ABSTRACT

Presenting models based on the philosophies of Carl Rogers, John Dewey, Erich Fromm, and Jean-Paul Sartre, this paper proposes a philosophical approach to education and concludes with pragmatic suggestions concerning teaching based on a fully-functioning-person model. The fully-functioning person is characterized as being open to experience, living in an existential fashion, and finding his organism as a trustworthy means of arriving at the most satisfying behavior in each existential situation. If the philosophies of Rogers, Dewey, Fromm, and Sartre were distilled into a model for curriculum development, the curriculum would be narrowed to the most relevant subjects, the introduction of new subjects would be dependent on the stage of development of the students, and emphasis would be placed on motivation. In the author's classroom, where the fully-functioning-person model is used, student interest is the goal, with skills being a by-product. Discipline is not imposed by the teacher, but self-discipline is encouraged. Students help determine the grading criteria, select class projects, write performance contracts, and discuss and evaluate their achievement. Educators are encouraged to emulate this model or to experiment, remembering their goal is to get students to function as independent persons capable of exercising choices to determine their own destinies. (Author/LAA)
Curriculum Development: A Philosophical Model.

by

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CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL MODEL

Introduction and Theme

A week or so ago I called the United States Office of Education to discuss an idea I had about a workshop for teachers and other interested persons with whomever might talk with me. I was told by the regional office in Indianapolis to talk to a certain person in that Office of Education. The person I talked to in Indianapolis told me that I should be sure to mention my goal and objectives and what behavior modifications I desired to achieve. It was difficult to get to the "right" person in Washington, but I finally was able to talk to a "Dr." So and So. The plan I had was to invite six or seven well-known writers to come to our campus to discuss two themes: 1) where is education at the present, and 2) where is education going. The proposed title of the workshop was "The Future of Education." My goals and objectives were to get teachers and others to think about the broad issues of education--the purposes of education--and to think about what they were doing now and what they might be doing in the future. Of course, such a workshop was labelled "philosophical" and this presumably ought to be translated as "not practical." Needless to say, I received little encouragement from the dear Dr. in Washington. He did say I could write up a brief proposal and he would look at it, but he did not think that any of the grants he knew of were concerned with "philosophical" issues.

I was a bit incensed at this lack of interest and I asked the dear Dr. what the goals and objectives of the United States Office of
Education were and what behavioral modifications it sought to achieve. The answer came quickly: "We have as our goals and objectives to implement whatever legislation Congress passes." I was shocked. Was there no broader purpose here and were the various functionaries in the Office of Education unable to see beyond the horizon? Perhaps I should have assumed that the Congress saw beyond the horizon, but I'm not a credulous person and I could not give the legislators this benefit of the doubt. My conclusion was that the United States Office of Education had no goals and objectives!! I do not mean to imply that none of its programs are any good; many of them are excellent at least as presented or paper. But it had no philosophy or purpose other than the rather unexciting task of following the lead of the Congress. The same stereotype of philosophy that I had found at my own campus was in fact also manifested in the highest government agency concerned directly with education.

I wondered about the agency's appreciation for the history of American education and in particular about its apparent lack of understanding on the work of John Dewey. How is it that such an agency, staffed by otherwise competent people, could be so blind to the crucial question concerning where education is in the United States and where it is going, for better or for worse?

I realize that the reputation of philosophical speculation is still tarnished by the stereotype of the philosopher who fell in the well as he was walking because he was gazing at the heavens and could not be bothered about looking where he was going. Unfortunately the
whole story of Thales is never told. This same person who fell in the well also cornered the market on corn one year and made a rather handsome profit when he sold it. Philosophers need not be unconcerned with worldly affairs.

This paper attempts to begin the task of setting up appropriate philosophical models on which education can be based. The model offered here need not be read as the only one possible nor even as correct in all its details. What I would like to do is to suggest that models developed with philosophical bases are in fact what is necessary for education if education is to have any idea where it is and where it might be going.

Unfortunately on my own campus the two education departments have radically divergent notions about what models to use for developing a philosophy of education. To explain why we have two education departments would be too much of a task for this paper—it would be too much of a task for any human to undertake. One department stresses methodological concerns and form, while the other, perhaps not by its own choice but by university policy, stresses content. To give an example, if I decide to get into English education at one school I am an Education major with a concentration in English. If I decide to get into English education at the other, I am an English major who takes the appropriate Education courses to get certified by the State. The former uses Education faculty to teach the methods courses and to act as a liaison between the student teacher and the critic teacher. The latter uses English faculty to teach the methods course and English faculty to act as the liaison between the student teacher and the critic teacher.
This divergence of educational philosophy might be classified as a quarrel between content and form. This, of course, is somewhat simplified but it can serve us as an entrance point for our further discussion. The theme of this paper can best be stated by referring to a quote from Kierkegaard’s Postscript: "If one who lives in the midst of Christendom goes up to the house of God, the house of the true God, with the true conception of God in his knowledge, and prays, but prays in a false spirit; and one who lives in an idolatrous community prays with the entire passion of the infinite, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is there most truth? The one prays in truth to God though he worships an idol; the other prays falsely to the true God, and hence worships in fact an idol."¹

This reference should not be interpreted to mean that I am arguing for form over content. What this paper is trying to develop is a form in which content can be taught. 'Form and content cannot be separated except for analysis and/or discussion. In a real teaching situation form and content must both be there. Regardless of my knowledge of the subject matter, if my teaching form is bad, my teaching is bad. Regardless of my form, if my knowledge of the subject is deficient, my teaching is bad. Form without content is empty; content without form is blind. This paper does distinguish the two for purposes of explanation and exposition only. I am operating under the naive assumption that the various content areas do share something in common—a form. Also I am not equating form with method. I am not going to discuss how one teaches English as opposed to mathematics
or a foreign language. I am aiming at something more general than that. I am not interested in asking how to teach math; I am not interested in asking if math belongs in the curriculum at all. What I want to discuss is why do we have education at all. What is the purpose of education? Why do we have schools at all? Does education have some intrinsic value that almost compels the state to insure that each of its citizens has at least a minimal amount of education? Can we evaluate--by pre-test and post-test if the "educators" insist--the performance of education if we have no idea what we are to evaluate? This paper focuses primarily on the issue of the purpose of education and only indirectly on the other questions raised.

