An original purpose of higher education in the United States was personal development through acculturation to the classics and moral principles. Other purposes, those of economics, political orientation, and service, have frequently overshadowed that original goal. It may be that higher education institutions have neglected personal development, to the detriment of the entire education process. Yet there has always remained the belief that the college experience can transform the lives of students. Descriptive procedures and formal instruments for the assessment of the transformation have been prepared. Suggestions have been made by researchers as to possible approaches for teaching ethics or analyzing values. Such efforts provide hope for some educators of a renewed commitment to the basic purposes of education. (MSE)
VALUES AND HIGHER EDUCATION: SOME OBSERVATIONS

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VALUES AND HIGHER EDUCATION: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Introduction

With the founding of the first North American college, Harvard in 1636, an effort was made to establish "a city upon a hill" which would sustain learning in the face of "degeneracy, barbarism, ignorance and irreligion." Jonathan Mitchell, expressing these hopes and concerns in 1663, had a vision of higher education as a civilizing force—a means of transmitting to successive generations those values deemed worthwhile. "Thus an original purpose of American higher education was personal development through acculturation to the classics and to moral principles" (Carnegie Commission, 1973, p. 59).

Change over the years, however, has modified this early conception of purpose: the "classics" have ceased to be taught to any extent (save at St. John's College) and "moral principles" have often become relegated to that part of the collegiate experience known as the extracurriculum. Other themes, introduced at later times into the academe, have frequently overshadowed the original goal. According to the Carnegie Commission, "the economic purpose was principally developed in the late nineteenth century," and provision for personal development in the financial area became a significant objective of many programs. Preparing men and women who would be able to contribute to the economic growth of an expanding society—surely this was an ample justification for the spread of American colleges and universities.

But yet a third theme, favored by Thomas Jefferson, could be seen throughout institutions: education as an agent for political orientation in a democratic context. Citizens would be made aware of the rights and responsibilities of liberty; leaders could be selected as they rose from those around them by virtue of their intellect and ability; opportunity could be best provided through an educational system which stressed high achievement. A final purpose, service, has emerged (from the work of the land grant colleges created by the Morrill Act of 1862) which
has increased the role of higher education and ensured its visibility. The contributions of its scientists, for example, have given the university a position of prominence and a base of considerable power; the influence of graduates and faculty can be seen in the various enterprises of the contemporary world, from its commerce to its culture.

It is conceivable, however, that academic institutions have neglected the first purpose of higher education—the personal development of the student—to the detriment of the entire process. The discipline and piety which characterized the early colleges would certainly not be suitable for either the research universities or the vocational colleges of the present. Still, in many ways, a reevaluation of the role of individual and societal values in the instructional program seems appropriate. While it is not desirable that colleges teach specific moral conduct, a small portion of the curriculum could, nevertheless, be devoted to an examination of ethical questions and their relationship to life both inside and outside the academic community. An ironic commentary of the necessity of analyzing moral issues can be found in an address given at the University of Rochester's 1966 commencement:

...the complete free play of ideas and opinions is the best process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth. We now accept as principles of both our political and academic societies that no opinion stands immune from challenge; that an individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question, especially as presented by those who feel strongly and argue militantly for a different view; that suppressing discussion or muffling the clash of opinion prevents us from reaching the most rational judgment and blocks the generation of new ideas (pp. 2-3).

Although the speaker of these remarks, Richard Nixon, was to later suffer much because of those "discovering truth," the soundness of his argument is apparent. College can serve as an arena for the testing of ideas, which need not be confined to the traditional content of the disciplines. For higher education, by its nature, should permit a greater latitude of expression than elementary and secondary education. In the college classroom, numerous value theories and philosophical conceptions
may be rigorously explored; in the extracurricular programs, opportunities for
dialogue in an informal setting may be extended, allowing a free exchange of
student-faculty-administration viewpoints. But this is conceivable only if
universities and colleges are above reproach, serving in the capacity of "secular
churches" (Brubacher, 1977). In the opinion of H. S. Commager (as quoted by John
Brubacher):

"The university is the most honorable and the least corrupt
institution in American life. It is, with the church, the one
institution that has, through all of our history, served or
tried to serve the interests of the whole of mankind and the
interests of truth. No other institution can perform the
functions which the university performs, no other can fill
the place which it has for long filled and with such
intelligence and moral influence" (p. 124).

