
Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.

300-76-0462

Graph on page 11 may be marginally legible.


EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$2.06 Plus Postage.

Descriptors Declining Enrollment; *Educational Change; Educational History; Educational Innovation; *Educational Trends; Elementary Secondary Education; Enrollment Trends; *Futures (of Society); Population Growth; *Population Trends; *School Community Relationship; *School Role

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, it is intended to communicate the authors' sense of the context in which the schools will be operating over the next 10 or 12 years and how this context differs from that of the past dozen years. Second, this analysis presents two scenarios for the schools' larger community roles in the next 10 years. One of these scenarios deals with growing communities; the other deals with communities experiencing decline. The essay concludes with a more general ranking of the possible community roles that the schools can fill. An appendix provides additional information on the major factors influencing school enrollment trends. (Author).
Report No. 2

The Schools' Community Roles in the Next Ten Years: An Outside Perspective
The project presented or reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U. S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U. S. Office of Education, and no official endorsement by the U. S. Office of Education should be inferred.
The Schools' Community Roles in the Next Ten Years: An Outside Perspective

Developed pursuant to Contract No. 300760462 by Jane Newitt and Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute Inc., Croton-on-Hudson, New York. This paper represents the views of its author. No opinions, statements of fact, or conclusions contained in this document can properly be attributed to the Institute, its staff, its Members, or its contracting agencies. Funded by the U.S. Office of Education under Title IV, Section 405 of the Education Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-380) "Community Schools Act."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary
Mary Berry, Assistant Secretary for Education

Office of Education
Ernest L. Boyer, Commissioner
THE SCHOOLS' COMMUNITY ROLES IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS: AN OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE

I. INTRODUCTION

Hudson Institute's future studies program has gained attention most recently for looking ahead two hundred years.* However, most of the futures studies the Institute has undertaken for government agencies and private businesses focus on the next decade or so. Such studies generally probe questions of special interest—the future supply and demand for food and fuel, the future of U.S. cities, of the Federal health-care role, of multinational corporations, welfare programs, "working mothers," and so on.

The paper you are starting to read is not a report on a specialized study but a "think piece." We have been asked to apply our knowledge and intuitions to a particular subject: the ways in which schools may innovate in serving their communities' needs under the conditions of the next dozen years. As we understand this subject, it is not intended to include the traditional, primary educational functions of the schools, but only the secondary uses of facilities, equipment, and personnel. In practice, this distinction is not always clear: such innovations as the employment of retired people as teacher aides, or the institution of certain kinds of work-study program, may serve both primary and secondary functions. Still, it is a useful distinction, and it gives us the terminology to state at the start that our focus on secondary functions should not be allowed to obscure the fact that educating children is the primary function of the schools.

---

What we would like to do in this essay is two things. First, we want to communicate our sense of the context in which the schools will be operating over the next ten or twelve years, and how this context differs from that of the past dozen years. Part of this discussion will relate to quantified trends in the age distribution and location of the population; part will deal with what we perceive as the dominant near-past and near-future trends in public and "elite" attitudes, cultural climate, and social policy, as these bear on our area of concern. In the second part of the essay, we will develop and discuss two scenarios for the schools' larger community roles in the next ten years. One of these scenarios will deal with growing communities; the other with those that experience decline. The scenarios will attempt to differentiate the problems and opportunities for the schools' community roles that "go with" conditions of growth or decline. The essay will then conclude with a more general ranking of the menu of possible community roles for the schools. An Appendix provides additional information on the major factors influencing school enrollment trends.

We should mention that our title intends to convey several messages: First, that we are "outsiders," with the advantages and limitations that implies; second, that, as outsiders, and as policy-oriented futurists, we naturally center our attention on the empirical rather than the theoretical aspects of Community Education; third, that our aim is to improve the community educator's ability to work with the opportunities and constraints that we consider likely to characterize the next ten years. In other words, we do not speculate on the longer-term prospects for community schools in "post-industrial" society. We aim for short-term usefulness, not to
inspire or entertain, and certainly not to evoke agreement with all of our interpretations and emphases. In the final analysis, the user is the "futurist," and our essay is probably less helpful where it reinforces the user’s prior beliefs than where disagreement serves as a springboard or catalyst. The essay will be most productive where the act of reading it stimulates the reader, at least figuratively, to write his or her own.

II. ESTABLISHING THE CONTEXT

A. The "Softer" Sort of Trends

Recent years have seen an extraordinary shift in fashionable attitudes about the schools. This shift has not occurred in a vacuum but as part of more general changes in the climate of the culture. Of these the most conspicuous has been the development of a mood of malaise with respect to both the ends and means of social policy. In the mid-1960s, sentiments ranging from radical to reactionary found expression in the concept of a "sick society." These sentiments proved profoundly subversive of the Great Society and "poverty war" objectives of the Johnson Administration. Specifically, the notion that the poor should be aided to acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for full participation in our advanced industrial economy came to seem crass and insensitive, or it was contended that such aims could not be realized without prior "radical restructuring" of our institutions.

Around the turn of the decade, such activist and, in their own way, optimistic views gave way to a profoundly pessimistic fatalism. The industrial era's concept of progress was discredited not as an anachronism from which "forerunner youth" would save us, but as a trap from which, quite
possibly, there was no escape, an inexorable downward spiral triggered by global population growth, pollution, resource depletion, and human greed.

At the same time, the fashionable critique of social policy refocused from ends to means. It was said that "nothing works"; that efforts to solve social problems generate worse problems; that poverty programs mainly function to line the pockets of middle-class professionals and "bureaucrats."

However, this period also saw a narrowing of the abyss that had come, a few years earlier, to separate "elite" reformers from the average American. As the economic disorders of the 1970s displaced the social disruptions of the 1960s, highly educated Americans began to recover the respect for the values and needs of the "common man" that had characterized reformers of earlier times. Such terms as "law and order" and "work ethic" could once more be used without a deprecating sneer.

These complex trends have been fully evident in the area of education. A dozen years ago, any essay on the future of the schools would have centered on discussion of substantive goals and priorities. The educational field was permeated with a sense of success and a relish for innovation. For as long as many young teachers could remember, each incoming class had done better than the one before. Although the school population was growing by leaps and bounds, local taxpayers were endorsing rates of increase in expenditures that substantially exceeded the rate of increase of enrollments. Class size was dropping. New buildings dotted the landscape. Federal aid had become a reality, and was being re-targeted on the poor. The intransigence of Southern resistance to racial integration of the schools was easing. Rising salaries were making the teaching profession more attractive. A better-educated, more affluent public was proving hospitable to an array of long-advocated innovations, and to new technologies as well.
Today a very different orientation prevails. The sense of controlling the future has long since dissipated. The trends of central concern were not planned by anyone. Their origin, functioning, and significance are poorly understood. They are to be coped with, made the best of. Like so many other aspects of our national life, the schools are gripped with the notion that the mission of America's third century is to learn "the art of managing decline."

