The primary objective of a conference held in Bellagio, Italy, and of this follow-up volume is to assess various educational and training models and strategies for improving the effectiveness with which top- and middle-level public management functions are performed in developing countries. The volume concentrates particularly on management education and training for development sectors (or public systems) carried out by postsecondary educational institutions in these countries. Part 2 sets forth concrete examples of the management constraints operative in the sectors of population and agriculture and derives the management requirements for the two sectors. Part 3 examines common models and alternative models for management education for development sectors. The teaching methods and materials that are most effective in implementing whatever curricula are adopted are also considered. Part 4 concerns strategies for institutionalizing public management education and training programs. Studies of India and Nigeria illuminate the broad range of public policies and institutional arrangements that determine program effectiveness. The chapter concludes with discussion of the role of external assistance agencies in institutionalizing management education programs. (Author/MLF)
Education and Training for Public Sector Management in Developing Countries

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BACKGROUND

Throughout its history, The Rockefeller Foundation has concentrated its efforts on selected programs with well-defined goals. In 1963, the trustees approved a major new interdisciplinary program, University Development, the objective of which was to strengthen a few selected universities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This was designed as an operating program that would draw upon the Foundation’s own staff in the agricultural, health, and social sciences to serve as visiting faculty members and to work closely with indigenous leadership. At the outset, it was thought that assistance would be required at each university development center for some ten to fifteen years to enable the Foundation to contribute effectively to creating a strong university with a critical mass of highly qualified scholars before phasing out its support.

This program has been guided by the premise that universities can be instruments for social and economic improvement. While the objective has been to establish centers of excellence, the meaning of excellence in both teaching and research has been defined in terms of commitment to addressing national and regional needs. When the trustees reviewed the program in 1974, the Foundation was actively working with universities in ten countries. At that time, the trustees emphasized the serious maladjustment between educational systems and the aspirations of the societies they are designed to serve all over the world. To accentuate this dimension, the program was renamed Education for Development (EFD), and the Foundation increasingly encouraged efforts to develop, on an experimental and demonstration basis, applied programs and extension activities in university centers where it was engaged.

Pursuant to a long-standing policy of conducting a continuous review and evaluation of all ongoing programs, The Rockefeller Foundation is currently examining the field of management education and training in the less-developed countries (LDCs) as a possible new exploratory dimension of its Education for Development program. A preliminary survey revealed widespread and increasing recognition of a “management crisis” in the LDCs arising from the lack of management capabilities as a major constraint in implementation of national development programs. It also revealed that there are a number of LDC educational and training institutions seeking to grapple with the problem by developing new approaches to the training of public managers for work of this kind for their own societies.

The management constraint is particularly critical in those development sectors in which the Foundation already has major program interests, namely:

Agriculture. The problem of increased food production is no longer primarily technological, but shows a pervasive managerial deficiency at all levels in assuring the delivery of services to the small farmer, who must make the critical decisions required to increase productivity.

Health Care. The problem of delivery of health care and family planning services to the mass of the population also is not mainly a technological one, but is rather a fundamental weakness in the planning, organization, and management of those services.

Education. The problem of increasing social returns from the vast resources committed to education is basically a lack of indigenous capacity to plan, manage, innovate, and control the functioning of systems of education.

Although the Foundation has provided limited and primarily indirect support for management
studies in the past through its support of the social sciences in selected universities in the LDCs, there has been no direct engagement with the problem of management education as such. As a first step in the process of exploring this field as a possible new dimension of the EFD program, a conference was held at the Villa Serbelloni, in Bellagio, Italy, in mid-August, 1976. The participants, whose names are listed in the Appendix to this volume, included scholars and educational administrators from Asian and African institutions responsible for current efforts in public management education in their countries, as well as representatives of various external agencies responsible for external assistance in this field. This volume consists of selections from the background papers discussed at that conference, together with brief interpretive comment by the editors.

A REVIEW OF TERMINOLOGY

As in any new and evolving field drawing its conceptions and content from a variety of disciplines, there is the vexing problem of developing a common terminology. At the outset, therefore, it is useful to review definitions of some basic terms encountered in the field of public management. A good place to begin is with the title of this volume. What is “public management” and how does it differ from “public administration”? In practice, the two terms are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless, management and administration carry differing connotations and associations of words that influence our ideas about their meanings. Kenneth Rothwell has observed:

"Administration is usually thought of as accepting goals from outside the system, as depending upon resources from other systems and being instructed in the use of means. Management, on the other hand, is usually thought of as developing goals within the system, using resources over which the system has control, and being free in the use of means. Receiving its authority from outside (or above) and referring its decisions and results elsewhere, administration is self-contained and acts as principal rather than as agent."

In short, management is an active, positive, opportunity-seeking, change-oriented, aggressive, developmental concept, whereas administration implies a greater degree of passivity and a status-quo orientation.

Over the years, there has been a growing realization that the challenges of the developing countries required that its public officials go beyond the traditional orientation of administrators and become change-oriented managers. Nevertheless, the efforts to relate public administration (mainly American) to the developing countries often aimed more at maintenance needs rather than developmental needs. As William Siffin has noted in his paper reproduced in this volume, “the essence of development is not to maintain, but to create effectively.” Development requires management. The Ford Foundation recognized the management component of development when it subsumed its traditional budget categories of “Public Administration” and “Development Planning” under the more inclusive heading “Public Management” in 1973.

Public management is a hybrid term suggesting public administration’s orientation toward implementation and maintenance and management’s emphasis on the formulation of goals, or, to paraphrase Siffin, “the effective creation” of objectives. Public management recognizes that while there are external policy constraints operating on the public manager in developing countries, within his broad area of operations he is an agent of change; he does indeed have a significant choice in both the formulation and implementation of management policy.

It is both realistic and more positive to recognize that the public administrator has an entrepreneurial and managerial role in government, albeit that he is bounded by the policy determination and decision-making powers that are vested in his political superiors. The creative, entrepreneurial and decision-making role of the public administrator as a manager warrants more attention than it has had in the past. This is particularly important with

regard to the planning and management of economic and social development programs. In the view of some prominent professionals in the management field, a distinction is drawn between management per se and management support. Siflin stresses this distinction:

The word "management" covers a large territory. Meaningful statements require that this terrain be disaggregated. One way to begin this task is to distinguish between management per se, or "executive function" and management support. The latter category refers to functions ranging from control techniques through planning and analysis activities to providing direct supporting services for individual managers. "Management" is a relative and varying property of organizations and sets of organizations. It may be concentrated or dispersed. It may be "large" in scope or almost absent. . . . There is a widespread misconception of the relationship between the idea of "management" and the idea of "control." Control is a vital means of facilitating management. It helps render some things manageable and others needless of being managed. Management—the executive function—is concerned with (1) analyses, judgments, and decisions which are not susceptible of control, (2) drawing lines between that which can be controlled and that which must be "managed," and (3) with deciding how best to control the controllable. The essential point is this: Control does not equal management. Techniques of control are not an adequate content for management training (although they are one valuable source of training for management support).

Siflin argues further that management might best be viewed as a "residual category," "a function which remains when all else has been subjected to rules and specification." This conceptual distinction between management per se and management support acquires considerable relevance in subsequent discussions regarding the educability of "managers," as distinguished from "management support" personnel.

This distinction by Siflin also relates to the classification of public managers. A generally accepted practice is to categorize managers by top, middle, and low levels, according to both the degree of their involvement in the formulation and implementation of policy in their sector and the degree of the geographical and functional scope of their activities within their particular sector. A top-level manager, responsible for managerial strategy, planning, and target-setting, is concerned with a high degree of formulation and a low degree of implementation of policy. His scope of activities ranges over the entire sector. The head of a country's population program and his central staff would represent top management. The middle-level manager deals basically with the implementation of programs, administration in general, and the monitoring and control of specific activities. His scope of activities is limited geographically and/or functionally. The regional staff of a family planning program within a population program might constitute middle management. Together, top and middle managers might be considered macro-systems managers. The low-level manager, concerned almost exclusively with implementation and job supervision at the project level, deals with micro-management. The village-level field supervisor of a health service program is an example of a low-level manager.

Now we turn to the other half of the title of this volume, "education and training." The International Labour Office of the United Nations has defined management development as "the activity directed towards the further development of the knowledge and skills of practicing managerial personnel and modification of their concepts, attitudes, and practices." The ILO distinguishes between management development that is pursued informally in the work setting through on-the-job experiences.

or in-service programs and management development that takes place in an institutional setting. Formal, institutional approaches to management education and training can be distinguished by whether a degree is conferred. Thus management education would be defined as “the regular teaching of management as part of an institutional curriculum leading to a formal degree” and would normally occur in a university or in an institution devoted specifically to management activities. Management training could be defined as “an institutional program that does not result in a formal degree.” Training may be conducted by universities, management institutes, or other types of organizations.

There are several ways of distinguishing management education and training models that depend upon the who, what, and when of the programs. For whom is the education or training program designed? The most obvious and relevant distinctions here would be among the levels of management—top, middle or low level. An equally important consideration is whether the student group consists of professional specialists in a particular sector or generalists without professional training.

What knowledge and skills is the program designed to impart? The major distinction in this area is between general and functional programs. General programs convey the conceptual, theoretical elements of public management and include areas such as public policy formulation, economic theory, political thought, decision theory, and organizational behavior. Functional programs of public management present specialized areas such as marketing, personnel administration, and financial management.

When in the manager’s career will the education and training occur? Preentry education and training occur at the precareer stage of a manager. Postentry education and training take place after the manager has begun his career.

Taken together, this matrix of interdependent who-what-when considerations constitutes the determinants of management education and training programs. The length of the program (short term, a few days to six months, or long term, one to two years), its curriculum content, and the teaching materials and methodologies employed are all dependent on the who-what-when matrix.

THE FOCUS OF THE VOLUME

In order to sharpen the focus of discussion upon a manageable range of problems and issues, the volume concentrates upon education and training (1) for the public management of development sectors, (2) for top- and middle-level management, and (3) in postsecondary institutions in the LDCs.

The severity and nature of the management crisis vary across the broad range of governmental functions, from the commercial types of tasks in public enterprises to the development needs of public systems or development sectors and the maintenance of routine bureaucratic structures. Concentration upon public management needs in public systems or development sectors, such as agriculture, health, and education, has a compelling rationale. This is an area in which a pervasive managerial deficiency at all levels appears most evident in failures of development plans and projects. In development sectors, the least seems to have been done explicitly to stress, or even to include, management education or training as a dimension. True, traditional programs of professional education in many of these sectors have given some attention to aspects of the management function: in agriculture “farm management,” in health “hospital administration,” and in education “educational administration.” But the central focus of such traditional programs has been upon micro-management, i.e., the administration of particular institutions or activities, and not upon macro-systems management with a developmental perspective. Even in advanced developed countries, only recently have professional schools of agriculture, medicine, and education made explicit provision for the management of agricultural, health delivery, and educational systems. Most LDCs have imported with little adaptation the traditional professional educational models. In general, the view that only the professionals in these sectors (agriculturalists, physicians, and educators) are the natural and necessary managers has prevailed. Only a few countries have commenced to experi-
ment with management education as a relevant and significant component in these professional programs, and due to the brevity of these experiments evaluation has not yet been possible.

In focusing upon top-level and middle-level management, we recognize that management is differentiated by both level and function, and that educational and training programs for the different categories must in some measure also differ. A key issue in the discussion of management training is whether there are common core components in the curricula and methods of training appropriate for all levels of managers; and if so, what these are, as distinguished from those components that are distinctive to particular levels of management. The differentiated nature of management levels and the corresponding types of management training required are usefully illuminated by William Siffin's distinction between the "executive function" and the "management function" noted earlier.

The third delimitation of focus discusses how top- and middle-level managers in development sectors can be most effectively educated and trained in postsecondary institutions in the LDCs. Much management training, of course, is still conducted for top-level LDC managers in institutions outside the LDCs, and there are those who argue that this should continue to be the emphasis, at least for certain categories. Also, some forms of management training in the LDCs are conducted outside the framework of postsecondary institutions, and there are those who maintain that these are, in certain instances, the more effective. However, fixing our attention upon management education and training in postsecondary institutions provides a coherence in focus. These are the institutions that both traditionally and currently are regarded as the principal structures through which management education and training are conducted for those destined to occupy top- and middle-level management roles. They are also the institutions from which can be drawn a group of educational leaders, widely experienced and deeply engaged in a common enterprise, a group among whom there can be fruitful collective thinking and discourse about comparative experiences, as was the case at Bellagio.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The primary objective of the Bellagio Conference and of this follow-up volume is to assess various educational and training models and strategies for improving the effectiveness with which top- and middle-level public management functions are performed in developing countries. As stated above, the volume concentrates particularly on management education and training for development sectors (or public systems) carried out by postsecondary educational institutions in these countries. Part II sets forth concrete examples of the management constraints operative in two critical development sectors: population and agriculture. From these examples are derived the management requirements for the two sectors.

Part III examines alternative models for management education for development sectors to determine whether it is possible to identify general principles or characteristics that have been effective. Since many existing management programs in LDCs have been derived from Western programs, various aspects of the issue of transferability are examined. There is considerable skepticism that a satisfactory educational model for development sectors has been developed in the West, but it is possible to identify elements that are transferable and to consider the problems of adaptation in Asian and African settings. This is followed by an examination of three common models of management education for development sectors: (1) the addition of management content into technical undergraduate programs, (2) preentry, postgraduate programs in management, and (3) short-term, post-entry management courses. The question is raised whether it is possible to construct core curricula for the major educational models. The chapter also considers the teaching methods and materials that are most effective in implementing whatever curricula are adopted.

Part IV concerns strategies for institutionalizing public management education and training programs. Studies of two major LDCs, India and Nigeria, illuminate the broad range of public policies and institutional arrangements that determine program effectiveness. Examination of manage-
ment training institutions that appear to be successful suggests certain key variables, such as organizational structure, scope, and leadership. The chapter concludes with discussion of the role of external assistance agencies in institutionalizing management education programs.

In presenting this volume, the editors wish to thank the participants in the Bellagio Conference, who made the deliberations a stimulating experience for us. The interpretive essays at the beginning of each chapter owe much to the richness of the discussion. All but two of the papers that follow were written specifically for the conference. We regret the lack of space to print all the papers, as well as sometimes extensive editorial revisions that were required in order to bring those papers that could be included within the scope of this volume.

We recognize that a large part of what is needed for development cannot be taught formally in the classroom. To the extent that an individual can be taught to manage, the Nixon White House suggests that “efficient” management does not assure wise or compassionate government. The juxtaposition of impressive Institutes of Management in India with severe conditions of underdevelopment discourages us from seeking instant panaceas. Nevertheless, we believe that better public management is a necessary condition for speeding development. We hope that this volume will convey both the magnitude of the task and appreciation of the promising initial successes in coping with the problem.
Part Two

MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS IN TWO DEVELOPMENT SECTORS: POPULATION AND AGRICULTURE

The range of government activities carried out in development sectors suggests the need for complex and diverse managerial inputs. Management training must be fashioned to meet such requirements, with the recognition of functions that are *sui generis* to a particular sector and those that are common to several or more of the broad range of development sectors. Skills, for example, in the planning and implementation of large-scale capital projects frequently would be required in the power, irrigation, and transportation sectors, where traditional economic criteria of evaluation are relevant. On the other hand, social service sectors, such as education and health, may require quite different skills, such as marketing, logistics, and delivery of services, although they may be fundamental core requirements inherent in all such public activities.

Before proceeding to consideration of management training models and strategies, an examination of the management requirements and practices in several sectors can provide a concrete reference point and a useful basis for generalization. Based upon their extensive experience in family planning and agriculture, Dr. David C. Korten and Dr. Dwight S. Brothers have described the essential managerial functions in these two sectors and the implications for management education in the papers at the conclusion of this section. Analysis of management in the family planning and agriculture sectors, while not exhaustive, can illuminate some of the similarities and differences relevant to management training programs.

A common practice in these, and perhaps, to a lesser extent in other development sectors, is for management positions to be held by technical specialists with little or no managerial training. Doctors and agricultural scientists represent professional elites within the two bureaucratic structures, and they naturally advance upward in the hierarchy into management positions. In both cases, they are products of scientific cultures that stress professional standards that may conflict with the criteria appropriate for effective management behavior. The medical doctor is often cited as the extreme case. Trained in curative medicine to bring the resources of modern science to bear upon the problems of an individual patient, he is ill equipped to cope with the need in the preventative field to serve large numbers with very limited resources.

Better management in these sectors requires either (1) management training for the professional specialists or (2) changes in the structure of the sectors so as to reduce dependence upon them. Equipping the specialists with management skills is a massive and perhaps the most urgent problem. The conventional approach is by means of short-term management training programs for mid-level scientists who have or are about to assume managerial roles. An alternative, longer-range approach is to impart a managerial dimension to the regular professional curriculum for medical and agricultural scientists from developing countries by adding management courses or summer workshops.

Korten and others argue, however, that the structure of the organization dominated by scientific specialists may be so incompatible with the functions of the sector that structural changes must precede management training. This is illustrated most clearly in the area of family planning. Figure 1 depicts an organizational structure common for implementing population programs in developing
FIGURE 1
Typical Population Program: Organization Chart

MINISTRY OF HEALTH

PROGRAM DIRECTOR (M.D.)

ADMINISTRATION  RESEARCH AND EVALUATION  HEAD NURSE  CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER  HEAD SOCIAL WORKER  STATISTICIAN

INTERMEDIATE LEVEL

DIRECTOR OF CLINIC (M.D.)

GRADUATE NURSE  AUXILIARY NURSE  EDUCATION  SOCIAL WORKER
countries. Although there may be variations in types of services provided, family planning is an activity with a single focus and technology that probably requires less adaptation to local conditions than does agriculture. The organization in Figure 1, with three roughly parallel layers from headquarters level to clinic, reflects this simplicity. Medical doctors customarily have line responsibility for management at each level.

Management training for the doctors in the family planning organization can improve the effectiveness with which such typical organizations implement programs. However, the centrality of doctors and clinics may make such a structure so inappropriate for the task that the management training can have only marginal benefits, and it may even be counterproductive in the sense of delaying structural improvement. According to this argument, training the doctor in management creates new problems—the inappropriate use of the doctor’s skills, a conflict in his organizational role, and a diversion from the real need for community involvement. Organizational changes may be designed to reduce the probability of management failures. To the extent this is true, training and educational organizations should use all their influence and resources to highlight the need for basic structural changes. Although they seldom have the political power to effect such changes, their research and writing can illuminate the need for change. If the system is obdurate, limited training resources might better be directed to improving the effectiveness of management in other development sectors.

The problem of structure-function compatibility is fundamental to the design of management training programs. Organizational defects can be identified in almost all bureaucratic structures in developing countries. But since perfect structures are probably illusory, to what extent should training be deferred until structures are improved? The conflict between the urgent need for better management of present structures and their obvious structural inadequacies can be recognized, not resolve however, structural change is not a management panacea. Experience provides countless examples of the launching of new organizations that proved ineffective because they were based on faulty diagnoses of the need or limited vision of new problems that would be generated by their establishment.

In contrast to the population sector, agricultural development agencies reflect great organizational diversity. By comparing agricultural programs in four countries, Brothers’s paper emphasizes this variety. Agricultural development normally involves a broader range of services than strict family planning, so organizational forms and relationships can be exceedingly complex. Moreover, the technology and the appropriate mix of services must be specifically related to quite narrowly defined geographic regions, thus further increasing the variation in structural forms.

Within the agriculture sector, there is an immediate and urgent need to increase the number of properly trained people for management and to upgrade those occupying management positions with inadequate preparation for their responsibilities. While structural reforms may often be warranted, the variety of functions makes generalization less valid than in the population sector.

Management requirements may be distinguished by function and by level. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for the family planning sector, and a similar format could be adapted to agriculture or other sectors without major modification. The listing of functions (distribution, finance, personnel, etc.) suggests the types of management skills for which training is required.

The generality increases at higher management levels, as does the difficulty of transferring the requisite skills. At top levels, performance demands higher ratios of entrepreneurial skills, which are difficult to develop by means of present educational and training techniques. It can be argued at this level that the selection of candidates for management training should place heavy emphasis upon the personal qualities of leadership and motivation that the training process can support but not create.

The above discussion, and Figures 1 and 2, have been based on the conventional conception of the
### FIGURE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Program Components</th>
<th>Management Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Level</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intermediate Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local or field personnel whose chief concern is adequate performance of defined routine tasks</td>
<td>Middle-level managers whose chief concern is functioning of their unit of the program as currently structured; this also includes supervision of lower level staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Examples of Activities at Each Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication and motivation of clients</td>
<td>Imparting information to and developing means to impel actions of acceptors and potential acceptors</td>
<td>Effective fieldworker/clinic worker contact with clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics, procurement and distribution</td>
<td>Securing, handling, and distributing contraceptive materials needed for the program</td>
<td>Maintaining stock of supplies at clinic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of services</td>
<td>Provision of professional and paraprofessional services necessary to back the program</td>
<td>Maintaining good interpersonal interactions between field/clinic staff and clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, budgeting, and control</td>
<td>Raising funds, providing bases for their expenditure, and auditing financial activities</td>
<td>Maintaining up-to-date financial record forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel management</td>
<td>Job definition, selecting, hiring, training, and supervising personnel; providing for security, advancement, fringe benefits, working conditions, and morale</td>
<td>Supervising day-to-day operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>Management Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program planning</td>
<td>Defining organizational levels, personnel needs, lines of responsibility,</td>
<td>Giving work plans to field and clinic workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>flow of information and materials; definition of work scope with budget</td>
<td>Preparing detailed program plan showing staffing patterns, and budgets, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimates and forward long-term and short-term plans</td>
<td>Formulating clear long-range goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and evaluation</td>
<td>Research aims at generation of new knowledge, and evaluation measures</td>
<td>Maintaining up-to-date service statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>quality of achievement. Needs must be defined by top-level administrators</td>
<td>Setting up an effective unit or office charged with developing, performing, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and findings must reach administrators quickly and in convenient form</td>
<td>reporting research and/or evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relationships</td>
<td>Handling relationships of program among appropriate government bodies,</td>
<td>Preparing and distributing external progress reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>private organizations, professional groups, religious bodies, and funding</td>
<td>Encouraging all levels to have free and cordial access to and relationships with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agencies</td>
<td>other branches of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Making active efforts by top personnel to encourage, establish, and maintain such</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sector's organizational structure as pyramidal, with power centralized at the top and authority delegated downward toward the field level. In arguing for community-based population programs, Korten advocates a reallocation of power to the community so that it becomes the major source of initiatives for the whole range of social services. In agriculture, a comparable area-development approach has been proposed. In his paper in Chapter III, for example, Gabino A. Mendoza describes the Asian Institute of Management's interest in community-initiated business projects. Outside of revolutionary situations like China, such restructuring of development efforts is largely experimental and the management implications are not fully understood. It is therefore desirable for management training institutes to participate in planning new development structures, so the managerial requirements can be anticipated and appropriate training programs designed.

The following two papers develop the themes discussed above and the more particular requirements for management in the population and agricultural sectors.
During the early 1970s, management emerged as a major concern in the field of population. This resulted from the observation that family planning services often were not getting to the people because of serious weaknesses in the management of the delivery systems being used. Significantly, the problem and the need for action were recognized not only by a group of influential donors and academicians, but also by the leaders of several of the important population programs. The growing concern has produced an effort aimed at bringing about improvements in program management that is likely to have important influence on the broader field of public sector management for development.

This effort has been all the more challenging because of the rapid rates at which the concepts guiding program action in the population field have been changing. With changes in concept have come some basic changes in program design and, necessarily, changes in the scope and nature of the interventions required to address management improvement needs. Attention to these changes and their management implications is relevant specifically because changes taking place in population closely parallel the changes taking place in much of the rest of the development field.

My purpose is to share something of what I think we are learning about management within the population context, and in the process provide a framework that may be useful for identifying broader issues and options.

I should perhaps make it clear that I am using the term "management" in a broad sense to refer both to the management of the process by which plans are developed and to the management of the processes by which programs are implemented. When I speak of management capabilities, I usually am referring not only to an individual who has abilities as a manager, but also to institutional capabilities to manage planning and implementing processes. Possession of such institutional capabilities implies a structure more or less appropriate to the job to be done and an adequate staff of persons with the level and type of managerial abilities required by their assignments.
ICOMP: THE UNIQUE FACTOR

One thing that makes the population field of special interest to this meeting is the unique effort to address the field's management needs, led by a group known as ICOMP, the International Committee on the Management of Population Programmes. The membership of ICOMP is comprised entirely of the heads of major population programs and major management institutes, all from the developing nations. Its purpose is to serve the needs of the programs through facilitating research, training, and consulting activities that build on an exchange of experience and expertise between countries and seek effective working linkages between major programs and leading management institutes. Among the distinctive characteristics of ICOMP are the following.

- It is a direct expression of the felt needs of program managers.
- It is controlled by program managers to serve their interests.
- It has chosen to work largely with the best of the management institutes with strong experience in business management in preference to more conventional institutions oriented entirely to public or health administration.
- It has focused on the goal of improving program management and insists that all training, research, and consultation be directed clearly toward this end.
- It has avoided the common tendency to confuse management with a specific set of concepts and techniques that can be taught in the abstract divorced from program reality and has insisted that training activities be based on field research and consulting experience in population programs.
- It is committed to a collaborative effort between managers and educators to develop a body of management knowledge and experience based on and directly applicable to the needs of population programs.

ICOMP is far from having cracked the management barrier to effective performance in the population field, but it is making important progress in initiating an intelligent and attractive concept that shows considerable promise of producing longer-term results. It is largely through the work of ICOMP that I have been led to the perspectives presented in this paper.

DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE

The population field has been facing parallel and very significant changes in three related areas: family planning programs, development policy, and population policy. The directions of change in each area point to a convergence on what in the population field is being called a third path strategy. I will elaborate on this later.

Family Planning Programs

A major shift in focus has been taking place in family planning from models in which the clinic is the focal point of effort and concern, to models in which the community is the focal point.

1. Clinic based and clinician oriented. The early model, still followed in less progressive programs, is the clinic-based-clinician-oriented services delivery system. Family planning services are made available at the clinic to anyone who wants them badly enough to endure the inconvenience and humiliation commonly involved. The normal practice is to plan the clinic hours and procedures mainly for the convenience of the clinician, with little thought to the needs or feelings of the client, who commonly experiences long waits, indifferent treatment, and late or absent doctors. Promotional efforts in this model rely heavily on the mass media and occasional lectures or movies presented to community groups aimed at persuading people to come to the clinic.

2. Clinic based and community oriented. As the limitations of the initial model become recognized, the next step often is to add an extension worker who is assigned out of the clinic to go to the community to convince people to use the clinic service. In some instances, steps are...

1. The member institutes are the Asian Institute of Management in Manila, the Administrative Staff College of India in Hyderabad, the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, and the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administracion in Caracas.
taken to make the clinic services more convenient and to provide more client-oriented service. The program remains clinic based, but with outreach into the community, first attempting to pull the clients, and later beginning to take the service to them. There are three variations, each of which moves successively nearer to the community.

a. *Methods undifferentiated.* At first, there is no distinction between methods. The clinic-based fieldworkers simply do promotion. The user must go to the clinic whether for a condom or sterilization.

b. *Partially differentiated by method.* Next, the fieldworkers may be allowed to distribute in the community methods the program has classified as nonclinical. Normally, this starts with condoms and foams and is later extended to include pills.

c. *Fully differentiated by method.* Finally, methods become differentiated by nonclinical, paramedical, and medical. Fieldworkers distribute nonclinical methods, paramedicals carry out IUD insertion and early abortion, and provide backup for minor complications, and the doctors handle sterilization and serious complications.

During this stage it is common to take steps to involve fieldworkers from government programs outside the health sector in service delivery and educational activities.

3. *Community based and community oriented.* The major breakthrough normally comes when the community rather than the clinic becomes the actual focal point of program concerns and activities. Fieldworkers consider their communities rather than their clinics as their primary bases of operation and the clinic moves to the role of a technical backup system. Fieldworkers no longer simply promote and deliver on a one-to-one basis, but rather concentrate on building a network of community members who take on the promotional and delivery roles.

a. *Community distributors.* First there is the appointment of a community distributor whose primary status is member of the community rather than program employee. They may be entirely volunteer, or may work for a small commission.

b. *Community groups.* Next comes a shift from the individual to the group as the entry point to the community. The group will normally be some sort of mothers’ club or possibly a cooperative. The group assumes major responsibility for recruitment and nonclinical distribution.

c. *Community mobilization.* In the ultimate stage, of which there are still relatively few examples, the family planning activities become an integral part of a broadly based community-directed effort to mobilize its resources and assume responsibility for improving its future.

These are the basic directions of change in family planning. It will be noted that movement from less to more advanced conditions is basically additive in the sense that new workers, tasks, and facilities are added as new requirements are addressed. But previous requirements are not eliminated. For example, Stages 2 and 3 require clinics just as much as Stage 1. The extension workers added in Stage 2 continue to be required in Stage 3. Mass communications support continues throughout. The roles of individuals and facilities do change, however, and each more advanced stage adds new dimensions to the management problem.

These changes are all taking place within the content of, and to some extent are dependent on, a number of broader changes that are taking place in basic priorities in development policy.

**Development Policy**

Changing priorities and strategies in development policies are having particular impact because they set the institutional policy context within which population policy issues must be addressed. The trend is away from trickle-down strategies toward direct mobilization of community resources.

1. *Growth with trickle-down benefits.* At the conventional end of the spectrum is the trickle-down model, which argues that if first growth in output is sought, benefits to all levels of society will follow. The main management capability
required by the government to manage this model is an economic planning capability through which the economic context can be managed in a way conducive to rapid growth in output. Expenditures in the social sector tend to be looked on somewhat skeptically as social overhead or simply unproductive consumption. As a result, development of administrative structures and delivery systems in the social sector is a somewhat low priority.

2. Redistribution of social benefits. Disillusionment with trickle-down strategies and a growing concern for social equity tend to result in attention to policy measures directed toward achieving redistribution. Usually, these policies involve the government more actively in doing things, in providing services, and in acquiring and redistributing physical assets beyond simply regulating the economic context. This means the government must give higher priority to the development of administrative structures to carry out specified activities such as providing the people with food, health care, education, credit, agricultural assistance, etc. These structures tend to be centralized, vertical, sectoral institutions, each with its own narrowly defined area of activity and an autonomous structure extending from the capital city down, at least in theory, to the community. Loyalties of the bureaucrats rest more with the central office than with the people they are to serve. Not surprisingly, these structures generally are not very effective. The centrally planned procedures for program implementation often prove inadequate or inappropriate to actual local circumstances, there are few sources of either intrinsic or extrinsic reward for employees at the periphery to encourage effective performance in the absence of controls, and the administrative control structures are too weak to force effective performance.

Since the system fails to push the services down to the people, often those concerned with the welfare of the poor try to organize the community to demand the services the government has promised as a matter of right. This may or may not help, though ultimately the reality must be faced that the total pot is sufficiently small that simply dividing it more equitably will add very little to the average person's quality of life. At the same time, the redistribution of strategy tends to reduce incentives for being productive while educating people to a welfare mentality. So attention turns to a third model.

3. Community mobilization. The third model, which lies to the progressive end of the spectrum, gives particular attention to mobilizing the underutilized resources of poor communities so that these communities can more directly provide for their own needs and enhance their own welfare. It is a dynamic self-help model requiring major social and administrative reforms that is attracting attention from an increasing number of governments and international agencies. An important recent publication of the World Bank titled The Assault on World Poverty gives it major attention.

The community mobilization model requires placing a major priority on the development of institutional capabilities for social management at both planning and operating levels. At the planning level, the same sophisticated attention is needed in planning the management of noneconomic social processes that governments have in the past given to the management of economic processes. At the operating level, the weaknesses of the fragmented vertical bureaucratic structures must be overcome. Structures are required that have the capacity to be more locality specific in their response, more integrated, and more responsive to local leadership. Structures designed originally to facilitate centralized bureaucratic administration must be redesigned to align themselves to the needs and structures of the communities to which they must now learn to relate. This means two things: decentralization and a shift from primarily vertical to primarily horizontal structures. I will return to elaborate on this later in the paper.

As was true for the family planning models described earlier, these models are also basically
additive in their requirements as a country moves from the more conventional to the more progressive.

Population Policy

Just as with family planning and development, the major changes taking place in addressing population policy can be broken down into three models. In general, the direction of movement in the population field is away from equating population policy with little more than an effort to provide family planning services, and toward addressing the basic social processes that determine a population's characteristics.

1. Population as a single-program, single sector policy. In the most conventional model, population policy translates into a single program (family planning) that is the responsibility of a single sector (health) to implement. Within this model, it is common to view the "population" (family planning) program as a basically independent (vertical) activity. Though located in a health facility, it often is physically separate and even administratively independent. In this model, the population program is only minimally dependent on other governmental programs, which in turn have little if any dependence on it. Administratively, the program may be divided into national, regional, and clinic levels, as illustrated in Figure 1. The biggest coordination problem is that of coordinating the doctor, nurse, and social worker or extension educator working within a given clinic. Planning involves little more than deciding how much budget will be allocated, and which of the various delivery systems models will be employed. Generally, administration is highly centralized.

2. Population as a single-program, multisector policy. In the second model, population still translates essentially into a single program (family planning), but this time the program cuts across several sectors, with an increased amount of integration with the ongoing activities of each sector. In this model, family planning activities are carried out not only in the health sector, but also in other sectors such as education, community development, information, labor, religion, defense, agriculture, etc., creating the need for intersectoral program coordination at various administrative levels. This single-program, multisectoral approach is conceptualized in Figure 2.

Planning gets more complex in that a greater number of agencies are involved and generally more advanced program models are being employed, but planning issues are still pretty much limited to choosing between alternative designs for family planning promotion and service delivery, and deciding which agencies will assume responsibilities for each aspect of the program.

3. Population as a multiprogram, multisector policy. The more advanced policy perspective gaining currency in a growing number of countries attempts to address quantitative, structural, distributional, and qualitative characteristics
of the population, all within their broadly defined social and economic contexts. Such policies are by nature both multiprogram and multisector, as illustrated in Figure 3. Within this broad perspective population policy begins to intersect with nearly every other major concern of the society and its government. As a result, greatly increased complexities are added at the planning level because of the pervasive interdependence inherent in this policy perspective. For this reason even those countries that have adopted comprehensive population policies generally have a long way to go in solving the problems of translating them into implementable plans and programs.

For example, objectives relating to population location intersect with policy choices relating to industrial location, agricultural mechanization, housing, allocations of social services, location of roads, media content, and so forth. The planning of interventions to reduce death rates means making inputs to decisions relating to water supply, sanitation facilities, nutrition, population distribution, and health facilities. In turn, any one of these related concerns—nutrition for example—brings in decisions relating to income distribution, food production, crop varieties, child spacing, and education.

The complexities of attempting to address these variables in an integrated way at the central planning level quickly become staggering if we follow the current social sector planning conventions, which are based on the central design and top-down implementation of individual social programs. Perhaps we will need a major paradigm shift in the way we address social planning, away from emphasizing the central planning of individual centrally administered programs and toward the central planning of the regionalized institutional framework capable of addressing the needs of the social development process at the local level. There might also be more attention to the planning of strategic interventions into social and political processes to bring about critical changes in social process dynamics analogous to the critical interventions economic planners seek to achieve in the economic system.

There are few existing planning bodies fully prepared to deal with the requirements of the
new policy concepts, the full implications of which in my view have hardly begun to be grasped.

At the program level, it becomes necessary to recognize that it is no longer possible to speak of “the population program.” A country can have a population policy, but there will be many implementing programs, each of which has multiple purposes, some of which may be at odds with its population purposes, and most of which will be multisectoral. A greatly expanded need is generated for capabilities to manage programs on an intersectoral basis.

At the community level, the most promising way to translate the comprehensive population policy into action is through a general community mobilization effort. Properly implemented, such an effort can simultaneously produce improvements in nearly all the variables identified as having important influence on demographic variables, including income, health, and women’s involvement. It also serves to build a sense of the community being in control of its own destiny and builds community interest in the influence of demographic changes on community well-being and in the measures that can be taken by the community to control these changes.

Again, the directions of change create new requirements that are largely cumulative rather than substitutive. Family planning services remain important in Model 3 and involvement of the health sector remains important in all three models. The distinguishing features of the more advanced models are their concern for a broader range of outcomes, the greatly increased number of input variables considered relevant to these outcomes, and the greater recognition of the interdependence of these variables.

Convergence: The Third-Pathway Strategy

The population field has been dominated in recent years by a controversy over whether the priority in efforts to reduce fertility rates should be placed on family planning or on development. There is some feeling that a resolution may appear
through what has been called a third-path strategy. Basically, it is toward convergence of such a third-path strategy to which the directions of change in family planning, development, and population are leading. The third path emphasizes the activation of change processes within the community that will lead to self-directed mobilization of its resources in meeting its own needs. In so doing, it brings together all the change processes with which the more progressive population policy models are concerned.

The more progressive models, which represent the point of convergence, bring with them identifiable requirements for organizational and managerial capabilities that parallel the requirements being generated by similar shifts in emphasis in other areas of social policy, including health, nutrition, and rural development. By specifying the nature of these requirements in common, we can in large measure anticipate the types of roles for which management personnel working in the public social sector must be prepared and the more important management skills they will need. It also helps to explain the changing complexion of the problems we are addressing in efforts to strengthen management capabilities within the population field.

THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES. OVERALL GOVERNMENT

The Model Structure for the Third-Path Strategy

The type of national governmental structure toward which current evolution points consists essentially of the following:

1. A national planning unit responsible for integrating economic and social planning capabilities and concerns.
2. A matrix organizational structure with at least three dimensions reflecting sector, program, and geographical lines of coordination.
3. A major authority at each administrative level responsible for all governmental activities within the geographical area, possessing a regional planning capability closely tied to implementation, and having political as well as administrative accountability.
4. Sectoral ministries responsible for providing technical support and for maintaining technical standards with representatives at each administrative level responsible to the regional authority.
5. High priority intersectoral programs, such as family planning, with program management units at the appropriate administrative levels.
6. Highly organized communities providing major sources of initiative through a number of interlinking organizations, including youth groups, women's groups, cooperatives, health committees, irrigation authorities, etc.; and involving wide participation in leadership roles.

The core of the implementing structure will be the intermediate-level regional authorities headed by provincial governors and district commissioners with considerable authority over governmental activities within their regions. The district-level official will be responsible to the provincial governor, who in turn will be accountable to a central ministry such as interior, home affairs, or local government for accomplishment of development targets within their region within the general guidelines of central policy. Many Asian governments already have such structures, whereas a number of Latin American governments are planning seriously for regionalization.

Planning will be interactive between central and peripheral levels, with peripheral levels having ample scope to develop priorities and programs in ways most responsive to local needs, conditions, and resources. Both program and sectoral representatives will be accountable to the person with overall authority for their region, as well as to higher-level program or sector offices. A rough schematic of the system is depicted in Figure 4.

Some Common Concerns

This model commonly raises a number of concerns.

3. Obviously the titles and the number of levels will vary from country to country.
FIGURE 4
Schematic of Institutional Structures
Model 3 Development Policy
cerns that are worth specific comment. To begin with, there is the uneasiness of persons who see it violating the classical principle that an organization should have clearly defined lines of authority, with the person responsible for an activity having complete authority over it, and with each individual having one and only one boss. Violation of the principle is an inherent necessity of integrated development strategies and a common experience in modern organizational life.\footnote{Excluding private consulting, I have four immediate bosses in four separate organizations to whom I am directly accountable and each of whom must make accommodation to the demands of others. There is nothing particularly unusual about my case.}

You cannot have coordination by program, by sector, and by geographical area as demanded by the way the development task is now being defined and still maintain “unity of command.” The new development concepts are based on a recognition of interdependence. Tasks that involve high levels of interdependence cannot be divided into tightly autonomous little boxes. They require matrix forms of organization in which it is necessary to learn to live with the reality that responsibility nearly always exceeds formal authority and in which most individuals with positions of responsibility have more than one boss. This can lead to a good deal of uncomfortable tension, but it seems to be unavoidable in a complex modern or modernizing society. To manage organic processes requires organic organizational forms.

