Because the many definitions of rhetorical situation, genre, and movement have been based on differing conceptions of rhetorical motive, there is a need for fresh inquiries into the meaning of these terms. This paper first examines the varying usages of situation, genre, and movement in the contemporary literature; discusses the confusion that surrounds the meaning of each term, taken individually; and surveys discrepancies that seem to exist regarding the hypothesized relationships among the terms. It then proposes definitions of situation, genre, and movement together with axioms detailing the connections existing among the three concepts. The definitions are based on a conception in which the audience acts as the prime rhetorical motive and the rhetor operates poetically and rhetorically. The power of the audience to demand communication and to judge its appropriateness is paramount. (GM)
Situations, Genres and Movements: Toward an Integrated
Definition of Some Pivotal Terms in Contemporary
Rhetorical Theory and Criticism

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Rhetorical Theory and Criticism

Seminal works on rhetoric by Bitzer, Frye, Black, Rosenfield, Griffin, Simonds and others have thrust the terms situation, genre and movement into the forefront of rhetorical scholarship. Today, one can scarcely open a new issue of a speech communication journal without finding a theoretical or applied exploration into the meaning of one or more of these concepts. Yet, despite the recent attention given these key terms of modern rhetoric, there exists little consensus as to the meaning and relationship of the three. Perusal of the literature suggests that situation, genre and movement have been defined and used in a number of differing and mutually-exclusive ways. Further, it is not uncommon to find one of the concepts defined in terms of another. This latter phenomenon has led to an increasing circularity of definition as, for example, when genres are described as being like situations, or when movements are conceived of as being closely akin to both situations and genres.

In the following pages, I shall attempt to clarify the meaning and relationship of situation, genre and movement. Beginning with an extended inquiry into the various approaches taken to defining and binding these key concepts, I shall propose and justify a set of integrated definitions. This is, of course, a vast and, one might almost say, presumptuous
undertaking, and I do not claim that my essay will amount to the "last word" on this subject. What I am suggesting is that to make further progress in situational, generic and movement criticism, our field must begin to come to consensus as to the meaning and relationship of the terms. The present essay is intended as but a single step in that direction.

Contemporary Conceptions of Situation, Genre and Movement

Any proposal for a new or modified understanding of frequently-cited concepts assumes that present definitions are not entirely satisfactory. Thus, in the first part of this essay, I will examine the varying usages of situation, genre and movement in contemporary literature. My reading convinces me that the terms have been, and continue to be, applied in differing, philosophically contradictory and circular ways. I will first examine the confusion which surrounds the meaning of each term, taken individually. I will then survey discrepancies which seem to exist as to the hypothesized relationships among the terms. In so doing, I will examine essays which take a predominantly "theoretical," approach to the terms as well as those which work primarily from an "applied" vantagepoint.

The varying individual definitions of rhetorical situation, genre, and movement are difficult to sort out for the simple reason that all such definitions necessarily make reference to each of the concepts of rhetor, discourse, audience and events. But, upon close scrutiny, subtle differences may be detected in the ways in which successive authors organize the rhetor, discourse, audience and event elements which, together, constitute any theory of situation, genre or movement.
Rhetorical Situations

Let us begin with a study of the several conceptions of rhetorical situation. Perusal of the literature suggests that situation has been variously defined as a context in which (1) objective, real events call forth and shape fitting rhetorical responses; (2) a rhetor perceives an exigence and intentionally encodes language designed to remove that perceived deficiency, (3) an audience perceives a need for the symbolic removal of an apparent exigence and constrains a rhetor to provide appropriate discourse, and (4) a combination of any two of the above.

The basic work on situation is, of course, Lloyd Bitzer's 1968 description of a deterministic rhetorical context consisting of exigence, audience and constraints. Bitzer's exigence--"an imperfection marked by urgency" (p. 6)--is a catalyst embedded in a context consisting of "objective and publicly observable historical facts" (p. 11), such as the exigence of pollution residing in the real, observable industrial world (p. 7). Bitzer's situation is deterministic because the objective exigence controls the behavior of rhetor and audience. Writes Bitzer, "in any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence which functions as the organizing principle: it specifies the audiance to be addressed and the change to be effected. The exigence may or may not be perceived clearly by the rhetor or other persons in the situation" (p. 7). Later, Bitzer reiterates his point that events control the situation, meaning that rhetor intention and audience perception are keyed to an empirical reality (p. 9). Thus, objective situations constrain both the behavior of rhetor and audience (p. 6), producing a fitting rhetorical utterance (pp. 5, 10).

Bitzer's notion of situation as being something real and deterministic is shared, at least in part, by Edelman and Gronbeck. Writing of the symbolic activity of political actors, Edelman presents the "political
"setting" as a physical and intellectual reality which "limit[s] perception and response" (pp. 102-103). Continuing, Edelman asserts that "settings not only condition political acts. They mold the very personalities of the actors" (p. 104; see, also, pp. 96, 111). In Edelman's view, "political acts must be compatible with settings physically or symbolically expressive of particular political norms, legitimations, or postures" (p. 110). Yet, although Edelman seems to endorse the scene-act determinism of Bitzer, Edelman also gives an independent role to the rhetor as a free, creative manager of reality. Edelman argues that the political actor translates facts and events into a symbolic reality to which political audiences respond. In other words, "mass publics respond to currently conspicuous political symbols: not to 'facts'" (p. 172), and it is the political rhetor, who manages the symbolic reality of the masses (see pp. 13, 188, 15, 20, 4 and 5). Edelman's discussion of the role of the rhetor as a creator of situational reality introduces a second definitional focus for the term situation. Situations may be viewed as rhetor perception, choice, and intention as well as deterministic reality.

A second form of duality, event-audience perception, is present in Gronbeek's definition of situation. Seemingly Gronbeek conceives of audience as the pivotal factor in situation: "The peak or highest point of audience expectation must be discovered by the rhetorical artist. Audience expectations are psychological states-of-mind which build steadily or pulsate through some situation; the rhetor must attempt to capture the ascendancy or intensity of expectations at their peak to give his message maximum impact" (p. 86). Audience "expectancies" are termed the "key variables affecting the timing of rhetorical messages" (p. 87). Despite his apparent desire to treat audience need/expectation as the controlling aspect of situational rhetoric, Gronbeek, at several points, appears to endorse the Bitzerian notion of situation as objective reality. Gronbeek writes of events as causing the rapid or slow peaking of the
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audience's state of mind (p. 86) and cites the "dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima" (an event) as "producing almost immediate public anxieties for high official answers" (pp. 86-87). The apparent equivocation between events and audience perception as the germ of situational rhetoric is also present in Gronbeck's curious statement that "auditors' expectancies certainly form the core of Bitzer's concept of rhetorical situations" (p. 86). I would argue, in contrast, that Bitzer's event-based determinism is quite pronounced.

Thusfar, I have surveyed definitions of situation which (1) look solely to events (Bitzer) as the source of situation-based rhetoric or (2) which look to a combination of either events and rhetor intention (Edelman) or events and audience expectation (Gronbeck) as the source(s).

There remain a further three classes of situational definition—definitions which center the situation in rhetor choice, audience expectation or a combination of choice and expectation.

The premier statement of situational genesis via rhetor choice is to be found in Vatz's criticism of Bitzer's factual determinism. Basing his analysis on Edelman's 1971 work on Politics as Symbolic Action, Vatz elevates rhetor perception by arguing that "no situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it" (p. 154). The rhetor acts as the situational linchpin by (1) choosing the events to be discussed, putting the events into a meaningful structure (thereby giving presence to facts), and (2) translating the chosen information into meaning (pp. 156-57). This latter act, according to Vatz, is an act of creativity, interpretation and transcendence, in which the rhetor uses "linguistic depiction" to make facts meaningful and salient for the audience (pp. 157, 160). Vatz's rhetor is free to create differing rhetorical realities from essentially the same body of fact as in the example of John F.
Kennedy's choice to interpret the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba as a "grave crisis" facing the country as contrasted to Richard M. Nixon's choice to eschew crisis rhetoric in dealing with a Soviet nuclear submarine base in Cuba (pp. 159-60).

