The report discusses issues relating to multilateral disarmament in the context of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly to be convened in 1978. Intended as a forum for the exchange of ideas of government leaders from the United States and other nations about the international peacekeeping role of the United Nations, the Conference ordered discussion topics so that they would parallel the agenda proposed for the United Nations Special Session. The four-part agenda is as follows: (1) review of the international arms race and examination of the relationship between disarmament, international peace, and economic development; (2) adoption of a declaration of disarmament which would entail a firm commitment to action by national governments; (3) adoption of a program of action on disarmament; and (4) review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament. Presented in outline format, the report is designed to reflect the essence of group discussions on disarmament topics, including arms limitation treaties, new weapons, escalating proliferation, the SALT talks, principles of disarmament, peaceful nuclear explosions, mass destruction, military budgets, world security, and international compliance with disarmament agreements. A directory of conference participants and comments by the conference chairman, Mexican government officials, and the United Nations Secretary General are presented. (Author/DB)
Multilateral Disarmament and the Special Session

Twelfth Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade
San Juan del Rio, Mexico • June 19-25, 1977

Sponsored by THE STANLEY FOUNDATION
Muscatine, Iowa 52761, U.S.A.
Foreword

The Twelfth Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade assembled international statesmen, diplomats, and scholars at San Juan del Rio, Mexico, under the auspices of The Stanley Foundation. Their deliberations on the topic "Multilateral Disarmament and the Special Session" approached the vital issue of disarmament in the context of the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly to be convened in 1978. The topics discussed at this conference parallel the four-part agenda proposed by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session: Review and Appraisal; Declaration on Disarmament; Program of Action on Disarmament; and U.N. Role and International Machinery for Negotiation.

A variety of topics concerning the increased effectiveness of the United Nations were considered at eleven earlier conferences: San Francisco, California, U.S.A., 1965; Burgenstock, Switzerland, 1967; Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 1968; Quebec, Canada, 1969; Fredensborg, Denmark, 1970; Sinaia, Romania, 1971; South Egremont, Massachusetts, U.S.A., 1972; Amafi, Italy, 1973; Vail, Colorado, U.S.A., 1974; Baden bei Wien, Austria, 1975; and Charlottesville, Virginia, U.S.A., 1976. Participants have offered suggestions to encourage nation-states to maximize their participation and support of the United Nations. The time focus of these conferences has been the next decade; in order to avoid undue concentration on today's crises and unwarranted attention to utopian objectives.

Conference participants have been knowledgeable about the United Nations and personally convinced that it needs to play a more viable role in world affairs. They have participated as individuals rather than as representatives of government.

The format of this conference has been an informal off-the-record exchange of ideas and opinions. No time has been spent in the presentation and debate of prepared papers or positions. No effort has been exerted to achieve consensus where difference of opinion has been noted. The Conference Report has been prepared by the rapporteurs to reflect the essence of discussions. The report is distributed in the hope that it will stimulate study, research and education with respect to the United Nations and its vital role in achieving international peace and security and a better world. Additional copies of this report are available free of charge from The Stanley Foundation.
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CONFERENCE REPORT
Multilateral Disarmament and the Special Session

OPPORTUNITIES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

The participants in this conference welcome the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1978. The Special Session is an opportunity to take a fresh approach to this urgent task and to mobilize general support for action. This must not be a routine session. It must be prepared and conducted so as to assure a breakthrough toward disarmament and peace.

This report relates to the four-part agenda proposed by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session:

"1. Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race and the close relationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development.

"2. Adoption of a Declaration on Disarmament.

"3. Adoption of a Program of Action on Disarmament.

"4. Review of the role of the U.N. in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including, in particular, the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference."

REVIEW AND APPRAISAL

The Special Session should make an objective appraisal of the present situation and the need for action toward disarmament. The following observations may be useful in this process.
Present Situation

The arms race continues and increases. In the last 15 years global military expenditures have tripled and now approach $400 billion (U.S.). The escalation is both quantitative and qualitative; the rate of development of new weapons, both nuclear and conventional, is accelerating.

Peace still depends on a precarious balance of terror and on the good fortune that has avoided an inadvertent nuclear war to date. There have been many conventional wars, and the risk of these wars continues. Another world war is not inevitable, but it may become inevitable if the arms race is not reversed reasonably soon.

The escalating arms race drains money, technology, and skilled personnel that could be used to meet human needs; delays needed development; and weakens the economies of most countries.

Each nation's arms decisions appear to be a reasonable reaction to the acts of others, but the collective result is madness.

* This Conference Report was prepared by the rapporteurs; was reviewed by the participants in their final conference session and was revised by the rapporteurs, taking into account the participants' comments during the review session. The Report indicates the participants' consensus or lack of consensus. Participants were not asked to approve the Report, and it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to every recommendation. The rapporteurs accept full responsibility for any error.
Progress to Date

Eight multilateral treaties and ten bilateral Soviet-U.S. treaties on arms limitation and control have been concluded in the last 20 years. The United States and the Soviet Union have implemented internal controls and other measures which increase the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence and reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear attack. A few constructive regional agreements have been or are being negotiated, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Helsinki Agreements and mutual force reductions (MFR) negotiations in Europe. In certain areas, the arms race has been limited.

These steps and the continuing development of detente have had a mutually beneficial feedback effect. The environment for negotiations has been improved to some extent. Many nations have contributed to this improvement. The psychological impact of recent agreements is important. The possibility of limited progress has been demonstrated; this should encourage greater future progress.

The world has now avoided nuclear war for 32 years; however, the future is uncertain.

Need for Greater and Faster Progress

Opinions vary on how much progress has been made. But it is self-evident that the problem is outrunning the progress. Recent agreements have not substantially slowed the arms race. Indeed, the pace of new weapons development exceeds
the pace of arms control agreements. Nuclear proliferation — both vertical and horizontal — has not been halted. Many nations now have or soon will have the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and there is imminent danger of escalating proliferation. The conventional arms race has become more widespread, with more nations participating.

The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles on Disarmament Negotiations, agreed by the Soviet Union and the United States and endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, has not been implemented and has been largely ignored in recent years. Most of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which the General Assembly called to the attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1970, has not been implemented and is not likely to be realized in this decade.

The human race is falling behind in a race it dare not lose. More strenuous efforts for disarmament are required, both step by step and comprehensive measures leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under a strengthened international security system.

Building on Experience

The world must learn from its experience. Both successes and failures in disarmament should be carefully analyzed to determine the reasons. It is important that past achievements be reinforced and that past mistakes not be repeated.

It is also necessary to identify why nations have not responded adequately to prior disarmament proposals, and why they have failed to realize that national security depends on a world security system rather than on the arms race.

The Special Session has a special opportunity to make this analysis. It should be done in a positive manner, avoiding recriminations. Most participants believe it would be helpful if each nation would occasionally admit some of its own mistakes: All have been wrong at times, and it would be refreshing to say so:

The arms race is a habit-forming drug which gives only the illusion of security. The world must break the habit. In order to do so, the root causes must be removed or reduced. These include many feelings of insecurity, some real, some imagined. Careful analysis should be helpful in replacing the arms race with an international security system.
DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT*

Nature and Purposes of the Declaration

The Declaration on Disarmament should be both a call to action and a commitment to act. It must not be merely another resolution or a noble statement followed by inaction.

The Declaration has two primary purposes: to state the firm commitment of national governments and to address and inspire public opinion. It should state what governments genuinely intend to do. A nation's vote for the Declaration should constitute a moral commitment, not a mere statement of intention.

The Declaration should be comprehensive but short and concise. It should be positive. It should realistically describe the present danger but should avoid recriminations.