The second concern stems from an assumption that decentralization means the center gives up power to the periphery and that this would only lead to any benefits being captured by traditional interests. This concern stems from an incorrect belief that power or influence exists in a finite quantity and that if one person or group has more, another person or group necessarily has less. If we think of power as influence, it is easy to show that the total quantity is variable. In many developing countries, neither center nor periphery has any real influence over the other. In other countries, such as China, it appears that there is a fairly high level of interaction influence between center and periphery. In the classical authoritarian model, the influence, at least in theory, is all from the center and works in only one direction. In a classical democratic model, influence is in theory all from the bottom up. The goal of the participative decentralization model that is currently being widely advocated, particularly in the rural development literature, is a strong interactive system with a resulting increase in influence at both the center and the periphery.

The next concern stems from the argument that community mobilization, on which the model is based, was tried and basically failed in the community development efforts of the 1950s. In a sense, this is correct, but the world has changed a good deal since then, including changes in the expectations of those at the periphery, the values of those at the center, understanding of the complexity of the development process, the stimulus to policy action generated by population pressures, and the capacities of the governments involved. It may also be that the community development efforts of the fifties were not adequately backed by the broader social and institutional reforms that would create the context in which community response would become self-sustaining. While success is now by no means assured, the prospects seem greatly improved.

The final concern is somewhat more difficult to dismiss. It is asked, how can a country with such limited management capability that it has difficulty organizing a doctor, a nurse, an auxiliary, and an extension educator into an effective working unit to promote and deliver family planning services hope to muster the management resources required to manage such a sophisticated set of relationships as those described by the model? A good question, and one that can be answered only by looking more closely at some of the special qualities of the management problems we face within specifically family planning programs.

MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS: POPULATION

This discussion has taken us a long way from the question of what is required to manage a family planning clinic. But it reflects dual realities that cannot be ignored. First, there has been a redefini-
tion of the problem of population growth and the appropriate means for dealing with it. Second, the approach to the delivery of family planning services is changing rapidly. Both realities substantially change the basic nature of the management problems involved.

But let me now return to the basic clinic delivery system to describe some of the things we found when we started to analyze them from a management perspective.

The Basic Clinical Delivery System

One of the more in-depth studies of the management problems of the basic family planning clinical delivery system was carried out by a project I headed at INCAE in Central America. Though these programs were small and rather conventional in their orientation, subsequent experience leaves me confident that they reflect the problems of clinic-based family planning service delivery systems throughout the developing world.

While the programs have many minor variations, there are a number of features that are quite typical. Overall responsibility for the family planning program would rest with a central office located in the Ministry of Health. This office would invariably be headed by a physician, possibly with some political qualifications. Under the program director, there would be a number of staff positions or offices typically including a chief medical officer, a head nurse, a head social worker and/or a head educator. There also would probably be a statistics office, a research and evaluation office, and an administrator.

Family planning clinics were located in various types of health facilities that normally included a number of other types of clinics. A typical family planning clinic would have one doctor hired for a specified number of hours specifically to do family planning consultations with the expectation that he conduct six consultations per hour. The doctor was usually designated as the director of the clinic. In many cases, the family planning doctor was employed during other periods of time to provide other types of services in the health facility and might also hold the title of director of the facility, though the nature of his authority, if any, over other clinic personnel was often unclear. Except in very small clinics, there would usually be at least two nursing-type personnel—graduate nurses and auxiliaries. The more senior nurse might or might not have actual authority over the less senior nurses. Between them, the nurses were responsible for registering and screening the patients, taking weight and blood pressure, deciding who would see the doctor, giving promotional and educational talks, explaining the different contraceptive methods, distributing pills and condoms, and so forth. Often they were expected to make home visits to find women who failed to keep an appointment.

There might also be a social worker and/or an educator assigned to the clinic or assigned to a broader geographical area that included the clinic. Commonly, they were expected to spend certain designated hours in the clinic giving educational talks and the rest of their time working in the community. Generally, the work they did in the clinic duplicated the educational work of the nursing staff, though sometimes they had special tasks assigned in the clinic, such as one program in which the social workers were supposed to do a case history on each client before they were allowed to see the doctor to register in the program. This consisted of asking them such questions as whether they had ever been a prostitute or had had VD, and when they had had their first sexual experience. We never could determine for what purpose the information was gathered. The norms simply indicated it was part of the procedure that the social worker was responsible for carrying out.

Most activities in the clinics are reduced to routines and procedures, some of which are spelled out in official documents and others which are established by clinic personnel. These often seem to be largely matters of custom, which, once established, were seldom questioned, even though they might often be neglected.

The programs we observed were generally vertical in the sense that personnel in the family planning clinics were directly responsible to and were supervised by the central family planning office.
It was often unclear what the lines of authority were at the clinic level even though the doctor was usually designated clinic director. He seldom had any formal authority over the nurses, educators, or social workers, each of whom worked for a... was responsible to her own professional department within the central ministry office. When supervision was carried out at all, it was by profession, i.e., a doctor would visit to supervise the work of the doctor, a nurse to supervise the nurses, etc. Often there was no point of coordination below the level of the program director. Each professional group did its own work nearly independently, even though the task would seem to call for considerable teamwork. In one instance, separate departments of social work and education each did nearly identical work with no coordination. The primary concern in supervision was with insuring that the procedures for which that profession was responsible were being carried out and that various forms were being filled in properly.

The designation of the doctor as clinic director seemed more a recognition of his professional status than a designation of a role responsibility. The complaints of doctors arriving late, leaving early, or not showing up at all were pervasive. Though there were important exceptions, the doctors usually limited their concerns to filling their consultation quotas as rapidly as possible. When they arrived, they expected the nurses to have the patients ready for them. They ran them through as quickly as possible, and left the nurses to give the women their materials, check to see whether they had understood the instructions, and complete the paper work. Only in the most exceptional cases did the clinic directors give any attention to matters of clinic management, to program promotion, or to coordination of the staff personnel.

The emphasis on routines and on arranging everything to facilitate the work of the doctor during his consultations led to practices reflecting an almost complete disregard for the client and for the purposes and requirements of the program. These were most starkly evident in the more crowded facilities. It was not unusual for anyone arriving less than an hour before the scheduled arrival of the doctor to be turned away. The rationale was the need to insure that the women would not arrive late and keep the doctor waiting. In order to maintain "medical control," women taking the pill were routinely required to return to the clinic each month for a new supply of pills so that the clinic staff could "motivate" them to continue. This ignored the fact that the women typically had to travel an hour or more and neglect their families and jobs to get to the clinic. Each month, the women returning only to get their pills had to wait in the same line with women coming to enter the program. All were processed identically, having the same weight and blood pressure check and listening to the same talk month after month. In one clinic, women were lining up at six in the morning to get their pills and then being turned away at noon because the clinic staff could only attend to twenty-five women in one afternoon, given the procedures they used to process clients. In another program, which required that women desiring to start a method come to the clinic only during their menstrual period, the women were required to be present at least an hour before the arrival of the doctor so they could be sent to a small airless closet to remove their undergarments and any sanitary pad materials to prepare themselves for the doctor. Then they returned to the hot, crowded waiting room in this state of undress to wait from one to three hours for their turn to see the doctor, assuming he actually arrived.

Most startling to us was how little recognition there was even among the more able and dedicated program personnel of the extent to which such practices added to clinic congestion and literally drove away women who desperately wanted to avoid having more children!

Such horror stories were easily found in nearly every area of program activity. There were programs where so much time was spent completing reports that were never read and compiling statistics that were never used that personnel could not attend to the clients. There were programs where as much as a third of the medical hours were devoted to taking Pap smears. The numbers of tests were proudly reported as an indication of the
program's contribution to maternal health, with no concern for the fact that effective follow-up of women with positive tests was nearly nonexistent.

There were also a few, very few, bright spots. Usually, these were situations in which an exceptional doctor or nurse at the clinic level took charge of the situation and recognized that the purpose of the program was not the completion of procedures and records. These few individuals often went beyond their authority, organized the clinic personnel into a working team, designed and carried promotional campaigns in terms of target groups and their needs, and designed clinic procedures in terms of efficiency and client convenience.

What did we learn from this about management in family planning programs? Were the programs failing because of management weaknesses? From what we observed, we could not even say that the programs were managed. They simply happened. Individuals performed their individual routines, some with exceptional dedication. These efforts provided contraceptive service for those with sufficient perseverance. But the management process was absent. We found very few individuals thinking through what they were trying to achieve, planning, organizing resources, motivating and supporting subordinates, checking results, and continually revising strategies to improve results. As a result, the programs were meeting only a fraction of the apparent potential demand for services and were using the resources expended inefficiently.

Management is needed, but how do you get it? The programs we observed were imbedded in medical systems and the conditions we observed were a direct result of the conventions that governed those systems. Many of the difficulties can be traced back ultimately to one central reality. The systems have been distorted by the fact that they have become dominated by one group of technical specialists, the physicians.

As with most technical specialists, physicians are very highly trained to perform narrowly defined functions. The profession tends to attract persons whose personal styles are compatible with the performance of these functions. Basically, these functions involve receiving persons one at a time to diagnose and prescribe treatment for their physical malfunctions. Normally, the patient is expected to submit unquestioningly to the physician's judgments. In the larger centers, the physician is normally supported by a complex system of administration, housekeeping, and technician backup that he prefers to take for granted. The physician is likely to have a high need for independence and generally feels more comfortable in the role of unquestioned expert than in the role of team leader. Persons whose temperaments are suitable for the physician role are unlikely also to be well suited to the role of managing the multiple, simultaneous relationships involved in running a large, complex organization and balancing the contributions of many different types of professional specialties.

It is the consultation room for which the physician has been trained, and it is in the consultation room that he spends the vast majority of his professional working hours. As he develops his career, it is not surprising that he comes to believe that health care is what he does in his consultation room, failing to recognize that his is only one technical component of a very much larger and more complex system. From the physician's perspective, the primary component of a health care system is the consultation room in which the primary figure is the physician. Only another physician can really understand the task of carrying out a consultation; therefore it follows in his mind that health systems and health care facilities should be headed by physicians. It also provides a reassuring consistency between his professional status and his position in the organizational hierarchy to permit only doctors authority over other doctors. It would seem improper for a nurse to be in a position of managing a facility in which a doctor is employed in a subordinate position no matter how much better qualified the nurse might be for the task. These are the physician's implicit perceptions, and unfortunately physicians often have the power to impose their view of the situation on health organizations. They demand the top positions and refuse to be answerable to nonphysicians. Yet they seldom recognize or accept the implications of the respon-
sibilities of these positions. Thus, while the physicans fill the management positions, they don’t actually manage. The result is that the system functions essentially without management, held together largely by the more able nurses who, to avoid appearing to assume authority beyond their station, work by the standardized norms and procedures and do their best to cover for the doctor. No one asks any basic questions, the patients suffer, and the costs of the inefficiencies that result grow entirely out of proportion to the service actually provided. Likewise, it also becomes exceedingly difficult to get real attention in most health systems to health concerns that must be addressed outside a consulting or operating room. This type of problem is probably not unique to health systems. I suspect that similar problems would be encountered by any organization that falls totally under the domination of members of one narrow technical specialty.

None of this analysis bodes particularly well for prospects of a strategy that seeks to improve management of conventional clinical delivery systems as a basis for improving family planning services delivery. It does not, however, rule out the possibility of improvement. There have been a considerable number of regional management seminars and conferences addressed to top-level management personnel. We are coming to realize, however, that any real improvement within the medical system is going to require in-depth development within individual programs and ministries. This means that effective training in basic management skills is going to have to be made an integral part of the ongoing in-house training activities of these organizations. The health and family planning training institutes in India have recognized such a need. Though so far their efforts have been rudimentary, they are committed to continued experimentation to find the right approach. This type of effort should receive major attention over the next few years.

Perhaps one of the most important things that management training can accomplish for the physicians is to create an understanding of the nature, difficulty, and challenge of the management role, and at the least produce a recognition that, by the very nature of the tasks, one individual cannot manage a medical facility while holding medical consultations. They are mutually exclusive activities, like driving a car and riding a bicycle. Even though a person may have the skills to do both, they can only be done one at a time. This insight is basic to achieving acceptance of the need for the physician manager to either take the management job seriously and devote himself to developing the skills the job requires, or to allow the management positions at the various levels to be assumed by nonphysician personnel trained specifically for these assignments. Change will come, but real improvements from working within the medical system are many years away unless there emerges strong outside political commitment to the task.

What about the more advanced models with their much greater managerial requirements? Are they any more promising? Quite likely.

Advanced Models

When we turn to the more advanced models, our discussion must necessarily become more speculative. The experience is newer, the systems involved are much more diverse, and it is something of a problem at times to distinguish between plans and accomplished reality. There is, however, a growing body of substantive experience on which to draw. Indiæesia has accumulated several years’ experience with what is now a fairly mature and effective multisectoral family planning program. Bangladesh recently embarked on an ambitious multisectoral program. The Philippines Population Commission is spearheading what they refer to as a total integrated development strategy that seeks to include family planning efforts with an integrated multisectoral community mobilization effort. Colombia some years ago undertook to integrate a strong population policy perspective within its development planning processes. Singapore has successfully implemented a strong program of social incentives for fertility reduction. El Salvador recently announced a comprehensive population policy and has a multisectoral group working on planning for its implementation. Costa Rica is in the process of exploring approaches to
the development of a national population capability and to the integration of family planning with more basic community development processes. A number of years ago, Korea took successful steps to mobilize women's groups as vehicles for community advancement and as focal points for community-based family planning activities. Community-based family planning efforts are particularly well established and effective in Colombia, Brazil, Thailand, and in some provinces of Indonesia. Ghana and Egypt have both had comprehensive multisectoral population policies for years and have been actively seeking the most effective approaches to strengthening their implementation. Most of these efforts so far reflect only fragments of the third-path model, and others are mainly plans that have yet to be turned into action. The one country that may reflect the model in all of its various dimensions is the People's Republic of China.

Of course, the more advanced population models are largely dependent on broader reforms toward decentralized integrated regional administration of governmental programs and measures to mobilize community resources. Regionalization is a topic of growing interest throughout the world. The World Bank indicates that there is a clear trend toward reliance on local-level management as the cornerstone of the economic systems in Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, and India; and that a system of decentralized planning and decision-making is being practiced in Malaysia and being developed in Indonesia. The Philippines is also developing regional planning capabilities. It has been claimed that one of the secrets of development progress in Taiwan and South Korea has been their decentralized administration and their successful mobilization of broadly based community organization. Of course, these two countries have been among the more successful in the world in their promotion of the use of family planning.

We are very much in a stage of transition, and experience is being gained through trial and error efforts. The ICOMP managers have chosen to devote their 1976 annual conference to discussion of experience with implementation of broad-perspective population policies, and out of these discussions should come more substantive insights regarding the management issues and requirements involved. From my own reading of the experience, the following statements can be made:

- A crucial prerequisite to the success of any such effort carried out by a government seems to be strong political support from the highest levels. This support has been a very significant factor in the success of population efforts in Singapore and Indonesia. Attention is needed to the processes by which support is mobilized. Without it, the inertia of entrenched interests in the bureaucracy is very likely to frustrate the actions required to move to more progressive models.

- Social planning of the type required by comprehensive population policies is a difficult business not easily addressed by existing national development planning bodies. The further the movement into new policy concerns, the more difficult the problem. For example, only the most rudimentary knowledge exists of how to go about developing programs to address policy variables such as raising the age of marriage or modernizing women's roles.

- More advanced models require the effective introduction of matrix forms of organization with which most public sector managers are neither familiar nor comfortable. Their thinking tends to be in terms of centralized formal vertical authority. The need exists to develop an understanding of the necessity for and logic of matrix forms of organization and to develop the program management skills involved in identifying, gaining the cooperation of, and coordinating re-

sources over which one has limited formal authority.

- The development of management systems geared to local regional planning responsive to national policy guidance becomes a major issue. Of particular concern are budgeting, management information, supervisory, and training systems.
- A major reorientation of supervisory styles is needed to ease participation and bottom-up planning.
- A major investment must often be made in development of regional planning and administrative capabilities.
- A great deal of skill in organizational design and management systems is required and is exceedingly scarce in most governments, as well as in most of the donor groups that have major influence on their development policies.
- A great deal of attention is required to the development of strong and effective organizations at the community level and to stimulating meaningful and sustained local involvement. The skills required here are also quite scarce.

To return to our earlier question, how can a country that cannot manage a doctor, a nurse, an auxiliary, and a social worker in a family planning clinic hope to muster the capability to manage such complex systems?

Medical systems tend on the whole to reflect rather poorly the managerial competence of the nations in which they are located. Consider the U.S. medical system, for example. Throughout much of the developing world, it is a common perception that Ministries of Health are among the most poorly managed of governmental agencies. No wonder. As we saw when examining the experience of clinic-based family planning programs, they have designed systems that almost insure that the management functions will not be performed. It is significant that the more advanced family planning program models are less medical in their orientation. Interestingly, many of the more important innovations have been introduced by the more forward-looking physicians, who recognize the weaknesses of the conventional medical models.

I think it is a reasonably verifiable statement that so far as family planning programs are concerned, generally, the further the program moves from clinic-based to community-based models, the more successful the program and the more qualified its management appears to be. Perhaps it is because the more qualified managers have moved their programs away from the clinic-based models. Or perhaps it is because once programs have been broken away from the domination of the medical hierarchy, it becomes more possible to appoint to the top positions individuals selected for their management qualifications rather than their qualifications as physicians. At this point, I cannot say which it is. In any event, I doubt that it is a coincidence that we see simultaneously a trend away from clinic-based models and a trend away from assigning doctors to central roles simply because they are doctors.

Often there is a great deal more managerial competence around than one might assume. Indonesia, which in the late 1960s was considered a nightmare of bureaucratic incompetence, has, within a period of only about five years, developed some very impressive regional administrative structures that the family planning effort has used very effectively to its advantage. I am also in agreement with an observation by Robert Chambers that “most field staff have far greater capability for managing their work than most of their superior officers assume.” The key is to develop structures that nurture and facilitate rather than stifle the exercise of such capability. Doing so may well be the most crucial challenge currently in the development field.

I believe also that the rapid shift taking place toward intersectoral perspectives will have its own salutary effect. The medical sector is not alone in having a particular group of technical specialists exercise a monopoly control over its leadership positions. It is less likely that any one group of specialists will successfully gain monopoly control

within the organizations designed on intersectoral lines. Thus, the prospects improve for managerial qualifications becoming more important criteria for appointment to management positions. This should open many new opportunities for managerially trained individuals to perform significant roles within governmental social development programs.

THE BROADER CONCERNS OF DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

What is happening in population is directly analogous to what is happening to the field of social development in general. Conventional thinking in sectoral terms is rapidly becoming obsolete, with the current emphasis being on integrative rather than sectoral approaches and lateral rather than vertical institutional structures. Population is no longer synonymous with family planning though family planning remains an essential component. Rural development is no longer synonymous with agriculture, though agriculture remains an essential component. What has conventionally been labeled the health sector is no longer synonymous with current thinking regarding the determinants of health status, though applications of conventional health technologies continue to be an important component.

These changes present a major challenge for the application of management concepts and techniques to problems of intersectoral social planning and operation at national, regional, and community levels. None of the needs outlined here would seem to be limited to population alone. Only the specific applications differ. Success in addressing these needs will be a crucial requirement for successfully breaking the barriers that have been frustrating past efforts to achieve both development and social equity.
I propose to outline here, in general terms, what seem to be the essential requirements for effective management of national agricultural development programs, and to suggest certain implications for the education and training of developing-country personnel destined for managerial responsibilities pertaining to agricultural development within public sector contexts. The intent is not to advocate one approach or another to the problem of management education and training as related to agricultural development, but rather to indicate the objectives to be sought.

MANAGERIAL FUNCTIONS IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

The managerial functions inherent in overall rural development are not dealt with here except to the extent that agricultural development programs (which are principally concerned with increased agricultural productivity) constitute an element in rural development processes (which are directed toward improved standards of living for rural populations—particularly the rural poor). While increased agricultural productivity is generally an important aspect of rural development, the degree of overlap in particular situations is determined by a variety of factors, the discussion of which is considerably beyond the scope of my present concern.

It should be emphasized also that I am concerned with public management aspects of agricultural development programs and not with managerial functions performed by individual farmers and the private enterprises with which they have commercial relationships. While farm management and agroindustry management are excluded, it is evident that without a clear understanding of the determinants of managerial decisions on the part of farmers and the enterprises serving them, government officials are unlikely to be able to manage agricultural development programs effectively.

The agricultural development process in virtually every national context is heavily influenced by government policies and programs administered by a variety of agencies usually related in one way or another to Ministries of Agriculture. But while
Ministries of Agriculture have primary responsibility for executing national policies and coordinating national programs pertaining to agricultural development, they generally are not free to establish policies or to initiate programs without reference to a broader framework of national priorities and constraints as determined by Ministries of Finance and Planning. When the policies are right and the financial resources adequate, effective management of government functions pertaining to agriculture can make a great deal of difference in the pace of agricultural development. But without the necessary wisdom in policy-making councils, and without sufficient resources to support priority activities, the effectiveness of otherwise competent managers of agricultural development programs is bound to be sharply diminished.

The scope and nature of typical national agricultural development strategies and policies, and also of particular programs and projects, have undergone substantial change in recent years, as agriculture has been given higher priority and as better understanding of the essential components of agricultural development has become more widespread. There appears to be less tendency nowadays to rely as heavily as in the past on manipulation of economic variables (e.g., prices, credit, taxes, etc.), and a correspondingly greater tendency to seek ways of adjusting the technological and institutional parameters of agricultural development processes. As a result, agricultural research and extension activities, land tenure arrangements and operations of irrigation districts and other cooperative organizations, among other things, have tended to become relatively more important as functions for which effective government management is required. Furthermore, as larger amounts of financial resources have been mobilized for support of agricultural development, there has tended in most developing countries to be a proliferation of programs (regional, commodity, etc.) and projects (research, infrastructure, etc.), all of which require effective management. Also, there has been an increasing tendency in recent years for the objectives of agricultural development and those of rural development to become more closely intertwined or "integrated"—particularly with reference to the distribution of benefits from productivity improvements between various segments of the rural population. The managerial functions performed by public officials have, therefore, tended to become both more important to agricultural development processes and also to require an increase in the numbers and improvement in the capabilities of such officials.

The growth of foreign assistance availabilities to the agricultural sectors of the developing countries, while certainly welcomed, also adds substantially to the burdens of public officials responsible for management of national agricultural development programs—especially when, as is normally the case, the foreign assistance does not include management assistance. As bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies have become more committed to, and sophisticated about, provision of financial and technical assistance to developing-country agriculture, a very considerable proportion of the time and energy of the most able officials in recipient countries has tended to be absorbed in satisfying requirements of foreign assistance agencies and in utilizing the services of technical assistance personnel.

In summary, the essential managerial functions pertaining to agricultural development commonly required to be performed in the public sectors of developing countries can be categorized as follows:

- Management of institutions and procedures required for establishment of objectives, strategies, policies, and priorities.
- Management of service and research agencies, regulatory authorities, and public enterprises involved in planning, implementation, coordination, and monitoring of sectoral programs and individual projects.
- Management of organizations and systems required for mobilization, budgeting, allocation, and control of financial resources—including foreign aid availabilities.
- Development of organizational structures and staff competences required for effective performance of the managerial functions listed above.
SOME PARAMETERS OF MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS

As is true for any institution or activity requiring effective management, it is essential that the organizational structures devised for carrying out national agricultural development programs be consistent with the objectives and priorities of such programs as well as with the particular managerial and technical functions to be performed. One of the great difficulties throughout the developing world (as well as in numerous so-called advanced countries) is that the established organizational structure of government agencies is incompatible with effective performance of necessary functions. While this problem of structure/function incompatibility is probably no more serious for agencies concerned with agricultural development than for other components of developing-country governments, it is nevertheless, in many instances, a major constraint on the agricultural development process. It is quite important, therefore, that as new ways and means of addressing problems of agricultural development in the poorer countries are being advocated and adopted, adequate attention be given to the corresponding adjustments in traditional organizational structures required to avoid unnecessary constraints imposed by ineffective public management.

Quite different organizational structures are, of course, required for effective performance of the various types of public management functions relating to agricultural development listed above. For example, the sectoral planning function (i.e., specification of objectives, strategies, policies, and priorities governing agricultural development) is generally highly centralized and managed by high-ranking political appointees within the organizational context of a president's or prime minister's office, or as an adjunct of a Ministry of Finance. The role of the Ministry of Agriculture in the planning process is usually restricted to that of providing data to the central planning agency and of developing program and project proposals for incorporation into the sectoral development plan. It is at the implementation stage that the Ministry of Agriculture and subordinate agencies under its jurisdiction are required to assume primary operational responsibility for performance of technical, service, regulatory, and monitoring functions pertaining to those programs and projects approved (if not originated) elsewhere in the government structure.

The sorts of managerial talents required by a Ministry of Agriculture for effective performance of its primary responsibilities are therefore quite different from those required by a central planning agency or a Ministry of Finance. For example, the capabilities required for effective management of national agricultural research and extension programs are quite different from those required for management of the technical functions, bureaucratic procedures, and political forces involved in the development planning process. Furthermore, the types of managerial talents required by most Ministries of Agriculture are extraordinarily diverse. There is a considerable difference, for example, in the competences required to manage a national agricultural research program or commodity marketing enterprise, on the one hand, and those required to manage localized extension activities or cooperative associations, on the other. A related point is that the levels within the organizational structure of a Ministry of Agriculture at which important managerial responsibilities must be exercised, as well as the geographic dispersion of individuals assigned such managerial responsibilities, normally encompass quite a wide spectrum. This implies that Ministries of Agriculture and related agencies and enterprises require an unusually wide range of managerial talents, possessing not only different types of technical knowledge and functional skills but also motivated by different career aspirations.

The organizational structures devised for implementation and management of national agricultural development programs differ widely among countries. As is illustrated later, the organization and management of essentially similar national programs are much more centralized in Botswana and Nepal than in Brazil and Indonesia—although there are significant differences between Botswana and Nepal, and between Brazil and Indonesia, in
this respect as well. Furthermore, because of differences in the types and stages of agricultural development in these countries, and also in the scale and sophistication of development programs that are presently feasible in technical and economic terms, quite different types of management techniques are required from one context to another.

A fundamentally important factor governing the types of managerial techniques that are appropriate in individual developing countries is, of course, the competence and sophistication of available managerial talents. Unless the managerial functions to be performed correspond to the capabilities of available staff, public management ineffectiveness will be a major constraint on national agricultural development programs no matter how consistent the requisite functions are with organizational structures. It is unfortunately often the case that institutions or agencies are created, and program objectives set and financial allocations made, without sufficient consideration of the capabilities of the manpower available for performance of requisite management functions. Foreign assistance agencies are particularly prone to encourage developing country governments to undertake so-called "institution-building" initiatives without adequate and realistic assessment of management requirements. It is highly important that this factor be given careful attention by developing-country governments and foreign assistance agencies alike as plans are formulated for major incremental international infusions of capital and technology into the agricultural sectors of developing countries.

In most developing countries, it has been traditional to assign public management responsibility for agricultural development processes to civil servant generalists who often have insufficient understanding of the technical aspects of these processes. In a number of developing countries, however, it is becoming increasingly common for a younger generation of technically trained individuals to be assigned managerial responsibilities pertaining to agricultural development processes within established civil servant contexts. This tendency to "elevate" recently graduated M.Sc. and Ph.D. agricultural scientists, economists, and engineers to positions of managerial responsibility appears to be motivated by frustration at the highest levels of government with the generally poor performance of traditional civil servants, and to be premised on the assumption that those who have demonstrated their qualifications for advanced degrees in technical fields are thereby qualified to manage organizations or activities relating, however indirectly, to their technical training.

These technicians are generally aware that there is little in their training or experience to qualify them for major managerial responsibilities but are also usually reluctant to decline because advancement within the civil service tends to be a career path promising more status, compensation, security, and power than prospective advancement within their particular fields of professional expertise. Therefore, except for those developing countries with the most progressive and accessible private enterprise sectors or university/research establishments, the temptation for some of the best-trained agricultural scientists, economists, and engineers to abandon their disciplines in favor of management careers within the civil service is often overwhelming. Unfortunately, however, these technicians-turned-managers are often greatly frustrated by the traditional procedures and bureaucratic mentality that pervade civil service establishments, with the result that they are often unable to perform any better (and sometimes less well) than the traditional civil servants they have replaced—a result that is doubly distressing because their talents are lost to the professions for which they were initially trained.

Several generalizations emerge from the foregoing discussion with implications for education and training programs addressed to the public management manpower requirements of national agricultural development programs. First, unless the organizational structure of government is compatible with the functional requirements of agricultural development programs, management effectiveness will be limited and otherwise competent managers will be frustrated. Thus, in many situations, appropriate organizational reform is an essential precondition for successful management
manpower development programs. Second, because of the wide range of managerial competences required within government with respect to agricultural development processes, it would be difficult to devise a management training program at other than the most general level relevant to the full range of managerial responsibilities that must be effectively exercised. In other words, the orientation and particular knowledge and skills required for effective management performance in one functional context or at one level in the bureaucratic structure are quite different from those required for other contexts or levels. Third, while the effectiveness of public management of agricultural development processes varies from one country to another, and is determined by different factors within each country, it appears that there is a general tendency for nonspecialist civil servants to have insufficient understanding of the technical aspects of these processes pertinent to exercise of management responsibilities, and a corresponding tendency for technically trained agriculturists assigned management responsibilities to have an inadequate understanding of the particular techniques and systematic procedures required for effective managerial performance.

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NATIONAL PROGRAMS

The foregoing and related points will be discussed subsequently. In the present section, I will endeavor to illustrate and compare the public management requirements of four rather similar national agricultural development programs that are soon to be implemented. The countries concerned are Botswana, Brazil, Indonesia, and Nepal—and the funding agencies are the World Bank (in the cases of Brazil and Indonesia) and the United States Agency for International Development (in the cases of Botswana and Nepal). A common element in each of the programs is major expansion of production-oriented agricultural research and extension activities. These four programs therefore constitute a reasonably representative cross section of the organizational and managerial arrangements evidently thought to be appropriate for implementation of national agricultural development programs of this general sort.

Botswana

The Crop Production Improvement Project to be initiated in Botswana, with $1.75 million in grant funding from the United States Agency for International Development, is intended to complement other ongoing efforts being made by the government, supported by various assistance agencies, to expand production of sorghum and certain other dryland cereals. A new Crops Division is to be established under the Department of Agricultural Field Services within the Ministry of Agriculture; more productive and reliable dryland farming systems are to be developed by the Department of Agricultural Research; additional grain storage facilities are to be constructed for management by the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (a parastatal enterprise under the jurisdiction of the MOA); additional staff for the Extension Division of the Department of Agricultural Field Services are to be trained locally in methods for encouraging farmers to adopt new technologies as these are developed and tested; and, over the five-year period, thirteen Botswanan are to be trained outside the country in various areas of technical agriculture relating to crop production.

The project budget provides for eleven and a half man-years of expatriate technical assistance, for which it is intended to contract with a United States organization. The permanent secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for management of the project, although it is understood that particular management functions will be delegated to the chief of the Crops Division (to be provided by the contracting organization) and other department and division heads, most of whom are also assigned to the government under various technical assistance programs.

The technical assistance personnel to be provided by the contracting organization are not expected to function as a team responsible to a designated project director, but rather as individual civil servants responsible to their respective division heads. The chief of the Crops Division (i.e., the senior technician to be recruited by the contracting
organization) will, however, be expected to serve as the official liaison between USAID and the other expatriate staff members provided by the contracting organization. Performance of these personnel, as well as the government, is to be regularly monitored by USAID in accordance with separate but corresponding agreements between the government and the contracting organization on the one hand, and USAID and the government on the other hand.

Commentary: Several observations come to mind regarding these arrangements. First, they are probably more elaborate than necessary, given the relatively small dimensions of the project and the relatively simple organizational structure to which the project relates. Second, more ongoing managerial burden is placed on the MOA and its various department and division heads than would be necessary if the government, USAID, and the contracting organization would simply agree on what is to be done and on a project director capable of assuming responsibility for execution in accordance with the guidelines specified. Third, if the contracting organization is to earn its overhead charges, it should be obligated to see to it that the task is adequately performed in accordance with contract specifications—thereby freeing the government and USAID from excessive managerial burdens. Fourth, given the shortage of local managerial capability, it would seem to be desirable to place a greater emphasis on counterpart in-service training and, in the case of those trainees to be sent outside the country, on managerial rather than strictly technical aspects of agricultural development. Finally, and with reference to the second point above, there appears to be a danger that the USAID monitoring role will impose a substantial burden on both ministry officials and project personnel beyond what would be required if the contracting organization, acting through a designated project director, were to be entrusted with faithful execution of properly specified obligations.

Brazil

The Agricultural Research Project to be implemented in Brazil during the next five years, with approximately $40 million in loan financing from the World Bank and some $150 million in cruzeiro equivalent provided by the government, is designed to substantially strengthen the capability of the recently established Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA)—a state enterprise operating under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. The project is focused on three tropical agroecological areas (north, northeast, and central west), and is directed toward achievement of significant increases in production of nine commodities of major importance to the Brazilian economy. The project encompasses, therefore, nine National Commodity Research Programs and three Regional Farming Systems Research Programs—to be linked, as appropriate, with fourteen state-level experiment stations, which are to conduct adaptive research based on new technologies generated by the core research programs.

The project judges provision for substantial technical assistance to EMBRAPA with respect to organization and management of the various research programs and also implementation of an ambitious staff development plan. A research program adviser is to be recruited internationally to work with the Brazilian director of EMBRAPA’s Department of Technology and Science, and several senior scientists are also to be recruited internationally to provide leadership for the commodity and farming systems research programs. A total of 59.5 man-years of long-term expatriate consultants, supplemented by 41.0 man-years of short-term consultants, are budgeted for the five-year period.

The project encompasses a large-scale training program under which 123 EMBRAPA staff are to be trained to the Ph.D. level and 663 to the M.Sc. level both in Brazil and overseas. Specialized short-course training is to be provided for an additional 180 staff members. This training program—which is keyed to the personnel requirements of the various research programs—has been designed to provide EMBRAPA with an adequate supply of appropriately trained technicians and managers for the foreseeable future.

EMBRAPA is to have overall responsibility for execution of the project, but the director of the Department of Science and Technology is to have
primary responsibility for implementation of the research program components. He is to be assisted by two teams of senior scientists, an eight-man "technical unit" and a four-man "management unit," which are to be responsible for maintaining liaison between EMBRAPA headquarters and the various experiment stations. In addition, a "technical support unit" comprised of architects, engineers, and supporting staff is to be established to plan and supervise the construction of research facilities and other civil works components of the project. Corresponding plans have been devised for organization and management of the individual research programs and agricultural research centers to be established, under which designated Brazilian program directors will be assigned responsibilities for execution, coordination, and evaluation of particular activities.

A Program, Planning and Budgeting System is to be established for each research program, incorporating detailed specifications of problems, objectives, plans, leadership and staffing, interinstitutional linkages and funding arrangements. Several advisory councils are expected to assist in identification of priority research activities and development of procedures for dissemination of improved technology. And a National Committee for Agricultural Research, Technical Assistance and Rural Extension is to provide guidance to EMBRAPA on national priorities for agricultural development and on general policy and procedural matters. Staffing of the project is to be programmed and managed in accordance with equally well-specified procedures under the direction of EMBRAPA's Department of Human Resources. Recruitment of expatriate staff is to be contracted to one or more international organizations experienced in selecting and administering technical assistance personnel, and the programming of fellowships for foreign training is likewise to be contracted, both functions to be performed in accordance with terms and procedures satisfactory to the World Bank.

Commentary: While the arrangements described above for organization and management of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Project are impressive, it remains to be seen whether or not they are workable. It is remarkable, however, that the Brazilians and the World Bank are so obviously concerned with establishing appropriate organizational structures and management procedures—and with developing staff capabilities accordingly. The success of the project over the longer term, of course, depends on how effective the projected staff development program proves to be—which will depend, in turn, on how well the contracting organization and the institutions receiving the trainees are able to satisfy EMBRAPA's and the trainees' requirements. The success of the project in the early years will be largely determined by the quality of the expatriate personnel to be recruited for performance of the various technical and managerial functions—and, therefore, depends on the quality of the services rendered by the contractor selected for this purpose. It should be noted that, as in the Botswana case, Brazil does not intend for the expatriates recruited to provide technical assistance to operate as a unified team subject to direction of a team leader, but rather that they function as individual consultants (whether long- or short-term) directly responsible to EMBRAPA. Furthermore, it appears that the Brazilian project will be less subject to World Bank monitoring than will be the Botswana project to USAID monitoring.

Indonesia
The Agricultural Research and Extension Project that has been designed for implementation in Indonesia during the next five years, with approximately $21.5 million in loan financing from the World Bank, supplemented by some $25 million in rupiah equivalent provided by the government, is intended to strengthen national production-oriented research and extension activities pertaining to commodities of particular importance to Indonesia. The newly established agency for Research and Development (ARD) and Agency for Education, Training and Extension (AETE), both under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, provide the organizational frameworks for the program. Research programs are to be developed by ARD for four types of crops (rice, "Paliwija crops," "highland vegetables," and rubber) for
execution at regional research centers yet to be constructed. A central and nine regional agricultural information centers are to be established by AETE for the purpose of assembling and propagating information of practical, economic significance to farmers. There are, therefore, substantial construction and manpower development aspects to the project.

Because of the shortage of competent and experienced agricultural research personnel in Indonesia, a sizable number of foreign research scientists are to be recruited to provide the planning, coordination, and operational leadership necessary for conducting the sorts of problem-oriented multidisciplinary research being envisaged. An experienced expatriate research adviser is to be recruited to assist the head of ARD and his headquarters staff during the initial years and four expatriate research program adviser/specialists are also to be recruited to assist the four Indonesian research program directors in formulation, design, and supervision of the respective research programs—while also contributing directly, along with several additional expatriate research specialists, to research activities pertaining to their scientific specialties. Furthermore, a financial administrator capable of developing an adequate financial management system is to be recruited, together with an equipment procurement specialist, who is to assist in determining equipment needs, preparing specifications, and evaluating tenders. And, finally, four expatriate specialists in agricultural extension techniques are to be recruited to assist AETE in formulating, designing, and supervising agricultural information programs.

A total of 62.5 man-years of such technical assistance expertise (including short-term consultants) is to be utilized by ARD and AETE, these services to be provided under a contract between ARD and an organization experienced in employing, administering, and servicing the required types of research and extension specialists. The organization is to recruit such personnel internationally under terms and conditions satisfactory to the World Bank. The project also provides for about 170 fellowships for local and foreign training of ARD and AETE staff, and it is intended that awards for foreign training will also be administered by a contracting organization.

A vital dimension of the project is, of course, establishment of the two new agencies as effective operational units within the Ministry of Agriculture. ARD is expected to consolidate all ongoing agricultural research activities under a single directorate, and to effect reassignment of all ministry research personnel to one or another of the newly-defined research programs in accordance with a reevaluation of standards of competence and redefined scales of remuneration. AETE is also expected to effect consolidation of the available agricultural information and research extension competences presently employed by the ministry. It is essential for the success of the project, however, that additional Indonesian staff be recruited and adequately trained in accordance with ARD and AETE staff development requirements during the five-year period.

Commentary: While the Indonesia and Brazilian projects described above are conceptually quite similar, presumably reflecting the imprint of like-minded World Bank staff, the arrangements for organization and management of the two projects differ substantially. These differences reflect the fact that Indonesia is attempting to conduct the indicated activities within the established ministerial context, while Brazil has chosen to create a wholly new entity (the EMBRAPA organization) for this purpose. In principle, of course, the ARD and AETE, as governmental agencies attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, should be able to operate as effectively as a semiautonomous organization such as EMBRAPA—but the risk of bureaucratic drag is probably substantially greater. Because of the more cumbersome government procedures in Indonesia—which are both caused and affected by the generally lower level of technical and managerial staff competences—it seems probable that the success of the Indonesian project is even more dependent on the effectiveness of expatriate technical assistance personnel to be recruited and administered by the designated contracting organization. It also seems likely that both
the contracting organization and the World Bank will play more influential roles vis-à-vis the Indonesian project leadership than in the Brazilian case. Although some differences do exist, the Indonesian and Brazilian projects are basically similar and should provide an unusually good comparative test of the respective merits of the differential organization and management arrangements—as well as of the abilities of the two governments to demonstrate a capacity for effective public management of national agricultural development programs.

