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This paper was one of two presentations made at a session designed to provide for the field of curriculum and assessment of its methodological and substantive status, as well as an assessment of the implications of that status for practice. The recent history of the field is sketched briefly. The ideas "curricular possibilities" and "improvement" are discussed as these have been understood in the field, and why "comprehension" is viewed as a "first step." Finally, a reconceptualization of these ideas is laid out in summary fashion. (Author/MLF)
Notes on the Curriculum Field 1973

William F. Pinar
The University of Rochester

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Decker Walker concludes his recent discussion of the state of the field in this way: "I have the disquieting feeling that to justify its continued existence, research in curriculum will have to do more than increase our comprehension of curricular realities. It may also have to create new curricular possibilities, if it and public education are to survive. Comprehension is a good first step toward improvement, but it is not enough."

In this paper I wish to discuss the history of Professor Walker's 'disquieting feeling' by sketching briefly the recent history of the field. In so doing I will underscore the ideas "curricular possibilities" and "improvement" as these have been understood in the field, and why 'comprehension' is viewed as a 'first step'. Finally, I will lay out in summary fashion a reconceptualization of these important ideas, referring to the work of Jurgen Habermas, especially his work on knowledge and human interests, the confusion of the technical and the practical, and the relation between theory and practice. Richard Bernstein's The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory will be my sourcebook.

A Map of the Field

What is the state of the art in curriculum? It strikes me a curious question. I can imagine its use in the present context only in order to avoid the use -- or misuse our colleagues in natural science might argue -- of the term 'science'. More than a few of our colleagues in areas like educational psychology, as well as in natural science, regard the curriculum field as in a primitive stage of scientific development. The title of the address acknowledges this much, but in so doing misuses the term "art". Neither the literature of this field, nor current practices of curriculum development, strike me as artful in any serious way. I conclude that this title originates only in the need to acknowledge the non-scientific character of the field. I accept that the field is not scientific; I insist it is not artful. Thus let it be explicit that this paper attempts to answer the question I take to be behind the question printed in the program, namely: what is the state of the field?
If we are to take Professor Walker's recent study as indicative, we must answer that the state of the field is tentative. He concludes that curriculum research has increased our comprehension of curriculum, but that in order for it to continue, curriculum research may have to create new curricular possibilities. The first step toward improvement has been taken, at least in part, and the second step -- improvement -- must follow.

The implication in Walker's statement is that now that comprehension is achieved we must set ourselves to the task of improving the actual curriculum in the schools. Implicit in this view is the widely-held view among what Bernstein terms "mainstream social scientists" that the improvement of practice involves the application of empirically-verified theory. \(^5\) How I do not think that Professor Walker is a strict adherent of this social scientific view, but he accepts tacitly a version of it. It is suggested in the structure of this sentence: "Comprehension is a good first step toward improvement, but it is not enough." I will argue, relying on Habermas, that such a view of theory and practice is sure not to lead in any serious improvement in the public schools.

Another widely held view is that theory is not essential to the improvement of practice; in fact, it may deter such work. This is a view associated with some traditionalists in the field. With mention of traditionalists permit me to acknowledge the "map" of the field I am employing. \(^6\) It is one I find minimally distortive, maximally useful. I discriminate among traditionalists, conceptual-empiricists, and reconceptualists. Extremely briefly and for the moment (I will develop these characterizations in the course of the paper) I will describe them. Traditionalists value service to practitioners in the schools above all else, and this service is more important than the development of an integrating theory or conducting research (as this term is used by social scientists), although some traditionalists would maintain that theoretical considerations and research findings be employed with discretion. Ralph Tyler is the traditionalist par excellence.
There are other nearly as visible traditionalists whom I will mention when I describe this category in more detail. Conceptual-empiricists, the second group, define those terms according contemporary social science. They tend to be trained in social science, and see service to practitioners subsequent to years of research, although of course even one study may have "Implications". Decker Walker is a visible conceptual-empiricist. Reconceptualists is as broad a category as are the first two. They tend to be trained in the humanities, but even those whose backgrounds are social science tend to hold theoretical considerations above the conducting of quantitative research. They have not, even if some maintain they have for the time being, abandoned school practitioners, but fundamental to their view is that an intellectual and cultural distance from our constituency is required for the present, in order to develop a comprehensive critique and theoretical program to be of any meaningful assistance now or later. Let me develop these characterizations as I sketch a recent history of the field, a history that begins in the late nineteen fifties when the curriculum field was identified with those in 1975 I identify as traditionalists. As with all "maps", there is a continuum where the divisions suggest unconnected, discrete entities.