The Purpose of Education

As an initial answer to the question concerning the purpose of education, let me refer to Carl Rogers. Rogers claims that the goal is what he calls "the fully functioning person." I will define this notion shortly but it is important here to point out that there are several assumptions that must be true if education is to achieve this purpose. Rogers phrases this in terms of psychotherapy, but he claims that this is more because of his own experience and expertise than anything else.

...I shall assume that this hypothetical person whom I describe has had an intensive and extensive experience in client-centered therapy, and that the therapy has been as completely successful as is theoretically possible. This would mean that the therapist has been able to enter into an intensely personal and subjective
relationship with this client—relating not as a scientist to an object of study, not as a physician expecting to diagnose and cure, but as a person to a person. It would mean that the therapist feels this client to be a person of unconditional self-worth; of value no matter what his condition, his behavior, his feelings. It means that the therapist is able to let himself go in understanding this client; that no inner barriers keep him from sensing what it feels like to be a client at each moment of the relationship; and that he can convey something of his empathetic understanding to the client. It means that the therapist has been comfortable in entering into this relationship fully, without knowing cognitively where it will lead, satisfied with providing a climate which will free the client to become himself.2

If we substitute the word "teacher" for the word "therapist" and the word "student" for the word "client," then we have Rogers' position on the goal of education as far as what he has assumed to be true. The fully functioning person is achievable if and only if the above assumptions are true.

The result then, the fully functioning person, is characterized by three personality traits: 1) the fully functioning person is open to his/her experience, 2) the fully functioning person lives in an existential fashion, and 3) the fully functioning person finds his/her organism as a trustworthy means of arriving at the most satisfying behavior in each existential situation. The first facet claims that a fully functioning person must be aware of all the things that happen to him/her. Nothing that is experienced is shut off or not acknowledged. This does not mean that the person needs to agree with what is experienced or needs to act out what is thought, but the person needs to acknowledge that it was experienced and was thought of.
The second facet claims that the fully functioning person would approach life as if each moment is new and dynamic, not old and static. Again this does not mean that there would be no continuity to the person, but that the person would not let continuity destroy the dynamic progress of the developing person. The third facet claims that the total person would be used as a basis for living in this existential manner. All facets of the person must be included in the person. Nothing can be set aside or left out of consideration.

The crucial notion that Rogers mentions only in passing is that this notion of a fully functioning person is only a working hypothesis—a construct, a model. Presumably not many of us come anywhere close to instantiating this ideal.

While this formulation as given is admittedly speculative, it leads, I believe, in the direction of hypotheses which may be stated in rigorous and operational terms. Such hypotheses would be culture-free or universal, I trust, rather than being different for each culture. It is obvious that the concepts given are not easily tested or measured, but with our growing research sophistication in this area, their measurability is not an unreasonable hope.

Philosophy and Psychology

Although John Dewey has written more on education than most of us could even begin to read, I refer to him here because of something he said in the context of a discussion of religion. His comment will serve as the theme for this section.
History seems to exhibit three stages of growth. In the first stage, human relationships were thought to be so infected with the evils of corrupt human nature as to require redemption from external and supernatural sources. In the next stage, what is significant in these relations is found to be akin to values esteemed distinctively religious. This is the point now reached by liberal theologians. The third stage would realize that in fact the values prized in those religions that have ideal elements are idealizations of things characteristic of natural associations, which have then been projected into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction.4

I want to expand Dewey's threefold notion of development a bit and also include my own version of the bio-genetic law—ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. The development of the individual mirrors the development of the species. The first stage that Dewey refers to can be divided into two groups. This stage is infancy obviously, but not all infants have the characteristics that Dewey suggests. Dewey describes what we might caricature as a "fundamentalist" or "right-wing bigot"; he does not articulate the difference between the child who by chronological age is an infant and the adult who is unable to function on a level that is commensurate with adulthood and who chooses not to so function. Tillich claims that this stage is the stage of literalism and that it has two branches, a natural and a reactive.5 What Dewey is describing is the reactive type of infant. The natural literalist is not as Dewey describes. In fact, Tillich is probably wrong in claiming that the natural literalist is literal at all. The distinction between literal and symbolic is not one made by the native literalist. A child is not able to make the distinction between literal and symbolic at the
"dawn of consciousness" but must be taught to make such a distinction. There is no "born literal."

The appropriate distinction then would be 1) a native or born infant stage which I will call "primitive" (this term does not have the usual negative connotations), 2) a reactive literalism often called fundamentalism, 3) a liberal stage that is similar to adolescence, and 4) an adult stage that is synonymous with maturity. Most of what follows will be concerned with the mature stage, but a few comments are in order on the other three stages.

All four types are obviously idealized and to some degree stereotyped, but this does not destroy the validity of the types. It should make us aware that probably no one fits exactly into any one of the types. All of us probably have the characteristics of several of the types depending on circumstances and so on.

The first type called the natural primitive is best exemplified by so-called primitive tribes such as the American Indian or the recently discovered Tasadai in the Philippines. The word "primitive" here is not meant to be a derogatory term for in fact the so-called primitive may be much better off than all of the other groups discussed. The word primitive here is used to refer to the technological and intellectual achievements resultant therefrom that a culture might manifest. To say that a culture is primitive in this sense is to be quite ethnocentric. To say it is primitive is to say that it does not have a highly sophisticated technology—nonetheless, it may have all the technology necessary to survive and prosper in its own environment. To have more technology than is necessary is not a positive
value. Young children are very much like this on an individual level as culture may be like this on a group level. Young children are generally quite satisfied with very simple things—things that hold their interests. Children are by nature inquisitive, creative, and exciting—even though from some adult standards they may be very unsophisticated. Children do tend to be naive, honest, and seldom if ever hypocritical. Children are by nature good learners and pick up an astonishing amount of information and skills in a little time.

