The document presents a report of a conference to stimulate study, research, and education in the field of foreign relations. The report contains summaries of small group discussions of peace and security, economic order, development, resource/population balance, the environment, and human rights. It is presented in six sections. Section I summarizes discussions of non-proliferation strategy for the late 1970s. One major proposal was to create multinational nuclear power centers. Section II focuses on long-term strategies for human rights, action by the United States and international organizations to preserve human rights, and consideration of priorities for action in the field of human rights. Section III identifies problems of international security in outer space, including unavailability of scientific data, and the absence of an international space monitoring agency. Section IV examines ways to encourage social and economic development through technology. Section V describes United States government policies toward the United Nations' 1978 Special Session on Disarmament. Topics discussed include alternative security systems, the conduct of disarmament negotiations, and the role of public and private organizations in promoting peace. The final section reviews U.S. foreign policy options with regard to South Africa. A directory of conference participants concludes the document. (Author/DB)
EIGHTEENTH
STRATEGY FOR PEACE
Conference Report
October 13-16
1977

Airlie House
Warrenton, Virginia

Sponsored by
The Stanley Foundation
The Eighteenth Strategy for Peace Conference continued the Stanley Foundation's series of annual meetings dedicated to a re-evaluation of U.S. foreign policy. Ninety participants from a wide spectrum of disciplines convened to discuss six timely and important issues confronting the world community.

The first Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace was held in June 1960, to involve leaders in government and the professions throughout the United States in a search for a more enlightened and forward-looking foreign policy.

The format of this Conference has been an informal off-the-record exchange. No time has been spent in presenting or debating prepared papers or positions. No effort has been exerted to achieve consensus where difference of opinion has been evident.

Each group report was prepared by the rapporteur to state the essence of discussions. Reports were reviewed by group participants and finally revised by the rapporteur reflecting participants' comments during the review session. However, members supporting various parts of the report do not necessarily endorse them in their entirety or specific language. Moreover, as participants did not review the reports of other groups, the reports do not necessarily reflect the views of all members of the Conference.

Participants in the Conference are in no way committed to any position or findings of the discussion groups.

The views expressed in this report are not necessarily the views of
The Stanley Foundation.

This report is distributed in the hope that it will stimulate study, research and education in the field of foreign relations. We urge that references to, or duplication or distribution of the contents of this report be given proper acknowledgment.

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C. Maxwell Stanley, Conference Chairman

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The Stanley Foundation
Our Eighteenth Strategy for Peace Conference convenes at an auspicious hour. The time is favorable for the emergence of dynamic and innovative U.S. leadership in the world community's faltering efforts to manage global problems. The opportunity for leadership is always with us; the needs of this troubled world are always present and constantly escalating. Now is a unique time due to a fortuitous combination of two factors. First, the Carter Administration has clearly demonstrated a determination to exert U.S. leadership more commensurate with the inherent responsibility of the large and powerful. Second, global attitudes toward accepting U.S. leadership are more favorable than in the recent past.

President Carter, before and since his election, has confronted many facets of U.S. foreign policy boldly. He has called for a reduced defense budget, together with curtailment of U.S. sales of conventional weapons. He has urged a new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement with lower limits on nuclear weapons and strengthening of detente with the Soviet Union. Urging substantial reduction of nuclear weapons, he has proposed indefinite deferral of reprocessing and plutonium recycling, delayed development of breeder reactors, and other measures intended to stave off proliferation of nuclear weapons. Greater use of the United Nations has been emphasized. The rights of humans have become a prominent U.S. policy objective. Peaceful resolution of controversies in the Middle East and southern Africa is being actively sought; a Panama Canal treaty, resulting from many years of negotiations, has been supported.
The Carter Administration has acted to implement many of these objectives, even though some have been reduced by encounters with vested interests within and without government. The implementation of some initiatives has appeared naive or ill-timed. It is too early to judge the success of many of the initiatives. Many of the persons appointed to key foreign policy administration positions are known advocates of these new initiatives. On balance, President Carter and his Administration have given a new thrust to U.S. foreign policy principles.

Changes in global attitudes toward U.S. leadership result from several factors, not the least of which is the expressed determination of the Carter Administration to take a fresh look at a number of global problems. Black Africans are impressed by attention given the long neglected problems of southern Africa. Developing nations are cautiously hopeful that the United States will continue and expand previous initiatives to deal with global economic problems. People everywhere welcome Carter’s announced desire to reduce nuclear weaponry and applaud proposals for a SALT II treaty with greater limitations than those of the Vladivostok agreement.

There are other factors affecting the improved climate, however. Nations throughout the world, developed as well as underdeveloped, are feeling increased economic pressures, partly attributable to the burden of military establishments. More national leaders are recognizing the need for more effective international and transnational approaches to world problem solving. More moderate leadership and postures from the Third World, within the Group of 77 (now grown to 110 nations) and other organizations, may be an indication of this attitude. None of these subtle changes mean that the United States can or should dictate world policy or dominate global decisions. However, a climate is emerging wherein intelligent and dynamic U.S. leadership can make more positive contributions to the resolution of problems plaguing the world.

Through my professional activities and those of the Stanley Foundation, I have had numerous contacts with national leaders and diplomats throughout the world. It has been many years since I have sensed a climate as favorable as currently exists for constructive measures dealing with the serious world problems.

To take advantage of these opportunities, however, there must be clear understanding of fundamental factors. Understanding that must grow internally within both the public and the private sectors of the United States and externally among and between nations. Three areas of understanding seem essential.

Critical world issues in need of management must be identified. The world’s problems are legion, but they can be grouped into several
major categories. I like to use the following six categories, you may prefer others.

1. **Peace and security**: developing adequate systems to assure peaceful settlement of international differences and to protect the security of nations against overt or covert intervention, thus removing the need for threat and use of armed force and leading to arms reduction and disarmament.

2. **Economic order**: improving the various systems and mechanisms comprising the world economic order to better manage trade, commerce, and development.

3. **Development**: achieving an acceptable pattern and tolerable pace of economic and social development for the less developed two-thirds of the world’s population.

4. **Resource/population balance**: managing the finite resources of the earth and stabilizing population growth to achieve and sustain a quality of life compatible with human dignity.

5. **Biosphere**: protecting and managing the biosphere to avoid hazardous deterioration and enhance environmental and resource contributions to the quality of life.

6. **Human rights**: extending elemental human rights to all people and developing better systems to protect such rights.

These six critical world issues are urgent priorities on the world community’s agenda. Even the most superficial examination of accomplishment in each area — the true test of effective management — reveals serious deficiencies.

Along with the identification of critical world issues is a second area requiring greater understanding — the nature of interdependence. Much has been written and more has been said about interdependence, but just what is it and how does it relate to the management of critical world issues? More than one type of interdependence deserves attention. The most common type is, technological and physical resource interdependence. Very few, if any, nations are fully self-sufficient. Some have physical resources, but lack technology. Others have technology, but are short on resources; the United States is in this group. Many have deficiencies in both areas. Nations are truly interdependent in their efforts to achieve economic and social growth.

A less recognized form of interdependence relates to the global problems just outlined. These global issues are so interrelated that little
progress can be made on any one of them in isolation. Where, from reduced military expenses, will more adequate funds for economic and social growth be generated? Can there be substantial improvement in world economic order without improved means to reduce tensions and peacefully resolve controversies? Can the resources necessary to provide a decent existence to growing numbers of people be assured without protection and enhancement of the environment? Finally, are human rights more likely to be enlarged in a peaceful and secure atmosphere and a progressive climate encouraging economic and social development? Indeed, there is a high degree of interdependency among the critical issues the world must manage.

Nations desiring resolution of a specific issue of legitimate interest are dependent upon the support of other nations whose interests may lie elsewhere. Developing nations can achieve neither a new world economic order nor technology and finances for economic development without the assistance of developed nations. Developed nations cannot reduce the burden of armaments, improve the world’s security system, or get the changes they desire in the world economic order without the cooperation of developing nations. No nation or bloc of nations, however strong, can gain desired objectives alone. Unfortunately, however, a few strong nations or a large bloc of countries can seriously impede progress.

Interdependence of global problems and nations requires a third type of understanding — understanding of the political realities fundamental to successful management. Decision making in the world arena calls for political action of which compromise is one fundamental element. To achieve compromise, nations must be willing and able to look ahead; they must be willing and able to recognize the long-term advantages of managing global problems. Otherwise, efforts to compromise will falter upon tempting short-term self-interests, both legitimate and illegitimate. Finally, management of global problems calls for transnational, and ultimately supra national, institutions to execute and administer programs that are established through international conventions and treaties.

The objective of Strategy for Peace Conferences is to explore urgent foreign policy concerns of the United States in search of more enlightened and forward-looking foreign policy. We seek to achieve this objective by structuring discussions among experts. We endeavor to select timely and relevant topics related to the six critical world issues. We examine U.S. positions that are not hardened and inflexible.

This weekend we will emphasize the issues of peace and security and
human rights Three groups — non-proliferation strategy, military competition in outer space, and U.N. Special Session on Disarmament — deal with facets of peace and security that are of immediate concern. Two discussion groups — human rights and southern Africa — consider from different points of view fundamental problems related to enlarging human rights. Four critical world problems are affected by science and technology — economic order, development, resource/population balance, and biosphere. The interrelationships and impacts of these topics are myriad.

NON-PROLIFERATION

Our first topic is “Non-Proliferation Strategy for the Late 70s.” This is a topic the Stanley Foundation has been continuously interested in since our 1961 conference considered the merits of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Europe. Since then, the subject has been considered repeatedly at Strategy for Peace Conferences, at Vantage Conferences in 1975 and 1976, and has been the subject of several Occasional Papers dealing with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and with nuclear-weapons-free zones.

Managing nuclear capabilities is perhaps the most complicated and serious problem confronting the world community. Nuclear energy is needed, nuclear weapons are unwanted. The result of failure to manage nuclear capability is likely to be unrestrained nuclear proliferation with all its horrors and hazards. Irrational or desperate national leaders may use the nuclear weapons they hold in arsenals. Nuclear weapons may be released by misjudgment, misinterpretation, inadvertence, accident, or warning system failure. Moreover, the reality of nuclear explosives in the hands of terrorists may develop. Obviously, the genie has grown too large to be returned to the bottle, but it must be shackled for beneficial use to mankind. The urgency of developing proper nuclear policies is matched only by the complexity of doing so.

As nuclear policy affects both energy and proliferation, the formulation of a more adequate U.S. policy for nuclear energy has been a concern of both the Ford and Carter Administrations, as well as the U.S. Congress. In the fall of 1976, President Ford proposed certain nuclear policies. Meanwhile, Congress was also considering legislation dealing with nuclear policy. The Carter Administration has proposed bold, but controversial, policies, including indefinite deferral of reprocessing and plutonium recycling, de-emphasis of commercial development of breeder reactors, and expansion of enrichment capability to provide an adequate supply of nuclear fuels.
to foreign, as well as domestic, customers. Our discussion group has
the opportunity to review these proposals, offer modifications, and
suggest means of implementing them.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Promotion of human rights has become a stated goal of the new ad-
ministration. Fallout from this human rights emphasis seems to have
influenced SALT I negotiations, the same issue almost wholly
dominated the June, 1977, annual meeting of the Organization of
American States (OAS). The outcome of the Belgrade Conference
now reviewing Helsinki accords will depend in part upon successful
management of varying views of human rights issues.

Most everyone favors the philosophy of human rights, but interpreta-
tions differ and approaches vary from culture to culture and govern-
ment to government. We, in the West, think of human rights in
political terms, including the freedom of worship, speech, assembly,
and movement, and the right of privacy, dignity, property ownership,
and diversity. Developing nations think of human rights in economic
and social terms, such as employment, food, shelter, health care, and
education. A third interpretation of human rights is freedom from
fear, insecurity, and the traumas of war, terrorism, and barbarism.
While the course of human rights progress in any country can be in-
fluenced from without — witness the contributions of the United Na-
tions and the Council of Europe — the fundamental responsibility for
improving human relations rests with the leaders and peoples of na-
tion-states. Obviously, measuring progress is difficult due to great
variations of culture and openness of societies.

One task of our discussion group on human rights is to assess the
U.S. efforts to stimulate interest in enlarging human rights throughout
the world. Another task is to formulate proposals for improving U.S.
performance in support of human rights, without sacrificing other im-
portant foreign policy goals. Stanley Foundation conferences and
publications have not previously examined in depth the subject of
human rights. This discussion will formalize our long-standing in-
terest.

OUTER SPACE

The importance of outer space to the world community has been re-
cognized by The Stanley Foundation for several years. At our 1974
and 1976 Strategy for Peace Conferences, we discussed the need for
international cooperation and demilitarization in outer space. An Oc-
casional Paper in 1975 dealt with many aspects of international
cooperation in outer space.
The growing threat of further militarization of outer space has recently attracted public attention. The media has widely publicized purported Soviet breakthroughs in antisatellite weapons technology. Despite the inaccuracy of the media reports, the United States and the Soviet Union are clearly devoting increased resources to research, development, and testing of new weapons systems adaptable to warfare in space. The development of high energy laser and charged particle beam weapons encourages military planners to view outer space as a suitable environment for exploitation of new technologies. The Star Trek, Star Wars, and Logan’s Run scenarios seem less like the science fiction they were designed to be.

Advancing technology has also increased the importance of non-military use of outer space. Worldwide communications increasingly rely upon satellites. New techniques are developing for satellites as tools to survey resources and detect encroachments upon the environment. Verification of international arms limitation and disarmament agreements are further vital satellite functions.

While military intelligence satellites currently contribute to stabilizing the arms race, competition to deploy a variety of weapons in space could be profoundly destabilizing. Hence our third discussion group will address "Military Competition in Outer Space." It is time to focus upon proposals to prevent an arms race in space before the present momentum becomes irreversible. It is time to consider amendments to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to deal with the development, testing, and stationing of weapons in space. Now is the time to give far more attention to international control of space reconnaissance, communications, verification, and similar beneficial operations.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The role of science and technology in the economic and social growth of developing nations is receiving increasing and warranted consideration. This is the first time the Foundation has addressed the subject head on, although economic and social development has been repeatedly on our agendas for nearly two decades. Hence one of our discussion groups will examine the topic "Science and Technology International Development." Preparation is under way for the proposed 1979 United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development. The U.S. State Department planning for the 1979 conference is focused upon amalgamating views of industry, labor, academia, and government.

