
Ohio State Univ., Columbus. Mershon Center.

76

16p.

MF-$0.83. HC-$1.67 plus postage.

Conference Reports; *Disarmament; Ethics; *Foreign Policy; *International Relations; Military Organizations; *Military Science; National Defense; *Nuclear Warfare; World Problems

United States; USSR

The booklet summarizes proceedings of a conference coordinated by the Ohio Arms Control Study Group (OACSG) on the topic of United States-USSR relations and the influence of nuclear weapons upon international behavior and strategic thought. The OACSG is composed of faculty members from Ohio colleges and universities who have a vocational or avocational interest in contemporary arms control questions. Three main speakers during the first day of the conference discussed the emotional nature of ethics and morality, the role of nuclear weapons in American foreign policy since World War II, and contemporary models of deterrence. Seven speakers during the second day discussed arms control and disarmament negotiations, comparative Soviet and American military policy and strategic thought, threat perception, and unilateral reduction in tension. Topics on the third day included basic concepts of submarine and anti-submarine warfare, and barriers to the fabrication of nuclear devices from stolen materials or radioactive waste. Several of the speakers represented government military agencies. The booklet also presents names of conference attendees, the agenda for the conference program, and the OACSG charter. (AV)
Ohio Arms Control Study Group

Workshop I
June 24-26, 1976
The Ohio State University

SUMMARY
of
PROCEEDINGS

The Mershon Center of The Ohio State University
199 West Tenth Avenue, Columbus, Ohio  43210

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CONTENTS

Summary of Proceedings ........................................... 5
OACSG Attendees ................................................... 10
Program ................................................................. 12
OACSG Charter ....................................................... 14
Foreign Policy and Technology Group Membership ........ 16
SUMMARY of PROCEEDINGS

SPONSORED BY THE FORCE AND POLITY PROGRAM of the Mershon Center and chaired by ALLAN R. MILLETT, the program director of the Ohio Arms Control Study Group (OACSG) met for the first time to study and discuss some of the more salient features of US-USSR relations and the influence of nuclear weapons upon international behavior and strategic thought. The membership of OACSG is built around an Ohio State University faculty seminar that studies foreign policy and technology. Of this group, eleven faculty members attended or participated in the workshop. They were joined by eleven faculty members from other Ohio educational institutions and by three observers from two different Pennsylvania universities. (A list of the OACSG attendees, as well as the OACSG charter, is appended to this workshop summary on pages 10 through 16.)

Professor Millet opened the conference with an explanation of OACSG. He urged the participants to recruit additional members and to encourage the members to make suggestions for additional OACSG activities that may be funded by the Force and Polity Program.

In the opening session, the Rev. BURTON V. CANTRELL, Director of the Wesley Foundation at Ohio State, discussed the imprecise, emotional nature of ethics and morality. With reference to the threat of nuclear conflict, he argued for a situational rather than an absolutist definition of the morality of war. When challenged for his relativism, Cantrell responded that absolute systems of values often breed a fanatical surety that destroys peace. Quoting George Kennan, he urged statesmen to be "gardeners, not mechanics" and to reject both chauvinism and pacifist idealism. Cantrell also rejected cynicism and realpolitik since common universal values may prevail in the avoidance of war as "punishment" for "crime," in the limiting of violence, and in the preservation of life. Professor DAVID LOUSCHER remarked that a discussion at Harvard Divinity School had confronted similar dilemmas, and Professor PHILIP STEWART added that one more guide would be for statesmen not to assume blind malevolence from suspected enemies. In the general discussion, the participants agreed that some sort of utilitarianism shaped by universal humanism was probably the best one could expect in designing an international ethic of deterrence. All agreed that the subject needed far more discussion by academics teaching national security policy.
In his examination of the role of nuclear weapons in American foreign policy since World War II, Dr. Stephen M. Millett (Captain, USAF) described four crises: the first use of the A-bomb and the surrender of Japan, the Berlin crisis of 1948, the continuing conflict in Asia from 1950 through the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1955, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He pointed out that the World War II experience is not a good model for future behavior since the bombs were used to end a catastrophic global conflict that had already killed probably 40 million people. More precisely, the United States was understandably worried about the additional losses to both sides from a conventional invasion of Japan. The postwar crises are more difficult to analyze since deterrence assumes that the object of deterrence is planning to undertake the action to be deterred. That is seldom clear, even in retrospect. Millett stressed that in each crisis conventional (non-nuclear) military response and diplomacy prevented escalation and that the possession of nuclear weapons may have deterred the possessor as much as the object of deterrence. In the general discussion, some participants questioned the low salience Millett attributed to strategic deterrence, arguing that an ambiguous threat is no less threatening than an ultimatum.