Nepal

The Integrated Cereals Project to be inaugurated in Nepal during the coming months, financed with approximately $4.4 million in local currency grant funding to be provided by USAID over a five-year period, is directed toward development of technology required for increasing production of the country's major cereal crops (principally rice, maize, and wheat) and improvement of related farming systems. Multidisciplinary research to be conducted at the central research station near Katmandu and at several regional stations will be extended to farm field trials under a variety of ecological conditions. A number of technical assistance agencies are to be directly involved in the project, including IRRI, CIMMYT, CIP, and the U.S. Peace Corps. Also, coordination with related projects already underway in Nepal, supported by other bilateral funding agencies, is to be an important feature.

The organizational structure for the multidisciplinary research activities, the physical aspects of which are already in place but in need of improvement, is to be administered by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irrigation. A United States contracting organization is to provide a senior scientist to direct the technical assistance activities (this person will also serve as adviser to the director general of the Department of Agriculture) and numerous specialists in agronomy, plant breeding, and agricultural economics. Several of these expatriate specialists are expected to serve as "joint coordinators" together with the designated Nepalese coordinators of the national production improvement programs, while also functioning as contributing research scientists. Approximately forty-four man-years of technical assistance, including occasional consultants, are expected to be required over the five-year period. The contracting organization also is to perform project-related procurement services for the government, and to assist in programming eighty-seven man-years of "participant training" in various countries.

The contracting organization, through the designated project director, is to have broad responsibility for administration of its technical assistance personnel, and for performance of its other obligations, in accordance with standards and procedures specified in a formal agreement to be entered into with the government. While the policies and other requirements of both the government and USAID must be complied with at all times, it is anticipated that the project director and the expatriate staff for which he is responsible will operate as a multidisciplinary team in performing the services specified in the contract.

Commentary: While the Nepal project is larger and inherently more complicated than the project planned for Botswana, the managerial burden on both the government and USAID officials should be substantially less in the Nepalese case. The contracting organization, and particularly the designated project director, will be required to perform quite substantial managerial responsibilities—both with regard to the research activities of the team members and the coordination and integration objectives of the project. The Nepal project, therefore, is likely to correspond more closely to the Indonesian project with respect to organization and management than to either the Botswana or the Brazil project.

It is evident that each of the four national agricultural development programs reviewed above reflects a great deal of planning effort over considerable periods of time on the parts of both the respective governments and funding agencies. Furthermore, even though substantial management assistance will be forthcoming from the expatriate personnel and the contracting organizations during the terms of these projects, the primary public
management responsibility rests with the governments. Whether the projects succeed or fail, therefore, depends in substantial degree on development of adequate managerial capabilities within the respective national agencies responsible for implementation. This fact implies that there is a close relationship between the success of these and other such national agricultural development programs and the in-service and formal training of management personnel.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In the foregoing sections, it has been argued that inadequate management capabilities threaten to undermine the major new efforts being planned to accelerate agricultural development in the poorer countries. It has been suggested, furthermore, that this problem cannot be adequately addressed simply by increasing the number of conventionally trained civil servants and agricultural scientists, but rather requires substantial innovations in the education and training of developing-country personnel destined for positions of managerial responsibilities within the context of national agricultural development programs. While it might be possible to introduce certain of these innovations into training programs offered in the United States and other advanced countries, it would obviously be preferable for requisite modifications to be made in management training programs conducted in the developing countries.

In concluding, it might be in order to raise some questions and offer some hypotheses regarding what, if anything, can and should be done to address the problem of inadequate public management of national agricultural development programs by means of improved management training within developing countries.

First, is it really true, as the World Bank and other international assistance agencies claim, that inadequate management capability on the part of governments in the developing countries threatens to become a major constraint on implementation of the greatly increased volume of agricultural development programs and projects that are prospectively fundable? If so, is this situation the result of inadequate capabilities on the part of those already in positions of management responsibility, or is the need less for upgrading of those in post than for increasing the numbers of those with comparable training and experience? Whether the need is for mid-career training or improvement in the quality of those embarking on managerial careers, what are the types of management training likely to be most useful to those undergoing such training? And, is it possible to devise management training programs that are generally relevant to managers of agricultural programs and projects, whatever their prior experience and prospective responsibilities, or are specialized and/or individually tailored programs likely to produce the best results?

The hypothesis offered with reference to this series of questions is as follows: Inadequate management capability is, indeed, a serious threat to accelerated agricultural development, and this problem warrants a variety of responses in developing-country contexts, including establishment of formal degree and mid-career training programs appropriately tailored to the requirements of definable groups, and in some cases, particular individuals.

Second, what is the most appropriate combination of technical and managerial training for those already in, or likely to achieve, positions of managerial responsibility pertaining to national agricultural development programs? To what extent should such management training programs incorporate instruction pertaining to agricultural development strategies and policies as well as to management techniques per se? Whatever the components of the training to be offered, how can those with the best potential as effective managers be identified and motivated to undergo such training? And what are the essential requirements for the fullest realization of the managerial potentials of such trainees in their subsequent career endeavors?

This series of questions suggests the following hypothesis: Technical and managerial training
pertaining to agricultural development are naturally complementary, as are such managerial training and instruction relating to policy questions; furthermore, if synthesized training of this sort is to produce the desired results, it must be combined with careful trainee selection schemes and with systematic manpower and organizational development programs that assure the fullest scope for and utilization of the most competent talents thereby generated.

Third, is it not often the case that the problem of managerial ineffectiveness is attributable more to malfunctioning political systems and organizational structures than to incompetent or poorly motivated managers? And, if so, is not this problem of incompatibility between organizational arrangements and effective management performance amenable to correction by means of the same principles of analyses and decision-making constituting the substance of quality management training programs? More to the point, what is the potential for and proper relationship between management consultancy and related research activities on the one hand and management training programs on the other hand within developing country contexts?

The hypothesis implicit in these questions is as follows: Management training programs are improved by involvement of the trainers and their professional associates in consultancy and research activities relating to the organizations and particular management problems to which the training is addressed, and such consultancy and research activities are doubly effective when they can contribute to improvement in the organizational structures and to resolution of the particular management problems for which the trainees are being prepared.

Finally, is it not even more true in the field of management than in most others that learning-by-doing is the best means of training? If so, does this not imply the need for appropriate learning experiences in noncourse contexts for prospective agricultural program managers—and, more particularly, that those who have had considerable practical experience are the best candidates for properly tailored short-course-type management training focused on their particular requirements? Furthermore, particularly in the case of middle-level management training pertaining to agricultural development, where the need for larger numbers of effective managers appears to be greatest, is it not true that the most relevant training is country-specific, problem-specific, and perhaps even institution-specific? And does this not suggest that in addition to questions pertaining to the cost and appropriateness of management training available in the United States and other advanced countries, that by far the best location for management training programs relating to agricultural development is in the countries and localities, and perhaps even within the institutions, where the management trainees are expected to demonstrate the benefits of such training?

The final hypothesis, is, therefore, as follows:

In most instances, and certainly in the case of middle-level management trainees, a combination of on-the-job and specific formal instruction directly relevant to the immediate responsibilities and proximate career objectives of the trainees should be preferred; this implies, furthermore, that except for the highest level and most specialized types of agricultural development management training not available locally, most developing countries should attempt to establish their own management development capability—and recognize that one of the best uses of available financial and technical aid would be for this purpose.
Part Three
MODELS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT SECTORS

TRANSFERABILITY OF WESTERN MODELS

Throughout the developing world, the existing models for education and training that fall under the broad rubric of public management are Western in their origin. Three waves of transfer can be distinguished, each of which has left its imprint. The first wave was the imposition of the administrative cultures of Western colonial rule, including their traditions of training for the public services. The perpetuation and adaptation of these inheritances have characterized much of the postcolonial technical assistance cooperation between the new states and the former metropolitan countries (e.g., the Institutes of Administration and the Administrative Staff Colleges in anglophonic countries, and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in francophonic countries). It is in these inherited systems of administration, concentrating on law and order maintenance, that many of the present generation of public officials have been socialized and to which they attach their sense of professional identity; consequently, they constitute in many respects a baseline of resistance to innovation and introduction of the newer management techniques. The second discernible wave, now largely dissipated, was the eager and uncritical cooperative transfer of American public administration programs during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, resulting in the establishment or development of some seventy administrative training institutions in the developing world—see Siffin's paper in this chapter. The third, most recent and still expanding, wave has been the replication of the American business management model as exemplified in its most advanced forms at Harvard, MIT, and Stanford. This sequential transfer of variegated models from the West to the LDCs was, at least for the last two waves, a collaborative process that both exporters and importers judged desirable and necessary, if not inevitable. Only recently has the transferability of these Western models been seriously questioned.

Any discussion of the issue of transferability of Western concepts and programs of public management education must start with a recognition of this empirical mosaic of partially undigested models. Two other considerations should also be stressed. The first is that "Western management" does not possess substantive unity as an intellectual discipline in the sense of a common body of agreed principles, although coherent and effective programs in business management have been developed. Management is a still-evolving mix of concepts and subject matter drawn from diverse disciplines, and there is not complete agreement on what the components of that mix ought to be. The second point is that there is only the beginning of the development of programs of education and training for public management in the United States, and these initial pioneering efforts are concerned almost exclusively with domestic management problems. Thus, as Samuel Paul has noted, there is in fact no existing Western public sector management model available for export. Indeed, in some respects, the most relevant innovations and experiments in the development of new models for public management are to be found in the new management institutions in the LDCs.

For present purposes, the ensemble of theories, techniques, and subject matter, drawn from a variety of disciplines, and loosely aggregated under
the heading of public management education, may be classified into the following categories for the purpose of analyzing their transferability.

1. Tools, techniques, and technologies (TTTs).
   Drawn primarily from disciplines of public and business administration, management sciences, economics, and statistics, these range from the most simple and basic to high complexity and sophistication, between which only an arbitrary line can be drawn for illustrative purposes.
   a. Basic (nuts and bolts) tools (a presumptive core curriculum)
      Statistics and economics
      Cost-benefit/cost-effective/opportunity-cost analysis
      Records management
      Personnel management
      Accounting and budgeting
   b. Advanced analytical tools
      Decision theory
      Organizational theory
      Systems analysis
      Network analysis
      Operations research
      Linear programming
      Modeling techniques
      Survey and sampling techniques
      Development planning
      Computer technology
      Communication skills
      Information systems analysis
   c. Pedagogical techniques for management training
      Case studies
      Syndicates
      Sensitivity training
      Group dynamics
      Role-playing
      Simulated learning through structured work experiences
      Action learning

2. Skills to analyze the operating environment.
   Drawn mainly from the disciplines of political science, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, economics, and law, these are the skills requisite for appraising the entire environment within which systems of public management must operate. Concerns include the nature of authority patterns, the character of the governmental system and its processes, cultural values and beliefs, the macroeconomic system, the legal framework, and the distribution of power and influence in the society. Systematic training of this nature can contribute to the development of what Gabino Mendoza calls “the synthetic mode of thought” (i.e., “systemic-thinking,” following Ackoff, “something to be explained is viewed as part of a larger system and is explained in terms of its role in that larger system”), and to Samuel Paul’s “integrative skills,” which he stresses in the discussion of the essential capabilities of public sector managers in his paper that follows in this section.

3. Principles of organization and management.
   Derived from Western conceptions of the norms and operative ideals, or the practices, which should and/or which do (the distinction between the “ought” and the “is” is crucial) characterize modern management.
   Hierarchical authority structures
   Functional specificity of roles
   Rational-legal norms and procedures
   Efficiency and impersonal professionalism in standards
   Universalistic (nonascriptive) norms for recruitment and promotion

4. Unstructured skills
   Interpersonal skills
   Synthetic and integrative skills
   Problem-and-opportunity-finding skills
   Decision-making skills under conditions of instability, uncertainty, and flux

   The skills in this murky “unstructured” area of public management education, the boundaries and teachability of which are in dispute, are regarded by some as at the very heart of creating effective managers, irrespective of sector.

   Within the framework of the foregoing classification scheme of Western management education, there is a qualified consensus that much if not all of (1) and (2) is transferable and therefore has the potential of being useful in management education.
tion programs everywhere; whereas (3) is inherently culture-bound, as the papers of Siffin, Mendoza, and Moris argue. Siffin notes that the "tools aspects of administration have transferred most readily across national and cultural boundaries." Samuel Paul has also suggested that transferability is most promising in sectors that are technology-intensive, but difficult if not impossible in sectors that are people-intensive, where differing cultures and value systems are the determinants of receptivity and adoption.

There are, however, several reservations regarding the transferability even of tools, techniques, and technologies:

1. Some are specifically designed for stable, ongoing systems in which the ethos of "maintenance" rather than "development" is the operative imperative.

2. Some are too sophisticated and powerful in terms of the needs, available data, and qualified personnel, and the general resource base of the country concerned; they are used either sub-optimally or irrelevantly.

3. There is a record of faddism in the discovery and adoption of TTTs in the management field; some have been abandoned after a brief and unproductive life. Given the scarce resources of the LDCs, a position of cautious, experimental, and pragmatic skepticism is in point.

4. Their effectiveness anywhere is determined in part by the presence of what Moris calls a congruent "surrounding administrative culture," some parts of which are an "essential precondition for the effective transfer of these techniques to other administrative systems."

This latter observation by Moris suggests a useful distinction between two types of cultures in LDCs that significantly affect transferability. One is the administrative subculture imposed by Western colonialism and largely perpetuated since independence in those parts of the Third World that had a colonial experience. Initially an alien overlay or superstructure, through the passage of time it has acquired its own enduring legitimacy either because it has evolved as an amalgam congruent with indigenous value systems or because of sheer prescription. The second type of culture is the deep-rooted traditional culture of a people or a region analyzed by Mendoza in his illuminating comparison of the management systems of the United States and Japan. Whether the culture of reference is the administrative subculture of the colonial epoch or the indigenous precolonial culture of a people, it is not one that is receptive to the cultural predispositions and value systems underlying many of the principles—as distinguished from the TTTs—of Western management. The implication in both instances is that a priority objective in the LDCs is to identify the fundamental principles of organization that would enable them, in Mendoza's words, to develop management systems that are "responsive to and congruent with the values, the needs, and the resources" of their respective cultural areas. It follows that programs of education and training must be developed that are consistent with these systems.

The discovery of these incompatibilities and the heightened awareness of the limitations to imported educational models is a salutary process of adjustment to an earlier period of uncritical emulation. Retrospectively, that epoch of transfer can be rationally explained; there were great and understandable pressures for indigenization of the public service; there was high faith in the power of Western management techniques on the part of both importers and exporters; and there was available substantial external assistance disposed to export the Western model. Public services are now fully staffed; external assistance for further transfer has slackened; and, most significant of all, models of emulation are under critical scrutiny. Both the West and the LDCs are in search of alternative models.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT EDUCATION IN DEVELOPMENT SECTORS

The starting point in devising new models for development sectors such as agriculture and health is the basic imperative that most of the managers in those sectors are and will be professionals in the disciplines of agriculture and health. They must have a professional degree, since the systems in
which they must operate expect it; therefore their authority, credibility, and effectiveness depend upon it. Yet, as many contributors to this volume have noted, existing programs of professional education make little provision for systematic exposure to management subjects. This dilemma suggests at least three possible models for management education and training in these sectors:

**MODEL 1: Infusion of Management Content into Existing Professional (Preentry) Degree Programs**

Looking to the future—for this model can address itself only to increasing the competence of future managers—there are limited opportunities for inclusion or expansion of a management component in the programs of study for the first professional degree in existing LDC faculties of agriculture and medicine. The existing professional reward system, the constraints of time available, and the priority of technical subjects in the curricula and in the weighting of examinations—all combine to discourage any serious motivation, or any perception of importance, by students seeking to add a management dimension to their training.

One area of opportunity for the application of this model is a strengthening of the existing curricula in the subdisciplines of the respective professions that focus most centrally upon management aspects in the sectors, namely, Departments of Agricultural Economics and Departments of Public Health. A good example of this model is the evolving degree programs of the Department of Agricultural Economics of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. However, within the existing first-degree programs, there is a limit to which the management dimension can be expanded.

**MODEL 2: Preentry Postgraduate Management Degree Programs**

This model accepts the foregoing constraints in existing professional first-degree programs and concentrates directly on new graduates by offering a one- or two-year postgraduate program in management with a sectoral emphasis. In a two-year program, the first year would focus upon the basic tools and techniques, and analytical skills of management (in common with professionals in other sectors); the second year would emphasize management in the sector of specialization. The newly inaugurated Postgraduate Programme in Management, with its Specialization Package in Agriculture, at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, is an example of this model. A similar initiative is found in the two-year Master of Agricultural Administration degree program recently launched in the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Ghana.

Several reservations have been expressed regarding the feasibility of widely expanding this model in the LDCs. Some believe that it is so costly that only a few LDCs have the scale and resource base to support such programs. Others argue that it is too long in duration for reasons not only of cost but also of the availability of young sectoral professionals. The curricula have been criticized for not sufficiently emphasizing action learning. Suggested modifications include the introduction of a "sandwich" formula in which there would be one year of structured work experience interspersed between each of the two years of formal study; another is to squeeze much of the basic "core curriculum" into the first degree program (which seems an unlikely possibility under Model 1); and another is that strong national centers in selected LDCs capable of instituting such a program could serve a wider group of countries within a region. Whatever the shortcomings of this model, it appears to be the best means of achieving the declared objective of significantly "topping up" a professional degree with exposure to the basic analytical skills of management.

**MODEL 3: Postentry Short-Term Nondegree Programs**

The stark reality is that throughout the LDCs, the agricultural and health delivery sectors are mainly being administered by a generation that had little or no formal exposure to management education. The obvious training model for professionals of this generation is specialized, intensive, short-term courses for senior and middle-level sectoral managers. The object would be systematically to expose them as actual or prospective practitioners to the managerial skills required for
the more effective performance of their responsibilities. Such a model has already been applied in many LDCs (e.g., the Agricultural Management Programme of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and the Special (West African regional) Course in Health Administration and Management for Senior Doctors at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. The effectiveness of this model in the LDCs has not been adequately evaluated. Reservations exist regarding both the profundity and durability of an exposure so necessarily brief and singular in character. Given the nature of the management crisis, however, this model is as logically unavoidable as the other two.

CURRICULA AND TEACHING METHODOLOGIES

The curricula for each of the foregoing models is significantly affected by the fact that the objective of program design is not to create full-fledged professional management specialists, but rather to graft managerial skills and an understanding of advanced analytical techniques onto sectoral professionals. Given the relative inelasticity of preentry professional degree programs (MODEL 1), and particularly the fact that not all graduates will occupy management roles, the most that can be achieved is an exposure to the nature of the management problems of their sector, to how various types of management skills can help solve such problems, and to the nature of the environment in which the management system operates. In the two-year postgraduate degree programs for preentry sector specialists (MODEL 2), the first year must concentrate on the “nuts and bolts,” or basic skills, as well as provide an introduction to the more advanced analytical methods appropriate for the sector. The objective is not the total mastery required by a professional management practitioner, but the awareness and sensitivity of an intelligent consumer. The second year’s focus is on subjects and learning experiences central to the management problems of the sector concerned.

For the short-term program for mid or senior-level managers (MODEL 3), a more selective approach is obviously essential. There can be no uniform design for the education of public sector managers at different levels. As Samuel Paul has noted, the curricula for senior public managers should emphasize skills related to the functions of planning and policy, some parts of information and control, and selected aspects of organization and personnel. Younger, preentry persons should receive a more comprehensive package. Thus there are multiple criteria for curricula design and development: career stage, experiential background, program duration, and the actual or intended management functions of the personnel concerned.

The concept of a core curriculum for public sector management education programs is generally regarded as desirable and feasible, but given the newness of the field, considerable experimentation and evaluation are still required.

The most problematic components in any model of a public management curriculum are those which are intended to develop the “unstructured skills.” According to those of Siffin’s persuasion, designing a curriculum for these components is almost impossible, because such skills are not teachable in formal programs of education and training. As James Q. Wilson argues:

Some things literally cannot be done—or cannot be done well—because there is no one available to do them who knows how. The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast as the number of problems being addressed by public policy. All of the fellowships, internships, and mid-career programs in the world aren’t likely to increase that supply very much, simply because the essential qualities for an executive—judgment about men and events, a facility for making good guesses, a sensitivity to political realities, and an ability to motivate others—are things which, if they can be taught at all, cannot be taught systematically or to more than a handful of apprentices at one time.

The skills of such a manager include Mendoza’s synthetic skills (“opportunity-seeking and systemic-
thinking") and interpersonal skills ("people-convincing-and-motivating") and Samuel Paul's "integrative skills" (the capacity to harmonize and coordinate diverse functions, an acutely complex requirement in public sectors), which are some of "the hardest to learn in the classroom." Among those who feel that unstructured skills can be imparted, or their acquisition facilitated, by formal management training programs, great emphasis is placed upon the development of new and innovative teaching methodologies. As Mendoza observed, for the inculcation of such skills, the job of the teacher is not to teach management but to structure and manage a learning environment to maximize self-learning.

Existing management education programs have developed a wide spectrum of teaching methods ranging from classroom lectures at one extreme to action learning through work situations of great flux at the other; in between are case studies, syndicates, simulated learning through structured work experiences, role-playing, sensitivity training, internships, and so forth. No fixed mix of methods can be prescribed; rather there must be flexible adaptation to differing categories of students according to background and management functions. For senior executives, maximum use tends to be made of devices such as simulated learning through structured work experiences, action learning, and other mechanisms to foster self-learning.

The case study method is widely accepted as valuable, indeed, indispensable when dealing with large numbers of students. It encourages the development of habits of rigorous analysis and logical thinking and an awareness that there is no correct solution to a management problem. Case studies are not only pedagogical techniques for learning purposes; they are an important means of faculty development, as they bring confidence to the teacher and deepen his knowledge of the client system. At the present state of the art, there is an acute dearth of case study material on public management in development sectors in the LDCs.

There are limitations or disadvantages in the use of the more sophisticated teaching methods in the LDCs. They require a high level of teacher competence for effectiveness; they are also costly. There are hazards in introducing them under external auspices because when the latter support terminates, the innovations may not be sustained. There is also the danger of faddism in teaching methods. Behavioral modifications are very difficult under even the most favorable circumstances, and the best methods of realizing these modifications through formal educational experience are the most expensive in terms of time and money. All of which is to say that the creative design of and innovation in teaching methodologies effective for management education in LDCs must be very high on the agenda.

The following papers by William J. Siffin, Gabino A. Mendoza, Jon R. Moris, and Samuel Paul illuminate the foregoing observations from a variety of vantage points.
We have learned from two decades of international experience in public administration. It has been a costly learning, too—for some of the recipients as well as for the disseminators. What have we learned? The answer begins with a portrait of the state of the art as it was twenty-one years ago.

THE BASELINE—1955

Nineteen fifty-five: it was a recent year, but a year in a different era. Nineteen fifty-five was a vintage year in a time of faith—faith in the developmental power of administrative tools devised in the West. It was a sanguine year in a time of hope—hope that public administration could lead countries toward modernization. It was a busy year in a brief age of charity—the not unmixed charity of foreign assistance. It is a proper year on which to base a look at change. Nineteen fifty-five was part of a time of large-scale efforts to export public administration from the United States of America into some countries of Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This public administration can be described in terms of four of its major features: its tool orientation, its structural orientation, its value orientation, and its context orientation. These features stand in lieu of a definition of the field. Twenty years ago in the United States there was no accepted definition. Some argued that public administration was an art comprised of the skills and behaviors of those who practice public management. Others said that if public administration was not a science, then it should be. In 1955, the social sciences were in a lively adolescence, and many of their concerns and findings were flowing into public administration. Defining that subject was less an issue than doing it, studying it, and exporting it—whatever it might be. As Dwight Waldo observed, "The assertion that public administration is or can be made a science has come to be made much less often and much less firmly. . . . Call administration both a science and an art, and get on with it." The definitional issue never has been resolved.²

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2. Martin Landau, "Political Science and Public Administration. 'Field' and the Concept of Decision Making," Chap. 7 of his Political Theory and Political Science (New York: Macmillan, 1972), presents the definitive treatment of what is involved in the effort to define the content or, in his words, the "center" of the discipline of public administration.
CONCERNING TOOLS AND THE TOOL ORIENTATION OF THE FIELD

One major feature was a set of tools and a set of ideas about them. It is not incorrect to refer to these as the “technologies” of public administration.

They included certain “processes” that help support and order the substance of administration. Personnel administration is a prime example. By 1955, it was a long-established mixture of pragmatic and semisystematic techniques. Psychology and social psychology were funnelling some of their products into this tool area. Meritocracy remained the ideal. Personnel selection and classification were the technical core; but new ideas, methods, and prescriptions about motivation and employee relations, about training and employee development, and about “managerent” were undermining the technical coherence of the field by enlarging its boundaries and concerns.

Budgeting and financial administration were well-developed and technique-centered. Public budgeting had been treated technically and prescriptively since the 1920s. The foundations of “performance budgeting” and “program budgeting” had been laid by Clarence Ridley, Herbert Simon, and others. Budgeting, the budgetary process, and the supporting tools of accounting were the preeminent domain of administrative technology, an array of principles and techniques crucial to rational, efficient, responsible public management. A systematic view of public budgeting as an intrinsically political process was still a decade off. Aaron Wildavsky’s classic work, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown), was not published until 1964.

Information technology and sophisticated techniques of administrative planning and scheduling were in their infancy, beginning to be absorbed into public administration out of industry and the inventions of World War II. Machine-processed punch cards had appeared in modern jurisdictions. IBM was on its meteoric rise to power and eminence. Operations research was being used in some quarters, and there was an avant-garde interest in sophisticated computational decision-making techniques. But the computer was more in the offing than on the scene. The word “computer” does not appear in Dwight Waldo’s survey, The Study of Public Administration, published in 1955. Only in 1952 was the first general-purpose digital computer programmed to perform routine office work, and much of the information and analysis technology that now symbolizes “progressive administration” remained to be developed.

Other technologies there were aplenty, ranging from records management and work simplification to property and supply administration. There was, as there is today, the large province of the lawyers as makers and scrutinizers of process and procedure. There were technologized program fields, such as tax and revenue administration.

In 1955, we could still rather neatly distinguish between the key tools of public administration and the techniques, technologies, and theories of “organization.” The tools were among the prime export products of American public administration. They were seen as crucial mechanisms for producing the kind of administration that would foster modernization. Thus, “the primary obstacles to development are administrative rather than economic . . . Countries generally lack the administrative capability for implementing plans and programs. Countries share in common most of the same administrative problems and obstacles.” To solve those problems the imperative was “the transfer of administrative techniques to improve the central machinery of national government.”

Beneath the massive export of tools was the thesis of “administration as a tool.” Nineteen fifty-five was the twilight time of a premise rooted in the nineteenth century and withering—that a useful, workable, basic line can be drawn between “policy” and “administration.” But, in 1955, confounding problems were being encountered as foreign experts and their counterparts sought to install

4. Ibid.
the tools of a tool-oriented administration as means to serve modernization. The tools and their working presupposed something about their context. And there was embedded in them an ideology, a set of assumptions about certain basic values—values that did not necessarily fit the circumstances to which they were being transferred.

**CONCERNING ORGANIZATION AND THE STRUCTURAL ORIENTATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

In 1955, as now, two important public administration questions were: "How should things be organized?" and "What are organizations like?" The questions were as compelling then as now. The answers and the thought about the answers were a mélange of tradition, convention, theory-based prescription, and emulation. The study of bureaucracy was making inroads upon workaday images of public organizations and "systems" of such organizations. New ideas about organizations were rampant. They tended to spill over, verbally more than otherwise, into the domains of practice. At the root of it all, an administrative organization was usually perceived or idealized as a "cooperative" arrangement of humans marked by a high degree of rationality. And Max Weber's idealized conception of legal-rational bureaucracy was in 1955 orienting most thinking about public administrative organization.

Four elemental factors in Weber's model—specialization of function, hierarchical authority, operation on the basis of rules, and "impersonality" or the drawing of distinctions between roles and incumbents—were commonly seen as the pertinent features of the administrative agency or system. The inadequacies of this view were obvious to a lot of people: it largely ignored the human side of administration and the real problems of incentives. It afforded no foundation for the study of policy-making and administrative politics. And it simply did not fit the realities of most of the developing countries of the world.

But shouldn't it?

This question was usually answered affirmatively. Weber's model, a utopian summation of one line of institutional evaluation, was converted into a prescription. And this Weberian view short-circuited efforts to examine and understand some of the real possibilities—and equally real limitations—of public administration in developing countries.

In practice, efforts to design organizations for public administration in developing countries were largely emulatory. But the materials infused into the public administration teaching and training institutions of developing countries contained a large dose of Weber. It was not mitigated by an awareness that Weber had actually presented three different ideal types of organization, and had distinguished them in terms of the type of authority that impelled the sociopolitical system within which each model "existed."  

Ironically, the dominating eminence of Weber was eroding within the United States among the leaders of administrative thought. Organization theory was racing in several new directions. Norbert Wiener's work on cybernetics, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, had just been published. It was part of an effort that presented a "systems perspective" on organizations and their management, and reflected attempts to develop "general systems theory." Cybernetics provided a new base for concerns with communications and control within organizations. It stimulated interests in "automation." It inseminated the word "feedback" into the lexicon of public administration. It helped blow down the old intellectual focus and boundaries of organizational thought.

The idea of administration as instrumental was waning. One of the nation's foremost scholars in the field observed in 1955 that "the whole complex of ideas associated with the term civil service needs to be rethought in the broadest, most imaginative terms. Our present amalgam of ideas... is surely inadequate to the present demands.

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5. Waldo, Public Administration, p. 6.
6. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
We have just scratched the surface of institutional invention. . . . " But the most advanced thinking and the nagging questions are not what get exported. One leads from strength and habit—the strength and habit of established convention. The legal-rational Weberian model fitted the vision of administration as tool. It solaced both donor and recipient: tool-oriented public administration could be viewed as nonpolitical. The utility of this myth reinforced the appeal of the Weberian view.

THE VALUE ORIENTATION AND EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Obvious matters are not very interesting, but obvious matters can have interesting implications. One of the most obvious features of U.S. public administration in 1955 was its normative quality: it was saturated with certain value orientations. On the domestic scene, the insistent assertion of these values suggested their idealization as much as their realization.

The thematic value of them all was the idea of administration as instrumental. From this derived supportive values: efficiency, rationality, responsibility, and (sometimes) effectiveness. Along with these there was the burgeoning value of professionalism.

Administration was to be responsible for serving lawful aims in lawful ways. It was to be predictable in its modes and outcomes. Its very form and quality depended upon the presence of transadministrative means for setting goals, and for monitoring and enforcing the compliance of the actions with the rules. The Rule of Law was a leitmotiv. Education for administration included indoctrination in these values along with training in techniques.

The vision of an explicitly elitist administrative class was rejected. Administration was the province of broadly knowledgeable, socially aware, distinctively intelligent professionals, performing the tasks of management within a national bureaucracy, within its major cities, and, hopefully, within its state. They were to be recruited under an egalitarian ideal (consistent with the existence of a large and mobile middle class).

This value of professionalism spawned certain issues—how to train administrators? About what should they be skilled and discerningly judgmental? Particularly outside the technique areas, there were then (as now) the questions: "What is to be professed and mastered? To what professional standards should they defer?" These questions are easier to ask than answer. As a leading sociologist observed, "Perhaps the organizational executive in particular, because he must deal with so many diffuse intangibles (including the almost uncertainties of changing situations in complex environments), must always 'play it by ear' instead of submitting to codified rules or definitions of essential technical knowledge."

Programmatic professionalism was a powerful political force within U.S. public administration by 1955. The value orientations of this facet of administrative professionalism extended to the specification of political goals—ostensible "technical criteria," institutionalized through training, education, research, professional association, and effective political claim-making. For program administrators in agriculture, health, education, welfare, planning, law, etc., important normative questions were answered by reference to "professional standards." While some of these were essentially ethical, many of them were, as they are today, programmatic: so many square feet of space per child, so many cases per worker, so many children per teacher, etc.

As for the generalist administrators, practitioners and pedagogues were usually insulated from knowledge of such fields as agriculture, health, education, and public works. As a result, their potential for grasping and responding to many of the most palpable administrative needs of developing countries was not so high as one might have hoped, in 1955 and the years that followed.

The pristine value orientations of American

8. Waldo, Public Administration.
administration did not fit the immutable realities of many developing countries. The realities did not go unrecognized. But recognition often took the form of assertions that efficiency, rationality, effectiveness, responsibility, and professionalism must be institutionalized with the public administration of developing countries, if the vision of administration in the service of development was to be fulfilled. Some implications of this view were beyond both ken and competence of the exporters of the American vision of modern public administration.

Efficiency, or at least effectiveness, and rationality are among essential properties of good public administration anywhere. It does not follow that tools and techniques developed in the United States would serve those values in other settings. (They didn't always work at home.) And the implications of the value of responsibility confounded many efforts to achieve what Ralph Braibanti has called "The Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform." Writing of the American approach to development through administration, my colleague Jack Koteen has observed:

*Early Agency programs . . . starting in the 1950's, concentrated on the transfer of administrative techniques to improve the central machinery of national government. Thus, they reflected the then-current U.S. doctrine and experience in public administration. It was felt that chief executives need the management tools of budgeting, personnel, accounting, auditing, organization and methods analysis, and reporting. Government officials, it was reasoned, could thereby more effectively discharge their responsibilities, control their activities, and achieve a greater measure of "efficiency and economy" in the wide array of public services. . . . A major strategy . . . was to seek comprehensive, government-wide administrative reform. . . . Also important during this period was the establishment of institutes of administration that trained large numbers of cadre to engage in the vast task of modernizing public services to cope with the demands of economic development. . . .*

It was assumed—it has to be assumed—that proper value orientations could be inculcated into public administration through professionalism, itself to be institutionalized through training, education, and the redesign of administrative arrangements and procedures. Thus administration would become a responsible tool in the service of development. But the instrumental mythos of U.S. public administration was by 1955 losing much of its ascribed validity. And the normative elements of that mythos—particularly the commitment to responsibility as a basic value—were predicated upon a certain kind of sociopolitical context, the kind of context that is distinguished in its absence from nearly every developing country in the world.

**THE CONTEXTUAL ORIENTATION OF U.S. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

The context of American public administration twenty years ago included complex and interactive economic, social, political, and intellectual aspects.

Economically, the role of administration was limited and the resources available were vast. The thrust of the U.S. economy of 1955 lay largely outside government. The tasks of administration did not include the creation of wealth where there was little, nor did they encompass a deliberate and radical transformation of the economic structure.

Societally, public administration functioned in a relatively pragmatic, pluralist, dynamic context. It was not the chief source of middle-class status and employment. Its functions did include sizable social welfare efforts, but not an obligation to the rapid transformation of society itself.

Politically, American public administration functioned in a rich and complex set of political environments, marked by legislative oversight, political leadership, and popular involvement in limited and orderly competitions for share in control of government. There were deeply institutionalized arrangements for the transfer of political power. "The government" was a federalistic


set of loosely linked and partially integrated domains of goal-setting, goal-protecting, and goal-pursuit. Some balancing and integration were obtained through complex combinations of myths and mechanisms. The real "systems" of action involving public administration included interest groups, legislative committees, communications media, and substantive jurisdictions. These "systems" operated within reasonably stable political frameworks, with limited competition for resources and mandates. In this milieu, administrative technologies provided order more than integration. The political context of administration was generally predictable, supportive, and incrementally expansive. One of the miracles of U.S. technical assistance in public administration is that exported tools and ideas sometimes worked as intended in political environments so profoundly different from that of their source.

As for the intellectual context, the dominant concerns of public administration were not intensely intellectual, in the broad sense of that ambitious term. There were boundaries as well as interchanges between public administration and the social sciences. The professionalistic orientation of academic efforts in public administration encouraged a focus upon problems within the field, more than upon problems of the field.

One of the latter problems was the shifting position of administration in an intellectual view of politics. John Gaus had noted in 1950 that "a theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics too." But with political science, as Waldo noted, "there is little creative interaction." With the field of political theory, the presumed proprietor of issues concerning administration, and politics, "relations of public administration have never been close or cordial." Some academics were beginning to talk of a need for the study of "political economy." This would—hopefully—provide a more comprehensive calculus for setting social goals, choosing instruments, and assessing relations between government and the economy. The idealized aim of political economy was a "net" maximization of desired goals in society. Intellectually, this was exciting stuff; its impact upon the concerns of public administration was not large enough to be labeled modest. The most important intellectual onslaughts against the politics-administration dichotomy were the development of the "case method" as part of the study of public administration, and the resurrection of the "group theory" approach to the study of the political process. Some public administration cases of the 1950s attested (unsystematically) the intertwining of our governmental institutions in the "real" political process. The interest-group perspective on the political process, exemplified by David Truman's work The Governmental Process, more systematically portrayed mid-twentieth-century political realities in the United States. The case method was to some extent exported.

By 1955, the edges of American administrative ethnocentrism were being breached in the comparative study of politics and government. The work of Herman Finer and Carl J. Friedrich was influential. Looking across the array of Western experience and into its historical backgrounds, Finer and Friedrich delineated broad and basic issues in the relations between public administration and social, economic, and political development. Their classic studies, and the increasing encounters with immediate realities in developing countries, encouraged the rise of a subfield of public administration, "comparative administration." In 1956, the first American book on this subject was published, Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration.
The radical differences between the U.S. administrative context and various overseas situations were substantially ignored. Some transfer of intellectual perspectives between U.S. institutions and schools and scholars in developing countries was beginning by 1955. It had little impact upon the transit of operating ideas and techniques. These were rooted in convention and impelled by faith, hope—and politics.

In 1955, as in other years of the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the international transfer of public administration could be described as big business. Hundreds of Americans were working overseas. Students from developing countries were coming abroad to study. New institutions were springing up across the world to teach the tools of public administration, to create the professionals, and to proclaim the assumptions of those whose means were administration and whose intents were modernization.

THE TREND OF THE DECADES:
A BRIEF NOTE

Public administration was a major category of American technical assistance well into the 1960s. From about 1967, emphasis declined rapidly and sharply. U.S. government funding for public administration projects dropped from $18 million in 1967 to $11.4 million in 1970 and $9.8 million in 1972. Between 1955 and 1963, U.S. aid for public administration had totaled $187 million. In the early 1970s, the annual rate was less than half the average for the earlier period.18

The shift is reflected in a comparison of the development literature of the early 1950s with such later statements as the Pearson Report, submitted in September, 1969, to the World Bank. The four hundred pages of that report contain only passing attention to public administration.

Why this shift? Was it because the job was done? The indigenous administrative capabilities of developing countries had grown by the middle of the 1960s. Tens of thousands of individuals from those countries had been trained. Between July 1, 1952, and March 31, 1963, almost six thousand persons were sent abroad for training under the U.S. aid program alone. The United Nations, the Ford Foundation, and the United States government had helped establish or develop some 70 public administration training institutions in developing countries.19 There were a lot of changes.

One was a growing conviction that the key to development is not so much the general improvement of public administration as the fostering of indigenous economic growth through effective domestic and international policies. From the mid-1960s, the hopeful views of the 1950s, in which administrative creation and reform figured so largely, were increasingly replaced by more complex and more economically oriented problem perspectives.

The frustrating public administrative experience of the period encouraged this shift, although there were some important achievements. The most frequent successes were transfers of specialized technologies. The sheer numbers and persistence of public administration institutes and similar training, education, research, and consultation organizations suggest that this facet of administration transfer and development has had its impact. It has been a mixed impact. The commitment to broad and rapid transformations of the institutions of public administration has faded. Yet it was not entirely unsound.

It is hard to dispute the primordial premise that effective administration mechanisms are important to national development. It is equally hard to ignore the argument that developers must do the things they know how to do. Twenty years ago, public administration was one of the things people thought they knew how to do and how to transfer. Since then, our knowledge has grown enormously, and with it our sense of the limited scope and potency of some of that knowledge. Our failures

and disappointments have probably taught us more than our successes. What are some of the lessons?

LESSONS AND PORTENTS

First: Tool aspects of administration have transferred most readily across national and cultural boundaries—especially the budgetary and financial technologies. Some of these transfers have had significant constructive effects.