It is suggested that the Declaration should consist of two parts:

1. An introduction or manifesto. This should frankly state the present situation, the achievements and limited progress to date, the grave and growing danger of the arms race, and the urgent need for faster progress toward disarmament, a world security system, and a world without war. It should be a strong statement which will attract attention and impel action.

2. A statement of principles to guide the Program of Action and the negotiations on disarmament. These principles should be broad but precise and clear. The Declaration should not include specific measures, treaties, or proposals; these should be stated in the Program of Action.

Suggested Principles for Inclusion in Declaration

This list is suggestive but not inclusive.

1. All mankind has a vital interest in more rapid progress toward disarmament. It is essential for human survival and to permit a decent life for all. Significant but limited progress has been made so far. The threat of nuclear war, the continuing economic burden of the arms race, and the rapid changes resulting from science and technology, require more prompt and more effective action.

2. The objective is world peace with security, freedom, and justice. This objective ultimately requires general and complete disarmament under effective international control, with nations retaining only limited forces necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens. Interim measures leading toward this goal, including comprehensive arms reductions, are essential. These interim measures should be as extensive as possible and consistent with the goal of general and complete disarmament.
Progress in disarmament must be accompanied by building a stronger world security system, primarily through the United Nations. This system must include adequate means for verification of compliance with disarmament agreements; peacekeeping, using an international peace force; peacemaking; and peaceful and just settlement of disputes. Firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations is necessary.

Progress in disarmament is interrelated with confidence-building measures; the process of detente; economic and social development; and peaceful, just, and binding settlement of conflicts. The process of detente and general improvement of the international atmosphere are of extreme importance in relation to disarmament. Positive action in any of these areas will aid action in the others. However, failure or inadequate progress in any one area must not be used as an excuse for inaction in the others.

The United Nations has a vital role in disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. This role must be strengthened.

All nations have a responsibility to participate in disarmament negotiations, adhere to constructive disarmament measures, and reduce their arms, armed forces, and military budgets. All nations having nuclear weapons or the capacity to make them have a special responsibility.
Universal participation in disarmament measures is highly desirable and is essential for some steps. If universal agreement on a measure is not achieved, as many nations as possible should proceed with less than universal participation, so long as the risk to their security is less than the risk of continuing without this measure.

Disarmament activities, including policy formation, review, and negotiations, must be conducted at many levels — multilateral and bilateral, global and regional. Work on each of these levels should be done so as to aid and coordinate with work on the other levels.

The immediate objective must be to halt and then to reverse the arms race, both nuclear and conventional.

Nuclear disarmament measures have the highest priority. Nuclear weapons must be steadily reduced and both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation must be halted, while ensuring universal access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Other weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms and forces also require urgent attention. Nuclear and conventional disarmament are interrelated; each can advance separately to a considerable extent, but progress in either area will aid the other.

Reductions of arms and armed forces should be mutually phased so that no nation obtains an unfair advantage and no nation's security is endangered at any stage. It is important to avoid anything that would destabilize the situation or increase the risk of war.
The political will for disarmament must be generated, and the public must be kept informed. The United Nations, national governments, and non-governmental organizations should cooperate toward this end.

Each nation approving the Declaration regards it as a firm moral commitment to comply with, and to cooperate in achieving, these principles and the following Program of Action on Disarmament.

**PROGRAM OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT**

It is suggested that the Special Session include the following items, among others, in its Program of Action on Disarmament.

**Comprehensive Programs**

The interrelationship of action on disarmament with conflict resolution, a strengthened U.N. security system, confidence-building measures, detente, and development has already been noted and is again emphasized.

General and complete disarmament (GCD) under a world security system remains an essential goal and should not be abandoned. This goal enlarges horizons and should aid negotiations.

However, it must be conceded that GCD is a long-term goal. Some participants suggest that the end of this century may be a reasonable target. GCD is more likely to be achieved in a series of major steps than in one complete treaty.

A clear definition of GCD is needed, in order to reduce negative emotional reactions. It may be helpful to place GCD in the context of the real goal: a peaceful world, with freedom and justice, protected by an international security system with adequate safeguards.

There is a growing interest in comprehensive disarmament measures, as a middle road between the current step by step method and the ultimate aim of GCD. Several nations have made comprehensive proposals which deserve consideration.

Comprehensive disarmament plans would continue the step by step approach but would take larger steps within an orderly and agreed framework. Actual reduction of armaments is the key. A plan might include reductions in several kinds of arms and armed forces, both nuclear and conventional. The link between nuclear and conventional disarmament is important, and a comprehensive staged plan is needed if serious reductions are made.

A comprehensive disarmament plan should specify coordinated, integrated, equitable, and phased reductions. It would probably include several stages, though a rigid timetable might not be necessary. It might well include some or many of the Program of Action items listed below.

Some participants believe it would be useful to ask the Soviet Union and the United States to revise the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, or their 1962 draft treaties for GCD, or both. Review and perhaps revision of the 1970 Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (which the General Assembly called to the attention of the CCD) might aid the Special Session in adopting a Program of Action.

**Nuclear Weapons**

1. Limitation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems. The limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, including delivery vehicles, is a critical key to progress in other areas of disarmament.
The nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility to exercise strong leadership and demonstrate rapid progress. Most participants believe that the participation of all nuclear weapons states, including China and France, is highly important although some steps can be taken without their participation if necessary. However, nuclear disarmament is a global problem in which all nations should be actively involved.

Strong support for, and vigorous efforts to expedite, the SALT talks and the European mutual force reduction talks are needed.

However, these negotiations and others must soon proceed to the progressive reduction of nuclear weapons. Most participants recommend a prompt freeze of these weapons, both qualitative and quantitative. It should be followed by mutual and equitable reductions. Cessation of production of these weapons, and agreements not to manufacture or deploy new or improved nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles, would be very helpful.

At some point nuclear weapons reductions by the United States and Soviet Union must be accomplished by reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons by other nuclear weapons states. Most participants believe that
the United States' and Soviet Union's overkill capacity is so great that they could make substantial reductions without endangering their security.

The psychological effect of prompt reductions by the United States and Soviet Union would be very constructive and would be especially helpful in building support for non-proliferation measures.

2 Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Uses. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, to which there are now 102 parties, is an important multilateral step toward nuclear disarmament. The grave dangers of nuclear proliferation are increasing, including the risk of accidental war as nuclear weapons are acquired by more nations which may not have adequate internal controls. The Special Session should declare its strong support for non-proliferation, and all nations should be urged to ratify the NPT or at least to comply with its policies and objectives. Voluntary compliance by non-parties would be a useful partial measure. Some participants recommend a separate treaty which could be ratified by non-parties to the NPT.

There is an important balance of obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons state parties to the Treaty. Nuclear weapons states must make greater efforts to comply with their obligations under Article IV of the NPT, dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is even more urgent for nuclear weapons states to comply with Article VI of the NPT, and achieve progress in vertical (strategic) disarmament, and to comply with its preamble concerning the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

It is uncertain whether international security guarantees to NPT parties would encourage more nations to accept the NPT. If so, realistic security guarantees should be developed and made effective.

Most participants believe the NPT has certain defects which must be remedied. Among these is the situation whereby non-parties to the treaty have an advantage over parties in terms of fewer safeguards required in cooperative nuclear agreements. This and other defects should be dealt with in the context of the review process as stipulated in the treaty, augmented by ongoing discussions among nuclear
supplier nations and in other forums. Some participants believe that the NPT need not be revised at this time but that its potential should be fully developed. Some participants suggest consideration of international sanctions (perhaps applied by the U.N. Security Council) for a nation violating its NPT obligations, although a positive and more comprehensive approach to nuclear proliferation offers the best hope for a solution.