Professor Richard Rosecrance concluded the first day's program with a discussion of contemporary models of deterrence. He was particularly critical of the megatonnage model used by Paul Nitze in his recent articles. Rosecrance argued that Nitze was unduly pessimistic about a Russian first-strike and U.S. post-first-strike strategic weakness. He also argued that NATO conventional deterrence in central Europe is more stable and probably more effective for real war-fighting than many claim. Moreover, the introduction of precision-guided munitions — and anachronistic but influential World War II ideas about the “inherent weakness” of the defense — make clear that conventional defense requires far more serious analysis. Rosecrance concluded by pointing out that the tentative trilateral relationship of the U.S., USSR, and PRC bolsters deterrence through “creative ambiguity.” Some of the participants, however, criticized Rosecrance for his too enthusiastic dismissal of the megatonnage model and speculated that the conventional cost-benefit analysis of deterrence, draw-down curves, and exchange rates in a war may be seriously flawed as a predictive model for an actual war. In the general discussion of the likelihood of war in Europe, the group wondered what possible benefit such a war would bring to the USSR: most of the participants agreed that both the U.S. and USSR military presence in Europe played a great political role short of war and might, perhaps, reduce the likelihood of war. Both the U.S. and USSR seem to recognize this utility and approve of each other’s use of military presence in this role.

The second day’s meetings began with a description of arms control and disarmament negotiations by Professor Allan Millett. Beginning with the first Hague conference (1899) and terminating with the SALT negotiations of the 1970’s, Millett concluded that initially the negotiators
believed that arms reduction depended upon the settlement of unresolved political issues. This mode of analysis has diminished in importance with time, although it has not disappeared. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear weapons themselves has become the political issue since such weapons directly threaten the very existence of nations. Another factor has been the persistent concern for the cost of weapons. In discussing arms control negotiations, particularly in the nuclear age, Millett argued that negotiations within international organizations (e.g., UN-sponsored meetings) have been largely unsuccessful since the United States feels some need to placate its NATO allies and allow some influence from less powerful nations. He added that only the "decoupling" of arms control from alliance politics in the 1960s allowed the first SALT treaty to be signed. Nevertheless, multilateral negotiations (e.g., the non-proliferation treaty) have continued, thus providing several levels of multilateral as well as bilateral negotiations.

Professors George E. Hudson and Philip D. Stewart described Soviet military policy and strategic thought. Hudson stressed that roles and missions controversies within the Soviet military have shaped military doctrine, as indeed such controversies have done in the United States, but that American analysts still do too much mirror-imaging, particularly for naval doctrine. The ambiguities in Soviet thought on deterrence and warfighting are no less real and perhaps less understood than in American strategic thought. Despite thirty years of intensive effort, American understanding of Soviet military politics is not great. Hudson stressed that serious analysis of military effectiveness must be related to the different strategies and geopolitical concerns of the USSR.

Stewart then reviewed the latest of the Dartmouth Conferences for which he was a rapporteur and translator. He pointed out again that the Americans tend to stress technical problems, the Soviets political issues. Soviet participants are concerned by the lack of parity in warhead numbers and by developing American technology, e.g., cruise missiles. The Soviets want no radical change in the existing military balance and see negotiations as a way to freeze the current balance. The United States, on the other hand, sees negotiating as a way to influence future behavior. Stewart stressed that the Dartmouth participants are now emphasizing more detailed information exchange, a position still difficult for the Soviets to accept. He expressed the hope, however, that the several institutes of the National Academy of Sciences that study Western behavior will increasingly influence Russian policy-formation. This influence should give the members of the Politburo a less alarmist view of American intentions.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Pilley, USAF, a research associate at the Mershon Center, briefed the workshop on the American strategic theories and force programs that influence the US "triad" of manned bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs. In addition to answering technical questions on weapons systems, Colonel Pilley pointed out some basic differ-
ences in Soviet and American programs and their relationship to arms control negotiations. He admitted that the capabilities model had its limitations in divining Soviet intentions, but stressed that the US military could not responsibly ignore real USSR arms programs. He, too, warned about mirror-imaging analysis, particularly in such areas as air defense and civil defense. The participants then speculated to what degree some Soviet programs were responses to American programs. The consensus was that the action-reaction model was not a sound explanation for arms programs; rather than directly perceived immediate threats, programs are influenced by mid-range (5-10 year) definitions of threat.