An Ethical Crisis in Higher Education?

has described an emerging "ethical crisis in education"—particularly higher
education. His concern centers upon the rather abrupt change of the university
from its previous position as an institution with principles to one with little
regard for ethical standards. While the past history of higher education has not
been without its cheating scandals and unsrupulous administrators, he has asserted,
nonetheless "American colleges and universities have performed with comparatively
high ethics—certainly no worse than the church and surely better than government
and industry" (p. 26).

But of late, it is becoming apparent, higher educational institutions are
compromising as necessary in order to survive the "new depression" characterized
by Earl Cheit for the Carnegie Commission. By reciting case after case of
institutional actions which were not ethical, Martin proceeds with his indictment:

misrepresentation of job market opportunities for graduates, mismanagement of federal
and state funds (especially student loans), misunderstanding the purpose of higher
education (with the consequences of curriculum catastrophe), misplacement of
academic priorities leading to the resulting decline of standards for scholarship. What is developing, in his opinion, is a state of academic anarchy—a "mindless denial of order and tradition" which could effectively end the vital mission undertaken by the university. Moreover, anarchy and an ethical crisis may be the signals forces outside the institution are awaiting; with some justification they can then move into the realm of academic policy-making. With this imposition of external control the historic autonomy of most colleges and universities becomes nonexistent: the role of higher education is expressed only in terms of its usefulness to the state; and where there is disagreement, the state exercises its authority.

To combat this disastrous slide toward mediocrity (and possibly oblivion), Martin has proposed that a dichotomy be established: academic institutions as separate entities from educational ones. The former are to be devoted to the highest form of intellectual excellence, with a strict adherence to traditions of scholarship, rationality, order, and sequence; the latter would stress education in a "broader, more contextual, emphatically relational" way, with attention to imagination, experiential learning, and practical achievement. After an appropriate period of program redefinition and institutional "repentance," Martin believes that "both types of institutions can contribute to the development of the new paradigms which are so much needed." By incorporating the highest possible standards of ethical action and by involving the many participants in higher education, "the new organizing principle for our colleges will be symbiotic—the successful and necessary reconciliation of apparently irreconcilable differences" (p. 33). To abandon its present quest for "warm bodies," the college may have to reconsider its real purpose for existing; it may even suffer greatly in this process of self-examination, both in terms of its status and its financial sustenance.

Surely, Martin's analysis is not without some degree of personal bias, yet his general feeling of apprehension is shared by others. Caroline Bird has made
a "case against college," calling the time spent in college an often tragic waste of the vitality of youth; Ivar Berg has described much of education as a "great training robbery" where the correlation between schooling and success is weak at best. In essence, the promises of institutions notwithstanding, a college degree does not magically transform the student into a well-adjusted, economically secure individual whose abilities have been so enhanced that his chosen occupation becomes yet another means of self-fulfillment.

Should higher education, however, be responsible for the future of those who partake in its programs? Are institutions guilty of unethical (or immoral, as some have charged) conduct in their promotion of the potential benefits of higher learning? Interestingly enough, Howard Bowen (1974) has argued just the opposite: that colleges and universities are not acting ethically when they restrict program enrollments unduly because of a depressed job market.

According to his interpretation, the manpower approach to higher education leads to morally questionable assumptions: (1) that the changing demands of employers should set the quotas for applicants to institutional programs; (2) that the chief reason for colleges is "to prepare people for specific jobs"; (3) that educators must accept "whatever work flows from the blind and predestined imperatives of technology." No, Bowen has asserted, higher education does not fail except when it refuses to dedicate itself to the search for knowledge and to the development of its students. Taking a more committed stand may be necessary, though, if institutions are to overcome the pressures of those who would equate the needs of the moment with the requirements of the future. The avoidance of hucksterism, gimmicks, and deceitful practices is mandatory; attention can be given to both those of lower ability and those with superior skills "in the spirit of excellence and honesty of purposes and standards" (p. 158).