An additional two relatively pure definitions of situation as rhetor choice/perception/intention may be found in works by Andrews and Consigny. Andrews treats the rhetorical situation surrounding British reaction to the 1861 seizure by the Captain of a United States warship of Confederate agents Mason and Slidell from the British-registered mail packet Trent. He describes the situation as perceived by the British government and demonstrates that Britain's rhetorical response to the seizure was based on a particular view of the rhetorical climate. Thus, the coercive rhetorical strategy pursued by Great Britain (and embodied in discourse by Her Majesty's government) was based on beliefs of British military superiority, feelings of moral rightness, an interpretation of the seizure as illegal, a perceived need to make a forceful case and, finally, a desire to obtain both the release of the agents and an apology (pp. 256-58). The situation was the perception, intention and choice of the British government. Consigny's theoretical article takes a similar approach to situation. In an effort to reconcile the antithetical definitions of Bitzer and Vats, Consigny develops a notion of rhetoric as art in which a rhetor both confronts and manages facts (p. 176). Consigny faults Vats for asserting that rhetors may create situations at will and for believing that facts do not serve as real constraints (pp. 178, 179, 183). Consigny attempts to reconcile the totally deterministic (Bitzer) and completely free will (Vats) theories of situation in a system of topics which allows the rhetor to both function in an indeterminate situation and to manage real situational particularities (pp. 180-85). Although Consigny rejects Vats's definition of situation,
Consigny continues to center the rhetoric of situations in perceptions, choices, and intentions of the rhetor.

Another class of situational definitions is that in which audience needs or expectations are said to be the chief determiner of a rhetor's discourse. Perhaps the earliest audience-based definition may be found in Black's 1965 treatise on rhetorical criticism. Black's audience orientation is clear in his definition of rhetorical situation: "Situation here refers to the prevailing state of the audience's convictions, the reputation of the rhetor, the popularity and urgency of his subject; in sum, to all the extralinguistic factors that influence an audience's reaction to a rhetorical discourse" (p. 133). To be sure, Black writes of the rhetor's ability to affect audience expectation (pp. 34-35, 113); but he emphasizes that an "argumentative situation" takes place when "objections [to the rhetor's thesis] are likely to be in his audience's minds" (pp. 149-50) and that the audience is the measure of incompatible ideas (p. 166). Black provides an example of the situation of the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates in which the context is defined as "a situation in which his [Douglas'] constituents were becoming increasingly agitated and divided over the question whether slavery was to be allowed into the territories" (p. 157). Black argues that the rhetor has a range of choices in a situation (pp. 133-36, especially); but throughout the discussion of rhetor choice, the opinion of the audience appears to retain theoretical primacy (see pp. 167, 173-75, especially).

Similar in nature to Black's audience-based presentation are definitions by Hunsaker and Smith, by Baxter and Kennedy, and by Rubin and Rubin. The Hunsaker and Smith article is complicated, for the authors introduce into the discussion of situation the concepts of issue formation and issue perception, as well as a differentiation between (1) the "situational" and "actual" audiences and (2) "logical" versus
"rhetorical" constraints. Yet, their definition is prominently audience-centered for they assert that the "issue perceptions of an audience caught up in a situation create the complex event known as the rhetorical situation" (p. 154). Further, while they treat facts as a starting point for situational rhetoric (pp. 146, 155) and while they also accept the importance of rhetor perception (pp. 145, 156), Hunsaker and Smith, citing definitions of situation by Bitzer, Vatz and Conisnuy, highlight the need for increased emphasis on the audience (pp. 144-45). Finally, according to these authors, "if there is a disparity between the issue perceptions of the speaker and the actual audience, it is the speaker, not the audience, who must labor to "reconcile this disparity" (p. 153). Thus, when a rhetor "adopts the strategy of avoidance, and does not address the issues that have salience for the audience," he will be punished with failure (p. 154). Baxter and Kennedy, sharing an interest in audiences, write of situation as an "epochal whole of becoming" (p. 162) in which the "rhetor emerges in response to the truths, motives, and need for community of an audience" (p. 162). The rhetor is viewed as subsidiary for it is the audience which calls for the rhetor. In a case study of situation-based communication, Rubin and Rubin similarly describe the discourse of Weight Watchers program speakers as resulting from needs of the participants in the program--the audience (pp. 136-40). Further, the basic situational exigence is seen as the individual member's perception of his overweight condition (p. 134). Thus, audience need both provides the exigence and constrains the rhetoric of the Weight Watchers program. The situation, according to Rubin and Rubin, dictates the purpose, theme, matter and style of Weight Watchers program messages.

The final conceptions of situation, that I will treat, are those in which discourse is seen as motivated by a combination of rhetor choice
and audience need. Such an approach is to be found in Arnold's textbook on Criticism of Oral Rhetoric. Although ostensibly "following" Ritzer's leads," Arnold's exegesis of the situation begins with the audience (pp. 28-29). Using his analysis on listener attitude, Arnold probes an example speaking situation, seeking out the needs, expectations and wishes of the audience (pp. 29-32; see also, pp. 33-40). Arnold concludes that "the perceptions, motivations, and experience of the respondents are the ultimate forces through which the rhetor must gain whatever influence he seeks" (p. 40). Although treating audience attitude as the ultimate rhetorical constraint, Arnold also views discourse as a source of rhetorical situations: "in dialogue . . . rhetorical situations [may be] created within and by talk itself" (p. 240). He cites an example of a husband-wife conversation in which the husband's remarks created a "special rhetorical situation" to which the wife felt constrained to respond (p. 241). Thus, according to Arnold, the rhetor possesses some freedom from constraints based on audience need. The rhetor may shape discourse so as to constrain the listener. Miller, in his analysis of anti-Corn Law and Chartist rhetoric, also views situation as springing from the interaction of rhetor and audience intentions. He emphasizes situational perception, asserting that "an exigence is a conclusion in the mind of its perceiver" (p. 112). Both the rhetor's perceived exigence and his notion of what constrains his discourse are fused into speaker intent. Correspondingly, the audience's perception of both exigence and constraint creates a set of listener expectations (pp. 116-17). Miller views the rhetor as a creative agent who seeks to reconcile, via discourse, his own perceptions to those of the audience. Accordingly, the critical assessment of speaker excellence should be based on judgments of the rhetor's effectiveness as a manager of both his own and the audience's constraints.
Two final case studies reveal further scholarly interest in the situational interaction of speaker and listener perceptions. In his study of Vice Presidential candidate Thomas Eagleton's effort to overcome the stigma of psychiatric treatment (and thereby remain on the 1972 Democratic ticket), Patz has analyzed speech making as a rhetor's answer to his perceptions of audience expectation. Based on Eagleton's "Midwestern world-view" the Missouri Senator heard his audience "calling for initiative and determination in a crisis situation" (p. 284). Thus, responding to only selected elements of an inherently subjective situation, Eagleton embarked on a strategy of self defense which further weakened the candidacy of George McGovern. Gregg also uses situational perception as a vehicle for sorting out contradictory factors of rhetor motive and audience reaction in the situation of Senator Arthur Vandenberg's speech on internationalism in foreign policy, January 10, 1945. Gregg's goal is "to argue that the 'dramatic conversion' interpretation of the Vandenberg speech is incorrect...[and] that an analysis of the interacting constituents of the rhetorical situation existing on January 10, 1945, which emphasizes human intention, expectancy, and perception, uncovers a situation marked by ambiguity and shaped partly but importantly by accident" (p. 156). Presenting an interpretation of Vandenberg's motives and needs together with the needs and motives of the Roosevelt Administration and of the newspaper press, Gregg provides a cogent explanation of the genesis of Vandenberg's speech and reactions to it.

It seems clear that no consensus has yet emerged as to the nature of the rhetorical situation. Approaches centering on events, rhetor intentions, audience needs or a combination of these three elements complicate the application of situational theory to rhetoric. Beyond these differing notions of rhetorical motive reside two crucial issues
whose resolution is a sine qua non for any coherent theory of situation:
(1) does the rhetorical situation constitute a reality "out there" or are situations "in" people? and (2) does the situational context function in a deterministic fashion, or do actors possess an independent, free will? I will confront these questions in the latter portion of the essay.

Rhetorical Genres

Definitions of rhetorical genre are seemingly, even more diffuse than those of situation. This is because students of rhetoric use of situational concepts in their narrations, thereby complicating further the role of event, rhetor, discourse and audience in the formation of genres. All writers on genre of which I am aware, agree that genre necessarily implies a stylistic or linguistic similarity which binds together works of differing times and by differing rhetors. Sharp differences emerge, however, with respect to the ways in which critics account for the stylistic features shared by members of a genre. Some writers see no need to posit a cause or causes for rhetorical archetypes and define genre, simply, as a set of stylistic features shared by discourses. Yet, most writers appear to believe that a viable theory of genre must explicitly account for strategic likenesses via some analysis of rhetorical motive. The emergence of generic form has been attributed to (1) the unfolding of social realities (events) which impose analogous constraints on the productions of rhetors, (2) recurring perceptions, intentions and free language choices by rhetors, or (3) similar speaker responses to the needs, expectations and demands of audiences, (4) decisions of critics to classify by highlighting certain strategic features of discourse and (5) a combination of any two or more of the above.