The long-established core technologies of public administration are palpable and specific in content and direct output. What to establish, how to establish it, with what probable outcomes, can be known in advance of action. And certain technologies offer obvious attractions: they promise increased order and control, plus compatibility with a wide range of policy orientations. Fiscal technologies serve the needs of people, often among the most potent and purposeful in a government, responsible for managing finances. Administrative technologies also tend toward relatively high (but admittedly varying) degrees of self-containment. Their enactment can be buffered against impact of the larger environment. Technologies are rather readily learnable. And every package of administrative technologies worthy of the label is a coherent combination of procedures, norms, and partial organizational specifications. The technical norms must be honored if the technology is to work: their content and effect are closely linked with outputs. As a result, it is sometimes possible in a technological field of action to institutionalize arrangements and behaviors consistent with the values of rationality, effectiveness, and responsibility, even when the larger bureaucracy is not much imbued with such values.

Second: The attractiveness of technology transfer has been matched by major problems. Availability has encouraged misuse. Quite a few efforts to transfer technologies out of American public administration into the governmental apparatus of developing countries have failed, entirely or substantially, initially and sometimes permanently, through suboptimization and irrelevance. Efforts have sometimes been frustrated by formalism. Effects of intrinsically adequate tools have in instances been judged trivial in relation to needs and expectations.

Budget processes and accounting arrangements that "make financial management neat and tidy without much affecting financial policy" are not uncommon examples of suboptimization.

Budget processes and accounting arrangements that "make financial management neat and tidy without much affecting financial policy" are not uncommon examples of suboptimization.

Others include elaborate "rationalizations" of formal organization, and O & M units and planning units lacking any potent linkages with goal-setting and resource-allocating centers.

The precise distinction between suboptimization and perverse irrelevance is not as clear as the fact that imported technologies have too often produced the wrong results—unneeded information, superfluous proceduralism, and the frustration of intent. Particularly good—or bad—examples are found among developing-country experiences with computers, management information systems, and planning tools.

Governments of countries in Africa must beware of reformists who are so obsessed with some of the modern management techniques that they are determined to foist them upon the poor countries. Premature computerization and hasty introduction of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) into the administrative systems can do more harm than good. Countries that have comprehensive development planning when their data base is very shaky and their administrative capability unable to cope have found out to their dismay that some of the new techniques are not automatically applicable...

The problem of formalism was celebrated in the work of Fred W. Riggs. He explained formalistic propensities in the administration of developing countries in terms of a theory of "prismatic socio-
ciety. Jose Abueva has illustrated and analyzed some of these tendencies toward formalism and resistance to technologies on grounds of their inconsonance with old cultural values. This "culture vs. technology" view can be pushed to the level of chauvinistic absurdity (just as the "traditional vs. modern" dichotomy can be elevated into an absurd oversimplification). As an explanation of why technologies won't work, "culture" is sometimes the refuge of the very pragmatic negativist. In technological activities, formalism and ambiguous bureaucratic behavior frequently can be minimized, with gains in the effectiveness and predictability of particular bureaucratic domains. But deliberate efforts toward such ends require knowledge and understanding not provided by the technologies themselves.

Technologies do not include criteria for determining whether or not to use them. Yet technologies, which are at best instruments for solving problems, have often been used as a means of "defining" problems. Together, these two statements explain a lot of the failures of administrative technology transfer and the limited success of many attempts to modernize public administration in developing countries.

Problems are not actually defined—they are stipulated. One of the greatest suboptimizations of the past twenty years has been the tendency to "define" rather large problems of administration and development in technological terms. A problem is a synthesis of facts (or assumed facts) and judgments. The question "What is the problem?" can be answered by analysis and deliberation, or by action, or both. When the answer is determined by action more than by analysis, an interesting thing happens: the solution specifies the problem. The problem becomes that set of conditions that is affected beneficially by the intervention.

Problems that are "in fact" largely technical are susceptible of technological solutions. Over the years, American public administration focused largely upon intrinsic or instrumental problems, to be attacked through technology in the service of efficiency, effectiveness, rationality, and/or control. The ready availability and apparent utility of administrative technologies stimulated tendencies to "define" the administrative problem of developing countries in technological terms. The decisions to install technologies have not always been informed by analysis. "In or out of the U.S., there is a lot of humbug mixed in with the solid meat and bone of the recent and still exotic topics of PPB, computers, operations research, information systems, etc. If the exporting nation is represented by consumers of humbug, then the old rule applies that "when the blind lead the blind, they all shall fall in the ditch.""

Alas, the implications of this propensity for error are much greater for developing countries. As Caiden and Wildavsky have noted, where needs are greatest, means are most limited, probabilities of error are largest, and the cost of mistakes is highest.

Third: The technology transfer efforts of the past two decades illustrate a basic feature of the public administration that has been so extensively and expensively exported to developing countries: it has aimed more at maintenance needs than developmental needs. The established technologies and traditional conventions of American public administration were best suited to the operation and incremental improvement of established arrangements, within well-institutionalized sociopolitical systems. In such systems, a tool-and-technique orientation to administration makes sense.

Maintenance and development do not, of course, constitute a pure dichotomy. Maintenance activities are essential in developing as well as developed countries. Revenues must be produced and allocated. Public works, health and education services, public infrastructure for agriculture, law enforcement, and dozens of other things must be provided with reasonable effectiveness and predictability.

25. Friedman memorandum, op. cit.
If concerns with these matters are necessary, they are also insufficient to development.

Administrative technologists and other transfer agents too often suboptimized, and assumed auspicious relationships between improved bureaucratic outputs and increased developmental effects. This is understandable. Ten or twenty years ago, no one knew much about ways to monitor complex noneconomic organizations for effect as well as output, or how to design agencies that could adjust smoothly and effectively in response to feedback about effects, in the absence of effective external political institutions. Even today, our knowledge of these aspects of administrative design is quite limited. We have developed relatively sophisticated social indicators and ways of getting them. To move from indicators to orderly auspicious changes in cause-effect relations remains a long step indeed.

In the first of the two decades past, some Western scholars came to fear the possible effects of bureaucratic modernization in countries with feeble political institutions: the bureaucrats might take command of policy-making as well as execution. The emergence of "technocrats" as key elements of policy leadership in a number of developing countries suggests some basis for this concern. Yet few of the technocrats of Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, and other countries where they flourish have come out of conventional education and activity in public administration. More basic needs for the analysis of development problems and of administration-environment-goal relations pertinent to their solutions were neglected. The lesson is that of a large need for redesigning public administration training and education, as these pertain to development.

There is a lot of emulative scholasticism in public administration education in developing countries. Indigenous contexts, plus limited external support for upgrading, have conspired against creativity and the adaptation of imported curricula and ideas to better fit local circumstances.

The record in the field of training is not clear. Once one goes above the level of narrow skill and knowledge training, training effects are elusive in any case. We know relatively little about the consequences of management training in our own milieu, let alone in developing countries.

Few of the seventy public administration institutes have made their marks in research. There are exceptions, and that is precisely what they are. Some of these institutes have been described as little more than "disasters." This is both sad and ironic; the first test of their effectiveness should be survival and acceptance—if only because this is the first law of public administration everywhere. Agencies that cannot practice that law can hardly preach it well.

Just as many efforts at bureaucratic reorganization and administrative rationalization and reform have failed, some institutes failed because their aims were unattainable: the contexts were so profoundly inconsonant with their goals. In many of those settings, large strivings at administrative transformation may have been noble; they were also sometimes bizarre.

Today—after two decades of building institutes and other arrangements for public administration, education, training, research, and consultancy—business schools, industrial engineering schools, and economic development institutes are preferred instruments of education and training for the managers and designers of program and projects in developing countries. This is unfortunate. These
alternative instruments are unlikely to address the essentials of the training and education agenda.

The issue is not one of academic jurisdiction. It is a matter of preparing persons and devising arrangements for essential tasks of developmental analysis and design. These include the analysis of potential policies and programs in terms of organizational and top-level managerial requirements and issues. Development projects, programs, and agencies are usually planned and devised on the basis of economic analysis, and/or analysis based upon programmatic technological factors. Organizational and managerial issues are ignored, or resolved by intuition or established conventions. The approach is analogous to the application of administrative technologies discussed above. So are some of the results.

The crucial need is to reduce the likelihood of error in the design and implementation of development efforts. Technological expertise will ever be limited in its capacity to contribute to this need: it can often say what won’t work, or what is necessary if not sufficient to effective action. It cannot guide the selection of large goals and major means. Granted that public administration has no superior track record in dealing with such basic needs, it does have a distinctive potential for making a vital contribution.

The agenda of public administration has enlarged beyond the instrumental orientation of twenty years ago. In principle, and somewhat in practice, it encompasses the analysis of relations between public organizations and their sociopolitical environments. It examines the limits and potentials of bureaucracy as an instrument of social change. It considers the implications of trying to act effectively under novel and relatively indeterminate conditions. This is the part of the agenda that needs attention and emphasis. The conventional subjects—budgeting, personnel, and other technologies—should be fitted within a framework that includes criteria and modes of analysis for making effective and discerning use of technologies.

Fifth: If the need for ability to design and implement arrangements involving technologies is greater than the need for the technologies, then that need is for what some people call development administration. This term—it has been around for more than a decade—attests to rising frustrations with the public administration of the West as an instrument of development.

The essence of development is not to maintain, but to create effectively. In the design approach of development administration, innovative problem analysis and “definition” logically precede the specification of solutions. Through the past twenty years, problem-defining capabilities within developing countries have grown considerably, usually in specialized entities. These include some planning agencies, ministries, and departments making use of such analytical tools as sector and project analysis, and some finance ministries. A common and important imperfect of these increased capacities is their limited ability to take account of organizational and managerial factors.

The most powerful and extensively used tools are economic. “Organization” is treated as a given, or even as a factor extraneous to the analysis. In this respect, these tools can be perverse. They can also be strengthened by being placed in proper context.

Doing this means, among other things, marshaling substantial amounts of knowledge about organizational design and the effects of alternative organizational arrangements. It means applying such knowledge to ubiquitous and important organizational problems—such as the miasmic realities of public enterprises in many places, and the dreary ineffectuality of many of the organizations called cooperatives. We need to know the factors that determine if these and other organizational forms will be effective, or not effective. Many of these factors are environmental—not intrinsic to the organizations themselves. Thus a key concern of developmental design is the task environment. Another is the interplay of organization and

environment in relation to desired goals. Even more challenging—we need mechanisms for applying that knowledge.

An excellent illustration of a developmental design strategy is found in John D. Montgomery's study "The Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Process and Outputs." The problem he addressed was not land reform, but the effects of alternative organizational approaches to land reform. He examined twenty-five cases, classified them into three categories—centralized, decentralized, and "devolved" organizational arrangements—and asked: What different effects did each of these arrangements produce on bureaucratic power, on peasant security, on peasant political power, and on peasant income?

The findings are significant:

Devolution of land reform operations . . . gives substance to local government . . . and the largest volume of peasant benefits. The expected result is a spiraling citizen interest, and presumably a greater commitment to the political process by which government enters into developmental activities.

Montgomery discovered certain trade-offs between centralization and peasant benefits, between peasant benefits and bureaucratic power, between administrative effectiveness and ease of administrative management. As he shows, alternative designs have alternative consequences. A priori knowledge of this fact—knowledge for design—opens up the opportunity for informed choices of means. Such choices can, indeed, have truly profound effects.

Montgomery's inquiry epitomizes development administration. It shows how design can be rooted in analysis of the prospective effects of known alternatives, prior to the basic decisions about implementation.

Under real-world conditions of novelty and indeterminacy, the design process does not end when implementation begins. It continues, in management processes that look beyond outputs to effects and accordingly adjust inputs and/or operations and/or goals.

Approaches of this kind, and the building of capacity to apply them, are prime needs, now and undoubtedly for the next twenty years. The past twenty offer us no clear assurance of their future, for these are heroic needs.

One final lesson: In two decades, we have come a long way from the self-assured export and import of conventional administrative ideas and techniques. As a consequence, one-time importers and exporters have come closer together. The so-called developed countries have moved beyond systems maintenance administration into efforts to guide and manage social change. The lessons of the last decade in the United States—the lessons of the "War on Poverty," for example—demonstrate that we too have great needs for development administration—needs that somewhat parallel those of other developing countries. There is much that we can learn together, that we can truly share instead of peddle. We should therefore build the content and apply the portents of development administration, and make more sensible use of conventional public administration, as we face futures marked by blooming demands for the coordination and integration of efforts, for the adroit and effective setting and service of social goals, and for more audacious and auspicious public interventions in the terms of human existence.

29. Uphoff and Ichman, ibid., p. 458.
It is generally accepted that while the French and the British have made some contributions to the development of modern management theory, it is American industry that has demonstrated modern management’s effectiveness and applicability, first when it transformed itself during World War II into the “Arsenal of Democracy” and then after the war, when the American multinational firms expanded so rapidly on a worldwide basis that by the middle of the sixties, even the Europeans were alarmedly forecasting that in one more decade, Americans would “have a monopoly on know-how, science, and power” and would transform Europe into an “annex of the United States.”

Today, what is known as management theory in most of the world consists basically of the American interpretation of the teachings of the classical school of Fayol and Taylor, with some gleanings from the works of the better-known behaviorists and operations management theorists. It also is accepted generally that the “principles” of management used by the Americans with so much success are universally applicable, that they are transferable, with some minor “fine-tuning,” from country to country and from one organizational type to another. Consequently, most management training and education is done all over the world, often by rote, from American textbooks.

The view that management is one and that management principles are the same all over the world would probably have remained unchallenged had the Japanese not performed their economic miracle in the sixties. Starting from an economy in shambles at the end of World War II, its factories leveled by “firebombs,” its giant financial and industrial combines (the zaibatsu) broken up, the Japanese, in about twenty years, rebuilt their industries and invaded the markets of the world so successfully that by the mid-sixties, they were among the world’s most industrialized countries and by the seventies had surpassed all but the United States in productivity. In trying to find the causes for Japan’s great suc-

cess, academics began focusing on the way the Japanese ran their businesses. At first, all they saw was quaint confusion. The Japanese were doing everything the wrong way. Moreover, they were obstinate in refusing to do it in the right way, the Western way. As one author put it, “Until a Japanese businessman has been very thoroughly exposed to Western thought and manners, he cannot bring himself to the point where he condemns certain Japanese practices and comes out in favor of the Western way....

“In fact there is a natural tendency for the Japanese businessman to wrap himself tighter in the web of the ‘Japanese way’ whenever he is confronted with a different set of rules which threaten to shatter his well-ordered world.” But as the Japanese, despite their refusal to change their “immoral, irrational, dishonest, evasive, inefficient, and indecisive” ways, went on from success to success, eventually less ethnocentric scholars began to discern a pattern in the Japanese ways, a “method in their madness.” And they realized that the Japanese had developed an entirely different management system; a system that was internally consistent; a system that worked for the Japanese. And it is this Japanese management system, radically different from that of the West, yet equally effective, that now prompts a reexamination of the premise, the long-held conviction that the “principles” of management discovered by the West are universally applicable.

Upon reflection, one begins to realize that what we know as the “principles” of management are actually generalizations made by Western managers and scholars about managerial decisions that have worked for Western managers in their dealings with Western workers. The “discovery” of the Japanese management system is an opportunity to find out how these “principles” apply in a different context.

And the conclusion is: what may be a “principle” in the West is not necessarily a principle elsewhere. For example, one of the cardinal principles of management is the principle of delegation of responsibility. In an American corporation, great care is taken to ensure that the recipient of delegated responsibility is clearly pinpointed. This guarantees that should things go well, praise and reward will be given to the right man, and should things go badly, censure and disincentives will not be imposed on the wrong man. The Japanese, on the other hand, use what they call the ringi-sei, or the “consultative decision-making process,” which operates in such a way as to diffuse rather than to pinpoint responsibility. The ringi system works this way: when a major decision needs to be made in a Japanese company, a low-ranking man is generally asked to study the matter and to come up with a recommendation on what must be done. In doing so, he drafts a position paper known as a ringisho. This document is then circulated around the company and reviewed by all who will be affected by the decision or who will have a hand in its implementation. During this process, a great deal of consultation takes place, some bargaining, and a lot of rewriting. Eventually, a consensus is arrived at and formal approval is given by the president. Because so many have actively participated in the process and have caused changes in the ringisho, by the time the decision is reached, not one man but all who took part in the process have become responsible for the decision. Responsibility has been diffused and all are committed to success.

Another “principle” of management is clarity of assignment. To make sure that each man knows exactly what he is supposed to do, whom he reports to, and whom he is responsible for, Western management has developed complex systems of job descriptions and job specifications. Moreover, as Ronald Dore points out, Western organization charts are drawn up in order to carefully define relationships between individual positions. In

3. M. Y. Y. Asato, Japan’s Managerial System, (Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, and Peter Drucker, 1968), Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Principles (New York, Harper & Row, 1975), disagree on this point. Yoshino’s view has been adopted here (p. 225). Drucker, on the other hand, claims that the focus is on problem definition rather than on what the decision should be (pp. 466ff.).
contrast, M. Y. Yoshino explains, "one of the distinctive features of the Japanese corporate organization is that it is structured in collective organizational units rather than in terms of individual positions. . . . A closely related feature of the collectivity orientation is that the responsibilities of each organizational unit are defined only in very general terms. Detailed job descriptions as typically specified in large American corporations do not exist in Japanese firms." He goes on: "This characteristic stems from the traditional Japanese view that a task is to be performed through cooperative efforts among individual members of an organization. Thus, Japanese managers are much less concerned about who performs a task and where the responsibility lies than about how individuals within the organization work together harmoniously toward the accomplishment of the goals of the collectivity." Chie Nakane explains this further by pointing out that "because of the ambiguities in the field of function of the leader and the subordinate, the range over which the leader exercises authority is determined by the relative balance of abilities and personalities which the leader and his subordinate bring to a given group."

More than anything else, she points out, the leader in Japan needs the ability to understand and to motivate his men, because the primary aspect of his job is to manage the processes of the group rather than the substance of its tasks.

Still another strongly held "principle" of Western management is that of the division of labor. Nakane points out that in the Japanese system, there is little concern for the principle of division of labor. Because work is assigned to the group rather than to individuals, the role played by any one member of the group at any one time is determined not by his area of specialization but by the needs of the group. "The Japanese," she explains, "in general hold fairly strong convictions that one man can do another's job whenever this be necessary." Dore also points out that managers in the West "are recruited for and appointed to particular jobs, promoted from job to job by a system of applications and/or offers as opportunities occur, but with no clearly marked-out career expectations." They rise and fall on the basis of how well they perform their particular job. In the Japanese system, on the other hand, the manager is hired by the company for life. He is recruited from college as an undifferentiated salaryman; he is not a specialist, but a generalist. During his lifetime in the company, he will be assigned to different units on the basis of the company's need. His salary level, his promotional prospects, are influenced more by his seniority, his loyalty to the company, and his contributions to the attainment of the group's goals than by his competence in a particular function.

In trying to account for the very fundamental differences that can be found between the American and the Japanese management systems, the acknowledged authorities on the subject—James Abegglen, Chie Nakane, M. Y. Yoshino, Ronald Dore, among others—all attribute these differences to the differences in the cultures of the societies: the American society is a society of individuals, while the Japanese is one of groups.

A noted American sociologist, Daniel Bell, points out that in the United States "the individual—and not the family, community, or the state—is the important unit of society and . . . the purpose of social arrangements is to allow the individual to fulfill his own potentials." One need only to look back over American history to see why this is so. It is the individual who made America; the individual who left his parents, and family, and friends in England and migrated to the New World, where he could worship as he pleased, the individual who pushed back the Western frontiers, trading with the Indians in the Northwest, seeking more fertile farmlands in the Midwest, riding where the pastures were greener and the ranges had no fences in the Southwest, and panning for gold in California; it was the in-

individual who seized responsibility for his own destiny, relying on himself to carve out a future. The Japanese, on the other hand, are more members of groups than they are individuals. Chie Nakane points out, for example, that when a Japanese introduces himself to a foreigner, he is inclined to identify the group that he belongs to, his company, before he identifies himself. It is within the group that he finds identity; it is as a member of the group that he finds meaning.

The group-centeredness of the Japanese can be traced back almost to the very early beginnings of the nation. At first, it was founded on the idea of the closely knit family. But over the centuries, the idea of the blood-related family as the basis of social organization metamorphosed into the concept of ie, the House or the household.

"...To be more precise, the House is composed of the head of the House and of the members who are subject to his authority. Those members may include not only his kindred by relationship of blood, but also persons, male and female, who are not his blood relations and who enter the House with his counsel." Nakane explains the concept further: "...the human relationships within this household group are thought of as more important than all other human relationships... A brother when he has built a separate house, is thought of as belonging to another unit or household; on the other hand, the son-in-law, who was once a complete outsider, takes the position of a household member and becomes more important than a brother living in another household."

In the samurai ie, as well as in the agricultural and merchant households of medieval Japan, not only the in-laws but also "outsiders with not the remotest kinship ties... (and) servants and clerks were usually incorporated as members of the household and treated as family members by the head of the household."

During the Meiji Restoration, the ie was established as the society's key legal institution. Yoshino explains that "the ie collectivity, rather than individuals, constituted the basic legal entity in the civil code."

It is the concept of ie, the House, that has served as the model and has furnished the structure and the terminology for the modern Japanese Kaisha or company, as well as for the industrial nation-state that is Japan.

"The term Kaisha," Nakane explains, "symbolizes the expression of group consciousness. Kaisha does not mean that individuals are bound by contractual relationships into a corporate enterprise, while still thinking of themselves as separate entities; rather, Kaisha is 'my' or 'our' company, the community to which one belongs primarily, and which is all-important in one's life. Thus in most cases the company provides the whole social existence of a person, and has authority over all aspects of his life; he is deeply emotionally involved in the association."

In summary, paraphrasing Daniel Bell, in Japan it is the ie, the House, that is the unit of human society. In the process of trying to build a modern nation, they have succeeded in expanding this concept of the ie to include both the Kaisha, the company, and the nation-state. The purpose of social and economic arrangements is to allow these collectivities to fulfill their destiny. And the individual finds his meaning by contributing to this fulfillment.

This comparison of the Japanese management system with the American management system, the Japanese culture with the American, almost inevitably raises several very fundamental questions regarding management in the developing countries of Southeast Asia.

First, if between two developed countries the effective management systems can differ so greatly, should not the effective management system for the developing countries of Southeast Asia be also different? Second, if these differences between these two management systems find their roots in the fundamental character of their respective cultures, what then is the fundamental character of the cultures of Southeast Asia? Finally, what would be the basic elements of an effective
management system for the developing countries of Southeast Asia? Except, perhaps, for the first, the answers to these questions will not be easy to arrive at. The process of developing the modern Western management system began in the late 1800s and is still going on. As was pointed out earlier in this paper, its principles are generalizations made over the years by Western managers and scholars who described and analyzed thousands of “cases” of managerial situations and arrived at their conclusions using what worked for Western managers in their dealings with Western workers. A similar long and arduous process of looking at concrete managerial situations in the Southeast Asian context, of documenting what works and what does not, is one that we cannot bypass. There is no substitute for it. But by knowing what we are looking for, and where we should look, we may be able to do the job more effectively, more efficiently, and with less time and effort. Thus, in this paper, we propose to discuss and, hopefully, clarify some of the major elements of our search process.

The first thing we have to recognize is that the task of developing a Southeast Asian management system, while important, is only a means to an end. Its value, if we are able to develop one that works well, will be found in its capacity to help us in trying to attain for the peoples of our region “the good life.” The difficulty with this, however, is that what constitutes “the good life” for us is something we Southeast Asians are not really sure of, something that we have not really defined for ourselves. The countries of Southeast Asia have been so long dominated by Western powers that, for the most part, our formulations of “the good life” are echoes of the definitions of the West. The tragedy, of course, is the fact that even the developed countries of the West are fast coming to the realization that, even for them, “the good life” as they define it currently is not sustainable over the long pull. We have been following a mirage. We need to look deeply into ourselves, and try to understand what is really important, in short, to define what “the good life” is for Southeast Asia, one that is congruent with our fundamental values and yet attainable and sustainable with our present and potential resources.

But what does all this have to do with developing a Southeast Asian management system? Everything. The Americans and the Japanese developed successful systems because they knew what they wanted the systems for. For the Americans: religious freedom, “a chicken in every pot,” a Model T Ford, a merry Oldsmobile, a Cadillac car, “More!” the world safe for the American way of life. For the Japanese: no more bombardments by the black ships of the barbarians, “a strong Emperor, a strong nation,” a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” parity with the West. We will never be able to develop a working system for ourselves until we know clearly what we want the system for.

The second thing we have to recognize is that crucial to defining “the good life” for Southeast Asia, as well as to developing a management system suited for Southeast Asia, is a thorough understanding of the fundamental value system that is shared by the peoples of Southeast Asia.

We, of course, are assuming that there is such a shared value system. Whether this assumption is a good one or not is something that needs researching. From my readings, from my contact with fellow Southeast Asians, both in their own countries and at the Asian Institute of Management, I feel that it is a valid assumption. If Southeast Asia is anything, it is diversity; diversity in racial origins, diversity in languages, diversity in religions, diversity in the manner in which the various countries have been influenced by and have reacted to the various waves of invasion and of transmigration that have come from India, from China, and from the countries of the West. In all of this diversity, however, there is one thing that the people of Southeast Asia do have in common: the great majority of them sup-

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port themselves on the basis of wet rice agriculture on the alluvial plains of the region. Keith Buchanan points out that "wet rice cultivation" occupies a distinctive "ecological niche ... in Southeast Asia," the type of environment termed by Spencer "the moist aquatic fringe." It is typical of the major alluvial low lands of the region, from the low lands of the Red River in the north to the coastal plains of Java and Celebes in the south. It is the most distinctive type of agriculture in the region; indeed, the very term "Southeast Asia" conjures up a vision of close settled, carefully tended swamps (irrigated rice fields) against a backdrop of palms or forested hills. This pattern of cultivation has resulted in very high densities of population. In central Java and the plains of Tungkin, for example, they have reached highs of as many as 380 persons per square kilometer. "These remarkable densities of population in low land Southeast Asia are based, not, as the Atlantic world is, on industry but on intensive exploitation of the soil by peasant families living on tiny plots of lands." Buchanan continues:

"Rice, as a crop, is not only demanding in terms of environmental conditions and thus encourages a marked localization of population, it also gives a high output of food per unit area and thus is a "factor of density."

"Each of these concentrations of population are broken down into an infinite number of villages, tiny social and economic "cells. It is this cell-like structure which gives Southeast Asian civilizations their strength and their resilience. These villages are both political and economic centers; village political life is strongly democratic, governed by a traditional law which has often outlasted codes of law superimposed by a central government and in the administration of the village, all the family heads are equal, any special consideration being due to age or personal merits. Each village in turn consists of a multitude of smaller cells, the family units. The family is the basic social group and at the same time, the basic economic group since in the traditional societies it was the basic unit in the system of land expropriation."

"This primarily rice-growing economy that has resulted in small, tightly packed social and political cells is developed in the Southeast Asian a set of fundamental values that I believe the majority of Southeast Asians share in common. I feel that some of the key elements of this system of values are the following:

First, the Southeast Asian is paradoxical in that he greatly values his individual independence, while at the same time he willingly is bound by responsibilities to his family, to his kin group, to his neighborhood group, and to his village community. He is not as much of an individual as the American because of the network of responsibilities that limit his freedom of choice; neither is he as much of a group-oriented man as the Japanese, perhaps because he has so many groups to which he is emotionally committed that he ends up being free to make his own choice from among his albeit limited range of alternatives.

Second, the Southeast Asian places a very great value on personalistic relationships. In the West, a man can divorce in his mind his role as a worker in a factory from his role as a volunteer worker in a civic organization or as a father in a family. In contrast, the Southeast Asian places a great value on his being taken as a complete person in whatever situation he is in. In the workplace, he insists that his supervisor see him not only as a worker but as a complete person; to a political meeting, he brings not only his political convictions but also the totality of his concerns. He seems incapable of compartmentalizing his life and insists that others not do so.

Third, because the Southeast Asian lives in such small yet intricately intertwined groups to which he owes multiple loyalties, he feels a very strong need for maintaining smooth interpersonal relationships with all those around him. Those of the West who have had a chance to deal with Southeast Asians have often complained that it is difficult to communicate with them because they never wish to express disagreement; they tend to say yes even when they mean no. They also complain that the Southeast Asians have a tendency to
tell a man what they think he wishes to hear rather than what they actually know or feel. Part of this syndrome also is the Southeast Asians' tendency to distrust the mechanism of the majority vote to settle issues. Not for them, the resentment of even a small minority. The Asian way, which the Indonesians call "Musjawarah," is to discuss an issue at interminable length until consensus is reached. It is these and similar other strongly held values that we must clarify and make explicit so that we can use them in trying to define what a "good life" is and in trying to develop a management system that can work for us.

Fourth, we must realize that this task must be approached with an open mind—and humility.

The schools of management alone are not capable of undertaking it. Men from other disciplines—philosophers, economists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, agriculturists—have knowledge, skills, particular kinds of research capabilities that these tasks will also require. Furthermore, universities alone are not sufficient for the attainment of these goals; we will need the participation, in the development of a common language, of a commonality of ideas, of a way by which learning and practice may be shared, and in the process of evolving consensus, of the different elements of the society—government, the business and the managerial community, local community leaders, the religious groups, the professors, the workers, the farmers, and so forth. Their help must be sought, their initiatives encouraged, their assumption of leadership welcomed in those areas—and these probably constitute the majority of the areas concerned—where they can be more effective than we.

We must also accept the fact that most of us in the schools of management have quasi-Western minds, not-quite-Southeast Asian patterns of thought, habits of thinking, internalized paradigms and assumptions about the nature of man and the workings of the universe in which he lives. We have a lot of relearning to do, we need a lot of reeducating.

Apart from participating actively in the totality of the process, perhaps the work that we in management education can most competently and confidently undertake is that of seeking out, observing, studying, describing, documenting, analyzing, and learning from cases of real-life managerial decision-making and action, testing our perceptions, our conclusions, our hypotheses in the classroom, in the dialogue that we must maintain within our faculties, with other management institutions, and with the managerial community in both government and the private sector. In this process of research, and discussion, and reflection, we need to continually challenge the paradigms that we have picked up and adopted from our Western-oriented education and upbringing. We must be willing to change them when they deserve changing. And, most of all, we must be willing to change ourselves.

Finally, because the field of management is as wide and as various as Southeast Asia itself, we must realize that we cannot cover all the areas possible. We must choose, we must focus, we must concentrate our efforts and our study on those areas that will prove most strategic for the region over the long pull and where the most fruitful learning may be had.

At the Asian Institute of Management (AIM), we have made some of our choices. Our first choice has been the family firm. Through sheer number alone, the family-owned small and medium (plus a few large, family managed and controlled domestic) companies could hold the key to economic development. The reliability of statistics within the region varies, but anywhere from 60 to 85 percent of all nonagricultural, census-registered firms and enterprises are family owned, family controlled, or family managed. Because most of the incomes of these firms is undisclosed or hidden, wealth estimates cannot be determined, much less compared with the top one thousand corporations, for example. But it ought to be substantial. At any rate, given this critical mass of a particular type of firm, it deserves special study.

There is another reason why we have chosen the family firm. The family is the basic primary unit of Southeast Asian society. Our theory is that there is a great deal of transference from the
family to the family firm of values, of mores, of practices, of the culture itself. We wish to see how these impact on the firm's requirements for productivity, efficiency, effectiveness, in both small and large firms in order to see what works and what does not. We suspect that some of the truisms about family firms that we have accepted uncritically as true—i.e., “Nepotism is bad,” “Paternalism is backward and counterproductive,” etc.—may be true only for the West, and that nepotism and paternalism may be functional and effective in our own cultures for furthering the interests of both the family firm and society.

Our second choice is the small community as the basic unit not only of political and social but also of economic organization. Sixto K. Roxas III points out that the business firm, the enterprise, “has been the exemplar of all economic organizations. It has been around its modality that all our other institutions have been designed; our laws, our financial institutions, our management organization technology, our economic projects.” He points out that the enterprise was introduced by the West to Southeast Asia in the form of outposts of Western or industrial nations in distant lands for the purpose of acquiring goods required by the European industry: the early Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and English “factories” in Asia, and then later the establishment of mines, and plantations in Malaysia, Indonesia, Indochina and the Philippines.

The resulting pattern in that of the three-tiered economies of the Asia Pacific region with a traditional rural, subsistence village encompassing the large majority of the population, a “bazaar” urban economy with the Chinese, Arab and Indian traders, the small town markets and import-export economy, and an enclave of Western-type enterprise, a mine, a plantation, with all the ancillary network of businesses, banks, insurance companies, shopping centers, recreation facilities, etc. This economic configuration creates a tremendous pole of attraction around economic activities, directly or indirectly serving the market priorities of foreign countries and thus distorts the pattern of total national development. The domestic enterprises are starved of critical human and financial resources. A serious imbalance occurs in the pace of development of domestic versus foreign-oriented enterprise. Invariably the tension that results becomes too much for the tenuous political system to contain.12

In contrast, Roxas proposes the development of rural villages (with populations of about two thousand) and small urban communities (populations of up to fifty thousand) into viable and efficient economic units. Unlike the business enterprise, which is exclusively concerned with extracting single commodities for a market outside the community itself, this new basic unit, the small community, will have for its objective the development of “the totality of an area’s resources with a view to maximizing the livelihood of the population.” He gives the following example:

A logging company that comes into an area for the sole purpose of cutting the commercial timber to service a market will have an operating strategy that is quite different from that of an entity whose objective is to develop a viable human settlement. Both institutions may use the commercial timber stands that can be logged without permanently damaging the environment. But the logging company’s job is finished when the logs have been converted into revenues. For the “community,” the revenues from the logs are merely the means for providing capital to develop the infrastructure facilities and the other sources of livelihood for the population of the region.

It is conceivable even that both entities may be organized for profit. But the enterprise earns its profit by extracting and marketing the logs. The “community” must earn its profits by producing a permanently viable human entity and developing the total resources of the region.

We at AIM are intrigued by Roxas’s idea of a new paradigm for Southeast Asian development.

While we realize, as he does, that the concept still needs a lot of thought and a lot of development, we feel that because it builds on the villages, market towns, and small cities that constitute more than 80 percent of Southeast Asia's population, it is an idea that is worth exploring. For this concept to prosper, however, Southeast Asia will need to develop, a very special kind of manager. One who not only can operate in a business-oriented mode but who also has the skills necessary to generate greater internally based motivation within the community, for the good of the community. Rather than dealing with the workers, say, in a logging operation, only as workers, he will have to see them as total human beings for whose development he will be responsible.

To begin understanding the managerial technology that will be required to implement this concept, we plan to take a close look at, to write cases on, three types of existing organizations: the "enclave enterprise," the company town, and the community-initiated business project. The "enclave enterprise," in the classical analogue posited by Roxas, is in a community in order to extract its resources for distant markets; it buys what it needs in terms of raw materials or cheap labor without worrying too much about its effects on the community, whether good or bad. Then there are companies which, realizing that they constitute a main economic base of the community, have adopted the idea that they are at least partially responsible for the development of the community. As part of their social responsibilities, they have established and maintained such things as worker housing projects, churches, hospitals, schools, power-generating stations, etc. Finally, there are quite a number of examples of communities that have tried, on the initiative of either political or civic leaders, to develop business projects that would contribute to the prosperity of the community. These have ranged from simple projects such as organizing the handicraft activities within a town in order to give them a better chance of tapping export markets to total development schemes aimed at improving the long-run economic outlook and even the social structure of the community. We think that describing how these different types of organizations are managed and comparing them one with the other will give us a pretty good idea of the problems and opportunities that a "community manager" would have to face and what his feasible courses of action would be. They may even yield insights into how such communities may have to be restructured in order to form the self-developing small communities of which Roxas speaks.

Our third choice is agribusiness management, which we regard as a key element in the economic development of the region. Prevailing economic theory describes Southeast Asia as consisting of labor-surplus economies with a large moribund provincial-agricultural sector and a small but growing urban-industrial sector. Previous development planning concentrated principally on industrialization within the accessible urban areas, in the process neglecting the rural-agriculture sector where the bulk of the population lay. More recent development plans now address the agricultural sector: economic theory and common sense coincide, and it is now widely believed that economic development must start where the bulk of the population is. The agricultural sector must first make the country self-sufficient in food, and then more, before industrialization can take place. The agricultural issue in the 1960s was technology; the issue in the 1970s is management—resource management, logistics management, financial management.

The manager in agribusiness must cope with a set of conditions entirely different from that faced by his urbanized, industrialized counterpart. These conditions often take the form of absences or inadequacies of basic infrastructure—no roads, no transportation, no telephones, no power, etc. The management of resources in agriculture must take these factors into account. A second management element far more crucial in agriculture than in industry is logistics. Given the technology to produce for self-sufficiency both in the farm and for the rest of the country, the problem becomes
one of moving output to the markets; in the course of this movement, the manager must develop a system to minimize wastage and pilferage losses as well as to reduce the price increases added on to the basic product as it moves along the cumbersome and inefficient distribution network. Add to this the fact that farm output is the result of small-scale agriculture (in the Philippines, there are approximately 2.3 million farms, and only 5 percent of these are over ten hectares, i.e., twenty-five acres), then the manager must also work backwards to cope with the collection problem. The third management problem is in institutionalizing the financing for the farmer by taking him out of the hand of the town usurer and into the arms of the rural banker. The rural farmer represents an untapped source of real income, and development demands that his needs, and his savings as well, must be incorporated into the financial system. The manager, be he farmer or banker, must achieve an understanding with his counterpart. But beyond these technical considerations is the matter of the farmer's values. There are few others in the Southeast Asian society, in any society, for that matter, who are as conservative as the farmer. What therefore is the managerial technology that must be developed that the farmer can use in the running of his business? Which of his values must he modify if he is to be effective? Which of our own ideas and concepts must we change if we are to help him achieve his ends?

Our fourth choice is the management of government corporations. Throughout Southeast Asia, the government influence on, and participation in, business continues to grow, both quantitatively, in the number of government-managed enterprises, and qualitatively, in the selection of important industries and/or firms to manage. The growth of the government-managed corporation does not necessarily imply a failure of the free-enterprise system; at present, most Asian governments seek participation in business, not a monopoly of it. Rather, government or public sector participation is based on the assumption that business or the private sector is a key implementing factor in development. The government-managed corporation follows the logical sequence from development planning at the macrolevel to implementation on an industry-wide or company-wide level. The stereotype of the government bureaucrat bungling through a business or industry has not been universally or conclusively proven: and running a business is still essentially a management problem and not a political issue. The failure of government-run corporations may indeed be blamed on the intrusion of "politics," but the fault lies equally in the failure to resolve the management task of reconciling multiple objectives: efficiency, as measured by profitability and returns, and economic development, as indicated by high employment levels, for example. There is also the fact that because of the presumed advantages the government has behind it when it steps into an industry or firm, it tends to pick those projects that precisely are difficult to manage. Managing a steel mill or a port for international trade is not an easy task, and failure is measured not only in income losses but also in lost development opportunities.

There are several areas of research available in analyzing the government manager. Given the "business policies" as indicated in the development plan, the discrepancy, if any, between planning and implementation can be studied. Second, the role of the government corporation in infrastructure development can be analyzed; there is even the possibility of making a comparison of the enterprise when it started out as a private concern and after it came under government control and management, and vice versa. A third area for study is the development of criteria of efficiency and success for government-managed corporations, assuming that profitability is not the sole or primary criterion. Finally, there is the problem posed by the development of a very pervasive culture not only in the government corporation but also in government itself: a culture that mouths the "arm's-length" attitudes of the West but puts into practice the very personalistic values of Southeast Asia. It is what one sociologist has called a "split level" culture. And because of this, management in government corporations has rare
ly been very effective. One suspects that a management technology for Southeast Asian government corporations can be developed that will be responsive to the needs of the communities that they serve if only we would recognize that the Southeast Asian has a unique kind of psychological and social makeup to which the technology must be fitted. This we propose to explore by examining examples of government corporation operations that work and determining what makes them work and how their successful managers go about doing their jobs.

Our fifth choice is the entrepreneurial manager. The preceding four settings that the Southeast Asian manager faces—in the family firm, in the small community, in agribusiness, and in the government-operated enterprises—may be described as horizontal situations. They represent four possible environments in which the Asian manager must operate. The entrepreneurial manager, on the other hand, represents a vertical concept, an attitude and mode of behavior, which the manager must first develop in order to effectively manage the situations in which he may find himself.