Any such mercurial shift of national "mood" must be viewed with suspicion. However, with respect to the schools, it is evident enough that a great deal has changed, and an essay on the future must take these changes into account. First, the Coleman Report cast doubt on what had hitherto been gospel: that costly "inputs" improve the "output" of the schools. Then the trend toward annual improvement in measured academic achievement reversed. Noted initially in inner-city schools (together with rising disorder and violence), this countertrend was often attributed to the rapidly changing racial configuration of these schools. Similarly, the decline in College Board scores was at first explained by reference to the fact that more--and presumably less well qualified--students were taking these tests.

Recent studies have documented that neither explanation suffices. Academic performance has been dropping in white suburban schools as well as in central cities. Often the best students have shown the greatest decline, compared to their peers who took the same tests in the same school.

*This paragraph summarizes findings of a Hudson Institute study, conducted by Frank E. Armbruster, as part of a program of U.S. social policy studies funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity (now the Community Services Administration). A book based on this education study has a planned publication date of June 1977.
districts in earlier years. Perhaps most mystifying, the turn down in
scores occurred at about the same time for all levels above third or
fourth grade: in other words, the phenomenon was not a matter of an
'under-achieving' cohort moving through the grades but, at least at the
start of a synchronized slippage on the part of students of various ages
who had previously been on the rising phase of the achievement curve.

Meanwhile, large numbers of school districts began to turn down bond
issues and budgets. The recession of 1970 and the more severe "stagflation"
and recession of recent years reinforced this development, as did the
serious fiscal problems that many cities were forced to face. At the same
time, traditional means of funding public schools came under court challenge;
and turmoil resulted from efforts to enforce racial integration in the North.
On top of all this came the problem of rapid enrollment decline in many
elementary schools, dramatizing the long-term prospect for the high schools
at a time when the short-term prospect was still a rise in enrollment every
year.

Curricular emphases have changed as well. The neo-traditionalist
emphases of the post-Sputnik era gave way to a climate in which the schools
were deprecating for stressing competitive achievement. "Soft" subjects
came into vogue. The idea of equipping the children of the poor and near-
poor with the basic academic skills to rise in a hard, cruel world was sup-
planted by the idea that the schools must compensate for the psychological
damage of disorderly home environments. As in middle-class schools, the
inner-city teacher was charged first and foremost to be sensitive to the
needs and interests of each individual child. Yet this was immensely diffi-
cult to attempt even in many schools where the task was not complicated by
rapid racial change.
Nor was the teacher helped by the long period when fashionable thinking denied or obscured the demands of poor and nonpoor, black and white parents alike for a disciplined environment for learning and a reasonable emphasis on the three Rs. But what one might term the "counter-reformation" of fashionable attitudes is now clearly impacting on the schools; and we regard this development as having major import for the next ten years. Instead of casting themselves in a vanguard role, many of the well-educated parents and other citizens who bestir themselves to influence school policy at the local level seem likely for a good many years to see their role as one of championing the values and concerns of the community at large.

However, what this connotes is easy to misstate or caricature. Gallup's annual surveys of attitudes about education suggest continuing concern about costs— but not blind opposition to higher budgets, and not a widespread belief that teachers are overpaid, although these attitudes are obviously important in some places. The surveys show strong opposition to teacher tenure, and strong attraction to "accountability"— but also acceptance of teachers' right to belong to unions, if not to strike. They suggest emphasis on basic skills, discipline, and vocational training— but not blanket hostility to the innovations of recent years, or to new forms of experiment. They show strong opposition to busing— but strong

---

acceptance of racial integration. Thus the concept of "counterreformation" is not a synonym for restoration of the ways the schools were organized and functioned thirty years ago. It refers rather to what might be termed a "New Synthesis" of elite and popular attitudes, a consensus of moderates that is already reflected in the composition of school boards in many areas.

This, at least, is the construction we find persuasive. Those who are less sanguine perceive instead a "swing to the right," with ominous import for civil rights, civil liberties, and (at a more mundane level) the funding of the schools. We agree that such developments will characterize some school districts; while today's 17,000 school districts are remarkably fewer than the 40,500 in 1960, they suffice to allow for great diversity. But we expect this diversity to function within a framework of constraints and incentives such as our term "New Synthesis" is meant to connote, at least until the late 1980s.

We also see it likely that this coming decade will be characterized by relatively rapid economic growth. This forecast rests on analyses that we lack the space to explicate here, but it is worth noting that our economic and social forecasts are interrelated--and that the familiar term, an "aging population," is very misleading for the next decade, when an unusually high proportion of our working-age population will be entering their most productive years, in terms of employment experience, health and...
vitality, and the motivations that accompany family responsibilities even if the family is small.

We do consider it possible or even likely that an era of slackened economic growth, social conflict, and renewed appetite for social experimentation may begin to emerge by the end of the period of interest to this essay. In other words, our decade of "New Synthesis" might be viewed as a breathing space between two more "interesting" times. Also, it should go without saying that unpleasant surprises can occur, and that failure to control inflation (whatever happens to the unemployment rate) could have serious disorienting effects. The schools, like all our other institutions, including the family, would be severely handicapped in ability to plan and in "sense of control" by continuing high rates of inflation and by their characteristic, often difficult to predict, unevenness among commodities.

The public knows this: only once in the depths of 1974 did the percentage of Gallup's respondents who regarded unemployment as our most important national problem (crime remains the top local problem) exceed the percentage who saw inflation in this light. Thus to an important extent our New Synthesis forecast rests on an assumption that the annual rate of inflation will not get out of hand--indeed, that it may be brought well below the level that plagues us today.

B. School Enrollment Trends

The most solid data we have for speculation on the social future relate to the numbers and age distribution of people already born. For the schools this means that we can speak with a high level of confidence about the numbers of first graders through 1982. The same data allow us
an estimate for high school seniors through 1994, although the element of uncertainty obviously compounds with time: by 1994, educational policy regarding dropouts may have changed, or the Census Bureau's present assumptions about the contribution of immigration to population growth may no longer be valid.

However, these relatively solid data pertain to the national scene. Their usefulness for state and local planners is limited by variation in law or practice regarding school-entry and school-leaving age. It is limited by great differences in the distribution of children between public and non-public schools, and by differences in the trends this distribution shows. Most important, it is limited by the fact that Americans, especially younger ones, move around a lot. While most of these moves are local, a sufficient number are longer-distance to produce considerable interstate-variation in enrollment trend. As illustrated by the accompanying map, the 1972-74 period saw a decline of more than seven percent for Illinois and, at the opposite extreme, a rise of almost fifteen percent for Arizona.

This variance does not mean that national data are "academic" except for national educational planning purposes. This conclusion would be warranted if past birth rate trends had varied greatly from state to state, but these trends have shown a marked tendency to move together. Thus interstate variations in school enrollment are substantially, although not entirely, a function of the difference between out- and in-migration. State and local planners, having estimated their migration prospect, can interpret national projections as diminishing or exaggerating the expectable impact of the migration trend on their schools. Thus in 1972 past
trends in the national birth rate (expressed as national school enrollment projections) might have warned such states as Texas and California to expect the moderate enrollment decline shown on the map despite their expectation of fairly substantial in-migration. Ten or twenty years earlier, a similar rate of in-migration would have connoted a disproportionate impact on the schools. And these differences over time have meaning for the school district level as well as the state, although at this level one would expect some exceptions to the general rule.

