ABSTRACT

Recently, communication scholars and theorists have begun formulating rules to describe the workings of language in various situations of everyday use. Theoretically, current rules approaches are in violation of the basic philosophy underlying communication theory—Whitehead's notion of process. The inconsistency is a function of the degree of generalization required to formulate a rule, the determining of relative importance of contextual differences of the situation under study, and the continuing reinterpretation of important and unimportant variables after the event. The recognition of two levels of rules eliminates the problem of exceptions. (1) Context-specific rules are unique to each specific occurrence of communication as process. (2) Meta-rules are heuristic and serve to aid in the discovery of context-specific rules, but are not bound by the necessity of actual occurrence or by the qualification of exceptions. Such meta-rules continually point language research in the direction of discourse analysis of specific, real-world situations, emphasize the methodology of participant observation, and remove the monkey of process from the language-in-context theorist's back. (IS)
A Reconceptualization of Rules

by

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Increasingly, scholars from a wide variety of communication related fields have begun theorizing about communication from a rules perspective. These scholars place language as the central focus of communicative inquiry. If the essence of communication is meaning and if language is central to communication, language and meaning may be viewed as closely tied and engaged in a very fundamental relationship. The problem for study then, is trying to determine the exact nature of the role that language plays in contributing to the meaning of a communicative event. These scholars believe that in order to have a real understanding of communication, it is necessary to understand the use of language in context. Toward this end, several theorists (e.g., Lakoff, Searle, etc.) have proposed rules that govern and explain the workings of language as it occurs in various situations of its everyday use. 

While the notion of applying rules to communication is a sound one, this paper will take exception to the current manner of application. I will argue that current rule approaches are in violation of the basic philosophy underlying communication theory—the Whiteheadian notion of process. The Whiteheadian notion of process is well embodied in Berlo's definition of process:

If we accept the concept of process, we view the events and relationships as dynamic, on-going, ever-changing, continuous. When we label something as a process we also mean that it does not have a beginning, an end, a fixed sequence of events. It is not static, at rest. It is moving. The ingredients within a process interact; each affects all of the others.

Communication theory reflects a process point of view. A communication theorist rejects the possibility that nature consists of events or ingredients that are separable from all other events. He argues that you cannot talk about the beginning or end of communication or say that a particular idea came from one specific source, that communication occurs in only one way and so on.
For an excellent discussion of the Whiteheadian notion of process see David Smith's article "Communication Research and the Idea of Process." 

While accepting the Whiteheadian notion of process as a philosophical cornerstone of their work, communication theorists have long had trouble dealing with it. In "Communication Research and the Idea of Process," Smith demonstrates a contradiction in the work of communication empiricists. He claims that their theoretical endeavors are conceptually sound in terms of the Whiteheadian notion of process but that their methodology violates it. This paper will charge that a worse state of affairs exists for theorists who approach communication from a language rules perspective. Not even their theoretical work is conceptually sound. The rules that they propose are inconsistent with the Whiteheadian notion of process.

This paper will demonstrate the inconsistency and its consequences (Section I), propose a reconceptualization of rules that will eliminate the problem (Section II), and discuss the implications of the solution (Section III).

I. The Generality Paradox

Implicit in the rules that theorists have proposed to explain language in context is the assumption of a certain degree of generality. There are two senses of generality that are used here. The first sense of generality assumes that communicative situations possess enough similarity to allow for the formulation of rules that apply to a number of like situations. Although we are all familiar with the expression, "there are exceptions to every rule," there is some point at which a rule ceases to be a
rule in the face of an overwhelming number of exceptions. (The exact number of exceptions is intuitive. After a rule is proposed and exceptions begin to be found, we say that the strength of the rule decreases. As more exceptions are found, we say that the rule is no longer a rule. The exception has become the rule.)

The second sense of generality assumes that the number of like situations which form the domain of a given rule will be of adequate quantity. (Adequate quantity is a matter of intuition. The point is that if the number of like situations is too small, then the focus of the rule is too narrow and the rule will be trivial.)