Basically, the entrepreneurial manager represents a possible prototype for the manager in the developing economy. The developing country may be defined as one in which too many opportunities go unexploited, undeveloped, unrealized. And the entrepreneurial manager seeks out opportunities, exploits (in the beneficial sense of the word), and develops these opportunities. This type of manager therefore performs a function over and above the administration of a business. The entrepreneurial manager is not a job-seeker but a developer of opportunities; he not only uses existing resources, but he also marshals them into new and creative configurations to suit the situation.

The man who the developing countries of Southeast Asia need is one who can spot an opportunity, gather the requisite resources to take advantage of it, and organize a viable enterprise to capitalize on it, as well as nurture the enterprise, solve its problems, and maintain its ability to respond to emerging opportunities while keeping it prosperous and productive. He must be both an entrepreneur and a manager; in short, an entrepreneurial manager.

The concept of entrepreneurial manager presumes the existing polarity in style between the administrative manager, whose training and analytical tools are suited principally for ongoing concerns, and the "pure" entrepreneur, who is best suited for the creation and organization of enterprises, but has little skill or aptitude for their management. The concept implies the creation of a middle ground, and the ability to develop the characteristics of both types in a single manager. The entrepreneurial manager may already exist, in some rough form, a necessary product of his environment; or he may represent an entirely new breed to be created by a new or modified management educational process. Research must therefore take two tracks: the reality-based track aims at identifying situations in which entrepreneurial opportunity-seeking did in fact take place, and studies the manager or entrepreneur responsible; the planning-based track attempts to define and describe, in a synthetic or total view, opportunities in the environment, still unexploited, that can be analyzed, also in a synthetic fashion, by the graduate student. The reality-based track answers the questions "What happened, and how did it come to happen?" The planning-based track concentrates on what could happen, and how it can be made to happen.

In this essay, I have tried to do two things. First, to show that there is a need to develop a management system that is responsive to and congruent with the values, the needs, and the resources of Southeast Asia, and that such a system will be different from either the Western or the Japanese management system; and, second, to indicate some of the more critical elements that would have to be considered in the development of such a system.
The Transferability of Western Management Concepts and Programs, an East African Perspective

Jon R. Moris

5

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN RURAL ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA

The 1960s were the years for optimism in technical assistance: when, for example, in Africa alone, more than forty different Institutes of Administration were funded, built, and staffed with extranational assistance; when visiting professors were so plentiful as to be an embarrassment; when training opportunities overseas abounded, while the volume of new projects was almost more than many young nations could absorb. And, most fundamentally, our carpetbags bulged with technological miracles: manpower planning, comparative administration, project planning, even (lately) intermediate technology. Few of the many involved in this vast effort to enlist the Western, non-Marxist experience for the benefit of the emerging Third World nations doubted the efficacy of their “answer” (which, in fact, consisted of a loose panoply of competing programs and techniques). If they encountered problems in achieving the effective transfer of this Western management tradition—as they immediately did—it was seen as an analytical challenge, a need to understand the working of alien and apparently irrational socio-political systems so that the suitable points for leverage could be identified and then acted upon.

One component of the transfer exercise was the implementation for the first time of some fairly sophisticated field surveys to measure what was being achieved in the sphere of rural administration (the main emphasis in Africa being upon studies of agricultural extension, cooperative administration, land settlement, farm innovation, and adult education). By coincidence, the published results from this first-generation of evaluative research have coincided with a dramatic downturn in the fortunes of both technical assistance and the relative economic position of the weaker Third World nations—those population-rich, resource-poor, tropical and semitropical countries that some authors distinguish as the “Fourth World” to highlight their peculiarly disadvantaged situation in the world economy.

1. A classic embodiment of this premise was the 1966 Kericho Conference in Kenya, intended to furnish the guidelines for coordinated technical assistance toward even the local costs of rural action programs. A parallel instance from Asia has been the evolution of foundation-sponsored research on comparative public administration.
The true measure of the scope of the problems confronting these less developed countries is only just becoming apparent. Almost any prognostication of present trends in international relationships shows that the Fourth World countries face a bleak economic future. However, the research mentioned above now suggests that, in addition, these countries must cope with a systemic and persistent malfunctioning of their internal administrative systems, most notably in the crucial fields of their agricultural, educational, and health services. The contrast between the ambitious aims of technical assistance as it was in the 1960s and the harsh field realities documented from the early 1970s could hardly be greater. It is so widespread and fundamental a problem for the future performance of the African nations that it justifies designation as a genuine crisis in rural administration.

The situation lends itself to sweeping generalizations and simplistic judgments. It is a predicament that baffles even some of the most committed experts, with the widest field experience. For example, in his recent review of the rural development program experience, Vernon Ruttan has hypothesized that rural development does not represent a viable project, program or plan objective, and raised an important question that will reappear several times in our discussion: "Why is it relatively easy to identify a number of relatively successful small scale or pilot rural development projects but so difficult to find examples of successful rural development programs?"1

The field studies to which reference has been made were conducted in East Africa during the early 1970s. One of the best of these studies was Hyden's follow-up of trainees in twenty-nine primary cooperative societies who had sent staff to the Moshi Co-operative Education Centre. Sampling was done to represent weak, medium, and strong societies in five regions of the country. No relationship could be found between the level of knowledge possessed by society leaders and their organization's performance. Indeed, though training did change slightly the respondents' levels of knowledge, Hyden was forced to conclude:

The problem with education is that it does not disrupt the existing social structure. . . . In the absence of other forces that cause disruptions, the values and the knowledge imparted through education will be interpreted and used within the existing social structure. This is very much what has happened in co-operatives in Tanzania. Individuals have returned from courses and seminars to the prevailing social system in the rural areas, and very few, if any, have managed to achieve any drastic improvement of performance in their institution.2

In study after study, the results indicate that the existing rural system is almost totally ineffective in performing its intended functions—whether the specific sphere of activities is land settlement, ujamaa production, farmer education, or agricultural extension.

The symptoms of this low-level "managerial crisis" are possibly most evident in relation to the three key public service areas of agriculture, education, and health. Here the problems of ineffective programs, low junior staff morale, cost constraints, and complex environmental difficulties are extreme, even by African standards. All three spheres are absorbing the full brunt of the fall-off in technical assistance, rising public expectations, shortages of supply, rising costs, import restrictions, and the like: on top of which they must cope with an ill-designed staffing pyramid in which the lower and middle-rung employees feel disadvantaged and do not perform to even that limited level of which they are capable.

However, before we accept "good management" as a sort of deus ex machina for solving Africa's immediate crisis, perhaps it would be wise to look at the Western management tradition in more detail. Is it even desirable to suggest the transfer of Western management concepts, techniques, and programs into a setting where many forms of adap-

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administration are operating with levels of efficiency from 15 to 30 percent of their potential?

**THE WESTERN MANAGEMENT TRADITION AND ITS TRANSFER**

If we define "the management process" in Western terms as "the activity of planning, initiating and controlling the activities of other people," and if we assume (as many do) that the organizational techniques accumulated in the West over the past few decades render this process a rational and efficient instrument for achieving organizational goals, there would appear to be a prima facie case for the direct transfer of these techniques into non-Western contexts where resources are scarce and where organizational goals are of the utmost importance for the survival and well-being of the polity.

To see just what is at stake, let us define more explicitly the basic ingredients of our Western management concepts and programs that allow us to refer legitimately to them as a coherent tradition. Certainly, "Western management" does not possess a substantive unity as an intellectual discipline, a common body of agreed principles. (It defies imagination that anyone could reduce the vociferously competing arguments of Weber, Taylor, Simon, Blau, Hutton, Bennis, Crozier, Downs, Drucker, Riggs, Marini, Ichlan, and Uphoff—all ostensibly elucidating aspects of the same phenomena—to any single paradigm.) If so, what is it then that we have to transfer? Most authors accept a certain minimum definition of the scope of Western management:

a. It is about hierarchical organization
b. with formal structure and internal specialization
c. which have defined tasks
d. realized by the employment of rational techniques
e. of Western origin
f. designed to maximize efficiency

But this sort of definition (of which there are many variants) can be quite misleading when utilized as a justification for the direct transfer of Western management concepts and programs into non-Western settings.

We owe an intellectual debt to comparative administration theorists for making clear some of the assumptions implicit in the above model. First, "rationality" and "efficiency" are epiphenomena: attributes of organizational action that are determined not by the techniques themselves but rather by their manner of employment within larger contexts of organizational activity. E.g., the use of elaborate cost-benefit techniques in a context where data are unavailable, true costs unknown, and benefits incommensurate can hardly be defended as a rational and efficient administrative exercise. Second, by definition, management involves the employment of managerial techniques in a social context, i.e., the surrounding administrative culture is just as vital to effective management as are the specific techniques, if not, indeed, more vital. The literature on comparative administration abounds with warnings that the export of techniques alone is risky, more likely to complicate than to expedite management in non-Western contexts. Third, there is little that we can call uniquely Western about bureaucracy as such (witness the classic instances of Middle Eastern and Chinese bureaucracy). The paradox we face in so many ex-colonial nations is that some of the greatest managerial barriers consist of administrative traditions originally derived from the metropole itself. To view such systems as being fundamentally non-Western is thus historically incorrect; it is also methodologically dangerous (the ecological fallacy), since all administrative systems take place in specific cultural contexts with which they are in continuous interaction.

Our image of "management" as being Western, rational, and efficient is probably a better indication of our idiosyncratic needs within Western society than it is a tool for the comparative analy-

5. In a recent issue of Management Today (April, 1976), John Argenti notes that of some five or six dozen management techniques that seemed promising a decade ago, a bare dozen survive in proven, widespread use. In fact, the current attitude toward techniques as such among British managers is one of "very nearly total" disillusionment. See "Whatever Happened to Management Techniques?" p. 79.
sis of other administrative systems. As Streeten observes, "It is a strange fact that social scientists, whose special interest is social reality, are exceedingly naive when it comes to examining the social origins of their own theories and models." For example, the notion that Western management is intrinsically rational strikes many non-Western observers as strange, since to them the patent irrationality of many of our arbitrary procedures is strikingly obvious. Similarly, in stressing the great efficiency of Western management, we easily overlook the coexistence of other, deviant forms of management within the West (some highly effective examples being the Cosa Nostra and the Daley political machine), as well as entire bureaucracies (the Italian case), which embody what would otherwise be judged as non-Western principles.

While these strictures have been advanced generally in regard to comparative public administration, they are especially apropos to what I have styled "the Western management tradition." Management, in contemporary business parlance, is a peculiarly American invention—and a fairly recent one at that. Like the computer, it has emerged rapidly through a sequence of specific responses to practical organizational needs. It has a distinctly American preoccupation with fashionable gimmickry, and, as a tradition, it is heavily dependent for its success upon wider assumptions that are rarely challenged within American business and administrative culture. It is not accidental that this tradition has traveled most successfully on the backs of American business and military ventures: with MacArthur to Japan, with SHAPE to Germany, with ITT to Latin America, with the multinationals to Britain and Spain, with the oil firms to OPEC countries. In all these cases, the effective transfer of Western management depended upon a mass accompanying cultural penetration, for some countries virtually the Americanization of whole sectors of their economy. Given such support, the Western management techniques have appeared to yield "rational" and "efficient" results in some non-American contexts.

Otherwise, the Fourth World experience (excluding the OPEC countries) indicates that the mere export of management techniques by themselves remains problematic—a form of transfer likely in the longer run to be neither effective nor desirable. Partly, the error comes from the widespread but unproven assumption that management is principally a matter of skills: a sort of high-level craft tradition that can be taught in any cultural context, and hence one subject to export in much the same way as ox-ploughing has been introduced in many societies on various continents. Partly, the error derives from our own fundamental naivety about "what makes management tick" in Western industrial societies. The standard textbook treatments of the topic abound in long and yet highly abstract discursions on management functions (with chapters on "planning," "coordinating," "communicating," "delegating," and so forth); there is endless talk about training managers, as if to become an effective manager all one has to do is attend Harvard Business School.7 But we don't really believe it, and neither do the companies—at least when it comes to the recruitment of their key managerial talent.8

But, most of all, the impetus for a rapid transfer of Western managerial training into African contexts arose from a convergence of opinion on both sides about the needs of new nations just after Independence. As many have pointed out, the first priority in such nations was to replace the colonial administrators: either by rapid promotions of junior officials (which in Africa usually meant crash programs of short-term training) or by starting their own institutes for professional

7. A major critique of this assumption has been offered by R. Revans, who established a very different management training system in Belgium, Developing Effective Managers (London: Longmans, 1971).
8. Perhaps one reason for Peter Drucker's continuing popularity has been his preoccupation with the underlying causes of managerial effectiveness. A most valuable reconsideration of this issue is by H. Mintzberg, "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact," Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1973), pp. 49-61.
training, and usually by both. America had the universities, and the technical assistance funds, to satisfy these demands. In Africa, the assumption that managerial effectiveness is primarily a result of adequate training is not only unquestioned; it is unquestionable. The existing regimes have made an enormous investment in support of this premise. For example, in Tanzania, which at Independence had no institutions for higher-level management training, there are now five, while in the same period, the number of middle- and senior-level officials has been increased from about four thousand to over sixteen thousand. Most other African nations show a similarly rapid expansion of their top cadres. Thus, to challenge the efficacy of management training is tantamount to querying the rationale for Africanization itself.

Yet, at some point the issue must be faced: why is it that the transfer of Western management practice into Africa and Asia has had such disappointing results? Granted that the doctors and agriculturalists working in the service professions largely missed the first phase of generalized training in administrative skills. But if such training achieved such minor long-term impact in the main-line administration—which arguably is today characterized by even worse performance than when training was begun—on what conceivable grounds can one urge that these same approaches be given a second trial in the sphere of the public service sectors?

Here, the simple answers are quite probably wrong. After bitter trial and error, one can only conclude that it is the system itself that is the problem, capable of rendering almost any input ineffective—whether trained staff, new equipment, sensible policies, or fresh projects. Working within such a system, one soon realizes that deeply rooted attitudes toward authority and assumptions about communication negate the intended impact of many Western managerial innovations. To the outsider, the origin of these obstacles within the colonial tradition seems obvious. Americans, particularly, seem prone to react to their frustrations by attacking the ex-British or ex-French origin of current administrative practices. They fail to realize that this inherited ex-colonial system is finely nuanced and extremely complicated. Just as Independence opened the door for the indigenous leaders to assume coveted positions of authority, so also much of the esprit-de-corps shared among senior officials derives from their patiently acquired expertise in making an arcane system by dint of great effort jump through the hoops. Challenges to the individual's established ways of showing deference are thus perceived as immediate threats to the established administrative order. For, in truth, it has not been for many decades "the British" or "the French" or "the Dutch" system of administration; it is now fundamentally the national system.

Let us distinguish carefully between techniques and administrative culture. Techniques are by definition readily identifiable skills; and, as such, they are subject to transfer by training. They have been the object of virtually all "management training" that has been conducted in Fourth World contexts to date. Administrative culture, on the other hand, is the combined outcome of a long process of informal socialization and the interaction of complex administrative structures. It is much less readily amenable to direct transfer, perhaps hardly subject to programmatic transfer at all.

While we have little difficulty enumerating for export various promising managerial techniques (PERT, Management by Objectives, etc.), we know almost nothing about the structural prerequisites that underlie their effectiveness in the parent society. Nevertheless, it does appear that the transfer of at least some parts of this surrounding administrative culture is an essential precondition for the effective transfer of these techniques into other administrative systems. Examples of some of these crucial elements of American administrative subculture, whose lack in African contexts might help to explain the very weak performance of individual Western techniques, are as follows:

1. The interchangeability of organizational re-

sources (manpower, materials, plant, time, and money) for decision-making purposes.

2. Prevalence of an informal relationship of trust (in contrast to zero-sum game competition) among managerial associates.

3. Acceptance of the costs of tying expensive facilities and resources to special purposes to ensure their availability at all times for those purposes.

4. Extension of the accountancy (control) system impersonally to all aspects of an organization's activities.

5. Acceptance of internal decision rules governing operations as restraints dictated by technical requisites.


7. Existence of mechanisms that institutionalize the organization's intelligence separate from the person of individual officeholders.

The preceding listing could be extended for many pages; but at least it should illustrate the interlocked nature of supporting assumptions that surround and render effective individual management techniques. Such assumptions cannot be made the object of a training package; they reside in the individual attitudes of actors throughout the system as a whole. Obviously, if the individuals in Western management refuse to accept the money value of their time, do not observe arbitrary scheduling commitments, misuse tied resources, and demand a full demonstration each time technical constraints are imposed—our system could not work. And yet, from the standpoint of the individual actor in his proximate social and economic relationships, operation according to the preceding assumptions involves substantial private costs that in most non-Western societies would appear unnecessary and irrational.

Our problem in sponsoring the transfer of this tradition into other administrative systems has the following components:

1. Which of these background assumptions are crucial to the success of a given managerial technique (whose transfer is being planned)?

2. Which of these are reasonably congruent with the premises already being observed in the receiving administrative system?

3. Which other linkages between assumptions are a precondition for successful transfer?

4. What program contexts would appear to offer a congenial social setting for implanting and encouraging the whole corpus of managerial innovation necessary to make the transfer effective?

5. And, finally, is the transfer itself a desirable objective, given the complexity of the necessary supporting arrangements?

A CLOSER LOOK AT AFRICAN FIELD ADMINISTRATION: SOME HYPOTHESES

There is an emerging consensus about the diagnostic features of Third World administration that appear problematic from the standpoint of the Western management tradition. At the risk of restating the obvious, let me itemize some of the attributes various authors have noted:

1. Norms about hiring and firing are not enforced, so that recruitment occurs through personal influence. Security of employment is accepted as the norm at all levels.

2. The distinction between public and private goods is not maintained, and, in varying degree, forms of corruption are common.

3. Tied resources are often diverted to meet urgent needs in other sectors; consequently, one can never rely upon the availability and status of special equipment and facilities.

4. While governments' efforts are constantly directed toward acquiring new facilities, capital, and equipment, the maintenance of existing equipment and facilities is so poor that despite low labor costs, the actual unit costs of opera-

Depreciation rates are roughly double those for the developed world, sometimes triple or quadruple.

5. Officials show marked ambivalence about technical matters. On the one hand, they may be so insecure in their understanding of the issues at stake that no actions are taken when decisions would seem to be imperative. On the other hand, they often suspect deep down that technical constraints are merely a pretext used by the colonialists—now replaced by the Western nations and their experts—to embarrass them.

6. Professional norms are rarely enforced, and professional "standards" are widely suspect as artificial devices designed to block the entry of indigenous nationals into such fields.

7. The civil service incorporates microhierarchies of limited scope with many internal levels even where such a steep hierarchy is unnecessary. There is an intense internal politicization of the junior officers, who line up beneath various patrons in the hope that they may thereby gain advancement and recognition. Whom one knows and not what one does is regarded as the key to personal betterment. Distrust of associates and subordinates is common, and many senior officials employ protective strategies vis-à-vis the younger generation of officials, a matter of routine. Personal influence is seen as crucial for making the formal system work, and everyone remains highly sensitized to the power implications of each change of leadership and office.

8. The control systems for top officials appear to be inoperable. In the face of a lack of enforceable sanctions, the top officials use the transfer of subordinates as the main administrative solution to almost every problem. Consequently, top officials are constantly being moved around the country within the bureaucracy. Problems having to do with corruption or personality are not solved, but merely exported to some other locus in the system.

9. Within the administration, downward communication is facilitated and expected; lateral communication forbidden; and upward communication of a personal nature not sought.

10. At the bottom levels, morale among the junior staff is so low and supervision so hap-hazard that work performance is highly unreliable. Few individuals perform to the limited level of their capability with any consistency.

11. Expectation at the top remains of the military "line-of-command," with each officer responsible for all actions by all subordinates. Higher officials operate in a condition of chronic work overload.

12. Administrative actions are frequently taken before they have been given a legal basis, which is regarded as a formality to complete if and when time permits.

13. There is a flexible attitude toward scheduling. Almost every day assumes that nothing ever occurs quite as planned; therefore, departures from schedule are to be expected.

14. There is a flexible attitude toward plans, which are viewed as paper commitments mirroring a certain situation in power relationships at one point in time. Power relationships and circumstances change; as they do, so will the urgency of carrying out mutually agreed actions. If there is any uncertainty about the authority relationships, implementation will be held in abeyance.

15. In administrative actions, the personal relations of everyone concerned are of paramount importance. Disagreement over issues is tolerated, but never if expressed in public. Any such displays will be interpreted as an attempt by the junior official to advance his own personal position vis-à-vis his superior in this zero-sum game of power politics. The monolithic and unitary conception of authority leaves no room for rival views based on technical expertise.

16. Thus the occupational hierarchy is used to reinforce status distinctions observed in the larger society. In place of open channels for advancement, great stress is placed upon the minutiae of formal qualification.

17. The administrative system lacks the capacity
for organizational intelligence; it appears unable to learn from its past mistakes. Planning and coordination techniques remain personal to the leader in power, with the consequence that the institutionalization of these key functions remains rudimentary or even nonexistent.

18. The system as a whole has characteristic weakness in managing large scale or complex activities beyond the capacity of one top executive to control directly. Its performance in the initial stages of growth is often impressive, but it lacks the capability for sustained growth without a loss of control.

19. Increasingly, decision-making takes place among a relatively small circle of people at the top of each organization. A sizable portion of each country’s “high-level manpower” is being either disused or misused. Before decisions have been announced, they are “sensitive” and “confidential”—not suitable for discussion, but once launched, they become “policy,” which is equally sacrosanct.

20. With the passage of time since Independence, the administrative system shows decreasing sensitivity to rational control from the top. Its size has burgeoned, and its best men become tired. Too young yet to retire, they are too exhausted to make the efforts they once aspired to. Survival from one crisis to the next has become the order of the day, and the system as a whole is very slow to react to changing external circumstances.

As a totality, the above listing is a caricature. Mercifully, no one national system betrays all these characteristics; perhaps they are indeed universal—to some degree found in all administrative systems—but most evident when one deals with a strange bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the picture carries a sting of recognition for those working in certain Asian and African situations: the smaller, resource-poor countries; the field administration away from the provincial and national levels; the professional fields like agriculture or medicine or education in which the contrast between performance standards and what can actually be realized with a paucity of equipment reaches appalling proportions. The above thumbnail sketch does represent the present, contemporary realities one would find at the bottom levels of the bureaucracy in much of rural Africa.

If the above delineation of common bureaucratic weaknesses has any validity, it does suggest at least three main implications. First, these attributes of bureaucratic behavior have a particularly virulent effect in the context of the public professional services. For example, in medicine and in agriculture, the tendency of other officials to regard technical norms as being mere dramatic devices without substantive reality has immediate negative consequences within the field programs. The achievement of common tasks by the field units is greatly complicated by the internal polarization of roles between professional versus custodial cadres—an added impetus to overload the top officials in order to counteract the irresponsibility of the bottom-level workers.

Second, a majority of the above weaknesses are of systemic origin. That is, they express the aggregate choice of actors spread throughout the system; hence, they are not subject to alteration by individual action(s). Even when new recruits with different pre-dispositions enter the system, their long-run chances for realizing major change are minimal. Why then does the system not collapse from its own internal weaknesses? The answer is that the above traits are “weaknesses” only from the standpoint of the peculiar assumptions that underlie administrative effectiveness within the Western managerial tradition! Viewed as functional prerequisites in a social system, these same traits become organizational strengths that help to explain the extraordinary persistence of traditional bureaucratic forms under adverse conditions. The system retains the capability to perform certain social functions effectively, so that viewed from within, the organism appears in normal health.

Third, the prospects for achieving an effective transfer of Western managerial practice into such systems by training alone (or, for that matter, direct capita. assistance such as the World Bank gives) appear slim. More “high-level management...
training" would not appear promising until we can specify what it is about these systems that seems to destroy the efforts of their own best men. Why are the capable men in such societies so overloaded with work while their juniors loaf, and why are so many well-intended efforts having so little field impact?

Adequate answers to this central question depend heavily upon one's diagnosis of the particular causes responsible for the administrative patterns caricatured above, as do also one's prescriptions as to where in this system transfer efforts should be directed. Accordingly, let us take a second look at some of the more likely explanations that account for the apparent distortions one sees in the field administration.

First, it is undoubtedly true that much of the present fabric of administration reflects strands woven in the colonial situation: represents, indeed, the predictable consequence of such experience and is not surprisingly found almost everywhere throughout the ex-colonial Third World. In comparison with their home-based equivalents, the colonial officials retained most critical managerial functions—planning, coordination, and control—in their own hands at the top. Initially, of course, they had no alternative. Later, when other options would have been feasible, these peculiar distortions had been subsumed already into the usual functioning of the administrative structure and were overlaid with new stresses when virtually the entire cadre of top managers was replaced in the first few years after Independence. The relatively uniform age and composition of the incoming cadre was a highly atypical phenomenon in managerial practice, a gigantic experiment whose success in very difficult circumstances is a tribute to most ex-colonial regimes. Indeed, so argue that the administrative system has been the most stable and successful feature of post-Independence African regimes.

Second, management has been the missing function in the education of the service professionals (doctors, agriculturists, engineers, and resource scientists), just as rural development has been the missing sector in management education. Amidst a rather large volume of formal instruction supposedly conveying "management skills" to middle- and upper-level trainees, management as such receives relatively little emphasis. The real essence of effective management never becomes explicit; "management" remains a mysterious residual factor to trot out at the end as one of the preconditions for effective implementation of rational planning. There would appear to be much scope for enlarging the actual managerial content of such training.

Third, the extreme situational constraints affecting Third World administration can certainly be used to explain some of its more bizarre features. Observers from the industrialized nations tend to ignore the cumulative impact upon the system as a whole of its constituent difficulties. The conditions of acute scarcity of most basic and critical components of a supportive infrastructure the West takes for granted breed a peculiar mentality of decision-making, most evident in the poorer, socialist nations, which creates and reinforces the more crippling weaknesses of the system.

Fourth, the above circumstances encourage a particular mode of task organization that I have called elsewhere the "hub-and-wheel" pattern for managerial control. The fastest and most efficient managerial tactic in the colonial situation, was for the individual officer to provide all the complex and abstract functions of administration himself. Any complex task was reduced to a set of rudimentary and specific instructions, which the center-post official could then pass individually to a ring of poorly trained subordinates, each of whom bore only limited responsibility not requiring much lateral communication (i.e., to adopt what in communications theory has been called variously the "wheel," "spoke," or "Y" network). The usual mode of operation was for the central official to do all the managerial integration needed for task completion personally. By dint of great

effort, he was sometimes able to achieve quite remarkable results, considering the scarcity of resources and the low and unreliable quality of subsidiary staff. Indeed, experiments have shown that the “wheel” pattern of communication emerges quickly and easily from an unstructured group; on simpler tasks, requiring mainly one-way communication, it is perhaps the most efficient form.

Nevertheless, despite its stability and apparent success, it has numerous long-run weaknesses if simultaneously employed as the structural basis for task integration (the “hub-and-wheel”). For one thing, the motivation and involvement of the subsidiary actors (the rim of the wheel in our metaphor) remain low. All the experience, power, and satisfaction accrues to the center-post position, none to the periphery. Second, this structure does not perform well in situations where problem-solving is required, and two-way communication necessary. It seems to foreclose the possibility for large-scale activities, since the pattern has no mechanism to allow for internal delegation and specialization beyond the first rudimentary step of task assignment. Third, the essential planning and coordinating skills remain personal to the manager; they do not become part of the organization’s own heritage. When the center-post man becomes old, or is promoted, there will be nobody beneath capable of assuming his functions; someone else in his mirror image must be found, and the whole cycle repeats itself.

This pattern for task accomplishment was characteristic of the best colonial officers; it was also, incidentally, Henry Ford’s preferred mode of action. The tendency to continue this form of administration as the predominant mode for control is strongly reinforced in contemporary Third World settings. The “wheel” communication pattern is congruent with the prevailing conceptions of authority, and it embodies the preferred form of administrative communication. When interposed within the “hub-and-wheel” form of task organization, the two mesh together so quickly and so tightly that one cannot specify which is the cause of the other. Thus the administrative system’s extreme structural resilience grows out of the substantial access to power that these minuscule hierarchies offer to a fairly large minority of actors (the center-post occupants) who hold the many senior positions interlaced at all nodes throughout the highly differentiated network. For them, administration is an exciting and rewarding experience: except at the very bottom level, almost everyone controls and gives orders to somebody else. In particular circumstances, a developing nation faces, the “hub-and-wheel” pattern is not only the most likely form of administrative control, if rapid performance is necessary, it may be virtually mandatory. We should not forget, however, that one-person-controlled companies still exist in the Western world, and some of them compete quite effectively with even the largest corporations on certain types of tasks.

Fifth, when outside technical assistance has been directed toward the public service sectors of developing nations, almost invariably the mechanism employed has been the individual project. Because of the features of Third World administration described above, the pressure to adopt individual projects as the point of leverage for technical assistance is all but irresistible. The project offers so many short-run advantages: for example, it is not subject to political interference on a day-to-day basis; it allows the organization to employ its own, familiar control and accountancy devices; it seems to concentrate specialized resources in a setting where their effectiveness can be made at least somewhat likely; it is a separate budgeting entity; and it can distribute reports on its own activities without disclosing the “secrets” of the local administration.

Nevertheless, in the longer run and most especially in regard to the agricultural and rural development sectors, the project is self-defeating and ultimately self-destroying. It embodies sharp differences in factor intensities, which not only are

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not replicable in the larger administrative environment, but which also cause such jealousy among local officials that as soon as possible after termination the project will be raped of its most vital assets. The very effort to circumvent local bureaucratic controls and procedures means that any innovations of a managerial nature the project implements will not be adopted in the larger system. Projects characteristically generate large recurrent budgets, far beyond the capability of the government to support in the larger system. The overlapping of jurisdiction with the "usual" agencies means that the project will be perceived from the start as a rival to their success. Thus the observation that Ruttan makes that projects rarely survive into general practice is both valid and predictable—which is rather disquieting when one considers the orthodoxy that "projects are the 'cutting edge' of development." Economists, especially, seem captivated by the project format, so much so that the bulk of their writing about development management is devoted exclusively to the topic of project planning and implementation. 14 One cannot help but include, therefore, that a major reason for the weakness of the transfer of Western managerial innovations into Fourth World administration has been the general preoccupation of the outside agencies with semiautonomous projects as their main focus.

The preceding comments are hardly exhaustive. Additional dimensions would require consideration in any detailed review of the workings of Fourth World administration. The suggestion is, however, that these resource-poor, tropical countries of Africa share a common style of administration that is neither entirely non-Western, nor fully explicable in terms of each country's unique cultural heritage. Furthermore, this pattern of administration has shown sufficient resilience to render ineffective many externally induced managerial innovations. But before we risk dismissing the Fourth World's administrative needs out-of-hand, we should realize that these "irrational weaknesses" have, paradoxically, rational causes subject to analysis and informed action. At a minimum, a comprehensive understanding from the inside of how these systems appear to work would seem to be an essential starting point for future attempts at managerial innovation in Fourth World contexts.

14. Despite its topic, the only study not subject to this criticism remains A. O. Hirschman's excellent Development Projects Observed (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), a study with much to say about our topic.
My purpose here is to present a framework for thinking about the nature and content of a curriculum for public management, with special reference to development sectors. The conventional wisdom on public policy analysis, public administration, and enterprise management is all we have today to serve as a basis for modeling a curriculum on public management. I doubt that any one of them provides a valid model for the task at hand. What is proposed below is an approach that starts by looking at the functions of the public manager. The building blocks of the curriculum are then put together, based on the insights derived therefrom and on the disciplines underlying them.

**NATURE OF PUBLIC SYSTEMS**

There is considerable diversity among public systems of technology, client systems, and environment. Furthermore, within a public system, there is heterogeneity in the degree of permanence and complexity of the organizations involved and the tasks expected of them. To illustrate, agriculture as a public system will have at least three types or levels of organization. At the ministry or departmental level, there is a system concerned with overall policies, allocations, and assignment of tasks. Then there are specific agencies or organizations, such as directorates, that operate as specialized subsystems on a functional or regional basis. Finally, there are programs with specific time-bound tasks assigned to them. Many observers will agree that there is a decreasing order of organizational permanence and complexity in this hierarchy.

As against these inter- and intra-system diversities, one could also point out a number of similarities among public systems. All public systems are expected to play a facilitating role. They do not ordinarily sell goods or services on a commercial basis and do not practice a quid pro quo relationship with their client systems. Resource generation and supply of services are therefore two separate transactions for public systems. Finally, while the inputs of their services can be stated in monetary terms, their outputs do not lend themselves easily to measurement and control in money.
terms. The standard financial budgeting approach cannot cope with the problems of planning and evaluating the “soft” outputs of public systems.

The diversities as well as similarities must be borne in mind while planning a curriculum for public managers. If there is a great deal of diversity, it will indeed be necessary to formulate a separate curriculum for each sector. If, on the other hand, commonalities are the dominant feature, it should be possible to evolve at least a good core curriculum relevant to all public systems.

MANAGERIAL FUNCTIONS
The design of the curriculum should be based on an understanding not only of the nature and complexity of public systems, but also of the functions to be performed by public managers. In a generic sense, basic managerial functions are the same irrespective of the sector in which the manager operates. It is important, however, that these functions are spelled out in the context of the setting of public systems.

There are six separate and critical functions that every public manager may be expected to perform. These are planning and policy; environmental appraisal; service delivery and logistics; technology and production; budgeting, information, and control; and organization and personnel. The boundaries between them are not always clear-cut and overlaps do exist. Even so, these categories may give us a useful perspective on the components that constitute public management.

1. Planning and Policy

In an organization that has to play a developmental role, the importance of defining the objectives and tasks to be achieved cannot be overemphasized. In a conventional government department, a clear definition of objectives is seldom attempted and the process of looking ahead to identify the tasks to be accomplished may not exist. Rather, the system reacts to problems as they arise, the anticipatory role being given only a secondary place. On the other hand, in developmental systems characterized by heavy resource use and close and predictable linkages between current decisions and future outcomes, planning assumes a much greater degree of relevance as a managerial function.

In the public system context, planning refers to the function of clarifying and determining the hierarchy of objectives and tasks to be achieved, given the opportunities and constraints that lie ahead, and of choosing between alternative strategies available to achieve the tasks. Planning of this type must of necessity have a long-term time perspective within which operational plans or a series of action can fit. Another feature of the planning function is its dynamic nature. Environmental changes and internal considerations will necessitate a continuing reappraisal and updating of approved plans.

At the highest levels in the hierarchy of public systems, the planning function gets inextricably intertwined with public policymaking. For instance, the objectives and alternative strategies for energy planning considered at the ministry level will have considerable public-policy content. Policymaking at this level therefore is virtually public policymaking. However, as one moves down in the hierarchy of public systems to those agencies or organizations concerned with a given region, function or program, public policy becomes a framework given to them and within which their planning and internal policymaking must take place. Thus, the agency concerned with thermal energy grapples with second-order policy problems, such as choice of projects, distribution strategy, and replacement. Public policy analysis and implications are still important, but increasingly become given factors that the public manager must take into account in his strategic planning and policymaking.

“Policy” in public management thus has two dimensions. One consists of strategic policy choices at the national and sectoral levels that are dealt with primarily at the highest levels of public systems. The other is policymaking of a more restricted type at subsystem levels given broad public policy guidelines. Generation of alternatives, choice of appropriate criteria, and evaluation of costs and outcomes are important in both cases. Yet the complexity and depth of public policy
skills required seem to be far greater at the national and sectoral levels. If public management is to improve, adequate attention should be given to both dimensions of policymaking.

2. Environmental Appraisal

Planning, generation of alternative strategies, and policy choices are very much influenced by environmental forces and constraints. The environment within which public systems operate is an extremely complex and sensitive one. It comprehends the entire gamut of the social, political, economic, legal, and cultural systems of the country. A major problem in public management in many developing countries lies precisely in this area. Public managers often operate their programs and make decisions mechanistically with scant attention to the likely response of the client systems and little understanding of the environmental constraints at work. This lack of awareness is also reflected in the indiscriminate import of foreign ideas and programs that come to grief for the same reason.

Environmental appraisal assumes special importance in public management also because of the divorce between the tasks of resource generation and supply of services. A public system has to contend with two distinct forces in the environment. First, there is the client system to whom specified services have to be delivered. Second, there exist government and the political groups behind it whose job is to mobilize and provide resources in order that the client system is served. The public system’s need to understand and carry both with it makes environmental appraisal a difficult task.

The managerial function of environmental appraisal has three dimensions that deserve to be noted. First, the public manager needs to understand and internalize the objectives, values, beliefs, and constraints that characterize government as a system. Sometimes, public managers who come from outside the governmental system become frustrated and fail to be effective because of their lack of understanding of the goals, ethos, and operating culture of the government. The political trade-offs and bargaining, the concept of public accountability, the role of procedures, and the high visibility of internal decisions become barriers in their effort to cope with the environment. This is not to imply that some of these features cannot be changed or improved. The fact is that a public manager has to recognize and accept the fact that he has to work within this system that is an important part of his environment. Even if a manager does not fully identify himself with the way the government system operates, his understanding of it will improve his ability to foresee likely reactions and even to influence them.

Second, the manager should be conversant with the larger political, social, economic, legal, and cultural framework of his country. Management education cannot possibly provide him a bag of tricks to be used without any reference to this framework. Many civil service training programs provide this input in a descriptive or institutional fashion. What is really needed is a more perceptive, analytical understanding of the framework so that the manager can better serve his client system. In family planning programs, for instance, the population is often treated as a mere collection of individuals. Deeper insights into their social groupings, economic and social motivation, and power structure might well have opened up different strategies for dealing with clients, perhaps differentially on a regional basis. Without an understanding of the broader framework, a public manager will find it difficult to cope with such environmental complexities. To take another example, agricultural program planning cannot be done in isolation from the linkages with industry and foreign trade. Some understanding of the process of income growth and of intershockal linkages is a prerequisite for a manager who wants to appraise the environment.

Third, the public manager must learn that competent environmental appraisal calls for the ability to analyze power relationships and distribution of influence. Public systems are very much in the thick of these struggles. A systematic understanding of the operation of these influences and skills to analyze and use them in favor of his program are attributes he should develop. The capability to
appraise the environment in terms of the three dimensions outlined above provides an important link between the policy and planning function and the operational functions to be discussed next.

3. Service Delivery and Logistics

The mission of a public system is to meet some specific "developmental needs" of a definable client system in society. This may be achieved either through the delivery of services direct to the clients or by enabling or facilitating other organizations to perform that task. In either case, the public system generates and delivers services or "soft" outputs which seldom entail normal market transactions. There are exceptions, such as distribution of energy or water, but then their systems of management are likely to be commercial rather than developmental in nature. In fact, it is to take care of this end of the spectrum that the concept of public sector enterprise was evolved.

Public managers often appear to be totally innocent of the notion that service to a client system is their primary task. This managerial function is perhaps the least understood in the world of public management. Efficient performance of this function has been neglected for so long because the basic concept of the function itself was far from clear. Weak linkages with user or client publics and the lack of concern for what happens at the field level are largely manifestations of this phenomenon. The term "service delivery and logistics" has been used to denote this function.

There are four aspects of this function that appear to be relevant to most public systems. First, service delivery and logistics entail the identification of the needs of potential clients that must be met. Frequently, developmental needs are not "felt" by the public, and it becomes necessary to "discover" the needs and design appropriate services and promote them. In many sectors, such as health, agriculture, or education, needs are self-articulated by client systems. The twin tasks of need identification and design of services call for a sensitive understanding of the environment, ability to identify the relevant client segments, and considerable innovativeness on the part of the public manager. The promotional task also requires similar capabilities along with skills in communication.

The second aspect of the function concerns cost-price-subsidy relations. All services involve the use of scarce resources, and the manager should have an appreciation of what it costs to service his public. A more efficient use of resources could result from his skills in this area. Even where services are free or highly subsidized, the relevance of this aspect remains. Costs and prices must be viewed from a social point of view, and this, of course, makes the task even more complex.

Third, there is a major managerial challenge in ensuring that services are delivered at the right locations at the right time. Services may not be complex by themselves. But to plan the delivery of the relevant services in the right sequence and to coordinate with other agencies effectively become a major problem for the public manager. Infrastructural bottlenecks that plague developing countries make it imperative that adequate attention is paid to the logistics of delivery.