As I mentioned earlier, genre analysts agree that discourses must possess linguistic likeness in order to qualify for generic kinship. For instance, Lawrence Rosenfield begins his essay on analogue criticism by asserting that speeches by Richard M. Nixon and Harry S. Truman possessed similar
qualities and, thus, could validly be analyzed in tandem.\footnote{19} Jamieson makes the same point, writing that "a genre of rhetoric contains specimens of rhetoric which share characteristics distinguishing them from specimens of other rhetorical genres."\footnote{20} Writing of "exhortative" messages, Edwin Black uses the terms "genre," "strategy" and "style" almost interchangeably.\footnote{21} Ware and Linkugel make similar generic claims for certain speeches of apology: "We believe that apologetical discourses constitute a distinct form of public address, a family of speeches with sufficient elements in common so as to warrant legitimately generic status."\footnote{22} One could compile an extensive list of like-minded assertions, but these excerpts from four articles generally thought of as being seminal in the field of genre analysis, sufficiently illustrate the one point on which genre scholars agree: a genre is a family of commonly styled discourses.

We may, however, distinguish among three basic forms of genre definitions: (1) those in which the presence of stylistic likeness is treated as being sufficient as a defining characteristic, (2) those in which observable features of style are treated together with explications of the origin of the stylistic elements, and (3) those in which stylistic likeness is treated solely as a dependent variable and in which emphasis is placed in the factors of genre formation.

Although some scholars appear to treat genre on the basis of its being an intrinsic feature of messages,\footnote{23} most writers feel obligated to offer some explanation for generic phenomena. Even Frye who defines genre as a "radical of presentation" and who uses such synonyms for genre as "form," "convention," "pattern" and "structure,"\footnote{24} also gives weight to rhetor intention as a factor in the paternity of genres. Frye makes this observation in connection with the genre of poetry, arguing that "the poet's intention to produce a poem normally includes the genre, the intention of producing a specific kind of verbal structure."\footnote{25} The overlap
of the stylistic definition with notions of stylistic origin (i.e., as a result of decisions motivated by events, rhetors, audiences and critics) is to be found in the writings of many rhetorical scholars. Vivas describes genre as being based on "normative notions of classes" (p. 98) exemplified by popular acceptance of the form of the novel, but he recognizes the ability of rhetors to consciously use or alter generic convention (pp. 97-98; 103-105). Reichert treats genre as consisting of a set of productions which are related (a) because their authors chose common unifying devices in executing the works and (b) because critics have chosen to highlight certain patterns and to classify accordingly. Campbell has written that discourses possess generic affiliation when they "share basic stylistic and philosophical judgments" (p. 37) but she also recognizes that it is the critic who performs the act of classification (pp. 13, 37); Butler conceives of the apologetic genre as involving elements of style but allows that the "style will vary with the apologist" (p. 289). Wootin examines the recurring form of Hellenistic ambassador's speeches and describes speech similarities as originating in similar events or social realities faced by the ambassadors; in two essays, Jamieson has examined the relationship between succeeding genres (e.g., between the colonial sermon and Washington's Inaugural Address or between the British Sovereign's speech from the throne and Washington's State of the Union Addresses), but to this notion of style producing style she couples a description of genre as resulting from both rhetor perception/intent/choice (1973, pp. 163, 165, 166, 168) and from the Bitzerian situational demand of historical events (1973, p. 163; 1975, pp. 409, 414). Cragan describes generic brotherhood as a commonality of dramatic form and theme but also writes of audience perception of the drama and audience sharing of the vision; and, finally, although Chesebro and Hamsher treat elements of style as the "defining features" of genres (p. 330; see, also, p. 328), they acknowledge that an
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audience may perceive a work as belonging to a different genre than that intended by a rhetor (p. 328).

Having surveyed a number of analyses in which stylistic features are treated as coequal with rhetorical motive in the defining of genre, we may survey a number of approaches in which style is treated as an entirely dependent variable—definitions in which the formation of genre through aspects of rhetorical motive (event, rhetor, audience and critic) is predominant. A large number of writers have settled upon events as the germinal factor in genre. Aly's account of the genre of gallows speeches looks primarily to the surrounding context of events as the principal factor behind the stylistic predictability of this speech type. Other authors have identified rhetoric as being motivated by such observable social phenomena as "government policies," and the "reality" of "oppression," via "sexism" and "racism." Martin also looks to an event-based type of occasion writing that the "occasion creates an audience" and that it determines the speaker-role (p. 247). Rhetorical critics have rooted genres of rhetoric in a kind of economic determinism. Scott and Smith identify rhetoric-producing social divisions as resulting primarily from objective scenic factors. Brandes and Sillars look to vicissitudes of the economy as being instrumental in producing the discontent which, in turn, motivates a rhetoric of revolt or protest. Rich and Goldman view tuition and salary decisions by university administrators as the "prompting factors which invited agitation" at the University of Michigan. Several authors couple events with one or more additional rhetorical motives as an explanation of rhetorical behavior. Bormann treats the institution of slavery as the major impetus for the "Rhetoric of abolition" (pp. 1-15, especially), but also looks to factors of rhetor judgment and choice in the use of conversion versus agitational strategies (pp. 29, 32, 35).
Gronbeck hypothesizes that events, audience expectations, and decisions by critics are critical in the formation of genres. Reid emphasizes the role of "identifiable historical situation" (p. 259) in the creation of pro-war "homefront" speaking but also gives attention to the close connection between objective events and subjective speaker purpose and audience orientation (pp. 259, 261). Simons identifies three active factors in genre development: situation (presumably, events), rhetor purpose and investigator methodology. Ware and Linkugel see a close relationship between events, rhetor choice and audience perception in situations of personal attack and defense. Patten calls for increased attention to purpose and events in genre criticism.

Event-based notions of genre formation tend to be deterministic (when social reality is viewed as the predominant motive for discourse) or quasi-deterministic (when rhetor purpose, audience expectation or critic's judgment are viewed as at least partially independent of events). Many scholars, however, prefer to locate generic rhetoric, partially or entirely, within the realm of the free perceptions, intentions and choices made by rhetors. Burgess and Chesebro have presented rhetor perception and intention as something which flows from the shared world-view of cultures to which rhetors belong. In two essays—one theory-based and another a case study—Campbell centers genre on the perceptions and intentions to which of rhetors, exemplified by women's liberation speakers. Related genre studies of the rhetoric of women's liberation by Hancock and Hope also view speaker strategy as a vehicle for defying the exigence and expressing an intention. Studies of confrontation and the diatribe, as protest genres, also look to rhetor intention as the rhetorical germ. Andrews focuses on the attempt by radical protesters to style their messages so as to preclude the exercise of free choice by their audiences. Windt writes of the choice by Yippies to alienate the
mass audience of Americans. Finally, in an essay on the 1973–1974 apologetic rhetoric of Richard M. Nixon, Harrell, Ware and Linkugel write of Nixon’s errors of perception and strategy in the Watergate situation, according primacy to rhetor decisions.

As a final set of approaches to generic rhetoric, let me cite a number of studies which emphasize demands by audiences and delineations by the critic-as-audience in the development of language strategy. Bass identifies "societal and cultural expectations" by audiences (pp. 3, 8) as a major constraint underlying the resignation speeches of both Richard M. Nixon and Spiro T. Agnew. Rosenfield and Katula emphasize audience-based constraints but also root apologetic communication in the personality of and decisions by rhetors. The most extensive consideration of audience expectation as a germinal factor of genre is to be found in an article by Mohrmann and Leff. These authors pattern their analysis after the generic system of Aristotle (consisting of the epideictic, forensic and deliberative genres), a system in which, they argue, "the audience is the central element" (p. 63). Mohrmann and Leff's own approach is similarly audience-centered except that they acknowledge the role of situational events in provoking audience needs and expectations. While no writer has, to my knowledge, defined genre solely from the perspective of the critic-as-audience, we may identify several who view genre as partly a critic-centered phenomenon. This notion of genre is strongly reflected in statements by Burke and Measell. In his opening statement in the Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke highlights the magic involved in the process of naming any situation. Measell, although he recognizes the role of events and rhetor intention in the production of genres, observes that "the critic, as he relates similar situations and discourses, is in fact the creator of genres."

In this summary of forty-four works on genre, we have observed a
variety of approaches to the concept. While there is a consensus of opinion that genre implies certain analogies in form, scholars have not come to any consensus as to an explanation of generic similarity. Genre theory is plagued by complications of rhetorical motive akin to those found in situation theory. In the second section of the paper I will confront these major issues of genre theory: (1) is a stylistic definition of genre sufficient or must the theory of genre account for the emergence of stylistic patterns? (2) which is more important in a definition of genre—the stylistic or the causal elements? and (3) what is or are the motive(s) for genre—social reality, free choices by rhetors, demands by audiences or decisions by a specialized, critical audience?