Still, problems which relate to the issue of institutional honesty appear and reappear with a dismaying frequency. The recent court cases (one yet to be resolved)
of Marco DeFouis and Allan Bakke have brought into question admissions policies which reflect "reverse discrimination." While designed to promote access to the benefits of higher education, special admittance procedures for minority applicants may deny fundamental rights to others—at least this is the contention of those who are currently challenging the affirmative action programs of universities. Can institutions fulfill their self-imposed moral obligations, meet federal guidelines, encourage an "open" society, and, at the same time, violate the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of equal protection? Obviously, whatever decision is forthcoming will not be satisfying to all interested parties.

Another aspect of the expressed concern for integrity in the academe is the "full disclosure" position of the consumer movement. Will a college be compelled to supply sufficient information on its programs, requirements, and personnel to meet the demands of educational consumers—its actual and potential students? Binding contracts may one day replace the "gentleman's agreement" which has often existed between the representatives of the institution and the individual student. If mistrust and dishonesty can be reduced by force of law, outside authorities may attempt to structure and to regulate academic policies for the benefit (as they see it) of the consumer.

But are deceptive practices really prevalent in higher education? Has the campus become a "moral morass," where those who enter may experience personal discomfort and, frequently, defeat? George Arnstein (1976) has stated emphatically, "yes, there is fraud in American postsecondary education," from false claims of accreditation to outright deceit. Even those bodies—the accrediting associations—which should enforce standards and insist upon conduct of a high order are themselves woefully short on principles. By assuming that education is above the competition and corruption of the business world, Arnstein has noted, academics have misplaced their trust; undivided attention to the responsibilities of a sound system of
properly conducted programs is necessitated. However, for the present, "nobody is in charge; there is no system; and there is no agreement as to suitable ethical standards" (p. 11).

Echoing the criticism of Arnstein, Anna Nardella (1977) has accused institutions of deception in employment practices through the advertising of vacancies which do not exist. Colleges and universities have used the surplus of Ph.D.s to advantage in the faculty selection process, arbitrarily hiring and firing to suit the pleasure of administrators. A distressing lack of concern, she has concluded, for the job candidates has been exhibited on the part of the institutions; there seems to be little appreciation of the effort expended and of the value of advanced study itself.

Can these charges of unethical behavior be dismissed as but the complaints of the embittered? Perhaps. Nevertheless, there has indeed been much resentment over the seeming indifference of higher education to the realities of today's world. The press, for example, rarely neglects an opportunity to point out inconsistencies and irregularities in academia. In 1964 Newsweek investigated "Mores on Campus" and concluded that a revolution in sexual behavior had occurred, though it did not arrive overnight. While holding up the values of college students to public scrutiny, the writer did grant that the institutions cannot impose standards of morality which are not supported by society at large.

Following in the next few years, readers were to be informed about student protests (sit-ins, assaults, bombings) and student problems (the draft, job openings, drugs, premarital sex, cheating). After the most recent scandal at a military academy, Time examined the question, "What Price Honor?" (1976), suggesting that although dishonesty is hardly new to colleges it is more widespread than ever. Cheating has become almost accepted as an academic necessity, the article continues, because students are simply applying the prevailing ethics of American life to their own activities. Has conformity to the pressures of coping and achieving rendered
honor obsolete? Have the peer-enforced codes of conduct become anachronistic? (In the opinion of Josiah Bunting ("What Price Honor?", 1976, p. 20), President of Briarcliff and a former West Point instructor, such a code is an anachronism—but one which must be retained to ensure military officers of integrity. As to whether this approach to classroom honesty is really effective or whether it even promotes worthwhile values is conveniently overlooked in Bunting's discussion.)

Lastly, one cannot escape the difficulties which are constantly brought into view by modern day "muckrakers." The incidents involving the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts have caused a collective shudder in institutions across America. Misappropriation and misapplication of funds, questionable admissions and graduation standards, capricious employment practices—virtually every possible violation of academic ethics was attributed to the School. Unfortunately, a definitive statement of the truth or falsity of the allegations will never receive the attention that the initial revelations of the story did. For many who are outside of the academic community, the "U. Ma. Mess" becomes but another example of "institutions that pander" or "green-stamp universities" caught in the act of not "practicing the preaching."

