ABSTRACT

This paper is an abstract of the original manuscript, by Nancy Boulton, which examines the area of intersection between purely linguistic and social behavior to see if the latter is amenable to formal description. The paper examines psychoanalytic discourse and presents evidence for the following hypotheses: (1) since participants can recognize deviation from expected communicative principles, there exists a system of rules of communicative competence; (2) some forms of deviation from this code are more acceptable than others, which suggests rule-governed behavior; and (3) by mutual consent, deviations from the communicative norm are employed and tolerated. The following hypotheses are formulated: (1) an adequate theory of communicative competence must cover both normal and extraordinary forms of discourse; (2) psychoanalytic discourse can be learned because it follows normal rules of communicative competence; (3) differences between normal and psychoanalytic conversation occur by mutual consent of the participants, and are therefore tolerable; and (4) Freud's basic rule of analysis and the ordinary rules of communicative competence are not mutually compatible, but violation of the latter in the analytic setting provides the basis for the analyst's interpretations. (Author/AM)
II. PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE AND ORDINARY CONVERSATION

(abstracted from the original 31 page ms. by Nancy Poulton)

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Grammar is a continuum from the strictly linguistic rules of phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics to the contextually bound rules of the pragmatic system. We can think of grammar as part of a set of descriptive rules which comprise both the norms of social behavior and the assumptions of a cognitive system. However, it is still a debatable question how much of human social behavior is rule-governed in the way purely linguistic behavior is. This paper...
examines the area of intersection between purely linguistic and social behavior to see if the latter is amenable to formal description.

The fact that deviant systems of communication can be constructed and recognized as such can be considered as proof of the existence of a grammar of discourse. Therefore, this paper will examine one such system—psychoanalytic discourse—and present evidence for the following hypotheses:

1) Since participants can recognize deviation from expected communicative principles, there exists a system of rules of communicative competence.

2) Some forms of deviation from this code are more acceptable than others to the participants in a discourse. This in itself suggests that we are dealing with rule-governed behavior.

3) Participants learn to engage in special forms of communication by mutual consent and in a well-defined context. Under these circumstances, deviations from the norm are countenanced and employed, where in other contexts they would not be.

The participants in psychotherapy learn to communicate in this special system while it is in effect. Unconsciously, they devise both a comparative grammar contrasting their normal communicative system with that employed in psychotherapy and a descriptive grammar of the therapeutic language itself.

In normal discourse participants make two overriding assumptions:

1) The participants are rational.

The Principle of Rationality (PR) implies that participants assume that one another’s contributions are intelligible, and that a failure in intelligibility tends to be perceived by the addressees as their fault. If a speaker’s meaning or motivation is questioned, this implies that the questioner is no longer able to maintain a sense of identity with the other and (implicitly) does not consider the speaker to be a member of the community to which the questioner belongs. If this can be attributed to natural causes, such as being a foreigner, then the affront is much less and explanations may be much more freely asked and given.
If the speaker should be a member of the community, any imputation to the contrary is threatening.

2) **All contributions benefit the participants.**

The Principle of Benefit (PB) refers to the fact that people engage in discourse because they expect to and do get something out of it. "Something" may be useful factual information, or it may just be an emotional feeling of acceptance or well-being; most often it is a combination of the two. A communication that fails to be beneficial is likely to be considered harmful by the receiver on the grounds that: 1) it does not benefit and may actually hurt; 2) he has not been correctly perceived by the other and therefore a relationship of identification does not exist between them.

Participants in a normal conversation take turns at the roles of speaker and addressee. Holding the role of speaker is one of the principle benefits to be gained from a conversation, and a participant who monopolizes a conversation is thus in violation of the Principle of Benefit.

The determination of how participants are to benefit each other rests upon two sets of lower-level rules. The Rules of Clarity entail maximally informative information: their purpose is the optimal expression of content. The Rules of Rapport meet the emotional needs of the participants. Stylistic choices tend to express rapport considerations, while pure content is dictated by clarity. Clarity communications are largely verbal in nature; rapport-oriented communication may often be non-verbal. Emotional satisfaction appears to be a higher benefit than the gaining of information. If one must choose between optimal clarity or rapport—the latter supersedes.