Rhetorical Movements

Definitions of rhetorical movement proceed along the same general lines as do those of rhetorical genres. In fact, many of the genres I surveyed also represent forms of movement rhetoric: abolition, agitation, Black Power, crisis, confrontation, distribute, "Petition in Boots," revolt, Women's Liberation, and the notion of general cultural conflict. We may expect to find in the literature, therefore, definitions of movement which center on events, rhetors, audiences, style of discourse, decisions by critics or some combination of these. Many writers approach movement from the vantagepoint of rhetoric, perception, intention and choice. Simon's seminal proposal for a "Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements" emphasizes the ideology and tactics of moderate, militant and "intermediate" leadership. The focus is on choices made by the leader and their effects on both movement participants and elements of the establishment. Like-minded authors have viewed movements as "passion and moral conviction in need of organization," and as an aggregation of persons sharing ideology, goals and having a lack of organization. Smith and Windes have treated both general social
divisions (pp. 140-146) and specific decisions by rhetors to avoid the appearance of fundamental conflict with the establishment (pp. 143-145) as the defining characteristics of the "innovational movement" as opposed to the radical movement. Chesebro, Cragan and McCullough have treated consciousness-raising as a means for "radical revolutionaries to achieve the 'level of consciousness' necessary to engage in rhetorical confrontation."

While several have looked to the communicator as the prime ingredient of the movement, a larger number of writers have examined the relationship between the event and rhetor elements of motive. Although recognizing the influence of events, essays by Griffin, Simons, Hahn and Gonchar appear to locate rhetorical motivation primarily in the rhetor. Griffin posits feelings of alienation as the first stage of a movement and traces such feelings to events or attitudes (p. 162, especially). Simons looks to perceived irreconcilable differences as the basis of social conflict (p. 231). Such perceptions are somewhat event-based because Simons describes them as not always being subject to reconciliation by talk--i.e., they are based on "claims to scarce status, power and resources" and are not merely linguistic. Hahn and Gonchar treat shared beliefs (related to demographic forces and "environmental characteristics") as a source of shared activities (the rhetor > act motive), while Cox features the goals, perceptions and choices by protest leaders, together with some consideration of the objective context, in his treatment of anti-Vietnam War protest. Three essayists have taken the opposite tack, emphasizing the event half of the event-rhetor equation. Griffin describes the rhetorical movement as something which grows out of a historical (i.e., real) context (pp. 184-86). Both Andrews and Bowers and Ochs present rhetor perception and strategy as closely dependent on social observables.

Of the final four essays which I survey, three contain descriptions of
movement which strongly emphasize message style (the act element of the
grammar of motives) in the definition of movement. Reacting against the
adoption by rhetoricians of the sociologists' scenic description of movements,
Cathcart constructed a definition which looked to the interaction of
opposing rhetors' purposes and statements. Writes Cathcart: "the abolition
movement began, not when individuals became aggrieved over the fact of
slavery, but when, perceiving that slavery would never be abolished under
the Constitution, they demanded the release of all slaves, and when the
spokesmen of the established order responded in turn that the abolitionists'
real desire was to destroy the system of private property and free
enterprise" (p. 87). Wilkinson builds on Cathcart's definition and
Smith and Windes also define movement as an interaction of rhetor
"perceived social problems") and statement ("rhetorical movement may be
defined as acts which include mobilizational appeals").

The final movement essay I have chosen to survey is one in which
audience need and critic decision share prominence with rhetor in the
working of a movement. Writing of their study of group dynamics (the
"Tavistock" method) in a campaign to recruit rural physicians, Barton and
O'Leary describe the efforts of rhetors (recruitment committees, in
communities lacking a physician) to adjust their "fantasy themes" to those
of the audience (young physicians). Finally, they describe the rhetorical
critic (p. 154) as one able to "influence the outcomes of social movements"
when his special knowledge is made available to the rhetor.

It is apparent that the issues surrounding the nature of movement are
not unlike those pertaining to the theory of genre. Is the behavior of
movement rhetors constrained by the fabric of social reality, by their
own perceptions and free choices, by the needs of audiences, or by a
combination of the above (to say nothing of the active or passive role of
discourse and the critic in the evolution of movements)?
Contemporary Conceptions of the Relationship Among Situation, Genre and Movement

While discrepancies in individual definitions of situation, genre and movement cry out for resolution, one further definitional question must first be considered before any reorganization is attempted. The reader has probably already observed the overlap between and among definitions of the three terms. One or more of the concepts have frequently been defined in terms of another, but usually in such a way as to further obfuscate rather than clarify the relationship. The basic difficulty is twofold. First, writers characteristically emphasize one of the terms, providing, at best, a cursory examination of the other(s). This practice has resulted in confusion both as to the relationships among the concepts and as to the meaning of the terms themselves. Secondly, writers often base a definition of one term (for example, genre) on another (for example, situation) without either (a) really defining the latter notion or (b) acknowledging that a lack of consensus exists as to the meaning of the latter concept. Such has resulted in a massive begging of the question in rhetorical theory.

Let us first survey the literature to gain an understanding of common notions about the relationship of situation to genre. Twenty-three, or a little over half, of the "genre articles" explicitly treat the situation-genre connection. However, only one of these essays contains a systematic account of both situation and genre. The others assert that rhetorical genres flow from rhetorical situations without really defining the idea of situation. Articles written before Bitzer's situational vocabulary had become well known are more hesitant on this point. Thus, Rosenfield, Scott and Smith and Aly refer to designators such as "conditions," "environment," "occasion" and "context" as often as they use the expression "situation." However, by 1972, the tendency to locate the origin of
generic phenomena in the concept of situation had become commonplace.

Windt writes of the Greek cynics as being persons who parodied the rhetorical situation; Ware and Linkugel treat genre as being a family of discourses that occur in and result from a particular situation; Woetin explains vicissitudes of Hellenistic ambassador's speeches by means of differences in situation; Campbell presents women's liberation rhetoric as a response to women's perceptions of the 'rhetorical problems' facing them; Jamieson asserts that "genres are shaped in response to a rhetor's expectations of the perception of the audience and the demands of the situation"; Mohrmann and Laff argue that "the concept of genre assumes that certain types of situations provoke similar needs and expectations among audiences"; Raum and Measell treat a rhetorical situation of latent polarization as being a necessary condition for the rhetoric of polarization; Erlich asserts that, "when a rhetor attempts to justify legal transgressions, certain topoi are prescribed by the situation"; writing of apologies by Nixon and Agnew, Bass holds to the opinion that "similar qualities in the two speeches suggest certain constants operating within the two rhetorical situations"; treatments of the apologetic genre by Katula and by Harrell, Ware and Linkugel also use situation as the primal locus of genre, the latter writers taking the position that "apology is a genre distinguished by the exigency which calls it forth"; Cragan observes that many recent "rhetorics of" have been classified by situation; in a critique of genre criticism, Patton calls for more attention to "historical details which shape the specific context for rhetoric"; Martin introduces his essay on the genre of "staged withdrawal" by observing that "the elements responsible for the production of a rhetorical genre bear some relationship to those Bitzer has identified in the rhetorical situation"; Reid, in studying genre in the rhetoric of war, assumes that "war is an identifiable historical situation which usually calls forth many rhetorical endeavors addressed to various audiences and
propounding various points of view relating to war; finally, in papers presented orally as part of a 1976 Speech Communication Association Convention program on "Significant Form" in rhetorical criticism, Simons treats "genre-similarities" as resulting from "common constraints" of "purpose and situation" and Campbell avers that genre is a stylistic response to perceived demands of situations.91

Two writers deviate slightly from the general practice of treating genre as a response to situation. In her essay on "Antecedent Genre as Rhetorical Constraint," Jamieson argues that a present genre may originate in a past genre (created by a "past historical context") as well as from an "immediate" present situation.92 Measell carries this train of thought one step further, asserting that while "situation may produce a genre of rhetoric," it is also possible for a genre ("a particular type of rhetoric") to "produce a corresponding situation."93

As I observed earlier, with the exception of Black's book on rhetorical criticism, no writer on genre, of which I am aware, has propounded a systematic and parallel account of situation. Writers who base a definition of genre on the concept of situation tend to "assume as true what is to be proven."94 That is, they assume that the term situation is well enough understood to constitute a firm bastion for a sally into the area of genre. However, as my previous review of the literature on situation has demonstrated, no consensus exists as to the meaning of "rhetorical situation." Situations have been conceived of as deterministic responses to events (reality), perceptions and free decisions by arguers, responses to audience demands or a combination of motive ingredients. This controversy over motive is reflected, as we have also observed, in writers on genre who similarly emphasize various rhetorical motives as the source of genre. Thus, if no agreement has been reached as to the meaning of situation and if no consensus has emerged as to

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the sequence of motivation in the development of genre, then the "agreement" that situation produces genre has no more substance than a mirage. In fact, this chimerical Magna Charta on the situation-genre tie-in is counterproductive for it lends a false air of stability to definitions of genre which are, it would seem, based upon an unsecured foundation. The meaning of the terms, taken individually, is further obscured.