The global spread of plutonium, including the development of national reprocessing facilities serving the current generation of power reactors (and the later possible development of breeder reactors), increases the danger of nuclear weapons development and nuclear terrorism. The development of new methods of uranium enrichment also portends an increased danger from the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. This issue is complicated because many are convinced that utilization of plutonium as fuel—and in some cases full development of the nuclear fuel cycle—is necessary to meet pressing energy requirements. Others stress the overriding danger of plutonium and urge deferral of reprocessing, development of fuel cycles which can be more easily safeguarded, and incentives to develop other energy sources.

It is essential that the system of international safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be made more effective in order to meet the challenge of increased utilization of and production of fissionable material. The Program of Action should include specific proposals to achieve this result in as short a period as possible. These should include recommendations for extensive new research efforts and the training of IAEA inspectors utilizing the most modern equipment. It should also recommend that all parties to the NPT quickly complete the required safeguard agreements with the IAEA.

The Preparatory Committee might consider inviting the Director General and appropriate IAEA officials to report to the Special Session regarding the IAEA’s progress in achieving international standards for the handling and transportation of dangerous fissionable material.
Many participants suggest that cooperation among nuclear supplier nations (the "London Club") can be an important element in strengthening the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. An agreed code of conduct for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology by the fifteen supplier nations (to supplement the very general set of guidelines adopted in 1976) could be a positive contribution. They should agree not to supply fissionable materials or special equipment to any nation that has not accepted adequate safeguards covering all peaceful nuclear activities. However, some participants believe that it is important to avoid the appearance or reality of a cartel-like arrangement among the nuclear supplier nations, as this would promote development of a counter bloc of nuclear have-not nations. Dialogue is essential between the nuclear supplier nations and those nations with developing nuclear programs. It is suggested that the Special Session's Program of Action support cooperation among supplier nations so long as it does not prejudice the interests of nations having developing nuclear programs which meet NPT requirements.

Some participants propose that multilateral management of critical portions of the nuclear fuel cycle may be a viable alternative to national programs in some areas of the world. This may have important advantages in economies of scale, lessening of bilateral and regional tensions, and reducing the danger of nuclear-theft and terrorism. It could also present nations with access to a secure source of energy without being dependent upon any one supplier nation or group of nations.

Some participants suggest that those aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle which might be internationalized could include enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel storage, and radioactive waste disposal. The Special Session should recommend serious study of the appropriate institutional framework for multinational management of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is recognized that many nations are pursuing—or intend to pursue—independent development of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Some participants believe consideration should also be given to the important role of regional organizations, both in administration of safeguards (based on IAEA standards)
and more positive actions such as undertaking research and mobilization of capital. They might also undertake regional management of portions of the nuclear fuel cycle under certain circumstances. Regional standards should be at least as high as IAEA standards. Particular attention is drawn to the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) as a regional organization with significant potential to evolve.

Comprehensive Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Most participants believe the Program of Action should give the highest priority to adopting a comprehensive test ban agreement (CTB), if not already concluded before the Special Session. This subject appears to be ripe for action. Such an agreement should prohibit all nuclear testing and should, if possible, include all five nuclear weapons states and all other nations. However, initial inability to attract all nations should not be permitted to become an insurmountable obstacle. Adequate national verification methods now exist to detect most, if not all violations of such an agreement. A temporary moratorium on all nuclear testing as an interim step toward a CTB may be advisable.
The issue of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) is a particularly difficult problem related to achievement of a CTB. Some hold the view that PNE technology may eventually produce sound economic benefits. These nations argue that substantive progress should be made toward international arrangements for utilization of PNEs as foreseen in Article V of the NPT. Most, however, believe that, regardless of the potential future economic benefits (which many question), PNEs should not be permitted to frustrate completion of an agreement to ban all nuclear testing. In this view all nuclear explosive devices (whether termed PNEs or weapons) should be permanently banned from the international environment.

Agreements on Non-First Nuclear Use or Non-Use of Force. Some participants propose a universal agreement not to make the first use of nuclear weapons. Others question whether such an agreement would be attainable or workable, especially when levels of conventional forces are unequal. The Special Session should consider this proposal and its relationship to conventional force levels.

In addition or as an alternative, some participants suggest a universal agreement renouncing the use of force or threat of force in international relations. They suggest that even though this principle is already stated in the U.N. Charter, a treaty would convert it to a binding obligation. Others question whether such a treaty would have any substantive effect and state that the Charter obligations are already binding. The Special Session should consider this proposal and the alternative suggestion that the Declaration on Disarmament should include a reaffirmation of the Charter obligation.

Consideration of regional measures for non-first nuclear use or non-use of force is suggested by some.

Some participants suggest development of the concept of "international tort," which would declare to be illegal and immoral the use of weapons that destroy life or property in a country not a party to a conflict.

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Most participants believe that a treaty banning most chemical weapons appears to be ripe for action. If not achieved before the Special Session, it should have a high priority in the Program of Action.
If it is not possible to ban all chemical weapons, most participants believe that a treaty prohibiting the most dangerous ones would be a significant step. It is recognized that verification will be difficult; some chemicals have both peaceful and military uses, and the same plant may be able to produce both peaceful chemicals and chemical weapons. Extensive research on this problem need not delay the treaty. The treaty prohibiting biological weapons contains some provisions which may be useful in a chemical weapons treaty.

The rapid development of new weapons of mass destruction and the refinement of existing ones are serious dangers and may have a destabilizing effect. As soon as a new and dangerous type of weapon can be anticipated, an effort should be made to prohibit its manufacture and use. It may be easier to ban weapons not already in use. Prompt negotiation of a treaty to ban new weapons of mass destruction is recommended.

Some method of limiting national military research and development programs would be extremely helpful as part of a comprehensive disarmament program. The reduction of military budgets should include reduction of expenditures for military research and development. Secrecy is an inherent problem, because research and development could not be effectively controlled without openness. If the verification problem can be overcome, a mutual agreement to reduce military research and development budgets might be considered. In spite of the difficulties, the Special Session should consider this problem and possible solutions.
Outer Space and Oceans

The Special Session should consider whether the existing treaties need to be strengthened or supplemented.

Some participants believe that the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits certain military activities in outer space, should be extended to provide for the demilitarization and neutralization of outer space, permitting only peaceful activities in outer space. Others believe that this proposal is unrealistic; they note that existing national satellites are used for both military and non-military intelligence and verification purposes.

Protection of verification satellites is vitally important. Anything that might destroy satellites, or make them even temporarily inoperative, would be seriously destabilizing. The Special Session should consider whether any action is needed to prohibit manufacture or use of hunter-killer or other anti-satellite weapons. It is noted that two existing Soviet-U.S. agreements prohibit interference with national technical means of verification. The benefits to developed and developing countries of information obtained by Soviet and U.S. satellites are noted.
The Seabed Treaty prohibits emplacement of mass destruction weapons on the seabed beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. It is important that this 12-mile limit not be extended under any pretext; this issue is entirely separate from the economic zone question under discussion in the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. The growing importance of the seabed resources is noted. The Special Session should consider whether the Seabed Treaty should be enlarged or strengthened, taking into account the results of the current seabed review conference.

Possible improvements in anti-submarine warfare are especially dangerous, because of the severe destabilizing effect if nuclear missile submarines become more vulnerable. This problem is in effect a seagoing version of the antiballistic missile question. There should be a careful examination of whether some realistic limitations on anti-submarine warfare or weapons can be developed.

**Conventional Arms and Armed Forces**

**Limitation and Reduction.** Conventional forces absorb more than 80% of world military expenditures, and these costs are rising sharply. Most of the potential savings from disarmament, and most of the potential funds for development, depend on substantial conventional disarmament.

Limitation and reduction of conventional arms and forces should be a high priority item. This is linked with nuclear disarmament and should be considered in parallel with it, preferably as part of a comprehensive program.