Obviously, trends in enrollment and projected enrollment can have an important bearing on the evolution of the schools’ community roles. However, the range of local variance does limit the interest of national trends. For this reason, we limit our discussion to several points and speculations of general interest. (A more detailed treatment will be found in the accompanying Appendix.)
The first point to make about the national enrollment trend is that the 1980s will see a stabilization and, indeed, a slight rise in the numbers of elementary and junior high school children even if the birth rate drops slightly lower than it stands today. This oddity results from a continuing increase, for several more years, in numbers of women who are in their prime child-bearing years.

Meanwhile, the problems that have been experienced by the elementary schools will begin to shift to the secondary schools. If immigration holds constant, the number of 14 to 17-year olds in 1990 will be 25 percent lower than in the peak year, 1974. As is illustrated in the Appendix to the paper, some of this decline (especially through 1985) might be accommodated informally by the reduction of class-size. Also, while there is some interest today in lowering the legal dropout age, the problems associated with declining enrollment seem likely by the mid-1980s to dampen this interest and to yield increased emphasis on improving retention rates and increasing the re-enrollment of school-leavers. In short, if one counts high school classrooms instead of students, or enrolled students rather than high-school age population, the decline from 1974 to 1990 (or later) will probably turn out to be somewhat less.

As already noted, migration trends will produce great local differences. However, the projection of migration trends is fraught with considerable uncertainty. Until rather recently, comprehensive and detailed data on population movements within the United States were limited to the decennial census years. Current techniques for annual measurement are still somewhat experimental. Perhaps more important, we lack the experience to judge how much of the migration of the 1970s is a temporary
product of economic ills. How many of the people who were attracted in the early 1970s to the healthier economies, warmer climate, and lower living costs of the "sunbelt" states will stay there? How seriously should we regard the historically unprecedented fact that fewer Americans are moving into than out of metropolitan areas? What about the equally unprecedented fact that as many blacks are moving into the South as are moving out? Even if our documentation of these "facts" were more precise than it is, the underlying conditions supporting the trends could change. Similarly, at the local level, experience is an important teacher but also, in some circumstances, a treacherous one.

A special case of this problem is the future birth rate. It is usual today to assume that the 1940s and 1950s were an anomalous episode in the long-term trend of birth rate decline. The resumption of this long-term trend during the past twenty years has included especially rapid rates of decline in fertility for most population subgroups that had exceptionally large families in the past: e.g., Catholics, blacks, immigrants, rural people, the poor. Thus it has been easy to postulate that various contextual factors are producing and facilitating a homogeneous preference for small families.

As applied to "lagging" groups, this line of reasoning is certainly persuasive; elsewhere, the question arises, "How small?" Today's birth rate points toward average completed fertility of 1.8 children. To sustain this average, it is necessary that very large numbers of young women have one child or none. Yet even today, when the polls indicate that family size preferences are lower than ever before, they do not yield this result. The modal preference is two children, and the percentage
wanting three or more is a great deal higher than that which favors one
or none.

Also, the difference between a two- and a three-child family looks
terribly dramatic when expressed in national terms, but the difference it
connotes for the budget of a particular young family may be well within
a range where fashion is decisive. In a society so affluent as ours, it
may be that the long-term decline in the birth rate is replaced by a
cycle in which young people who grew up in very small families think it
would be more fun to have somewhat larger ones, and vice versa.

There are, basically, four different theories one might take seriously
about the birth-rate trend of the next ten years:

1. That cultural changes (e.g., feminism, commitment to zero
   or negative population growth, distaste for children) can
   result in a continuing fertility decline;

2. That the birth rate may rise slightly, but will stabilize
   more or less permanently at roughly a replacement level;

3. That birth rates will rise in the 1980s (and 1990s), expressing
   the rising phase of an inter-generational cyclical trend; and

4. That birth rates will rise, but for reasons that do not hold
   promise of an orderly, counterbalancing, subsequent down-
   turn.

The second most important point to make about these theories is that, in
the period of interest, there would be no way to tell whether a rise in
the birth rate corroborated Theory #3 or #4. The most important point to
make is that all possible developments—Theories #1, #2, or the ambiguous
#3/#4—would almost certainly be viewed with mounting concern. This is
the legacy of the great fluctuations of the past half century. In the
1980s we will begin to experience a situation where the number of young
workers grows smaller each year. If the birth rate stays low, the
associated economic problems and the prospect of their worsening will become more "real," yet the scary connotations that rising birth rates have acquired since the 1950s will not go away. With reference to "right teaching," the schools will be pressured from both directions. The relative harmony that has recently existed on the subject of desirable birth rates will tend to be replaced by rather heated controversy, whatever the fertility trend.

In short, for purposes of speculation on the next ten years, what happens to the birth rate should be regarded as an open question; second, the range of direct impact of alternative birth rate trends on enrollment, within this ten-year time frame, is almost certainly not great enough to justify flagging the uncertainty as including any potential for a serious problem; and, third, whatever the trend, the anxieties and conflicts it generates will create worse short-term problems for the schools than the trend itself.

Among the uncertainties which complicate projection of a school district's enrollment, we should also mention the potential for change in national immigration policy. Our Appendix provides some information on recent immigration trends, but these trends have pertained to nationalities and occupations rather than numbers. For demographic and also, more recently, for economic reasons, there have been effective pressures to keep the numbers of immigrants small. However, because of the birth rate decline, legal immigrants now account for about a quarter of our annual net increase in population, compared to about a tenth in 1960.*

*This comparison does not include the one-time surge in immigration associated with the evacuation of South Vietnam. It also excludes illegal immigrants, whose numbers in the country today may be as high as five or six million.
In the 1980s, the decline in numbers of young people reaching working age could trigger a fairly rapid build-up of pressures to increase numbers of immigrants, especially the less-skilled. Even a tripling of immigration would not have a great impact on the "average" school district, since the distribution of immigrants tends to be concentrated. However, even a redistribution of the present immigrant flow—for example, if more industry moves to the Southeastern states—could become the central problem of school-community relations in many districts. In a number of states, only a few percent of the population are "foreign stock," a category that includes not only the foreign-born but people with one foreign-born parent. If we suppose some increase in immigration, a marked shift of occupational preference toward the less-skilled, and some geographical changes in immigrant-receiving localities, it is easy to imagine that many more school districts than today will be faced with "traditional" problems that are new to them.

C. Summary of Contextual Factors

We pause now to recapitulate the points we have made thus far about the context of school-community relations in the next ten years. We believe it is reasonable to expect, at least by comparison to the past fifteen years, a relative absence of issues that polarize communities, setting races, ethnic groups, social classes, and the generations at odds. It will generally be possible to appeal to a broad constituency without infuriating militant minorities. In the schools, there will be more concern for "standards," in all our institutions, a more relaxed attitude about living with reasonable (or even silly) institutional rules.
Community and personal life are likely to seem more interesting in the coming decade than national politics and crusades. As economic recovery proceeds, the "typical" school district will be characterized by stable elementary school enrollment, declining high school enrollment, and an expanding tax base, as the crest of the baby boom generation moves into its home-buying and peak earning years. Our age distribution also suggests that, while families may remain small, the proportion of all households that have at least one child in school will rise. Thus there is no reason to expect the school's most direct electoral constituency to shrink. Indeed, families that have only two children may well have more time and motivation to interest themselves in the schools than the larger families of the past. (We assume that this is a mixed blessing from the educator's point of view!)