The other type of infant is the reactive type. Better still this type is the repressed type that is discussed by Gordon Allport in his *The Nature of Prejudice*. These people are characterized by prejudice, close-mindedness, religious fanaticism, violence, fear, and on and on. Allport has suggested that 90% of all people harbor enough prejudice to influence their daily lives. Insofar as this prejudice does influence one's daily life, one is tending toward the category of the reactive infant or the repressive individual. Psychological studies into schizophrenia show that many of the indicators of schizophrenia are also characteristics of the repressed infant as I have briefly described it.

Our third type represents the so-called liberal. The liberal is much like the adolescent—he/she is neither a child nor an adult, but somehow caught in the total ambiguity called "beginning to mature." This category is represented by ethical relativism and by fence-sitting. These people believe, in what Mencius calls "repressive tolerance," only they do not call it repressive tolerance, but freedom of
speech. Not all adolescents can be characterized like this because some of them do go on to the adult stage. The ones who rightly are characterized as adolescents are not those who for a time are adolescent but get beyond it, but those who are fixated at the adolescent level and never get beyond it.

The fourth and last group is what Rogers called "the fully functioning person" or what I am going to call the adult or mature stage. Presumably the adult has gone through both the infant and the adolescent stage and has been able to see that the dynamic structure of the psyche demands going beyond them. It may even demand going beyond adulthood. It should be pointed out that the natural primitive and the adult have much in common, although force of circumstance may make the two appear different. The adult is developed only when material conditions necessitate its development; only when the culture and the technology demand that the natural primitive reorient his/her priorities to a milieu that is not conducive to the lifestyle of the American Indian or the Tasadai. The insights of the natural primitive can be used and need to be used by the adult. What Rogers describes as the fully functioning person can be obtained by the natural primitive but the natural primitive cannot survive in the economic and technological society of the 20th century. As Siddhartha the adult must go to the river and listen to it speak and ponder what it says, but the adult cannot stay at the river forever. Perhaps in another culture or another time he/she could, but not today in the West.

Gordon Allport is considered to be one of the major figures in the development of theories of personality and his views speak directly
to the issue of describing the mature individual. He claims that there are three general characteristics in the mature personality: 1) "a variety of psychogenic interests is required which concern themselves with ideal objects and values beyond the range of viscerogenic desire," 2) "the ability to objectify oneself," and 3) "a mature personality always has some unifying philosophy of life, although not necessarily religious in type, nor articulated in words, nor entirely complete." These three traits are described briefly as the expanding self, self-objectification, and self-unification, respectively. Granted that these three traits are very general, they do form the rudiments of a psychological theory of the personality that not only fits what Rogers is claiming about the fully functioning person but are able to be developed in more detail to clarify their initial abstractness. When speaking about what he calls the "mature religious sentiment" Allport claims that the mature sentiment is differentiated from the immature sentiment by the following: "...the mature sentiment is (1) well differentiated; (2) dynamic in character in spite of its derivative nature; (3) productive of a consistent morality; (4) comprehensive; (5) integral; and (6) fundamentally heuristic." Further specification is available here too. For instance tests can be given to measure some of the characteristics of the mature person in terms of his/her prejudice. Allport reports many such studies in his classic The Nature of Prejudice.

A second way of looking at a description of the mature personality also from a psychological point of view is to look at the work of
Erich Fromm. Although Fromm comes from a somewhat different intellectual background than Allport, both seem to be in basic agreement about the fundamental of the mature personality. Allport is more inclined to what might be called the liberal psychological view and the more "scientific" view of psychology while Fromm is much more clearly influenced by Freud and Marx. Allport's religious background is Christian and Fromm's is Jewish. Fromm is not a practicing Jew in any traditional sense. He claims his position is non-theistic mysticism.

Fromm discusses his own view of religion in his You Shall be As Gods much in the way that Allport discussed his view in the book already cited. Fromm claims that there is a common experience that is often conceptualized differently in various religious traditions. The experience he describes can be used as a characteristic of the mature personality.

...one can describe a "religious" experience as a human experience which underlies, and is common to, certain types of theistic, as well as nontheistic, atheistic, or even antitheistic conceptualizations. What differs is the conceptualization of the experience, not the experiential substratum underlying various conceptualizations. This type of experience is most clearly expressed in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish mysticism, as well as in Zen Buddhism.

Fromm gives a psychological analysis of this experience which he calls the "X experience." His position is very similar to the notion of a common faith that is espoused by John Dewey. The X experience has five general traits. First, the person who has the X experience experiences life as a problem—a question that needs an answer. Second, a
person who has the experience has a definite hierarchy of values. Third, the person treats all humans as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Fourth, the person lets go of his/her ego, greed, and fears, empties himself/herself in order to be filled with the world. Fifth, the person has an experience of transcendence.

Fromm is quite fond of Master Eckhart and quotes him soon after he lists the above mentioned traits.

That I am a man  
I have in common with all men,  
That I see and hear  
And eat and drink  
I share with all animals,  
But that I am I is exclusively mine,  
And belongs to me  
And to nobody else,  
To no other man  
Nor to an angel nor to God,  
Except inasmuch as I am one with him.10

Fromm also develops other ways of talking about the mature personality in non-religious contexts. His Man for Himself devotes many pages to describing what we have been discussing so far. Fromm too is aware of the fact that listing personality types is done at the risk of oversimplification; nevertheless, he does suggest that there are five basic types of character: the receptive, the exploitative, the hoarding, the marketing, and the productive. We are concerned here only with the last type. The Freudian background of Fromm is quite evident in his discussion of the last type.