Finally, delivery of service is not a one-shot affair. In many sectors, such as agriculture and health, follow-up is important. The concept of service delivery as a phased phenomenon over time until the primary task in relation to a client is accomplished is yet to be evolved. When this new concept of "service cycle" is accepted, the public manager's view of service delivery and his attitudes toward client systems will become more functional. In this context, the experience of machinery or durable-goods manufacturers and the systems they have evolved will be instructive.

4. Technology and Production

Every public system has its underlying technology. Public managers must possess a basic understanding of the relevant technology and its processes and characteristics. There are three areas in which the influence of technology will be felt most. First, the estimated volume of supply of services to clients and the desired patterns of delivery will be the basis on which scale and location of production or service facilities will be determined. Technology will have a major influence on these decisions. Second, when projects and pro-
grams are developed to generate services, technology will play an important role in their identification and formulation. Third, technology will also have a bearing on the scheduling and logistics of service delivery.

Just as technology provides the framework for the identification and formulation of projects and programs, social cost-benefit analysis could provide a basis, even if partial, for choice among projects. Though political and other environmental pressures will undoubtedly influence these decisions, the use of these analytical aids will enable public managers to anticipate the consequences of the complex alternatives facing them.

Efficiency in the implementation and operation of projects and programs can be improved by the use of quantitative techniques, some simple and others complex. Programming methods, network analysis, work study, PERT, and CPM are tools that can be effectively applied in public management as well as in enterprise management.

From the standpoint of the public manager, the managerial function of technology and production consists of identification and formulation of projects and programs within the technological framework of the public system, appraisal and choice of projects, implementation of projects, and generation of services. It is only when this set of tasks is completed that the managerial function of logistics and service delivery can come into its own. Careful integration of these two functions is therefore a critical prerequisite for the effectiveness of any public system.

5. Budgeting, Information, and Control

To accomplish its goals and tasks, the public system must allocate resources that it can in turn use to acquire facilities, materials, and services. The only common denominator that can be used to measure the cost of all these inputs is money. In fact, a public system receives its share of resources only in monetary terms. As a result, budgeting becomes an important instrument of the public manager for all internal resource allocation purposes. However, given the nonmonetary nature of the soft outputs and services of the public system, conventional budgeting becomes a rather weak and even misleading tool in the monitoring and evaluation of the performance of public systems. Time and again, this weakness has been exposed in the practices of governments that review the accomplishment of developmental tasks by reference to the expenditures incurred on them.

This problem underscores the importance of evolving appropriate information and control systems that public managers can use to monitor performance. Performance budgeting provides one approach that has been tried in several countries on a limited scale. The system has to be such that it can be used to monitor and improve the accomplishment of planned tasks and also motivate those responsible for the system to strive for this accomplishment.

In public systems, the manager has no financial function in respect to the generation of resources. Rather, his critical role in relation to finance will be in planning and operating a budgetary process that will facilitate the achievement of the time-bound goals and tasks laid down for the system. In this sense, the budgetary function is an aid to the planning process. A major deficiency in public management in developing countries is the relative absence of suitable information and control systems that can help the top management to make mid-course corrections and provide the right signals to those in charge of implementation. The managerial function will then not only be to link the short-term financial budget to the overall planning process and operate it, but also to evolve an information and reporting system that goes well beyond financial variables and provides a better basis for the evaluation and control of the public program.

6. Organization and Personnel

That the public manager must be a good organizer will be accepted by all without reservation. That the organization of public systems should be different from that of government’s routine maintenance systems will also be an acceptable proposition to many. There will be less unanimity, however, when it comes to the question of what organizational designs and practices are appropriate to developmental agencies.
There are several organizational requirements and characteristics of public systems that flow from the preceding discussion of managerial functions. These have implications for the structural aspects of the system as well as for the organizational and personal skills and attitudes required of the public manager. First of all, a public system is likely to be characterized by a great deal of differentiation. There are many specialized jobs to be done, but when specialists abound, the task of integration becomes the casualty. The organization must therefore provide for a strong integrative mechanism. Second, the public manager must act as a good team builder, and develop a sense of task orientation among his men. These are not qualities that are commonly found in government systems. Third, the public manager must himself possess and also develop in others attitudes that are conducive to the achievement of developmental tasks. There are positive attitudes toward work, clients, and the use of resources, including time, that must be encouraged. In a large and complex public system that has to deal with client publics scattered over vast distances, the manager must encourage initiative and flexibility at lower levels. A logical consequence will be greater delegation of authority to subordinates. Finally, the organization should provide for change and renewal so that its vitality is not lost. A developmental organization has to deal with a dynamic environment. Systems and men must therefore be kept recharged continually.

Personnel is a much neglected function in government systems. The basic aspects of personnel, such as selection, development and training, evaluation, and manpower and career planning need to be strengthened so that they fit in with and contribute to the requirements of a developmental organization. In many public systems, these aspects are left to some lowly officials who operate in a routine fashion with little impact on the system's effectiveness. The public manager should realize that men are his primary asset and that attention at a sufficiently senior level to personnel problems is important if he is to get the most out of them.

The insights that the public manager derives from his study of organizational and personnel matters will provide the underpinning he needs in the discharge of his many functions. The skills he develops in dealing with people or motivating them are relevant to all functions that he will be called upon to perform. Every public manager, therefore, should have an understanding of the alternative ways in which organizations could be designed and developed, and of the attitudes and interpersonal skills required for organizational effectiveness. All these point to the importance of innovative and sensitive organizational leadership as an essential ingredient of public management.

**SKILLS AND FUNCTIONS**

The managerial functions discussed above are not watertight areas in which different public managers will specialize. They are interlinked and often rather ambiguous functions, and task performance will demand an integrated view of these functions by the manager. To be able to harmonize and coordinate diverse functions, the public manager should have an integrated and total perspective of the public system that could be developed through the educational process.

An intellectual understanding of managerial functions is no guarantee that a manager will perform effectively. The performance of functions operates through organizational processes of decision-making and action. It is only through experience that a manager finally develops the skills in operating these processes. No educational program can provide such experiences in a direct manner. Educational methodologies could be used to simulate managerial situations. Project assignments could be used to bring students closer to the real problems of implementation. Even so, I have no hesitation in asserting that a major part of the skills in decision-making and implementation can be learned only on the job.

What skills, then, can be learned through the educational process? In my view, there are four types of skills that the public manager must learn. These are planning skills, analytical skills, organizational skills, and integrative skills. Performance of different managerial functions de-
minds varying combinations of these skills. Planning skills are needed not only in the area of long-term planning, but also in almost all other functions discussed above. Similarly, analytical capabilities are a prerequisite in practically all managerial functions. Organizational and integrative skills are most important in functions closer to implementation, such as service delivery, logistics, and production. These also happen to be the skills that are the hardest to learn in the classroom. Curriculum planners should consciously search for ways and means to develop the required managerial skills through the educational program and not stop with a mere intellectual discussion of functions and skills.

CURRICULUM DESIGN

If the objective is to develop skills in the public manager to perform his functions effectively within the framework of an integrated view of the public system, then the primary focus of the curriculum should be on the development of skills in the context of functions. Skills involve the application of knowledge. The curriculum should not only provide knowledge inputs, but also should emphasize their application in the relevant contexts. In planning the curriculum for public management, attention should be paid to the conceptual inputs relevant to functions as well as to the educational methodologies used and the contextual appropriateness of teaching materials.

Conceptual inputs refer to the knowledge and analytical tools derived from disciplines that have something to offer to improve our understanding of public management and from the growing experience with public management. To begin with, the former source is bound to dominate the scene, but there is no reason why sustained research and experimentation should not make the latter route equally important. Irrespective of the source, if conceptual inputs are to be a basis for learning skills, the methodologies used should facilitate this process. Similarly, given the diversities among public systems and intercountry differences, educational programs should take into account the "contexts" involved and develop teaching materials relevant to the environment for which the public managers are being trained. Though these are important aspects, since they do not fall within the purview of this paper, I shall not pursue them here.

The curriculum design presented in Table 1 is functional in approach, with emphasis on the substantive tasks under each functional area. The tabular statement does not adequately bring out the linkages between the functional segments. These linkages can be made explicit only at the stage of detailed course planning and sequencing. Similarly, it should be noted that the integrative function of public management receives special attention in the segment on planning and policy. Other implications of the curriculum design are:

1. The items listed under each functional segment are suggestive and not exhaustive in terms of their coverage. The thrust is on the conceptual inputs required and tasks that belong to the function.

2. Each segment draws upon a set of disciplines with an existing knowledge base, such as social sciences, management science, technology, and public administration. The problem is in identifying what is relevant to public management from each of these fields. The search should be governed by the overriding consideration of how a practitioner can make use of what he learns. The strategy should be to make disciplines the servant and not the master of public management.

3. In due course, as experience in public management grows and research is encouraged, new knowledge on the subject will emerge independent of existing disciplines. There is hardly any such fund of knowledge in existence today to be drawn upon.

4. Specific functional courses arising out of each segment may have to be supported by discipline-oriented courses to provide the public manager an adequate foundation in terms of difficult conceptual or methodological inputs.

A CONCEPT OF CORE CURRICULUM

Before concluding, I would like to comment on two other issues that are germane to the design
## TABLE 1

**Curriculum Design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning and Policy</th>
<th>Environmental Appraisal</th>
<th>Service Delivery and Logistics</th>
<th>Technology and Production</th>
<th>Budgeting, Information, and Control</th>
<th>Organization and Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Strategic planning</td>
<td>2. Social system, values, and beliefs</td>
<td>2. Promotional and formulation of projects and programs</td>
<td>2. Forecasting and budgeting</td>
<td>2. Developmental attitudes and roles</td>
<td>2. Developmental attitudes and roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Generation of alternatives</td>
<td>5. Cultural factors</td>
<td>5. Cost-price-subsidy policies</td>
<td>5. Generation of services</td>
<td>5. Organizational design; structures and processes</td>
<td>5. Organizational design; structures and processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Knowledge/ discipline base

- Political theory
- Economic theory
- Policy sciences
- Systems analysis
- Corporate planning
- Political science
- Sociology
- Anthropology
- Social psychology
- Macroeconomics
- Management science
- Public administration
- Sociology
- Psychology
- Communication
- Microeconomics
- Operations management
- Financial analysis
- Information sciences
- Statistical methods
- Technology
- Industrial engineering
- Management science
- Organizational theory
- Psychology
- Sociology
- Anthropology
- Public administration
presented above. The first question is whether there can be a uniform design for the education of managers at different levels. The answer is an emphatic no. For a group of senior public managers, the program should emphasize segments such as planning and policy, some parts of information and control, and selected aspects of organization and personnel. For young persons entering into public management, a strong dose of all segments may be appropriate. There is thus no standard program that will fit the needs of all levels of public managers.

The second question is whether there can be a core curriculum that meets the needs of all public systems. The answer to this will depend on the balance between intersystem diversities and similarities. If in some public systems, certain functions are unimportant, their managers are unlikely to find a program that gives considerable attention to them attractive. If such diversities are not significant, we could evolve a core curriculum in order to provide a common foundation for all public managers. Elective courses that go into the specific managerial problems of individual sectors, such as agriculture or energy, could then be offered as areas of specialization. I would like to believe that a core curriculum is a feasible concept. However, more empirical evidence needs to be collected to determine the extent of diversities and similarities that mark the different public systems.

At the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, we offer a special elective package on agricultural management as part of the two-year post-graduate program in management. Those who opt for the agricultural package in the second year do take a set of core courses in management in the first year along with all other students. This approach reflects the belief that a part of the curriculum can be organized as a common core for different sectors. Before one generalizes on this issue, a careful study of the country's environment and the unique features of its diverse sectors must be undertaken.

CONCLUSIONS

I have attempted to sketch the bare outlines of a model of curriculum design for public management. I have argued that the design should focus on the basic functions of the public manager and on the skills required for the performance of these functions. An important implication of this approach is that the relevant disciplines and knowledge inputs should be made to play a supportive role in the curriculum so that the public manager understands their use and application in the context of his organizational role.

The functional segments identified and recommended for the curriculum are planning and policy; environmental appraisal, service delivery and logistics; technology and production; budgeting, information, and control; and organization and personnel. The conceptual inputs needed for these functions come from a variety of disciplines. The public manager can be helped to improve his skills in performing these functions if the curriculum uses educational methodologies that are application-oriented, and the educational process emphasizes contextual relevance.
Part Four
STRATEGIES FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

After analyzing alternative models of management training in Part Three, it is necessary to consider strategies for institutionalizing them so that they will contribute in actual practice to improving management capabilities. This chapter concerns the broad range of public policies and institutional arrangements that determine program effectiveness. To illuminate the degree to which specific environmental factors affect the success of programs, papers are included on two major countries in Asia and Africa: Dr. Chowdhry has written on the experience in India and Dr. Adamolekun on Nigeria.

An essential requirement for successful institutionalization of management training programs is effective demand for their services. While the need for better management in the LDCs is enormous, governments must attach high priority to this problem and be convinced that management training institutes can ameliorate it.

Government priorities vary at different stages of development. By the late 1950s in India, the massive expansion of the public sector was clearly impaired by management deficiencies, and a large number of senior people had experienced management training programs themselves and realized the value of expanding such training. A different sequence of priorities delayed the appearance of such perceptions in West Africa until very recently. The first emphasis was on Africanization, not management of the government service. Faithful to the colonial tradition of generalist administrators, governments there trained officials to take over the maintenance functions of the government from colonial civil servants. Management problems were considered the concern of foreign firms in the private sector. As governments have indigenized their economies and increased the scope of public activities, they are now increasingly recognizing a need for management training.

While certain minimum demand conditions on the part of governments are essential, management training institutions must actively market their products to demonstrate their value. It is a major challenge for them to link the demands for better management with the supply of managers they are producing. This requires a status or legitimacy that ultimately is dependent upon competence to be effective.

What variables determine an institution's capacity to succeed in training managers? While no fixed set of factors can be established, some policies and institutional arrangements are presumably more supportive than others. It may be useful to consider the cases of two management training institutions, the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and the Asian Institute of Management, which have been widely judged by outside observers to be "successes" and to seek common elements in their experience. In her paper, Dr. Chowdhry briefly describes the establishment of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. IIMA was established in 1962 by the government of India in collaboration with Indian industry and the state of Gujarat. Its stated objectives are as follows:
1. To provide educational facilities for training young men and women for careers in management and related fields in any form of organization.

2. To contribute to the improvement of the decision-making skills and administrative competence of practicing managers.

3. To develop teachers and researchers in different fields relating to management.

4. To develop knowledge through original research, both applied and conceptual, relevant to management and its underlying disciplines, and to disseminate such knowledge through publications.

5. To assist organizations in solving their management problems by providing consulting services.

6. To collaborate with other institutions in India and abroad, to further any or all of the above objectives, and, if necessary, to assist in institution building.

The Asian Institute of Management is a professional school located in the Philippines but specifically designed to serve regional needs. The following description is from a recent AIM bulletin:

AIM offers the following programs for developing managers:

— A two-year graduate course leading to the degree Master in Business Management for young men and women.

— A one-year graduate course leading to the degree Master in Management for experienced managers.

— An eight-week Management Development Program for middle-management executives.

AIM, legally, is a private non-profit, non-stock corporation created under Philippine law, governed by a Board of Trustees. It was founded in September 1968 jointly by Ateneo de Manila University and De La Salle College with the cooperation of concerned business leaders, Harvard Business School, and the Ford Foundation. Practically all the initiative and over 85% of the financing come from non-government sources.

An international Board of Governors, consisting of eighteen business and government leaders from ten Asian countries and the first president of AIM, was established in 1971, to determine the strategic directions of and to set academic policies for the Institute.

On the basis of the IIMA and AIM cases, a number of key variables can be identified for consideration.

1. Organizational form. A number of institutional patterns are common: departments, colleges, or institutes within a university; public management training institutions attached to a government agency; autonomous private or semi-private management institutes; administrative staff colleges on the model of Henley-on-Thames; ILO productivity centers and other training units established by international organizations. Each of these patterns has certain advantages. Both IIMA and AIM are autonomous institutions, with government sponsorship but not control in the case of IIMA and with completely private control in the case of AIM. The important feature appears to be the absence of inflexible governmental controls rather than the specific structural form. They clearly have the required autonomy to carry out the evolutionary and flexible programs that are absolutely critical to meet changing needs. If a nation’s governmental regulations prevent a publicly controlled institution from having such freedom, then an independent institute of some nature may be essential. Viewed narrowly, autonomy is a static concept defined legalistically by an organization’s charter. In practice, an organization’s autonomy must be earned by continuing demonstration that it is successfully using the flexibility that private or public support makes possible.

2. Multipurpose character. Effective institutions invariably stress the complementary relationship of management teaching with research and consultancy. S. G. Odia has written:

Management teaching has the goal of imparting knowledge in the art of management. Management teachers, therefore, assert that effective teaching of these subjects could enable the manager to relate his wisdom more readily
to his business problems. Experience has shown that whereas management as a classroom subject is useful, there is still so much to be gained by the very practice of the art. Consultancy keeps the teacher in touch with current management problems and practice. By its very nature, consultancy is a form of teaching, but it is more the teaching of organization-based management which assists in identifying and solving problems. Both the teaching of management-and-management consultancy have as their primary aim, better performance in the management of organizations.

Management consultancy and involvement in business organizations are of immense value in enriching the course content, curriculum development, the training methodology, and the overall effectiveness of training institutions. Moreover, they provide a unique opportunity for testing and propagating research findings. Most of the world’s leading business schools are known to use case studies extensively for management education and training. Practicing managers all over the world are known to be reluctant to divulge their organization’s secrets. Therefore, the preparation of useful case studies can only be facilitated by direct involvement in tackling problems in organizations. In preparing the programme and course contents of a management school, it is necessary to identify the training needs of the society, and keep abreast of trends in management practices. This will assist in placing the right emphasis on the various subjects taught. There must be a basis of communication between the faculty and the employers of the trainees. In conclusion, consultancy activities stimulate both faculty and students, provide realism, create opportunities to test research methods and ideas, and very importantly, it enables the institutions to fulfil their roles as important tools of national development.

While the validity of Odia’s statement may appear obvious, his survey in Nigeria indicated that at the official/institutional level, private consultancy by institutional staff is discouraged, and in fact, frowned upon. It is viewed solely as a ‘greedy’ way of earning more money.”

With reference to his Asian experience, Raul de Guzman writes:

It is not uncommon to hear students and trainees making the remark that what they are learning in the classroom would all be coming from the books and hardly related to the realities of the administrative/management situation. It is not uncommon to hear some faculty members/trainers being labeled as bookish, too academic, and even irrelevant. I could see the difficulty of how a teacher can communicate to his students the subtle intangibles which are essential elements of the administrator’s art without having experienced them himself or without intimate knowledge of them which could be gained from one’s involvement in management research and consultancy work.

Teachers/trainers who do not have either direct or vicarious experience in public management generally tend to follow the formal-legal-institutional approach in the study of politics and government. They tend to concentrate primarily on the provisions of the constitution, statutes, rules and regulations, on the structure and functions of governmental institutions, and on theories and concepts in organization and management and other subject matter areas in the field.

A subject such as policy formulation and implementation would be discussed in terms of the structure and functions of institutions involved in policy making and the formal processes and procedures of how a policy proposal is transformed into public law. While the formal institutions and the legal prescriptions are aspects of reality, the presentation of the policy-making topic only in such terms would be inadequate and unrealistic. The dynamics of the process, i.e., the interactions of individuals, interest groups, and institutions, and the substantive aspects of policies are more meaningful topics for discussion which would not be captured in the formal-legal-institutional.

The gap between the academic teacher and the management practitioner causes much of management teaching in the LDCs, especially at the undergraduate level, to be sterile. The vitality of teaching in institutions such as IIMA and AIM arises from the linkages that research and consultancy provide with management practitioners and the environment in which they operate. Such relationships are particularly effective when they involve sustained collaboration with a government agency for the purpose of improving systems or structures as well as designing training programs for the individuals to manage them. At the request of the secretary of agriculture in the Philippines, AIM has been engaged in such consultancy-training programs at various levels of the Department of Agriculture. IIMA has similar relationships with the state population program in Uttar Pradesh, the Indian Academy of Civil Service, the agency dealing with telegraph and telecommunications, and other organizations.

3. Educational model. Both IIMA and AIM started with the well-defined model of business-enterprise management that had a conceptual coherence and established record of success in the West. They had already established records of competence in the business management field before deliberately expanding into the public management area in response to mounting demands. With solid roots in the business school model, they were able to borrow and adopt elements to serve public management needs.

That two of the most effective training programs for public system management evolved from institutes established to teach business management may appear strange. However, at the time of their establishment, the theory arising from alternative sources was inadequate. Even now, it is doubtful that the new public administration or the public policy and management programs evolving in the United States provide satisfactory alternatives. There may be practical as well as theoretical reasons why business-oriented institutions have succeeded in developing effective programs to train public sector managers. They derive essential autonomy from a private constituency outside government and, even in university settings, such departments or schools tend to be less captive to the academic value system than public administration, for instance, because of their roots outside the traditional disciplines.

It is not clear whether future institutes established for the express purpose of training public sector managers should follow a similar, circuitous avenue by starting with private enterprise management. The business school model, with the necessary cultural adaptations, is a reasonable starting point for management training programs for public enterprises. Except for the level of the chief executive and the problems of public accountability, the management requirements in an enterprise, whether public or private, are similar. The public management requirements in development sectors, however, are less well defined. IIMA, AIM, and other management training institutions are pioneering with programs to identify and serve such needs but, as Part Three emphasizes, there is no agreement on either the framework or the elements of an educational model for this purpose.

4. Leadership. One of the few possible generalizations about developing universities in the LDCs is that success depends upon the quality of the leadership. In the cases of IIMA and AIM, the leaders have been able to establish a sense of purpose in their organizations. The faculty members are intellectually active and professionally proud of their capacity to grapple effectively with national problems. Leadership must also have the stature and ability to establish the organization's legitimacy outside in the particular political and cultural setting.

5. Size. In referring to the Indian experience, Chowdhry states that a faculty size of thirty to one hundred or more "provides scope for experimentation and innovation as well as programs and activities that require multi-disciplinary groups." To the extent that such scale is required to mount programs of the quality
of IIMA or AIM, severe limitations exist in replicating such programs. Small LDCs, for example, may not have adequate resources to establish institutes of this nature. Given the weak empirical record of regional institutions, the requirements of small countries could probably best be served by adding regional components to strong national institutions, in large countries.

Institutes-on the suggested scale are costly—at least in aggregate—and they focus primarily on preparation of the managerial elite, the relatively few at the top levels of management. Such institutions do not have the capacity directly to meet the enormous needs at lower levels of management. Therefore, management education strategies must be devised to use such institutes to upgrade management training in the colleges and universities where the great bulk of the training must take place.

The experience of IIMA and AIM suggests that the effectiveness of management education and training programs will be enhanced by the presence of the factors cited above: a flexible organizational form, the encouragement of research and consultancy, a sound educational model, leadership, and a minimum size of operations.

The successful institutionalization of organizations and programs depends ultimately on the quality and motivation of the teaching staff. Staff development for management institutions differs in important respects from other educational institutions. As de Guzman observes:

The ideal teacher/trainer in management schools is one who has both the academic qualifications and administrative/managerial experience. He could be the person who could deal with the subject matter realistically and effectively motivate and teach the students/trainees. How could management schools recruit and develop such faculty and staff members? It is not easy to recruit in a school’s faculty somebody with advanced academic or specialized training in public management and related fields who is already working in government or the private sector as a top administrator/manager. The preference of such a person is to stay in government or the private sector in view of the status, higher salary and other privileges that one receives as a top administrator/manager in government or business... Since there is difficulty in recruiting persons with both the academic qualifications and administrative/managerial experience, most schools of public administration in Asia have recruited young graduates and invested in their further training and education. This is what we call in our College as the “nurturing” approach in faculty and staff recruitment and development. The practice of nurturing means that bright young men in our master’s program or in our research and training staff are identified and selected for further advanced training to enable them to work for doctoral degrees.

In the absence of experienced management teachers, the selection and training of bright graduates with several years’ experience does appear preferable to the “retooling” of older professional academics, government officials, or businessmen. This approach, however, involves long planning in advance of the launching of new programs. Adequate training—graduate studies abroad plus apprenticeship in case-writing or consultancy at home—may require a decade or more.

Foreign agencies, particularly the Ford Foundation, have played a crucial role in the staff development for management institutes throughout the LDCs. They provided advisers and visiting staff and financed the costs of foreign fellowships.

In the cases of IIMA and AIM, their educational model defined the mix of professional skills needed and this was easily translated into foreign degree requirements. Both relied heavily upon the Harvard Business School, and they both attribute their staff’s present cohesiveness, confidence, and competence, at least in part, to that widely shared educational experience. Planning the foreign degree requirements is more difficult for institutions teaching public management than for one teaching business administration. Part Three made clear that there is neither an accepted educational

3. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
model for public management nor a single institution in the West upon which public management institutes in the LDCs can depend. In planning the staff for such an institute in the LDCs, the leadership must chart its own way, sending faculty to acquire the array of skills and knowledge it hopes eventually to orchestrate into the unique types of education and training programs it will offer.

As the best young faculty members return from foreign study and become involved in consulting and research, they inevitably receive offers in government and business with greater status or compensation than in their educational institution. Their opportunities are much greater than in other academic fields. Staff development must, therefore, include means of motivating faculty members, the scarcest resource, to stay with the institution. This is particularly difficult in many Asian countries where it is not unusual for the government to set faculty salary levels far below that required for a minimum standard of living. Workable reward systems can be built only on the basis of an adequate compensation system including consultancy fees, and a stimulating professional environment such as at IIMA and IIM.

How shall the management education or training institute establish priorities among the broad range of public management needs? In the introductory chapter, a typology of public management functions was suggested, ranging from the commercial types of tasks in public enterprises to developmental functions in public systems to the maintenance requirements for routine government activities.

The thesis of this volume is that there are opportunities for management training to ameliorate the urgent need for better management in development sectors. On the one hand, the management needs of the LDC public enterprises can be served by business schools. On the other, the management problems of the routine government services may be so intractable because of bureaucratic controls and archaic structures that management education and training would be futile. There will be development sectors and subsystems in most LDCs also that are too backward to utilize management training—see Korein’s paper on family planning (Chapter One) and Moris’s on East Africa (Chapter Five). But a development sector can be tackled effectively if the following conditions exist: (1) the structure of the sector provides a mechanism with which to work, (2) government officials responsible for the sector recognize management deficiencies, (3) the state of knowledge concerning management of the sector encourages hope for important advances, (4) the educational institution itself has the financial and human resources to undertake the task.

Francis Sutton’s paper illuminates why external assistance for public management education programs is declining. Donors are reaching a more modest assessment of the potential for change and improvement by means of formal educational programs. While generalized faith in the value of institution building may be waning, there is increasing encouragement to the focused approach to development sectors advocated in this volume. A number of UN training institutions and the World Bank’s Economic Development Institute have resources that can be brought to bear on the management problems of development sectors. There is no ambivalence concerning the existence of the management problem. Although foreign donors may play a less prominent role than in the past several decades, foreign resources are less of a constraint than carefully designed training programs capable of improving the management of development sectors.
Strategies for Institutionalizing Public Management Education: The Indian Experience

Kamla Chowdhry

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

In India, as in other developing countries, the range and intensity of government intervention in the economy have increased steadily since Independence and are likely to grow further as government tries to respond to the basic needs of the people. In the years from 1956 to 1974, employment in the public sector (center, state, quasi-governmental, and local) grew from 5.2 million to 12.5 million and now constitutes 64 percent of total employment in the organized sector of the economy. The increase has been most marked in the quasi-governmental sector, where the numbers employed increased almost tenfold, from 368,000 to 2.9 million. In terms of industry classification, the growth was greatest in the service sector, from 3.0 million in 1956 to 6.2 million in 1974.

These figures reflect the increasing scale of the traditional maintenance functions of government revenue collection, law and order enforcement, provision of transport, communication, and other essential services. They reflect even more so the government's efforts to provide an increasing array of economic and social services to a widely dispersed and rapidly growing population. The national family planning program, starting from virtually zero in 1964, now has over 100,000 workers and an annual budget of Rs. 54 crores ($68 million). Rural development and community development are also examples of large programs with significant budgets. The numbers also reflect the increase in industrial and commercial activities undertaken by government departmentally and through autonomous organizations that are wholly or substantially owned by the government. The total government investment in various public enterprises has ranged from 41 to 51 percent of gross capital formation.

As the role, size, and complexity of government tasks have increased, so has the gap between plans and their performance. In analyzing the reasons for the implementation gap sector by sector, the Planning Commission has mentioned such problems as: "unsatisfactory administrative and organizational arrangement" (agriculture); "lack of adequate project management and monitoring"
In short, problems of adequate and efficient public management.

**IMPROVING PUBLIC PERFORMANCE**

Over the years, government has attempted to improve public performance and management by administrative reforms on the one hand and by creating new organizational forms to achieve public purposes more effectively on the other hand. Development tasks that were formerly carried out in government departments and by civil servants are being delegated horizontally and vertically to autonomous or semiautonomous agencies—public authorities, development corporations, public enterprises—which can have greater flexibility in financial and personnel policies and greater capacity for experimentation, innovation, and risk-taking. Examples at the national level are the Atomic Energy Commission, the Electronics Commission, the Space Commission, the Central Water and Power Commission, and the Railway Board. Corporations have been established for rural electrification, agriculture finance and development, housing and urban development, forest development, and so forth. New organizational forms have also been started for integrated development of irrigation command areas, tribal and hill areas, and drought-prone areas. Special attention through new agencies is also being given to backward regions, to small and medium farmers' service agencies, and to Harijans, Scheduled Tribes, and other backward communities.

It is hoped that through many of these organizational initiatives, benefits of economic growth will reach the lower 40 percent. If hopes are to be translated into effective programs, it would be necessary to improve the productivity and performance of those working in the public sector at various levels. A review of past experiences in the field of management education especially might be useful in considering strategies for institutionalizing education and training programs in public management.

**REVIEW OF PAST EXPERIENCES**

In reviewing and reflecting on our past experiences of success and failure in the professionalization of management education in India, there are certain steps, decisions, and phases that seem relevant to the institutionalization process.

**Critical Felt Need and a Critical Mass**

Before Independence, whatever business, trade, or industry India had was managed either by foreign business houses, foreign subsidiaries, or family businesses. It was the government's policy to Indianize the management of foreign subsidiaries and consequently to put pressure on foreign subsidiaries to promote Indian managers to senior positions. At the same time, the government, by abolishing the managing agency system, forced the family businesses to introduce professional managers acceptable under company law. Therefore, business firms, both foreign and Indian, were under tremendous pressure to find trained young managers. Further, with the emphasis on industrialization in the Second and the Third Five Year Plans, and the tremendous growth of the public and private sectors, there was a critical shortage of trained managers. Consequently, government enterprises as well as private industry were ready and keen to find professional managers for their enterprises.

In the middle fifties, a series of steps were initiated to professionalize and institutionalize management education. Several teams composed of government officials and industrialists were sent abroad to recommend to government the kind of management education to be set up in India. Fellowships were also provided through different aid agencies to senior managers to attend various advanced programs of management development abroad. A rough estimate of middle and senior managers trained in the graduate or advanced programs abroad in this period, especially at Harvard Business School and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, would be around three hundred to four hundred persons.

This was also the period when steel plants were
being built in the public sector. The government of India requested the Ford Foundation to arrange a "crash" in-service training program in the U.S. for some nine hundred Indian engineers who were to help build and manage three public sector steel plants. Some six hundred engineers were trained in management and production methods in technical institutes and in-service training programs.

Further, in the late fifties, the All India Management Association was founded to promote professional management in the country. One of its major activities was to organize an Advanced Management Program, which was run by the faculty of the Sloan School of Management, MIT. This was a prestigious program in which forty to fifty participants from senior positions in the public and private sectors (more private than public) attended the program each year.

There was thus not only a critical need but also a critical mass of one thousand to fifteen hundred managers in responsible positions in government and in the private sector who had firsthand experience of professional schools of management and who were willing to encourage and support the beginnings of professional management education in the country.

The implications of a critical mass in institutionalizing change is evident from the following mathematical example: "three raised to the power of eighteen.

What it means in dynamic terms is quite dramatic. If a person spreads a gossip to just three others and the same is passed on by each of them to three others, and so on in succession, in just eighteen steps almost the entire population of India would share the spicy story. Note that if each step takes one hour, 90 per cent of the people hear the gossip for the first time only during the seventeenth and eighteenth hours. Indeed during the whole of the first 80 per cent of the time, the process affects merely 11 per cent of the population. Even though each individual is partaking in the chain reaction exactly like all the others who preceded him, that is, he receives information from one person and passes it to three others, the social impact at a late stage of development hits like an avalanche.\(^1\)

There is something of the same spread effect in the process of institutionalization when persons in key positions committed to change become a part of "three raised to the power of eighteen."

Institutional Form: The Need for Autonomy

As interest and demand in modern management increased, steps were considered to develop institutional resources in India for management research, education, and training.

In 1959, the government of India requested the Ford Foundation to invite a consultant to recommend the kind of institution that should be considered, taking into account Indian realities. George W. Robbins (then associate dean of the Graduate School of Business at UCLA) advised against trying to build on the existing commerce education or within the institutional framework of the universities. He recommended establishing one or two autonomous national centers. This recommendation was supported by the business community and was accepted by the government of India.

A new institution with new objectives, goals, and tasks must change many established ways of doing things in a traditional setting. If the new institutes of management were a part of the Indian university system, their ability to innovate would have been seriously impaired. They would have had to follow University Grants Commission norms of faculty organization, of student/faculty ratios, and other rules and regulations of a university system, which can, in the context of Indian universities, act as a constraint to experimentation and innovation.

Further, if the institutes were a part of the university system, leadership of the kind provided by Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, a cosmic ray physicist by training, and Mr. K. T. Chandy, a lawyer (the first directors at the Indian Institutes of Management, Ahmedabad and Calcutta, respectively), would not have been available. And it is more than likely that with the kind of institutionalized system

of selecting faculty in universities, neither Dr. Sarabhai nor Mr. Chandy would have been considered to head the School/Faculty of Management in the university.

The Institutes of Management have been registered as autonomous societies under the Societies Registration Act. They are a joint venture of the government and of business and industry. They have their own board of governors from public and private sectors who establish broad policies for the institutes' work.

The institutes do not have a degree-granting status and consequently give a diploma for their two-year postgraduate programs and award the status of Fellow for those completing their doctoral program. It seems to make no difference to the employing agencies as to whether the applicant has an M.B.A. degree or a P.G.P. (Post Graduate Program) diploma—although many were deeply concerned in the early years at the lack of a university degree. The ready market acceptability and demand for P.G.P. graduates and the institute's Fellows has eliminated the earlier concerns and wish for a university affiliation. The concern now is to maintain a flexible and autonomous system that can be responsive to environmental needs.

Another attempt to strengthen an institute for training in public administration highlights the need for an autonomous institutional form for undertaking research and training useful to a broad range of developmental tasks. In 1957, the government of one of the Indian states established an institute for pre- and in-service training for state level government cadres. The institute was established as a subordinate agency (to use government language and an apt description) of the Department of Personnel of the state government. This meant that the institute was governed by the Department of Personnel and existing bureaucratic procedures. According to the prevalent hierarchy, the director has to be of a lower rank than the secretary of the Department of Personnel. Because the institute is a part of a government department, it has a working culture very similar to that found in the state government. Academic and research decisions have to be processed through the hierarchy of the Secretariat. If the chief secretary expresses an interest in a training program for public enterprises or for family planning, even though the institute has no resources for such programs, they are unable to say no to the chief secretary.

Although traditional bureaucracies are hierarchical and authoritarian in nature, the Indian bureaucracy is perhaps more so than others partly because of the authoritarian family structure and partly because of the legacy from the days of colonialism. According to Kakar:

> The authority equation (in the Indian bureaucracy) was not only one of superiors and subordinates but of British superiors and Indian subordinates. Whether or not the autocratic firmness of the British managers and civil servants was due to the prevalence and widespread acceptance of the ethic of social Darwinism in the West, the fact remains that the authoritarian elements in their relations with their Indian subordinates were greatly exaggerated by the social-psychological exigencies of the colonial situation. Whatever be their "back home" convictions about authority relations, most Britshers, once this side of Suez, exhibited a high degree of autocratic firmness in their behaviour toward the Indian subordinates, whether it be the despised clerk, the babu or the illiterate worker.  

In an institute whose objective was research and training for developmental tasks and new economic roles, the hierarchical structure and the authoritarian system of decision-making completely alienated any professional staff they were able to attract. Professional persons require greater freedom, more participation in decision-making, more autonomy in their work, than a bureaucratic system such as the institute could provide.

After nineteen years of functioning, the institute has not been able to develop a competent faculty, for the civil servants come on deputation for varying periods. Although special resources were allo-

cated for the introduction of management and social sciences, the institute has not been able to develop meaningful programs related to the development needs of the state. Faculty—that is, generalist civil servants—who have been abroad for training have opted for more generalized training involving visits to several institutions, and often on returning are transferred back to government, making any planning for faculty development an impossible exercise.

Around the same time as the state government established the Institute of Public Administration, the government of Gujarat set up the Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social Research as an independent society to specifically serve the needs of planning and economic analysis for Gujarat State. The Gujarat Institute has been able to find an excellent director, incidentally, a person from the state mentioned above, who has been able to attract and collect a strong research faculty. If the director's state had followed Gujarat's example, it is very likely that the Institute of Public Administration would have been a valuable resource for training and development for the state government.

There are other cases that can be cited to indicate that for new roles and new tasks one needs an organizational form that encourages innovation. If a new idea is planted in a traditional system, the environment will not provide the nurture it needs to grow up as a different and distinct system.

The kind of operating culture found in many universities is reflected in the following case of a young lecturer who tried to improve the teaching and research in his department.

*I worked very hard preparing for my classes and in working with the students. The curriculum was outdated and I spent many evenings in working out a proposal for improving the content and teaching of statistics. When I presented the draft proposal to the Head of the Department for discussion, he showed no interest in introducing any change either in the curriculum or in the teaching methods. . . . He made all the decisions pertaining to the department. . . . The enthusiasm for wanting to do an I to improve things began to corrode. . . .

Regarding research, the young lecturer mentioned:
*I worked out a very good research proposal on a subject of interest to the Planning Commission. The Research Section of the Planning Commission returned the proposal saying that they do not entertain research proposals from anyone less than a Reader. The Head of the Department was willing to bend his name if the proposal and the subsequent publication had his name first as the author. The Departmental Head had made it quite clear that he was neither interested in the research subject nor did he plan to contribute to the research work. The price of getting my research proposal accepted was to accept the Departmental Head as the senior author.3*

There are a whole host of factors that seem to alienate bright young people from established and traditional systems like the university, endangering their sense of responsibility, initiative, and commitment to intellectual value. In the above case, the lecturer left the university and the country and sought an environment that would encourage new ideas in teaching and provide good research facilities.

In developing a strategy for institutionalizing public management education, it is therefore important to consider an institutional form that has the necessary flexibility and freedom for experimentation and innovation.

Leadership: Interacting Clusters

Although an appropriate organization form is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for men to work effectively and satisfactorily. Any organization or procedure can be perverted by those who wish to do so. The leadership of men who create new institutions and leave an imprint of their personality on the institutions they create is of crucial importance. By leadership of an institution I refer to the manner in which the leader's assumptions concerning the task and the motivation of people are translated into an operating and working system.

There is another aspect to the leadership role. There are certain individuals who, through their key positions and relationships, are at the center of a network of an interacting cluster of individuals through whom they are able to achieve new tasks and at the same time initiate social and cultural change. Let me share an example of such leadership and institution-building.

In the early fifties, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai helped start the Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association (ATIRA), which helped modernize a very traditional industry. There were several people who could be identified as playing a significant role in the growth of ATIRA. Thus, at the board level, there was Mr. Lalbhai, a leading industrialist in Ahmedabad, Dr. Krishnan, director of the National Physical Laboratory, Sir Bhatnagar, director general of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. These persons, who were friends, were also on each other's boards, helping to build the new institutions. Further, Sarabhai belonged to an industrialist family and was also a scientist with links to other young scientists in and outside ATIRA. It was the convergence of these significant individuals in interacting clusters, with the combination of their special skills, abilities, experience, position, and relationships with each other, that was of crucial significance. Similar interacting clusters at the political, governance, organization, and social levels were also found in the case of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (IIM-A), with the Sloan School of Management, MIT. The Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI), Hyderabad, although patterned on the Henley Staff College, did not have a collaboration with it (although its consulting division was established in collaboration with Uhrwich and Ohr, a consulting organization in the U.K.).