As the title to Professor Tyler's famous book indicates, traditionalists have tended to be concerned about "principles" guiding curriculum development and implementation. The term "theory" has been employed to indicate that such principles are abstractions from actual experience of practitioners, and often at variance with actual practice. In a social scientific sense of the term, or in the senses it is used in the humanities, traditionalists have not been theoretical. In their books they have focused on schoolpeople, and they present an overview of considerations imagined pertinent to these readers. Prototypical traditionalists include Alexander, Doll, Saylor, Shores, Smith, Stanley, Staatemeyer, Taba, and in the present time McDell, the Tanners, and Zais. It is service to school practitioners that distinguishes traditionalists; service is more important than research or the development of theory. Many traditionalists tend to be former schoolpeople, and they tend to remain loyal -- intellectually and culturally -- to their former
colleagues. This is understandable historically. (As you recall, the field began in the nineteen twenties as a response to a practical concern for curriculum matters, not as a conceptual extension of an extant cognate field, as we can say of educational psychology, for instance. The first curricularists, then, were school teachers whose interest in curriculum led them out of the classroom and into administrative offices.)

In one sense it was the closeness of the relationships between traditionalists and schoolteachers that maintained the atheoretical and ahistorical character of the field. Working so closely to our clients, and working so continuously to speak to their questions, forbade us the intellectual distance necessary in part to generate adequate curriculum theory. It was the very instrumentality of traditionalists, with its constant and enslaving preoccupation with the classroom which made likely that no meaningful and systematic understanding of that classroom could develop.

Many traditionalists have been conscious -- at times painfully -- of this inadequacy. These individuals were not surprised, I would guess, when cognate field specialists were selected to lead the so-called curriculum reform movement of the nineteen-sixties. Curricularists were used infrequently during this time, and then primarily as consultants. This bypass was a kind of deathblow to a field whose primary justification was its expertise in an area now dominated by cognate-field specialists. The field has yet to fully recover from this event.

During the curriculum reform movement the field began to undergo a fundamental transformation. The appearance of conceptual- empiricists in the field in the nineteen-sixties was part of the rise of the social sciences generally. The basic premise is that a scientific knowledge of human behavior (a subset of which involves curriculum) is possible. Of course, the notion of "science" is very much allied with a natural science model for social science. As sociologist Robert Merton, a prototypical mainstream social scientist, has observed: "Between twentieth-century physics and twentieth-century sociology stands billions of man-hours of sustained, disciplined, and cumulative research". Of course there are substantial dis-
issues, but it is a shared fundamental assumption among mainstream social scientists -- who accept that social science can and must be modeled, in some way and in some measure, upon natural science -- that increasingly refined methodologies and sustained, "cumulative" research will bring a science of human behavior.11

It is understandable that this view, one that is so persuasive partly due to the "success" of natural scientists and those who have applied their basic research to help construct technocratic society, would enter the curriculum field. If the traditionalists' "basic principles" and curriculum designs were acknowledged to be of little use -- at least by those who funded the curriculum reform movement -- then the "problem" was creating knowledge of great use.12 The "solution" lay with social science research. Enter the conceptual-empiricists, curricularists trained, increasingly nearly exclusively, in mainstream social science, and often ignorant of the field's history. This ahistorical view, not original with conceptual-empiricists, is in some degree inevitable with social science. If any knowledge worthy possessing is yet to be discovered, there is little point to studying the unscientific past.

Conceptual-empiricists argue that their research functions to serve school practitioners. By creating a science of curriculum the traditional aspiration of the field can be realized. What distinguishes conceptual-empiricists from traditionalists is the allegiance of the former to social science. Traditionalists' allegiance has been to practitioners and to "kids". Conceptual-empiricists seem to have their eyes more upon their colleagues in social-science fields, upon creating nomological knowledge than upon practitioners, who at times, given their participation in experiments, seem a means to other ends (nomological knowledge). Such a view is characteristic of mainstream social science. But it can be understood another way.