What instabilities may influence the school's community roles? We have noted the possibility of considerably increased immigration, and/or its direction to areas that have not experienced it before. Internal migration, as we will shortly discuss, can also cause friction, and generate needs that the schools will be asked (or wish) to address. Also, there will be an increase in what we call "localism," the sometimes harmful trend toward increasingly effective community resistance to local siting of airports, power plants, low-income housing, mental health centers, and other facilities that nearly everyone approves in the abstract—but not in this neighborhood. Similarly, resistance may firm in some areas against further consolidation of school districts, and against further enhancement of the state governments' educational funding and policy roles. At the extreme, confrontations with the courts might occur.
Our basic forecast invites a guess that divorce rates, employment rates of young mothers, and crime rates may stabilize or decline, and that birth rates may rise. Thus it is very important to note that, of these four behavioral indices, only crime rates as yet present any empirical evidence that this is happening. Of course, it is also important that (at least among whites) nearly nine out of ten children still live in two-parent families, and two out of three mothers of young children do not "work." Nonetheless, we should not expect the 'Eighties to be a reprise of the 'Fifties. Pressures on the schools and other public institutions to act in loco parentis seems unlikely to subside decisively anywhere. In many communities such pressures may be expected to rise—but conflict over meeting them will also rise.

III. LOOKING AHEAD AT THE SCHOOLS' COMMUNITY ROLES
A. Two Scenarios

A scenario is not a forecast but an analytical tool. Unlike most other tools of futures studies, a scenario attempts to interrelate a great many variables in a manner that frankly relies on the authors' intuitive skills. As with fictionalized histories that go beyond documentable fact, a scenario fails in its purpose if the reader's intuitive sense of what is credible, what "goes together," differs markedly from the authors'. However, this criterion of success or failure is not absolute. A scenario which makes the best case for an unfashionable or neglected view of the future can usefully educate the reader who does not find this case wholly persuasive. Conversely, a scenario which expresses what the reader thought all along may connote nothing more than shared--
and importantly erroneous--intuitions. In this case, the "successful" scenario fails as an analytical tool unless (as may happen) its spelling out of what "everyone knows" evokes challenges from third parties that would not otherwise be made.

At the start of this paper, we sketched a basic social scenario for the context of the schools' community roles in the next ten years. This "Standard World" is the first of fifteen scenarios for the next decade which Hudson Institute has developed in varying levels of detail. A number of these scenarios are variations of the Standard World. Others spotlight particular possible developments that might or might not alter the functioning and trend of the Standard World to an important degree. Several scenarios are to greater or lesser degree catastrophic by definition.

For present purposes, it is not necessary to go into such detail. We believe that most readers will consider it reasonable and useful to differentiate the coming decade from the past one in roughly the way that we have done. The next question is: what sub-scenarios can usefully be presented to suggest specifics, and their variation, in the schools' community roles?

We have concluded that the most salient distinction among school districts in the next ten years is whether their communities are perceived as growing or in decline. Since Hudson Institute is known to favor economic growth, this conclusion runs the risk of antagonizing some of our readers. Will we be "objective" in sketching our two scenarios, or will we be arguing a brief? The answer is "Both." We want to direct attention to aspects of the growth issue that seem neglected or misunderstood; we will try to do this effectively, but clearly as proponents of a point of
view. But we also are persuaded that, in the coming decade, the growth-decline dimension will be more important than such other dimensions as race and class in shaping the schools' community roles.

This judgment rests on regional economic and population trends, and especially on the importance that state and local leadership, the media, and the general public have come to attach to these trends. General economic recovery cannot confidently be expected to decelerate either the so-called "sunbelt shift" of people and jobs, or the recent tendency for more people to move out of metropolitan areas than to move into them. A number of alternative forecasts for these trends are somewhat persuasive. None is commandingly so except in the most general terms: i.e., there has been a long-term trend toward inter-regional convergence on various measures of wealth and income. We may expect this long-term trend to persist, with the economic growth of the historically more affluent states lagging the national average; with some cities and counties in these states showing actual economic decline; and with many others fearing the onset of decline. Further, we can expect that the general school-enrollment decline, resulting from falling birth rates, will tend to magnify the impact on the schools of any out-migration that a district experiences. It seems worthwhile to center our speculations on this new type of experience, and to contrast it to the "growth scenario" that was the norm for school districts for so many years.

1. The Declining Community, and Its Schools' Community Roles

The factors of central importance in the declining community are likely to be:
a. surplus plant and personnel;
b. a rising proportion of older people in the population;
c. a shrinking proportion of households that have children in the schools;
d. strong sentiments and efforts to turn the population/economic decline around (even if the economic "decline" is relative rather than absolute);
e. a decline in the socioeconomic family status of the average school-child (i.e., out-migrants ranked higher on these indices than the families that remain); and
f. a change in the balance between public and nonpublic schools.

This last can go either way. Schools which depend on tuition and other private support are logically more vulnerable to the out-migration trend than tax-supported schools. However, if the selective character of out-migration is seen as resulting in a "lower class" majority or disruptive minority in the public schools, many middle class people may be motivated to accept the monetary burden of pulling their children out.

In any case, it seems evident that the school board and school officials of the declining community will feel a need to enlarge (i.e., re-enlarge) their base of community support. An emphasis on services for the elderly will seem attractive on both pragmatic and philosophical grounds, including such services as recreational programs (possibly during school hours, and using school staff), school-bus transportation, re-focusing of school service clubs on assistance to older people, and use of retired people as school aides.

Second, the schools will be motivated to reduce class size, and to increase or develop emphasis on counseling and other services for...
low-income students and their families; under-employed teachers may be retrained to double in these roles, or to serve as full-time specialists in remedial reading, learning disabilities, health education, and other subjects that especially address the needs of the lower-income groups that have become a more prominent part of enrollment.

Efforts of this type will logically include attention to the dropout problem. There will also be interest in absorbing and expanding publicly funded nursery schools or day-care centers. Such interest is likely to run afoul of the fact that most such centers operate year-round, but some effort to involve the schools in early education is still likely to be made. Making kindergarten a full-day program, at least in low-income neighborhoods, may have similar appeal, as a service to working mothers and a means to take up slack.

However, we must now note that many such "logical" responses of the schools to a changing community have little if any relevance to the urgent concerns of the community's leadership. They may indeed be viewed as inimical to the objective of attracting new business and residents. The contention will be made that the elderly, the poor, and the near-poor already pay less in taxes than they receive in services, even if these services are not closely "targeted" on their special needs. High taxes may be seen as a major reason for the community's decline. The schools' natural orientation toward services and toward meeting immediate needs is thus likely to sit poorly with the community leadership's anxious efforts to invest in long-term economic improvement, even if short-term sacrifices (by the poor) are required.
Thus, in the declining community, a second agenda for the schools emerges in parallel with the first, emphasizing cutting costs (especially of services to economically marginal groups), rationalizing the use of existing resources, and testing any proposed innovations in the schools' community roles by reference to their attractiveness to business and the middle class.

