A recurring puzzle in Aristotle's "Rhetoric" is the book's ethical stance; Aristotle gives practical advice on the use of persuasive discourse and intends it to be used in association with virtue, although the two seem to be separable. However, persuasion and virtue in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric have connections deriving from the nature of the art of rhetoric itself. The ideal practitioner of rhetoric employs the skills and qualities of "phronesis," or practical wisdom, as outlined in the "Nicomachean Ethics." Three arguments support this contention. (1) The definitions and concerns of the concepts of rhetoric and phronesis are strikingly similar. (2) Excellent performance of rhetoric requires the characteristics of practical wisdom. (3) The relationships desired between the person of practical wisdom and the public closely parallel the relationships between the rhetorician and the audience. The interpretation of the ethical stance of the "Rhetoric" must rely on important theoretical and practical relationships between rhetoric and phronesis. The person of practical wisdom has the capacity and the incentive to be an ideal rhetorician. Only when practical wisdom is applied to rhetoric is there the ideal situation in which the name "rhetorician" denotes excellence both of artistry and of purpose.
A recurring puzzle in evaluations of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the assessment of the book's moral or ethical stance, a stance variously argued to be explicit, implicit, and absent. Whitney Cates charges that "ambivalence" about questions of value is the "most striking characteristic" of the Rhetoric and explains this ambivalence in terms of Aristotle's apparent inconsistency of focus:

we can see in the Rhetoric, when the author has foremost in his mind his thought in logic, ethics, and politics, a reflection of the views expressed therein toward matters of value. But when he is in the mood of an author of a practical handbook, any concern for value seems in some places to vanish, leaving us in a realm of amoralism, if not immoralism.1

Though he does not sermonize throughout his discussion of rhetorical techniques about the ends for which those means are to be used, Aristotle does offer numerous indications of ethical concern in the Rhetoric. He notes for example, "It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger, or envy, or pity--one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it." And, after commenting on the value of knowing how to argue both sides of a question, he reminds the reader that in actual practice, "We must not make people believe what is wrong."2 Of course, Aristotle's practical advice about rhetoric, like the rain, falls on the evil man as well as the good and as Henry Johnstone has noted, our modern "uneasiness" about persuasion "arises partly because Aristotle's association of persuasion and virtue has come unstuck," and we fear the use of persuasive techniques in the hands of the unvirtuous.3 It is not necessary, however, to move from this point to the assumption that the concerns for both ethicality
and practicality in discourse are inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive. There is no necessary conflict between ethical persuasion and effective persuasion in the Rhetoric; in fact, Aristotle's statement that the truth tends to be more persuasive than lies (R 1355b21-22) suggests just the contrary.

This essay seeks to establish the claim that there is an "association of persuasion and virtue" in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric which derives from the nature of the art of rhetoric itself; more specifically, that the ideal practitioner of Aristotle's Rhetoric employs the skills and qualities of Aristotle's model of virtue, the Phronimos or "man of practical wisdom," who is described in the Nicomachean Ethics. Three arguments support this contention. First, Aristotle's view of rhetoric should be understood in relation to the concept of practical wisdom since the definitions and provinces of concern assigned by Aristotle to the two concepts are strikingly similar. Secondly, excellent performance of the art of rhetoric Aristotle describes requires the characteristics associated with practical wisdom (phronesis). Finally, the desirable relationship of the man of practical wisdom to the public closely parallels the relationship Aristotle posits between the rhetor and the audience in the Rhetoric.

The importance of studying the Rhetoric within the context of the Aristotelian corpus is suggested by Aristotle's announcing directly that "rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectical and also of ethical studies" which are political in nature (R 1356a25-26). The Politics argues, of course, that society's upper class (presumed to be virtuous) should control the state--no one charges Aristotle with egalitarianism. Yet Aristotle included in the Politics a right of revolution and since he obviously did not advocate tyranny, we may assume that the elite reigns through the force of public persuasion and the symbolic power of their status. For the student of
rhetoric the question of how virtuous leaders are to succeed in convincing the rest of the citizenry of their wisdom remains: how do they hold sway over their fellow citizens who are the "judges" of their rhetoric?\(^4\) If the link between such persuasive power and virtue was anything more for Aristotle than wishful thinking we might well expect to find in his discussion of ethics some indication of the requisite qualities of the ideal orator. And, we do.