The bypass of the traditionalists by the curriculum reform movement weakened the justification for traditional curricularists in colleges of education. In the nineteen-seventies, with less money for new curriculum proposals, with fewer opportunities for participation in inservice programs and hence fewer opportunities to demonstrate curriculum leadership in the schools, traditionalists' presence in colleges of education and universities became increasingly dependent upon others'
assessment of the intellectual quality of their writing, not its popularity with practitioners. Thus the position of traditionalists, which is to say the field of curriculum, deteriorated. Numerous efforts were made to put the field back to its prior status -- among them several theory-building efforts such as the A.S.C.D. commission on curriculum theory. While such efforts stimulated the beginning the important work, the trend continued. In 1970 Schwab would pronounce the field 'moribund,' a diagnosis to be repeated six years later by Dwayne Huebner. The only pulse detectable was the work of conceptual-empiricists, and in the early nineteen seventies it seemed if a curriculum field were to survive, it would be as another colony of mainstream social science.

There appears now, however, to be another set of heirs to this field. James Macdonald, in a 1971 article discussing curriculum research, described this group. A third group of individuals look upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual task which they maintain should be neither used as a basis for prescription or an empirically testable set of principles and relationships. The purpose of these persons is to develop and criticize conceptual schema in the hope that new ways of talking about curriculum, which may in the future be far more fruitful than present orientations, will be forthcoming. At the present time, they would maintain that a much more playful, free-floating process is called for by the state of the art. Many of these individuals met a conference in 1973 at the University of Rochester, and yearly conferences have ensued. Four publications emphasizing this work, including the 1975 A.S.C.D. yearbook, have appeared, and are receiving critical attention. A journal emphasizing theoretical work is scheduled for publication in the autumn (1970). These individuals I have characterized as reconceptualists, although the term is controversial.

Metatheoretical context

In other places I have described these three groups and what their work indicates about the state of the field. Today I wish to situate the three groups in a metatheoretical context, the broad outlines of which are provided by Richard J. Bernstein in his The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. This study of the status of the three major metatheoretical orientations in the social sciences --
empirical theory, phenomenology, critical theory -- is useful in distancing ourselves from the present state of the field. Herbert Kliebard, speaking to the professors of curriculum group in Minneapolis in 1973, discussed the distinction between the generalist and the specialist in a way which illuminates the function of critical distance.

The specialist can be likened to one studying, on his knees let us say, an area of a hillside. He examines carefully, in detail, over time, an area of, say, five square yards. He discovers aspects of this area which only such indepth study can permit. The generalist, on the other hand, can be likened to one aloft with, say, a hang-glider. He is two hundred feet above the ground, and from his perspective, he can see the specialist, there over to the left, and the overall pattern of the countryside, a pattern not discernible to the specialist. While the specialist gains information not possible for the generalist, he cannot see the broader context in which this information occurs. It is the generalist who sees this, and understands the limitations of the specialists' perspective. Similarly, by leaving the corner of the field we have studied -- curriculum -- and situating ourselves in a broader point of view, we can comprehend more completely the relation of our area to others, illuminating areas we before could not see.

The point of view I offer today has three dimensions. Each of these is a fundamental theoretical issue which cuts across discipline. The first is the matter of the technical and the practical; the second is the relation between knowledge and human interests; and the third is the relation between theory and practice. Each of these issues is extremely important to the work of curricularists. To discuss them, I will turn to Bernstein, and his discussion of critical theory, primarily the critical theory formulated by the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas. Habermas' work is ambitious and governs a wide area. I will confine myself to his analysis of these three issues.
The first issue Habermas views as the fundamental problem of contemporary social and political theory. He characterizes this as the confusion of the practical and technical. Isolating three basic principles from the work of Thomas Hobbes, Habermas lays out the nature of the confusion.

First the claim of scientifically grounded social philosophy aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as such. Its assertions are to be valid independently of place, time, and circumstances, and to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless of the historical situation. Second, the translation of knowledge into practice, the application, is a technical one. With a knowledge of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of society, a practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions. Third, human behavior is therefore to be now considered only as the material for science. The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order.