Possible measures to be considered include: (a) uniform reporting to the United Nations of all force levels and major weapons; (b) international verification of these reports; (c) a freeze of arms and force levels; (d) reductions of arms and force levels; (e) reduction or withdrawal of foreign troops and bases; and (f) additional research on conversion of arms production industries to peaceful uses.

Large reductions will have to be carefully phased and scheduled. The varying security problems of nations must be taken into account, including the different situations of nations that are members of alliances and those that are not.
However, it appears that most nations could make some significant reductions of conventional arms and force levels without endangering their security. Some nations or groups of nations could, without significant risk, set an example by making modest unilateral reductions which might be reciprocated by others.

Transfers of Conventional Arms. The sharp increase in arms exports is destabilizing, and it increases the burden on many developing nations. It will be difficult to control arms transfers without also limiting force levels; work on these two objectives should proceed in parallel. Settlement of existing disputes will also be extremely helpful.

Most participants believe that the major supplier nations should attempt to agree on some reasonable limits. If possible, this should be done through a multilateral agreement approved by the U.N. General Assembly. Limits on arms sales should be balanced with respect to the various recipient nations. Discussions among suppliers and recipients may be helpful in reaching agreements to limit arms transfers. Guidelines, a code of conduct, or a multilateral treaty should be considered.

**Reduction of Military Budgets**

Some participants believe that reporting of military budgets to the United Nations is a necessary first step. Uniform formulas and standards for military budgets should be used. Openness of military budgets should be encouraged; it would build confidence and make reductions more feasible. Additional research is needed on the problem of comparability of military budgets.

Some participants propose a freeze of military budgets, to be followed by percentage reductions or other agreed reductions. Various proposals would apply to the five nuclear weapons states, or to them and to other states with comparable military expenditures, or to all states.

Negotiations in this area should be encouraged. The problems are complex, but a general reduction of military budgets is not likely to endanger any nation's security and is more likely to increase it.

Part of the fund saved by reduction of military budgets should be used for the development of developing countries.
Regional Programs

Regional efforts are important in building a comprehensive disarmament program. Many problems can be more successfully dealt with on a regional level; small groups of nations can consider items of central concern to them. Regional programs may include both conventional and nuclear armaments.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) should receive new emphasis in the Program of Action as effective measures for nuclear disarmament. In the creation of NWFZs, while it is desirable that all nations in the proposed zone be included, most participants believe this is not a prerequisite for an agreement. The initiative for an NWFZ proposal should come from states within the proposed zone, should include adequate verification procedures, and should envisage the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, including nuclear weapons bases. For maximum effectiveness the cooperation of all nuclear weapons states is desirable, in the form of a convention or protocol by which they refrain from acts which would violate the zone (including the use or threat of force). The regional treaty and zone should be endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly. The Latin American example, as embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is an important model which could be emulated in other areas. Proposals for regional programs in Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Africa, South Asia, and the South Pacific have been made and should be pursued. The political situation differs from region to region, and the degree of success in achieving additional NWFZs will depend on a complex of factors.

Zones of peace such as the proposed arrangement in the Indian Ocean represent another important regional effort. The Special Session should encourage all interested nations, especially the United States and Soviet Union, to proceed with this effort to a successful conclusion.

Regional non-proliferation agreements, including regional safeguards and inspection procedures, have been suggested. Verification will be easier among neighbors.

Conventional weapons control arrangements on the regional level can have merit. Regional agreements limiting force levels, reducing military budgets, and prohibiting or restricting the importation of certain weapons have been
suggested. The effort in Latin America (Declaration of Ayacucho), as discussed by eight nations in the region, should be encouraged. Conventional arms control on the regional level should seek to establish balance and stability and also lower force levels. Particular attention should be given to banning highly sophisticated weapons.

Most participants believe that the ongoing Vienna discussions on mutual force reduction (MFR) are of central importance to international peace and security. The situation there is unique, as the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances confront one another. The efforts for MFR in Europe deserve the strong encouragement of all nations.

Regional mechanisms for settlement of disputes may be useful and should be considered.

**Verification and Compliance**

Most participants suggest that the Special Session should give particular attention to verification, safeguards, and compliance related to disarmament measures. Agreements are of little value unless compliance is assured, while effective verification builds confidence and encourages further disarmament.

- Most participants believe that recent progress toward open military budgets and activities is constructive and should be continued. Other steps toward openness should be encouraged.
Some participants suggest establishment of a U.N. verification satellite system. This would assure that information obtained by satellites would be available to the entire world, and should help to reduce uncertainties and tensions.

**World Security System**

The Program of Action should recognize that the United Nations and its security system must be strengthened in parallel with progress toward disarmament. Most participants believe that the ultimate goal of GCD will not be possible until the United Nations has the authority and means to protect nations against war and aggression, so that all nations can safely rely on the United Nations rather than their own armaments.

Therefore, most participants suggest that the Program of Action should call for parallel action to strengthen U.N. organizations and programs for peacemaking, peaceful settlement of disputes, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, including effective implementation of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. It should emphasize the need for longer range plans to develop the United Nations so that it

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can assure peace and national security after disarmament is achieved, together with safeguards to prevent abuse of the United Nations' authority.

**INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT**

Effective mechanisms are of great importance for substantive progress in disarmament negotiations. While disarmament mechanisms are not an end in themselves, they are an important aid in pursuing complex disarmament issues. They require careful consideration by the Special Session. However, the political will of the nations of the world to achieve disarmament is the most important prerequisite.

To be effective, disarmament machinery should generally reflect the existing balance of forces in the world, and should include all militarily significant nations and adequate representation of nations not belonging to the two large military alliances. It is of particular importance that all nuclear weapons states actively participate in disarmament mechanisms. Every nation must have an opportunity to express views and make proposals.

Both large discussion forums and small negotiation forums are important — the former for outlining broad policies, achieving consensus on disarmament goals, and periodic review of progress and the latter for negotiation of specific agreements.

The Special Session should carefully review and evaluate existing disarmament mechanisms and make recommendations for their reform or improvement. Particular care and study precede any recommendation for new multilateral disarmament machinery, although this possibility should be considered.

Better coordination among disarmament mechanisms is also important to overall progress in disarmament. This includes coordination of mechanisms within the United Nations, those related to the world body, and regional organizations, and bilateral negotiations. The Special Session should review this issue and make appropriate recommendations.
The General Assembly should be informed of progress in all disarmament negotiations.

**General Assembly and Related Bodies**

Most participants suggest that the Special Session recommend improved procedures for the General Assembly's consideration of disarmament items. Under the present system, the First Committee receives and discusses the annual report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), makes recommendations to the CCD concerning its future work, and annually debates a number of disarmament items. However, the First Committee must consider an excessive number of disarmament resolutions in a relatively short period of time (less than five weeks), preventing full and careful consideration of important issues. Many nations do not feel the deliberations of the First Committee are relevant to their central concerns and consequently do not participate. These and other defects in this multilateral disarmament forum are undercutting the effectiveness of the United Nations in disarmament.

The Special Session may wish to consider recommending:

1. Assignment of all disarmament items to a committee dealing exclusively with disarmament matters. Disarmament items might be considered exclusively by the First Committee with all other political issues discussed in the Special Political Committee. An alternative suggestion is a special committee for disarmament, with the First Committee to deal with all other political issues. Either proposal would permit more thorough consideration of disarmament items and other important political issues as well.

2. Annual preparation of one general (omnibus) resolution taking note of or reaffirming past years' resolutions. More time could then be given to a few specific disarmament items ripe for action.