Such qualities are the distinct endowments of the man of practical wisdom. Aristotle's "productive art" of rhetoric and "intellectual virtue" of practical wisdom have much in common.\(^5\) Both function in the domain of the "variable," in the realm where human deliberation or calculation results in probable truth about contingent matters. In the section of the *Nicomachean Ethics* wherein the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom is elaborated, Aristotle asserts that the calculative aspect of man's soul functions through two distinct "reasoned states of capacity"—"making" (or art) and "doing" (or virtue).\(^6\)

The definition of art illumines the definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (*R* 1355b26-27). Art is defined as:

a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are concerned with the variable. (*NE* 1140a20-29).

A "true course of reasoning" enables the artist to select the relative mean between excess and defect which characterizes all good art. Classifying rhetoric as an art marks it as a normative process. Making an artful discourse requires, by definition, pursuing a "true course of reasoning," in examining available means of persuasion and weaving them into an appeal for a particular judgment from a particular audience.\(^7\) By the same definition,
eschewing such a careful process of invention and composition in favor of a "false course of reasoning"—perhaps displayed in attempts to manipulate or distort the audience's judgment—is certainly possible, but not artistic. As E.M. Cope pointed out long ago, the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as an art emphasizes the process of discovering means of persuasion, not just the achievement of persuasive effects.

Yet, while good action may be an end in itself, "making" or art, according to Aristotle, always involves some end other than itself (NE 1140b6-7). In the Rhetoric the end of the art is clear—"Rhetoric finds its end in judgment." The Rhetoric describes the enthymeme, the very "substance of rhetorical persuasion" as the primary method of evoking an audience's values and premises on behalf of a particular judgment. William Grimaldi argues that all three of the book's isteis entechnoi—logos, pathos, and ethos—function as enthymemes and, though any of the proofs may be used independently, "rhetorical demonstration which is directed toward achieving judgment from the auditor in the area of human action demands specifically a presentation which confronts both the intellectual and appetitive faculties, or reason, ethos, and pathos." Obviously the rhetorical artist needs knowledge of all the aspects of the human soul and the ability to achieve in each situation the appropriate balance of appeals to evoke the desired response in the audience. He must lead his audience by inviting participation in judgment, by reasoned, balanced appeals to the various elements of their total human personalities. Implicit in such a practice of the art of rhetoric are responsibilities to the art and the audience.

Immediately following the discussion of art in the Ethics Aristotle treats the other "capacity of the calculative part of the soul"—the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Phronesis is a virtue "concerned
with action," with "doing." Aristotle writes, "Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods" (NE 1140a20-21). We credit a person with having practical wisdom when he is "able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g., about what sorts of things conduce to health and strength, but about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general" (NE 1140a25-29). In a sense, the man of practical wisdom bridges the gap between "making" and "doing" since his deliberations directly instruct, even "command" action (NE 1143a10), due to their wisdom. This fact links the virtue of phronésis to the master art of politics.

Aristotle states that:

[this is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate well, but no one deliberates about things invariable, nor things which have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by action. The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action (1141b9-14).

According to Helen North, "the traditional Greek feeling for moderation" (sophrosyne) "finds its most comprehensive expression in Aristotle's theory of the Mean" and sophrosyne and phronésis are interdependent.12

The man of practical wisdom continuously balances the good and the expedient, the ideal and the possible. The consistent quality of his deliberations is such that virtue is defined by his choices and behavior. The Ethics asserts that virtue is "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it" (NE 1106a36-1107b2).