The practical question -- how can one provide a practical orientation about what is right and just in a given situation -- evaporates, replaced by the technical one involving increasingly subtle control of human behavior. Habermas notes that in advanced industrial societies there exists:

an escalating scale of continually expanded technical control over nature a continually refined administration of human beings and their relations to each other by means of social organization. In this system, science, technology, industry, and administration interlock in a circular process. In this process the relationship of theory to praxis can now only assert itself as the purposive-rational application of techniques assured by empirical science. The social potential of science is reduced to the powers of technical control -- its potential for enlightened action is no longer considered. The empirical, analytical sciences produce technical recommendations, but they furnish no answer to practical questions.

This lack of answers is a familiar lamentation in the curriculum field. Above all else, the traditional function of curriculum theory is to guide practice: curriculum development, design, evaluation. This guidance, if we reflect moment- rily, is not of prudential sort. Instead, it is technical. The sense
is that adequate curriculum theory could be applied to practical situations, transforming them from unordered, potentially chaotic situations to ones of smooth and consensual procedure. I overstate here only a bit. This identification of the practical with the technical expresses, in a profound way, the state of the curriculum field. Before reconceptualist literature, one is hard put to find curriculum writing which escapes this confusion. Once such illustration may be Ian Westbury's 1972 essay on the Aristotelian art of rhetoric and Schwab's sense of the practical, which may be an attempt to restore a classical view of the practical.

Clearly, the traditionalists attempted to write about the practical in some systematic way. Understandably these curricularists expressed the Zeitgeist and wrote instead about the technical. The writing is not always sophisticated in a technical way, but its impersonality, attempt at generalization and procedure, indicate its genesis in the spirit of the technical. The idiosyncracy of actual situations, the lived quality, the ethical dimension, the aesthetic: as Huebner has written, these disappear into the procedural.

This confusion of the practical and the technical is possible only in a scientific age, a time when science is the measure of what is and what is not. Habermas captures this historical development succinctly in his discussion of the "dissolution of epistemology", its reduction to the philosophy of science. A classical interest in modalities of knowing -- epistemology -- has become a concern for scientific knowing. 'For the philosophy of science that has emerged since the mid-nineteenth century as the heir of the theory of knowledge is methodology pursued with a scientistic understanding of the sciences. 'Scientism' means science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science.'

With this historical understanding of the present intellectual situation, we can see how inevitable it was that the traditionalists were followed by conceptual-empiricists. If the difficulty was that traditional understanding of curriculum matters were insufficiently rigorous, excessively haphazard -- and from a scientific perspective such a judgment is inescapable -- then the 'solution' lay with rigor and...
systematic research. Because traditionalists were atheoretical they lacked any potent defense against these charges. The practical becomes even more closely the technical, and the language of curriculum is reduced further to the objective language of the procedural with its atemporal, ahistorical quality. Beauchamp's Curriculum Theory is an example par excellence.

Habermas appears to distance himself from this situation, characterized as it is by the intellectual hegemony of the natural and social sciences. From this point of view he identifies three "cognitive interests", of which the technical is one. These are the technical, the practical, and the emancipatory. "The approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest." Each of these is associated with one fundamental dimension of human life: work is associated with the technical interest, interaction with the practical interest guiding the historical-hermeneutic disciplines; and power is associated with the emancipatory interest guiding the critical disciplines, i.e. the critical social sciences. Habermas emphasizes that these interests are non-reducible, and he criticizes any attempt -- whether by empiricists or by historical disciplines -- to claim that one interest provides the most fundamental understanding of the world.

Nonetheless Habermas does regard the third interest -- the emancipatory one -- as the most basic one, although the other two cannot be reduced to it. It is the most basic in that the technical and practical interests can be pursued only to the extent that the conditions for free, open communication are present. Such conditions demand an open, self-critical community of inquirers. Habermas concludes that implicit in the technical and practical interests is a requirement for the intellectual and material conditions for emancipation, i.e., an ideal state in which free, open interaction can occur.