The successful transfer of science and technology from developed to developing countries is a highly complicated process involving...
economic, social, legal, and political, along with technical, problems. Many leaders of developing countries place unjustified hope in the magic of science and technology, many are likely to be sadly disappointed to discover the limitations and burdens it poses. Nevertheless, intelligent transfer of science and technology, properly applied to the needs of labor intensive economics, can stimulate economic and social growth.

As a world leader in these fields, we should be in the forefront helping to develop more effective procedures and mechanisms for transfer of suitable science and technology. Our discussion group is encouraged to examine appropriate U.S. initiatives to accomplish this end, taking into consideration impacts upon both source and recipient nations.

SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Work of the Preparatory Committee for the General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament is well under way. Decisions of the May, 1978, Special Session can influence the course of multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations for the next decade. The United States must play an important role, not only in the work of the Preparatory Committee but also in the Session itself.

Once again our activities and interest in the entire subject of disarmament are varied and numerous. Most recently we examined the Special Session at our 1977 Conference on United Nations Procedures and again at our 1977 United Nations of the Next Decade Conference. Accordingly, the topic of our fifth discussion group is "U.N. Special Session on Disarmament: U.S. Initiatives."

What initiatives for stimulating arms limitation and disarmament should the United States propose to the Special Session? As one of the two superpowers and major activists in the arms race, responsibility rests heavily upon the United States. There are two ways in which we can increase the probability of success at the Special Session: It is incumbent upon us to demonstrate sincerity when working bilaterally with the Soviet Union. This calls for cooperation in advance of the Special Session, demonstrated by a meaningful SALT II accord, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and agreement to proceed with a treaty banning chemical warfare. Were the United States and the Soviet Union to come to the Special Session with these accomplishments, the climate for a successful meeting would be greatly enhanced.

The second area of opportunity is support before and during the Special Session for substantive and procedural proposals focusing at-
attention on conventional, as well as nuclear, arms reduction. Attention should be given to the specifics of a proposed program of action and to improved mechanisms and procedures for dealing multilaterally with arms reduction and disarmament. Approaches should be consistent with long-term objective of general and complete disarmament. This discussion group is charged to come forth with ideas that can have early impact upon the world community’s efforts to halt and reverse the arms race.

**SOUTHERN AFRICA**

The sixth of our discussion topics is “Southern Africa. U.S. Policy Options.” Until very recently, the United States had overemphasized the proverbial benign neglect in Africa. During the Ford Administration, Dr. Henry Kissinger focused attention upon the controversy in Angola and attempted to advance peaceful resolution of the controversy in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Under the leadership of Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador Andrew Young, the Carter Administration has substantially intensified U.S. overt attention to African affairs.

This healthy development is long overdue. The neglect of Africa, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa, has been both regrettable and inexcusable. Our Fourteenth Strategy for Peace Conference took an in-depth look at issues concerning sub-Saharan Africa. Greater public interest in Africa is justified for several reasons. African resources and trade will be of increasing interest in the years ahead. Importantly, more than 40 votes in the United Nations General Assembly belong to African states. Forward looking U.N. initiatives to manage global problems are unlikely without the support of the African nations. Furthermore, we have important and unique ties to the area, it is the ancestral home of some 15 percent of our population.

Currently, attention to African matters is appropriately concentrated upon the southern part of the continent – Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa – where the overwhelming black majorities are denied political, economic, and human rights. Having spent considerable time in Africa on behalf of Stanley Consultants, I was convinced long ago that independence, including majority rule, in all of sub-Saharan Africa is a prerequisite to a unified and peaceful continent. The task before this discussion group is to consider new policy initiatives associating the United States more clearly with the desires of the African majorities. These desires include rapid movement toward national independence and racial equality, while avoiding major armed conflict.
CHALLENGE

The most challenging question now is, Will the United States rise to the occasion and take advantage of current opportunities to exert more positive leadership in the world community? Or, hobbled by prejudice, precedent, and fear, will we allow the opportunities to fade away? I certainly lack the vision to answer these questions for you. But I believe two prerequisites to the development of determination to forge a more positive leadership role for the United States are important considerations.

First, our decision-makers must overcome their tendency to yield repeatedly to the pressures of vested interests. The arms race, for instance, will never be halted so long as weapons development and production is justified to maintain employment, to improve the U.S. balance of payments, or to satisfy unreasonable demands of the military. Only as decision makers resist such pressures and focus upon measures to manage effectively the world’s problems will our response be adequate.

The second prerequisite concerns relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. What a spectacle is created by the sight of these two great powers locked in ideological and military confrontation. Neither wants war, yet they pile overkill upon overkill. Both would benefit from a letup in the amount of resources now poured into military establishments, both would benefit from exchanges of resources and technology, both would be the victors if critical world issues were managed better. Thoughtful reappraisal by these two countries of their attitudes to one another is long overdue. Without it there is little hope of defusing the seemingly perpetual confrontation. Without reappraisal, the United States will continue to avoid its responsibilities and overlook opportunities to provide leadership.

Only in the future will we know whether or not the United States rises above obstacles and provides more positive leadership. Fortunately, as a famous comedian has observed, “the future lies ahead.” To this bit of wisdom, I would add, “the future starts now.” Here, at this conference, we have the opportunity collectively to help shape more positive and dynamic U.S. leadership contributing to secure peace with freedom and justice.
NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY FOR THE LATE '70s

DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT

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NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY FOR THE LATE '70s

The risks of the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons recently has attracted increasing public attention, in part because of two dramatic and unpredictable events. First, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973 focused world attention on the future scarcity of fossil fuels, the vulnerability of existing oil supply arrangements, the disparity of national resources of fuels and energy, and the need to develop alternate energy sources. The alternate source furthest along in development, and the one encouraged by many governments, was nuclear power.

But a second event, India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974, raised anew the spectre of the atom’s destructive potential, revived fears of the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and prompted renewed discussion of ways to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Efforts to deal with the proliferation problem are not new. Many international conferences have been held since 1945 to address the risks posed by proliferation and what to do about them. In this new era of concern since the oil embargo, progress has been made by nuclear exporting countries to seek common ground rules for their nuclear commerce. Presidents Ford and Carter have made comprehensive statements on nuclear policy, and several other heads of government have made new declarations — such as the decisions of France and the Federal Republic of Germany not to undertake new agreements to export sensitive technology — designed to assure that the peaceful uses of the atom will not be turned to destructive ends.

Despite this progress there is no international consensus on the additional measures which should be taken to prevent proliferation and the process to achieve one promises to be lengthy and tortuous. Thus, in our deliberations we worked to identify the elements of a global non-proliferation strategy, and the objectives it may seek to achieve.

Proliferation can be said to occur in two ways. “Vertical” proliferation is the expansion of numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states. “Horizontal” proliferation is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-weapons states, and it is this form of proliferation that we focused on in our discussions.
WHAT IS PROLIFERATION

A principal problem in discussing nuclear proliferation is its definition. Lawyers scrutinizing international treaties may have one definition. Laymen reading a newspaper account could have quite another. For our purposes we decided to consider proliferation in terms posed by one of our members: proliferation is both a fact and a process.

Proliferation is a fact when a country joins "the club" by acquiring a nuclear device, a status that may not become apparent until an explosion occurs. Considered in terms of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), proliferation occurs whenever there is an increase in the number of states possessing a nuclear explosive device. And in this respect efforts to limit nuclear proliferation have been reasonably successful. Since July 1945 there have been more than 1,000 known or presumed nuclear explosions, yet the number of countries detonating these devices has not exceeded half a dozen. The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, and India. Many members of our group found this reassuring in the light of predictions early in the nuclear era that by now there would be more than a score of nuclear-weapons states.

As a process, nuclear proliferation is an immensely complicated matter. The nature of this process is more significant for anyone trying to devise a non-proliferation strategy than the simple fact of proliferation. It is the process which must be controlled. There is no simple, single route to nuclear proliferation, and similarly there is no single road block to prevent it. One country could build a small reactor in secret to produce and a reprocessing plant to extract plutonium, and then fabricate a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, running only the risk of detection by intelligence operations. Another country could take incremental steps beginning with the transport of nuclear power reactors and fuel, then acquiring more sophisticated technical capability, and culminating in a military or political decision to use plutonium from it, and make a crude explosive. Yet another country could deliberately set out to develop and produce nuclear explosives reliable and predictable enough to be used as weapons. Finally, proliferation could result from the purchase of nuclear materials on a black market that might develop in the event that these materials become articles of international commerce.

There are many ways to get the nuclear materials needed to make an explosive. A government could try to divert significant quantities of safeguarded nuclear materials, the risk would be whether such a diversion would be detected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. One possible means of doing this...
might be to seize weapons grade material. Another might be to build a covert reprocessing facility and then seize spent fuel, reprocess it quickly, and incorporate the materials into an explosive. It was estimated by one member that a well qualified technical team could use such material to make a military weapon in several months if advanced preparations had been made, or that it could make a “crude” explosive, with unpredictable yield, within a week. Such a “crude” bomb might have a yield in the kiloton range (1,000 tons of TNT equivalent).

The group was also informed of a study which concludes that a small, covert reprocessing plant could be built in a matter of months, with a capacity sufficient to separate in a matter of days after start-up enough plutonium for making a nuclear explosive device.

Theft of a bomb or weapons-grade materials and its use by sub-national groups or terrorists is another important concern. Since this topic was covered in the 16th Strategy for Peace Conference Report in 1975 (pp 33-40), we did not consider it in detail. However, the group noted that any technical step taken to deter national proliferation would increase the resistance to sub-national or terrorist activities.

INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES

Just as the routes to nuclear proliferation are numerous and unpredictable, so the incentives to follow these routes are subtle and complex. Unfortunately, the incentives not to proliferate are at times tenuous and ambiguous. While the group agreed that to some extent incentives and disincentives to the acquisition of nuclear capabilities parallel the world’s growing appetite for energy, we divided over what relationship exists between “peaceful” nuclear power and the pursuit of a “military” capability. Indeed, it is a fact that it would be easier for a country utilizing only its own resources to directly produce the materials to build and test a bomb than to establish an indigenous power program and then divert weapons grade materials from it. Much of the technical information necessary to produce nuclear materials is in the unclassified literature, and the general principles of nuclear weapons design are available, although not in specific detail. By contrast, a power program involves creating a large national and international bureaucracy, arranging long-term finance, contracting for complicated fuel-supply and waste-disposal agreements, arranging for safeguards and safety, and maintaining a vigilant scientific and managerial organization to control the program’s continued operation. We raise this contrast to illustrate that the spread of
nuclear power, while potentially contributing to the proliferation "process," should not be seen as inevitably culminating in proliferation. In the history of the nuclear era there are many states with extensive power programs but no apparent interest in building nuclear weapons, despite their technical ability to do so if they wished. Proliferation, at least historically, has not resulted from nuclear power programs.

The key to fostering a creative political climate for non-proliferation policies rests in large part on the ability of nuclear weapons states to provide their allies with a credible security "umbrella." Insecurity is a powerful urge to proliferate. The more secure and stable international conditions can be made, the more likely it will be that commerce in nuclear power can thrive without an attendant spread of nuclear arsenals.

Nevertheless in considering additional measures for non-proliferation we agreed that the process may yet involve nuclear explosions by new countries. This pessimism, however, should not be grounds for concluding that the existing non-proliferation efforts have been a failure. On the contrary, the group stressed the vital role played by existing political institutions which we have called the "non-proliferation regime," which have reduced the political incentives for proliferation and which have provided considerable stability to date in international nuclear affairs.

A key institution of this regime is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. More than 100 states are now parties. The IAEA, which was created in part to apply an international nuclear safeguards system, has been apparently successful in assuring that nuclear materials subject to its scrutiny remain confined to peaceful uses. The group agreed that both the pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, subject to verification by IAEA safeguards, as required by the Treaty, and the obligations of IAEA safeguards, have served to foster the spread of nuclear power without the attendant dangers of further proliferation. (There is concern over the ability of the IAEA to provide such assurances in the future, especially with the next generation of nuclear technology.) The group noted the importance of such political institutions and obligations as nuclear test bans and the Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in restraining proliferation. Finally, the group emphasized the importance of the growing unacceptability to the world community of additional countries acquiring nuclear weapons.

We discussed several incentives and disincentives to proliferation, in the context of various countries' decisions not to ratify the NPT.
Some have abstained because of the discrimination inherent in the NPT. Some have abstained because they say the treaty provides no guarantee for their security. Others may see the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons as a means of gaining prestige. Still others see the prospect of NPT as a bargaining chip to be used with neighbors or allies. Several have complained that current application of the NPT by nuclear power countries focuses on its restrictive regimes for safeguarding nuclear materials, to the exclusion of its promises (in Article IV) to make available nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

We agreed that there could be little hope of attracting more countries to undertake NPT commitments if it appears that having nuclear weapons imparts some special advantages, or an immunity from commonly accepted safeguards standards.

The group agreed generally that for a non-proliferation policy to succeed, there must be access to the benefits of nuclear power as well as adequate control. Assured supply of nuclear fuel, under both national and multinational arrangements, was recognized to be a key incentive in obtaining effective non-proliferation constraints. We generally agreed that the spread of nuclear power to countries that do not accept the NPT, or at a minimum safeguards on all their nuclear activities, should be opposed. Some among us felt that it may occasionally be necessary to disseminate nuclear technology and equipment even to countries that have not adhered to the NPT, in order to achieve non-proliferation commitments, or at least not to push such countries into an indigenous development of nuclear power immune to foreign influence.

In this respect, we concluded that increasing scarcity of fossil fuels and their rising prices, might cause more countries to turn to nuclear energy, and that this increasing dependence might be a strong impetus for them to undertake NPT commitments — or at least to accept international safeguards regimes.

NEW APPROACHES

We agreed generally that any approach to containing nuclear proliferation must go beyond merely technical deterrents. Political, economic, and military considerations are highly important in dealing with both the incentives and the disincentives to proliferate. Questions of energy, resources and needs, regional security agreements, and internal political stability, all play a part in the complex situation surrounding a country's decision whether or not to proliferate. The problems ahead are so complicated, we all agreed, that no single technical, political, or economic "fix" will suffice. Indeed, to seek one
would be foolish. It was observed that those with technical backgrounds sometimes argue for political solutions, while those with political backgrounds tend to argue for technical solutions. It was agreed, however, that concerted and imaginative efforts on all fronts are needed, coordinated in terms of existing political and economic realities.