A parallel process of obfuscation may be observed in the attempt to relate situational and movement theory. Writers on movement invoke situation as a touchstone for their treatment of movement rhetoric without first providing a sufficient inquiry into the dynamics of situation. Early movement writers approached the relationship of situation and movement with some hesitancy. Works by Griffin, Simons, Bowers and Ochs, Bormann, and Cathcart contain only oblique references to "exigencies," "rhetorical problems," "situations of agitation and control," "analogous patterns" of rhetorical situation, and "dramatic situation." By 1973, authors were becoming more confident of the alliance between situation and movement. Campbell writes of the strategies of women's liberation rhetoric as "adaptations to a difficult rhetorical situation"; Andrews presents exigencies in and economic factors of the situation of the working class as an explanation of the rhetoric of the Chartist movement; Cox seeks to define social movements "from the perspective of Bitzer's rhetorical situation," and states that the "symbolic behavior that occurs in a social movement is both a response to and an effort to help shape the rhetorical situation"; Smith and Windes cite Bitzer for their assertion that the spokesman for an innovational movement must make the audience perceive the situation by giving presence to an exigence; in a later article, Smith and Windes again footnote Bitzer in connection with their point that "mobilizational exigencies" define the "rhetorical situation of movement"; Etch and Goldman view the "rhetorical/agitational movement" as coming from "interactional situations characterized by the advocacy
of and resistance to significant change.

We may conclude that situations are characteristically viewed as being the germ of movements as well as the fountainhead of genres. Once again, writers who look to all manner of motive in the genesis of movements somehow concur that movements are situational in nature. Yet, since these authors espouse diametrically opposed theories as to the motive origin of movements, their concurrence that situation represents a defining characteristic of movement is meaningless. In the absence of a consistent approach to rhetorical motive, it is impossible to determine precisely what kind of situation the authors view as being responsible for movements. Failure to confront the controversy over the origin of situation once more leads to difficulty when situation is used as the basis for the conceptualization of another rhetorical term.

The genre-movement connection is a final relationship which has received attention in recent essays. The overlap between genre and movement results, basically, from the treatment of movement rhetoric as belonging to one or more "rhetorics of": protest and moral conflict, in particular. As was the case with the situation-movement connection, early descriptions of the commonalities of genre and movement tend to be somewhat terse and tentative. Griffin's 1952 essay refers to possible patterns or "configurations of public discussion" which may recur "like movements"; Griffin's 1969 essay looks to the ability of movement orators to use various "forms" of communication (i.e., literary genres) such as speeches, essays, songs, novels, etc.; citing Rosenfield's essay, Bormann writes of the possibility for an "analog criticism of the rhetoric of abolition and of contemporary black rhetorics"; Cathcart observes that "a movement is a form related to a rationale and a purpose"; and Windit treats both ancient and modern cynics (users of the genre of distaste) as constituting respective rhetorical movements. Later essays assert a more explicit
movement-genre relationship. Chesebro advocates the generic study of groups of speakers. He believes that movements such as civil rights, black power, anti-war and women’s liberation will contain generic patterns. In a later article Chesebro and Hamsher elaborate upon this point, writing that “the concept of a movement is a more useful starting point for generating rhetorical genres. . . . [because] the rhetoric of a movement reveals common rhetorical characteristics employed by multiple speakers before multiple audiences.” Articles by Campbell and by Hope treat the rhetoric of women’s liberation as a genre. Smith and Windes, however, disagree, arguing that because the rhetoric of women’s liberation contains few mobilizational appeals, the rhetoric is generic but not movement-oriented.

What emerges, then, is a notion that the rhetoric of certain types of movements attains generic status in view of stylistic regularities. Yet, since no consensus has emerged as to the rhetorical role of motive in either genres or movements, the positing of a genre-movement tie-in has only limited utility in the development of rhetorical theory. Movement rhetors may, indeed, come to rely on characteristic strategies. But, until critics gain a clear notion as to how movements are motivated, and as to how genres are formed, we will profit but little from the observation that the two terms share certain surface mutualities.

Towards an Integrated Definition of

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The preceding review of the literature of situation, genre and movement suggests some requirements for successfully defining the terms individually and synthetically. Discrepancies between and among the definitions point to rhetorical motive as the key issue in coming to grips with situation, genre and movement. As Jamieson notes, “the question of the extent to which rhetorical response is determined by situation, audience
expectations, antecedent rhetoric or other factors requires determined inquiry. We may enlarge upon her observation and postulate a grammar of motives which includes events, rhetors (intentions, perceptions, language choices), audience (perception, need, demand, expectation), style (antecedent rhetoric) and critic. Each of these factors has been cited as the Ursprung of situational, generic and movement strategy.

Resolving the problem of rhetorical motive presupposes that we find answers to at least three questions: (1) do rhetors function freely or is their behavior determined by factors of the environment such as events or audiences? (2) is the rhetorical situation a "reality out there" or does situation exist only on the basis of rhetor/audience/critic perception? and (3) what is the relative importance of style versus rhetorical motive in definitions of genre, in particular?

In addition to coming to grips with motives, a successful definition should be integrative. That is, it should delineate the relationships among situation, genre and movement. In this connection, we may also observe the presence of a consensus-of sorts in the literature. No one has asserted, to my knowledge, that the three are completely independent terms. In fact, most recent writers assume that the concepts are closely allied. The literature review, therefore, sets forth the tasks to be undertaken in the final portion of this essay. In the following pages I will present definitions of situation, genre and movement together with axioms detailing the connections existing among the three concepts.

The Rhetorical Situation

A rhetorical situation may be best understood, I think, as being something which is defined by a need for discourse felt by a group of individuals. The rhetorical audience is made up of those who feel the need and who have an expectation that the need will be met. While it is common for audience-members to share both time and space, such is not a
necessary condition for membership in the rhetorical audience. From the point of view of a rhetor, however, the audience must share time, if not space, with the person from whom communication is demanded. Rhetorical need, as perceived by a set of auditors, may originate in one or more ways. Events may be a source of rhetorical need. In the case of John F. Kennedy's assassination, the audience's need for communication arose largely from what Bitzer would call a "publicly observable historical fact." The hunger of Englishmen who supported repeal of the corn laws is also an example of need arising, at least in part, from social reality. The need of the audience may, also, result primarily from rhetor intention—the communicator's linguistic construction of reality and his conferring of presence on "facts." For example, in the situations of industrial pollution and of the Cuban missile crisis, decisions by rhetors to emphasize certain aspects of reality were instrumental in creating a state of anxiety in a group of auditors. Rhetors create anxiety, for example, by using the problem-solution structure of discourse in which a need is established, via linguistic emphasis, and is alleviated rhetorically. The unfolding of such a scenario may be observed in recent advertisements for home smoke detector fire alarms. Advertisers desirous of marketing this product have found it necessary to give rhetorical presence to the problem of home fires and to the product which they offer as a solution to this problem. Finally, the need of the listeners may proceed primarily from particular characteristics of the audience. That is, we may postulate that the feeling of need by individuals will vary even given the same events and rhetor emphases. The need for discourse about pollution felt by a group of industrialists would be strongly affected by factors of the group members' occupational affiliation. Thus, the expectations of an audience may originate partly from individual characteristics.

Throughout the remainder of this essay I will use the term exigence to
denote an audience-perceived need for communication. To elaborate on an earlier point, those who share the feeling of exigence constitute the audience. I see a need to center the exigence in audience perception even though that perception is affected by events and rhetors. By acknowledging audience perception we are, at the same time, highlighting the ability of auditors to exert at least some control on the structure of discourses through the process of reward and punishment. Such a view of exigence as audience perception and demand is consistent with traditional assumptions of the speech communication field that (1) messages are "adapted" to audiences (assuming that a rhetor desires something from his audience), (2) rhetors are free to encode messages but are also mindful of what is likely to win acceptance from the audience, and (3) both rhetors and audiences are capable of intelligent, purposeful behavior which is at least partially free from the control of the objective environment.

Once discourse has been called for by an audience's perception of exigence, communication is subject to control by the audience. The audience enforces constraints which limit the freedom of the rhetor, assuming that the rhetor seeks to influence the audience. We may define constraints as the audience's control over the content of communication by means of its ability to reward and punish. It seems apparent that constraints may vary from specific to general and from strong to weak. Constraints on message structure are specific and strong when the audience perceives, clearly, the nature of the message which is required to alleviate the exigence. Constraints are of three types: (1) the audience's knowledge of facts, (2) the audience's interpretation of reality as embodied in attitudes or attitude systems (ideologies), and (3) the values held by the audience. Since it is likely that there will be differences in the beliefs, attitudes and values held by the persons who feel the
exigence, it follows that subaudiences will exist within the general rhetorical audience. The content demands will be different for the various subaudiences. That is, while the members of the rhetorical audience are united by their common feelings of need for communication, the members may be segregated into subsidiary groups on the basis of different expectations as to the content of a "fitting" communication. The need for communication about the Vietnam War, in 1968, will serve as an example of the different constraints on content which are placed by subaudiences. Some of those who demanded information on the subject of the war expected a "hawkish" speech which advocated a more aggressive pursuit of victory. Others, who possessed differing beliefs, attitudes, and values relative to the Vietnam War, demanded "dovish" messages in which withdrawal from the conflict was advocated. One can imagine that the hawks and doves could be further discriminated into more microscopic subaudiences. For instance, among the extreme doves there probably existed a subgroup for whom the removal of exigence required a message advocating immediate withdrawal and recognition of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) as the legitimate government of South Vietnam. Thus, while I will occasionally use the term "audience" in its singular form, it should be remembered that any audience will likely consist of a number of distinguishable subgroups and that the same message will be received differently by these subaudiences in view of their various content expectations.