The technical interest alone cannot maintain such a perspective; it accepts what is static and deformed in the historical present as timeless. It becomes, in its absorption with the application of "knowhow", the static and the deformed. The
notion of emancipatory interest, however, provides the epistemological basis for a quite different function for the social sciences. Habermas terms these the critical social sciences, performing a certain order of critique which is not static but freeing in its effect. Habermas writes:

The systematic sciences of social action, that is economics, sociology, and political action, have the goal, as do the empirical-analytic sciences, of producing nomological knowledge. A critical social science, however, will not remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed. If that is the case, the critique of ideology, as well as psycho-analysis, take into account that information about law-like connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus the level of (nonreflective) consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed. Of course, to this end, a critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection alone render a law itself inoperative, but can render it inapplicable.

The methodological framework that determines the meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this category is established by the concept of self-reflection. The latter releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers. Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest.

Habermas then cites psychoanalysis as a discipline the essential method of which is systematic self-reflection. It requires, Bernstein notes a "depth hermeneutics", in which he misunderstands himself, and fails to grasp the significance of the symptoms from which he suffers. Habermas: "The technique of dream interpretation goes beyond the art of hermeneutics insofar it must grasp not only the meaning of a possibly distorted text, but the meaning of the text distortion itself, that is the transformation of a latent dream thought into the manifest dream. In other words, it must reconstruct what Freud called the 'dreamwork'." Such work is not disinterested. The psychoanalyst is guided by his interest in assisting the patient move through his suffering and be released from the debilitating symptoms from which he suffers. This can be achieved only to the extent that the analysis is successful in assisting the patient to become conscious of his distinctive self-formative process. The "act of understanding to which it leads is self-reflection."
Habermas agrees with Freud that this sort of emancipatory self-understanding cannot come through the analyst's imparting information to the patient, or merely by applying psychoanalytic theory in a technical or strategic manner. What is necessary is a coming to consciousness by the patient that functions to dissolve resistances. Freud warns in this regard: "The pathological factor is not his (the patient's) ignorance in itself, but the root of the ignorance in his inner resistances. It was they that first called this ignorance into being, and they still maintain it now. The task of the treatment lies in combating these resistances. Informing the patient of what he does not know because he has repressed it is only one of the necessary preliminaries to treatment. If knowledge about the unconscious were as important for the patient as people inexperienced in psychoanalysis imagine, listening to lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him." 33

Thus it is the patient's own re-collection and reconstruction of his past that is central knowledge in this procedure. A technical manipulation of the patient by the analyst is by no means sufficient. What is necessary is a setting off, in the patient, a process of depth self-reflection. Habermas comments: "First it includes two movements equally: the cognitive, and the affective and motivational. It is critique in the sense that the analytic power to dissolve dogmatic attitudes inhere in analytic insight. Critique terminates in a transformation of the affective-motivational basis, just as it begins with the need for practical transformation. Critique would not have the power to break up false consciousness if it were not impelled by a passion for critique." 34

It is psychoanalytical, then, that offers an illustrative structure of an emancipatory discipline. Habermas is careful to note that he regards as questionable and largely expendable those conceptual categories by which psychoanalysis understands the patient's 'text'. It is the structure of psychoanalysis, its basis in self-reflection assisted by a pedagogue who is the analyst, that is pertinent to the formulation of critical social science.

What would an emancipatory discipline of curriculum look like? That is not clear to me, although my sense is that the movement in the field that is the
reconceptualization aspires to such work. At the present time reconceptualists generally are preoccupied with a comprehensive critique of the field as it is, a field immersed in pseudo-practical, technical modes of understanding and action. The understanding is that to realize the aspirations of the field we must repudiate the dominant trends by examining their domain assumptions, such as the notion of technical interest. In a sense, the reconceptualization becomes more fully intelligible as it is viewed as a surfacing in the curriculum field of the same historical movement which has surfaced in philosophy as critical theory. As a student of these matters in the social sciences, Bernstein detects "an emerging new sensibility that, while still very fragile, is leading to a restructuring of social and political theory." Reconceptualists, in historical context, can be seen not as isolated, reactive curricularists, but as colleagues in a multidisciplinary transformation of our understanding of fundamental issues in the human disciplines. The work of Maxine Greene exemplifies the order of effort necessary.