We agreed also that IAEA safeguards should be improved, both in respect of their coverage and in terms of their potential effectiveness. First, all parts of the nuclear fuel cycles of all non nuclear weapons states should be covered by IAEA safeguards agreements. Second, plants handling significant quantities of special fissionable material should be so designed as to facilitate the application of safeguards. Measurement equipment and national practices to account for nuclear material should conform to standards to give the IAEA the opportunity to draw all necessary conclusions.

Nuclear supplier nations should also consider using a broader range of incentives and disincentives to induce their nuclear trading partners into accepting stricter controls and adherence to the NPT. Whereas in the past supplier states have seen the totality of their relationships with their nuclear clients as necessitating a softening of their approach to non proliferation objectives, the group believes that the totality of such relationships should be used to advance such goals in the future. The effort need not be limited only to the nuclear aspects of the relationship but may also be extended to economic, political and military affairs.

SANCTIONS

We concluded that it is important to create a climate of world opinion hostile to proliferation and a will for governments to meet a decision to proliferate with effective sanctions. Such sanctions should be unequivocal, inevitable, and preferably multinational.

The IAEA has a vital role to play in triggering sanctions in case of any violations of non proliferation understandings. The group agreed that IAEA procedures toward this end should be carefully evaluated to ensure that they will function effectively when needed.

Reports of South African preparations in 1977 to explode a nuclear device, and the attendant international diplomatic pressures to dissuade them from doing so, emphasized both the need for and possibility of achieving prompt and effective international action to counter proliferation threats.
PROPOSALS

Our group discussed proposals to rationalize and stabilize nuclear commerce by creating multinational or international fuel-cycle centers. We recognized that there were problems connected with setting up and operating such centers, but felt they offer major possibilities for minimizing proliferation risks associated with sensitive fuel-cycle activities. On the one hand, such centers could remove the excuse for some nations to build their own nuclear fuel reprocessing plants—a source of plutonium in forms that are useful for weaponsmaking. They should be reinforced by political institutions such as the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones. On the other hand, such centers would not guarantee that a nation would thereby refrain from clandestine nuclear weapons planning or preparation. Moreover, unless great care is taken in setting up such institutional arrangements, such centers could conceivably be sources of further proliferation. We agreed, however, that for any new international institutions to be attractive and acceptable to nations now interested in expanding their nuclear power programs, these must be equitable, economical, and well administered. For them to be attractive and acceptable to nations interested in stopping proliferation, they must in addition involve minimizing of numbers of sensitive nuclear facilities and careful siting and management of such facilities. Here agreements by nuclear suppliers to refrain from commerce with countries unwilling to participate in these institutions might help to assure their success. Conversely, efforts by individual exporters to undercut new international marketing or processing arrangements could undermine them.

The group considered several approaches. One possibility would locate sensitive fuel-cycle activities, such as reprocessing, in international enclaves under the jurisdiction of an appropriate multinational organization. This international organization would have full custody and control of sensitive materials while in the enclave and during transportation back into the reactor. Technical, managerial, and operational responsibilities would be under national organizations that desire to locate facilities in the enclaves. This approach would separate the sensitive activities, which should be under multinational custody and control, from those which need not be, such as the facility's management and operation. This arrangement would perhaps overcome one of the main objections raised in the past to the multinational fuel-center concept.

Another possibility would be to establish a multinational facility in a particularly stable country. This facility would provide enriched uranium to countries prepared to forego national reprocessing and enrichment facilities. The spent fuel would be returned to the center.
in exchange for credit towards additional fuel supplies. Fuel reprocessing using the safest possible technology would be added at a future date, as could breeder or advanced converter reactors (which would use the separated plutonium) thereby minimizing international commerce in weapons-grade materials.

INITIATIVES OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

We praised the Carter Administration’s emphasis on non-proliferation, but was divided about the wisdom of certain proposed policies. In particular we commended efforts to convene the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation as a first step toward building an international consensus on further steps for a rational non-proliferation strategy. We were divided on our perception of the international effectiveness of calling for indefinite deferral of reprocessing and plutonium recycle, and of commercialization of breeder reactors which produce more fuel than they consume by converting now useless uranium 238 into plutonium. There was, however, general consensus that plutonium recycle for light water reactors is now of dubious economic attraction. The breeder reactor, on the other hand, is considered by a number of countries to be an important energy objective.

The group discussed the particulars of legislation currently before the U.S. Congress on non-proliferation. While reaching no conclusions as to the desirability of specific approaches, the group agreed that legislation could make an important contribution to non-proliferation efforts, provided that it combined assurances of reliable supply with effective non-proliferation restraints. An important advantage of such legislation would be to remove much of the uncertainty surrounding U.S. nuclear exports.

The current non-proliferation debate, and especially the initiatives of the Carter Administration, have created an improved climate for the acceptance of innovative non-proliferation measures. In particular a number of nations are willing now to consider new multinational institutional-arrangements, which they formerly rejected.

Many in the group concluded that the time is ripe for serious consideration of a broad range of ideas that will enable the expanded use of nuclear power with minimal proliferation risk.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Though concern with human rights can be traced for at least three thousand years in history, today’s international concern with the promotion of human rights derives most directly from the excesses of Nazism and Fascism before and during the Second World War and from the “Four Freedoms” articulated by President Roosevelt in 1941. Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear. Public interest in these freedoms, and in international measures for the protection of human rights, was intense as the Second World War came to a close, and as the United Nations and its Human Rights Commission were organized. In order to ward off efforts to restrict the treaty powers of the United States (the Bricker amendment), the government of the United States promised to reduce its participation in U.N. work on human rights, and only recently has the promotion of human rights become again a central goal of U.S. foreign policy.

This report considers a number of issues relevant for the present and for the future. Hoping that international concern for human rights will remain an enduring feature of international relations, the focus of the discussion group was on the long term, rather than on short term goals and strategies. Accordingly, emphasis is given to the need for developing international standards and international institutional arrangements designed to translate concern into action at both the international and the domestic level. At the same time, consideration was given to internal U.S. needs, and to some current aspects of U.S. foreign policy in this area.

Several major issues recognized as important in the discussion group are not addressed in this report. Chief among these is racial discrimination and the protection of human rights in southern Africa, which will be dealt with by another panel at the conference. Second, issues of special treatment for particular groups or classes of persons were omitted for lack of time. A third major exclusion relates to the human rights issues growing out of scientific and technological developments. Although recognizing the importance of such issues in the framework of the present report, the group was unable to devote the attention required for their inclusion in the report.

In an initial consideration of priorities for action in the field of human rights, the group generally agreed that its discussion might usefully proceed along the following lines:

1. What can be done about gross violations of human rights, especially torture, preventive detention and mass killings.
2. The relationship between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights;
3. "Linkage" between human rights action and national and international security, arms control or other issues;
4. Measures to improve the machinery and procedures of international agencies;
5. Specific actions that should be taken by the United States;
6. Measures to strengthen the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in securing compliance with international human rights standards.

While several members of the group stressed the especially urgent need for action in some of the areas listed, it was stressed that such an emphasis was not intended to imply a lack of obligation to take action in other areas as well. In particular, it was generally agreed that governments ought not to ignore some rights while pressing others.

GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The problem of gross violations of human rights was chiefly discussed from two standpoints: whether greater precision is needed in the existing international standards in such areas as torture, summary execution and preventive detention; and what action should be taken in specific instances of gross violations of human rights.

Some members felt that existing standards were clear enough, and that what is needed is more adequate means of bringing pressure on governments to comply with such standards. Others felt that the process of working out more detailed standards would contribute to their effectiveness. This was true because the process of refining the standard would strengthen it through focusing attention on the problem and helping to build a consensus that the behavior in question is wrong and should be prevented. The redefinition of the standard would also provide an occasion for the development of additional machinery for its implementation, and, through the greater precision in its definition, aid those who seek to restrain government conduct leading to violations of the rights in question. An example of the value of the careful elaboration of human rights standards is the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which defines the nondiscrimination standard and provides special international machinery to aid in its realization.

With these considerations in mind, most members of the group supported efforts to elaborate the right to freedom from torture through the General Assembly Declaration on Torture, adopted in 1975.
General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX]], and through an international convention on torture. Several NGOs have started on the preparatory work for such a convention.

Some members also supported a similar development of detailed standards in the areas of preventive detention, summary execution and mass killings. In the first two areas the rights raise issues of the adequacy of the legal process in some countries that ought to be explored in detail and are not easily solved through the more general language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Some members felt, however, that existing standards were fully adequate for most “gross violations” problems, and it would only drain energies and deflect attention to embark upon additional drafting exercises. In their view, emphasis should be given to the procedures already in place and political capital should be devoted to using these procedures in cases of gross violations of human rights.

The group generally agreed that more forceful action should be taken in handling gross violation cases. The General Assembly, for example, should be more willing to consider and adopt resolutions directed to specific cases of gross violations of human rights. It was suggested that other means also be explored of bringing pressure upon the guilty government, for example, giving publicity to the wrongful acts, withholding aid, declining to hold international conferences in the country, and keeping up a steady criticism of leaders of the government in question. Specific measures of this nature are discussed in detail later in this report.

Two areas of consensus emerged from the initial discussion of action in cases of gross violations of human rights. First, there is an urgent need to give greater publicity to such cases, specifically, in addition to efforts by governments and others, the procedures of the Human Rights Commission and Sub-Commission should be revised to permit public disclosure of communications containing allegations of gross violations of human rights. Second, action taken in cases of gross violations should not exclude action in other cases, and should not imply that gross violations are the only violations of human rights that are of international concern.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Discussion of this subject raised the issues of a “hierarchy” and “priority” in human rights, exemplified by the statement that “human
Rights begin at breakfast. "Resolution 4 (XXXIII), adopted by the Human Rights Commission this past spring, referred to the "full realization of economic, social and cultural rights as an essential means for ensuring the real and meaningful enjoyment of civil and political rights." Did that resolution imply that economic, social and cultural rights come first, and that the implementation of civil and political rights can be postponed?

In contrast to claims that the "hierarchy" of rights exists, the group considered that civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights are interrelated and cannot be separated in this fashion. Both International Covenants, for example, recognize in their preambles that the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The reasons for separating the two types of rights into two International Covenants included the initial perception that whereas civil and political rights could largely be guaranteed without delay, most economic, social and cultural rights could be achieved only progressively as resources could be devoted to achieving full realization of rights in those areas. Although the "progressive" accomplishment idea is now applied also in some areas of civil and political rights, it would not be accurate to link the accomplishment of civil and political rights to prior satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights. Indeed, the Human Rights Commission resolution quoted above might equally well have called for the full realization of civil and political rights as "an essential means for ensuring the real and meaningful enjoyment" of economic, social and cultural rights.

Beyond the abstractions surrounding the hierarchy idea, some members of the group pointed out that in concrete cases of individuals, their specific conditions of life may give a special urgency to one or the other of the basic human rights. In this sense real and compelling priorities do exist. That fact, however, and the fact that under some circumstances severe economic problems might be thought a sufficient practical justification for lapses in the full realization of certain civil and political rights, should not lead to an uncritical acceptance of the general proposition that economic, social and cultural rights may be treated as prior in sequence to civil and political rights.

A member of the group pointed out that the hierarchy issue was being raised by governments of autocratic countries, with some support from liberal intellectuals in western countries, and that it was not at all clear that people in the poor countries were not interested in civil and political rights. Some felt that the hierarchy concept was being
raised by autocratic governments as an excuse for the denial of civil and political rights but the fact that the recent change in government in India was brought about with full support from the poorer classes clearly shows their interest in civil and political rights.

More complex problems are presented when specific economic, social or cultural rights come into conflict with civil or political rights. For example, in the area of freedom of information, it has been asserted that the right of societies to preserve their cultural heritage implies a right to control news content. Cases of conflict of this kind have no ready solution. The most that can be done is to attempt to reach an acceptable accommodation in making clear through declarations and conventions the scope of such rights and the limitations that may be imposed to protect rights existing in other areas.

"LINKAGE" BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION AND OTHER ISSUES

The group discussed the "linkage" question in relation chiefly to national and international security and arms control issues, and to the general issue of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter.

It was generally agreed that the human rights referred to in the U.N. Charter and made the subject of international declarations or conventions have become matters of international concern and in principle cannot be said to be "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of states as that term is used in Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter. This conclusion was based upon the many years of experience with human rights issues in U.N. organs, and the generally accepted view that the content of the "domestic jurisdiction" concept cannot remain fixed: it must change to reflect the acceptance of international obligations concerning the promotion of human rights. Thus, in the view of the group, states are internationally accountable for the actions they take within their jurisdictions in violation of international human rights standards. In particular, the group did not accept the argument advanced by some states that although the formulation of human rights standards in the international covenants is a matter for international action, means chosen to implement such standards lie within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the states concerned.

Having taken this position on domestic jurisdiction, the group considered that there may nonetheless be practical and principled limitations on the extent to which governments should act to promote human rights in other countries. In general, the group agreed that
focus might properly be given to specific practices of governments that are seen to conflict with international human rights standards as contrasted with broad indictments of governments or generalized condemnations that might be seen as efforts to overthrow a government rather than as efforts to promote the human rights of peoples subject to its jurisdiction.

The line thus drawn becomes difficult to apply when it is observed that in some respects appeals for change in human rights practices may challenge basic tenets of the government and thus, in effect, call for systemic change. In this situation, some members felt that policies directed towards protection of the individual cannot avoid being at the same time policies directed towards fundamental institutional change. This observation led some members to express reservations about the use of active policies to promote human rights in such contexts, while others considered that even if institutional change would be a necessary end result, that fact alone should not exclude support for international human rights standards.

At the level of practical politics, many members considered that distinctions might be drawn in terms of the expected result of pressures for the promotion of human rights standards. Where, for example, leverage exists, strong claims might be made in the expectation that this will influence government attitudes and accomplish protection goals for the individuals concerned. Where there is no leverage, as was said to be true in the case of closed societies, human rights demands may not work, and the best approach, exemplified by the Helsinki agreement, may be to combine emphasis on human rights with means of opening up that society. Some members feared that de-emphasis of human rights in relations with closed societies carries the danger of downgrading human rights and establishes a double standard.

Viewing the issue from the perspective of foreign criticism of human rights practices within the United States, it was observed that the United States had not sought to deflect such criticism through reliance on "domestic jurisdiction." For example, the United States has responded to inquiries raised through Organization of American States (OAS) procedures without invoking domestic jurisdiction, and in this connection has invited the Inter American Commission to visit the United States should it wish to do so.