Professor Thomas Milburn continued the discussion of deterrence by summarizing his recent research on threat perception. He pointed out that influence may occur without a perception of serious threat, but that all international actors have great difficulty identifying the utility schedule, value systems, and risk-taking propensities of other nations. He described the fundamental problems of understanding “rationality,” which is a normative, culture-bound concept. In a lively discussion, the participants then tried to differentiate between influence, threats, and coercion and concluded that there was ample room for contingent behavior that fell short of direct threats. Milburn also distributed a paper on the subject of threat perception, which is available from the Mershon Center.

The second afternoon’s program concluded with an impressive explanation of the concept of “gradual reciprocated unilateral reduction in tension” (GRIT) by Professor Gordon Shull. Shull pointed out that conciliation is often confused with appeasement, which poisons GRIT-type actions, and that, on the contrary, the aim of GRIT is stable, non-threatening, cheap, moderate deterrence that does not ignore mutual assured destruction as a strategic relationship. He identified what he considered to be some historical examples of GRIT initiatives, but admitted that these initiatives had seldom been given enough time to influence the USSR. He argued that the purpose of GRIT initiatives is to strengthen the hand of defense “moderates” in the Soviet bureaucracy. Stewart agreed that such moderates existed, but pointed out that the United States was often too impatient in expecting identifiable results. Shull continued that perhaps some sort of “conscious parallelism” of restraint might complement formal arms control negotiations.

At the evening meeting, Major General Jasper A. Welch, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans and Studies), U.S. Air Force, described the military participation in arms control negotiations and policy formation. He answered questions from the group both on the policy process and on substantive strategic issues. His principal point was that the military does see arms control as a part of national security policy, but that it has a constitutional responsibility to treat the Soviet threat seriously and to design military means to check it. On the other hand, although military advice is now well integrated into arms control negotiations, the advice
The third day's program began with Professor William Moreland's review of some survey research on defense policy and international relations recently completed in the Columbus area. Research that eventually will be published by the Center. Moreland's major point, however, was that strategic weapons systems (despite the well-publicized cruise missiles) seemed to be on a developmental plateau, thus paving the way for phased reductions. Some skepticism about the concept of technological stability was expressed, but Professor Francis O'Hara, a nuclear engineer, pointed out that science did not see in nature anything (e.g., the nuclear energy phenomenon) that had military applications. Moreland believes that the technological plateau will encourage US and USSR arms control advocates, but that neither side is likely to halt any current programs. Instead, the alternative might be stable, gradually phased weapons deployments complemented by reduced numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles.

In the next presentation, Lieutenant Commander G. R. McDonnell, USN, described the basic concepts and physical environment for submarine and antisubmarine warfare. He discussed the unique problems of detection, localization, and destruction of submarines and stressed the substantial tactical differences between handling (1) attack submarines and (2) ballistic missile submarines which are likely to remain relatively invulnerable. He admitted, however, his inability to conceive of limiting ASW by agreement in such a way that attack submarines could be attacked and missile submarines spared.

For the final presentation, Professor Francis A. O'Hara briefed the participants on the serious barriers that faced anyone wishing to fabricate a nuclear device from stolen materials or radioactive waste. O'Hara demonstrated convincingly that weapons-grade plutonium and uranium would be difficult not only to steal but also to enrich for destructive purposes. His highly publicized discussion of "homemade" bombs notwithstanding, he is satisfied that both national- and international safeguard systems are adequate to deter guerrilla bomb-makers and that the developing set of international relationships for the control of nuclear energy makes it difficult for even a national government to go nuclear without massive investments in facilities. He stressed that the need for safeguards varies with the stages in the fuel cycle and that most nuclear reactors are built to discourage any diversion of materials for unauthorized weapons. He concluded by reviewing the literature on the subject.

The Program of the OACSG Workshop I is on page 12.
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OHIO ARMS CONTROL STUDY GROUP WORKSHOP I
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PROGRAM

Thursday, June 24

Morality: Ethics and Nuclear Arms
Rev. Burton N. Cantrell
Wesley Foundation, The Ohio State University

Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age
Capt. Stephen M. Millett, USAF
Air Force Institute of Technology

Arms Control and International Security
Richard Rosecrance
Center for International Studies, Syracuse University

Friday, June 25

The History of Arms Control Negotiations in the 20th Century
Allan R. Millett
The Ohio State University

Soviet Policy and Strategy for the Nuclear Age
Philip D. Stewart
Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

George E. Hudson
Department of Political Science, Wittenberg University

Strategic Weapons Systems
Lt. Col. C. F. Pilley, USAF
Research Associate, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

Threat Perception
Thomas W. Milburn
Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