A danger I see in a coming stage of the reconceptualization is a flight from our responsibility to create new curriculum theory by becoming scholars of critical theory and phenomenology. The temptation is powerful: such scholarship offers intellectual and psychological security, or at least the illusion of same. But critical theory and phenomenology are movements in philosophy not in curriculum, and while explication of that work is necessary and fruitful for us, a retreat to explication of philosophical texts represents an evasion of our professional responsibility. As curricularists we must address ourselves to the historically-established concerns of the curriculum field. We must continue to address ourselves to our contemporaries in the field: to traditionalists and conceptual-empiricists. We must explicate the nature of our efforts, and at the same time, attempt to offer our work in ways which will permit others -- not yet on the scene -- to make syntheses of reconceptualized curriculum theory and traditional and conceptual-empiricial curriculum theory. For the field to finally emerge will not be one created solely from the hands of reconceptualists, but from the hands of us all. The quality of that field yet to come, and concomitantly, the quality of that field's contribution to
American education, are very much reliant upon our capacity to move through this complex, difficult time in the field. We must move ahead with our own theoretical program while keeping one eye on grand syntheses of which our own work will be but one, albeit important, part.

Such syntheses are some time off. The state of the field today is fragmented and arrested. Reconceptualized notions of curriculum are not widely understood. These notions aspire to be intellectually independent of the so-called cognate fields, and aspire to produce emancipatory knowledge. One such notion, potentially, I submit, is the theory of curriculum I have been developing with the considerable assistance of Madeleine R. Grumet. Fundamental to our view is the sense that curriculum research must emancipate the researcher if it is to authentically offer such a possibility to others. We have devised a method by means of which the researcher can examine his own "limit situations" in Freire's sense, his own participation in frozen social and psychological structures, his complicity in the arrest of intellectual development characteristic of American schooling. Essential to our formulation is acknowledgement of the false duality of 'self' and 'world'; human being is irrevocably 'being-in-the-world'. The world is both cause and consequence of the conditioned and the chosen in human life. Our aspiration is to gain increasing access to that which is conditioned, allow it to surface, to be released or permitted to remain, in either case in consciousness, hence open to the conscious intentions of the individual. It is the repression of the primitive, as Jung never tired of emphasizing, that has been a cost of technocratic-industrial civilization. The primitive -- including the violent and the erotic -- is repressed and forgotten, but not gone. It is projected, in classic psychoanalytic fashion, onto television and film screens, the same violence and sexual hunger banned from the conscious arenas of daily life. They are banned but present in unconscious subversive ways, ways which enslave us. The point for curricularists is this: the generally debilitating, arrested condition of American culture forbids profound intellectual movement and achievement. In disagreement with Freud, who tended to insist that repression is the necessary cost for intellectual achievement, it is clear in our time that intellectual movement,
the fluidity of mind which we associate with the overused term creativity, the order of intellectual advance for which the movement of twentieth-century physics is one exemplar, is very much reliant upon fluidity of being. Such ontological movement, dialectically related to cultural movement, can be initiated and maintained through conscious work with oneself and others, work permitting to surface material now frozen in unconsciousness. Such surfacing must be attended to cautiously, and control -- of some fundamental sort that is not repressive -- maintained. This subtle, complex process occurs without psychotherapeutic structuring, without the regressive method. However, Grumet and I have found that discriminating, sensitive use of the method with interested students helps melt, if you will, intellectual blocks or frozen areas, and allows intellectual movement. Individual intellectual movement occurs in complex dialectical relation to others, present physically as teachers and other students and through print in books and other artifacts. This dialectical movement occurs in the context of individual life history; when it occurs it is educational experience. In this sense we research the role of curriculum in educational experience. Other modes of emancipatory curriculum research must be formulated.

The final area I wish to outline is the important issue of theory and practice. Habermas' view of their relation is very helpful. In the fourth edition of Theory and Practice he writes:

The mediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified if to begin with we distinguish three functions, which are measured in terms of different criteria: the formation and extension of critical theorems, which can stand up to scientific discourse; the organization of processes of enlightenment, in which such theorems are applied and can be tested in a unique manner by the initiation of processes of reflection carried on with certain groups toward which these processes have been directed; and the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of political struggle. On the first level, the aim is true statements; on the second authentic insights; and on the third, prudent decision.