Turning to "linkage" with national and international security and arms control issues, the group recognized that no broad generalizations are possible. On the question of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), it was observed that the United States cannot avoid
"linkage" if the Soviet Union in fact considers that there is a link between human rights promotion and SALT. Although no conclusions were reached on the actual impact of the Administration's human rights initiatives on SALT, it was generally agreed that human rights cannot be seen as absolute interests to which other interests, as for example in security and arms control, must always be subordinated. At the same time, at a more general level, warnings were voiced that too often "national security" or national emergency is invoked without proper cause, and care must be taken to preserve the vitality of human rights' promotion in such contexts. Efforts to uphold human rights may themselves promote security interests. In all these situations, as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly provides, certain basic human rights must not be trampled upon.

**IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCY MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES**

As observed at the outset of this report, the group considered that international concern for human rights has become an enduring feature of international relations, and that therefore special emphasis should be given to the development of international standards and to the structure of international human rights institutions. Contributions in this regard were seen to have more durable impact than contributions to short-term planning.

In this sense, the group gave high priority to careful review of international human rights machinery and procedures and considered that care must be taken to ensure that developments of machinery and procedures will ensure impartiality, fairness and due process. With these standards in mind, the group considered proposals for basic changes in the structure of U.N. machinery and proposals for modifications in some of the procedures presently followed.

The view was expressed that both the Human Rights Commission and its Sub-Commission should have higher status in the U.N. system to more effectively advance human rights goals. Concern was also expressed that in fact these bodies were not able to meet often enough, and for long enough periods, to carry out their work. Finally, it was observed that the Human Rights Division of the Secretariat lacked both staff and funds needed for the work assigned to it, especially because of the new burdens imposed by the Human Rights Committee established upon the recent entry into force of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It was suggested, therefore, that the Division be given more adequate funds.

The efficient functioning of the Commission and Sub-Commission would be enhanced by separating its drafting function from the quasi-
judicial functions or reviewing state reports and individual petitions. While retaining the present division between bodies of independent experts and bodies on which governments are represented, some suggested the establishment of a separate structure for each of these two functions. Others suggested that the quasi-judicial functions would more appropriately be assigned to experts at both the Commission and the Sub Commission levels, while policy functions might continue in the hands of government representatives. It was observed that expert bodies had performed well in human rights inquiries.

In the area of basic change, it was observed that proposals had been made to replace the Human Rights Commission with a Human Rights Council that might replace the Trusteeship Council as a principal organ of the United Nations. The proposed council would solve the status problem and would consolidate treatment of human rights issues in the United Nations. Although such a change would most comprehensively be accomplished by Charter amendment, it could also be arranged through General Assembly resolution, the Assembly could not formally abolish the Trusteeship Council, but it could create a new council to replace the Human Rights Commission.

Some members considered that consolidation of U.N. human rights machinery would strengthen the system, make it more visible, reverse the trend towards proliferation of agencies exercising similar functions and improve coordination.

Turning to the present requirement that states report to the Human Rights Commission on action taken to give effect to international standards, the suggestion was made that all states should be asked to report on conformity of their laws to norms contained in the International Covenants even if they have not yet ratified the Covenants.

In the area of regionalization of human rights efforts, support was expressed for regional agencies on the pattern of the European and Inter-American agreements. It was suggested that such an approach might be especially useful in Africa.

The idea of a U.N. Commissioner on Human Rights also received support, with the suggestion that such a development might be extended to the regional level with regional human rights commissioners attached to the present United Nations regional economic commissions.

The group suggested the idea that, in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1978, an effort be made to stimulate national activities through the establishment of national machinery for the promotion of human rights, as well as through the study of human rights issues.
ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES

Action recommended for the United States falls into two categories: support for international action suggested earlier in this report, and additional measures appropriate for unilateral action by the United States rather than for action undertaken in concert with other countries.

The group endorsed the proposition that the United States should express support for governments that make progress on human rights, as well as criticism of governments that fail in their obligations to respect international human rights standards.

Two specific applications of these general policy approaches were discussed: the relationship between human rights and the U.S. foreign aid program, and between human rights and the policies of international lending institutions.

On the aid issue the group endorsed the existing practice of distinguishing economic aid from military aid. The group felt that the humanitarian type of economic aid ought not to be withheld on human rights grounds, but some members felt that it would be appropriate in some circumstances to withhold other forms of economic aid. Military aid, in contrast, should not be granted to governments responsible for massive violations of human rights, except in special and extraordinary circumstances.

Turning to international lending institutions, the group felt that a distinction should be drawn between actions pursued by the United States within such agencies in concert with other members, and actions sought to be imposed upon the agencies by unilateral decision of the United States. Along these lines it was observed that the institutions in question form part of the U.N. system and should be regarded as subject to the Charter injunction to further the realization of human rights. Therefore, in the view of the group, international lending agencies should be asked to take the promotion of human rights into account in their lending policies. This might mean, for example, that such agencies should consider the human rights impact of specific loans, and should affirmatively seek to support projects that would improve human rights in the applicant country. The group felt that going beyond considerations of this kind would imply an assessment of the form or character of the applicant government, which should be regarded as beyond the proper role of an agency in the U.N. system.

Two other major issues were considered by the group as of special importance: continued participation by the United States in the human rights activities of the International Labor Organization (ILO),
and the ratification by the United States of international human rights instruments.

As has been noted, praise was expressed in the group for the work done by ILO in the human rights field. The ILO Committee of Experts is highly regarded for its careful work on the implementation of International Labor Conventions, many of which relate to the promotion of human rights. The ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association, although accused of having applied a double standard in its reports on trade union freedom in the United States and in the Soviet Union, has a large and impressive record of fair dealing on trade union issues in other contexts. The group considered that, on balance, it would be a mistake for the United States to withdraw from ILO without at least waiting for an additional year or two to determine whether progress will be made on the issues that in 1975 led to the United States notice of intent to withdraw.

The final issue, U.S. ratification of international human rights instruments, is in many ways the most important issue. The United States has signed, but not ratified, five major human rights treaties: the Genocide Convention, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. Each of these treaties, and the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, should, in the judgment of the group, be ratified as soon as possible. Until the United States in fact joins major international human rights arrangements, it will continue to face embarrassment in its efforts to promote human rights in the world.

On questions of strategy to accomplish the ratifications, the group considered that the first step should be to seek Senate consent to the ratification of the Genocide Convention, which has been pending before the Senate for over twenty-five years. As to next steps, the group took the view that efforts to obtain ratification of the other treaties must be very carefully prepared. Major educational efforts must be made to secure a full public understanding of the content and operation of international human rights treaties, and of the reasons for their ratification.

The group agreed that the United States should examine further action to promote human rights within the United States, including the broadening of the Civil Rights Commission into a Human Rights Commission with power to monitor the execution of human rights instruments to which the United States is a party.
THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The group devoted some attention to the special importance of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the human rights field, but reached this issue too late in its sessions to consider all its aspects. Nevertheless, the group was unanimous in expressing strong support for the invaluable work of NGOs in bringing the facts of human rights violations to the attention of international human rights agencies. The group considered the current attacks made on the independence of NGOs a grave threat to the progress that has been made in the international protection of human rights. In particular, NGOs must be allowed to bring human rights violations to the attention of U.S. bodies, and to criticize the accuracy of government reports as well as of U.N. decisions.
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE

DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT

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PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE

INTRODUCTION

Mankind has been making increasing use of outer space for military and civilian purposes during the last two decades and there are clear indications that this trend will continue at an accelerating pace into the indefinite future. A number of international security problems have already emerged from this intensifying and potentially conflicting use of space. The group considering these problems decided to limit its discussion to the following: The current emergence of antisatellite capabilities in the United States and the Soviet Union. The near-future problem of spaced-based weapons that could cause damage either to other objects in space or to vehicles being launched into space or to objects on the ground, and the far-term problem of misperception of large-scale space activities on manned, permanent space stations. In addition the group considered policy problems related to remote sensing, scientific exploration, and sophisticated navigation systems, planned for the near future. The group recognized that the next few years offer the best chance of pre-emptive regulation of national space activities by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements that could ensure the peaceful and therefore most advantageous exploitation of space by Mankind. As a consequence the group agreed that there is an element of urgency in reaching such agreements before unilateral capabilities or actions endanger such peaceful exploitations.

An example of such capability is the apparent effort of the Soviet Union to develop a system that could destroy or interfere with satellites in orbit. The United States deploys at present two general classes of satellites: Near-Earth craft that includes surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic ferreting, communications, guidance and navigation, and weather satellites, and geosynchronous orbit satellites performing functions of early warning of strategic attack, communications, and accurate guidance. Unlike ballistic missiles, satellites cannot be effectively protected from attack even if very large sums of money are expended for that purpose. Although they can be hardened and a series of counter-measures (costly in treasure and operational capabilities) could lessen their vulnerability to physical destruction and interference, satellites will always remain ultimately vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated and powerful anti-satellite capabilities.
The group views the emerging Soviet and U.S. anti-satellite capability as the initial step in an escalating, expensive and destabilizing arms race in space. Consequently, the group devoted the largest portion of its deliberation to a discussion of that capability, its military and political implications, the need for arms control agreements to prevent the threatening arms race in space, and the multiple implications of such arms control measures.

RECENT SOVIET ANTI-SATELLITE ACTIVITIES

The Soviet program to develop an anti-satellite capability may date back to mid 1962 when Vostok III and IV were maneuvered to within three miles of each other. A new series of experiments were performed in 1968 to early 1971 during which a target satellite would be launched first and a few days later a second satellite would be launched in a trajectory that would bring it in the immediate vicinity of the first. On several occasions the second satellite would explode in the immediate vicinity of the first. In some tests the second satellite would achieve a co-orbital location with the first and appear to linger in that position as if it were inspecting the target craft. Those tests ceased in 1971, but commenced again in 1976 with seven satellites (either targets or interceptors) and continued in 1977 with three more launches in May and June of that year. In some of these the interceptor would be launched on a highly elliptic orbit that would bring it very near the target satellite within one orbit after launch. It is not clear what these experiments intended to achieve or their degree of success. All the tests were conducted in low and intermediate altitudes (where many but by no means all of the U.S. military or observation satellites orbit) but did not show any Soviet capability to intercept spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit, a mission which appears to be within the technical capability of the Soviet Union but would be achieved with considerable difficulty and uncertainty. The group concluded that the Soviet Union has indeed underway a satellite-interception program and that its capability to achieve interceptions at least of some low orbiting U.S. spacecraft is slowly improving despite an impressive apparent failure rate of their interception experiments. There is however no basis to occasional claims that the Soviet Union has damaged U.S. satellites. The group remains uncertain as to the motives and aims of the Soviet program. It considers that a peacetime attack on U.S. satellites would probably provoke a military response. The Soviet Union may be acquiring an anti-satellite capability for use during an armed conflict with the United States or to neutralize some space assets of the People’s Republic of China.
THE U.S. ANTI-SATELLITE PROGRAM

In the 1960s, the United States had a limited anti-satellite program based on facilities on Kwajalein and Johnston Islands as part of the larger Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) effort, with which an anti-satellite system has some common characteristics. This program was finally terminated in 1975. Very recently the U.S. Department of Defense awarded a contract to Vought Corporation to design a new U.S. anti-satellite capability that is reported to be more sophisticated than the Soviet system. In addition, since satellites could be damaged, or their proper functioning interfered with, by laser beams or electronic means from the earth, it is conceivable that incidental anti-satellite capability is resident in systems developed for a multiplicity of other purposes by the United States. The group is not aware of any evidence that such capability has been demonstrated, or its use planned in the near future.

NATIONAL COUNTRY ACTIVITIES IN SPACE

France, Japan, China, and the United Kingdom have demonstrated an indigenous satellite launch capability. A West German enterprise is preparing to acquire such capability for commercial purposes. India is known to be working on such capability. France uses satellites for reconnaissance, geodetic studies and probably mapping of the gravitational field, all necessary ancillary activities to the development of their nuclear deterrent force. The Chinese are known to have launched into orbit payloads between 2-4 thousand kilograms. They may be planning to use their satellites to acquire target information in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, as well as for tactical military communications. No other nation, however, has displayed any activity, or intention to pursue such activity, that could interfere with spacecraft in orbit.

IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY

The group agreed that both the United States and the Soviet Union are becoming increasingly dependent on satellites for their military activities and that civilian uses of satellites will become increasingly important in the future. The group also agreed that while the United States being more technologically advanced relies increasingly on satellites for its military operation, the Soviet Union is equally if not more dependent on its satellites for ocean and electronic surveillance, since it lacks the earthbound facilities of the United States for similar monitoring. Therefore, both countries would have a vital interest in safeguarding their space borne military assets. These assets
could be partially safeguarded by redundancy that could reduce the efficacy of anti-satellite activities, and by counter-measures that would both safeguard satellites from trivial interference and would make such interference difficult to conduct clandestinely. Such counter-measures would raise the threshold of covert interference that otherwise could be difficult to detect and identify and thereby could raise the political price for such interference. Thus satellite protective measures are stabilizing and consequently welcome, if needed.

The group agreed that peace time or pre-emptive interference with U.S. satellites is highly improbable, but that the Soviet Union could consider it profitable to possess the capability of attacking U.S. (or Chinese) tactical communications satellites during war. The group agreed that the Soviet Union could not decrease the strategic deterrent capacity of the United States by an anti-satellite attack on any of the U.S. satellite systems. The group concluded that it is definitely militarily preferable to protect the U.S. satellite systems by banning anti-satellite activities by treaty, rather than maintain the option to conduct anti-satellite operations against Soviet systems but in the process leave U.S. satellites vulnerable to Soviet attacks.

FURTHER ARMS CONTROL MEASURES IN SPACE

The group therefore recommends that: (1) the United States and the Soviet Union should promptly seek an agreement aimed at prohibiting the testing, deployment or use of any earth-based or space-based systems designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the functioning of any spacecraft of a foreign nation. Because of the urgency in curtailing development of such capabilities, which could escalate beyond control into the procurement of expensive and dangerous weapons systems for waging war in space, and since only the Soviet Union and the United States currently have the potential for such a capability, the initial agreement should be bilateral to avoid delays in bringing this potential arms race under control. However after it had been negotiated, it could be endorsed by the United Nations and later broadened into a multilateral treaty in a procedure analogous to that used in negotiating the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

Although it was not an overriding consideration, it was recognized that such a prohibition could encourage the use of space for deploying military systems by guaranteeing their invulnerability. Therefore the group also recommended that: (2) Agreement should be reached to prohibit the stationing in orbit, on celestial bodies, or elsewhere in outer space of weapons designed for or to be used for inflicting injury or damage on the earth, in...
the atmosphere or on objects launched into space from the earth. Such a prohibition is an extension of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty which deals only with weapons of mass destruction. Thus, while such an agreement might be initially reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, it might at an early date be made multilateral as a Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty.