3. Attention should also be given to a range of other recommendations which have been proposed at various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) meetings and by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, including: a semi-permanent chairman and staff for the General
Assembly committee dealing with disarmament, time limits on speeches, beginning meetings on time, creation of subcommittees for more in-depth consideration of items, utilization of groups of experts, informal consultation on draft resolutions prior to the beginning of the work of the committee, more high level representation on a regular basis for a portion of each session, and more participation by expert CCD representatives in General Assembly disarmament deliberations.

Many participants suggest that the Special Session consider creation of a new disarmament mechanism, a U.N. Disarmament Council. Such an organ would have limited membership reflecting adequate regional balance and other factors. It might have a membership approximately the size of ECOSOC, with a roughly comparable function in the disarmament area. The Council would serve as a standing committee to review disarmament issues and the progress of negotiations. It would not be a negotiating body. It would submit recommendations to the First Committee. It might convene twice a year while the General Assembly is not in session. One meeting might be held in Geneva prior to convening of the spring CCD session and another in New York prior to the fall General Assembly session. Advantages of such a body include the fact that it could be constituted without Charter change, would in theory include all permanent members of the Security Council (i.e., the nuclear weapons states) and would not require a new bureaucracy. (It would require increased staff support from the U.N. Disarmament Centre.)

One suggestion regarding the proposed Council would build into it a time limitation after which it would automatically cease to exist unless the whole membership decided to the contrary. Another view would assign security items, including U.N. peacemaking activities, to the Council's area of responsibility. While many support this suggestion, others believe that the Special Session should carefully consider the wisdom of creating a new disarmament mechanism, preferring to emphasize the strengthening of existing mechanisms.
Policy Formation and Review Function: Three Options

Some participants believe additional Special Sessions dedicated to disarmament could provide an important annual or periodic review of disarmament matters. Such meetings might focus on differing aspects of disarmament in succeeding years. They could also raise public awareness and help create a global constituency for disarmament. Others caution that Special Sessions should remain infrequent and irregular in order to emphasize their particular importance.

Some participants value a Special Session on disarmament primarily in the context of an interim step toward a World Disarmament Conference (WDC). A successful Special Session on disarmament may be an important step toward the convening of a WDC and could aid in preparation for it. Those favoring a WDC envisage it as a forum for discussion of all disarmament issues, in which all nations including non-U.N. members would participate. A WDC might achieve high level participation.

Some participants recommend that a WDC be held three to five years after the Special Session on disarmament and convene initially to appraise the implementation of the Session's Program of Action. Some participants recommend that a WDC be empowered to adopt practical and binding measures in the field of disarmament. However, some question the feasibility of a WDC given the current political realities, and suggest the need to consider alternative disarmament machinery which may prove acceptable to all nations.

The long dormant U.N. Disarmament Commission is another mechanism whose usefulness should be reviewed by the Special Session. Some favor a revitalization of the Commission, stressing that it is already in existence and enjoys universal membership (thus in theory all five nuclear weapons states are members). The Commission could form an important link between the General Assembly and the main disarmament negotiating body, the CCD. However, many conclude that the Commission would duplicate the General Assembly's functions and that it would be more difficult to revive a dormant body than to use a currently functioning organ.
Some participants suggest that one of these three mechanisms could serve a disarmament function comparable to UNCTAD's function in trade and development matters.

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)

Under the prevailing political circumstances the CCD may be the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of multilateral disarmament agreements. Its principal defect is the lack of participation of all nuclear weapons states, and serious efforts should be made to remedy this situation. Many participants believe that consideration should be given to altering the prevailing Soviet/U.S. co-chairmanship in favor of a rotating or elective chairmanship. Those favoring this change view it as a principal step toward gaining the active participation of France and China, and not as a denigration of the special importance and responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States in the negotiating process. Others are of the view that the co-chairmanship question is but one symptom of a larger problem that must be remedied by reorganization of the membership of the CCD. Others oppose any major change in the existing situation. Most participants believe it to be in the self-interest of the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the world community, to consider altering the chairmanship of the CCD. Some participants favor concentrating on improvement of the CCD's work rather than making organizational changes in the CCD.

Most participants believe that the Special Session should consider recommending that all countries now members of the CCD designate a permanent representative to that body. This would change some members' current practice of appointing ambassadors with overlapping responsibilities, and thus would increase the stature of and attention given to the CCD.

Improvements in the internal working of the CCD should be considered. While under the current procedures the CCD is free to create working groups, perhaps standing subcommittees dealing with different disarmament issues could provide for more expert study and improve the output of the CCD.
Most participants view it of considerable importance that the CCD be more closely linked to the United Nations and in particular to non-CCD members. The recent decision to circulate CCD documents to U.N. members immediately rather than at the end of each session is welcome. More reports from the CCD to the General Assembly regarding complex disarmament items might also be helpful. In addition it may be advisable for the CCD to send the General Assembly a progress report after the CCD’s spring session in time to take into account any suggestions prior to its summer session. Finally, non-CCD members should be encouraged to send permanent observers to Geneva and to formulate specific proposals to the CCD.

**Secretariat and U.N. Centre for Disarmament**

The U.N. Centre for Disarmament is an important mechanism for critical research in the field of disarmament and informing public opinion on vital disarmament issues. Of particular worth are expert reports on specific disarmament issues which can both inform and mobilize support for new initiatives. In carrying out these studies, it is suggested that the U.N. Centre make greater use of respected international experts and scientists and of the facilities of the United Nations University. The Centre should also continuously seek new methods of disseminating information to governmental officials, specialized audiences, and the general public. In this effort more cooperation with other U.N. agencies, such as the information service of the Office of Public Information, should be developed. The Special Session should carefully review the operation of the Centre and recommend measures to strengthen its effectiveness, including an increase in budget and professional staff.

**Security Council**

Some participants favor involving the U.N. Security Council more actively in the effort for disarmament.

One possible method is for the Security Council to establish a committee or committees under Article 29 of the Charter for various disarmament purposes. For example, there might be a committee, with regional subcommittees, to seek agreement on the arms transfer problem.
Regional Approaches

Because of the great importance of regional disarmament programs as noted above, regional mechanisms for policy formation, review, and negotiations are also important. An ad hoc preparatory body was of great value in achieving the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Improvement and expansion of regional mechanisms should be encouraged. The Special Session might consider recommending establishment of regional U.N. disarmament commissions comparable to the regional U.N. economic commissions. These organizations should regularly report to the United Nations and should have a close relationship with a standing U.N. disarmament organ, in order to aid the synthesis of global and inter-regional policies and experience.

ENLARGING THE CONSTITUENCY FOR DISARMAMENT

Progress toward disarmament will require great increases in participation by (1) national governments, with more nations participating and higher levels of activity, (2) non-governmental organizations, and (3) the people of the world who will be the chief beneficiaries of disarmament. Major expansions of expert research and public information are especially needed.

Participation by More National Governments

The interest and participation of all nations in disarmament negotiations are vital. It is an unhappy fact that many developing nations and one nuclear weapons state (China) have not actively participated.

Many developing nations do not regard disarmament as central to their most pressing concerns. For some of these nations, struggling to meet pressing human needs, disarmament is a peripheral concern of the highly industrialized nations. The Special Session should seek ways in which representatives from developing nations can become more actively involved in disarmament negotiations. More expert studies on the interrelationship between disarmament (particularly in respect to the vast sums spent on arms) and development could be helpful. The interrelationship of
progress in disarmament and progress toward a new international economic order should be stressed.

The importance of China's involvement in disarmament negotiations has been mentioned in several parts of this report. Participants are under no illusions that China will quickly modify its preconditions for participation: United States and Soviet Union non-first use pledges and nuclear weapons reduction.

Most participants recommend that the Special Session agenda should include disarmament items of particular interest to the Chinese, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, zones of peace, and non-first use pledges. The Chairman of the Preparatory Committee should continue to maintain contact with the Chinese and keep them fully informed of progress.