The two agendas do have points in common. Both include a heightened interest in additional possibilities for state and federal aid. This means that the state and federal governments may have considerable leverage in influencing whether the schools of declining communities evolve primarily in harmony with the service rationale or the city fathers' investment strategies. Also, both agendas include concern for the upset balance—in whichever direction—of public and nonpublic school enrollment. The reasons for this concern include, in one version, the problem of the nonpublic schools "skimming the cream" of the public school students; in both versions, the existence of parallel school systems compounds the problem of inefficient resource use. As a result, declining (or relatively stagnant) communities may be good testbeds for voucher experiments and other means for reducing the diseconomies of having two systems. It is in such communities that these diseconomies are most painful. Also, such communities feel a special need to attract favorable types of public attention from the country at large; some innovative community services might meet this need as well.
2. The Growing Community, and Its Schools' Community Roles

We now turn attention to a school district where the effects of past birthrate decline have been overbalanced by in-migration. This community may have started out as a freestanding town or small city, but it is now classified by the Census Bureau as part of the "suburbs" of a metropolitan area, or else it is adjacent to such an area, or it occupies a choice location on the interstate or freeway network, or it has some special attraction that serves as a node for development. While it may (or may not) be in process of becoming a regional center, it probably has a number of neighbors that are growing at a comparable rate.

We will say that its salient characteristics are these:

a. many relatively young, well-educated, and prosperous people, some of whom grew up locally, many of whom grew up in the same general regional culture, and a small but conspicuous minority are genuine outlanders (e.g., "the New York crowd");

b. an older, generally less educated and less affluent local culture, including a local leadership that favored, perhaps promoted, but is now not entirely comfortable with the effects of economic and population growth;

c. by local standards, a lot of new, less-skilled workers, possibly blacks or hillbilly whites, or locally unfamiliar ethnic groups;

d. by local standards, a lot of transients, crime, disorderly behavior, "welfare";

e. a construction boom;

f. a rising cost of living (although the price level, by the standards of many in-migrants, may still be low);

g. some school-crowding, some use of "tempo" and shifts, some new construction (but possibly the latest bond issue was turned down);
h. property taxes lower than where many in-migrants came from, but a ten-fold increase over fifteen years ago for some locals; and

i. a destabilizing of traditional balances of power and "arrangements" between political parties, and among the major churches, businessmen, professionals, labor unions, and ethnic groups.

As noted earlier, this is basically an old, familiar scenario, but there has been some change in attitudes about such subjects as work, children (and willingness to make sacrifices in their behalf), the association of progress with economic growth, and the inevitability of economic growth. School officials no more than others are certain how important these changes are, but at some level of importance they are obviously not good news for school districts where taxes have been rising rapidly and are destined to rise much more.

Nor are the schools' problems limited to those directly associated with rising rolls. In addition, the more influential newcomers are accustomed to different and more costly styles and standards of municipal services. They want recreation programs and facilities, a municipal swimming pool, trash collection, more school bus routes, more police, smaller class size, better-trained teachers, guidance counselors, better science laboratories, computer programming instruction and so on forever. Some of these people are also at odds with local law and custom on such matters as alcohol, marijuana, female dress on public streets, suitable books for school libraries, informal police procedures, the social studies curriculum, and Christmas pageants in the schools.

Still, our growing community no more than our declining community is in imminent danger of falling apart at the seams. Most newcomers are
reasonably sympathetic with the values and customs of the local culture, which, in turn, is reasonably tolerant of them. The fractious minorities on both sides are not large enough to be seriously disruptive. Moreover, the economic boom has been going on (with occasional dips) for some time. Within and outside the community, there is much experience-based knowledge of how to "manage growth" (as there is not for how to "manage decline"), and the general feeling is that the problems of the next ten years may be serious but are still the right kind of problems to have.

This, indeed, is why the school board and school officials can think about playing more varied roles in community life. Unlike the declining community, where such thinking has a strongly defensive basis, talk in the growing community centers on improving "the quality of life," encouraging "community spirit," and the like. Moreover, there is no serious schism between town fathers and the schools. The sources of friction relate to the allocation of resources that are merely growing less rapidly than some citizens' expectations. Thus both parties are interested in opportunities for sharing plant, equipment, and personnel, and for meeting several needs at once where new construction is concerned.

What can be done during the normal school day is not much. On the other hand, the schools are serving their communities by generating a considerable number of jobs; for women, these tend to be the best jobs around, despite the general condition of labor scarcity. Also, the community is receptive to a work-study program in the high school, and excited about a "pre-program" in the middle school, under which students are paid to do maintenance and clerical work in the schools and to assist teachers in the lower grades.
Use of the student workers also allows the custodial staff to work a later shift in several schools. This means that classrooms, gymnasiums, and an auditorium can be used evenings for community purposes at little cost. (Previously, the principal available facilities were in church basements, and access was often limited to members of the church and fraternal groups to which they belonged.) An array of adult education courses centers on equipping people to improve the use of their leisure time. An adult drama club and a chamber music group are formed. The inadequacies of the existing auditorium are deplored, and an adequate constituency emerges to include a better one in the plans for the new high school. A swimming pool is also added to the plans.

The growing community lost out some years ago in its bid for a community college. As an interim measure, arrangements are made for university extension courses to be conducted in the high school in the summer months. Initially, these are mostly teacher-training courses, but the curriculum is broadened each year, the courses are generally over-subscribed, and the community’s case for a year-round institution begins to be documented. Liaison with the state university also facilitates the introduction of lecture and concert series which respond to the community’s desire for a higher cultural “tone.”

At the opposite extreme, there is serious concern in the growing community about soaring crime rates, including (by local standards) shocking problems of pilferage and vandalism, and some violence, in the schools. Efforts to get at the “roots” of the problem are spearheaded by the churches and traditional youth groups, such as scouts and police auxiliaries. Attention tends to be focused on the least controversial...
"solution"—the expansion of recreational facilities and programs—and the schools are more or less drafted to serve this interpretation of the problem.

3. Commentary

Since the scenarios emphasize innovations, they tend to obscure the likelihood that the declining community's schools are already doing many of the things that the growing community's schools are only starting to do. However, this burden of existing commitments tends to reinforce the contrast we have drawn.

Basically, the declining community encounters serious conflicts between the schools' perspective on the top priorities for community service and the perspective of other local leadership groups. Such conflicts are less prominent in the growing community. The schools in its lower-class neighborhoods may feel neglected, and this neglect may seem to have overtones of racial or ethnic discrimination, but the relatively fluid situation of the growing community means that these overtones appear more circumstantial than deliberate; and it is also—or even more—important that lower-income people in the growing community generally share its optimism.