That we know this "golden mean" by examining the choices made by the man of practical wisdom and also recognize the man of practical wisdom by the fact that he typically selects the mean is a tautology often noted by
students of the Ethics. Aristotle's explanation of what gives the deliberation of the man of practical wisdom its "excellence" or "correctness" seems, at first, only to draw the tautological knot tighter (NE 1142b7-35). Thus, we must return to the principle by which the man of practical wisdom operates. Though difficult to operationalize, it is clear. It requires in every particular situation that a balance of what is desirable and what is reasonable be determined through deliberation. "Choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts" (NE 1039a23-26). Although phronesis has universal applicability, it is not "concerned with universals only—it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars" (NE 1141b14-16). As Ronald Milo observes, Aristotle's notion of good deliberation "presupposes both correct reasoning and reasoning with a view to a good end." The man of practical wisdom (and the true rhetorical artist) must "be good at deliberating," "have knowledge of general principles and of particular facts," and "be morally virtuous."  

Understandably, Aristotle reminds us that the golden mean is extremely difficult to discern and that those who consistently chooses it possesses a primary intellectual virtue. Practical wisdom "owes its birth and growth to teaching" and is typically the mark of a certain class of individuals in whom age and experience have culminated in the capacity to deliberate well consistently. Although the virtue is especially manifested by only a few people in society, prudence, like artistry in rhetoric, seems a reasonable aspiration for society in general. The phronimos does not exist in isolation. He deliberates well not only about private matters but with a view of what is good, what leads to eudaimonia or well-being for men in general, and the public's acknowledgement of this ability testifies to
their collective wisdom or inclination toward truth when persuasively presented.\(^\text{15}\) Further, Aristotle suggests that the phronimos may need an orderly society as much as the society needs him—"perhaps one's own good cannot exist without household management nor without a form of government" (1142\(a\)9-10). Phronesis, like rhetoric, involves an inherent social orientation and responsibility.

The significant similarities which have emerged in this analysis of the nature and province of rhetoric and practical wisdom may be summarized as follows: Rhetoric is an art, phronesis an intellectual virtue; both are special "reasoned capacities" which properly function in the world of probabilities; both are normative processes in that they involve rational principles of choice-making; both have general applicability but always require careful analysis of particulars in determining the best response to each specific situation; both ideally take into account the wholeness of human nature (rhetoric in its three appeals, phronesis in its balance of desire and reason); and finally, both have social utility and responsibility in that both treat matters of the public good.

Having established the integral theoretical relationship between rhetoric and practical wisdom we may turn to the practical question of how the man of practical wisdom shares his excellent deliberations and leads the public through rhetoric. The Politics indicates that it is just such an ability to use practical wisdom which distinguishes the ruler:

Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.\(^\text{16}\)

We may extend the analogy. The instrumentality of any rhetorical appeal depends on the facts of the case and the characteristics of the audience.
whose judgment is appealed to, but it is the artful use of the rhetorical instrument, the making of a melody of reason and desire, which calls forth good decisions and actions in the citizenry.

We may further support the claim that the art of rhetoric both requires phronesis and provides the means of its social dissemination by considering the expertise of the phronimos in Aristotle's three genres of discourse and by describing the skill phronesis provides for the use of his three types of rhetorical appeals.

The Rhetoric divides discourse into three categories based on "the three classes of listeners to speeches." In rhetorical situations (those in which deliberation and persuasion are sensible) "the hearer must be a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer" (R 1358b1-3). There follow three types of oratory—deliberative, judicial, and epideictic. To each type Aristotle assigns a time dimension, a central term (on which the decision solicited is based) and a dominant rhetorical modus operandi. Deliberation concerns the future, involves matters of public policy such as legislation, takes as its chief value "expediency," or the public good, and builds its premises on the constituents of happiness, the goods which promote the ultimate end of well-being. Judicial rhetoric concerns the past, involves questions of justice (as are decided in courts), makes the "just" its primary criterion, and proceeds through accusation and defense (based on analysis of pain and pleasure which cause people to act justly or unjustly). Epideictic oratory treats matters in terms of their present value, centers on questions of honor or virtue, makes "virtue" its prime term, and amplifies the vices or virtues of its object through praise or blame.