Recently Habermas has stressed this third function of the mediation of theory and praxis, "the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of political struggle." In part, Habermas in attempting to answer recent criticism, particularly by university students in Europe, that he
has abandoned the project of unifying theory and practice. Habermas notes that such unification is problematic, for political action does not automatically follow from a transformed consciousness. In fact, he argues that theory can never be used directly to justify political action. When it is demanded that theoretical statements provide absolute authority in determining what is to be done in the arena of social action, Habermas insists that both theory and praxis are deformed. He writes:

Stalinist praxis has furnished the fatal proof that a party organization which proceeds instrumentally and a Marxism which has degenerated into a science of apologetics complement each other only too well. (TP, 36)

Theory cannot have the same function for the organization of action, of the political struggle, as it has for the organization of enlightenment. The practical consequences of self-reflection are changes in attitudes which result from insight into causalities in the past, and indeed result of themselves. In contrast, strategic action oriented toward the future, which is prepared for in the internal discussion of groups, who (as the avant-garde) presuppose for themselves already successfully completed processes of enlightenment, cannot be justified in the same manner by reflective knowledge. The distinction among unconstrained theoretical discourse, enlightenment, and strategic political action are extremely important. In a sense, Bernstein notes, Habermas would seem to be closer to Hegel, and to Freud, than he would seem to be to Marx. This is so given that the immediate aim of critique is insight into the past. Thus it is retrospective as it aspires to initiate a process of self-reflection by which awareness of and liberation from the compulsions of the past are possible. As Hegel noted, the order of freedom the bondsman realizes as he becomes conscious that he has a mind of his own, is in a sense abstract and empty. It is not yet concrete freedom, and it arises in a world in which nothing has materially changed.

Habermas stresses this essential point again.

The organization of action must be distinguished from this process of enlightenment. While the theory legitimizes the work of enlightenment, as well as providing its own refutation when communications fails, and can, in any case, be corrected, it can by no means legitimate a fortiori the risky decisions of strategic action. Decisions for the political struggle, cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and then be carried out organizationally. The sole possible justification at this level is consensus aimed at in practical discourse, among the participants, who, in the consciousness of their common interests and their knowledge of circumstances, of the predictable consequences and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know the risks
they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations. There can be no theory which at the outset can assure a world-historical mission in return for the potential sacrifices.\(^4\)

This acknowledgement of a gap between theoretical justification and strategic action is interpreted by many as a grand "cop-out". For those who insist that unifying theory and practice means that theory tell us procedurally how to transform social reality, such a conclusion is inescapable. Whether these interpreters be "vulgar Marxists" or "bourgeois engineers", they are attempting, in Bernstein's judgment, to reduce all strategic action to technical manipulation. The desire is for a science and theory sufficiently secure that definitive judgments as to procedure are possible. Those Marxists who insist such a science is possible, even inevitable, follow in the tradition of the great bourgeois thinker Thomas Hobbes. They accept the central aim of his project, the achievement of a science of human beings which would provide the authoritative foundation for reconstructing society. When Marxists insist that Marxism is the true science, they fail to comprehend that they have succeeded only in making science into ideology.\(^4\)

Habermas is attending here to an ambiguity seemingly intrinsic to the human condition. That is, as a species, as an individual, one seems never to be in a position to know absolutely that enlightenment has in fact occurred, that without doubt it has released one from the constraints of the past and initiated genuine self-reflection. The subtly, persistence, and strength of the various forms of resistance and delusion; the inadequacy of intellectual understanding alone to effect complete transformation; the ever-present possibility that enlightened understanding may be, finally, another form of illusion: such considerations insist that the evaluation of the success or failure of critique must always be tentative in some degree.\(^5\)

For some this tentativeness brings discouragement. Such a response I regard as unwarranted. The inherent incapacity of theory to provide a definitive program of social action, in the present context for teachers, administrators, curriculum developers and evaluators, does not mean that the quality of strategy cannot be attended to. While strategy does not follow from theory in an explicit conceptual
way, the preconceptual ground for strategy does have significance for the quality of strategy. An enlightened person, a person engaged in continual self-reflexive examination of himself, will communicate this relation of self to self to others, even if material conditions force strategic action that is in some measure unacceptable to himself and to others. If the individual is preoccupied with technical manipulation of his behavior to force a desired outcome, even if this outcome is claimed as humanistic, the social experience of this behavior is one of technical manipulation. The following may help clarify this slippery but important matter.