Principles of communicative competence can be given in diagram form, as follows:
Principle of Rationality of Participants
Principle of Benefit to Participants

Rules of Clarity

1. quality: be truthful
2. quantity: say only what is necessary
3. relevance: be relevant
4. manner: be clear

Rules of Rapport

1. distance: remain aloof
2. deference: give the other options
3. camaraderie: make the other feel comfortable

Psychoanalytic discourse, as does normal discourse, has its own Principles of Communicative Competence. These principles were first enunciated by Freud some years ago in his paper, "On Beginning the Treatment" (Standard Ed., vol. 12, pp. 121-144). Freud says, "The patient must be left to do the talking, and must be free to choose at what point he shall begin." The implication is that it is the analyst's obligation to see that this is so. Ostensibly, it would seem from this statement that the patient has the power to determine the course of the conversation, while actually it is the analyst who determines how the discourse shall proceed and exercises this power by allowing it to proceed at the patient's will.

Although the analyst controls the discourse, he does not directly control the choice of topic. In this conversational situation, the one who appears to hold the power, does not really hold it. In normal discourse, power is usually shared among the participants. Why in psychoanalytic discourse do the participants put up with this abnormal relationship--how does it benefit them? We assume that the Principle of Benefit remains in effect in psychoanalytic discourse, but we must reinterpret the benefit according to this special context.

Another example of rapport violation through non-reciprocity exists when the analyst tells the analysand, "Before I can say anything to you, I must know a great deal about you." In normal discourse it would be considered very odd for only one participant to talk about himself and the other to comment on what he says. The one making the revelations would feel discomfort because he alone was violating distance. The receiver of the confidences would feel uncomfortable because he was abrogating camaraderie. But in the analytic situation such violations regularly occur.
The invitation to the analysand to be free from ordinary conversational constraints, when viewed more closely is seen as highly constraining. Freud's instructions to the analysand not to withhold anything, enjoin him to overlook both Rules of Clarity and Rapport. Being honest even if it hurts one of the participants is in direct violation of the overriding principle in normal discourse that if a possibility of conflict arises between Clarity and Rapport, Rapport supersedes Clarity.

In ordinary discourse, a violation of Clarity or Rapport is purely and simply deviant because such a violation nullifies the Principle of Benefit. But since the very deviance of a contribution in analysis is grist for the analytic mill, it is beneficial according to the broader concept of benefit employed here. The psychoanalytic conversation is but a means to an end, in contrast to most ordinary conversations which produce benefit in and of themselves.

Thus, the purposes of the analytic setting justify a different view of the abrogation of Clarity and Rapport. When violations occur, however, they are noted by the analyst. It is still assumed that unless somehow prevented, a speaker would wish and intend to present his thoughts in conformity with Clarity and Rapport. Deviation, then, is assumed to reflect a special situation in the analysand's unconscious mind. The distinctive feature of the analytic setting is that he is given an extra option—not really optional—of following trains of thought that do not directly benefit either participant. Both participants agree, more or less implicitly, that they will not expect to gain from this discourse what they would ordinarily gain.

However, both participants must benefit from a conversation in order for it to continue. What does the analyst get? Increased knowledge, we might say, more insight into the human condition, satisfaction of his curiosity, and the sense of having been useful; this is complementary to what the analysand gets, and closely related to what anyone expects to get from an ordinary conversation. These are of course less crucial benefits than the analysand derives, which is a justification.
for the analyst's fee.

Freud states that the process of interpretation in psychoanalytic discourse should wait until a bond of trust has been established between the analyst and the analysand. Interpretation mediates between what is unintelligible and irrational and what is understandable and clear. In ordinary discourse, to be told that one is not making sense is almost certainly received as an insult of a particularly humiliating kind. If one violates clarity to this extent, one is assumed to be doing so unintentionally (as is almost invariably the case), and, therefore, to be acting pathologically. It is evident that interpretation could disrupt the therapeutic dialog unless there was sufficient love and trust already established (via the transference) so that the analysand's positive feelings outweighed the negative. Trust and rapport are also strengthened by the participants' mutual agreement that the analysand will not insist on his rationality. Since both participants know that the analysand has chosen this role voluntarily, the analyst's interpretations of his contributions does not rankle as it would otherwise.

The analyst's interpretations are comparable to the analysand's contributions in that they are deviant from normal communicative acts. The analyst violates Rapport, specifically camaraderie, by questioning the motivation behind the analysand's utterance and treating his communication as something which requires an interpretation. However, the analyst does not typically violate clarity which would be done by giving evasive, unclear, or irrelevant answers.

From what we have said above, the following hypotheses can be formulated:

1. An adequate theory of communicative competence must cover both normal and extraordinary forms of discourse.
2. Psychoanalytic discourse can be learned precisely because it follows the normal Rules of Communicative Competence.
3. Differences between normal and psychoanalytic conversation occur by mutual consent of the participants, and therefore are tolerable.
4. Freud's Basic Rule of analysis and the ordinary rules of Communicative Competence are not mutually compatible, but violation of the latter in the analytic setting provides the basis for the analyst's interpretations.