The allocation of budgets in these collaborative ventures is revealing of the underlying philosophy of the strategy of institution-building in the fifties and sixties.

Ford Foundation grants to IIM-C over a period of thirteen years were $2.4 million. From these allocations, $1.15 million were spent on long-term and short-term consultants and about $0.12 million on IIM-C faculty training abroad (a ratio of 1 to 10). In the case of IIM-A, $0.94 million were spent on long-term and short-term consultants and $0.61 million on faculty training abroad (in the ratio of 1 to 1.5). These figures reflect, among other factors, the different strategies that IIM-C and IIM-A followed in the development of their respective institutes. The figures also indicate a greater dependence of IIM-C on MIT or MIT's greater involvement in IIM-C.

Grants to the government of Nepal for the strengthening of the planning infrastructure of Nepal totaled about $1.6 million, out of which $1.2 million were spent on long-term and short-term consultants and $0.06 million on foreign training of Nepalese staff (a ratio of 1 to 20). UNDP's budget for the Management Development and Produc-
tivity Center in Sri Lanka had a budget of $0.72 million for foreign experts and $0.04 million for training of local talent (in the ratio of 1 to 18). In the preliminary work required for business management in the forestry sector, the Swedish International Development Agency provided a budget of 808,500 Swedish kronor, out of which 550,000 kronor were for foreign consultants, 185,000 for training Indian foresters, and 73,500 kronor for contingencies.

More often than not this heavy emphasis on foreign consultants was at the request or insistence of the receiving agency rather than of the donor. In some cases, this reflected a desire to go ahead fast, without the delay involved in the training of younger people, which could mean a delay of three to four years in starting institutional work. Perhaps it also reflected a lack of confidence and fear of failure on the part of those assigned new roles and responsibilities. However, on looking back at some of our experiences, one wonders whether this heavy emphasis on foreign consultants in fact led to greater delays and to a self-defeating mechanism in the institutionalization process. The need to build competence and self-confidence of nationals even through failure is clearly brought out by Dr. Bhabha, who very successfully built India's atomic energy program. To quote Dr. Bhabha:

"The recent stoppage of foreign aid has shown our tremendous foreign dependence on a vast variety of materials and equipment, many of which could and should have been produced in the country long before this. We have found that a very large number of them can be produced as a result of the know-how which already exists in scientific organizations here, and steps are being taken to produce these in the country without foreign assistance. The results will show themselves within the next few years, and I have no doubt that the confidence which Indian technologists will gain thereby will spread to Indian industrialists and administrators, many of whom, not having any basis for technical judgements of their own, are inclined to play safe by relying on foreign consultancy.

Many examples can be given of foreign collaboration resulting in badly engineered plants or technical mistakes, and when such technical mistakes are corrected the foreign consultant benefits from the experience. Whereas, if an Indian scientific or engineering organization had been employed, the experience gained even from initial failures could have been a gain to the country. The Soviet Union did not hesitate to follow this path. One should also remember that in buying foreign know-how one is paying for an element which covers the cost of research and development done by foreign consultants, and it is clear that a more permanent benefit would result to the country if this money were made available for supporting research and development in India.

A similar approach was followed in the case of IIM-A. Emphasis was on training and developing young people rather than on investing heavily in foreign experts for operational roles. The experience and confidence gained by the Indian faculty produced far-reaching results.

Lessons Learned

From the various fragments of institutional case histories discussed what lessons can we learn, if any, about the institutionalization process relevant to management education?

Our experience indicates that there are certain characteristics shared by those institutions (e.g., IIMs, ASCI, ATIRA) that have grown strongest over the years.

- They are government sponsored but not government managed. Government sponsorship has provided legitimacy and continued financial support and stability. They can be more aptly described as joint ventures between government and business and industry.

- They are autonomous institutions. Their governing boards and their directors have established norms of independent functioning. The independence and stature of the early institution-builders helped to protect the institution from political encroachment of any kind and in establishing standards of excellence.

- They are multipurpose, that is, they combine re-
search, teaching, and consulting. They benefit from the mutual reinforcement made possible by this combination and from the close contact with client groups that these activities require.

- They have internal organizations and operating cultures different from Indian universities and Indian bureaucracy. Decision-making is participatory. Organizational structures are horizontal rather than vertical.

- They have sufficient faculty, ranging from a faculty size of thirty to one hundred or more. The size provides scope for experimentation and innovation as well as programs and activities that require multidisciplinary groups. Institutions that depend on a small number of temporary faculty on deputation seem to lack commitment to long-term policies for institution-building.

- They started with well-defined models that had their own prior histories of success but very soon established self-reliant postures and their own identities different from the borrowed models.

And it is possible that these successful institutes were lucky in terms of timing, political and financial support, and the interest and involvement of key people.

The Ford Foundation, which gained valuable experience in institutionalizing programs of economic development and assisting in institution-building efforts, has, on the basis of experience and insights gained, changed its substance and style of work in recent years. In the early years, Ford saw its principal role in making available to leaders and planners the best and most pertinent foreign experience. Teams of foreign consultants and advisers were brought to India to provide such advice. Ford has changed its role from providing foreign advisers to assisting in developing Indian competence and resources. Reflected in these changes are the growth of Indian competence, a feeling of confidence of being able to do things on one's own, a certain questioning of borrowed models from the West, and the Indian government's policy of relying less on the experience of developed countries and more on India's own capacity to innovate.

Future Growth in Public Management Programs: A Strategy of Spin-offs

There are two distinct streams (as in the U.S.) in education and training moving toward public management. The first stream emerges from "public administration" and deals with the study of government systems and improving the performance of bureaucracy at different levels.

In India, the institutions dealing with research, education, and training in public administration are a few university departments in public administration and a national Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) established in 1954 for policy research and in-service training in public administration. There is also the Shastri Academy of Administration, whose function is to train the new entrants in all central services of the government. Major central services of the government also have their own training establishments, e.g., police, income tax, forests, foreign trade, etc.

With the increasing scope of government activities and the complexity of developmental tasks, it is generally recognized that the existing institutions of research and teaching in "public administration" have not been able to respond adequately to the new needs of the government.

There is a second stream emerging in the institutes of management that deal specifically with problems of public management. As early as 1963, the IIM-A had a group of faculty members whose primary interest was in dealing with the managerial problems of the agriculture sector. The response of the Ministry of Agriculture to the work of this group was tremendous, and soon there was support in terms of projects, money, facilities, and consulting assignments from government. In fact, in the early years, the group not only earned its keep but generated resources for its expansion.

The development of this group, which is now called the Center for Management of Agriculture (CMA), had, in its early years, many problems and tensions within the system. Although CMA needed an umbilical cord to sustain itself, it also needed very special protection within the system. There were several senior faculty who doubted the
wisdom of such a group in the school of business management, but the institute's (Dr. Sarabhai's) philosophy of nurturing talent whenever found provided the leader of the group the freedom and flexibility to grow. The CMA was not a part of the master plan to move toward public management in agriculture but was a case of developing an organization around a person. With such a philosophy, there is a minimum of organization structure and formal control. Indeed, the basic philosophy is the same as that underlying the Max Planck Institutes in Germany, namely, "The Kaiser Wilhelm Society shall not first build an institute for research and then seek out the suitable man but shall first pick up an outstanding man and then build an Institute for him."

The institute's work on problems of agriculture and later on rural development meant working on many problems of national significance. It also meant a greater appreciation by the institute's faculty of government's problems and an improved ability to formulate national problems. It is possible that other ministries in the government—Family Planning, Education, Energy, etc.—became more willing to consider the institute as a resource for some of their problems for study and analysis partly because of the reputation it had developed in dealing with public policy issues and management problems in agriculture. Of course, there were other factors contributing to this push, but the success and public acknowledgment of CMA's work may have accelerated this movement toward work in public management. If the institute was primarily seen as a school of business management, it is unlikely that it would have received support so readily from government departments and the public sector.

With considerable ongoing work in public management, the institute has now set up a group (Center) on public management systems. Other management institutions too have been moving toward programs of public management. The Staff College at Hyderabad has set up groups for research and training in education systems, science policy and management, and regional planning and development. The institute at Calcutta has set up a group of study problems on urban development.

At this stage, it is worth raising the question as to what strategy should be adopted for institutionalizing public management education programs in India. Should programs of public management be set up in schools/institutes of (business) management? Should institutes of public administration be considered as the appropriate base for renewal? Should new institutes be established specifically to deal with public management?

All the three approaches are in operation in India. In the first-generation management institutions, IIMA, IIMC, ASCI, the tendency is to develop subsystems in various sectors of public management. The second-generation institutes of management hope to start out with a primary focus on public management. Thus the new Institute of Management at Bangalore has started with a commitment to public enterprises, public services, and other sectors of public management. Similarly, the proposed institute in Lucknow is likely to have a public sector emphasis. The Institute of Public Administration is also moving toward a greater emphasis on public management as distinct from public administration and in the process is becoming stronger and more relevant to government and public sector needs.

Future strategies in promoting public management education programs would of course have to take into account historical antecedents. However, a strategy followed by Bhabha and Sarabhai, which resulted in strong and viable institutions, is worth examining in relation to developing viable programs in public management education.

To institutionalize means to internalize beliefs, values, and norms of behavior. It also means specialized institutions that can care for and nurture certain specialized groups of people.

The first institution that Bhabha established, in 1944, was the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR). Bhabha, a man of exceptional ability, with the support of Prime Minister Nehru and the House of Tatas, with an international reputation that attracted eminent scientists to work with him, and with a philosophy of nurturing young talent, built TIFR as a scientific institution of ex-
cellence. Emerging from the work of TIFR, Bhabha proposed to Prime Minister Nehru the establishing of the Atomic Energy Commission in India. TIFR was the “nursery” for the various programs that subsequently emerged in atomic energy, space program, nuclear power stations, electronics, biomedical research, etc. When Bhabha established the atomic energy research program (AEET), he transferred a group of fifty-four scientists, technicians, and administrators from TIFR. Having worked in TIFR, they brought with them the operating culture of TIFR. Even though the atomic energy research program was established within the framework of government, it was able to have a working culture similar to TIFR. Later, when the electronics-research division of the atomic energy research establishment (AEET) began to work on electronics instruments, a group of research scientists and assisting staff (about one hundred) from the electronics division were transplanted to Hyderabad, and an institution was built around them, the Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL), whose progress in the last decade has been phenomenal.

In other words, the strategy was to build a first-rate institution for research and training and then to use it as a nursery for developing people and projects that became separate institutions.

The early beginnings of any institution are crucial, and the “operating culture” or the lack of it brought by the first entrants plays a significant role in establishing norms, procedures, and practices. Their numbers need to be large enough to achieve a critical size to permit positive interactions.

An inappropriate social culture can also be transferred by appointing persons from different working cultures. In this connection, the appointment in key positions or in large numbers at lower positions of competent government officials whose experience is primarily derived from routine administration in new research and training institutions or in industrial enterprises creates many problems. Even though many of these organizations are legally autonomous, administrative practices are introduced that negate the formal autonomy granted.

At this juncture should one consider a similar strategy of nurturing talent and developing public management projects and then spinning them off as separate institutions? For example, should one spin off at an appropriate time a separate institute for management of agriculture and rural development, or for health and family planning, or for urban affairs?

Institution-building in India is still such a fragile exercise, fraught with so many dangers to its autonomy and success, that in my opinion it is useful to consider strong institutions with leadership that can develop appropriate linkages, which has a philosophy of encouraging people and groups to develop in directions meaningful to them, and to use these for nurturing new institutions.

A combination of events and persons made possible the unique success of atomic energy in India. Similarly, there was a unique coming together of government policies, events, and persons in setting up the institutes of management and in professionalizing management education in India. These unique interactions and networks are not easy to reproduce. Consequently, the need to consider a strategy of establishing “nurseries” and the strategy of spin-off of institutions for new tasks and new roles and new client systems.

Institutionalization that means introduction of new knowledge, of new roles, and new power structure requires individuals of unique ability, who through their roles and interactions and power relationships can make a special contribution to the development of a new field of knowledge and practice. The process of institutionalization and of social and cultural change is therefore not easy to plan. The title of a paper by Aaron Wildavsky seems to be an appropriate way of concluding: “If Planning Is Everything, Then Planning Is Nothing.”
Nigeria inherited at Independence, in 1960, a colonial economic system in which the dominant role was reserved for foreign private enterprise. Because of the efforts of successive post-Independence governments to increase the proportion of the state and the national (indigenous) entrepreneurs in the economy, the role of foreign enterprise has become progressively reduced, especially since around 1970. The turning point was the promulgation in 1972 of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. This decree, commonly referred to as the "indigenization" decree, increased substantially the participation of the state and of indigenous businessmen in the national economy at the expense of foreign enterprise. The indigenization measures were significantly strengthened in July, 1976. All this means that Nigeria now has a mixed economy system in which the state plays an increasingly important role.

The evolving economic development strategy summed up above has profoundly influenced the policies and institutional arrangements for public management education in the country. Although the government does not prohibit privately sponsored postsecondary educational institutions, such institutions are few, and they are limited to the training of middle-level personnel. The only postgraduate-level training programs provided by private organizations are in-plant training within private enterprises and specialized professional training provided by such organizations as the Nigerian Institute of Management, the Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Institute of Personnel Management, and so on. All the other educational and training institutions that produce middle-level and senior-level manpower are owned by the government.

While professional and technical training schools were established for producing middle-level manpower in the various fields (especially teaching, nursing, forestry, and agriculture), universities modeled, for the most part, on the British university system were expected to produce the high-level manpower to serve both the private and public sectors. Throughout the 1960s, only a few departments, faculties, and institutes in the
The major emphasis in all of them was on general culture education (arts, science, social science, and law), and the graduates were expected to adjust as best they could to serve in either the public or private sector.

However, as early as 1956, a federal government commission had recommended that special training should be provided for public servants. While no action was taken at the federal level, each of the three regional governments in existence at the time took the recommendation seriously, and within the next ten years, each one had established an administrative training institute for the middle- and senior-level officers in its service. The following two objectives of administrative training spelled out by one of the three regional governments sum up what each government sought to achieve: (1) to ensure that each officer is fully equipped by training to undertake the full duties appropriate to his grade, and (2) to ensure the availability of trained and efficient Nigerians to meet the need for filling high posts in a rapidly expanding organization...

Although each of the training programs established attempted to combine general culture education with the acquisition of specific skills, the latter dimension did not become an important concern until around 1970, when a few management oriented courses were introduced in the institutions.

At the federal level, it was not until 1969 that the government announced its policy on the training of middle- and senior-level officers. This policy statement was contained in a White Paper with the significant title of A Statement of Federal Government Policy on Staff Development in the Federal Public Service. It spelled out a training program that essentially amounted to an attempt by the federal government to catch up on what the regional governments had been doing in the field of administrative training since the late 1950s. The only two innovations in the federal policy were the establishment of a "Standing Committee for Staff Development" and a plan to create a Staff College.

The Standing Committee was described as a "high-powered" body of experienced senior officials with the secretary to the federal military government as chairman. It was charged with the responsibility of formulating the training policy of the federal government and the supervision of its implementation. According to the White Paper, the Staff College will cater for the development of senior executives in the public services of the federation (meaning the civil services of the federal and state governments, all state enterprises, and other public institutions). The facilities of the college were also to be extended to senior executives in the private sector, "thereby showing in a practical manner the need for increasing the pace of Nigerianization in that neglected sector of the economy."

By 1971, the federal government had done very little by way of translating its 1969 policy into action. As if to remind itself of its commitment to a training policy, it announced the establishment of a Nigerian Council for Management Education (NCMET). The NCMET was requested "to formulate policies and plans aimed at enhancing the number, quality and effective utilization of the managerial manpower resources of the Nation, in the public and private sectors of the economy."

In January, 1973, a Centre for Management Development (CMD) was established as the operating agency of the NCMET. The CMD's functions
include, among others, “promoting management education and development and supervising training activities in institutions and enterprises in all sectors of the economy through research, consultancy, technical services and support.”

The growing awareness of the federal government about the importance of management education for both the public and private sectors was paralleled by a gradual increase in the number of courses that combined education with training in the higher education institutions. Thus, in 1975, each of the country’s six universities had two or more departments or units concerned with such management-oriented courses as accounting, management, finance, marketing, and business administration. Each of the eight polytechnics surveyed at the same time had at least one department dealing with one or more of the above courses.

Although the NCMET has responsibility for coordinating the training programs in the country, the available evidence suggests that it has not yet made any serious attempt to tackle the problem. And if it had attempted to perform the function, some conflict might have arisen because its responsibility on the subject overlaps with that of the Standing Committee on Staff Development established earlier, in 1969. In actual fact, neither institution has attempted to coordinate the activities of the existing training institutions. In the opinion of a commission that recently reviewed the public services of the federation, “the Standing Committee on Staff Development should be reactivated to ensure co-ordination of the total training effort and to reassess the role of existing institutions.”

Unlike the coordinating institutions, both the Staff College (called the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, ASCON) and the CMD, which are expected to serve as the major government-sponsored training institutions, have begun to function. However, the ASCON started only in 1975 (that is, six years after it was created on paper), and the greater part of its existing management training programs are carried out with the assistance of foreign training institutions. The CMD took off more promptly and has managed to carry out (with UN assistance in some cases) some activities related to the functions assigned to it. Judging by the current plans of both institutions, there is likely to be considerable overlapping and duplication in their programs if and when the plans are implemented. This point further underlines the urgent need for an effective national coordinating body.

The present situation, then, is that the institutions concerned with management education in the country lack coordination and are virtually without direction. In contrast, there appears to be some measure of clarity at the policy level. The government recognizes the importance of management education and is committed, at least in theory, to promoting its development. This commitment is due in part to the government’s desire to improve the efficiency of the personnel that run the public services and in part to the government’s desire to produce qualified personnel who would help to significantly reduce the number of expatriates who occupy management posts in private enterprises. (According to the Third National Development Plan, there were about ten thousand foreign senior executives and almost as many intermediate-level staff in the private sector in 1974.) Some of the indigenous personnel being provided with management training are expected to later take over the ownership of some of the private enterprises within the context of the indigenization policy. Finally, there is a formal commitment to “the development of a body of knowledge in the field of management development in Nigeria.” (This is one of the objectives set for the CMD.)

In other words, there is disharmony between

existing institutions concerned with management education and the government's policies on this subject. As a first step toward solving this central problem, there is need to reassign the leadership and coordination function, which at present appears to belong to both the NCMET and the Standing Committee on Staff Development. It will then be the responsibility of the new leadership institution to examine the existing institutions and determine how each can best contribute to the achievement of the government's objective. In particular, these institutions will have to be made to work together on the critical question of determining what constitutes effective management education in the Nigerian context.

Perhaps the most striking point in a review of the public policies and institutional arrangements for public management education in Nigeria and other West African states is the fact that until recently none of them showed a conscious awareness of the concept of "public management education" or even of "management education." The basic problem that each state sought to solve in the immediate years after Independence was the production of qualified men and women to run the government administration and the development activities undertaken by the state. In other words, these states were more concerned with manpower development stricto sensu than with management education. The concern with management education per se came only during the past few years as each state began to realize that its objective of improving the standard of living of its citizens through the successful execution of the development projects in such fields as industrialization, agriculture, transportation, health, and education was not being realized because of the inability of its public employees to "deliver the goods."

In responding to this problem, the critical variable was the post-Independence development strategy adopted by each state. This variable has produced two broad approaches. The first approach may be represented by Guinea, where the emphasis is on a state-controlled economy. This has led to a move in the direction of a general management education without any distinction between public management education and private management education. Instead, those who are to be employed as generalist administrators in charge of functions that require limited management skills focus on "law" and "police and security" courses, while the others, who are to undertake functions where management skills are important (both in the government administration and in the state enterprises), focus on "economy and finance" and "accounting" courses. However, the general management trend that is emerging in Guinea has so far paid little or no attention to those modern management techniques like management by objectives, planning-programming-performance budgeting system and cost-benefit analysis, which are considered important in most management training institutions today.

The other approach that is found in all the other countries is related to the option of these countries for a mixed economy system in which a distinct role is assigned to private enterprise. In these states, the trend is toward considering management education for public sector activities as distinct from management education for private sector activities. Nigeria has moved furthest in this direction. A special feature of the Nigerian approach is the formal recognition of the need for some joint programs for officers performing management functions in both the public and private sectors.

In the light of the above, it appears that the key to the ideal institutional arrangements for management education in each state is the national development strategy. While a unified and centralized institutional framework for management education in some anglophone states, notably Nigeria, of posting an officer who has just acquired some management skills to a job where those skills are least relevant shows the extent of the unawareness about the purpose of management education. This curious practice has just begun to disappear. The practice in some anglophone states, notably Nigeria, of posting an officer who has just acquired some management skills to a job where those skills are least relevant shows the extent of the unawareness about the purpose of management education. This curious practice has just begun to disappear. This general statement excludes the newly independent Iusophone states (former Portuguese territories). The signs are that they will probably adopt the Guinean developmental strategy. The Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey) appears to be gravitating toward the Guinean approach, although the economy still remains solidly the mixed enterprise type.
cation with a program consisting of general management courses is compatible with a state-controlled economy like that of Guinea, a pluralist institutional arrangement with training programs that have both similarities and differences will be needed in states like Nigeria, Senegal, and the others where an important role is assigned to private enterprise. The degree of coordination that exists between the different institutions will be a function of each government's determination to increase the role of its nationals in both the ownership and running of private enterprises.

Nigeria, which has moved furthest in the direction of a pluralist institutional arrangement necessary (in our opinion) for a mixed economy system, illustrates the types of problems that the other states could eventually face. One problem is how to ensure that institutions for management education do not proliferate simply because they are expected to serve both sectors of the economy. (Maybe the oil-generated wealth in Nigeria since about 1973 accounts in part for the institutional proliferation that has occurred in the country.)

More importantly, there is the problem of effective coordination and leadership in order to ensure that the institutions established respond to the objectives of the government.

The details of the relationship between institutions that are concerned exclusively with one sector or the other and those that cater for both sectors as well as the contents of the training programs for the different types of institutions are issues that each state will have to work out with as much imagination and creativity as it can muster. While some foreign models could have some useful lessons to offer (such as the widely acclaimed French ENA approach and the rich American pluralist tradition), what constitutes effective public management education will still have to be defined, in the final analysis, in relation to the concrete political, economic, and social realities of each state. This need for innovation and creativity is the more pressing because there is no consensus among scholars concerned with management education about most of the problem areas identified above.

INTRODUCTION

It is not easy to peel away the luxuriant emotional attachments we have to the words “philanthropy” and “development.” The attachments are of different sorts, some positive, some skeptical, a few negative. Not many years ago, when development assistance was viewed with optimism and enthusiasm, and we were all biens pensants, one could assume much and hurry on to the practical and technical business of linking the philanthropic foundations with the programs and needs of the developing countries. Nowadays, matters are more complicated. It used to be assumed that everyone knew what was being talked about when the word “development” was used; now one may have to bare a paradigm to be understood. Similarly, philanthropic foundations have come to be entangled in debates over transnational processes, establishments, intellectual dependency, and worse.

I hope in the main to deal here with the past and current engagements of foundations with the governments of developing countries. But I must begin with some broad discussion of context. We now have enough perspective to see the ideology of development as a historical entity of great international consequence in the years since World War II. The participle “developing” became attached to a large number of new states that blossomed into national sovereignty in the last decades, and a number of long-existing states found it convenient or appropriate to accept the label for themselves. The status of being a developing or a developed nation became a basis of admissible, proper, or morally demanding international relationships. International agreements under the United Nations and otherwise, and domestic legislation, came to be phrased in corresponding terms, and important programs of development aid and technical assistance were established and maintained.

A concept like development that assumes broad and fundamental importance in international affairs has, of course, no precise meaning. It could indeed not serve as a common basis of agreements and action if it were to be subject to precise specification. But this does not preclude the elaboration
of doctrines and theories of development from various points of view, some interested, and some disinterested, some clearly political and others as scientifically detached as professional social scientists manage to be. Amid much variation, theories and ideologies of development seem to have had these common elements: (1) they are egalitarian, both in the sense of stressing self-determination for peoples hitherto, in whatever humble statuses, and in stressing the right of all to the advantages of development; (2) they are materialistic in the sense that they stress improvement in economic conditions; and (3) they are activistic in the sense that they stress the possibilities of improvement through deliberate, rational effort. The emphasis on self-determination has given the governments of so-called developing countries a kind of ultimate authority on what development should mean within their countries, and the role of external agencies has been defined so as to stress avoiding any cultural or political ascendancy. Technical and economic assistance has had legitimacy when it did not taint the independence of the receiving countries. There have always been disputes and uncertainties over the boundaries of proper development assistance, and, of course, there have always been fundamental critics of the whole set of conceptions as a cover for capitalistic imperialism or the maintenance of dependency. But it is historic fact that enough general acceptance has been achieved by the guiding ideas that major programs of aid and technical assistance have been carried out through several decades.

It is in this general context that the foundations have found a place for a great part of their international efforts in the last decades. We commonly speak of “philanthropic” foundations, and the largest American foundations have frequently been characterized as “research” foundations. These two labels may be used to characterize foundation activities in the developing countries. The philanthropic tradition in the United States (and elsewhere) is a tradition of voluntary private effort in behalf of the well-being of others. It has, of course, played a very substantial part in the provision of many social services that we now regard as the proper function of government, but were for a long time not so regarded. It has had substantial links with religious traditions and the organized churches, and like them has commonly had an international reach. However, one regards the merits of the missionary tradition, it is a logical accompaniment of Christian universalism and carried along with it the traditions of Christian charity. This has meant that the philanthropic tradition in the United States has long been international. Indeed, as recently as the Pearson Commission report, it has appeared that private flows of international assistance still have their largest sources in the religious philanthropic tradition.

Foundations derive from the philanthropic tradition, and in their larger modern forms have added emphases suggested by the label “research foundation.” Research is an accurate characterization for only a part of what large foundations do, but it points clearly toward their strategy and associations. The prominence of research and training, pilot studies, professionally planned experiments, and the like in the work of foundations, domestically and internationally, has typically been a consequence of their efforts to probe for the roots of social problems and develop better means of dealing with them. This is what is sometimes labeled “modern philanthropy.” As any professional in it knows, to his frequent discomfort, it differs from simple, open-hearted generosity. By practicing it, foundations regularly have been engaged in building and mobilizing scientific and intellectual resources, and when they reach out internationally, they inevitably do so in close association with these resources.

The history of modern American foundation activity in the poorer areas of the globe goes back to periods before we called these areas “developing.” The Rockefeller Foundation was, of course, the great pioneer, principally through its work in public health, and this work displayed basic features that are still characteristic of foundations. As Fosdick has described in his history of The Rockefeller Foundation, the concern of the famous Rockefeller public health programs on hookworm
and yellow fever was not simply to understand what ought to be done about them but to bring them under effective control. They were, of course, programs based on research, but they were also philanthropic programs in the sense that they sought concrete results in the improved health of large numbers of people. The effective development of public health programs naturally involved relationships with agencies of government, in this country and internationally, and there was consequently a tradition of work with governments overseas when foundations came after World War II to want to play a role in the development process.

Being philanthropic, research-minded, and, although private and independent, accustomed to dealing with governments, the foundations found the frame of development assistance a comfortable one. Trying to help foreign governments with their programs might in other circumstances be viewed with disfavor, or be closely circumscribed. But as long as the governments were defined as “developing,” and thus as deserving of technical assistance, there was large scope for such activity, with results I shall describe.

We are now at a time when the doctrines of development that I have sketched as a working framework for international relations are under rapid change. The easy acceptance of relations between the developing and the developed is now perturbed by the substance and rhetoric of North-South conflict. The erstwhile “developing” nations have come to various forms of maturity. They propose a new international economic order, but a generally accepted orthodoxy such as the idea of development once provided has yet to emerge. The relations that foundations have had with governments during the past quarter of a century or so have been evolving correspondingly. In what follows, I shall distinguish an initial period, running roughly from about 1950 through the middle sixties. This was the era in which there were many new nations, the ideology of development and development assistance was quite generally accepted, and foundations worked readily within the context. The eight or ten years leading to the present have given much experience of evolution into new patterns, and I shall try to characterize what they now mean for the relations of foundations and governments.

FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS IN THE ERA OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Scale and Types of Foundation Engagements

There has not been to my knowledge a serious scholarly analysis of the range of engagements of the foundations with the developing countries in the years since 1945. Not surprising, since the subject is a rather sprawling one. Quixote aside from the problems of which the Church Committee report has recently reminded us, there are masses of scattered information that would require scholarly effort far beyond what can be attempted here. At best, I can provide only a sketch of the main pattern as I have perceived them, and focus on the activities with which I am most familiar.

There is only a small fraction of this country’s thousands of philanthropic foundations that has engaged in international activities. Even if one takes a liberal meaning of the words “international activities,” and includes support of studies and research on international matters within the United States, the fraction still remains small. For the years prior to 1967, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) has now emphasized that a part of the ostensible foundation funding for international activities was in fact provided by the CIA.1 But the relative magnitude of this CIA funding should not be exaggerated. The committee noted explicitly the exclusion of the so-called “Big Three” foundations—Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie—from this kind of funding (and indeed any operational use of the individual grantees or employees of these foundations by the CIA).2 Since the Big Three have regularly provided well over half the funding of international activities by American foundations, both before and after 1967, the greater part of

2. Ibid., p. 190.
such funding remains untainted by the committee's revelations. The limitations of my knowledge would in any case force me to restrict this discussion to the work of the Big Three Foundations and, indeed, largely to the Ford Foundation, but it is reassuring to be able to do so with confidence that we are dealing with the largest volume of international foundation activity, and can neglect questions of covert governmental connections.

The separation of the funds for international activities that are spent in or directly related to the developing countries is an exercise that we find difficult and complicated for the Ford Foundation alone, and that no one, to my knowledge, has attempted for all foundations. One can judge with some confidence, however, that there was, in the years after World War II, a great increase in the attention given to the developing countries. The entry of the Ford Foundation into major programs after 1950 made a large difference in itself. From 1950 through 1973, the Ford Foundation committed about $1.5 billion to international activities, of which a little over $1 billion has been devoted to problems of development. A considerable fraction of the remaining $0.5 billion has been devoted to studies of the developing countries in universities in this country and abroad, and to other activities that in one way or another relate to the developing countries. The Rockefeller Foundation, as I have already noted, had a long tradition of engagement in the developing countries through its concern with public health and, increasingly, agriculture. During the years after 1950, it added a broad concern with university development in the Third World, and for considerable periods has devoted more than half its annual commitments to overseas development. The Carnegie Corporation, in its Commonwealth Program, has during this period concentrated notably on the "new Commonwealth," particularly in the Caribbean and in Africa, and in the field of education. Carnegie and Rockefeller have thus been strongly engaged in what we commonly call "sectoral" development activities, and indeed a large and growing fraction of the Ford Foundation’s development expenditures are of the same character. Such sectoral development activities, whether in the fields of agriculture, population, education, health, or otherwise, typically involve close relationships with the political leadership, the bureaucracies, and the professional specialists of the developing countries. These "sectoral" engagements fit very well with the prevailing conceptions of unintrusive technical assistance that has been the ruling doctrine for acceptable relations with the developing countries. They did, of course, require broad views of the needs and problems of the developing countries beyond the specific professional problems of the sector in question. Thus, for example, a concern with building universities in Africa had to be related to the manpower needs of fledgling African states. Ventures like the Ashby Commission in Nigeria, or the planning conferences for the University of East Africa, in which the foundations were substantially involved, had to be based upon good understanding of the capacities, the financial resources, and the future needs of African governments. Similarly, commitments to community development or agriculture in India had to be related to major questions of political integration and developmental policy in the subcontinent.

It is, I believe, not simply a fault of my personal perspective to think that the engagement of the Ford Foundation with the governments of developing countries has been at once more intimate and more comprehensive than has been characteristic of other major foundations. From the beginning of its work in the Indian subcontinent, through a

3. Not enough figures were given in the Committee report to permit precise calculations, but one can make estimates using data published in the Foundation Directory. In 1957, the first year the Directory reported amounts devoted to international activities by American foundations, the total was $33 million. In that year, the Ford Foundation's commitments (according to our own records, and not precisely compared with the Directory's listings) were nearly $25 million. In 1962, after the CIA's "massive" use of foundations began, the Directory reported $106 million, a year in which the Ford Foundation committed $57.5 million for international activities. In the peak year 1966, the Directory’s sum is $170 million, and the Ford Foundation’s $124 million. The Church Committee asserts that in 1963-66, nearly half the grants made by the foundations other than the Big Three in the field of international activities involved CIA funding (p. 182).
long series of engagements elsewhere in Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and (in a somewhat different way) in Latin America, the Foundation has worked directly and very broadly on matters of government structure, staffing and general competence. We shared in the common conceptions of the time that made well-functioning governments indispensable agents of development. Indeed, as African experience particularly vividly displayed, the possibility of a well-functioning government entered centrally in the negotiation over independence and was a major preoccupation of development policy. Governments of new nations had our unambivalent sympathies. Relations that now look surprisingly trusting and intimate were both welcome and acceptable on both sides. In Latin America, relations were rather less intimate, but the “modernization” of governments there too was conceived as an essential part of development.

Two broad strands of Ford Foundation activity and a third of less persisting character emerged from this concern to build new or modernized governments. These were: (1) the installation and improvement of public management to serve development; (2) the building of economic planning competencies; and (3) the outreach of government and engagement of the general populace through such measures as the community development movement. The first two of these activities have engaged the Foundation throughout the period since 1950. We have a category in the standard classification of our commitments entitled “development planning and management,” which is credited with some $213 million through 1975, somewhat more than we have committed to population ($204 million) and agriculture ($177 million) over the same period, but rather less than education ($288 million). The engagement we had with community development in India in the 1950s gets classified as “rural development” on our books, but it is evident, of course, both from what Nehru said about the program and much subsequent analysis that it was concerned with the lasting problems of engaging and benefiting total populations in development. Both governments and agencies like the Ford Foundation continue to grope for means of effectively serving this egalitarian ideal and integrative necessity of development. But these are, of course, massive and deeply political matters where a legitimate role of outsiders is hard to find, and no persisting strand of activity like these on economic planning and public management is to be found in our work. It is, I believe, fair to say that insofar as we have been able to make contributions in these matters, they have been incidental to general development planning and to the sectoral development concerns that were noted earlier and that I shall return to below.

General Efforts to Improve Public Management and Planning

Three broad purposes may be distinguished in the efforts that have been made to shape and improve public management in the developing countries. First, there was the aim of indigenizing governments in the many cases in which countries came to independence with the machinery of government largely staffed by former colonial officers, or “expatriates” as they and others foreigners came to be called. Second, there has been the aim of transforming the character and aims of government to serve development. And, third, there is a residual category that embraces a persisting variety of efforts to improve the functioning of government. The modes of engagement for foundations in all cases have involved technical assistance, education and training, and research. In many cases, perhaps typically, there has not been a clear division between the three broad purposes, but emphases have differed markedly in different times and places and the analytical distinctions serve usefully as a frame of exposition.

Indigenization was of necessity the central initial issue in the ex-colonial countries of Africa and in some places elsewhere. The problem was to replace the former colonial administrators as rapidly as was consistent with the maintenance of competent performance. Evident needs were a supply of nationals with the necessary education and provision of suitable training and apprenticeship. But the problem went much beyond simple replacement. If the normal pace of training on the job and promotion that had characterized the colonial
services were to be maintained, it would take a full generation of independence to achieve an indigenized government. Incredible as it may seem, there were those among the colonials who confidently looked forward to being needed and acceptable for such long periods. But political realities were quite otherwise, and new independent governments were under great pressure to bring about indigenization at paces that seemed reckless to the old colonial hands. They had both to achieve rapid movement and show their citizenries that they were doing so. If there was not to be heedless turnover, there was a need for planning, reorganization, and accelerated training, and all formulated in explicable policy.

A resort to the skills, knowledge, and resources of outsiders to deal with these problems came readily. The necessary psychological and ideological bases were present both for the newly independent countries and for agencies from the developed countries. The former colonial powers took an important place, indeed typically the dominant place, in relation to their former colonies, but there was an urgent desire for wider contacts and for fresh ideas. It became conventional to talk about countries adopting the best ideas they could find in the developed world and making their own distinctive synthesis of them. American ideas and resources had, of course, great prestige, perhaps particularly in management and administration, and there was no want of self-confidence in the purveyors of things American. Sharp competitions often developed between those who were determined to replace a mere colonial heritage with fresh and more appropriate ideas and practices. The effects of this competition were often not happy ones, and there was a natural desire for "aid without strings" in more than a financial sense.

The American foundations, and the Ford Foundation in particular, naturally had their most familiar and easy access to American skills and conceptions. But they were not officially committed to the advancement of American national interests, and their actions have typically been taken on independent professional judgments. It is a subtle and difficult matter to try to say how they were perceived by new governments. Sometimes, as in the ex-French African states, the impression of their English-speaking, American character seems to have been dominant. But in the English-speaking countries, the reception was easier, and intimate engagement in the problems of indigenization developed quickly in several places. This included not only the introduction of training and the building of appropriate institutions. It also included technical assistance in planning of the indigenization process, in reorganizations to permit more rapid change by adaptation of structures for less experienced and professionally qualified staff, and in devising training programs. Africa was the main scene of these efforts, and Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia became the foci of long-continued and important efforts.

If one tries to categorize the main features of the foundation inputs in the planning and execution of these indigenization programs, the following stand out: first, there was a readiness to be pragmatic and eclectic, particularly with respect to British colonial administration. In contrast to some other agencies, the foundations found it possible to work closely with former colonial officers. Many of these had been vigorously committed to colonial devolution and they were known as such and trusted by the leaders of the new governments. We in the Ford Foundation hired a few of them after their retirement, and some of the most distinguished performances we have observed were the result. A second contribution lay in American experience in manpower planning and job analysis. We leaned heavily on a group of people who had had experience in these subjects in the Department of Labor, and in the vast efforts of organization and training that World War II had required. Manpower planning was then not viewed with the critical doubts that have latterly been cast upon it, and it became, in various modes, an essential element not only in the planning of governmental staffing but also more broadly of secondary and higher education. A third element was the American confidence in possibilities of training, including a belief that there were a variety of techniques not yet used in new nations that needed to be tried.
The European colonial traditions had been much less sanguine about the possibilities of formal training, at home or abroad. American impatience with intangible qualities such as experience, or habit of command, conformed with the hopeful optimism of new states that their peoples were capable of running modern governments in short order, given the necessary training; to have believed otherwise would have been disloyalty to the egalitarian and activist ideals on which national independence was based.

Building on these elements, advisers supplied by the Foundation to governments were able to help in devising programs for training, reorganization, and replacement. This sort of advisory activity became sufficiently in demand in the early sixties that the recruiting capacities of the Foundation were very hard-pressed. Indeed, this field is one that is good support for Ian Little's argument that, for Africa at least, there simply were not enough well-qualified people to meet the demands for technical assistance. The positions of highest responsibility, typically called staff development advisers, had the most difficult requirements. But the needs for training specialists, manpower planners, and job analysts were also hard to meet with the talent one could find. The difficulty lay in the fact that no routine transfer of techniques looked satisfactory; a creative response to the special circumstances of each country had to be made. Intellectual and operational challenges were typically present, but there was also a great deal of detailed work that offered limited promise to the academic or theoretically minded. The history deserves more careful and objective review than I am able to give it here, but I offer the summary observations that: (1) there was rather limited recourse to American universities, in public administration or in related fields; (2) we had a better batting average with British ex-colonials than with Americans; and (3) we recruited more mediocrities and failures in this field than in any other, except perhaps education.

Faith in training was never so naive as to ignore the educational and talent base on which specialized talent could be built. Hence a central question in planning had to be the distribution of effort between the higher and secondary educational system on the one hand, and direct job-related training on the other. Very sharp debate went on over the appropriate focus for foundation efforts. A natural and familiar association of foundations with universities made a focus on preparatory higher education appealing, and indeed a great part of what was done by foundations in the developing countries has been directed toward building their universities and some other forms of higher education. But the immediacy of indigenization problems called for attention to job-related training of much narrower sorts. Enthusiasm for setting up new training institutions ran very high, and a prudent reserve became perhaps as important as forthcoming generosity. There were particularly vigorous arguments within the Ford Foundation over the appropriateness of expenditure of training institutions for middle and lower levels of governmental functions. "Leave all that to USAID," some said. Others defended a direct concern with manifest present need over high policy and more academic priorities. The numbers of people to be trained for governments of larger countries made such undertakings appear awkwardly large for foundations. But there were needs to get new institutions started and to train the staffs that (in principle!) would continue to run them that sometimes looked to be feasible undertakings. The Ford Foundation engaged in several such ventures, the largest being the Ecole Nationale de Droit et d'Administration in Congo-Zaïre, to which more than $3.5 million was given over ten years.

