. Citizen satisfaction with police services thus should be evaluated. As such surveys are undertaken, it would be desirable to measure attitudes among various population groups, based on age, income, race, sex and other variables. It should also be understood that such citizen perceptions are often swayed by conditions totally unrelated to police behavior, performance or effectiveness. (p. 153).

For an extended discussion of these problems see E. Ostrom (1971) and (1973).

6In another work we outlined some of the reasons for expecting a negative relationship between size and citizen experiences and evaluations. (I. Ostrom, et. al, 1973:10-13) Specifically the following propositions were stated:

1. Police officers and police administrators working in small-scale police agencies will have better information about the areas they serve and conditions in the field than will their counterparts in larger agencies.
2. Citizens living in smaller jurisdictions will have more capacity to articulate demands for service and will have better knowledge about their police than will citizens living in larger jurisdictions.

3. An increase in the capacity of citizens to articulate demands for service and an increase in their knowledge about police will be associated with an increase in the knowledge that police officers and police administrators have of citizen preferences.

4. An increase in the citizens' knowledge about police will be associated with an increase in their support of police.

5. An increase in citizens' support of police will be associated with an increase in the levels of police output.

6. An increase in the knowledge of police officers about the area they are serving and about citizen preferences will be associated with an increase in the levels of police output.

7. An increase in the knowledge of police administrators of field conditions in their area will be associated with an increase in their effective control over actions of their departments.

8. An increase in the effective control of police administrators over actions of their department will be associated with an increase in the levels of police output.

9. An increase in the level of police output will be associated with an increase in citizen support for the police. (Ibid., 1r-13)

In regard to costs, one would expect at least a minimal level of investment would need to be made in each department for supervisory and supportive services. Very small police departments will have, therefore, a major portion of their budget devoted to such investment. Increases in size away from very small departments reduces the portion of the budget devoted to these investments and should therefore reduce the average cost of production. However, a continuous increase in the size of department begins to add more and more levels of hierarchy to the department as well as more specialization. These additional levels of hierarchy may add to the costs of providing police services in two ways. First, the costs may be increased substantially by just the investment in the supportive services. Secondly, costs may rise because those in command begin to lose control over the performance of at the street level. Thus, costs may have some aspects of a curvilinear relationship with size. Movement from very small departments to medium sized departments may lower average costs while movement to larger departments may again increase average costs.

7The hypotheses from the alternative perspective have been stated in F. Ostrom, et al. (1973) and E. Ostrom & Whitaker (1973).

For a discussion of rival hypotheses see Campbell (1969) and Campbell & Standley (1966).

Roger B. Parks and Dennis C. Smith both shared in the design and execution of this study. We are appreciative of the participation of many graduate and undergraduate students at Indiana University in making this study possible. We are also appreciative of the excellent cooperation we were given by police chiefs, police officers and citizens in the St. Louis area.


Copies of the survey instruments utilized in this study are available by writing to the author.

The method utilized for allocating costs of police service provided a neighborhood by a large department as described in E. Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1973).

A stepwise multiple regression program was utilized. The R2 value represents the variance explained by the total equation.

We also found that the mean level of college education of officers in a department was weakly and negatively related to success in obtaining warrants while mean total weeks of training showed an inconsistent pattern in regard to the ratio of warrants applied for to warrants issued. See E. Ostrom & Smith (1974).

See Boyle (1966); Duncan (1966); Dye & Pollack (1973); VanMeter & Asher (1973).

When the variable -- number of full-time officers is squared and entered into multiple regression equations, the size of the coefficient rises slightly giving some evidence of a curvilinear relationship. The untransformed variable was utilized throughout this paper since it is much more meaningful to those interested in affecting changes in institutional arrangements.

Personal communication with Bruce Rogers. The low coverage of the Metro Police has become a major issue in Nashville. The following editorial appeared in the Nashville Banner on January 10, 1974:

For many years, Nashvillians have known, to one degree or another, that their police department was not adequate for its job. People have not always agreed on why this was true -- and indeed there have been various operational shortcomings over the years. But behind the inadequacy has long been -- and certainly is now -- a lack of money.