At the beginning of this decade, Lewis Mayhew (1970) expressed a call for commitment in terms of a "new academic morality." First, institutions will need a legitimate basis of authority; second, generally accepted goals for the educational programs; third, a "restoration of institutional and professional modesty." He concluded:

Reflecting on the moral dilemmas present on the campus, the forces which produced them, and the conditions which seem necessary if they are to be resolved, I find that the overarching element of a new academic morality is parsimony. Through economy is the use of means to ends, arrogance on the campus may fade, problems of governance may be resolved, and the public backlash to higher education may be relieved (pp. 138-39).

But is it realistic to expect a restoration of confidence in higher education when reminders of its moral laxness appear everywhere? Yes, there is
hope: colleges and universities have no ethical principles, no system of values apart from the persons involved in the educational process. Since this includes students, faculty, and administrators (as well as those in the surrounding society), the work of renewal must begin with individuals, not institutions. All are a part of the problem; all must now be a part of the solution. The "ethical crisis" can pass: optimism is not unreasonable.

Values and Student Development in the Academe--Some Relevant Studies

In the search for clues to the values held by one vital group participating in the process of higher education--the students--a number of surveys have been conducted which reflect the changing "moods" of the nation. During the 1950s, for example, much was made of the conformity to campus life demonstrated by a majority of students. The returning veterans, together with the "organization-men-to-be," presented a rather serious appearance, modified occasionally by raucous fraternity activities and rugged sports events. (Of course, Kevin McKean (1975) has written, the glory of these times has been exaggerated in nostalgic literature; behavior on campus was not saintly, dissent and disruption were present, and prejudice was openly shown.) By the mid 1960s, according to the reports of Yankelovich (1974), the "children of change" were emerging: students who valued political and social action, being independent and committed to principles which were not related to vocational ambitions. Generalization must be avoided, however; by no means did all students stand at the barricades. Those less vocal, those more concerned with their careers (and perhaps tending toward a subdued approach to societal problems) did not join in open protest.

After Vietnam and the tumult of the previous decade, the students of the 1970s have adopted a still different set of personal values. Again, one must not attribute overall group tendencies to each student individually; no two "codes of ethics" would be precisely identical. Yet, some observations which hold true to a great extent
can be made about the current generation: rebellion and alienation are still factors in satisfactory adjustment, with parent-child relationships a key to the transition to adulthood; pleasure is a common value, although a concern for stewardship of limited resources and an awareness of the benefits of deferred gratification are clearly evident; sexual activity is regarded as a personal matter, not subject to societal restrictions; patriotism, while not passé, is surely subdued for governmental deceit has been often exposed; success is important in light of an erratic economy, but achievement must be related to self-fulfillment. "These values, with their strong emphasis on personal self-fulfillment, are reminiscent of the mood of privatism that prevailed among students' a generation ago in the 1950s" (Yankelovich and Clark, 1974, p. 46). But there is a distinction, without a doubt: "Today's college students refuse to be caught up in the same dichotomy between private values and the values of society. And indeed, the society no longer insists on rigid conformity to older moral and social norms" (p. 46).

The forward surge of minorities and women has had an impact upon the attitudes of students as more members of these groups enter colleges. And another trend, the "lifelong education" movement, has affected the campus by raising the median age of the student body. But a conflict of values can be anticipated: the desires of minorities versus those of the nonminority students; the yearning for a continuing educational experience versus the realization that credentials and additional coursework do not ensure a better job; the pleasures of residential campus life versus the necessity of daily commuting. Even cost-benefit analysis (positive knowledge) cannot provide firm guidelines for choices; each student must decide which alternatives are the most valuable for meeting his own goals.

If education can be considered a means of facilitating a student's selection and clarification of values, it would be desirable that increased proficiency be shown during advancement through the educational program. Indeed, as Stephen Bailey (1976)
What if the diverse institutions and instruments that constitute our educational system should consciously address these bedrock realities with the following basic purposes in mind:

--to help persons anticipate, and increase their capacity for creative engagements with, major predictable changes--physical and psychological--in their stages of development;

--to help persons in their concentric communities to cope, to work, and to use their free time in ways that minimize neurotic anxiety and boredom and that maximize inner fulfillment and joyful reciprocities;

--to help persons to learn the arts of affecting the enveloping polity in order to promote justice and to secure the blessings of liberty for others as well as for themselves (p. 5).