The group considered that these two self-denying agreements, affecting primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, should be associated with a broader multinational effort to establish further general principles governing peaceful international behavior in space.

The group's belief that a ban on anti-satellite activities is in the best military and political interests of the United States is supported by President Carter's proposal to the Soviet Union to enter an agreement banning such activities.

IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED ARMS CONTROL MEASURES

The group also discussed a number of military and political implications that would follow the adoption of the proposed two arms control agreements. For example, the group realizes that such measures bestow special legal and political status to spaceborne systems even though some of them may constitute parts of large weapons systems, arms control aspects of which lay beyond the scope of our current review.

The group recognized that some covert testing of anti-satellite systems could go undetected, and that occasional space activities unrelated to anti-satellite systems could be misconstrued as proscribed activities. Verification capabilities by national technical means will probably have to be expanded to accommodate the additional requirements of the proposed agreements so that these agreements will not give rise to an excessive number of "false alarms." These could be at least partly alleviated by better registration of the purpose of space launches and the establishment of a consultative mechanism to resolve ambiguities.

The group agreed that there will be inevitable uncertainty regarding the precise activities of the two countries vis-à-vis anti-satellite development systems or testing. However, we believe that the risk to international security caused by such uncertainty is small compared to the predictable destabilizing effects of an unlimited arms race in space.
REMOTE SENSING AND OTHER SPACE ACTIVITIES

The group deliberated in some detail on the international attitudes towards data collection by remote sensing satellite systems and the best policy to govern the dissemination of such data. The group agreed that the United States should not accept any prohibition on data gathering and acquisition from space borne platforms independently of the quality of data, the resolving power, or the degree of wavelength discrimination of the sensors. Neither should it accept any time or other restriction in disseminating data to all users. The group recognized the current practice of withholding data collected by defense and intelligence dedicated satellites. On the other hand, it also recognized that the inexorable technological trend is towards improved quality of data that will eventually eliminate the difference between the technological levels of civilian and military remote sensing platforms, even though the nature of the collected data may remain only partially overlapping.

Consequently, the group believes that freedom to acquire data should be coupled to the willingness to disseminate them freely, reliably and promptly. In addition, the group recommends increased assistance by the technologically developed countries to less developed countries (LDCs) in acquiring the technical capability to interpret and put to use the available data from space borne sensors.

As to U.S. activities, the group recommended that scientific data gathered by space borne sensors also be made freely available to all countries. Civilian acquisition of such data should be unfettered by military demands for the exclusive capability to gather such data. The group concluded that restrictions based on optical resolution or other data characteristics are unstable in the rapidly changing technological environment.

The group could not reach concensus on the question of disposition of navigation data of great accuracy that the forthcoming U.S. Global Positioning System will make available. The group recognized that military use of such data by nations other than the United States was unlikely but was unable to resolve the technical and security problems produced by unlimited access of this data.

Finally, the group endorses the idea that permanent large manned space installations should be managed, controlled, and manned on a multinational basis, since such a practice would remove suspicion and misperception of large scale activities in space and preclude international tension caused by fear of abuse of such installations, and would promote international cooperation.
# Discussion Group Report

**Ward Morehouse**  
Chairman

**Brijen K. Gupta**  
Rapporteur

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BACKGROUND TO THE 1979 UNITED NATIONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE AND THE UNITED STATES POLICY

The United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) is scheduled to be held in August-September 1979. The main objectives of the Conference are:

a. to adopt concrete decisions on ways and means of applying science and technology in establishing a new economic order;

b. to strengthen the technological capacity of developing nations so as to enable them to apply science and technology to their development;

c. to adopt effective means for the utilization of scientific and technological potentials in the solution of problems of development of national, regional and global significance;

d. to provide instruments of cooperation to developing countries in the utilization of science and technology for solving socio-economic problems that cannot be solved by individual action, in accordance with national priorities.

In an effort to focus the Conference on a more meaningful range of issues, the Committee on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD), a standing committee of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which was designated as the Preparatory Committee for the 1979 Conference, has stipulated that there shall be no more than five subject areas on the agenda, that these shall be clearly designated and limited in scope, and that member states will be expected to prepare country papers linking individual national needs in science and technology to social and economic priorities. Though the precise agenda of the 1979 Conference is yet to be determined, the overall goal of the Conference is to probe the realization of an international economic system, which was defined by the U.N. General Assembly in 1974 as a system based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems, which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations.

This view thus clearly recognizes the reality of interdependence of
nations, developed, and developing, and of the need to evolve a world economic order while maintaining the cherished concept of national sovereignty. Furthermore, this formulation stresses the need to correct the inequitable distribution of wealth both within and among countries, and urges not merely economic growth but economic and social development in order to arrest growing equity crisis within most nations.

The new U.S. Administration has been re-examining a wide range of U.S. policies in response to the call for a new international economic system. In his Statement to the World on Inauguration Day last January, President Carter pledged the country's cooperation in combating four pernicious enemies of mankind — poverty, disease, hunger and political repression — and this country's willingness to join other nations in seeking equitable development of the world's resources and the proper, safeguarding of the world's environment. As a further expression of this country's concern with the objectives of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), the present Administration has reiterated its willingness to host the Conference in 1979. Enlightened opinion in the United States while recognizing the limitations of science and technology in the complex process of social and economic development has, in the well-chosen words of C. Maxwell Stanley affirmed that "intelligent transfer of science and technology, properly applied to the needs of labor intensive economies, can stimulate economic and social growth," and that the United States "should be in the forefront helping to develop more effective procedures and mechanisms for transfer of suitable science and technology."3

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The discussion group defined its task as that of examining the role of science and technology in international development in view of the call for a new international economic system, and to determine what fresh and realistic initiatives should be undertaken by the United States bearing in mind the role of other nations in an increasingly interdependent world. Three assumptions guided our discussion.

1. Science and technology are not magic but only one set of variables in the process of economic and social change. Likewise investment though a crucial variable is not the ultimate factor in socio-economic development. But technological and investment choices do matter and the autonomous capacity to create, acquire, adapt and use technology, and to make wise decisions about investments to meet critical economic and social problems is vital to all countries.
2. Developing countries — and the peoples and institutions within them most immediately involved — are best able to define the objectives and needs which can be served by new forms of technology.

3. We are confronted with a global equity crisis of arresting proportions, marked by widespread poverty, sharp income inequality, and severe unemployment, underemployment, and employment at very marginal rates of productivity. In the coming decade this equity crisis will grow exponentially. To deal with it radically different development strategies are needed to replace the “trickle down” efforts made over the past 30 years.

Given these circumstances, some members of the group felt that a recent statement by Father Theodore Hesburgh, Chairman-designate of the U.S. Delegation to UNCS1D, underscored what should be the central thrust of the Conference and this country’s participation in it: “In simple terms, the goal of the Conference is to improve poor people’s lives by finding the best ways of bringing the benefits of science and technology to them.”

OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

The group agreed that UNCS1D involved varied objectives. Some objectives are of concern to all nations; others have a greater relevance to developing countries; a few others are preeminently of importance to the developed nations. For instance no nation of the world can be oblivious to the serious magnitude of the equity crisis among developed and less developed nations, and within a large number of such nations. Enhancing the quality of environment, proper and equitable utilization of natural resources and energy, improving the quality of life and human rights consistent with each nation’s cultural tradition, fostering better demographic equilibrium, increased employment possibilities, and equitable growth without runaway inflation are some of the goals and objectives shared by all mankind.

It was further agreed that developing countries had a special objective of creating through their own efforts and the cooperation of developed countries a self-sustaining economic and social development which at its foundation would provide an adequate and nutritious diet, and significantly better housing facilities and health care than that presently experienced by the world’s poor. Some members of the discussion group suggested that alteration of life styles in developed countries which are based on over-consumption of world’s
resources and which created both waste and pollution of the earth's resources and environment needed to be taken as a serious objective by the industrialized countries.

The group agreed that UNCSTD must consider several clusters of issues or topics as pertinent to the creation of a new international economic and social system. Among those suggested were these: (1) Population, Poverty, Health, Food and Nutrition, (2) Energy, Natural Resources, and Environment, (3) Climate, Soil and Water, (4) Employment, Trade and Industrialization, (5) Urban Settlements and Rural Development, (6) Education and Manpower Training, (7) Science and Technology Infrastructures and (8) Indigenous Research and Development.

In one way or another most developing countries and to some extent the developed countries are affected by these clusters of issues, or individual issues within a given cluster. It could not be said that all developing countries faced these clusters of issues with equal urgency. Therefore there could be no general prescription for solving these issues or problems because problems are country-specific, region-specific, and time-specific. It was repeatedly pointed out that no single issue could ever be resolved by the application of science and technology alone. Science and technology can indeed assist in providing the solution, but the importance of other factors — social, political, economic, and cultural — cannot be overlooked.

Indeed the assistance of science and technology to the solution of these problems can be most effective only when this science and technology is applied by persons closest to the situation, for they alone have the capability of seeking out a scientific and a technological strategy most consistent with their human, cultural, and other factor endowments. The world community should seek to provide to each individual nation access on reasonable terms to all relevant science and technology, but the decision on which technology is to be applied, and how, rests with the people of a country or region.

The preparation of country papers appeared to be generating a momentum in some countries of the world for defining priorities in national needs and the role of science and technology in satisfying them. Though it is too early to say whether the country papers would constitute a coherent national science and technology policy for development, it was agreed that such papers would indeed have the potential of being translated into effective national plans. Some concern was expressed as to whether country papers would reflect the broadest participation of a country's citizens and its divergent constituencies. While some felt that many country papers would be docu-
ments thoroughly sanitized by their sponsoring governments, others were more hopeful in obtaining documents which reflected a significant and widespread participation. Particular concern was expressed that this should be the case with the United States country paper for which serious preparations have begun. It was also recognized that there should be scope for divergent points of view expressed through alternative national papers and a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Forum at the 1979 Conference.

FOOD, POVERTY AND INDIGENOUS SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOCLOGICAL CAPABILITIES

The group devoted a good deal of its time to discussing appropriate mechanisms for meeting basic human needs. Due to limitations of time, only two issues — food/poverty and indigenous scientific/technical infrastructures were reviewed in some depth. An examination of the issue of food/poverty indicated that the problem is quite complex and needs different mixes of approach in each particular local situation. For instance in some areas priority might have to be placed in increasing food production, in others in altering social structures and fostering institutional changes, and yet in some others by extending the benefits of an agricultural extension service. Furthermore solutions to these problems are bound to be affected by human endowments. In some parts of the world there is scarcity of capital but not of trained manpower, in others there is abundant capital but the skilled personnel are scarce, and in some others both capital and trained personnel are in short supply. It was, however, recognized that with external assistance, principally from the industrial nations within which the position of the United States is preeminent, the process of applying pertinent science and technology together with local political and social support for eliminating poverty might become easier.

Throughout our discussions there was unanimity on the importance of indigenous science and technology infrastructure in the process of development. It was agreed that during the last thirty years the miracles of modern science and technology have failed adequately or appreciably to change the economic status of masses of people in the developing countries. Imported science and technology, in the absence of a well developed indigenous scientific and technological infrastructure, however massive it might be, has proved unable to trickle down the benefits of economic growth to the lower substrata of a developing nation. Many developing nations have made great economic strides in the last thirty years as measured by GNP, but such growth has in most cases neither decreased the level of poverty
nor created conditions for the eradication of poverty in the near future.

For alleviation of poverty, it is necessary that the lowest strata of society have direct access to and input into the indigenous infrastructure of science and technology. Otherwise such structures will remain marginal to the social and economic development of the poor.

THE NATURE OF DEBATE ON THE ISSUES

Serious and fundamental reservations as well as active support within the group were expressed regarding this proposition.

The United States should seek to encourage the transfer of those skills and knowledge designed to meet the basic needs of the poor majority in the Third World while ceasing to provide public subsidies and incentives, for the flow of investments and technologies which have adverse consequences for meeting these needs, as well as for employment in the United States. The determination of these consequences should be based on joint identification by the United States and the recipient country of the social and economic costs and benefits to both countries. The United States should also work toward international agreement with other industrialized countries to take similar steps.

In the view of some of the group, the vigorous differences of view on this proposition make it a key issue of public policy in the emerging national debate on the future shape of relations between the United States and the world’s poor majorities. But others in the group disagreed that this was the key issue, suggesting instead that the debate should focus on finding the best ways of making available relevant knowledge and skills to developing countries to help them solve their economic and social problems.

In the national debate that is being generated in preparation of the U.S. country paper for UNCSTD, we recognize a spectrum of differences on fundamental approaches. At one end of the spectrum, it is argued that technologies, however efficient, should not be transferred to the less developed countries unless they rapidly increase employment and have the potential of reducing social and economic disparities. It is further argued that the internal resources of a developing country and the external aid to it should be used primarily for the poor rural majorities and discouraging urbanization and development of an industrial structure imitative of the industrialized countries. On the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that rapid industrialization in which both heavy and light industries
play an important role is the only viable strategy for development even though there may be in the initial phases of industrialization an increase in social and economic inequities within developing nations. One argues for primacy of social direction of growth, the other for a mix of social and economic objectives. In our group, the differences were not at the ends of the spectrum. They were more in degree than in kind and lay primarily in the choice of means and strategies for obtaining a rapid development of self-sustaining social and economic growth with equity through the utilization of appropriate science and technology. Some of these differences are reflected in the suggestions that follow.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

The group agreed that steps must be taken by the United States because of its preeminence in many fields of science and technology if a new international economic system being proposed by the United Nations is to become a reality. The ultimate goal of all these initiatives is to be the development and the strengthening of a self-sustaining indigenous capability in science and technology which has so far eluded most developing nations. Since this capability cannot be developed overnight, both short term and longer term initiatives are necessary. Furthermore, since the capability must be developed within the countries concerned and cannot be imposed externally, what the United States and other industrialized countries can do is limited.

Together with the United Nations, and its member states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, we should seek the establishment of institutions and the development of mechanisms that would provide leadership in the application of science and technology to meet basic human needs while each nation seeks to develop its own indigenous self-sustaining capability in science and technology. Here are ten suggestions among the many advanced by the members of the group. Considerable difference of opinion was expressed by members of the group about some of these. Their inclusion here should not be taken to imply consensus but rather is intended to indicate the range and variety of ideas expressed.