We do not want to romanticize this point, or the larger picture of the growing community, which in many respects for many people seems an inferior place to the community that is in decline. Assuming the two communities are of roughly similar size, the law of inertia suggests that the declining one probably has more cultural advantages, more specialized shops, more experienced teachers, more complete social services for people in need.
If it offers fewer jobs, the mix of jobs (and hence the culture) is still likely to have more niches for special talents. And of course there are the psychological and perhaps esthetic strengths of a settled environment. The rawness of the growing community and its larger environment will be depressing to many people.

Still, it is nearly impossible to sketch a scenario for the schools' community roles in which the declining community looks as attractive as the growing one--to the average citizen or the poor--unless the decline is reversed. At least we have found it so, although we urge the skeptical reader to give it a try.

Healthy communities will either be benefiting from general economic growth or else they will be profiting at their neighbors' expense. The latter is not a formula one can recommend for general use. But in a larger perspective the issue becomes more problematic. Can one fault the declining community if it tries to "steal" industries from somewhere else (do unto others as they have done unto you)? Can one expect its school personnel--who may be genuinely convinced, in the abstract, that population and economic growth are "bad"--to stand up and be counted on this point?

No--and such inconsistency is not at all perverse. One may reasonably advocate a no-growth or slow-growth economy for the nation while scrambling to improve one's community's share of the pie. But we doubt that any national education policy can be formulated to give dignity to the "natural" local wish to better oneself, even at another district's expense. To be more precise, any national education policy for a no- or slow-growth America must either be disingenuously blind to reality, or else it must aim to shift funds from advantaged to disadvantaged places.
Yet this last is most problematic, as recent experience with "no growth" has shown. As already noted, our country has had a marked long-term trend toward reduction of interstate differences in average income. So long as the country prospered, it was generally accepted that federal education policy should do its part in forwarding the trend by disbursing funds under formulas that favored the poorer states. (Thus, for example, federal aid in 1974-75 accounted for 24 percent of all public school revenues in Mississippi, but only 5 percent in Massachusetts.) However, under no-growth conditions, it comes to be challenging that federal programs should disproportionately assist those states that are moving up toward the national income average, since this burdens the more affluent states that are "in decline."

In other words, for regions or states or school districts, as for individuals and nations, willingness to promote a narrowing of income inequalities is terribly sensitive to whether one's own income is moving up rapidly, or sluggishly, or moving down. There is great potential for social divisiveness in no-growth or slow-growth policies and conditions. Unhealthy dynamics are triggered. Conflicts of interest are heightened, and draped in righteous platitudes. Compromise and consensus become difficult to reach.

Perhaps there is an "art of managing decline," but perhaps this art is only practicable for picture-postcard villages, not for substantial industrial centers whose raison d'être is production and whose amenities are primarily man-made—and costly. For such places, it seems reasonable to state rather flatly that only if most people enjoy the experience of being better off materially than last year is there any realistic expectation
of willingness to place the national interest above local interests. And only if the experience of personal progress is general can we expect a good fit between the schools' construction of desirable community services and that of the citizens who must foot the bill.

Because of renewed economic growth, we expect that such a "fit" will return to being the usual experience in the next ten years, and that its accompaniment of continuing enrollment decline will primarily generate problems of surplus that can be construed as opportunities, so far as the concept of community schools is concerned. But declining enrollment can produce defensive thinking—by teachers' unions, by districts that find themselves losing state aid. There is a possibility that such problems may loom so large in the thinking of school people as to produce the decoupling that our "decline" scenario shows.

B. A Ranked Typology of Community Services for the Schools

So we return our attention to the "average" school district, and we ask: In terms of the community's felt needs, what are the more and less promising avenues of service that the schools may pursue in the next ten years?

We suggest, first, that it is not useful for any school district to ask this question until it takes inventory of services already performed. Except in a very small district, this may be a difficult task to do well, since schools tend to accrue informal commitments in much the way that fire departments come to be expected to get kittens out of trees. Still, it seems worth doing for a number of reasons. First, instances of flagrant favoritism or inequity in the existing provision of services may
be revealed. To eliminate such services and the vague resentment they evoke may be a better community service than many of a positive kind.

Second, existing informal services may provide a good index to community needs: if one finds that a school bus driver twice a week lets an elderly woman hitch a ride to the grocery store, perhaps this service ought to be regularized, not stopped. Third, the exercise of costing out existing services and attempting to eliminate those that seem unjustified can be useful in itself, and also to indicate how difficult it is to eliminate commitments once assumed, even if the basic reason for the commitment no longer exists.

Turning now to our generalized ranking of new services, it seems to us that those which are most congenial to the public mood will relate to reducing the gap between the schools and the world of work. There is a great variety of ways to serve this aim. Some are "token," some unpromising, some may even do more harm than good. Perhaps the best promise lies in devising and improving means for students to obtain the important experience of doing genuinely useful work, paid and unpaid, in their schools and communities.

Second most important are what we would term "assimilative services" in both a general and a special sense. In the general sense, it does not matter so much what the assimilative services are as that more opportunities for getting together with like-minded neighbors are generated, and the desire for a "sense of community" is served. The special sense refers, in some cases, to the same set of services, but with a special intent to provide links between "natives" and newcomers (whether U.S. "movers" or foreign immigrants).
Generally speaking, assimilative services of either kind will take
the form of evening classes, although some can be offered to elderly
people or housewives during the day. Of course, both types of programs
are common; they are not "new"; but their history shows a pattern of sub-
stantive innovation. Recent cultural trends have promoted the popularity
of, for instance, cooking courses for husbands and auto repair courses
for wives. In some areas, the Bicentennial generated interest in local
history and in the revival of colonial crafts. Perhaps the best key to
the dominant adult interests of the next ten years is the youthful inter-
est of the "baby boom" generation, whose members will be moving through
their twenties and thirties in the next ten years, but this key does not
suggest a very different mix of courses than the menu that is currently
available in many places. Our basic scenario notwithstanding, we doubt
that old-fashioned self-improvement and how-to-succeed-in-business courses
will recover popularity—but we could be wrong!

The concept of assimilative services also suggests a vehicle for
community action, and we are aware that some professional discussion of
"community schools" construes the school as providing leadership for social
reform. Whatever its abstract merits, this sort of role requires a will-
ingness to take risks, to court controversy, that does not seem likely to
characterize the situation of most school people in the next ten years.

Both assimilative services and those which address the school-work
gap appeal to what we expect to be major values of American culture during
the coming decade. A third set of services that may possibly belong in
this category relates to pursuit of economy through multiple and shared
use of public facilities and equipment (or personnel). However, there are
trade-offs here, since sharing among public services can be expected to generate frictions due to damage to equipment, failure to abide by schedules, unclear division of responsibility, and the like. So it is important to note that economic revival may ease the economy pressures on local government. A more prosperous public may place more value on the quality and convenience of services, less value on maximizing efficiency of resource-use. In some situations, it may continue to seem terribly important for the schools to cooperate with other local government agencies in supplying services at less cost or improving them at minimal cost. In other situations, the reluctance that "bureaucrats" typically feel about such innovations will come to look much more reasonable than it does today.