While higher education constitutes but a fraction of the total process, its influence is worthy of study for college participants and graduates continue to increase in number.

But how can the progressive development of a college student be charted with any degree of accuracy? Grade point standing could reflect only those factors pertaining to academic achievement (a partial correlation with knowledge acquired). Some system of representing growth along the social and ethical dimensions would be extremely useful: although Kohlberg supplies a stage development theory, it lacks detail for persons beyond the high school level, the fourth and higher stages being reached (if at all) about this juncture in life.

One categorization scheme with considerable promise is that created by William Perry (1970). In his *Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years* he has described his conception of the changes in students during their academic lives. Acknowledging his debt to the work of Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Jane Loevinger, Perry draws upon a transitional stage theory of human development to provide a framework for his data, collected through hundreds of intensive interviews.

The origin of his study may be traced to a report of the staff of the Study Counsel at Harvard in 1953 which attempted to document the college experiences of
students in Harvard and Radcliffe. Impressed with the possibility of detecting
crages in a student's outlook upon his life and the world, Perry and his colleagues
followed—by interview—students at Harvard during the span of their stay at the
institution (the spans included 1958-62, 1962-66, 1963-67). While the number of
participants in each segment was relatively small, the extensiveness of the interviews
over the years permitted a detailed analysis of the growth of these students.

After the initial contact was made to secure a student's permission to "probe"
his deepest thoughts, interviews were begun, each carefully taped and transcribed.
Questions were deliberately structured to encourage frank expression; opinions were
sought and personal experiences were to be related in detail. An important aspect
of the research was the thorough preparation of the judges, those persons who would
analyze the interviews to ascertain the particular stage of a student's thinking.

To ensure as much uniformity as possible in the descriptions of the student's annual
interview, procedures manuals were distributed to the judges; decisions made by each
judge were frequently checked for consistency.

Growth, both in intellectual and moral development, was indicated in the study
by advancement to "higher" positions—the assumption being that more mature, better
adjusted individuals exhibit characteristics of people at stages deemed to be
superior to those below. Perry has addressed this issue at some length:

"The values implied by the word "growth" in our scheme
are inescapable, and that they would be there even if some other word
were used. In short, in any exposition of a presumably maturational
development in the area of values, language intended to be purely
descriptive will become value-laden. Efforts to avoid this tendency
are likely to obscure its workings, and so to increase rather than
decrease the possibility of bias. In our opinion the best course
is explicit acceptance. This acceptance makes it possible to delimit
the values involved and to objectify the implications of describing
a person's development in terms of them.

The values built into our scheme are those we assume to be
commonly held in significant areas of our culture, finding their
most concentrated expression in such institutions as colleges of
liberal arts, mental health movements and the like. We happen
to subscribe to them ourselves (p. 45)."
(One interesting theory suggested by Perry concerns his belief that "secure" students would move further down or up his scale depending upon whether they lived 50 years ago or 50 years in the future. A different mindset would be more comfortable in one period of history than in another.)

The chart (figure 1) gives the scheme in considerable detail; however, some mention should be made of its interesting features. Clearly, courage is a definite factor in the transition from one position to another. As a student begins to doubt his past values and opinions, he seeks some new central point around which his life can be structured. After this stage proves inadequate, he again begins a quest for principles of guidance. Unfortunately, he may suffer a deflection during his progression—perhaps retreating to a previous position of reasoning, perhaps temporizing until an adjustment can be achieved.

The basic parts of the trichotomy Dualism, Relativism, Commitment are again divided into three, creating the nine fundamental positions. Dogmatism and the absolute right/wrong duality of the first stages should gradually change to increased understanding as the student develops. But still no firm position which reflects a philosophy of values grounded in reason is reached. In these middle positions students are adrift in a relative "ocean," with little to grasp for security. Finally, by the time of his graduation from college (it is to be hoped), the student has reached one of the positions of commitment, his sense of identity has been established, and his appreciation of the concept of community has become evident.