In discussing the productive character I venture beyond critical analysis and inquire into the nature of the fully developed character that is the aim of human development and simultaneously the ideal of humanistic ethics. It may serve as a preliminary approach to the
concept of productive orientation to state its connection with Freud's genital character. Indeed, if we do not use Freud's term literally in the context of his libido theory but symbolically it denotes quite accurately the meaning of productiveness. For the stage of sexual maturity is that in which man has the capacity of natural production; by the union of the sperm and egg new life is produced. While this type of production is common to man and to animals, the capacity for material production is specific to man. Man is not only a rational and social animal. He can also be defined as a producing animal, capable of transforming the materials which he finds at hand, using his reason and imagination. Not only can he produce, he must produce in order to live. Material production, however, is but the most frequent symbol for productiveness as an aspect of character. The "productive orientation" of personality refers to a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience. It covers mental, emotional, and sensory responses to others, to oneself, and to things. Productiveness is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him. If we say he must use his powers we imply that he must be free and not dependent on someone who controls his powers. We imply, furthermore, that he is guided by reason, since he can make use of his powers only if he knows what they are, how to use them, and what to use them for. Productiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the "actor;" that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him.11

What Fromm says may be accepted by many as an ideal and with no practical implications, since so many of us seem to be tainted by some essential evil in our person that we are unable to even attempt the quest for maturity. But Fromm anticipated this response and claims "productiveness is an attitude which every human being is capable of, unless he is mentally and emotionally crippled."12 The problem here may be one of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because many of us believe that we cannot achieve maturity (for whatever reasons), many of us do not achieve it.
Productivity can be both reproductive and generative. We can copy our experience and give a photographic representation of it or we can take our experience and re-create it and make something new. The generative function is almost non-existent in some of us. To be unable to generate is to lack vision, to lack seeing beyond the horizon, to be unable to see that the past does not dictate the future, to be unable to transcend (an ingredient of the x experience).

Let us suppose then that someone does in fact achieve a relative degree of what Fromm has called productivity. What then is produced? Can we discuss in this context something analogous to the gross national product? Does the productive person produce anything?

We have described productiveness as a particular mode of relatedness to the world. The question arises whether there is anything which the productive person produces and if so, what? While it is true that man's productiveness can create material things, works of art, and systems of thought, by far the most important object of productiveness is man himself.13

Let us suppose further that the productive person does in fact "produce" himself or create himself. What happens next? If I have created myself, do I have anything else to do? Can I be a finished product? Fromm argues that the start of the process is birth itself and that the end, of course, is death. But what can I achieve between these two termini? Is there a limit to my productivity? Fromm would claim that at least in one sense there is a limit. What I could be totally is never possible to achieve; some of my potentialities are never realized. Optimal conditions are doomed to at least partial failure—lest I realize all of my potentials and become static. As
Fromm states so poetically, "Man always dies before he is fully born."\(^14\)

If I submitted a grant proposal to the United States Office of Education and stated as one of my behavioral objectives that I desired to produce productive persons and that I knew that my objectives could never be reached, would I be given any funds to put on a workshop???

**Existential/Phenomenological Considerations**

The psychologists that have been mentioned so far, Allport, Rogers, and Fromm, do not go into great detail concerning the philosophical assumptions that must be true in order for their respective notions of maturity to be feasible. For some these psychologists are already too philosophical, but logically the notion of maturity thus far developed rests on as yet unarticulated philosophical positions. What I propose to do in this section of the paper is to unpack at least one philosophical position which would not only be consistent with the various (and compatible) notions of maturity developed so far, but in fact give substantial arguments for the validity of those notions.

I choose here to discuss the work of Jean-Paul Sartre because his existential/phenomenological approach can be seen as the philosophical underpinnings of the positions developed up to this point. But I warn the reader that Sartre is difficult on first reading and even on the second and third reading. I am trying to explain in my own terms what I take Sartre to be saying.
What is demanded by the psychological positions discussed so far is a philosophical development of the notion of self or person that is even more abstract as some would say, but more crucial because the failure of the philosophical position necessitates the failure of the psychological position.

For Sartre there are at least two levels of consciousness—a pre-reflective level and a reflective level. He also talks of these two levels as non-thetic and thetic or as non-positional and positional respectively. From a phenomenological point of view, the pre-reflective level is a nothingness—a lack of being. It is the subject and not the object. Sartre sometimes uses the phrase "pour-soi" to describe this level. But consciousness is always consciousness of for Sartre and thus a discussion of the object of consciousness must also be given. The object can be called "en-soi." En-soi is a being, not a lack but a positive something.

As I type this paper I am at times absorbed into the very keys of the typewriter—I am the typewriter. Although I am aware in some sense of the term that I am doing the typing and hopefully the thinking that goes into the typing, I am not reflectively aware of myself. In fact it makes some sense to say that there is no person or self doing the typing at all. The notion of self or person arises only on the reflective level and thus at the pre-reflective level I am not aware of my self—I do not exist at this level as a person. To talk about persons and about selves is to reflect on the pre-reflective experiences and thus to make an object of the experience. The subject of the experience is not capturable in a reflective moment, but
analysis necessitates its existence. Thus there is something that I am that I can never know in a reflective manner. This pre-reflective level is my immediate contact with the objects of my experience. It is non-positional—it is not locatable in space and time—in some sense it does not exist. I can be made aware of this pre-reflective level in a variety of ways. The ring of a phone in my office makes me stop typing and makes me reflectively aware of my own activity.