While the crime rate goes up and up, the Metro Police Department is in critical need of funds to support even basic policing operations.
The extent of the need is vividly shown in the survey of 40 police departments across the country made by the Kansas City Police Department. Nashville ranks near the bottom in almost every phase of the survey -- while serious crimes here increase 13.4 per cent -- to 17,859 -- during the first nine months of last year over the same period of 1972.

Metro ranks very low among the 40 cities studied as to its number of policemen related to area and population; fourth from the bottom in its police budget per-capita; ninth from lowest in total budgeted dollars, and equally as low or lower in salaries of officers -- all this despite the fact that a number of the cities are smaller than Nashville-Davidson County, which are combined into our one local government.

Jacksonville for all the mentioned increase in costs still has police coverage that is way below the average for the forty largest police departments in the country surveyed by the Kansas City Department each year. In regard to the number of police officers per 1000 population, Nashville, Jacksonville and Indianapolis are all among the lowest 7 departments included in the 1973 report. In regard to the number of policemen per square mile of area patrolled, Nashville, Oklahoma City and Jacksonville are the lowest three departments included in the 1973 report.
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

It is hoped that you may have learned from this Study Guide that empirical research can be made quite relevant for the consideration of important public policy problems. We as social scientists can undertake research which those making public policies can utilize in helping to predict the likely range of consequences to result from a change in institutional arrangements. However, to be cost effective in our research undertakings, we should be guided by the examination of alternative theoretical structures which predict different consequences from the same set of conditions. In this way, research can simultaneously increase the warrantability of one theoretical tradition and decrease the warrantability of another.

In regard to the problem of metropolitan reform, empirical analysis has demonstrated that some of the consequences predicted by advocates of traditional metropolitan reforms, and in particular of consolidation, are unlikely to occur in regard to some types of police services. The consistency in the findings across a number of metropolitan areas and one national study should lead to a serious questioning of the warrantability of the theoretical structure underlying the traditional metropolitan reform movement as it applies to services like police whose budgets are largely devoted to personnel. These studies do not provide evidence concerning other types of public goods and services which are more capital intensive such as water supply, sewage disposal and urban transportation systems.
It is also hoped that you will be able to conceptualize projects that would add to our cumulative body of knowledge about institutional analysis applied to the problem of metropolitan reform. Clarifying the nature of the theoretical structures underlying reform proposals is a major activity that has only just been initiated. Sketches of theoretical structures underlying several traditions have appeared in this Study Guide or in your assigned readings. However, those sketches need filling out. Specific operational propositions and their alternates need to be stated. Research then can be undertaken.

It should be pointed out that empirical research in the field of institutional analysis need not be large-scale in nature. Most of the research reported on in Chapter X was conducted as part of a teaching program. Students learned both some approaches to institutional analysis and some social science methodology. The first of the series of studies -- the one conducted in Indianapolis -- cost approximately $500 of out-of-pocket expenses prior to the extended data analysis phase. Thus, the drawing of the sample, the design of the questionnaire, its application in the field, coding and preliminary data analysis was accomplished for an extremely modest sum. The rewards that undergraduate students gain from participating in “real” research projects are numerous. They learn about the problems of questionnaire construction and all the errors that can occur during a research project unless extreme care is maintained. They learn from the direct experience of working as an interviewer. Their image of “the typical American family” is enriched considerably as a result of this direct interaction with respondents. They also learn that they can contribute to an on-going intellectual enterprise which may have considerable impact upon their
own daily lives at a future date.

Whether your inclinations are toward the theoretical or toward the empirical, I do hope that you will continue to be a practitioner of institutional analysis both in your role as a social scientist and as a citizen. Through concentrated effort, we may be able to learn what reforms are likely to produce more good than more harm. Until we can do that, our usefulness as policy analysis is relatively limited.