Along this developmental path, according to Perry, personal values are constantly being challenged and modified with a resulting change in the individual's perception of their importance. Teaching and in-class activities (together with those happening outside the traditional instructional program) provide countless opportunities for students to "grow." Arguments, exercises, lectures—all can be directed toward encouraging a movement from dualistic or relativistic thinking to
a level of commitment. The examples set by faculty themselves can be extremely influential. As Perry has noted, teachers can gain some immediate solace from his study: "Since different students are probably at different stages, each will react in ways which reflect his developmental position of the moment. Thus no two students may behave intellectually or morally in precisely the same way; however, it should be possible to place them, figuratively, on the Perry growth chart."

Among the suggestions of the study, at least three stand out: (1) educators should exhibit a certain openness in their thinking, in order to become effective role models; (2) faculty members should confirm their own membership in the educational community to which the student also belongs; (3) institutional representatives should ponder the finding that an analysis of the records for some single specific educational recommendation put forward by any large number of the students (participating in the interviews) reveals only one: "Every student should have an interview each year like this."
The message, we believe, is more general: that students should experience themselves more vividly as recognized in the eyes of their educators in their efforts to integrate their learning in the responsible interpretation of their lives (p. 214).

Values Education in Colleges and Universities:

From the work of Perry and his associates much has been learned about the developmental changes of students, particularly in the area of personal values. And, if "growth" is possible, what can institutions of higher education do to encourage such progression? Perry's recommendations are definitely sound; the faculty member can contribute to the student's sense of worth and to a more conducive atmosphere for the analysis of values.

The president of Harvard, Derek Bok (1976), has recently asked: "Can Ethics Be Taught?" Surely, this is not a question which solely belongs to the present generation. It has been posed often; and each time it is provocative and seemingly unanswerable. Quite probably the events of Watergate and Vietnam have led to the
current reexamination of the ethics of the nation's "elite." Still, the issue remains: how can colleges and universities best apply their resources to improve the "moral climate" of society? According to Bok, the didactic methods of the past, the strict honor codes, and the frequent homilies are no longer adequate because (1) the students have changed (and society as well) and (2) moral reasoning was not really developed by these approaches.

Many of the college students of the 1970s--especially those in professional schools--are extremely utilitarian in their outlook; for them, what is best for the majority must be "right." Even faculty members are known to remark that people either have ethical principles or they do not: values, therefore, cannot be influenced by teachers or courses. Bok has taken issue with this opinion, feeling that "educators have a responsibility to contribute in any way they can to the moral development of their students" (p. 26). Professional schools have been especially lacking in their programs: providing an examination of facts but not ethics. While one individual of high character, such as Archibald Cox, can do much for students by being an example of integrity, the need for instruction in ethics is still apparent.

What could be achieved if suitable courses in moral reasoning were taught in colleges and universities? Bok's listing includes: (1) students would "become more alert in discovering the moral issues that arise in their own lives"; (2) students would learn "to reason carefully about ethical issues"; (3) students would be able to "clarify their moral aspirations" (p. 26). Facing numerous ethical crises through course assignments would seem to prepare students to better meet problems encountered later. Various alternatives can be explored without the ramifications which would occur if such actions were attempted in society. Some students may indeed acquire skills in reasoning which will make them more evasive and deceitful--but the risk is worth taking.
Because these courses will deal with controversial, troublesome issues, careful selection and preparation of material is suggested to avoid a program which could fail to accomplish its purpose. No teacher can eliminate his personal biases or camouflage his values; actually, it may be beneficial for students to observe that the faculty is not value free. But instruction of high quality is mandatory for classes which discuss ethical principles: the professor should possess "an adequate knowledge of moral philosophy," "an adequate knowledge of the field of human affairs," and the ability "to conduct a rigorous class discussion" (p. 30). (Perhaps, Bok has indicated, special programs of an interdisciplinary nature could be established to assist universities in educating such faculty members.) With the proper instructors and well-designed courses, ethics can be "taught." As to the effect on students: "Will they behave more ethically? We may never know. But surely the experiment is worth trying, for the goal has never been more important to the quality of the society in which we live" (p. 30).

Expressing a similar concern for the importance of faculty participation in the development of student values, Robert Wilson and Jerry Gaff (1975) have written that the professors with the most impact on the lives of students often discuss value-laden issues in their classes. Educators must recognize that values are present in virtually every topic of every discipline. "This does not mean indoctrination... but it does mean helping students develop sensitivity and awareness about values, purposes, and choices in human life" (p. 190).