There is an inherent conflict between the two senses of generality which has trapped language in context rules in a generality paradox. By trying not to violate the first sense of generality (eliminating exceptions), the second sense is violated, (the range of situations is reduced to the trivial). By trying not to violate the second sense of generality (having an adequate number of like situations), the first sense is violated (a large number of exceptions occur). (There is, of course, an exception to this rule. Cases exist where a highly general rule (in the second sense) can be demonstrated to have few or no exceptions. The significance of such rules may be discounted as trivial because they take the form of truisms; e.g. Lakoff's rule - "It is impolite to impose.")

Theorists continually reframe their rules more generally or more specifically in an attempt to achieve a balance where the conflict doesn't exist. The logic of the Whiteheadian notion
of process dictates that these attempts be doomed to failure. Even if a rule is so specific that it has a range of only two situations, there will still be an infinite number of contextual variables that will differ between the two situations. Thus, the rule will apply to the situation which served as a model from which it was derived, but the other situation will be an exception.

One might object that it is an erroneous assumption to believe that the infinity of differences are communicatively important. I contend that this is an assumption dictated by the Whiteheadian notion of process. Even if all the differences are not communicatively important, a simple question demonstrates why they need be treated as such - what variables of a situation are communicatively important? The answer to this question leads directly into reductionism - a practice which runs counter to the Whiteheadian notion of process. Whitehead writes:

The how an actual entity becomes constitutes what the actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its being is constituted by its becoming. 5

In other words, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Everything is interrelated and emergent, and each situation is unique!

From a strict point of view, all of the infinity of variables are communicatively important since everything is interrelated and inseparable. Intuitively, however, one can sense that some aspects of the situation can be treated as possessing primary importance, while other aspects may be relegated to a negligible role. This cannot be determined in advance of occurrence and may even change after occurrence. Support for this assertion comes from Wilson's writings on the interpretive paradigm.
A central characteristic of documentary interpretation is that later appearances may force a revision in the perceived underlying pattern that in turn compels a reinterpretation of what previous appearances "really were." Consequently, what the situation "really was" and what the actors "really did" on a particular occasion are continually open to redefinition. Therefore, variables that one might intuitively label as unimportant initially, may come to be of primary importance at a later time. Since there is no time limit for the redefinition of a situation, continuing reinterpretation gives all variables the potential for importance.

If each communication situation is essentially different, then each has its own set of rules. We cannot come into a situation and analyze it with ready-made rules and think they are going to apply. Thus, the assumption underlying the first sense of generality - that communicative situations possess enough similarity to allow for the formulation of rules that apply to a number of like situations - is incorrect.

II. The Relationship Between Level I, Level II, and Meta-Rules

In order to visualize the problem clearly and understand the solution I will propose, it is convenient to think of the universe as consisting of levels. These may be conceptualized as levels of abstraction, where Level I concerns specific, real world occurrences and successively higher levels concern idealizations of an increasingly general nature.

Level I rules are the actual context-specific rules that emerge uniquely to, and operate in, every individual situation. They cannot be predicted with casual accuracy because of their uniqueness. Hawes supports this view as well as much of what was stated in the preceding section.
Yet another difference between the traditionalist and the naturalist perspective is the role and function of logics. By "logic" I mean a set of assumptions and rules for obtaining implications or entailments of those assumptions. The traditionalist uses preconceived logics to direct research and interpret findings. In short, the researcher establishes the nouns and relationships among them before gathering data. In fact, what constitutes a datum is determined by conceiving the logics prior to the observations. The naturalist on the other hand, is identifying the logics of the people being observed. In short, the researcher uses a variety of methods to determine the nouns and relationships among them that constitute everyday logics of social actors.

My position might be termed modified naturalist. I don’t believe that a preconceived logic (or rules) should determine what constitutes a datum, but I do believe such a logic (or rules) can be used open-mindedly while making observations, to assist in the identification of the logics (or rules) of the people being observed. Such logics or rules, thus become one of the variety of methods that Hawes refers to, as employed by the naturalist for discovering the everyday logics of social actors. Such logics or rules (preconceived) are what I term meta-rules.

A Level II rule is a meta-rule. It is a heuristic, whose purpose is to aid in the discovery of Level I rules. It is context-sensitive, but not context-specific. This trait frees the meta-rule from the necessity of actual occurrence. It is an idealization. It should be thought of in the sense of the "normal" or "average" American (with two and a half kids). Such a person is, of course, a statistical fiction. But it is a fiction which guides us in our evaluation of reality. This is the most important feature of meta-rules. It eliminates the problem of exceptions and ends the inherent conflict between the two senses of generality.