However, useful innovations of this economizing type would fit into a "logical miscellaneous" category the components of which are defined by an inventory of local needs. This definitional process is of course subject to many hazards, such as "Squeaky Wheel" demands (should the squeaky wheel get the grease?) and Self-Appointed "Spokesman" demands (does he speak for anyone but himself?). Doubtless, many readers could provide a long list on the basis of personal experience—but, as we earlier mentioned, "experience" can be a hazard, too: i.e., there is a common tendency for conditions to change faster than perceptions (although the opposite can also occur).

For our final suggestion, let us offer an illustration of how this can work. Certain habits of thought are generated by the experience of coping with and planning for the decline of enrollment in the elementary
schools. We have tended ourselves to slip into these habits of thought, yet it may be that the significance of the enrollment decline for the schools' community services changes significantly once the decline comes to center on the secondary schools. There are at least three reasons why this might occur: the pressures associated with the high schools' higher fixed expenses (plant and personnel); the "solution" suggested by the difference between present and potential enrollment; and the usually greater detachment of the high school than the neighborhood elementary school from the community it serves.

These factors suggest strong incentives to reduce per-pupil costs and increase state aid by concentrating on preventing students from leaving school before graduation, and on outreach efforts to re-enroll those who do. They also suggest that community service innovations by and in the typical consolidated high school may seem a poor investment because they mainly benefit an immediate neighborhood that is only a fraction of the school's "catchment" area.

Such developments would not invalidate many of the points we have made. Still, it is worth noting that enthusiasts for "community schools" may just be getting comfortable with the planning perspective appropriate for the experience of elementary enrollment decline when the pass-through of this decline to the secondary schools generates a considerable jolt for those who were anticipating "more of the same."

On this invigorating note, we conclude!
APPENDIX

MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SCHOOL ENROLLMENT TRENDS

I. The Past and Future Birth Rate

As noted in the text, our best knowledge of the social future relates to the numbers and age distribution of people who are already born. While assumptions must be made about immigration and mortality rates, one can be fairly confident about the numbers of first-graders through 1982, and only somewhat less confident about the number of high school seniors in 1994. Table 1 uses 1974 Census Bureau projections to show the expected trend in numbers of children ages 5-13 and 14-17 through 1990, while Table 2 translates these numbers into percentage changes over several periods of time. Slightly more recent Census projections are now available. We have used the 1974 series because it allows one to see how the spread between the three projections of future birth rates widens over the decade.

Of course, the birth rate has continued to decline (after a brief plateau in 1975). This means we can hazard a guess that the number of 5-13 year olds in 1985 will probably be fairly close to the Series III projection. However, a closer approach to Series II is possible, since even today’s historically low birth rates do not point toward completed fertility quite as low as Series III projects. Also, it is generally suspected that the current rates include a “recession effect” and that “catch-up” births are likely to occur. This view is supported by the most recent polls in which young people indicate the number of children they plan to have.

However, several general points can be made apart from such speculation. As Table 2 indicates, the problems for the schools associated with declining numbers of younger school-age children begin to taper off by the early 1980s. By the mid-1980s, the absolute numbers of younger school-children will begin to grow slightly even if the birth rate drops somewhat lower than it is today—the reason being, of course, that the largest age cohort of the so-called baby boom is only now beginning to move into its prime child-bearing years. By contrast, the impact of the “baby bust” is only now beginning to be felt in the high schools. Other things being equal, high school enrollment in 1980 will be only marginally lower than in 1970, and only 7 percent lower than 1974. But the overall decline from 1974-1990 in numbers of children of high school age will probably be close to 25 percent. This is hardly a prospect to be ignored!

*Actual and more detailed forecasts of school enrollment to 1985, using the Series III projection, have been published by the Office of Education.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AGES 5-13</th>
<th>AGES 14-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36,636</td>
<td>15,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>34,082</td>
<td>16,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>30,441</td>
<td>15,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>30,245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>30,112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>33,330</td>
<td>14,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>30,380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>27,945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>41,282</td>
<td>13,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>34,643</td>
<td>12,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>29,383</td>
<td>12,463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Roman numerals refer to Census Bureau projections based on 3 assumptions about future birthrates. These assumptions are specified in the footnote to Table 2.
### TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION, 1970-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AGES 5-13</th>
<th>AGES 14-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>+6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-80</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-85</td>
<td>+9%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-85</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-85</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>+24%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-90</td>
<td>+21%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-90</td>
<td>+13%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Projections assume completed cohort fertility rates moving toward:

1. 2.7
2. 2.1 (replacement level)
3. 1.7
But how seriously should it be taken? As we will shortly discuss, the problem in many localities can be expected to be quite severe. But we are, for the moment, utilizing a national perspective, and from this perspective—let us say, the perspective of the "average school"—it appears that the secondary—school enrollment decline can, at least through 1985, probably be accommodated almost entirely by informal means. Table 3 illustrates this point with an analytical device: i.e., an assumption that average class size in 1980, 1985, and 1990 is three students smaller than in 1974. (The 1974 figure of 25 students is arbitrary; any estimate for that year would do.)

This analysis suggests that a greater but perhaps often feasible reduction in the number of children-per-class can take care of most of the problem of surplus plant and personnel. In terms of the subject of the present essay, the suggestion is that the "average school district" will not be faced with a dramatic need to expand community services as a means for putting idle facilities and teachers to use. Indeed, unless this district's school board intervenes to prevent administrators and teachers from reducing class size, the "foreseeable" opportunity for new or enlarged community roles that depend on enrollment decline may prove rather limited.

II. Migration and Immigration

A. Internal Migration

Discussion of national trends is useful for national planning, and also for indicating an overall bias that will tend to reduce or exaggerate the effects of local trends, compared to what would occur if the national trend did not exist. However, its usefulness is limited by the considerable local variation in birth rates, in law or practice regarding school-entry and school-leaving age, and, so far as planning for public schools is concerned, by the great local variation in the percentage of children who attend non-public schools.

When we look ahead, an additional complication results from the fact that Americans, especially younger ones, don't stay put. The frequency with which our households change residence is overstated by the familiar figure that 20 percent move each year; a recent longitudinal mobility survey conducted by the Census Bureau showed only 41 percent of households reporting any move between 1970 and 1975. Also, a large

*Since there were some non-reporting households and immigrants from foreign countries were not included in the survey, the actual figure would be somewhat higher. With this qualification, it is still interesting to note that households reporting a move between March 1970 and March 1975 were 31 percent of Northeastern white households compared to 38 percent for the North Central region, 46 percent for the South, and 51 percent for the West. Black households showed a similar regional pattern but a narrower range (from 42 percent to 53 percent). While blacks moved more often, more of their moves were within the same county.
TABLE 3

POTENTIAL FOR ACCOMMODATING TO DECLINING SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION
BY REDUCING AVERAGE CLASSROOM SIZE

If the total school-age population were enrolled in school in 1974, with average classroom size of 25 children, we would have 1,363 million classrooms for children ages 5-13, and 675,000 for children ages 14-17 in that year.