For Wilson and Gaff, some reasonable methods for faculty members to use would include: courses for freshmen which examine the issues "facing an individual in democracy"; courses on topical and controversial issues facing the different professions; a "study of the lives of major intellectual figures" to allow students to see the problems and achievements of those who have sought knowledge. Colleges, they have concluded, should attempt several innovations to accomplish the goal of
changing students for the better: individualizing instruction, revitalizing general education, accentuating values education itself.

One should not neglect the role which philosophy departments can play. By attempting to reach more students, the philosophy faculty can do much to encourage the type of reasoning which leads to a sound code of ethics for the individual. Several methods in use by philosophy instructors have been given in *Change* magazine (January 1977): at the Ohio State University, students engage in rigorous analysis of ethical issues, both in a formal lecture setting and in small discussion groups; at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, a program which combines technology with philosophy is helping vocationally-oriented students understand the significance of philosophical studies; at the Brookdale Community College in New Jersey, philosophy is taught to students with little initial interest in moral reasoning, but considerable success has been achieved.

(Robert Bellah (1974) has advocated a different role on campus for a department of religion: to supply insight into the religious experiences which are manifesting themselves in the modern day form of the "new consciousness." Students are searching for some direction, he has asserted, in the process of identifying the substance of their beliefs. Through its efforts to analyze events and to sympathize with students, "a Department of Religion may be a small beachhead in that process of change which could lead again in a new way to a whole human being" (p. 115).)

Of the programs which have been developed to encourage students to examine their values, none has shown more promise than the University of Florida in Gainesville. Funded by grants in excess of one million dollars from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Mellon Foundation, the project has as its chief objective the improved teaching of the humanities to professional school students. Because over 60 percent of the students at the Gainesville campus are enrolled in such areas and programs as pre-law, pre-medicine, or other "technical-vocational"
fields, the majority of the student body would not ordinarily be exposed to courses in the traditional domain of the humanities. But by using well-planned syllabi and team-teaching techniques, the University seeks to provide instruction which will give some "perspective on human behavior and ethics."

In a discussion of the accomplishments to date, Charles Holloway (1977) has indicated the thorough preparation of each phase of the project. From its beginning as an idea of two professors, Banks and Schmeling, in 1972 for the injection of value issues into the medical field, the overall program has grown to include 15 classes in the schools of law, medicine, business, and engineering. Through the intensive study of ethical questions relating to their profession (euthanasia, ecology/energy, private versus public rights), students are directed toward an essential concept: that their beliefs and values will have an impact upon their patients, clients, or customers.

Participants in this professional/humanities curriculum read and evaluate not only technical treatises but also the classics of world literature, and, in so doing, analyze the motivations of the characters and the values of the particular age and culture. Social and philosophical studies are stressed, since many students with aspirations of becoming lawyers or doctors have not had a previous introduction to these schools of thought. To be suitable for replication elsewhere, this experimental program must be carefully checked to ensure that it is achieving some measure of success. Indeed, an elaborate system of observation, testing, sampling, and interviewing has been treated to provide the necessary verification. Although its cost has been rather great, the program will be deemed worthwhile if it manages to "keep professionals human" and capable of reaching sound judgments in matters of morality. (Addressing precisely this issue, Lewis Mayhew and Patrick Ford (1974) have stated that it is imperative that curricular reform emphasize "better ways of developing in students workable and acceptable professional ethics" (p. 66).)
Not as ambitious an undertaking, but of interest nonetheless, is the values education project described by Christopher Hodgkinson (1976). While hardly unique, his particular class on "values for teachers" does seem effective: to prepare those--the teachers--who will greatly influence children for the value-laden discussions of the classrooms. Calling the idea that a teacher can be an "immaculate intermediary" a fallacy, Hodgkinson proceeds to outline his course for students in teacher education. First, a discussion is held upon the meaning of values and values education; next, an analysis is made of the concepts of right and good, drawing distinctions; then, a value model is developed which illustrates the differences in the meaning of various terms; practical exercises in the realm of values theory are conducted; an examination of philosophical positions is completed; finally, the methodologies of values instruction were investigated to determine the most suitable approach for a particular situation. (Hodgkinson has reduced, for the purposes of his class, the number of techniques to six: direct instruction, clarification and analysis, modeling, moral reasoning, dissatisfaction induction, concurrent teaching.)