Hawes' idea of first-order and second-order constructs is roughly analogous to my conception of Level I and Level II rules.
Using Alfred Schutz's terminology for a moment, one would say that a traditionalist assumes first-order constructs of the everyday world and proceeds directly to the use of second-order constructs of the scientific world. The naturalist, rather than assuming first-order constructs, attempts to identify and explicate them. The order of a construct is roughly analogous to its degree of remoteness from its everyday use and meaning. 8

Just as Hawes states that the naturalist doesn't assume first-order constructs but attempts to identify and explicate them, I say that Level I rules are unique to each situation and can't be postulated prior to occurrence. They must be discovered after the event. One of the ways that Level I rules may be discovered is through the use of meta-rules (Level II rules). These exist independently of specific context and so, like Hawes' second-order construct, are further removed from reality.

The mistake of language theorists to date has been their attempt to propose preconceived, general rules as Level I rules. They push the real Level I rules (context-specific) off of the spectrum as if they don't exist. (This is why I'm making such a big deal about the term meta-rule. It focuses attention on the fact that there are rules operating at a lower level of abstraction than the generalizations that language in context theorists currently pass off as the bottom line. There are specific rules that operate uniquely in every individual situation and these are the Level I rules - the real bottom line).

At this point, the reader may feel frustrated and raise the question, "Must each situation be studied separately?" The answer is "yes." This is dictated by the Whiteheadian notion of process. However, science progresses toward generalities and although every situation is unique, intuitively one can sense that similarities exist between them. The meta-rule is the logical place for these
similarities to be located. Language theorists can develop their generalizations into meta-rules. A researcher armed with these meta-rules can then study a specific communication situation (after it occurs) using the meta-rules as starting points for discovering the Level I rules (context-specific, real rules) operating in that situation.

The meta-rule is like a mean and each individual situation with its Level I rules is like a raw score. The mean doesn't actually exist, but gets the researcher into the right area. After the Level I rules are discovered, the worth of a particular meta-rule can be evaluated by making an intuitive judgment about how much the Level I rules differ from the meta-rule. Continuing the analogy of the meta-rule as a mean, we would say that the richness of a meta-rule increases as the standard deviation of the Level I rule decreases. (Note that cases may exist where the Level I rule and the meta-rule are identical, just as a raw score may fall on the mean. This is by far a minority of cases.)

III Implications

The implications of meta-rules for language in context, theorists are two-fold. First, they correct a philosophical inconsistency by bringing the rule governed approach to communication into line with its underlying philosophy of the Whiteheadian notion of process. Secondly, and of practical consequence to researchers, they direct attention away from idealized generalities, toward the primary data of real social interactions.

Meta-rules arise out of generalizations based on observations of many specific situations. Each one is a mean arising out of
numerous raw scores. We are at the point now, where such a
descriptive base of raw scores is sorely needed in the field
of communication. In "Conversational Analysis," Nofsinger
argues for such observations:

Communication scholars are constantly immersed in an ocean
of data—communication phenomena—but for the most part
have not devoted themselves to the careful description of
communication acts and episodes. We do not understand
communication very well, because we have not carefully
observed, described, and interpreted its everyday
circumstances. Discourse analysis can provide the descriptions
and taxonomies which it is the business of theory to
explain. This seems to indicate that, from a rules
perspective, as well as the covering law model, the
explanatory machinery which the investigator constructs
(whether it be a grammar of communication, a theory, or
whatever) presupposes the existence of a data base of
observations, descriptions and interpretations.

Meta-rules are derived from this data base of observations.
They are then turned back toward specific situations to provide
guides for discovering the Level I rules in a situation under
investigation. Level I rules are discovered and then contribute
to the formation of a new data base from which new meta-rules
are created, etc.

The term meta-rule implies that there are rules at a level
below it. By pointing researchers in the direction of these
lower level rules, meta-rules bring language research down to
the specific, real world level envisioned by Hawes and Nofsinger.
The acceptance of the meta-rule concept implies a central role in
communication research for Nofsinger's discourse analysis of
specific situations. It implies a great increase in field
research and it implies a heavy reliance upon the methodology of
participant observation. Most importantly, however, the concept
of meta-rules takes the process monkey off of language in
context theorists' backs.
Footnotes