The following table uses projected numbers of children in these age groups, and indicates the percentage change in number of classrooms that would result, relative to the 1974 figures, if number of children per classroom were reduced to 22. The difference from 1974 is shown for 1980, 1985 and 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CLASSROOMS FOR AGES 5-13</th>
<th>CLASSROOMS FOR AGES 14-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ .2%</td>
<td>+ 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ .9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ .4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+11%</td>
<td>- 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1.3%</td>
<td>- 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+38%</td>
<td>- 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+16%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
majority of moves occur within the same county. Of course, even such intra-county moves often entail a change of schools or even school districts.)

But the fact remains, as shown in Figure 1, that long-range moves are sufficiently common to have a considerable impact on regional population growth. The map which was printed with the text of the paper on Page 11 indicates how the combination of past birth rates and migration influenced school enrollment by states in the period, 1972-74. Clearly, not all southern and western states were gainers in school enrollment, and not all north-eastern and north-central states experienced a decline (although nearly all did). Obviously, a breakdown by school districts would show even more variation underlying the general trends: even in the top growth states of Arizona and Florida, some school districts undoubtedly had a decline.

However, with migration data as with age-distribution data, information which relates to large aggregates can be helpful to planning even for districts that experience counter-trends. The grander migration flows that attract attention at the national level are not statistical artifacts.

These "grander flows" have been widely discussed in recent years because of evidence that some familiar long-term trends have changed, while others have intensified. Until recently, the major movements were (1) from nonmetropolitan to metropolitan areas; (2) among metro areas, from smaller to larger; (3) within metro areas, from central cities to suburbs; (4) regionally, from inland to coastal states; and (5) for blacks, from rural South to the central cities of the North.

Among these trends, the first to show a reversal--in the 1950s--was the disproportionate growth of our largest cities, those with a population of a million or more. Such cities housed nearly one out of every eight Americans between 1930 and 1950, compared to about one in twelve today. Further, only one-ninth of the growth of all metropolitan areas in the 1960s resulted from in-migration. Since 1970, the five-year mobility survey indicates that, in all four major regions of the country, as many or more white households have moved out of metropolitan areas as have moved into them, although the reverse continues to be true for blacks.

These metro-area losses accrued entirely to central cities, which experienced a net outmigration of seven million people in the years 1970-75. Suburbs and "second cities" in metro areas continued to grow, but there was a net outflow of a million and a half Americans from metro areas to more sparsely settled places. While this appeared to reverse a very long-term trend, about five eights of these losses were to counties.

Principal source for the discussion of internal migration is:
INMIGRATION, OUTMIGRATION, AND NET MIGRATION FOR REGIONS: 1965-70 AND 1970-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1965-70</th>
<th>1970-75</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
bordering on metro areas. Generally speaking, farming areas continued to lose population. Government studies suggest that the biggest gainers in the early 1970s were state capitals, certain retirement and resort areas, and college towns. The big losers were clearly the largest cities, primarily in the North—but Los Angeles, for instance, also lost population.

Some of these recent changes may be temporary. When one reads that many Southern states have exceeded their projected population for 1980 (and that New Mexico has reached its 1990 projection); it is well to remember that old rule of thumb for California: that three out of four in-migrants did not remain permanently. In particular, there may be transient recession effects involved in the recent spurt of areas where, generally, the cost of living is fairly low, and where serious unemployment often did not appear until 1976. Also, inter-censal surveys (which utilize fairly small samples and somewhat experimental means for improving the reliability of the count) may be subject to some correction after the next full-population census in 1980—but, of course, this correction might show greater shifts rather than less.

About all that can safely be said at this point is that Florida and the western part of the South have been growing rapidly; that the metropolitan-area population is spreading out and overflowing its technical boundaries; and that the rest of the "nonmetro" growth is concentrated in places that may soon qualify as new metropolitan areas or, at least, that are more urban than rural. It may also be that the interstate highway system is "structuring" population shifts as the railroads did in the last century; it may be, for the first time, that more blacks are moving to the South than are leaving it; it may be that an important growth surge will occur in both old and new coal-mining areas; it may be that Florida is "saturated" and its immediate neighbors will begin to grow more rapidly. But all such possibilities must be regarded as conjectural today.

**Immigration**

Another factor of importance for many localities is immigration from abroad. While the numbers of legal immigrants rarely exceed 400,000 a year, the birth-rate decline has enhanced their importance. Immigration rather than natural increase accounted for about one in ten net additions to the U.S. population in 1960; the current figure is roughly one in four. An estimated ten percent of our workforce are recent immigrants, and their national origins are dramatically different from even a decade ago, in large part because of changes in the quota rules. The percentage who are Asian, and especially Filipinos and Koreans, has jumped from 13 percent to 34 percent since 1965. Of these Asians, an astounding 46 percent of those who have work experience have professional and technical occupations compared to about 14 percent for our workforce as a whole, and to a mere 9 percent of immigrants from countries in the western hemisphere. Meanwhile,

---

*Principal source for the discussion of immigration is: 1975 Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service, USGPO.*
European immigrants have not only dropped from 38 percent to 19 percent of the total; also the numbers of Greek and Portuguese immigrants have zoomed to rival the British and Italians, and vastly to exceed the Germans, whose proportion was the highest for many years. Similarly, among western hemisphere immigrants, Canadians have been eclipsed by people from Mexico and the Caribbean area.

Such developments are enormously important in certain parts of the country, the rapid impact of Cubans on Florida being only the most conspicuous case. Other areas continue to be virtually untouched by foreign immigration, legal and other.

What are the implications of these facts and figures for our subject? So far as immigration is concerned, an additional point of interest is that the number of young people reaching working age is going to drop sharply over the next dozen years. A shortage of less-skilled workers is expected to emerge. As this occurs, pressures to reduce restrictions on immigration may become sufficient to override the objections of organized labor (which is even more opposed to the alternative of "exporting work"). Thus the fact that immigration has been relatively stable during a period when unprecedented numbers of young Americans have been entering the workforce each year—a period, also when teenage unemployment has been very high—is not necessarily a valid indicator of what is to come. It may be that rather large numbers of communities in the mid-1980s will face the problems associated with large foreign-speaking colonies with alien traditions, limited education, and limited skills. Further, if the pace of industrialization accelerates in the southeastern and south central states, some of these problems will accrue to communities that have never experienced such a thing before. Where this occurs, the twin (sometimes conflicting) objectives of assimilating the newcomers and "preserving" their cultural traditions may well dominate the new community role of schools.

Internal migration also generates problems of assimilation, as well as modifying school enrollment trends. As indicated in our "expanding community" scenario, migration patterns are currently dominated by people with relatively high education who move from areas where educational expenditures are high to areas where they are relatively low, and often from areas where education is strongly a local concern to areas where it has been traditionally promoted and funded primarily by state government. While the scale of this long-distance migration is easy to exaggerate, the frictions and opportunities it holds seem worthy of note, together with the possibility that more intensive industrialization of the receiving areas could alter the socioeconomic mix without altering the expectation of high levels of social services.*

*Our discussion of migration trends draws heavily on a current major Hudson Institute study of the future of the United States and its regions, funded by a grant from the Economic Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.