Indigenization was a concern of only some of the developing countries. A transformation to development commitment and the modernization of government has been the concern of all. This thrust for change was of course wrapped in high and diffuse aspirations. Government was to be the
appropriate and effective instrument serving the new purposes of a changing social order. In Latin America, there was a remarkable demand for old governments to cease defending the existing social order and bring about a social revolution to a new one. In keeping with the egalitarian, materialistic, and activistic principles of development, emphasis on economic growth and the spreading of its benefits to total populations became characteristic. Indeed, the focusing of development efforts on economic growth has been so central that we frequently forget the extent to which the building of new states and their governments was an intrinsic and essential focus of “development.” Economic development was readily accepted as a prime responsibility of government, and the desirability of central economic planning by governments of developing countries came, rather surprisingly, to be uncontroversial orthodoxy, even among Americans and Europeans who were more reserved about its applicability at home.

It can perhaps be argued that the foundations have been of more consequence in building economic competencies than in any of the other efforts they have made to assist the governments of developing countries. To argue so is not to ignore the controversies over the effectiveness of economic planning. Rather the argument is based on the marked increase in the importance of economic qualifications for government service and the powerful influence economists have come to have in the policymaking of many governments. The famous Berkeley “Mafia” that has played such a central role in the government of Indonesia since 1965 is only one of the most spectacular cases of the power of trained economists. The remarkable expansion of the place of economists in the governments of advanced countries in the past decades has been broadly paralleled over much of the developing world. In Latin America, the economists’ competition with older legally trained governmental elites has been conspicuous and, over much of the rest of the Third World, the growth of authoritarian governments has given economists in the civil service great scope for influence.

The foundations—notably Rockefeller and Ford—have shared the contemporary faith in economists and a persisting goal of their efforts has been to build national competence in the field. How to do so in a serious way is less than obvious. There are questions about the numbers of people needed at various levels, the location of effective training, the mix of research and training opportunities. Indeed, a kind of subspecialty of the philanthropic craft has grown up around the questions, and the larger foundations have people who take responsibility for knowing when somebody should be trained at home, sent, say, to the Philippines or to the U.S., and if the latter, whether to Harvard or Williams or Vanderbilt or someplace else. Special programs have been devised for civil servants, first in this country (as e.g., at Williams), more latterly abroad, as in the programs at Nairobi and Ife (Nigeria). The intelligent development of such programs obviously requires an informed view of the needs of developing countries’ governments, which in many places has flowed naturally from other engagements in technical assistance.

The provision of economic planning advisers to developing countries has been for many years one of the most important activities of the Ford Foundation. More than $40 million have been committed in Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Colombia, Chile, and elsewhere. A large part of this work has been done by the Harvard Development Advisory Service (now transformed into the Harvard International Institute for Development), but there have been places in which the Foundation directly employed specialists and assigned them to the governments in question. The guiding principles of this work were essentially those of technical assistance generally—competent professionals were to work with counterparts, training as they worked, and supplementary opportunities of training and research were provided with the general aims of building the planning functions into government as expeditiously as might be. Careful efforts were made to recruit international teams and to enable advisers to work loyally for the countries of their assignment. Intimate and trusting relations have been typically established.
While there has been a natural decline in this sort of engagement as governments have become more confident and independent in their operations, the decline has been rather slower than most of us expected, and frequently the Foundation has had to hold firmly to schedules of termination in the face of much national reluctance.

From the point of view of impact on government structure and functioning that interests us particularly here, one may note, first, that the central role given to national planning in many countries made the planning agency a focal point for consideration of a great range of national policy, not only economic policy. To engage in economic planning without considering the administrative strengths of government, its capacities to stimulate private business or relate to the peasantry, is obviously unrealistic. Planning organizations thus have tended to reach into the broadest questions of governmental capacity. In cases like India or Pakistan, they became kinds of superministries, and even when they were less powerful, they became the stimulants to studies and movements for reorganization and reform. The demands of planning also emphasized the need for professional specialization not only in economics and gave impetus to professional qualifications much more widely in governments. Planning thus became an important stimulus to the broader "modernization" of government that was always sought in principle but often constrained by inertia and vested interests.

High new purposes of government obviously implied demands for high capacities and performances. The maintenance of firm national control was axiomatic necessity, but new governments insisted that this should not be at the expense of efficiency, and older governments called for transformations to meet new goals and responsibilities. The broad aim of having a modern, efficient government that would be the leading agency of development became standard. For example, in India, the Ford Foundation perceived the aspirations of the Indian government as follows:

With the winning of independence, the Indian government recognized the necessity of making fundamental reforms in its administrative structure and character. From a government which had been designed chiefly to maintain law and order, to collect taxes, and to administer a dependency, it had to develop into not only an independent and democratic government, but a service government, capable of planning and putting into action an intensive welfare program and of providing forceful leadership and action in meeting the needs of its people.  

What did the world have to offer in response to these demands and aspirations? There was a great deal of confidence in the United States and in some of the European countries that they had good governments and corps of able managers, and varying degrees of confidence about the replicability of good standards elsewhere. Faith that the developing countries could be helped toward better public management at a brisk pace depended on technique that was communicable and not so inextricably bound to national cultures that it was either inaccessible or a betrayal of national identity if adopted. I have already commented on the optimism about the possibilities of training that marked the American entry into development assistance. This faith that people could be taught, reasonably quickly and efficiently, to perform specific jobs was part of a wider faith that rational general principles of administration and organization were known.

I trust I need not review the rather peculiar American conceptions of public administration that had taken shape in the years before World War II and were carried abroad by American foundations and others in the era of technical assistance. The remarkably sharp conception of distinction between policy and administration that our recent ancestors believed in made for easy confidence that one could introduce scientific methods of administration without intruding on the prerogatives of national sovereignty.

6. But it may help to recall a concise summary by Don Price: "This (American) approach... asked the administrator not merely to abstain from public participation in contests for power, but to avoid an interest in the substance of governmental programs. This approach, when followed in university programs of training for government service, turned out experts in managerial techniques—such as specialists in budgeting or personnel administration—for more success-
It also seems to me that the general conceptions of a modern industrial society that infused American social science in the years around the war provided a basis for thinking that there must be common features of the governmental bureaucracies of modern societies, whatever their cultural bases. Similar requirements of functional specialization in disciplined bureaucracies, with recruitment and advancement on universalistic principles of merit and performance, were to be assumed.

Foundation efforts toward governmental modernization have taken the forms of advisory assistance, the building of training institutions, and some more distant efforts to prepare future government officials by better university training. The first of these has come about in various ways—as the natural outgrowth of planning for indigenization, as a result of frequent requests for participation in administration reform movements, and in occasional ad hoc forms. One of the most notable examples came early in the Ford Foundation's work in India, when in 1952 we recruited Paul Appleby, then dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse, at the request of the prime minister. His report, submitted some months later, was critical of much in the proud ICS and IAS traditions, and led toward the establishment of the Indian Institute of Public Administration. The recourse to external expertise on administrative reform dwindles with the years, but it is by no means past; in 1973-74, for example, the Foundation supplied two full-time advisers to the Udoji Commission on salary and personnel policies in Nigeria.

Foundation assistance in the building of training institutions runs over a public–private range. Institutes of public administration firmly within or related to government service, like the Indian Institute just mentioned, have had a declining appeal. Combined training of managers for the public and private sectors has been encouraged notably in the Administrative Staff Colleges that came to be established at Hyderabad in India and Lahore in Pakistan. But the largest and now most favored approach has been one that started primarily from the efforts to train managers for industry. It has its prime expressions in the Indian Institutes of Management at Ahmedabad and Calcutta (to which the Foundation has devoted more than $7 million) and the Asian Institute of Management in the Philippines. These institutions began mostly training executives for national and multinational private industry under models and assistance from the Harvard Business School and the Sloan School of MIT. Later, they moved more to the training of managers for public enterprise, and, in further developments that will need more comment below, they have reached beyond the enterprise into questions of sector policy and planning. All of these institutions have had proclaimed functions in research and consultation that they have in varying degrees and quality fulfilled. A particular development in management consulting deserves mention. Building on experience in Turkey, the Ford Foundation has sought in several places to train cadres of consultants who would work in conjunction with management institutes and other nonprofit organizations. A notably successful group has been established at the Administrative Staff College, Hyderabad, that has had major Indian public enterprises as its clients.

Sector Management and Outreach

I shall have less to say about foundation engagement in sectoral programs of governments, not because they have been less important, but because a number of the relevant issues have already come under discussion in other contexts.

Foundations, like others, want to avoid trying to do everything, and hence have a strong tendency to focus on particular subjects or fields. Some of the choices of the major foundations have already

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7. For an interesting account of this mission, see A. H. Hanson, The Process of Planning (Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 280-83.  

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been noted. The largest sectoral engagements of
the Ford Foundation have been in agriculture,
population, education, and social science research.1
Agriculture and population are subjects that
naturally relate to total populations, and we have
had to look to the effective reach of national pro-
grams in them. The first major development effort
of the Ford Foundation came in the community
development program in India, which, as I have
already pointed out, was as much or more a pro-
gram for engagement of a total population in a
national movement as it was an effort to improve
basic economic conditions. Dissatisfaction with
the impact of this program on agricultural production
led to a new emphasis on the technology of agricul-
tural production. This took the primary form
of establishing international agricultural institutes
—the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
in the Philippines, the International Corn and
Wheat Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico, and ultimately
several others. It also led to a major sectoral
program in agriculture in India, the Intensive
Agricultural Districts Program, to which the Foun-
dation devoted more than $10 million. This
program involved complex and intimate working
relationships with the Indian government at several
levels and it became the largest single program in
sectoral organization and management that the
Ford Foundation has ventured. The international
institutes represented in themselves a move away
from governments of developing countries; they
have been financed and staffed internationally, and
are governed by international boards on which the
host governments are represented but not control-
ling. But the products of these institutes in
improved crop varieties and agricultural practices
had to be diffused in many countries to be useful,
and this outreach has involved extensive relation-
ships with governments as the necessary steps were
taken to introduce the new varieties and build the
local research that has been necessary to cope with
the many problems of local adaptation that inevi-
tably arise. Programs of this sort have been financed
by the Foundation in such places as Indonesia,
Bangladesh, Egypt, Tanzania, Algeria, Tunisia,
and Brazil. They typically reveal or foment prob-
lems of organization and management that can
sometimes be dealt with directly by agricultural
specialists, but at other times call for more wide-
ranging attack. We have thus been led into pro-
grams to help countries build cadres of appropriate
specialists often agricultural economists—and
sometimes to go beyond needs for trained man-
power into building institutions that may cope
locally with problems of policy and management.
The need for institutions like the Center for Man-
agement in Agriculture that has been organized
within the Indian Institute of Management at
Ahmedabad has been increasingly felt, though the
numbers of attractive ventures thus far have been
few. The classic difficulties of governments in
reaching effectively into traditional peasant agri-
culture have stimulated many pilot ventures, but
effective organizations like the famous Comilla
Academy in Bangladesh have been rare, and a
great many of the problems of rural development
remain unsolved.

A concern with agricultural or rural develop-
ment thus leads strongly toward sectoral manage-
ment and organizational problems that have been
easier to perceive than to solve. But the sectoral
focus permits a concentration of attention that gives
better promise of significant results than broadside
attacks on the functioning of whole governments,
and the introduction of new technologies sometimes
provides unusual opportunities for breaking out
of old patterns. Similarly, the introduction of
family planning programs has posed an abundance
of organizational and administrative problems, but
also a focus of effort and an opportunity to build
afresh rather than simply struggle to change old
habits.

The evident advantages of focusing on sectoral
programs has in recent years led to strong argu-
ments that foundations should confine their efforts
in development management to such contexts, and
abandon the wider concerns I have described. The force of such arguments needs to be judged in the contexts of the new era that I now come to discuss.

FRUITS OF EXPERIENCE
AND THE NEW ERA

After the enthusiasms and optimism of the years when development and international assistance were fresh and new, we have now come to a rather grumpy maturity. There is less sympathetic understanding between the developed and the developing countries; diminished confidence that outsiders can or will contribute usefully in what poor countries want to achieve. Even if the necessary will exists, there is growing doubt that we know what to do to bring about development. The swing of mood is no doubt more violent than a cool assessment of experience would justify, but the foundations have had to judge how they would respond to it.

The governments of developing countries are now certainly much changed, both in reality and in the ways they are perceived. The history of instability, coups, and repressions that makes much of the international news about these countries brings a wide spectrum of interpretation—from sympathetic apologia to disillusion and denunciation. At the least, it raises controversy and inhibits the easy cooperation that marked the beginnings of international development assistance. Currently the sharp revival of concerns over human rights and political repression—a movement by no means exclusively focusing on the poorer countries, but certainly including them—has put new questions about the legitimacy of close cooperation with governments.

On the other side, governments of the developing countries take much more reserved—indeed, sometimes suspicious or truculent—postures toward rich foreigners bearing supposed gifts. Disentangling the causal elements in their heightened reserve would carry us much beyond the needs and purposes of this paper. But among them are such diverse factors as growing self-confidence; the erosion of psychological dependencies that existed under colonialism and persisted in the first years of independence; aggressive nationalism that is in part a reaction to internal problems; and disillusionment with the effectiveness of aid and technical assistance. The temptation to radical withdrawal in these circumstances is obvious. Autarky or stern self-reliance has powerful appeal, but the costs are evident too, and demands for a new international order accompany critiques of the beneficence of what has existed.

The ideology of development and development assistance has been shaken by these changes. Indeed, it is now challenged in its essence by doctrines that make underdevelopment a condition of the rich countries’ prosperity, and development assistance only a superficial and misleading corrective. The faith that mixed economies could evolve successfully in a hospitable international order has weakened, and radical critiques of what has been achieved in the name of development flourish both with the Third World and in the Western countries. There is pessimism about widening international gaps, indignant critiques of national governments as exploiting elites, and resistance to international investment as inherently exploitative.

To some of this, international development assistance has been able to respond with freshened egalitarian emphasis—on reaching the “poorest of the poor” in rural development, on the spread of basic education, or other programs that promise widespread benefits. The foundations have shared in these responses. But obviously difficult questions have been raised about the relations with governments that are characteristic of the past.

A loosening of relations to governments has certainly gone on. Patterns that used to be characteristic chiefly in Latin America are now common throughout the Third World. In the work of the Ford Foundation, there has been a sharp decline in the number of project specialists in technical assistance assignments with governments from more than a hundred at the peak in the late sixties to less than fifty in 1975. A parallel decline has

9. Precise figures are difficult to supply because the statistical records do not distinguish between specialists assigned to government agencies and those assigned to universities and research institutes. Totals for recent years were as follows.
1973—105; 1974—85; and 1975—70.
also gone on in the number of advisers financed through the Harvard Institute of International Development and other means. Some of the decline reflects the reduced budget of the Foundation. But it has also been policy to reduce direct technical assistance as more trained nationals become available, and there has been a shared concern that the countries take full responsibility for their work.

The judgments involved in this decline of technical assistance to governments are often complex and difficult. The desire for disengagement is typically not one-sided. While the political posture of governments normally is to desire elimination of technical assistance at the earliest possible moment, there is often a sharp contrast in the desires of particular ministries and departments. We have, in fact, regularly to decline many requests for "old-fashioned" technical assistance. If we had the means, both financially and in the capacity to secure the necessary talent, the Ford Foundation could probably be fielding as many advisers as we did at the peak of our activity. Our resistance to continuing in the old patterns goes beyond the concern already mentioned that continued dependence on external advisers simply delays a necessary assumption of responsibility. In some cases, we do not think we could offer effective assistance in this way, or that our limited resources would have better long-run effects in being used for training, research, and other uses. There are also cases in which, because of the repressive and other features of a government, we do not think it proper to be intimately associated with this functioning.

None of this is to say that the role of foundations in technical assistance to governments promises soon to become obsolete, except perhaps in limited sectoral engagements. Its demise has often been prophesied, but recent revivals, such as our response to Egyptian requests for help in their efforts to open their economy to Arab and other investment, suggest it may still have considerable life. Estimates of the course of future action depend not only on political conditions but also on the prospects of making governments more effective agencies of development.

These questions now look difficult indeed, and we are less confident than we once were that the social sciences or tested practice offer ready means of dealing with them. Where indigenization has been needed, it has largely been achieved, and great progress has been made in strengthening the economic competencies of governments. But the quality of governmental functioning remains a source of great dissatisfaction in most countries, and the means of improving it look less obvious than they did when faith in training institutions was higher. The large investments made in the past decades in national institutes of public administration now are generally regarded as disappointing. Such has been the conclusion of an internal review we have recently made of our own experience in the Ford Foundation, and it is confirmed by other studies. The reasons for this disappointment are numerous: we have found that often only small fractions of the services were in fact reached, and these not always the most promising fractions; hopeful expectations of research and consulting were slow to develop or were abortive; and prestige and authority were hard to attain for such institutions. Professional confidence in a transferable science of public administration that could be brought to these institutions (and also to public administration programs in universities) has withered, and critical study of the experience, as in the work of the Comparative Administration Group, has brought much improved understanding of the cultural impediments to easy transfer but has not supplied much that was readily usable in practical training. What has been hopefully labeled "development administration" has brought together new ideas and experience but has been easier to define as administration for developing countries than as a settled body of theory and techniques."

The experience with management training institutes has been distinctly better. Whether because of the lively demand for their graduates in industry, their insulation from bureaucratic politics, or the more ready transferability of the substance of their curricula, some of these institutes have attracted good talent and resources, and shown versatile capacity at dealing with the emerging problems in their societies. Their reach beyond private enterprise management into the public sector, and beyond the enterprise level to broader questions of sectoral development, is providing a type of resource for analysis and training for which there appears to be rising demand.

But the growth of governments in size and complexity has everywhere challenged resources of all sorts. With the socializing disposition of the governments of developing countries has gone great quantitative expansion, a rapid multiplication of public enterprises, and a general proliferation of the public sector. (One finds in various Ford Foundation reports, for example, that Nigerian government employment grew 60 percent between 1960 and 1966, the Kenyan government doubled between 1964 and 1970, and Peruvian civil service from 240,000 in 1967 to 450,000 in 1974.) The attendant difficulties have been many, with perhaps especially notorious weaknesses in the performance of public corporations. Even where great scandals have not occurred, we read that there is a lack of "conceptual clarity as to the primary tasks of the public enterprise" and that "the mechanisms and systems for assuring task performances do not exist in many LDCs."12

Even when faith in training is preserved, the enormity of the tasks of upgrading armies of civil servants and public enterprise managers makes foundations search for types of assistance other than massive frontal attacks. In some cases, it is possible to identify special deficiencies that the training of a few people to high levels can relieve. Such has been the significance of some of the training of economists, and other examples can be found in tax administration and the negotiation of foreign investments.

The improvement of functioning through better policy- and decision-making promises in general to be easier than reform of administrative standards throughout a government, or even a branch thereof. Much of the significance we attach to better economic competences depends on the impact of better policymaking, and we search for means of improving policymaking of other sorts. But, in other matters, the resources for better policymaking seem less ready at hand; the needs are more for research and analysis than for the transmission of tested results through training.

The challenge of building effective governments of the type most developing countries appear to want, namely, governments that have extensive control over their economies and are broadly socialist in character, is a challenge not readily met by existing models or by applied social science. It can indeed be argued that there is a profound dilemma in the development commitment of governments. By imposing formidable goals of social change, development commitment presses governments too hard. Lacking persuasive ideologies of limited government, they are condemned to reach beyond what their resources permit them to do effectively. Pathologies of malfunctioning—confusion, misrepresentation, corruption, exacerbated resorts to coercion, etc.—then commonly appear. Studies of the way these pathologies arise are now fairly numerous and their multiplication under the aegis of well-regarded research institutes within the developing countries promises some corrective potential. But more is needed. Something approximating a fresh and general analysis of the roles of government in development is needed; an analysis that takes into account the organizational complexity of modern government and deals objectively with its strengths and limitations. At the present time, such broad subjects as the comparative study of economic systems appear to have had limited uses in the guidance of policy, and more specialized subjects are in less flourishing states than their practical importance for the developing countries suggests they should be. The study of public corporations is, for example, rather weakly developed.

in most Western countries, even for their domestic institutions; only at Leeds, until the death of Professor A. H. Hanson, and very recently at Boston University do we know of systematic attention to public enterprises in the developing countries. The theory of organization has, of course, been much cultivated by social scientists in recent decades, but its application to large questions of governmental organization, both at home and abroad, has thus far been rather limited.  

Strategies for better organization and functioning of the public sector in developing countries thus cannot readily be conceived as a straightforward application of existing ideas and techniques. Our imperfect understanding points to the need for much patient empirical research on current problems in the countries. The means of organizing such efforts will probably vary considerably, but the management institutes appear to be one promising locus. They have the attractiveness to government of a technical, applied orientation, and, in a few places at least, they have up-to-date masteries of available technique. As in all applied work, there is danger of getting lost in particulars, so that cumulation of experience and building of theory may be inhibited. Linkages among efforts in various countries is one attractive means of stimulating wider views and has been a common focus of foundation attention. Some of these linkages need to be directly among the developing countries, but there would also appear to be attractive opportunities for links with the now burgeoning public policy programs in the U.S. and comparable programs in other countries. Public policy programs in the U.S. now have a narrowly domestic cast to them, but in approach and technique, they are similar to much sector planning and analysis in the developing countries. The opportunities for mutual learning are only beginning to be exploited, and the neutral, technical, and professional content of much of this work promises communication over barriers of politics and ideology.  

There is at least one other set of issues facing the governments of developing countries that deserves brief notice because it appears to be as fundamental as the problems of coherent organization and management of large public sectors that I have been discussing. This is the set of outreach and equity problems that we know as a source of profound criticism of many existing governments. Demands for decentralization of government and more attention to rural development have been insistent in recent years and have had much impact on the doctrine and practice of development assistance. But as I have remarked earlier, the problems of effective governmental stimulation of social change in poor traditional rural settings are formidable indeed, and it is sometimes unclear if neglect is worse than clumsy or brutal effort. The need to find more effective and humane means of rural development is now a central need of development policy, and the promotion of research and analysis that may bring better and deepened understanding of the capacities and limitations of government in these processes is an essential element.  

The modes of foundation assistance in these matters need to be carefully considered to avoid troublesome by-products. Insofar as governments
and countries are open to the international world, their civil servants must be subject to temptations to seek statuses and rewards that would put them far above average standards of living in their countries, let alone the "poorest of the poor." Thus the professional advantages of international training, communication, and collaboration are gained at the cost of tensions with the leveling demands of serving poor populations. The management of these tensions must of course be a concern of national policies, and they are a principal reason for the jealous control of international contacts we now frequently encounter. External agencies like foundations have an obvious concern not to aggravate the tension unduly. One requisite is that the building of professional competencies be as compatible with future livelihoods as possible. This points toward the localization of training in the degree that it can be effectively done, and the reservation of international training to a few specialists, mostly at quite high levels. Economy generally dictates such a policy in any case, and a broad movement toward favoring local capacities for training and research has been characteristic of foundation efforts in recent years.

IN CONCLUSION

The spirit of this paper has been essentially conservative. I have stressed the great changes from the beginnings of the concern with development and developing countries to the present time, but then discussed what foundations are now trying to do in company with the governments of these countries on the presumption that they would keep on with these efforts. There are those who would take a different view, saying that we should get out of old habits and turn to something else. Sometimes, the judgment is that we haven’t accomplished much and ought to cut our losses by quitting; sometimes there is the kindlier judgment that we have done some good but still recognize that the age of development assistance is passing.

We certainly need to ask if there is enough that is still persuasive in the idea of development assistance to provide a basic rationale for continuing foundation effort. When countries come to be perceived not simply as developing countries but as foreign countries capable of pursuing their own policies and interests, it is natural to ask if they are proper objects of philanthropy. There is often, of course, powerful reason for philanthropic interest in the people of a country rather than in its government. If the country has many poor people and seriously limited resources for improving their livelihoods, then the case for effort is strong. As we know, there has been a tendency in recent years for aid programs to follow this rationale, and foundations have found it persuasive too. Such aims involve loosening or circumscription of relations with governments, but cannot and should not eliminate them.

The case for a broader and continuing concern with the quality and character of government in what we still, somewhat uncertainly, call “developing countries” needs a somewhat different rationale. In part, the basis of such concern continues to derive from the need for development. Whatever the disillusionments of recent years, countries still seek progress in independence, and governments are still looked to as the most important agencies of development. Moreover, the quality and effectiveness of government cannot be a matter of indifference internationally. It is painfully evident that a great many of the domestic troubles of countries around the world derive from the malfunctioning or incompetence of governments, and these troubles provoke international tensions and disturbances. There is currently a stronger disposition to criticize Third World countries for abuses of freedom and human rights within their borders. But the correction of such abuses requires competent and secure government at least as much as direct pressure to respect humane standards.

Whether or not it will prove possible for foundations to contribute significantly to the improvement of government in the new era will take time to assess. The tendencies in our work have been sketched in this paper, with emphasis on the decline of direct technical assistance, a more critical and selective approach to training, and a rising concern for research and analysis. At the outset I pointed out the concern of foundations to be at once philanthropic and research-minded, and in practice it is
not always easy to be both. The aims of benefiting human welfare in ways that try to get at the roots of problems often lead along uncertain and diverging trails. Human affairs are not yet to a point where we may confidently envisage an orderly sequence of research and analysis leading to policies and their translation into effective action. Foundations thus regularly find themselves trying to balance pulls toward research and action programs, and work with the governments of developing countries shows all the familiar difficulties of choice. In the latter part of this paper, I have dwelt upon the large deficiencies in our understanding of effective means for public management in developing countries. Both within these countries and outside them, there is evident need for fresh ideas, research, and technique if better governments are to be built. Present tendencies for foundations to concentrate attention on the research and analysis capacities within the developing countries seem proper to continue on these matters as on others. In future, the balance thus seems likely to fall more toward such activities than to the direct engagement with building governmental structures and action programs that had a large place in past agendas. There is undoubtedly some loss of excitement and sense of importance in this shift. But there is also a protection against the hazards of unwise intrusions that is welcome when we have come to more modest assessments of what may be offered. And finally there is the satisfaction of sharing in explorations in which there is ultimate uncertainty as to who is teaching and who is learning.
Part Five
CONCLUSION:
MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT

The challenge of training managers for public sector responsibilities confronts most nations, including those that are economically the most advanced. As governments increasingly assume responsibility for an ever-broadening array of functions that were formerly performed by the private sector (or not performed at all), fundamental problems of adequate management and accountability arise.

Problems of management are especially acute in many of the developing countries that are confronted on the one hand with inadequate institutional structures, large and unwieldy civil services, poorly developed educational institutions, and all too frequently unstable political arrangements... and, on the other, with ever-expanding national control of their economic and social systems. It should also be stressed that the “crisis in management” in developing countries results from the dramatic increase in problems related directly to growing population, food and nutrition, educational systems, escalating military expenditures—and all too often problems of economic instability aggravated by runaway inflation. It is apparent that these problems are not “passing phenomena” with a happier, more stable period in the offing. Indeed, practically every serious study agrees with the conclusion that the complex of problems confronting nations in an increasingly interdependent world will place increasing pressures on the developing nations and on those individuals and institutions concerned with policymaking, management, and administration.

This report, which attempts to keep the above factors in mind, is limited to public sector management, with primary emphasis on two sectors: health (with special reference to family planning) and agriculture. There is agreement, however, that the management problems in these sectors are not unique, and that programs for management training in health and agriculture are applicable to the needs of other public sectors (and, in many cases, for the private sector as well).

COMPLEXITY OF MANAGEMENT—AND MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

The multifaceted complexity of management is typically announced as “a given” by scholars and practitioners—but then they make special pleas that increasing attention be given to understanding “what management really is” and why these complexities must be understood.

The multifunctionality of management requires diverse management inputs. Dr. Samuel Paul (see Chapter 6) describes the following functions: (1) planning and policymaking—the task of classifying and determining the hierarchy of objectives to be achieved by the organization; (2) environmental appraisal—giving adequate attention to the totality of the economic, political, legal, and cultural systems within which the organization functions; (3) service delivery and logistics—with emphasis on the fact that a public system is expected to meet specific development needs, with delivery of a service “on a continuous basis”—and at the right place and right time; (4) technology and production—each of the public sectors has its underlying technology; public managers should possess “a basic understanding of the relevant technology and its processes and characteristics”; (5) budgeting, information, and control—to accomplish its goals and tasks, the public system must allocate resources... The only com-
mon denominator that can be used to measure the cost of all these inputs is money"; (6) organization and personnel management—the manager "must himself possess and also develop in others attitudes that are conducive to the achievement of developmental tasks."

MULTIDISCIPLINARY NATURE OF MANAGEMENT TRAINING

"Management" has no coherence as a discipline itself but requires skills and information drawn from a wide range of existing fields. Consequently, management education and training are by necessity multidisciplinary in nature and content. For example, for adequate "environmental appraisal," use must be made of information drawn from anthropology, sociology, political science, and public administration; and for "budgeting and control," from accounting, financial analysis, information services, and statistical methods. In addition to drawing on recognized disciplines and their subdivisions, management training also attempts to develop leadership and personal skills through simulated situations, role-playing, and various types of action learning, including internships and working within organizations.

In addition, it must be emphasized that in public sector management, the managers should normally be professionally trained in that sector, have a grasp of its technology, and keep abreast of new developments and delivery systems.

RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL SETTINGS

Education and training programs which fail to give adequate attention to the complexity of environmental factors or which gloss over basic societal divisions which exist or which fail to deal with the complexities of competing organizations and bureaucratic structures turn out managers for environments and situations which do not exist.

A number of environmental and situational variables should be emphasized:

(a) Drawing on Japanese management in particular (see Chapter 4), Mendoza gives attention to cultural factors that condition the management process. The "administrative environment" as well as a broad range of cultural, economic, and other environmental variables that severely condition management options is effectively presented in the paper by Moris (Chapter 5); (b) the resource base of a nation and, indeed, the entire macroeconomic system sets the boundaries within which sector planning takes place, projects are formulated, and the management process occurs; (c) the existing structures—both managerial and those related directly to management education and training, including the educational system, and especially higher education—are obviously essential elements of the environment; (d) the total political and governmental system, including its stability, divisions of responsibility, organization, and decision-making processes, and stability and character of the civil service are obviously of fundamental importance. The trend toward military regimes in much of the developing world only underlines the importance of this factor.

TEACHABILITY OF MANAGEMENT SKILLS

There is a high degree of variability in the teachability of the diverse skills embraced by management. It is generally agreed that the "tools, techniques, and technologies," indeed those skills most closely identified with Western (U.S.A.) management, including statistics, operations research, and systems analysis, can be taught to individuals from different cultures. At the other end of the spectrum, some of the unstructured skills that are the most closely related to leadership and successful management are almost impossible to impart to others. Indeed, many observers feel that the most important qualities and attributes of great leaders and managers are simply not taught to others in education and training programs.

In addition to the teachability of skills to individuals, there is the problem of transferability of skills so that they can be usefully applied in different cultural settings. Again, it is clear that the basic skills, and especially those that are "technology intensive," appear to be the most frequently copied and transferred. However, serious questions are being raised about "the package of skills" that appear to be "heavy handed," and give absolute
answers where cultural relativity must be considered. Frequently, it is charged, some of these skills really call for a continuation of the status quo rather than development. It is also noted that many of these skills are only usable within a very specific administrative culture (see article by Moris, Chapter 5).

AN ABSENCE OF WELL-DEVELOPED MODELS

Even though management training is clearly identified with the West, systematic attention to problems of management of public sectors is relatively new and comparatively little attention has been given to training managers of public development sectors. It is also clear that slightly modified, highly successful Western M.B.A. training efforts do not adequately meet the challenge of providing public sector development managers. Some of the most imaginative experimentation in training for public sector management is occurring in a few of the leading management training institutes in developing countries.

COMPLEXITY OF DEVELOPMENT SECTORS

In addition to the diversity among public development sectors—including different environments, client systems, and technology—there are major public sector management commonalities: (a) organizational complexity; (b) development sectors by their nature are dynamic, changing, and subject to experimentation; (c) problems of continuity and funding as programs are added or abandoned; (d) difficulties of evaluation due to the problem of adequately measuring the “soft outputs” of public services (see Paul, Chapter 6).

Given the relative complexity of management functions and the current state of management education and training programs for public sectors, what are the implications for future efforts?

First, it seems clear that a diversity of types of programs and structural arrangements is definitely needed. This involves new efforts to include training as a part of professional degree programs, as well as both degree and short-term programs following the completion of the professional degree. It is also important to develop a wider range of intensive short-term postentry training programs for managers and those who will be assigned management responsibilities.

Second, a continuing high priority must be given to research, experimentation, and evaluation of education and training programs. This experimentation and research should be emphasized in institutions in developing countries as well as in major educational institutions in the more advanced countries.

Third, a high priority should also be assigned to continuing development of teaching methods and new curricular materials. A new generation of highly adaptable “case” materials is needed, as well as usable and more effective descriptive and analytical materials relating to the cultural, social, economic, and political environments within which managerial functions are exercised. Siffin stresses the necessity of giving systematic attention to the study of “organizations” in different settings and how they influence sectorial management performance. Relatively simplistic assumptions have been made, and still prevail, he insists, about organizational behavior and how to assess and then prescribe for alternative organizational arrangements.

Fourth, in developing new programs and new teaching methods, it is crucial that adequate linkages be maintained between the operating institutions and agencies in a development sector and the training institutions for that sector. There are several compelling reasons for developing good rapport with top sectorial management: (a) so that they assign their best people for training programs; (b) so that graduates of training programs will have entree to the agencies; (c) so that the development agencies will cooperate in internship and other action learning training efforts developed by the management training institutions; and (d) so that curricula are based squarely on the current knowledge and experiential base.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSITIES FOR MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

There is a clear connection between the quality and strength of higher education and management training efforts. Management training institutes
cannot be considered a substitute for quality higher education. On the contrary, they should be seen as an integral part of the advanced educational and training system. The high-quality institutes that now exist in developing countries are dependent on their feeder systems of higher education for setting standards and for providing staff as well as management trainees.

Given the enormous and escalating costs of higher education both absolutely and relatively, it is evident that only a few of the developing countries will have the resources to sustain both high-quality management institutes (like the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and the Asian Management Institute in the Philippines), as well as a high-quality university system. In most developing countries, it will be the universities that must be encouraged and expected to provide diverse programs directly geared to national development needs, including management education and training. Management institutes and universities obviously can be of major assistance to each other in staff training and upgrading and in the development of curricula and research and evaluation efforts. Management institutes can perhaps make a special contribution to staff development at universities as they initiate programs in the management area.

SPECIAL CONCERN FOR MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED COUNTRIES

Most of the smaller developing countries, as well as some of the especially disadvantaged (Fourth World) countries, clearly neither have, nor are they likely to obtain, the resources to support either high-quality universities or special institutes for management training. Given the significant number of countries that fall into this category and the recognition of increasing public sector problems that they confront, special concern continues to be expressed for meeting their needs. These countries cannot rely on institutions in the developed (and frequently ex-colonial) countries to provide management training. On the grounds of both acceptability and applicability, other solutions must be found. Regional centers supported either by groups of these countries or by external agencies are probably not the solution for several reasons. First, given problems of nationalism and interstate rivalries, there are severe political constraints to this approach. Second, problems of continuing support and “institutionalization” are obvious, and, third, there are problems of leadership and staff development arising from their multinational composition. There are, however, at least two “regional” solutions that should be imaginatively and carefully explored. First, existing institutes of management of demonstrated excellence should be encouraged to expand their training programs so as to serve the needs of those countries in their regions that lack a management training capability, and, second, selected universities of high quality in the developing countries that have such a capability or could develop and sustain it should be encouraged to become institutions serving regional training needs.

AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

Public sector management training programs are still in their infancy and significant tasks relating to their improvement lie ahead. The following stand out as some of the significant agenda items:

1. Systematic research aimed at achieving a deeper understanding of the cultural systems that determine or condition (a) management norms and behavior in management systems and management training programs in Western countries (i.e., Moris’s argument, Chapter 5, regarding what is exportable); (b) indigenous management behavior in developing countries for the purpose of identifying congruences and potentialities for the development of effective national management systems.

2. Evaluation and comparative analysis of experimental management programs for the purpose of identifying, and where appropriate replicating, ideas and elements that have proven effective under comparable sets of conditions.

3. Comparative study of ways and means by which closer integration can be achieved between the management requirements of operating agencies...
in development sectors and management training programs intended to serve those sectors.

4. Systematic and comparative study and experimentation in the development of relevant teaching materials and teaching methodologies, particularly in those unstructured skills that are quintessential for effective management but which are so difficult to impart through formal educational and training programs.

5. Encouragement of innovations in program and structure of management institutes and in top programs in high-quality universities and the development of interaction and cooperation between independent institutes and those institutes and programs established in universities.

6. Systematic attention to the establishment and institutionalization of effective public sector management programs in high-quality universities that are in a position to serve national needs and to conduct outreach programs serving small and disadvantaged countries.

7. Encouragement of effective cooperative relations within the public sector management training community; this could include the exchange of faculty members, workshops on high-priority topics including the development of more effective teaching materials, improving evaluation procedures, and sharing the results of research findings related to management training.
Appendix

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Bellagio Study and Conference Center
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Bibliography

A large and diverse collection of literature exists on the subjects of management and of public administration in the less developed countries, much of which relates in some way to the problems of public sector management education and training, but almost none of which addresses directly the problem as defined in this volume. The lack of consensus on terminology in the area makes the task of sorting out those works that are relevant to the subject formidable indeed. Words such as “planning,” “administration,” “management,” and “implementation” all carry different meanings depending on the author and the context in which they are used.

What follows is a brief, suggestive bibliography of works relating to public sector management and to the problems of education and training in the area that the authors found useful in preparing for the conference and this report. The bibliography is by no means comprehensive or exhaustive; rather it is intended to be an entry point for those interested in a further exploration of the issues discussed in this volume. The bibliography was prepared by Paul N. Eatman.

1. Books, pamphlets


2. Articles


Dayal, Ishwar, “Crisis in Administration.” *Quest* (September–October, 1975).


3. Information Concerning Management Programs at Selected Institutions

An increasing number of diverse institutions—departments and schools of public administration, schools of business and management, regional and international organizations, etc.—are becoming involved in public sector management education and training. These institutions publish annual reports and descriptions of their programs that exhibit the wide range of approaches and philosophies used to deal with the issues outlined in this volume. A selected cross section of such institutions and organizations is listed below and they will supply further information upon request.

International Institute of Administrative Sciences
Brussels, Belgium

Polytechnic of Central London
London, England

International Institute for Educational Planning
Paris, France

Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
Accra, Ghana

School of Administration
University of Ghana
Legon, Ghana

Administrative Staff College of India
Hyderabad, India

All India Management Association
New Delhi, India

Indian Institute of Management (Ahmedabad)
Ahmedabad, India

Indian Institute of Management (Bangalore)
Bangalore, India

Indian Institute of Management (Calcutta)
Calcutta, India

Indian Institute of Public Administration
New Delhi, India
University of Delhi
Faculty of Management Studies
New Delhi, India

The Management Institute
Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia
Jakarta, Indonesia

Centre Africain de Formation et de Recherches Administratives pour le Developpement (CAFRAD)
Tangier, 27 Morocco

Centre for Management Development
Lagos, Nigeria

Nigerian Institute of Management
Lagos, Nigeria

Asian Institute of Management
Makati, Rizal, Philippines

College of Public Administration
University of the Philippines System
Manila, Philippines

Development Academy of the Philippines
Makati, Rizal, Philippines

International Committee on the Management of Population Programmes (ICOMP)
Makati, Rizal, Philippines

Pan African Institute for Development
Geneva, Switzerland

Asian Development Institute
The United Nations
Bangkok, Thailand

Economic Development Institute
The World Bank
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Public Management Development Program
Institute of Public Service
University of Connecticut
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International Center for Public Enterprises in Developing Countries
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