The awareness of self at this pre-reflective level necessitates the presence of others. Consciousness is in some sense essentially social. Sartre likes to give concrete examples of the experiences of both the pre-reflective and the reflective level. His most famous example is the keyhole example in his opus Being and Nothingness. Suppose you were walking down the hallway of an apartment building and you heard laughter and giggling behind one of the doors. Suppose you knew that the person who rented the apartment had wild parties very often. You become interested in what might be going on behind the closed door. You screw your eyes to the keyhole and peer inside the room. For a time you are not reflectively aware of the fact that you are standing or half kneeling in the hallway being a voyeur of types. Then you hear some noise in the hallway. Suddenly you realize that someone is watching you—you feel embarrassed. It’s like getting caught reading a dirty book. You blush; you are ashamed. You have been looked at, have been made an object by someone else’s gaze. You have been reduced to an object. You have lost the initial spontaneity that is the freedom of the pre-reflective level of consciousness. You
are no longer making a world for yourself; you are being made a part of someone else's world.

But the pre-reflective level also stops immediately. You can no longer look through the keyhole. You get up and mumble some petty excuse and you try to get out of the person's sight as soon as possible. The example is quite obvious in terms of the actual experiences but the philosophical implications are not as obvious. The experience is quite common and there is no need to have a philosophical defense of it, but an explanation of it demands a great amount of philosophical sensitivity.

In order to come to grips with my relation to the other I must understand how the other enters into my world. Sartre gives the following example.

I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and along the edge of that lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man. What does this signify? What do I mean when I assert that this object is a man?15

There are at least three different things I might experience when seeing this man. First, I might claim that he's a thing just as the benches and the lawn are. He is not singled out for any special consideration. He is related to the other objects in my field of vision in a "purely additive" way. He is a spatio-temporal thing identical with the other objects. Secondly, I can experience him as a man and this adds significant complexity to the experience. Now something changes in my field of vision. I realize that I have created the
field of vision of which I am the subject, but I also realize that the man has a field of vision also and that he creates a field of vision for himself. Now the bench is not only a certain distance from me, but also a certain distance from him. As Sartre somewhat technically puts it:

Perceiving him as a man, on the other hand, is not to apprehend an additive relation between the chair and him; it is to register an organization without distance of the things in my universe around that privileged object. To be sure, the lawn remains two yards and twenty inches away from him, but it is also as a lawn bound to him in a relation which at once both transcends distance and contains it. Instead of the two terms being indifferent, interchangeable, and in a reciprocal relation, the distance is unfolded starting from the man whom I see and extending up to the lawn as the synthetic upsurge of a univocal relation. We are dealing with a relation which is without parts, given at one stroke, inside of which there unfolds a spatiality which is not my spatiality; for instead of a grouping toward me of the objects, there is now an orientation which flies from me.16

Sartre also claims that the experience he is talking about is one that occurs in everyday experience. Thus no matter how difficult the explanation the phenomenon to be explained must be in some sense staring us in the face. Perhaps a diagram or two may make this much clearer. The first relation that is expressed is seeing the man as a thing. If the visual field looks like this,

\[
x = \text{objects in my field of vision}
\]
then the man is just another of the many objects in my visual field. Notice here where the eye falls—outside the field of vision. The physical eye can be seen, but the phenomenological eye is never in the field of vision. It is equivalent to the pour-soi mentioned earlier. The second relation is that of seeing the man as a man. The diagram is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{x} &= \text{objects in my field of vision} \\
\text{y} &= \text{objects in other's field of vision} \\
\text{xy} &= \text{common objects in both fields of vision}
\end{align*}
\]

This is obviously a bit more complex, but the basic form is similar except that now there are two focal points instead of one. To some extent I am able to recapture the other even though he also escapes me to some extent. Even the second relation does not come to grips with the other's existence as it really is, because I can subsume the other's field of vision to some extent.

But the other is still an object for me. He belongs to my distances; the man is there for me, he is turning his back on me. As such he is again two yards and twenty inches from the statue; hence the disintegration of my universe is contained within the limits of this same universe; we are not dealing here with a flight of the world toward nothingness or outside itself. Rather it appears that the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it is perpetually flowing off through the hole. The universe, the flow, and the drain hole are all once again recovered, reapprehended, and fixed as an object.
A diagram of this would be:

The third relation that is possible is related to the keyhole example as mentioned a bit earlier. What occurs here is radically different than in either of the first two examples. Here I am no longer looking at the other; the other is looking at me. I become an object in his field of vision; I become an en-soi to some extent. Thus Sartre claims that this third relation is presupposed by the first two relations.

...my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other. It is in and though the revelation of my being-an-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. This revelation cannot be derived from the fact that my universe is an object for the Other-as-object, as if the Other's look after having wandered over the lawn and the surrounding objects came following a definite path to place itself on me. I have observed that I cannot be an object for an object. A radical conversion of the Other is necessary if he is to escape objectivity. Therefore I cannot consider the look which the Other directs on me as one of the possible manifestations of his objective being; the Other cannot look at me as he looks at the grass. Furthermore my objectivity cannot itself derive for me from the objectivity of the world since I am precisely the one by whom there is a world; that is, the one who on principle cannot be an object for himself.
Sartre would claim that on the pre-reflective level this is the only appropriate description of the phenomenon discussed. But not everyone is "in touch" with his/her pre-reflective level. Any reflection on this level must give the full integrity of these experiences and not try to "lie" to oneself at the reflective level. To lie to oneself is to live in bad faith or inauthenticity. Bad faith is defined as "A lie to oneself within the unity of a single consciousness. Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself. Bad faith rests on a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognize either one for what it really is or to synthesize them."19

Another term for bad faith is inauthenticity. Authenticity is a prerequisite for what Rogers has called the fully functioning person. But bad faith and authenticity are not as yet moral categories; no moral judgment is made when one is said to be in bad faith or acting authentically. Authenticity is a condition for morality, not a criterion for morality. Authenticity demands a true and lucid realization of the situation and a willingness to accept responsibility for the decisions made and a willingness to take whatever risks the situation demands. But for Sartre the notion of authenticity demands some notion of what it means to be a human. For Sartre this means that he must reject any notion of a human nature.