Arms Control and the Relaxation of International Tension
Gordon Shull
Department of Political Science, The College of Wooster

The Military Looks at Arms Control
Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr., USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans and Studies), USAF
Saturday, June 26

Contemporary Arms Control Issues: SALT II and Beyond

William B. Moreland
Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

Antisubmarine Warfare and Sea-Based Deterrence

Lt. Cmdr. G. R. McDonald, USN
Graduate Student, Department of Public Administration,
The Ohio State University

Nuclear Theft and Nuclear Proliferation

Francis A. O'Hara
Department of Nuclear Engineering, The Ohio State University
The Ohio Arms Control Study Group (OACSG) is composed of faculty members from Ohio colleges and universities who have a vocational or avocational interest in contemporary arms control questions. OACSG's purpose is (a) to educate its members on arms control issues, especially those that involve U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations, nuclear weapons and strategic command-control systems, and decision-making processes in arms control negotiations and strategic programs; (b) to increase the dialogue between arms control experts here and abroad writing on strategic issues; (c) to encourage arms control education at the undergraduate and graduate level in Ohio; and (d) to contribute to public understanding of arms control issues.

The OACSG is built around those members of The Ohio State University faculty who compose the Foreign Policy and Technology group, sponsored by the Force and Polity program of the Mershon Center. The membership of the OACSG will be broadened, however, to include other academics who may participate as they desire in all OACSG activities.

II. ACTIVITIES

OACSG SEMINAR

As it has done for the past two years, the FPT group will continue to meet weekly for lunch and discussion of current writings. Meetings may be changed, however, to accommodate off-campus participants. For three or four sessions the discussion will be of a single article selected by a member who will serve as the discussion leader and who will keep notes of the discussion. By the end of a month's discussion, he will write a critique of the studied literature to be sent to the author and to OACSG's members together with a copy of the original work. The author will be invited to respond in writing and, when feasible, to attend a specially scheduled OACSG meeting to discuss his study.

The volunteer discussion leaders receive from the Force and Polity program an honorarium of $200 for their efforts. No restrictions are placed on how this honorarium is to be spent, but Ohio State University faculty
members will have to take an "in-kind" honorarium, i.e., a credit for travel, book purchases, graduate student support, etc. Moreover, Ohio State University faculty members who are already financially associated with the Mershon Center will receive neither a cash nor an "in-kind" honorarium.

At the end of the academic year, the Mershon Center plans to publish in pamphlet form the critiques and basic readings with an introduction by the director or assistant director of the Force and Polity program. The pamphlet, professionally edited and designed to the editorial standards of a university press, will be distributed to OACSG's membership, to the authors of the basic studies, and to a select mailing list of potentially interested publics, e.g., ACDA, congressional committees, other arms control and international relations centers, and public interest groups like the Arms Control Association's board of directors. Financial constraints, however, may prohibit pro bono publico distribution. The Center will sell the pamphlet on a cost-plus/small profit basis to university libraries and to the interested public.

WORKSHOP

OACSG sponsors an annual three-five day summer workshop in Columbus for its members. The teaching faculty is drawn from the OACSG members (OSU and non-OSU) and from visiting experts representing academic arms control centers, government, and public interest groups. The purpose of the workshop is to improve arms control instruction, especially at the undergraduate level. The workshop director is the assistant director of the Force and Polity program, Dr. William B. Moreland, who currently teaches the Ohio State University arms control seminar, National Security Policy Studies 702. The workshop syllabus is published before the meeting and the readings are mailed to the participants. (The first workshop was held June 24-26, 1976.)

FOREIGN PROGRAM

Dr. Philip D. Stewart, professor of political science, The Ohio State University, is currently investigating the possibility of establishing ties with the arms control specialists of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. in Moscow. Professor Stewart is proposing a series of exchanges which includes publications, visitations, and in-residence study. OACSG has already mailed books and articles to the Institute.

ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION

The Force and Polity program will continue to offer National Security Policy Studies 702, taught by Professor Moreland in the spring quarter of 1977. The seminar will serve as a model for workshops and courses at other institutions, and members of OSU/OACSG will participate as they did.
in 1975. The "Force and Polity" program will consider requests for financial support from any OACSG member who is interested in improving instruction in arms control on his home campus. Funds for book and journal purchases, visiting speakers, and teaching aids, for example, will be considered.

III. ADMINISTRATION

The OACSG is supported by the "Force and Polity" program of the Mershon Center. The support includes library purchases and management, and clerical help.

Allan R. Millett
Director, Force and Polity Program
The Mershon Center of The Ohio State University

July 1976

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16 16