I. More effective mechanisms for making public sector technologies and scientific knowledge relevant to the needs of developing countries should be developed by the U.S. government, taking into account the experience of past efforts which have had only limited impact.
2. The recent steps taken by the Administration to create within the Department of Energy and the Agency for International Development (AID) small funds for support of research and development (R and D) on alternative energy sources of special relevance to developing countries should be expanded in magnitude and extended to other basic human needs such as food, health, housing and education.

3. The United States should establish an Institute for Technological Development to respond to specific requests from developing countries for technologies. The Institute would function both as a clearinghouse and source for supporting further R and D where needed in the United States or elsewhere and in either the public or private sector.

4. An international clearinghouse for identification of "community technologies" coupled with mechanisms for problem identification at the local level within developing countries should be created.

5. Regional technology development institutes should be established or strengthened where they already exist, under multilateral auspices but with active U.S. support.

6. Mechanisms should be created or strengthened to stimulate more flow of light capital technologies among developing countries, looking toward the eventual emergence of common markets in major regions of the Third World.

7. The United States should curtail its promotion of the export of capital-intensive technologies by requiring the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to concentrate their loans and investment guarantees on industrial projects in developing countries with low rates of investment per worker.

8. Tax incentives and other inducements should be given to U.S. corporations which make a serious effort at transferring the skills which go with the capacity for creating and adapting technology to their industrial partners in poor countries, especially those working in socio-economic areas directly related to meeting basic human needs.

9. Substantial and sustained research needs to be mounted in the United States, other industrialized countries, and especially developing countries on agriculture, afforestation, diseases, and weather change and climate control distinctive to the tropical regions of the Earth. Because most of the world's R and D
facilities are concentrated in temperate climates, relatively little basic and applied work has been done on these problems of the tropics.

10. Preparatory efforts for the 1979 U.N. Conference should be accompanied by a vigorous global consciousness raising effort to stress both the potential of science and technology in solving shared human problems and the complexities of utilizing them for constructive social purposes. Films, television, radio, and the print media should all be employed in this effort, which might be focused on a call for each member state of the United Nations to prepare and release for internal and external consumption three major productions in the form of films, television programs, or books on these themes before the 1979 Conference.

Uneven social and economic development in many countries, and social and economic stagnation in others, have created tensions both within and among nations that are not being contained within democratic and/or peaceful processes, and these tensions threaten to engulf nations and regions in conflict. Consequently a strategy for peace calls for bold initiatives, within the framework of cooperation with the world community, to hasten the process of social and economic development through a vigorous application of science and technology, even though science and technology by itself is unable to solve the world’s socio-economic problems.

**FOOTNOTES**


Science and Technology for Development, Washington, D.C.,
September 20, 1977.

5 These five clusters of issues were formulated by Fredenck Seitz
in "An Outline of Issues and Suggestions for the United States to
Consider in Programs of Science and Technology to Meet the
December 1976, signed by 29 leading U.S. scientists, and
forwarded to President Elect Jimmy Carter under cover letter of

6 Suggestions are not mutually exclusive. Some of the activities
suggested herein are being carried out by existing institutions. We
suggest that these institutions should be examined first to see if
they can be strengthened before new institutions are created.
U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: U.S. INITIATIVES

DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT

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U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: U.S. INITIATIVES

REASONS FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

The international competition in both nuclear and conventional armaments continues to gain momentum despite efforts on many fronts to control it. New approaches and more intensive efforts are needed to reverse this deadly momentum and to start the disarmament process. The Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, to be held from May 23 to June 28, 1978, if allowed to develop its full potential, can play a key role in turning the arms race around. It is incumbent on all countries, but especially on the United States and other great powers, to make every effort to insure that the Special Session becomes a cardinal event in the history of disarmament, not just an empty symbol of the unfulfilled aspirations of the world's people.

The Special Session is not intended to be a negotiating body, but instead to be a global forum for (1) reviewing the current status of disarmament negotiations, (2) adopting a Declaration of Principles, (3) adopting a Program for Action, and (4) assessing international disarmament mechanisms. The Session is the product of an initiative by the non-aligned states. A principal objective is to spur progress by (1) opening up disarmament discussions and bringing world opinion to bear on the major military powers, (2) stimulating governments to prepare serious negotiating positions and proposals, (3) improving the climate for taking greater steps towards disarmament at or following the Special Session, and (4) raising world consciousness about disarmament. There is also considerable interest in emphasizing the fundamental relationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development.

The five-week Special Session should not be seen as an end in itself, but as part of a much broader and far reaching disarmament process. It has been suggested that some long-stalled negotiations, such as those for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), have been accelerated partly in anticipation of the Special Session. It is to be hoped that many nations, including the United States, will use the Session as an opportunity to announce significant initiatives in limiting their armaments. The Program for Action should identify priority items and would also constitute a yardstick for assessing progress after the session.

IMPROVING THE CLIMATE

The successful completion before the Session of certain ongoing
negotiations regarding items long on the international agenda would do much to improve the political climate at the Session, thus increasing the probability of further progress. Agreements on (1) a CTO by at least the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain, (2) a Soviet American strategic arms limitation agreement with actual reductions, (3) eliminating chemical weapons would be particularly significant. Another important step now under negotiation would be a Soviet American accord limiting their naval forces and military bases in the Indian Ocean area. The group agreed that it is essential that none of the participating nations take any provocative military or political actions which could poison the political atmosphere surrounding the Special Session.

NATIONAL INITIATIVES AND MUTUAL RESTRAINT

In light of the evident inability of arms control negotiations to keep pace with the arms race, there is a growing feeling that formal negotiations should be supplemented and reinforced by national decisions to restrain weapons development and refrain from other military activities which could undermine the negotiating process. This particularly applies to the United States and other great powers. For example, some members of the group advocated that the United States declare a moratorium on nuclear tests while negotiating a CTB.

Such national initiatives need not be limited to armaments or armed forces under negotiation. If the world is to avoid nuclear war, and be relieved of the increasingly heavy burden of the cost of armaments, disarmaments and arms control, negotiations need to be supplemented by national decisions to restrain weapons development and in other ways to reduce the amount of national budgets devoted to military hardware and support of the armed forces. It would be particularly useful to show restraint in areas of weaponry which can be reciprocated by other countries. When a nation shows restraint, it would be desirable that other countries reciprocate with comparable decisions in similar or other areas. To be most effective in a climate where there is still much distrust among nations, the use of mutual restraint should be observable. Such restraint could start with small steps none of which would endanger national security, but when reciprocated could lead to larger steps and in the end could act as a catalyst in speeding up the pace of negotiations while slowing arms development, procurement, and deployment.

Most members of the group recommended, for example, that the United States announce at the Special Session the indefinite postponement of the further development or procurement of some
major new nuclear armaments, including the enhanced radiation neutron bomb and the MX mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The former lowers the threshold for starting a nuclear war, while the latter, once deployed, complicates the problem of verification. In light of the many pressing demands in the United States and in developing nations for the world's scarce resources, several participants urged that the United States reduce significantly its defense expenditures, particularly for research and development and the procurement of advanced nuclear and conventional weapons systems. (These expenditures now exceed $40 billion a year.) To assure the continuance of such restraint, it would be desirable for the Soviet Union to make similar cut-backs.

U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE SPECIAL SESSION

A. Proposals to be Submitted

U.S. proposals at the Special Session should encompass both nuclear and conventional weapons. While priority should be given to nuclear disarmament and arms control, some eighty percent of global military expenditures are for conventional forces and armaments. Therefore, if significant savings are to be achieved for domestic needs and for international economic development, then conventional disarmament must be included in any program of action at the Special Session along with nuclear disarmament.

The group suggested that the United States propose or endorse the following agreements in the nuclear field:

(1) An agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations to stop production of fissionable material for weapons purposes — this would halt the flow of nuclear materials for nuclear bombs, warheads, and other forms of nuclear ammunition.

(2) A reduction in the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the United States and Soviet Union, numbering in the vicinity of 30,000 for the United States alone, which would be a step toward actual nuclear disarmament. To verify such an agreement, the two sides would need to dismantle the nuclear weapons selected for elimination at a given site at which the process could be observed. Use of the nuclear materials released would need to be determined as part of the agreements.

(3) A comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, if one has not already been reached prior to the Special Session.

(4) Agreements to establish nuclear weapons free zones wherever
feasible. Most participants also recommended that (a) the U.S. propose an agreement by all nuclear weapons powers not to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state on whose territory there is neither the storage of nuclear weapons nor troops of a nuclear weapons power; and (b) the United States consider other measures to strengthen efforts to discourage further nuclear proliferation while assuring adequate fuel supplies to all countries.

In the long-neglected conventional field, it was agreed that the United States should propose limitations on the production and inventories of conventional armaments and on armed forces on a global and equitable basis. There was considerable support for initiatives relating to limitations on naval inventories and armored forces. Among the measures relating to the growing problem of the arms trade were proposals about registering or placing a tax on international arms transfers and restricting the export of arms-manufacturing technology.

As nations proceed to reduce nuclear and conventional arms and armed forces, there is the need to establish effective alternative security systems and improved international peacekeeping arrangements and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Most participants favored a statement by the United States at the Special Session which would constitute a comprehensive disarmament and arms control policy. This would encompass in one document the totality of U.S. positions, proposals, and actions in this field. It was suggested that such a statement was needed to inform the public which generally received information on a piecemeal basis because negotiations and arms control decisions took place in different forums at different times.

B. Views on the Declaration on Disarmament, Program of Action and Mechanisms

1. DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

The group concluded that the Declaration on Disarmament should provide the principles for the future conduct of disarmament negotiations which should include many of the principles in the non-aligned document of May 18, 1977, and in the Soviet-American statement of 1961 called the McCloy-Zorin agreement. Among other things, these exhort the governments to continue negotiating until a full and comprehensive agreement, encompassing all countries and weapons with reductions down to the level needed to maintain internal security, has been reached. It sets the goal of general and complete disarmament to be negotiated in verifiable stages. It adopts the
principle that nations must have alternative security arrangements and systems as they are reducing their arms and armed forces. The group stressed the importance of such alternatives as the world embarks on true disarmament. Another principle is the importance of countries taking national initiatives to restrict their military capabilities. In addition, the group pointed out that the overall cost of the arms race is not limited to monetary outlays, but includes losses of energy, damage to the ecology and the drain of scientific talent and resources. Finally, the group urged that the Declaration recognize the vital objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and the necessity of assuring adequate fuel supplies to all countries.

2. PROGRAM OF ACTION

The Program of Action is to stipulate priorities for disarmament. The group believed that the Program should be both comprehensive and specific.

The group enumerated a large number of desirable arms control and disarmament measures which have been proposed but have not yet been realized. They include measures on nuclear weapons; strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; conventional armaments; restrictions on arms transfers; limits on military expenditures and on the development of advanced weapon systems; proposals to limit military competition in space, in Central Europe, and in the Indian Ocean; measures to enlarge the number of nuclear weapons free zones; a ban on chemical weapons; and a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and missiles. Most participants agreed that equal weight should be given in the Program to nuclear and conventional disarmament. The group recognized that there are often logical linkages between different kinds of disarmament measures, but that in some cases it is counter-productive to link disarmament proposals because of the complexities involved which could retard negotiations.

3. MECHANISMS FOR THE CONDUCT OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

In the past fifteen years a number of forums have been created for the conduct of disarmament and arms control negotiations. Since 1962 an international forum, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), first of 18 nations and currently of 31 nations, has been negotiating in Geneva. The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union have continued since 1969. There have also been a number of regional arms control negotiations in recent years: one to prepare a treaty for a denuclearized zone in Latin America, now complete and in force; and one in Europe between North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact nations to negotiate an agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, which has yet to yield results. At the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly many disarmament resolutions are passed to inspire and stimulate negotiations on specific measures.

The group analyzed possible changes in disarmament mechanisms, while recognizing that a more fundamental factor is the political will of participating states to achieve real progress. Dissatisfaction was expressed in the structure and procedures of the CCD. Many participants felt that the United States and Soviet Union, as co-chairmen, have not consulted fully with other participants and have tended to discourage initiatives by other countries, particularly relating to nuclear reductions. According to some, the arms control and disarmament measures which have been negotiated under this framework in recent years have failed to come to grips with the major disarmament issues. Moreover, the existence of the co-chairmanship shared by the two largest nuclear weapons powers has discouraged French and Chinese participation in the CCD. It was unanimously observed that France and China should join a multilateral negotiating forum, which would necessitate a reconstructed CCD. Some dissatisfaction was also expressed that the membership of the CCD was too large to be an effective negotiating forum and that the set membership excludes other powers from participating in the negotiations.

Some criticism was directed at the annual practice in the United Nations of debating disarmament and passing numerous resolutions without having this lead to concrete results, but it was also noted that the debate reflects world opinion and should be taken seriously. The group suggested that one of the main committees of the U.N. General Assembly should deal exclusively with disarmament. Some proposed a special body, such as periodic special sessions or a disarmament council, which would direct its attention primarily to assessing and evaluating the progress toward disarmament by the various negotiating forums. This would include SALT, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), regional forums, and the CCD. It was suggested by some that the UN. Disarmament Centre in the Secretariat contribute to the performance of the assessment function. To do this, the Centre should engage in analytical studies and sponsor independent evaluations by outside experts.

**PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS**

If the United States is to play a leading role in the Special Session —
that is to propose major new disarmament and arms control pro-
posals for later negotiations — members of the public, private or-
ganizations, Congress, and the media need to become involved and
informed. Time is limited, there are less than seven months until the
Special Session. A first requirement for the U.S. Government,
therefore, is to decide the broad outlines of its policies and program.
While it is understandable that detailed proposals may not be
formulated until the spring of 1978, it would be a mistake on the part
of the Executive branch not to issue a statement of goals and the
framework in which proposals will be advanced. To have a significant
impact this should be available for public and congressional scrutiny
by January 1978.

Private organizations make valuable contributions to the enlighten-
ment of their members, the general public, and the Congress. A Na-
tional Commission consisting of outstanding citizens broadly
representative of the U.S. public might be appointed by the President
to advise the Executive branch concerning policies and proposals to
be advanced at the Special Session. It also would be available to pro-
vide private groups and the media with information about the Special
Session and the proposals and policies introduced in it by the United
States and other governments. Additionally, such a commission and
the private organizations working with it could stimulate public in-
terest in and knowledge about disarmament as an integral part of
U.S. national and world security. In this way, individual disarmament
measures would not be considered in a vacuum. Following the
Special Session, the National Commission could continue to work
with the public and the government concerning subsequent negoti-
ations and policy developments.