Rhetorical audiences use rewards and punishments as a means of enforcing their demands as to message content. When the rhetor removes or alleviates the audience's exigence, then he is rewarded with such incentives as applause, laughter, increased sales, votes, etc. If the rhetor ignores or deviates from the content constraints, he will likely not receive any rewards and he may find certain unpleasant consequences resulting from his rhetorical act. Notwithstanding the power of audiences to reward and punish, the
rhetor is free to structure discourse so as to attempt a modification of audience need. But, when the rhetor seeks to create or modify the exigence, he risks punishment. Evidence of the reality of constraints may be found in the efforts by rhetors to use "audience analysis" as a means for predicting the effects of variations in message structure. The communicator actively searches out those beliefs, attitudes and values of the audience which pertain to his goal. Having identified the content demands of the audience, the rhetor has a number of choices in structuring his message. He may choose (1) to adapt his purpose and structure so as to reflect audience constraints, (2) to structure his message in such a way as to modify audience constraints and bring these constraints into alignment with his purpose and outlook, or (3) to oppose or even flaunt the audience's content expectations and demands. Any attempt to modify or reverse strong and specific constraints carries with it a certain amount of risk. However, rhetorical theory provides the speaker with a number of structural approaches which allow risk reduction: e.g., the rhetor may minimize the dangers by identifying elements of agreement between himself and the audience and only gradually work toward points of disagreement. Also, relevant to the point of challenging constraints, we must remember that the rhetor has a great deal of freedom to structure his message in those situations in which (1) the audience possesses few specific beliefs, attitudes and values relative to the subject, or (2) audience constraints are either diffuse or not strongly held. Despite the latitudes of freedom possessed by rhetors, we must remember that the audience is always the ultimate agency of control in the rhetorical situation. The audience's power to demand, constrain, reward and punish is omnipresent, even though audiences may often defer to speakers. The very fact that a speaker structures his message with a view toward the audience demonstrates the potency of constraints.
In addition to those constraints imposed by the rhetorical audience, we may speak of certain secondary constraints imposed by a secondary audience. Secondary constraints are those demands and expectations of the rhetorical critic. While critical judgments are necessarily based on human perception, we may, nevertheless, view the judgment of history as something more objective than the demands and expectations of the immediate audience. Using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's terminology, we may view the critical audience as the universal audience. Some time may elapse before critical opinion becomes uniform on the matter of a rhetor's behavior. And, in fact, the universal audience often exists in potential rather than actuality. However, the critic's ability to act as a secondary judge of communication implies that the rhetorical situation includes a secondary exigence—the critic's need for a moral and valid message and his assessment of the effectiveness of actual and potential message strategies given the situation. When the critic uses the truth or ethics standards, he judges the morality of the rhetor's message. When the critic uses the validity or effectiveness standards, he searches out, respectively, the logical correctness and the actual effects of the message. I believe that it is important to consider the critic-as-audience, precisely because speakers may feel constrained not only by the immediate rhetorical audience, but also by the judgment of posterity. In addition to communicating for immediate strategic objectives, rhetors may posture for a place in history. This possibility, together with the very real observation that critics often interpret messages differently than audiences, suggests that the concepts of secondary audience, exigence and constraint deserve attention.

In sum, we may define the rhetorical situation to be a context (existing at a point in time from the perspective of an individual speaker) in which certain individuals (the audience) perceive an exigence or need for communication, constrain message content and reward or punish rhetors on the basis of adherence to details of audience need. While the audience is
the primal element in this scenario, we have observed a twofold role for the rhetor. On the one hand, the rhetor functions **rhetorically** (forgive the redundancy inherent to this term) in that, seeking to win adherence, he adapts his message to vicissitudes of the audience's need for content (i.e., the constraints). However, as a free, thinking being, the rhetor may elect to modify the exigence and/or deviate from the constraints. In so far as a rhetor is able to construct discourse to meet his **own needs**, he functions as a poet. In the role of a poet, the speaker does not construct communication for the benefit of an outside audience. Rather, the rhetor-as-poet makes himself the audience. As a poetic production, a discourse is complete when created by the artist, whereas, from a rhetorical point of view, a set of symbols becomes a **message** when it is addressed to an auditor. In reality, of course, the speaker functions simultaneously as rhetorician and poet, so that the structure of almost all messages contains the interplay of rhetor intention and audience demand. Yet, this differentiation between the poetic and rhetorical roles of communicators helps to shape a response to the issue of free will versus determinism in the literature on situation. As a rhetorical and poetic being, the arguer is simultaneously free and unfree. At times, the rhetor appears to heed no counsel but his own, while, at other points, the rhetor functions mimetically. We may postulate, therefore, that the audience does not constrain the rhetor in a deterministic fashion. As a feeling, thinking entity, the communicator, to a certain extent, is able to differentiate his will from that of the audience. Given that the rhetor may know both his own mind as well as that of his auditors, he possesses two kinds of freedoms: (1) the ability to respond to his own needs, neglecting the demands of an outside audience and (2) the ability to attempt a reconciliation between his own intentions and the needs of his listeners. This notion of the speaker as a free perceiver and choice-maker, together with my earlier
arguments that (1) the exigence is a perceived need and (2) that constraints involve attitudes and values in addition to knowledge of facts, helps to form my answer to another question about the nature of the rhetorical situation. My account of the rhetorical situation assumes that a situation is not a reality "out there" but that the situation exists as a personal reality for audiences, subaudiences, rhetors and critics.

The Rhetorical Genre

In my account of the rhetorical situation, I asserted that the rhetorical audience has two kinds of expectations with respect to a message. By definition, the audience is made up of only those who feel a need for communication of some type (i.e., those for whom the exigence is a reality). Additionally, subaudiences exist on the basis of differing needs, expectations or demands for message content (i.e., subaudiences impose differing constraints). The possible existence of a third kind of audience expectation—an expectation of form—brings us to the subject of rhetorical genre. The ability of an audience to have strong needs for, or expectations of, the form of communication makes possible the phenomenon of rhetorical genre. We may define rhetorical genre as an expectation of and demand by the audience for ritual behavior on the part of the rhetor. This conception of rhetorical genre both includes and transcends rhetorical situation. Genre subsumes situation because a demand for communication itself must necessarily precede or at least accompany a demand as to the form of the communication. But, while genre is situational, it entails more than an undifferentiated exigence. An audience's need for generic discourse requires that the rhetor provide a ritualistic message structure. That is, in the phenomenon of genre, situational content demands (constraints) become so specific as to constitute requirements of form. To be sure, the distinction between
content and form is not easily made and, as Griffin notes, "form is content" in rhetorical acts. Yet, we may distinguish between the audience's demands for content and for form by postulating that when the demand for content becomes so specific as to imply expectations of particular words, phrases and sequences, then we have marked a transition from content to form. For instance, when one approaches an acquaintance, the acquaintance expects to have his presence acknowledged. However, the frequent recurrence of this situation has resulted in characteristic content constraints (pertaining to the exigence of acknowledgement) which are so prescribed as to be demands of form. Rubrics of the greeting ritual include requirements as to words, gestures, length of interaction, etc. Generic demands, which I shall call rubrics are, then, a more elaborate form of situational constraint. Generic rubrics are demands for specific ritual behavior. The terms genre and ritual are, then, equivalent since both denote an audience's knowledge of and expectation for a pattern of appropriate behavior. The connection between situation and genre results from the fact that the rhetorical (exigence feeling) audience may simultaneously act as a generic (ritual demanding) audience.