Man is defined first of all as a being "in a situation." That means that he forms a synthetic whole with his situation—biological, economic, political, cultural, etc. He cannot be distinguished from his situation, for it forms him and decides his possibilities; but, inversely, it is he who gives it meaning by making his choices within it and by it. To be in a situation, as we see it,
is to choose oneself in a situation, and men differ from one another in their situations and also in the choices they themselves make of themselves. What men have in common is not a "nature" but a condition, that is, an ensemble of limits and restrictions: the inevitability of death, the necessity of working for a living, of living in a world already inhabited by other men.20

Two basic responses to this situation are bad faith and authenticity. Neither determines the morality on consequent acts as such.

The rational man groans for the truth; he knows that his reasoning is no more than tentative, that other considerations may supervene to cast doubt on it. He never sees very clearly where he is going; he is "open"; he may appear to be hesitant. But there are people who are attracted by the durability of a stone. They wish to be massive and impenetrable; they wish not to change. Where indeed, would change take them? We have here a basic fear of oneself and of truth. What frightens them is not the content of truth, of which they have no conception but the form itself of truth, that of indefinite approximation. It is as if their own existence were in continual suspension. But they wish to exist all at once and right away. They do not want any acquired opinions; they want them to be innate. Since they are afraid of reasoning, they wish to play only a subordinate role, wherein one seeks only what he has already found, wherein one becomes only what he already was. This is nothing but passion. Only a strong emotional bias can give a lightning-like certainty; it alone can hold reason in leash; it alone can remain impervious to experience and last for a whole lifetime.21

If we assume that the authentic response is the only acceptable response to the human situation, then what does this mean about interpersonal relationship? What does this mean about the notion of a fully functioning person that Rogers claims is the goal of education? What would interpersonal relationships look like if the persons were relating to each other in an authentic manner? Let us use the example of love.
...to love him genuinely is to love him in his otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes. Love is then the renunciation of all possession, of all confusion. One renounces being in order that there may be that being which one is not. Such generosity, moreover, can not be exercised on behalf of any object whatsoever. One can not love a pure thing in its independence and its separation, for the thing does not have positive independence. If a man prefers the land he has discovered to the possession of this land, a painting or a statue to their material presence, it is insofar as they appear to him as possibilities open to other men. Passion is converted to genuine freedom only if one destines his existence to other existences through the being--whether thing or man--at which he aims, without hoping to entrap it in the destiny of the in-itself. Thus, we see that no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the existence of others. 

Some Practical Results

Needless to say, the preceding analysis is very abstract and philosophical, but the question really is whether or not it provides the philosophical underpinning for the positions espoused by Rogers, Fromm, and Allport. One way of determining the validity of these underpinnings is to look at what practical ramifications the theory has in education in particular. I am not going to discuss the everyday ramifications but what I might call middle range ramifications. What would education look like in general if the philosophical theory developed here was used as the underpinning of the curriculum?

First of all, the curriculum would be sensitive to the dynamic notion of personality as developed not only by the psychologists mentioned but also by the philosophers. This would mean that different
subjects would be taught in different ways at different times depending on the stage of development of the students. Whitehead claims that there is a rhythm to education and that bad education may result not because the content was false but because the rhythm was out of tune. He claims that there are three stages to this rhythm: the age of romance, the age of precision, and the age of generalization. Most education focuses on the age of precision. But the age of romance must proceed the age of precision. Students will not learn precision until they are excited about the subject itself.

Education must essentially be a setting in order of a ferment already stirring in the mind: you cannot educate mind in vacuo. In our conception of education we tend to confine it to the second stage of the cycle; namely, to the stage of precision.23

That romance must come first is so obvious that it is hard to believe that so much education disregards this first level. The reason for this disregard is that the educators do not respect the otherness of the students—their freedom to learn. Precision abstracted from romance assumes a basically static theory of personality. Minds are receptacles in which information is poured and regurgitated on Fridays when teachers are too lazy to teach and therefore give tests. Romance never creates problems of motivation, because if a student is not interested in the subject presented then the teacher realizes that for whatever reasons the subject is not to be approached at that time. A sound educational psychology would give a fairly clear indication of when to introduce various subjects and the particular rhythm to use in introducing them.
Whitehead also argues for the elimination of much of what is taught in the schools. In the vernacular I call this "curriculum crap." Students are required to take so many subjects that they see little connection between subject A and subject B. He has two education commandments: Thou shalt not teach too many subjects and Thou shalt teach the few subjects well and thoroughly. The limitation of subjects taught is the result of the corruption that results from accumulating "inert" ideas--ideas that are learnt but have no usefulness. Precision and lack of usefulness go hand in hand in much of what we call education.

There is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all its manifestations. Instead of this single unity we offer children--Algebra, from which nothing follows; Geometry, from which nothing follows; History, from which nothing follows; a Couple of Languages, never mastered; and lastly, most dreary of all, Literature, represented by the plays of Shakespeare, with philological notes and short analyses of plot and character to be in substance committed to memory. Can such a list be said to represent Life, as it is known in the midst of living it? The best that can be said of it is, that it is a rapid table of contents which a deity might run over in his mind while he was thinking of creating a world, and has not yet determined how to put it together.24

Education takes place for Whitehead after you have been in school, have hopefully graduated, have hopefully thrown away your books, and your lecture notes, and begin to apply your knowledge to your own life. Most of what you learn in school you forget anyway. How much high school math do you remember? Can you take square roots? Can you solve quadratic equations? Whatever you need to know you will know because you use it nearly everyday. Whatever you do not know you can look up in the appropriate place.
Whitehead takes particular relish in criticizing the way literature is taught. Many of us have put up with the agony of reading Shakespeare plays in high school--I had to read six of them. It is not the plays that are bad obviously, but how and when they are taught.