The application of phronesis is required to find the mean or "good" in all three genres of discourse. Phronesis may also be translated as
"thought" or "thoughtfulness." According to Sir Alexander Grant, the general Greek sense of such "thought" included thought about one's self, "about one's family," and "about the state." "Thought" about the state could be either "universal," leading to legislation or "in detail," producing politics. The specific application of phronesis to politics occurred in the spheres of the "deliberative" and the "judicial." Obviously, the man of practical wisdom has special qualifications to construct discourse in these two of Aristotle's three rhetorical genres.

Additional proof of the importance of practical wisdom to the rhetorician is Aristotle's use of the same word (bouleusis) to characterize the process of deliberation in the Rhetoric as he uses to describe the faculty of the man of practical wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics. The word may also be translated as "to counsel." When, therefore, the most striking quality of the man of practical wisdom is his ability to deliberate well, it is apparent that he would be able to marshall the arguments necessary for effective deliberative oratory; to "counsel" audiences toward right choices. The importance of such skillful speaking in government is confirmed by P.J. Rhodes' study, The Athenian Boule.

The man of practical wisdom is also by virtue of education and experience well informed about various forms of government and able to evaluate the various forms as means to ends and to relate their qualities to the interests of others. According to the Rhetoric:

The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests (R 1365b22-25).

It is to the phronimos that the public must look for guidance about its general welfare. The Rhetoric states:
we are applying the term 'good' to what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which all things aim, to what they would choose if they could acquire understanding and practical wisdom (R 1363b12-15).

And the Ethics reiterates the point:

we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye, they see aright (NE 1143b11-14).

Excellence in judicial rhetoric even more directly depends on practical wisdom. Aristotle considered justice to be a peculiarly important virtue, calling it in the Ethics "virtue entire," because it alone of all the virtues is directly related to the good of others and "the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it toward another" (NE 1130a7-11). Justice is a mean between suffering harm and inflicting it. Appropriate judgments about justice must consider the facts of the particular case and be grounded in universal, immutable principles of equity, proportion, and fairness. Who could display more inventive skill in determining and persuading about justice than the man by whose deliberations and choices virtue itself is defined?

The answer to this question, of course, illumines the relationship between the qualities of practical wisdom and the epideictic genre as well. Obviously, the virtue of phronesis should enable its possessor to recognize and articulate the vices and virtues of others. One's own experience in deliberating well about matters of value should facilitate the ability to explain why the conduct of another either does or does not follow the "golden mean" and deserves either praise or blame. We might also expect that the man of practical wisdom, whose virtue is publically recognizable, would often be called upon to speak on ceremonial occasions. These occasions provide a forum for the display of practical wisdom and the confirmation of
it by the audience. Through the selection of objects exemplary of either vice or virtue and the persuasive explication of their baseness or nobility, a conception of "the good" is inculcated and reinforced in the collective consciousness.

In another triad the *Rhetoric* offers an equally precise and definitive statement about the means of persuading in the three genres of discourse. In so doing, it suggests more about the nature of the ideal orator.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion (*logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*). The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions ...

That the man of practical wisdom would be able to reason logically is self-evident in the definition of the virtue. And, since the *phronimos* characteristically deliberates well about matters of general welfare, we would expect him to fashion apt enthymemes from his awareness of the audience's interests, knowledge, and values. Similarly, the ability to correctly relate particulars and universals should translate into effectively constructed practical syllogisms. Finally, experience would provide the man of practical wisdom with a wealth of material for the other major mode of logical proof, examples.