Those congressional committees with responsibility over U.S. na-
tional security and foreign policy can provide guidance to the Ex-
ecutive branch and information to the public through the conduct of
hearings and issuance of studies and reports. Some hearings are
already scheduled for January 1978. Moreover, the group recom-
mended that congressional observers as well as public members be
appointed to attend the Special Session as liaison between it and the
Congress. In this connection, the group urged that a more concerted
effort be made to approach disarmament and arms control policies
and proposals in a bipartisan manner. Neither the Special Session
nor any other disarmament negotiating body can gain strong support
in the United States unless it has bipartisan backing. A conscious ef-
fort to solicit such bipartisan support needs to be made by the Ex-
cecutive branch and reinforced by public action.
SOUTHERN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT

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SOUTHERN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

The group decided to organize its discussions to focus on:

(1) the current situation in South Africa with particular emphasis on recent developments and the resultant pattern of internal and external dynamics;

(2) U.S. interests in southern Africa broadly conceived to include our direct interests as well as relations with non-regional countries;

(3) feasible U.S. policy options from an essentially short term perspective but taking fully into account the long run goals.

For the purpose of discussion, the group decided to define Southern Africa to include Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland as well as other "front line" states. However, it was felt that South Africa itself posed the central questions which need immediate consideration.

Finally, the group decided that its recommendations should be directed towards U.S. policymakers.

South Africa

With no attempt to be exhaustive or to reach final conclusions, the group felt that the following recent developments should be explored in formulating policies to deal with South Africa.

A Black consciousness movement has emerged as a genuine dynamic in the situation and is becoming increasingly organized. While divisions exist within the movement, it is an essentially unifying force which has broad based support. The movement should not be viewed as separated from the traditional national liberation movements African National Congress (ANC), Pan African Congress (PAC), it also encompasses some elements of the Indian and colored communities. While the movement does not fully reflect the range of interest groups in the Black community, it is representative of future leadership. The movement emphasizes seeking within the Black community a basis for Black pride and action with a noncommitant breakdown in interracial communication through not willingness to negotiate. In terms of U.S. policy, there needs to be a greater focus on the Black consciousness movement (as opposed to the traditional focus on the white community, the Afrikaners in particular) leading to a greater understanding of its dynamics.

The domestic economy is entering its third year of recession. This

Reservations were expressed by some participants that the group report does not necessarily reflect the entire range of views expressed by the discussion group.
has had serious impact on the Black community, for example, substantially increased unemployment. But it has also impacted on the white community and has increased resistance to even minimal changes. For example, it has led to the stricter application of job reservations. The root of the problem lies in the structure of the South African economy, but the situation is intensified by external developments such as declining foreign investments. Increased military expenditures and skilled manpower drains pose serious dilemmas for the country. Poor economic performance renders moot the thesis of a direct relationship between economic development and social justice.

The role of the business community, including foreign investors, is limited by the structure of South African society and the inherent nature of business. External codes — such as the recent European Economic Community (EEC) code — are palliative but do not address the fundamental question of the distribution of political and economic power. The argument is made that the presence of U.S. investment provides a means of economic leverage for fundamental change. However, U.S. investment also creates a stake in the health and stability of the current regime. The support of a genuine Black trade union movement might be useful.

The role of other communities — English speaking, Indian and coloreds — is ambiguous. The policy of the South African Government clearly is to divide them and to prevent their identification with the Blacks. The possibility of new constitutional arrangements which would involve separate parliaments for whites, Indians, and coloreds, has the de facto potential of further increasing the autocratic authority of the Government while establishing a de jure shell of parliamentary self-government.

There are evidences of stresses within the Afrikaner community. e.g., the conflict between the managers and the ideologues in the Cabinet, the “verligte” acceptance of the need for “change,” the less traditional approach of the Afrikaner business community. There is no evidence that the Afrikaner community is prepared to share its power.

Southern Africa

By way of introduction to our discussion of our interests in southern Africa, the group took note of unified African sentiment that the United States should join them in bringing about fundamental changes in the remaining minority regimes. However, the point was made that African states were prepared to take action with or without the sup-
port of Western powers and that the West has a larger economic stake in Black Africa than in South Africa.

There was an inconclusive discussion on the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). There was a general recognition of its historical importance and of the general importance of “unity” in the African context.

Because of its importance in the African context, Nigeria deserves special attention. However, the group strongly felt that care must be taken by the United States neither to appear as imposing Nigerian leadership on Africa nor seeking to impose responsibilities on Nigeria. In general, the United States should be particularly sensitive to the sovereign prerogatives of African states, especially Nigeria.

One theme which emerged during discussions of specific situations in southern Africa was the currency of the former U.S. policy which linked South African support in the Zimbabwe negotiations to a more relaxed attitude toward the internal situation in South Africa. The Carter Administration has publicly disavowed this policy arguing essentially that South Africa should support the peaceful transfer of power on its border for reasons of self-interest. There was some concern that the Namibian negotiations might be seen as offering a similar trade-off, that is progress in these negotiations in return for a more relaxed attitude toward the internal situation in South Africa.

Finally, in this general overview, the group felt that the Soviet Union had an interest in southern Africa. We cannot with any confidence define the role which the Soviet Union is likely to play, or whether it will be large or small. It continues to play an active role in Angola and Mozambique and will seek to exercise some influence over the outcome in Zimbabwe. Given U.S. and Soviet interests in the area, consultations should continue with a view to avoiding big-power confrontation. China was regarded as essentially peripheral to the situation.

Turning to specific situations:

With regard to Namibia, the group felt that it was important to internationalize (or Africanize) the negotiations as soon as sufficient progress had been made. It should be made clear that should these negotiations fail, the United States would be prepared to consider specific actions, including sanctions, as might be recommended by the United Nations. The group recognizes the possibility of internal disturbances in the post-independence period, but the major U.S. interest is in the securing of independence itself. While progress has been achieved in the Namibian negotiations, serious problems re-
main. The desire of the South African Government to maintain a client in Namibia is unacceptable.

With regard to Zimbabwe, the group discussed the degree of real influence which South Africa can exert and, again, the need to consider a sanctions program should the negotiations break down. The proposal of a Zimbabwe Development Fund might affect positively the negotiations but it was noted that its actual purpose has not been fully clarified. The group discussed the serious transitional problems should the Zimbabwe negotiations succeed and, in that context, discussed the possible role of UN peacekeeping forces and their limitations.

Relations with Mozambique are seen as important in the achievement of our aims in southern Africa, in particular with regard to the negotiations on Zimbabwe. Mozambique is seen as an opportunity for the United States to signal its willingness to assist in the development of an African country without regard to its political persuasion. This would appear to be in accord with the basic human needs approach of the present Administration. However, legislative limitations on assistance to Mozambique do not allow the necessary flexibility in dealing with the situation.

**Domestic Considerations**

Throughout its discussions, the group was aware of the domestic limitations on U.S. policy towards South Africa. On the one hand, domestic constituencies which would be reluctant to upset the status quo have been relatively quiescent. Any fundamental change in U.S. policy could arouse their active opposition. At the same time, the chaos that could follow even the successful outcome of negotiations in Namibia or Zimbabwe could impact negatively on significant elements of the American people. Finally, the perceived connection between Israel and South Africa, complicated by African support for the "racism-zionism" resolution in the United Nations, might reduce active support for a "pro-African" initiative. These limitations are not fixed parameters for U.S. policy. Nor do they in any way reflect the substantial support for a more positive approach to southern African issues. The need is for a greater public awareness and understanding of the basic issues involved.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

U.S. policy options in South Africa range from total disengagement to total cooperation with the present Government. In the past, U.S. policy has — or equally important, is seen to have — verged toward
cooperation. The new Administration has indicated a serious commitment to bringing about a just society based on the will of the people in the country. The need is for clear and decisive actions. We cannot say with certainty that the following recommendations will have the desired effect of a peaceful transformation in South Africa. We are convinced, however, that the other policy options would only contribute to the perpetuation of the injustice and harsh repression of the majority and ultimately to a racial conflagration with untold suffering for all South Africa and with serious consequences for the United States.

1. The group believes that the U.S. government should recognize that the current situation in South Africa is a "threat to the peace." The rising tide of racial conflict in South Africa is clear and evident. Equally evident is the deep and genuine concern of the international community, in particular the African nations, with this situation. And finally, it is evident that the conflict has spilled over the borders of South Africa and contains within itself the potential of an international racial holocaust with its concomitant implications for major power confrontations. The group stresses that the finding is one of a threat to the peace.

In making this finding, the group is conscious of its implications under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. By determining that South Africa is a "threat to the peace," the option of mandatory international sanctions is made possible but not necessary. The question of which specific measures to be applied is a separate issue and must be determined in accordance with U.S. national interests as discussed below.

The significance of such a determination is two-fold. It would clearly signal to the South African authorities that we are not satisfied with their responses to previous urgings on our part, and on the part of the international community, that they undertake fundamental changes in their society. Equally, it would signal to other African states our willingness to consider with them the total range of options designed to bring about effective changes.

2. United States has major and central interests in South Africa which can be roughly grouped into the following categories:

a. **Human Rights**: broadly conceived as securing for all people in the country those internationally recognized basic human, civil, political, and economic rights. The current situation clearly represents a pattern of gross and persistent violations of these basic rights.

b. **Big-Power Confrontation**: it is clearly in the U.S. interest to
avoid the introduction of U.S.-Soviet confrontation into the South African scene. The longer the current situation continues — and intensifies — the greater the potential for such confrontation. Given the deep South African antipathy toward Communism, only if the United States opts to support the present regime could a big-power confrontation develop along racial lines. This is clearly not in our interest. A second level of confrontation involves support of competing national liberation movements. This does not appear to be a serious problem at the present time, but should be kept under scrutiny.

57 c Peacekeeping: in keeping with its special responsibilities in the world community and with particular reference to its obligations as a Permanent Member of The Security Council of the United Nations, the United States cannot be indifferent to the absence of peace and justice in South Africa. Concomitantly, it is clearly in our interests to make every effort to promote the peaceful transformation of that society. If we fail to exert effective pressure on South Africa or fail to convince the Blacks in the country of our genuine efforts to do so, we must expect that the Blacks can only resort to armed struggle to achieve their legitimate goals.

d. Economic Interests: South Africa possesses export supplies of many resources of importance to the United States. Its importance in that regard must be viewed in the context of world-wide access to such resources, in particular the relative importance of South Africa vis-à-vis the rest of Africa. At the same time, there is substantial direct and indirect private investment in South Africa.

e. Domestic Interests: U.S. policy in South Africa must reflect the basic principles of our own society and, in particular, be sensitive to the concerns of those Americans of African ancestry in the interests of domestic peace and tranquility.

f. International Interests: it is clearly in the interest of the U.S. government to find common ground with African and other like-minded nations on an issue of such critical importance to them.

3. The ultimate goal of the United States should be a just and humane society in South Africa. To this end, all people in South Africa must be given full and equal opportunity to participate in the determination of the future of South Africa. The present authorities in South Africa are not on a course which will lead to these goals and, on their own, are unlikely to undertake the urgently needed measures to assure fundamental changes. In the light of the foregoing, it is imperative that the U.S. government urgently undertake measures, unilaterally and in cooperation with others, to exert pres-
sure on the present regime in South Africa to move fundamentally towards this goal.

4. Toward the end of exerting effective pressure, the U.S. government should consider the following measures (listed without regard to priority):

a. The denial of access to governmental, commercial and financial facilities and services, in particular the Export Import Bank. In addition, consider taking other governmental actions calculated to deny South Africa access to commercial credit and capital markets of the United States.

b. The denial of tax credits to U.S. taxpayers arising from activities in South Africa and creation of tax incentives to disinvest in South Africa.

c. Require U.S. citizens and associated entities in South Africa to adhere to all U.S. legislation relating to fair employment practices and standards.

d. Review both the level and the purpose of diplomatic representation in South Africa, but in any event withdraw military attaches from the U.S. Embassy and terminate forthwith all intelligence cooperation, and further to enhance public contacts with and support of black South Africans and other opponents of apartheid.

e. Establishment of a strict reciprocal visa policy regarding South African nationals.

f. In formulating and executing of our aid policy in South Africa:

(1) to strengthen the economies of the Black Student League (BSL) states toward the objective of substantially lessening dependence on South Africa and assisting them with the refugee problem and

(2) to establish and expand scholarship programs for South Africans

(3) to support other southern African states.

g. Prohibit arms sales of any character to South Africa and abolish all grey area categories.

h. Undertake an active public relations program in the United States to increase awareness of the basic issues involved and gain support for new initiatives.

i. Terminate the exchange of nuclear technology and equipment.

5. Further, the United States government should consider taking the following multilateral measures:
a. Further steps to demonetize gold.

b. Full United States government participation in all U.N. organs relating to southern Africa and provision of financial support to all U.N. institutes and institutions involved in southern Africa.

c. To recognize that now the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. Hence, the United States government should devise and implement a strategy employing, as appropriate, the full range of international sanctions available to the Security Council.

d. To seek concerted international actions apart from the United Nations to further the achievement of a just, humane South Africa in which all South Africans fully participate on a basis of equality in the processes which determine the future of South Africa.
NUCLEAR POWER
WITHOUT
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:
AVOIDING
FALSE ALTERNATIVES

An Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, U.S. Department of State

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the vital issue of nuclear proliferation at a Stanley Foundation Strategy for Peace Conference. These conferences are important both because of their focus on human survival, and their method of bringing together a broad spectrum of decision makers to write a coherent chapter.

The issue of non-proliferation is of vital concern to us all — how can we make nuclear power available to meet world energy needs without simultaneously accelerating the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. This is not an American problem. It is a global problem. Nuclear technology is no longer the monopoly of one nation, nor of a small group of nations. If we are to achieve our common goal of safe nuclear energy, we must develop a broad consensus among all nations with a major interest in nuclear energy.

We have witnessed in the past several years a growing concern on the part of the general public over the environmental, safety and security implications of nuclear power. After studying these concerns for more than a year, a group of twenty-one private citizens gathered by The Ford Foundation recently concluded that most problems associated with the commercial use of nuclear energy were manageable, but that the proliferation risks associated with commerce in plutonium would pose an enormous international challenge.