The great English Universities, under whose direct authority schoolchildren are examined in the plays of Shakespeare, to the certain destruction of their enjoyment, should be prosecuted for soul murder.25

My own academic discipline is philosophy and I would like to share some of the ways in which I personally have been able to use the model developed in the previous section and what I have gleaned from Whitehead in my own classes. There is no need to read this as a prescribed list which everyone should follow. My way of teaching may be, and should be, subject to criticism. What I want to do is to show that the theory does have implications for the practice.

The introductory course in philosophy is like the introductory course at many colleges and universities--irrelevant. But I refuse to teach the course as it is described in the catalog. The student knows this ahead of time, since I give a catalog-like description of how I teach the course. I also assume that the student has had no formal training in philosophy before he/she enters the class. Normally the students do not have anything but a very vague notion of what philosophy is. Thus the Whiteheadian stage of romance is in order--not the stage of precision. Students have to be excited about the issues first before they are able to develop any technical skills. This is not to say that technical skills are not developed as the course goes on, but the prime reason is not to develop these skills but to see
the issues in the first place. No doubt some precision comes regardless of the focus on romance, but precision is a by-product and not a goal.

Not all students are fascinated by the course and I try to discuss this with them and work out whatever alternatives are possible. It may be that motivational problems or personal problems do interfere with class performance, but I do not penalize these students if at all possible. In fact, I try to get them to approach their motivational or personal problems from a philosophical point of view. This works some times, but not always. Some students cannot be reached at least by me. I hope that someone can reach them.

Students are allowed to determine how they wish to be graded. To a certain extent grading is part of the situation (in Sartre's sense) of the educational milieu in which I operate, but within that situation students are free to pick the criteria on which they wish to be graded. I use what I call a matrix method. Students pick the various criteria that they think are relevant to determining their grade and assign a weighted value to each criterion. Normal criteria include attendance, reading the assigned material, class participation, and a project. Students are allowed to determine which project they want to work on. Normal projects include journals, tests of the take-home essay type, papers, book critiques, and so on. Students are free to choose non-traditional types of projects. I have had students do a painting for the project. Students are also allowed to do one project for the first half of the course and a second project for the second half of the course.
In the first week or so students are asked to make out a contract which states what grade they want to work for (not what grade they want) and to list the specific criteria that they wish to be graded on. Two copies are made—one for me and one for the student. I sign each contract and make any comments that might be necessary. Students who write papers or do book critiques must inform me of the particular subject or book before they appear. I have a type of veto power here, but have never had to use it. Normally I try to get the student to narrow the paper topic and I try to suggest some specific reading material that might be of some use. Book critiques present less of a problem, but I do remind the student that he/she should assume that I have read the book—lest a book critique becomes a book report.

Whenever my schedule is such that I can fit in conferences I urge the students to discuss with me the course and whatever else might come up in the conversation. My experience is that students thirst to talk with teachers and that teachers normally shut them off either by not being available or by making students make appointments that may be weeks off when the reason for the appointment perhaps is no longer valid. Of course, this means that I am sometimes "bothered" by students that really are just killing time between classes—a price I pay for the way I teach.

At the end of the course students are asked to evaluate their performance in light of the contract they made. Students are free to negotiate their contract during the course itself. Then I make an evaluation of the performance and a grade is arrived at. If the student's self-evaluation is within a reasonable distance from mine then
the student gets whichever grade is higher—his or mine. If there is a wide discrepancy between the two evaluations, then a conference is necessary to resolve the differences. I also grade progressively so that an initial low grade is not considered very much if there has been consistent progress throughout the course.

I would like to eliminate grading as it is now practiced but to some extent that is out of my control. I do think that I developed a compromise that makes the best out of an undesirable situation. My grades do tend to be higher than the traditional bell-shaped curve that "educators" claim is the correct distribution for grades. But grades are not always the best indicators of performance. Often the real learning takes place after the course has been completed and the student no longer is even in school.

There are a variety of ways in which I have been evaluated—mostly by students but also by my peers. Student evaluations tend to be a little less critical than they ought to be and tend to overrate teachers. There is an interaction analysis that can also be used that gives a very detailed description of what is actually going on in the class. I tend to have a lot of student input into my classes and the interaction analysis verifies that nearly 30% of the talk in the class is student initiated. I still take up about 70% of the time, but the 30-70 ratio was the highest student input in all the classes that were analyzed.

Students not only respond to my questions, but they also discuss among themselves what their peers have said in class. The conversation
is not always from the student to the teacher and vice versa. Traditional classrooms make it very difficult for students to discuss among themselves because the room always has as a focal point the desk and blackboard—and the teacher stands in front of the room. Desks can be rearranged if necessary but this tends to make the atmosphere even more artificial, because it demands that students and teachers contrive an arrangement that the room was obviously not designed for.

Rooms should be made more functional for discussion by eliminating the traditional tab arm desks (all for right-handers by the way) and by putting in comfortable chairs that are arranged so that student-student discussion is possible. However administrators who plan buildings do not think that class arrangement is very important except perhaps in laboratories. But a classroom is a lab and the old architectural cliche about form following function ought to be used in designing classrooms.