Aristotle's second principle form of rhetorical appeal, *pathos*, evinces a "sharp awareness that reason alone does not necessarily speak to the other, something which discourse in its effort to communicate must do." William Grimaldi writes:

Reason does not possess the power of persuasion. Thus Aristotle introduces into the syllogism, the instrument of reason, his psychology of human action. The enthymeme as the main instrument of rhetorical argument incorporates the interplay of reason and emotion in discourse ... At the heart of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric the enthymeme brings meaning to the assumed conflict in the *Rhetoric* between
reason and ethos-pathos. Like the metaphor in poetry, the enthymeme in rhetoric fuses the knowing in the person, makes the act of knowing a total perception of intellect, emotions, feelings. Aristotle defined emotions as "all those feelings that so change as to affect their [the audience's] judgments" and devoted nine chapters of the Rhetoric's second book to the analysis of emotional appeals. Since, as we remember, he expresses the concern in Book I that the audience be placed in "the right" or "fitting" emotional state and warns that it is "not right" to pervert the audience's judgment through inappropriate emotional appeals, the necessity of practical wisdom in the ideal use of pathos is clear. It is hard to find the "golden mean," to know what level of emotion is proper for the case at hand; but the virtue of the man of practical wisdom is that he consistently makes the right choice in such matters. Since his appetitive and rational natures are always in harmony and check each other, when functioning as a rhetor he would need only to convey his own emotions clearly to the audience. A concern of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the use of pathos to facilitate right choice; the phronimos best knows what is right choice. Both in terms of ethicality and effective rhetorical strategy, he has the bases for excellence.

The third type of appeal in the Aristotelian system, ethos, is based on the audience's perception of the speaker's moral character, knowledge and good will. The Rhetoric says that ethos "may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion" because "we believe good men more fully and readily than others. This is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided" (R 1355b13-14, 6-9). Since the truth by nature tends to be more persuasive than lies, we may presume that it would be easier for a truly virtuous person, such as the man of practical wisdom, to attain.
high ethos. And, we recall, the public does recognize practical wisdom. In considering whether the phronimos would likely display good will and friendliness toward an audience we turn to the final segment of this discussion, the role of the audience described in the Rhetoric and the manner in which the man of practical wisdom can be expected to relate to an audience.

We have already noted the interdependence of the man of practical wisdom and society, in returning to this relationship we conclude our final argument. Not only are there close parallels between the definitions, provinces and functions of rhetoric and practical wisdom; and not only does the man of practical wisdom have qualities which fit him to be an ideal practitioner of the art described in the Rhetoric; but finally, the man of practical wisdom has both important motives for rhetorical activity and characteristics which would lead him to address audiences in a manner consistent with Aristotle's view of the audience as "judge."

While Aristotle notes in the Rhetoric that "it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others" (R 1371b26-27), it is equally clear that the public display of practical wisdom is not simply self-serving or egotistical. Practical wisdom concerns itself with one's self, one's family, and the state because the individual's welfare is bound up with that of others. As the nineteenth-century scholar John Stewart observes, Aristotle understood that "Except as conforming to the conditions of the community to which he belongs, and as promoting its good, no man can be said to manage his own affairs prudently" for the "man who tries to manage his own affairs without regard for the common good, courts his own ruin."22

Despite his paternalism and the exclusion altogether of some groups from relevance in the state, Aristotle constructed a rather humanistic and democratic rhetorical theory. The man of practical wisdom impelled by self
interest and the virtue of deliberating well in the general interest, turns to the public audience with the qualities which enables the creation of powerful proofs appealing to all aspects of human nature. Knowing that "the intellect alone moves nothing," that emotions can "warp" judgment, and that the relationship of speaker and audience is crucial, Aristotle developed a rhetoric which, when most artfully practiced, balances these modes of proof. The rhetor when functioning ideally as an artist facilitates good judgment in hearers who are treated with certain respect. When such a relationship between rhetor and audience does not prevail, we may see the tactics of persuasion employed, but hardly the art of rhetoric. "Aristotle's thesis is simply that good rhetoric effectively places before the other person all the means necessary for such decision making [as promotes growth in understanding]. At this point the person must exercise his own freedom." The man of practical wisdom because of his character and abilities could be expected to regard the audience as a "judge" in just the sense described in Aristotle's Rhetoric and to effectively employ the art of persuasion.