As Jamieson has observed, the process by which audiences demand and recognize genre is not well understood. Yet, we may assume that rituals exist because human beings possess learned behavior patterns. It is not by accident that rituals are associated with cultures, because it is the process of inculturation which sensitizes individuals to the appropriate forms of behavior. As Gronbeck notes, "both interpersonal and public communication rituals seem governed by rules or cultural traditions." Duncan cites the Chinese belief that "rites are the orderly expression of feelings appropriate to a social situation," and he emphasizes the concomitant importance of the rubrics for performing the ritual, noting that how rituals were performed determined their effect. Vivas is probably
correct that if an audience is not educated to a particular genre, then that audience cannot hold the rhetor accountable to specific ritual rubrics. But, if an audience is sensitive to the genre, then the audience may view certain ritual forms of behavior as prerequisites for the removal of exigence. The basic generic scenario is as follows: through inculturation, individuals are sensitized to appropriate context-bound behavior patterns; having notions of what constitutes appropriate behavior, individuals frequently encounter situations in which the culture has prescribed a particular ritual for the alleviation of exigence; thus, the audience demands certain communication behaviors (forms of action) from the rhetor and holds him accountable for the fulfillment of the rubrics.

Our culture and its attendant subcultures are a repository of familiar ritual forms including greeting, courtship, exorcism, marriage, ordination/sponsorship (the laying on of hands), eulogy, confession, sermonizing, apology, conciliat ion, and so on. In some rituals, such as sermonizing, or persuading, the rubrics are less precise. The distinction between closely-drawn and loosely-drawn ritual rubrics suggests that an overlapping hierarchy of rituals may be discovered. To take an example of genres familiar to communication scholars, we may observe that the genre of the "campaign speech" is subsumed by the genre of the "deliberative speech," which, in turn, is a member of the phyle "speech" (following the Aristotelian tradition that expository speeches are a communication form distinguishable from poetry or drama). The familial nature of genres gives credence to Reichert's assertion that the pursuit of mutually-exclusive genres is illusory.

This description of genre as ritual suggests that a generic production is an outgrowth of the rhetorical situation since the demand for generic rubrics is a need by an audience relative to an exigence. Further, generic rubrics of form are but an elaboration of situational constraints on content.
We have now to search out the origins of generic rubrics and their effect on rhetors. Given the close connection between constraints and rubrics, it follows that the audience's demand for adherence to rubrics is traceable to events, rhetors and particular (in this case, cultural) characteristics of the audience. The occasion of Edward Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick" speech will serve to illustrate the interaction of event, rhetor and audience in the formation of ritual demands within the context of a rhetorical situation.

The peculiar circumstances (events) surrounding Kennedy's automobile accident on the night of July 18, 1969 served as a catalyst for audience expectations that either a confession or an apology would be forthcoming on Kennedy's part. The audience's need for a confession or apology is rooted in cultural norms. A young woman was dead, a curious delay in the reporting of an accident had taken place, and the responsible agent (Kennedy) held a position of high trust. All of these factors triggered the audience's concern for life and knowledge of responsible, moral behavior. Given the apparent lapses in responsible, moral behavior, the culture demanded that Kennedy either confess guilt or profess innocence (apologize). The interaction of facts and cultural aspects of the audience produced a demand for a certain form (in this case, forms) of discourse in addition to demands for communication with a particular content. As a member of the same culture as his audience, Kennedy was probably aware of the exigence, constraints and rubrics. Given Kennedy's intention to defend himself from charges of immorality and negligence, he choose to invoke the ritual of apology rather than that of confession. While Kennedy's intention helped to shape the rubrics of the apologetic ritual he choose, Kennedy's freedom was limited by expectations. That is, he probably realized that a campaign speech or an inaugural address would likely not be well received. Thus, he choose words, facial expressions, phrases, gestures and sequences appropriate to the apologetic ritual. In the Chappaquiddick speech, we see
the interaction of situation and genre. The audience felt an exigence and demanded certain features of content. For instance, Kennedy had to account for his sharing transportation with Miss Kopechne. However, because of cultural norms relative to death, family, etc., the audience had expectations of form as well as content. Kennedy was expected to confess (affirm guilt, express sorrow, ask for forgiveness) or to apologize (deny, differentiate, bolster and/or transcend). Kennedy was aware of the exigence, constraints and rubrics; but, even though he sought to fulfill the audience's needs, he still possessed some margins of free choice. That is, exigencies, constraints and rubrics bind the rhetor, but do not imprison him. Kennedy had the freedom to choose between at least two genres and, even though there exist standard rubrics for these genres, he still had some ability to shape the structure of his vindication.

This account of Kennedy's rhetorical behavior as a generic orator supplies evidence that the generically-constrained speaker functions rhetorically and poetically. By virtue of its residence in a situation, a generic work is constructed to fit the rubrics of an audience-demanded ritual. When the audience expects an apology, the audience matches a message to the recognized rubrics of apology, rewarding appropriate behavior and punishing deviations. The audience decides whether a speech fulfills the requirements established for apologies. However, as a poet, the speaker has a freedom both to choose rituals and to heed/ignore rubrics of the chosen ritual. For instance, in his nationally-televised speech introducing Sargent Shriver as the new 1972 Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate (replacing Thomas Eagleton), George McGovern faced an audience which probably expected the sponsorship ritual. But, instead of merely introducing and praising Shriver, McGovern delivered a campaign address replete with attacks on the Nixon Administration. McGovern delivered a
speech which conformed to the rubrics of two genres. To be sure, the audience's demand for genre was probably vague in this instance and, indeed, many may actually have expected a campaign address. But, this example suggests that rhetors are able to attempt an altering of ritual expectations or to deviate from customary rubrics of a given ritual. Such choices, of course, carry with them a risk of failure.

This narration suggests that discourses undergo a threefold generic classification. Works are assigned to genres by audiences, rhetors and critics. Accordingly, differences may exist as to perceptions of the generic title of a given composition. Yet, while a rhetor may influence his audience's expectations by publicly titling his work, and while the critic is a creator of genres who also helps educate the audience as to the range and rubrics of a culture's rituals, the audience retains ultimate control over generic classification. In a given period of time and from the perspective of a rhetor, the audience knows genre, recognizes genre, demands genre and, finally, assigns a generic title to messages.

Rhetorical genre is defined, then, not by the existence of similar messages, but by the origin of such similarities in culturally-induced demands for rituals which are styled according to prescribed rubrics. Although cultures evolve and, consequently, genres undergo modification, generic categories exist as a priori classifications which are known to the audience, rhetor and critic. Generic titles and associated rubrics, such as in the greeting, confession or apologetic rituals, are known to the members of a culture, even if this knowledge is frequently below the threshold of consciousness. Yet, because the rhetor is a poetic as well as a rhetorical being, the generic demands are not absolutely binding. The communicator may choose and style rituals to suit himself realizing, of course, that inappropriate behavior may be punished.
The Rhetorical Movement

In my review of the literature on movement rhetoric, I noted that movements have been treated as possessing both situational and generic traits. While the relationships have remained, I think, somewhat obscure, I agree that a definition of movement must be closely tied to definitions of situation and genre. Consequently, I define a rhetorical movement as being a situation in which mass participation rhetoric is created by and for an audience which expects (needs) such communication. A movement occurs when an audience (1) perceives a need for communication (feels an exigence) of a particular content and/or form, (2) is frustrated in that expectation because no rhetors come forth to meet the need sufficiently and, thus, (3) the audience itself rises up to meet the need. The movement becomes a ritual of self-assertion in which the movement participants are their own best audience. While a movement may address persuasive claims to an outside group of auditors, the movement members may be viewed as the original audience. The nature of a movement as self-assertion helps to explain why movement rhetoric is often nonconciliatory. Given that the members desire to express personal convictions, they choose to symbolically reward themselves rather than to adhere to the need for conciliatory communication of an "outside" audience. Movement followers have been frustrated by an exigence, so they treat themselves to exigence-relieving communication in which the constraints and rubrics are of their own making. The self-expressive function of movement rhetoric has been long recognized and this observation helps to explain certain features of movements, such as their rapid emergence and the meteoric rise of movement leaders. Since movements are organized around certain specific symbolic and material needs, it often follows that movements decline rapidly when the needs have been realized. The needs of movement followers may be seen to arise from three basic
sources: (1) events, such as the Vietnam War or busing, (2) rhetor agitation as when a particularly vocal individual or individuals stimulate an audience's perception of exigency, and (3) special features of the audience, such as the listener's being subject to the "draft" or having three children who are assigned to be bused to three separate schools. Because a movement originates in a shared feeling of individually-perceived exigence, the movement encompasses the situation. Because the demands of the movement participants (the original audience of a movement) imply features of context and form we may postulate that there exist certain genres of movement rhetoric: e.g., confrontation, diatribe, moral demand, etc.121

The observation that particular individuals may play a pivotal role in the development of a movement indicates that leadership is an omnipresent feature of the movement. Although mass participation and a low level of status differentiation are characteristic features of the movement (when compared to the formal organization), movements do take on elements of structure. Those best able to articulate "the message" (i.e., to provide the necessary symbolic rewards to the participants) rise to rhetorical-leadership.125 While "the word is made flesh in the person of the leader, it remains true that the leader responds to the needs of the movement—his primary audience. In fact, because the confluence of the individual needs of participants creates a movement persona, the leader finds it difficult to deviate from the movement's rhetorical center of mass.