Let me repeat again that my experience has been on the college level and that teachers should not feel bound to copy anything that I might do in my classes. For high school or elementary school, different situations might demand different techniques and different arrangements. The point is that teachers ought to experiment with a variety of techniques in order to develop the one best suited for the particular situation in which he/she finds himself/herself. Within that situation students should be allowed all of the freedom that it is possible for them to handle at their particular level of maturity—and within the same classroom different students may be able to handle different levels of freedom. If a problem arises between freedom and a
questionable level of maturity, allow the error to be on the side of freedom. Any mistakes that are made will at least be the result of a choice. In my own experience students have nearly always responded very positively to all of freedom you give them. This does not mean that anarchy (in the pejorative sense) is the rule of order, but that a relaxed and open environment is the most conducive to learning—although it is not conducive to much that is traditionally called teaching, i.e. brain filling. One caution is in order—because many students are used to being treated as "niggers" (to use Jerry Farber’s analogy) do not be surprised if students initially complain that the class lacks structure and has no stated goals and objectives. And do not be surprised if administrators start talking to you in the hall about discipline problems because your class might be noisy. Silence is not the only indicator that learning is taking place. Little children are noisy when they are learning and they are excited and happy—it’s fun!! Learning is fun, and so is the hard work that is sometimes associated with it. But students like to know that they have some control of the situation and what is being learned.

Reflections and Conclusions

If the philosophical model that this paper has developed is the model that "fits" the notion of the fully functioning person that Rogers claims is the goal of education, then the role of the teacher is going to be changed rather drastically. Teachers are often given respect because they are Dr. So-and-So or Ms. So-and-So or Dean So-and-So—an automatic distance is created between the teacher/administrator and the
student. Students are sometimes surprised that faculty have first names. Somehow they have been led to believe that first names were not something that teachers were given at birth!! Teachers need to realize that some students do not need them at all; that some students need them very much but only for a time. The goal of the teacher is to get the students to function as independent and free persons capable of exercising their choices to determine their own destinies. Student and parents often resent this. Cries about a lack of discipline are sure to be heard. There is discipline in a free and open learning environment, but it does not come from an authority figure who is really a disciplinarian first and a teacher second. The only discipline worth having is self-discipline. Only a faulty psychology can assume that real discipline is forced on people from the outside.

It is not necessary to devote a great deal of time explaining to students what the open classroom is like. Students will be able to tell in a few classes. In fact teachers communicate their attitudes in a variety of indirect ways and students are normally quick to figure out who cares and who does not. Values are not taught; they are caught. In fact one wonders if anything can be "said" that cannot be "shown" better. Since I began with a reference to Kierkegaard, perhaps it is fitting to conclude with a passage from him again plus a few comments on it.

When subjectivity is the truth, the conceptual determination of the truth must include an expression for the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of the fork in the road where the way swings off; this expression will at the same time serve as an indication of the tension of
subjective inwardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual. At the point where the way swings off (and where this is cannot be specified, since it is a matter of subjectivity), there objective knowledge is placed in abeyance. Thus the subject has, objectively, the uncertainty; but it is this which precisely increases the tension of that infinite passion which constitutes his inwardness. The truth is precisely the venture which chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite. I contemplate the order of nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see much else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety. The sum of all of this is an objective uncertainty. But it is for this very reason that the inwardness becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective uncertainty with the entire passion of the infinite. In the case of a mathematical proposition the objectivity is given, but for this reason the truth of such a proposition is an indifferent truth. But the above definition of truth is an equivalent expression for faith. Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.

Subjective truth so defined cannot be communicated in any direct way—or better a direct communication of subjective truth is not subjective truth itself but a reflection on, an inadequate reflection on, subjective truth. Subjective truth cannot be captured and written down on a piece of paper, but it can appear between the written lines. Kierkegaard calls subjective thinkers "knights of faith." In many ways what I have been suggesting in this paper is that the philosophical model that makes some sense out of the notion of the fully functioning person
demands that teachers stop teaching and become knights of faith—or better in subjective matters teaching is impossible. As Kierkegaard says:

The knight of faith is obliged to rely upon himself alone, he feels the pain of not being able to make himself intelligible to others, but he feels no vain desire to guide others. The pain is his assurance that he is in the right way, this vain desire he does not know, he is too serious for that. The false knight of faith readily betrays himself by this proficiency in guiding which he has acquired in an instant. He does not comprehend what it is all about, that if another individual is to take the same path, he must become entirely in the same way the individual and have no need of any man's guidance, least of all the guidance of a man who would obtrude himself. At this point men leap aside, they cannot bear the martyrdom of being incomprehended, and instead of this they choose conveniently enough the worldly admiration of their proficiency. The true knight of faith is a witness, never a teacher, and therein lies his deep humanity, which is worth a great deal more than this silly participation in others' weal and woe which is honored by the name of sympathy, whereas in fact it is nothing but vanity. He who would only be a witness thereby avows that no man, not even the lowliest, needs another man's sympathy or should be abased that another may be exalted. But since he did win what he won at a cheap price, neither does he sell it out at a cheap price, he is not petty enough to take men's admiration and give them in return his silent contempt, he knows that what is truly great is equally accessible to all.

Can you imagine what a curriculum would be like if this was the philosophy of those who were writing the curriculum guides? Does it all then fall into silence and into individualism? Is there no function left for the teacher and is there no need for a curriculum? I do not think that this follows at all. The teacher and the curriculum should be so sensitive to the subjective needs of the students (and of the teachers) that the curriculum should foster the students' ability
to deal with subjective truth, to grapple with ambiguity, to take risks, to accept responsibility for choices. If all else is forgotten but this, then the teacher has been a success and the curriculum has all the merit it could possibly have.

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way. Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
NOTES


3 Rogers, p. 136.


6 Psychological taxonomy is not as yet very exact. I have depended a great deal on the work of Silvano Arieti, in particular his *Interpretation of Schizophrenia* (New York, 1955) and his "Schizophrenia," in *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, edited by Silvano Arieti (New York, 1959). Any book on abnormal psychology would give the essentials necessary for a basic understanding of this phenomenon.


8 Allport, pp. 64-5.

9 Erich Fromm, *You Shall be as Gods* (Greenwich, Conn., 1966), pp. 46-47.

10 Fromm, p. 51.


17. Sartre, p. 49.


19. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 800.