This examination of the relationships between the art of rhetoric and the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom suggests that we may ground our interpretation of the ethical stance of the Rhetoric in something far more substantial than a belief that Aristotle simply trusted that the virtuous would control the force of rhetoric in a good society simply because they should. As we have seen, there are important theoretical and practical relationships between rhetoric and phronesis and it is the man of practical wisdom who has both the capacity and incentive to be an ideal practitioner of the Aristotelian art of rhetoric. In contrasting the use of the terms "dialectic" and "rhetoric" Aristotle wrote, "What makes a man a 'sophist' is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term 'rhetorician' may describe either the speaker's knowledge of the art, or
His moral purpose" (R 135b17-20). Aristotle believed that, "It is impossible for a man to be prudent unless he is good" (NE 1144a36-1141b1). It is only when practical wisdom is applied to rhetoric that we witness the ideal case in which the name "rhetorician" denotes excellence both of artistry and purpose.
Notes


4Ryan argues that in rejecting Plato's theory of ideas as the source of values Aristotle came to regard the ethos of society as the "principal reality" for ethical studies and then to avoid "utter relativism" addressed the question "Why does the ethos come to be as it is?" He writes "I believe it was in great part to ask and answer this question that Aristotle wrote the Art of Rhetoric. He wanted to see how persuasion works (as contrasted with education or teaching, for which most people are not fitted); to discover what is going on when persuasion is being used effectively; to investigate the functioning of rhetoric in a society; and to determine the technical rules for effective persuasion. And in carrying out this task, it seems to me, Aristotle is at least implicitly maintaining that the exercise of the art of rhetoric establishes in a society its ethos" (Ryan, p. 295).

5Aristotle distinguishes moral virtues, which develop through habituation and belong to the appetitive part of the soul, from intellectual virtues, which develop through teaching and belong to the rational part of the soul. Since the concern of this essay is the relationship between Aristotelian rhetoric and ethics, it should be noted that the "intellectual virtue" of phronesis (prudence) is interdependent with sophrosyne (moderation) and this faculty of determining the Mean is requisite for all moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. See Helen North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 197, 199, 204, n27.

6Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, pp. 1025-1026 (1140a1-24). All section numbers in the text preceded by NE refer to this translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Floyd Douglas Anderson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean and Its Relationship to Rhetoric," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 34 (Winter 1968), 100-107. Anderson outlines the relationship of the mean to Aristotle's concept of rhetoric as an 'art' and to his treatments of invention, stylistic clarity and appropriateness, metaphor, and arrangement" (p. 100). "The important assumption underlying rhetoric as an art is that in any given case, only certain methods of persuasion are available; other methods are inappropriate because they either exceed or fall short of the needs of the speaker before his immediate audience" (p. 103).


North, p. 200, 204, n27.


Arthur B. Miller, "Aristotle on Habit (e`dox) and Character (thronimo): Implications for the Rhetoric," *Speech Monographs*, 4 (Nov. 1974), 309-316. "When Aristotle used ethos to designate the character of a speaker as revealed in a speech, he was thinking of the speaker's habits, customs, traditions or manner of life" (p. 309). Again, as Miller notes, it is the thronimos who habitually chooses well" (p. 312).

Ryan, pp. 304-307. As Ryan notes, "the interplay of ethos, ethics and rhetoric sheds some new light on an apparent 'conflict in Aristotle of democratic versus aristocratic tendencies'" (p. 306).


Steele, pp. 82-83.


For a discussion of the relationship of phronesis to the epideictic genre see Christine Oravec, "Observation in Aristotle's Theory of Epideictic," Philosophy and Rhetoric, IV, No. 3 (1976), 162-174; and Ryan, pp. 300-301.

21 Grimaldi, pp. 16-17.
22 Stewart, p. 63.
23 Grimaldi, p. 147.