It is believed that evidence of the two most powerful nuclear states' determination to achieve significant nuclear disarmament, including the reduction of their own nuclear superiority, may be helpful in encouraging greater participation by both France and China. (See the above suggestions on their involvement in the CCD.)

Activities of National Governments

Many national governments are not organized so as to work effectively for arms limitation and disarmament. For many nations, arms limitation and disarmament are not central aspects of policy. Coordination is also a major problem; many government programs have important ramifications on arms control and disarmament. The Special Session should recommend that nations carefully review their own disarmament machinery and enhance its effectiveness.

The Special Session should also suggest that governments increase support for disarmament research. An international program for exchange of disarmament scholars, with government funding, could be suggested (and perhaps coordinated by the U.N. Centre for Disarmament).

National governments should engage in thorough preparation for the Special Session and should designate senior officials to participate in the Special Session.

It is proposed that all governments form special task forces to prepare a coordinated national program for the Special Session. Such a task force could form the nucleus of an ongoing national effort.

It is suggested that each head of state make a public statement after the Special Session, describing precisely what his government will do to implement the recommendations of the Special Session. This might well be followed by an annual major address on disarmament and national programs in support of disarmament.

**Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Institutions**

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have an extremely important role in raising public awareness and mobilizing public opinion in support of disarmament. They may also formulate or organize expert input into the work of the Special Session.

NGOs can also have a very important role in disseminating the results of the Special Session and advancing proposals for continued multilateral disarmament efforts.

Universities and research centers can develop fresh new insights into disarmament. The Special Session should encourage increased governmental and private funding of education and research in disarmament. This should also include funding of training in disarmament and endowing university chairs on disarmament.

Public Opinion, Education and Awareness

Public opinion, education and awareness are vital links to effective disarmament. However, it is worth emphasizing that all these factors are directly responsive to demonstrated practical results.

National governments should be actively involved in education regarding disarmament.

An important element in raising public awareness is enhanced education on the negative aspects of the arms race (and the positive benefits to be obtained by ending it). As noted earlier, NGOs, including United Nations Associations in various countries, can be of particular assistance. In addition, U.N. Information-Centers can be better supplied by the Office of Public Information with disarmament information. Some note the particular desirability of raising public awareness in developing countries as to the forthcoming Special Session.

An aroused public opinion in many nations can become a global constituency for disarmament.

CONCLUSION

The 1978 Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament presents "we the peoples of the United Nations" with a new opportunity to strive for progress on a very old problem. This opportunity must be seized promptly and used wisely.

Realists will observe that our record in multilateral disarmament does not inspire confidence. But true realism is appreciation of the difficulty of the current situation and determination to change it for the better. The Special Session offers a possibility — a chance — to advance toward a peaceful world.

Let us urge the nations and peoples of the world to exercise their individual sovereignty and express their collective will to build that better future.
We gather here to confront the ever escalating arms race: a gigantic inanimate monster possessing its own powerful life thrust. Nation-states succumb to its tempting enticements. They pyramid arsenals of nuclear warheads and mobilize divisions, fleets, and squadrons equipped with so-called conventional weapons. Nations spend nearly $400 billion (U.S.) annually on military establishments. The needs of developing nations and the mounting domestic needs of the more developed countries go unsatisfied. Scientists create new weapons systems to better exterminate people, devastate cities, and jeopardize survival of the human race. Meanwhile, vital research and technology are shortchanged — how to cope with shortages of energy, food, and other resources; how to protect and enhance the environment; and how to contribute to a higher physical quality of life. The threat and frequent use of force separates people by strengthening fears, prejudices, and hatreds. All of this is done in the name of peace and security; no national leader would dare claim otherwise. Future historians will no doubt describe these early decades of the nuclear era as a time of hazardous folly.

Now is the time to redouble efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, fashion a new security system, and achieve a world without war. Now is the time, lest we pass irreversible thresholds such as plutonium chaos, militarization of outer space, destabilization of mutual deterrence, and growing numbers of military confrontations.

This series of conferences has, since its origin, dealt with disarmament and security system issues. This year we approach them in a different and exciting context, preparation for the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be convened in 1978.
Review and Appraisal

Since World War II, efforts to control, limit, and reduce national armaments have produced very limited results. Disarmament has been approached multilaterally under the aegis of the United Nations, regionally in Latin America and Europe, and bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Seven treaties adopted by the U.N. General Assembly are in force: Antarctica, Nuclear Tests, Outer Space, Non-Proliferation, Seabed, Bacteriological, and Manipulation of the Environment.

The nations of Latin America perfected the Treaty of Tlatelolco and established the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In Vienna 18 nations are now negotiating a Treaty on Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations.

The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the 1972 SALT I Treaty setting limits on numbers of nuclear equipped ICBMs. Subsequently, the Vladivostok Agreement tentatively set new ceilings. SALT I expires in October, 1977, and the United States and the Soviet Union are currently negotiating SALT II.

Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons has been almost completely ignored. Yet all armed conflicts since 1945 have been fought with conventional weapons, and some 80 or 85 percent of the world's annual military expenditures support conventionally armed forces.

In summary, there has been some arms control, but no disarmament. Some limitations have been set, but no reductions. There has been much talk, but little progress.

Declaration of Disarmament

The Special Session must examine efforts against this discouraging background. The declaration to be adopted by the Special Session must forego lofty rhetoric and provide strong incentives to disarmament action.

Nothing less than a world without war is an acceptable, ultimate goal. The death, destruction, and trauma of war and the costs of preparing for it are no longer tolerable. Even though it seems far removed, general and complete disarmament (GCD) is the only disarmament objective consistent with a world without war. With GCD, national
armaments and military establishments would be reduced to levels consistent with internal security needs.

GCD must become a working objective, documented by a declaration adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. The declaration cannot and need not be overly specific. Certain key principles, however, should be stated, such as (1) the need to create a suitable world organization to administer treaties on GCD, (2) the need to reduce both conventional and nuclear armaments and armed forces on a staged basis over a period of years, (3) the assurance that arms reductions are scheduled so that no nation's security is jeopardized, (4) the universal application of arms reduction measures to nations of appreciable military strength, and (5) the need to establish suitable verification procedures to monitor agreed reductions of armed forces and destruction of weapons.

Meaningful progress toward GCD is dependent upon simultaneous progress to create an adequate security system to fill the void. An adequate security system must first of all provide reliable mechanisms to peacefully and justly settle disputes among nations and their citizens. Strengthened U.N. peacekeeping, involving use of sanctions, permanent peacekeeping forces, and effective application of authorities granted in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter are a further requirement. Finally, an adequate security system needs effective U.N. authorities and procedures to cope with acts of aggression, to prevent interventions by other nations, to obtain cease-fires, and to negotiate binding peace agreements.

Program for Action

The adoption of a declaration would not be an end in itself, only a beginning. Hence the importance of near-term programs to halt the arms race, initiate arms reduction, and improve the political climate for GCD. Four programs are critical.

While it is too late to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, checking and reversing the nuclear arms race among the major nuclear powers is an essential prerequisite to breaking the political logjam now restraining disarmament progress. This is the first, most critical need. The burden of responsibility to initiate nuclear restraints rests squarely and heavily upon the two nuclear giants. Only the two nuclear
giants can ground Mars — the god of war — still leading the arms race astride an ICBM armed with nuclear warheads.

Second, the spread of nuclear weapons must be contained. The objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remain valid despite the rejection of some present and potential nuclear weapon states. More nuclear buttons available to more hands add to the hazard and destabilize the present nuclear balance of terror. More sources of plutonium without proper safeguards increase the probability of nuclear theft and possession by terrorists. More nuclear installations of whatever type multiply the potential for accidents.