The group did not conclude that we should forego the benefits of nuclear energy, but it did conclude that the proliferation risks associated with changing from the uranium to the plutonium gener-
ation of nuclear technology were too great to permit an attitude of “business as usual.” Similarly, the Carter Administration has made clear that we foresee an important role for the peaceful use of nuclear energy at home and abroad, but has simultaneously called for a more vigorous approach to the proliferation problem. If we are to continue to use nuclear energy, we must not only secure the acceptance of the public at large, but also satisfy ourselves that we have done everything possible to minimize the dangers of nuclear proliferation. That is why we have given non-proliferation such a high priority in our foreign policy.

President Carter's non-proliferation initiatives often have been misunderstood or misrepresented. He has been accused of being both too rigid and too flexible, of failing to take foreign realities into account and of softening his policy over time. In fact, I believe both accusations are incorrect. For example, a reputable European newspaper recently reported that President Carter had softened his position after European criticism of his appeal for an international moratorium on fast breeder development last April. Yet the fact is that the President made such appeal. The United States has never made representations about other countries' breeder programs. Similarly, President Carter has been accused of nuclear isolationism because his views on plutonium fail to take into account the difference in the abundance of natural resources in the United States and their relative absence in Europe and Japan. Yet the fact is that the President's April 7 policy statement on plutonium called for an international study and explicitly recognized the concerns of uranium-poor countries that had already constructed reprocessing plants. Moreover, in the Non-Proliferation Legislation which he submitted to the Congress, President Carter has consistently resisted provisions that might have led to an export moratorium in a world where nuclear technology has already spread to a score of countries, and at least half a dozen are rapidly developing plutonium technology, we have argued that a coercive manipulation of uranium supply conditions would have the opposite effects of what we intend. On the contrary, the President's strategy is based on working closely with other countries to develop a consensus on a commercial nuclear fuel cycle that is as proliferation-resistant as possible in the face of technological change.

Obviously a consensus on a safe fuel cycle will not be achieved quickly. But if we are to move toward our goal of nuclear power without nuclear proliferation, we must focus international discussions on how to solve objective and factual differences. We must avoid mutual recriminations and stirring national passions. We also must avoid putting mythical obstacles in our path. One way we can avoid
myths and misconceptions is to steer clear of posing false alternatives. Let me give five examples of the types of arguments we should avoid if we are to build a consensus on nuclear energy and non-proliferation policies.

**ENERGY SECURITY VERSUS THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION**

We are told that we must choose between energy security and the risk of proliferation, that we must renounce nuclear energy in order to preserve our national security. To be sure, there are security implications associated with all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle — even with spent fuel. In fact, however, there are risks environmental and otherwise associated with all energy sources. The issue is essentially one of degree. The Carter Administration believes that renouncing nuclear energy at this stage in history would reduce rather than enhance our national security. The important security issue is to choose among alternative nuclear-based technologies those that are the most proliferation resistant.

Thus far we have managed the proliferation risks associated with the current commercial nuclear fuel cycle. But a plutonium economy based on the spread of national Purex reprocessing plants would challenge the very essence of the international safeguards system that has served us thus far. The "timely warning" function of the present safeguards system would all but vanish in the event of diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military purposes. Therefore, as we move into the next generation of nuclear technology, our task is to minimize to the greatest extent possible the security risks.

This is true particularly of breeder reactors. It is too soon to be certain whether this technology will live up to the expectations projected for it as the most economic long term answer to our energy needs. But before that day comes, we must, together, work towards developing a breeder fuel cycle that is more proliferation resistant than one with Purex reprocessing. Interestingly, it seems probable that because of fuel cooling times associated with fast reactors, the Purex process may be less desirable than alternatives from both an economic and security point of view.

**FULL STOP VERSUS FATALISM**

It is sometimes argued that because further proliferation is inevitable, we should resign ourselves to the facts of life and not let non-proliferation concerns place undue strains on our nuclear energy policies. Indeed it may be likely that more states will explode nuclear
devices before the end of the century. But just because we may not be able to bring proliferation to a full stop, it does not follow that our policy should be fatalistic. Proliferation is a question of degree. It is a mistake to speak of the “horse being out of the barn,” because it makes a difference to world politics how many horses and which horses are out of the nuclear barn. A multiproliferated world will be a far less secure world. Our non-proliferation policies should aim at managing political and technical processes in the light of possible effects on both global and regional security and peace and the potential disruption of our societies by terrorist nuclear threats. If there are further explosions, there will be all the more need for non-proliferation policies. In this domain, fatalism would be fatal.

**POLITICAL VERSUS TECHNICAL MEASURES**

Another false distinction is the assertion that nuclear proliferation is a political problem, not a technical one. This premise is used to reach the policy conclusion that technical measures to deal with the proliferation risks are largely irrelevant. Of course proliferation is political in nature. Of the twenty or so nations that have a commercial nuclear capability, two-thirds have chosen not to manufacture nuclear explosive devices. Their decision to forego nuclear explosives relates directly to their political instruments such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We must continue to strengthen measures which provide assurances with respect to the peaceful intention of one’s international neighbors.

But the importance of the political dimension of the proliferation problem does not mean that we should ignore the role of technology. We must shape technical choices to reinforce, rather than erode, our international system of political controls. The existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system bears directly on political decisions nations might take to seek or not to seek the bomb. It also provides time for diplomacy to work in the event of a detected diversion to military purposes. This is the problem with conventional Purex reprocessing. technical safeguards are ineffective. To the extent reprocessing is necessary we must seek alternative forms of reprocessing in future nuclear fuel cycles that are safeguardable. To the extent we succeed in developing more proliferation resistant technologies, the more difficult will be future political decisions to misuse commercial facilities and develop a nuclear explosive capability. As we choose among technologies we must consider their effects on future political choices.

**CONTROLS VERSUS DENIALS**

Another misconception relates to what should be the components of
a non proliferation policy. European critics have often characterized American policy as a futile effort at denials while European policy is one of technology transfer with controls. By controls, they mean applying safeguards where states undertake to avoid steps which would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and facilities. Realistically, of course, the term controls is a misnomer. What we are talking about is international monitoring of the possible misuse of transferred technology.

Since we are concerned about whether monitoring is sufficient as a means of controlling the weapons usable materials that comes from the current types of reprocessing plants, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France have all announced their intention to exercise restraint on future transfers of reprocessing technology and facilities. Thus it is inaccurate to characterize European and American differences as controls vs. denials. Both monitoring and export restraints are necessary but not sufficient elements of non-proliferation policy.

Technology transfers cannot be delayed indefinitely, but they can be postponed until we have time to develop more proliferation resistant technology and more effective international institutions. In the interim, the question arises whether restraints on the transfer of sensitive technology are fully consistent with our undertakings in Article IV of the NPT. Clearly there is a degree of tension, but we believe it is temporary, and that restraints consistent with the fact that Article IV of the Treaty must be read in the light of Articles I and II, where states undertake to avoid steps which would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons.

The long run solution to these differences must be an international consensus on the nature and management of the nuclear fuel cycle. That is why the Carter Administration has adopted a four-pronged non-proliferation strategy which goes beyond simply monitoring and denials. First, we will make safeguards more effective by insisting upon full-scope safeguards as our national policy and continuing to urge others to take a similar position. Second, we and other supplier nations will practice restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies until we have learned to make them more safeguardable. At the same time, we will join with other supplier countries in making public common standards which will guide our nuclear export policies. We believe that the publication of these guidelines will help to avoid development of a North/South cleavage in the nuclear area and will make clear that the Nuclear Suppliers Group is not a secret cartel seeking commercial advantages. On the contrary, the role of the group and its guidelines is to strengthen the IAEA by avoiding com-
mercial undercutting of its safeguards system. Third, we will work
with other nations to create international incentives through fuel as-
surances and assistance in the management of spent fuel for coun-
tries to forego a full fuel cycle. Fourth, we have invited both supplier
and consumer nations to join in building consensus about the future
structure and management of the nuclear fuel cycle. This fourth com-
ponent, that of consensus-building, is represented by the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation that President Carter announced last
April, and about which I will have more to say in a moment. The im-
portant point is that our non-proliferation policies must go beyond
the sterile debate of controls vs denials. We need not merely vigi-
lance and denials, but positive incentives and consensus in this age when nuclear power will spread to some forty countries over the
next two decades.

BREEDERS VERSUS NO BREEDERS

A fifth false dichotomy is posed by those who address the fast
breeder in the stark terms of pursuing our current breeder fuel cycle
designs or none at all. Many have misinterpreted the position of the
United States on the breeder. We are not anti-breeder. We believe
that a breeder research program is an important energy insurance
policy. Indeed, even without the Clinch River Breeder, President
Carter proposed to spend some $450 million in this fiscal year on
breeder research. What we do oppose is premature movement
toward a breeder economy, where the presence of directly weapons-
usable material would be widespread. This, when combined with its
economic and technological deficiencies, is the basis for President
Carter's position on the Clinch River Project.

We believe that we have time to explore on an international basis
more proliferation resistant breeder fuel cycles, ones that would
minimize the presence of directly weapons usable material. This, of
course, is one of the major objectives of the International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation to which I just referred. We envision that it will
examine all the factors that impinge on various fuel cycle alternatives
— timing, cost, technical feasibility, and the like. In the end, we hope
to separate myth from reality about the breeder and develop an in-
ternational consensus based on agreed facts.

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION
PROGRAM

I would like now to discuss more specifically this International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Program. The organizing
meeting will be held, as you know in Washington, October 19 through 21. Some thirty-seven countries with a major interest in nuclear energy have been invited to attend. We have deliberately included both consumers and suppliers, rich and poor, East and West. The purpose is to evaluate scientifically various aspects of the fuel cycle, and lay an agreed factual basis upon which a future consensus might be built. Participation in the program does not commit a country to anything. There will be no votes. The draft terms of reference consist of eight chapters or work areas, each of which is an important element in our efforts to strike a balance between the benefits of nuclear energy and its proliferation risks.

The first two chapters deal with natural resources and enrichment capacity. If the facts support our view that uranium and thorium resources are more plentiful than is commonly believed, we can extend the lifetime of the current generation nuclear reactor. To the extent adequate uranium and enrichment capacity are available to consumers to meet legitimate energy needs, the less the time pressure there will be to move to next generation fuel cycles before we have solved their proliferation risks. At the same time, we realize that it is not enough merely to prove the existence of sufficient uranium, thorium, and enrichment. We must also establish an international system of assured fuel supply. That is why the third chapter specifically addresses ways to assure supplies for resource poor countries.

The fourth chapter, reprocessing, will examine the economic and proliferation implications attendant to various reprocessing alternatives. We in the United States are especially interested in reprocessing techniques that would avoid producing pure plutonium. At the same time, however, the Evaluation will also explore the feasibility of technical and international institutional means of increasing the safeguardability of conventional fuel reprocessing. Similarly, the fifth chapter, which will deal with breeder alternatives, will focus on whether there may be systems which are economical and which would minimize the presence of weapons usable material.

The sixth chapter and work area will examine problems associated with spent fuel and waste disposal. Clearly, the degree to which we can alleviate current storage problems will directly affect the lifetime of current generation reactors. These storage problems are one of the driving forces toward reprocessing and plutonium recycle. We also believe that scientific evidence can be brought to bear on the conflicting claims that reprocessing enhances or worsens the environmental risks involved in nuclear waste management. For our part, we are
studying both domestic solutions and ways in which we can be of help to other nations in dealing with this problem.

The seventh chapter will look at ways to increase the fuel utilization in present thermal reactors. There is credible evidence that we may be able to double the utilization rate through various techniques. Obviously, this would be like discovering twice as many uranium mines! Again, the longer the lifetime of the current fuel cycle, the more time we have to design more proliferation resistant future fuel cycles. Finally, the eighth chapter will look at advanced converter reactors and other reactor and fuel cycle concepts, which could increase fuel resources without providing access to weapons-grade material. We will look at alternative concepts not adequately studied in the past, although in many cases fairly substantially developed.

Let me stress that this International Evaluation is not an American enterprise. It will be a truly international effort without results prejudged in advance. The objective of the United States, as indicated before, is to build an international consensus on all the views confronting us. We cannot dictate a non-proliferation policy to the rest of the world. We believe that facts will show that recycling plutonium in thermal reactors is a mistake from economic, security and ecological points of view, but we accept that our views should be subject to international scientific scrutiny. We believe that the facts support our view that there is time to examine more proliferation resistant alternatives to conventional reprocessing.

For example, technical people have suggested that it may be possible to develop within a matter of years, an economical pyrochemical reprocessing technology with the following characteristics:

1. Its process stream or "new" fuel would not be significantly easier to divert or convert into pure plutonium than is cooled light water reactor fuel.

2. The plant equipment would not be capable of producing pure plutonium, and no simple process adjustment would be able to produce pure plutonium.

3. The individual steps of the process would have either been demonstrated or be close enough to existing experience so that credibility of the process is high and the reliability of the method is assured.

Obviously such a more proliferation resistant reprocessing technology is not a panacea, and the claims of its feasibility need careful international scientific study. But this is an example of the type of alternative
we believe deserves our careful collective attention in the International Evaluation. Most important, if we are to develop and coordinate effective policies to reach our mutual goal of nuclear power without nuclear proliferation, we must avoid assuming that there are no alternatives to the technological path upon which we are now embarked. At the very least, we owe to future generations the assurance that we examined real alternatives, and were not simply carried along by the momentum of the past.

It is clear that there is presently a good deal of disagreement rather than consensus over the nuclear fuel cycle. We hope that INFCE will help to encourage the deliberate evolution of a new consensus that can support the IAEA and its international safeguards system. Amidst the turmoil we find some encouraging signs. For example, we are encouraged by the fact that in the Tokai agreement the Japanese Government has associated itself with our views that recycling plutonium in thermal reactors is premature. We feel the situation is well summarized by Rudolf Rometsch, Deputy Director General of the IAEA. As he told Nucleonics Week this summer, what he sees “is much more serious attention being given to ideas for international fuel cycle management in the face of the U.S. attack on reprocessing. The IAEA official explained that as recently as a year ago it was hard to find either utility or government officials interested in ways to internationalize plutonium control and other aspects of the fuel cycle in order to make them more proliferation proof. Now ‘quite a number are willing to go a long way to make that possible,’ Rometsch said. He added that this may be ‘the most positive point, if properly exploited,’ to emerge from the renewed U.S. concern over proliferation.” In short, our efforts to develop a new consensus about a more proliferation resistant and safeguardable commercial fuel cycle cannot be achieved overnight. Our efforts will require patience and close cooperation with other nations. Nuclear technology has diffused to the point that it is too late for any one nation to dictate. But it is not too late to cooperate. The United States stands ready to work with others in this spirit.
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