Insofar, I have written of the movement as providing symbolic rewards for the participants. Yet, in addition to desiring symbolic (rhetorical) remedies for an exigence (e.g., anti-war speeches or anti-busing speeches), the members of a movement often desire to effect a physical change in the environment (end the war; stop busing for racial balance). Since neither the members nor the leaders of a movement may directly change that aspect of the environment which they find offensive
(if they could, then a movement would be unnecessary), the leaders and participants frequently find it necessary to address claims to an "outside" audience. Also, since the existence of a movement necessarily creates expectations in an outside audience, there exists a second reason for the movement to address communication to the outside. The need to communicate with external elements presents a dilemma for the movement, especially for the leaders. As Simons observes, appeals designed to fire the imagination of participants (the original audience) may deviate from demands (in the form of exigencies, constraints and rubrics) made by the external listeners. Similarly, efforts to conciliate outside groups may reduce the morale of the participants. The solution to this dilemma depends on the ability of participants to sacrifice symbolic rewards for material ones. Participants of a movement whose goals deviate sharply from the status of the present system will probably not accept conciliation with outside forces (i.e., meeting the needs of outsiders) unless this act of self-denial is followed quickly by material rewards (changes in the environment). Even if this is the case, purists may still refuse to accept substitution of material for symbolic incentive.

The preceding analysis of movement rhetoric reveals, once again, the poetic and rhetorical roles of speakers. As poets, the members of a movement may construct messages to please their own needs to the neglect of expectations by others. As rhetorical beings, movement participants may allow their rhetoric to be structured in accordance with exigencies, constraints and rubrics imposed by external audiences. This scenario is further complicated by the distinction, within the movement itself, between leaders and followers. Thus, movement rhetoric takes place in a context containing two main rhetorical audiences (original; external) and two semi-independent rhetors (the persona of the movement; the leaders of the movement). There exists an ever-present potential conflict between the
inception (and survival) of a rhetorical movement and the "successful" propagation by the movement of its claims to outside elements.

The definition of movement as a mass participation rhetoric of self-assertion (which may or may not involve an outward propagation) implied that we cannot equate the terms "movement" and "movement rhetoric" as Catherwood would have us do. As was the case with my definitions of situation and genre, I see a need to treat the movement and its rhetoric as something which originates in audience expectation and in which communicators operate poetically and rhetorically.

Conclusion

Owing to the extensive literature on situation, genre and movement, together with the thorny issues in and relationships among the terms, this essay has become a rather extended endeavor. Yet, to return to the agendas which I set forth in the introduction and in the literature review, I believe that the outcomes of this inquiry may be briefly stated. Because the many definitions of situation, genre and movement have been based on differing conceptions of rhetorical motive, there is reason to attempt fresh inquiries into the meaning of these terms. Because of the apparent close connections among the three concepts and because of confusion surrounding efforts to relate them, there is support for my assertion that only integrative definitions will be satisfactory. Based on a system in which the audience acts as the prime rhetorical motive, I have presented a conception of rhetors as both rhetorical and poetic beings. The situational rhetor recognizes the demands (exigence and constraints) of the audience and constructs messages which, at once, seek to satisfy and to modify the audience. The generator observes in his auditors a need for communication (exigence), a corresponding need for content (constraints), together with a need for rhetorical form (ritual rubrics).
The movement speaker (the masses and/or the leader) views his own needs for communication, content and ritual as primary, but also is mindful of both the expectations and rewards held by outside audiences. Throughout this scenario, the power of the audience to demand communication and to judge its appropriateness, relative to exigence, constraints and rubrics, is paramount.

To be sure, this essay has not solved all of the complications of situational, generic and movement theory. But I hope to have at least pointed the way toward a solution. What is needed, in my view, are more theoretical and case study inquiries into the functioning of rhetorical motive, the nature of demands by audiences, the poetic and rhetorical behavior of speakers and the relationships of situational, generic and movement phenomena.
Situation, 44


Situation, 45

that I am among the first to publicly postulate that any one of the terms
cannot be successfully defined in isolation to the other two.

3 Essays on situation, genre and movement by Bitzer, 1-14, Eliseo
Vivae, "Literary Classes: Some Problems," Genre, 1 (1968), 97-105 and
Simohs, 1-11 may be taken as examples of the former. Essays by Richard
B. Gregg, "A Rhetorical Re-Examination of Arthur Vandenberg's "Dramatic
Ambassador's Speech: A Particularly Hellenistic Genre of Oratory," QJS,
59 (1973), 209-12 and Leland A. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the
'New Left' Movement: Part I," QJS, 50 (1974), 113-35 may be taken,
respectively, as examples of the latter approach.

4 Bitzer, 1-14.

5 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, Illini Books (Urbana:

6 Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Rhetorical Timing in Public Communication,"

and Rhetoric, 6 (1973), 154-61.

8 James R. Andrews, "Coercive Rhetorical Strategy in Political Conflict:
A Case Study of the Tent Affair," Central States Speech Journal, 24 (1973),
253-61.

9 Scott Consigny, "Rhetoric and Its Situations," Philosophy and
Rhetoric, 7 (1974), 175-86.

10 Black's book appears to be one of the first theoretical excursions
into the rhetorical implications of the term situation.


17. Gregg, 154-68.


20 Jamieson, "Generic Constraints," 162.

21 Black, pp. 138, 141, 143.


24 See Frye, pp. 246-47, 95, 96, 111.

25 Ibid., 246: Frye also observes that the poet may be viewed as an imitator of other poems (95-96). That is, the poet chooses to express his thoughts via the poetic vehicle.

26 Vivas, 97-105. Vivas, it should be noted, eschews the task of providing a definitive conception of genre (102).

27 John F. Reichert, "Organizing Principles and Genre Theory," Genre, 1 (1968), 1-4 and 9-11, especially.


30 Wooten, 209-12.


43 Gronbech, "Rhetorical History," 311, 316.

44 Reid, 259-86.


46 Ware and Linklil, 273-83.


67, especially, however, views coercive strategy as being a conscious decision by a rhetor to manipulate the scene.


59 Mohrmann and Leff, 459-67.

60 Ibid., 463. Mohrmann and Leff quote Jamieson, "Generic Constraints," on the relationship between "situation" and audience expectation. Jamieson, in this particular article, derives her conception of situation from Bitzer's 1968 essay, meaning that her use of situation—and, consequently, that of Mohrmann and Leff—has a basis in events.


62 Measell, p. 4.

63 Bormann.

64 Eich and Goldmann.

65 Burgess, "Black Power."

66 Burgess, "Moral Conflict."


68 Windt.

69 Sillars.

70 Brandes.

71 Hancock, Hope, and Campbell, "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation."

73. Simons, "Requirements."


76. Smith and Windes, "The Innovational Movement."


85 Cathcart, 82-88.


89 See Black, pp. 133-37.


91 See Windt, 8, Ware and Linkugel, 273-75, Wooten, 211-12, Campbell, "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation," 83, Jamieson, "Generic Constraints, 163, Mohrmann and Leff, 163, Raam and Measell, 29, Erlich, 14, Bass, p. 1, Katula, 1, Harrell, Ware and Linkugel, 246, Cragan, 1, Patton, "Generic Criticism" p., Martin, 247, Reid, 259, Simons, "Genre-izing," and Campbell, "Significant Form and Genre."


Two possible exceptions to this statement are Arnold, pp. 243-46 and Rubin and Rubin, who give roughly equal treatment to situation and movement.


Cheesebro, 12.

Cheesebro and Hamsher, 328.


Situation, 55


105 See Black, p. 167 on the "mimetic orator."


107 See Bitzer, 9-11, especially, on the issue of the poetic and rhetorical aspects of discourse. Also, Vivas, 101-104, on this same point.


110 See Jamieson, "Generic Constraints," 170 (footnote 7).


112 Duncan, Symbols, p. 187.

113 Vivas, 100.

114 See Mohrmann and Jeff, 464.
We may assume that both situational and generic subaudiences existed relative to the Chappiquiddick situation. For instance, on the matter of generic subaudiences, we may assume that individuals who respected Kennedy would have been more likely to have needed a speech of apology. "Kennedy-haters" would have likely felt less need for vindication and would probably have preferred a confession of guilt.

On the rubrics of apology, see Ware and Linkugel.

Gronbeck, "Rhetorical History," 316 suggests that deviation from generic expectation may increase effectiveness.

See Chesebro and Hamsher, 328.


Measell, p. 6.


See Smith and Windes, "The Innovational Movement," for a description of the genre of the innovational movement in which there exists no fundamental conflict between the movement participants and the outside audience being addressed.

See Simons, "Requirements," li-6 and Hahn and Gonchar, 52.

Cathcart 87, especially.