Additional ratifications of the NPT by nonnuclear weapon states should be actively encouraged. Pursuant to Article IV, the nuclear giants should devise a workable international program assuring availability of peaceful nuclear technology to nonnuclears. They must deal positively with their Article VI commitments. Superpower vertical “deproliferation” would then match the horizontal nonproliferation demanded of would-be nuclear weapon states. A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) would also help limit proliferation. Other potential measures to cope with nuclear proliferation include subjecting all nuclear installations to agreed controls and safeguards, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and colocating key nuclear processes.

A third action program concerns conventional weapons. Tradition and emotion are both on the side of conventional armaments; nation-states have long relied upon conventional forces and limitation touches every nation. The increasing sophistication and destructiveness of conventional weapons does not generate the awful fear generated by the atom bomb. Nevertheless, conventional disarmament is overdue for serious attention. The entire military budgets of all but a few nations are expended on conventional forces. In 1975 the military expenditures of the developing nations alone aggregated $60 billion. This compares to $17.3 billion foreign economic aid they received that year.

While conventional weapons disarmament warrants high priority for economic and security reasons, there is another persuasive reason: the need to involve all nations in the disarmament process. This will occur only when restrictions on a wide range of weaponry are tackled together.
Limiting arms transfers is one approach to dealing with conventional disarmament. Regional agreements aimed at limiting armed force levels such as MFR would reduce deployed, if not standing, conventional forces. Zones of peace, as proposed in the Indian Ocean, would avoid arms buildup. Certain types of more sophisticated weapons could be banned. Limits could be placed upon annual military expenditures.

Attitudes toward conventional force disarmament should be closely watched; they are key indicators of the world community's willingness to eliminate war as a means of settling international controversies. Disarmament cannot be left to the nuclear weapon powers alone.

Research is a fourth important action area. To move toward the long-term objective of a world without war, the world must break new ground and move far beyond conventional wisdom and experience. Progress must be fairly rapid to cope with the inherent hazards of a contentious and overarmed world. National and international decision-makers need the help of extensive research to chart the way.

The Centre for Disarmament within the Secretariat should be given responsibilities for coordinating and disseminating research undertaken by others. The United Nations University, with its planning and coordinating center in Tokyo, should be encouraged to stimulate multidisciplinary research in the areas of conflict management and disarmament. An independent global Disarmament Research Center staffed by outstanding statesmen and researchers is needed. Every nation needs its own research organization, however small it may be, to advise leaders. Even though non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may currently be doing more research and promoting more discussion on disarmament than are governments, NGO efforts should be stimulated.

**Mechanisms**

For the United Nations to perform its important multilateral role, better machinery is needed. Procedures for dealing with disarmament matters in the General Assembly and the First Committee should be improved. There is need for periodic meetings of all nations to establish and, from
time to time, update disarmament objectives and priorities and to review progress. Such meetings, here labeled Disarmament Review Conferences, should occur at regular intervals (two to four years), be of sufficient length to allow serious consideration of substantive matters, and thus warrant careful preparation and attendance by high level representatives of governments. The scheduled Special Session is an encouraging beginning.

Mechanisms smaller than the Disarmament Review Conference are needed to negotiate treaties. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has been useful, but improvement or replacement is overdue. France and China, currently abstaining from CCD, must be brought into disarmament negotiations. CCD could be strengthened by changing the chairing pattern, restructuring membership, and establishing closer liaison with the General Assembly. Alternatively, a new unit or units reporting to the Disarmament Review Conference or the General Assembly could be established.

Expansion of the capacity of the U.N. Centre for Disarmament to serve the General Assembly, the Disarmament Review Conference, and disarmament negotiation bodies is desirable.

Conclusions

For 30 years I have watched the world’s futile efforts to reduce dependence upon military force and to use the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. During this period, I have labored with others to strengthen the United Nations, improve international relations, and prod nations (particularly my own) into recognizing the necessity of working together to manage critical world issues.

Not long ago I viewed released film of devastated Hiroshima photographed after the first A-bomb exploded. Anyone doubting the urgency of disarmament should see that film or visit the Hiroshima museum which is filled with relics of the first nuclear explosion. Doubters might also visit the huge Leningrad cemetery where more than a half million civilian war victims are buried or Auschwitz where millions were exterminated.
Even as the urgency of disarmament progress is heightened, opportunities to deal with the problem arise. First, economic pressures within all countries are forcing reexamination of the use of financial resources. Second, realization of the inability of military power to maintain peace, solve global problems, assure security, and gain national objectives is growing. Third, detente continues despite arguments between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fourth, there are multilateral efforts highlighted by the 1978 Special Session. More nations are determining that disarmament is a mighty multilateral task.

I close with a challenge to you. Your nations are the ones most likely to provide dynamic and progressive leadership. The Preparatory Committee and the Special Session on Disarmament provide opportunities to display leadership. I particularly challenge the nuclear powers, including my country, to provide this leadership. May this conference contribute ideas, consensus, and determination to get on with the disarmament task.

As Chairman of the conference, I have a unique opportunity to sense certain attitudes and emphases not fully expressed in the Conference Report. I share these observations in the belief that they augment the Conference Report by calling attention to important points.

Fundamentals

This conference demonstrated a healthy understanding of fundamentals related to international peace and security. Discussion of general and complete disarmament (GCD) was no longer taboo. With few exceptions, participants viewed GCD as the proper long-range objective of disarmament efforts, consistent with the goal of a world without

*These observations, prepared by the Chairman following the conference, touch upon points pertinent to the United Nations of the next decade. They go beyond the Conference Report and, while focused upon matters discussed at San Juan del Rio, relate in some instances to prior Conferences on the United Nations of the Next Decade.
Although appraisals of the time within which it could be achieved differed, the objective of GCD was considered to be a proper guideline for step-by-step and comprehensive programs of action.

Moreover, there was general recognition that an improved security system, based upon a stronger United Nations, is an essential element of a world without war. Strengthening of the security system thus becomes a parallel objective to GCD. These understandings provide a solid foundation for the difficult, complex task of reducing national dependence upon armaments.

Responsibility

Participants repeatedly emphasized the crucial responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. Such action would be an invaluable stimulus to disarmament progress. Nations would become less reluctant to adopt and ratify a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB). Reduction of nuclear arsenals would lower the levels China might consider necessary for nuclear weapon sufficiency. Curtailment of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would become less difficult. Serious consideration of a no first use of nuclear weapons treaty would become possible. The door to broader nuclear reduction talks would be slightly ajar. Finally, the world could turn part of its attention to the reduction of conventional weapons.

The two most powerful nuclear nations were urged to speed negotiations of SALT II, broaden their efforts to reduce nuclear armaments, update their earlier proposals for comprehensive disarmament, and lead the world toward meaningful arms reduction.

China

The importance of China's early involvement in disarmament matters was evident to all participants. Many believed that China must, in due course and in its own self-interest, reassess its policy regarding the inevitability of war and accept the need for disarmament progress. Although many internal factors are likely to affect the timing of a reassessment, external disarmament progress could speed the process, particularly if the United States and the Soviet Union reduce nuclear armaments.
The opinion was general that substantial progress in the limitation and reduction of armaments could and should be made whether or not China is initially a party to agreements. While, it was hoped that China would participate in the Special Session, its absence should not be a justification for failure to develop meaningful action programs and improved mechanisms for disarmament.

**Mechanisms vs. Will**

The Conference Report properly emphasizes the importance of national will, even as it proposes improved mechanisms. Nevertheless, many participants seemed to underestimate the importance of machinery and procedures. Stronger national will to act is vital, but implementation of programs of action depends in part upon better mechanisms; the best conceptual programs will go astray without good management. Proper institutions and machinery would provide continuity, encourage research, produce proposals, and, by so doing, stimulate the will of nations to act. The success of the Special Session will be measured to an important degree by the machinery it establishes to implement proposed programs of action.