Perhaps you recall Kierkegaard's mocking of certain groups in Danish society: businessmen, rushing to keep appointments; churchmen and theologians, establishing doctrine of sinless behavior and jockeying for political position within the church; and university professors, particularly Hegel of course, who vaulted themselves into god-like perspectives, divested of their individuality, concrete in its biographic life. The learning of many theologians and scholars was exceptional, yet their sensibilities were brittle, dehumanizing. What had been the function of learning for such people? Function is indicated by the character of sensibility, which is in one sense prior to the character of participation in the social world. Any use of knowledge to arrest the development of the individual, suggested by its use to aggrandize one's social position or to mystify one's political action, indicate that "the relation of the knower to the known" is an enslaving one. The quality of knowledge produced and the quality of strategic action taken when such a relation exists, are necessarily enslaving.

The production of curriculum knowledge is important to the advancement of the field. However, if this production does not originate in an emancipatory intention but in a static one -- such as an essentially atheoretical accumulation of a "body of knowledge", or the application of theory (comprehension) to practice (improvement) -- then no fundamental movement in the historical situation can occur. The state of the field is arrest. For movement to occur, we must shift our attention from the technical and the practical, and dwell on the notion of emancipation. Not until we are in emancipatory relation to our work will we devise theory and formulate strategic action which will, in Walker's term "improve" the nation's schools.
REFERENCES


2. Bernstein, R. J. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976. The first page number listed in upcoming citations refers to the Bernstein text, the second to Habermas' texts. Bernstein argues persuasively that mainstream social science, of which educational psychology is an example, is not scientific in a strict naturalistic sense.

3. In my writing and in the writing of other reconceptualists, there is the attempt clumsy as it may be at this stage, to attend to the aesthetic aspect of theoretical discourse. See for instance Grumet, M. "Another Voice" in Pinar, W. and Grumet, M. Toward a Poor Curriculum, Dubuque, Iowa Kendall/Hunt, 1976.

4. Bernstein, P. G.

5. See also Pinar, W. "The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies". Journal of Curriculum Studies, in press.


11. Pertinent here is Bernstein's discussion of the fallacious assumption widely held by mainstream social scientists that a field must pass through a kind of "dark age" before achieving genuine scientific status. See Bernstein, p. 99.

12. Interesting in this regard is the name of the American Educational Research Association's Special Interest Group in Curriculum: Knowledge Creation and Utilization in Curriculum.


16. Conferences have been held at the University of Rochester (1973), Xavier University of Cincinnati (1974), University of Virginia (1975), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (1976), Kent State University (1977), and the Rochester Institute of Technology (1978).

17. Books included Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974), Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975), Schools in Search of Meaning (Washington: A.S.C.D., 1975), Toward a Poor Curriculum (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt 1976). There have been several reviews, the most recent of which is van Manen, M., "Reconceptualizing Curriculum Inquiry", Curriculum Inquiry, in press.

13. The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, managing editor is Janet Louise Miller, Center for Improved Education, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio.


22. Ibid., p. 167 (TP, 254).


25. Bernstein, p. 190, (K1, 4).


27. Bernstein, pp. 192-3, (K1, 300).

28. Ibid., p. 197.

29. Ibid., p. 196.

30. Ibid., pp. 198-9, (K1, 310).

31. Ibid., p. 200, (K1, 220-1).

32. Ibid., p. 200; (K1, 228).

33. Ibid., pp. 200-1, (K1, 229).

34. Ibid., p. 201, (K1, 234).

See the work of Apple, Huebner, Macdonald for instance.
36. Bernstein, xiii.


38. Professor van Manen seems to be asking for just this. See his "Reconceptualizing Curriculum Inquiry", *Curriculum Inquiry*, in press.

39. This is not only in the field of curriculum. Witness the controversy between Greenfield and Griffiths over the nature of theory in educational administration. See *U.C.E.A. Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, October, 1977.


42. See, for instance, the work of J. O. Brown, Susan Sontag, Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich.


44. Bernstein, p. 214, (TP, 32).

45. Ibid., p. 216.

46. Ibid., p. 216, (TP, 36, 39).

47. Ibid., pp. 216-7.

48. Ibid., p. 217, (TP, 33).

49. Ibid., p. 217-3.

50. Ibid., pp. 218-9.