**Critical Mass**

Like a nuclear weapon, a certain critical mass is needed to fuel efforts to reduce armaments. More nations must be involved; stronger world opinion must be focused upon the problem. Currently, no more than 15 or 20 nations are effectively involved in disarmament matters. Were this number to be doubled, a larger and stronger coalition for action would emerge: its collective outreach would be enlarged exponentially. Persuading other nations that they have a major stake in disarmament would become easier.

Every nation accepting membership on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) or a U.N. Disarmament Council (if one is created as proposed in the Conference Report) should establish within its government a disarmament unit, initiate study and research, and assign competent diplomats and experts on a continuing basis. Such action, even on a modest scale, is a prerequisite to keeping abreast of disarmament matters and contributing intelligently to decision-making.
Constituency

While greater national participation is needed to create a critical mass, broader constituencies must also be developed in every country to support disarmament efforts. Government officials, as decisionmakers and leaders, influence public opinion, but opinion-shapers, including non-governmental organizations, play an important role. Study and research of the type suggested in the Conference Report should be used to encourage opinion-shapers, and to serve as a basis for expanded communication, discussion, and debate. This will stimulate understanding of the need for an adequate security system and general and complete disarmament, the two interrelated prerequisites of a world without war.

Opportunity

Will it happen? Will the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly grasp the unique opportunity to accord deserved emphasis and high priority to multilateral disarmament matters? Will nations rise above lethargy, prejudice, and fear to succeed where past efforts have floundered? The answer is uncertain, but cautious optimism is warranted provided three things occur.

First, the Soviet Union and the United States must come to the Special Session with the SALT II treaty behind them, with negotiations to reduce nuclear armaments under way, and with firm determination to stimulate multilateral disarmament programs and strengthen multilateral disarmament mechanisms.

Second, the nonnuclear weapon states must come to the Session realizing that they too have substantial concern and responsibility for disarmament. Unwilling to leave disarmament progress solely in the hands of the major nuclear weapon states, they must have determination to be more actively involved in multilateral disarmament efforts.

Third, delegates must come to the Special Session adequately prepared. Nations, as well as the Preparatory Committee, must do their homework and be ready to develop a workable Program of Action. Full advantage should be taken of information available from both official and non-governmental sources. As a prelude to the Special Session, every nation needs to reexamine its attitudes to-
ward multilateral disarmament efforts. Heads of states should be involved, senior-officials should be designated to participate, and task forces should be established to prepare for the Special Session.

The potential rewards of meaningful disarmament, in parallel with a strengthened U.N. security system, are enormous. The risks, hazards, and costs of further delay in halting and reversing the arms race are frightening. No objective observer would deny these facts. If the delegates’ reaction to them is logical, as persons of reason, and emotional, as humanitarians, the Special Session should succeed. Critically needed breakthroughs in the disarmament stalemate should occur. The world community should move forward along the tortuous path leading to the substitution of global law and order for national military power as the foundation for international peace and security. May future historians describe the 1978 Special Session as one that saw the light and grasped an opportunity.
AUDIENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Jose López Portillo, President of Mexico, received Conference participants at his official residence Los Pinos on June 22. He greeted each of the participants personally, welcoming them to Mexico.

C. Maxwell Stanley, Conference Chairman, then spoke briefly, thanking the President for the interest, hospitality, and assistance extended by the Foreign Ministry. He outlined the purpose of the Conference and its focus upon the 1978 U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. Mr. Stanley paid tribute to the long-standing leadership of Mexico and the many contributions of Alfonso García Robles, a Conference participant, in the field of disarmament.

President Portillo responded, citing the appropriateness of a conference on the United Nations being held in Mexico, a country long committed to the goals of the United Nations. He made reference to the Conference theme of "Multilateral Disarmament," a topic of great interest to his country and central to its foreign policy. He wished the Conference every success in its deliberations on a topic of crucial importance to the world community. He expressed the hope that the 1978 Special Session would succeed in accelerating disarmament progress.
FOREIGN MINISTRY RECEIPTION

A reception for conference participants and spouses was hosted by Dr. Santiago Roel, Foreign Minister of Mexico in the Chancery, Mexico City, on June 22, 1977. Guests included officials of the Mexican government and Ambassadors to Mexico from countries represented by Conference participants.

Dr. Roel welcomed the “distinguished representatives of Mexico’s friends and of the Secretariat of the United Nations” on behalf of the Foreign Ministry.

“I rejoice that all of you have been brought together here in Mexico, a traditionally peaceful nation, enemy of all forms of violence. Also, I rejoice in the fact that, aside from nuclear disarmament, which undoubtedly deserves to be our highest priority, you have included in your plans other detectable forms of destruction.

I applaud the interest of The Stanley Foundation in exploring other avenues which the United Nations may follow in the next decade for the benefit of humanity.”
Since its inception, the United Nations has had disarma-
ment as one of its major goals. Looking back, however, it is
quite apparent that no decisive breakthrough has been
achieved in this vital area. We are still faced by the inherent
perils of a destructive and widespread arms race, which
places a heavy burden on the peoples of the world and
impedes the opportunities for a better life for all. At the
same time, this competition continuously endangers the
fragile state of security in the world.

The disarmament negotiations in the post-war era, both
within and outside the United Nations, have produced some
notable results; but these are modest when measured against
the threat which the arms race continues to pose to our very
survival. The thrust of these efforts has been on regulating
competition in armaments rather than on effectively reduc-
ing them. Particularly in view of rapid technological innova-
tions, the barriers erected so far have not proven strong
enough to stop the ongoing arms race.
The international community has, in recent years, become increasingly aware that the arms race represents a grave obstacle to development. Many states now feel that a comprehensive approach is needed, an approach which would aim at real disarmament and yet which would be realistic both with regard to the possibilities of achieving disarmament and the dangers involved if decisive progress is not made.

The decision of the General Assembly to convene a special session on disarmament next spring can be an important element in the search for a solution to these problems. The special session will, in all probability, be the largest, most representative gathering ever convened to consider disarmament exclusively. The task is complex and difficult, but no effort must be spared to bring about the achievement of that vital goal.

Against this background, I wish to commend The Stanley Foundation for its initiative in discussing the topic “Multilateral Disarmament and the Special Session” at this year’s Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade. The Conference offers a very valuable opportunity for many of those involved in the preparation of the special session to exchange views and to explore new avenues in an informal atmosphere. This, in turn, can facilitate the agreement which we all hope will result from the special session. I wish you every success in your discussions, and I look forward with great interest to the outcome of your meeting.
References

Other publications of The Stanley Foundation which deal generally with the topic of "Disarmament" are:


Perspective on the NPT Review Conference by Mason Willrich, Occasional Paper 7, April, 1975.


All publications are available free of charge from The Stanley Foundation.
The Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation encourages study, research, and education in the field of foreign relations, contributing to secure peace with freedom and justice. Emphasis is given to activities related to world organization. Among the activities of The Stanley Foundation are the following:

The STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCE explores urgent foreign policy concerns of the United States. It attracts individuals from a wide spectrum of opinion and belief who exchange ideas and recommend action and policies.

The CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE NEXT DECADE brings together international statesmen to consider problems and prospects of the United Nations. Its report recommends changes and steps considered practicable within the next ten years.

The CONFERENCE ON UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES is concerned with organizational and procedural reform of the United Nations. Participants come largely from the United Nations Secretariat and various Missions to the United Nations.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS are policy-oriented essays either concerning improvement and development of international organization more adequate to manage international crises and global change, or dealing with specific topical studies of U.S. foreign policy.

VANTAGE CONFERENCES are designed to anticipate and evaluate in-depth developing issues relating to U.S. foreign policy and international organization.

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