In Hodgkinson's view,

This type of values education does not commit the immaculate intermediary fallacy; it is concerned directly with the intermediary, the teacher. It presupposes that values education of an informal character will go on in any event in the ordinary conduct of schooling. It also presupposes that there is something to be gained by raising teachers' levels of consciousness and sophistication about their own values. It is no more than a strategy for the indirect values education of children, values education at one remove; but it is suggested that, on the basis of this experiment, an appropriate timing for implementation may well be that traditionally very stressful period known as the professional year of teacher training (p. 271).

The preceding programs have been directed primarily at students interested in professional careers; another approach is gaining support, however, which includes all college students through a core curriculum. (The University of Kentucky, for example, is offering in the fall of 1977 a "coordinate semester"
for undergraduates: three-course clusters in two areas, "cultural change in classical antiquity" and "power." Students who elect these optional courses will have, it is hoped, a more integrated learning experience and will become more involved in the analysis of the consequential issues of history.

Soon to be released will be a definitive work on this trend by Ernest Boyer, the present U.S. Commissioner of Education, and Martin Kaplan (1977), Educating for Survival: A Call for a Core Curriculum. As summarized in their article for Change magazine, the argument for such a common center in the curriculum can be based on the needs for community, for an appreciation of the heritage of many lands and peoples, for an understanding of the producer/consumer process, for a realization of the demands of the future, and for the ability to make ethical choices.

To Boyer and Kaplan, "much of the content of our education now seems atomistic, 'value free,' [reflecting] to a large degree the American condition—now culturally dispersive and devoid of shared assumptions" (p. 22).

In the attempt to find some common bonds, the necessity of the core approach was realized: each student should be able to choose his program and its content but it is to his benefit—as well as society's—to require some learning experiences which relate to the fundamental nature of human endeavors. And, they have recommended, "as a capstone to a core curriculum, we propose a very strong and forward look at the moral and ethical considerations that guide the lives of each person, a kind of forum in which personal beliefs could be discussed" (pp. 28-29).

Thus, in this particular conception, what is essential for both the survival of higher education and the society is "a new core curriculum based on the irreducible commonalities of our existence" (p. 29).

The search continues for some common core of courses on which to build a better student development program. For Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., this nucleus will consist of "value education, moral and philosophical education"
("Rediscovering the Liberal Arts," 1977). Harvard has not completed its curriculum study, but it is probable that the committee's report will suggest all students take courses in certain areas, with the objective of promoting shared experiences and beliefs. Although a few schools, such as St. John's, never abandoned the unified, humanistic approach to education, most colleges have stressed multiple electives. The return of required courses, which were dropped in numerous institutions because of criticism of their lack of content and of their inability to sustain interest, may signal the emergence of the core curriculum. The liberal arts, if properly introduced and effectively taught, can become a major factor in efforts to assist students in values clarification and analysis.

Conclusion

From their beginning, colleges have acknowledged the importance of "moral" or "values" education; indeed, among the chief purposes for such institutions in America was the desire to transmit "the essence of humanity." Vocationalism, to be sure, was and has been a dominant theme. Yet always has remained the conception of something more than the accumulation of information—the belief that the college experience can transform the lives of students (and also in the process, those of the faculty). Descriptive procedures and formal instruments for the assessment of this transformation have been prepared; while the results are not conclusive, evidently change does occur. Suggestions have been made by researchers as to possible approaches for "teaching ethics" or "analyzing values"; again, the consequences of the efforts have not been fully determined. To some in the academe, today's educators face a crisis the dimensions of which they can barely grasp: a decline in the integrity of institutions, a loss of public trust, an increasingly cynical student body. But for others intimately involved with colleges and universities, the present difficulties can be overcome and a renewed commitment to the basic purposes of education will be made by all participants.
In closing, three quotations may provide some additional insight:

For too long colleges and universities have suggested to students that beliefs are somehow less important than "the facts." But regardless of the pretensions of its member disciplines and the magisterial rhetoric of the college catalogs, the university—in its every procedure, structure, requirement, option, budget detail, admission, promotion, publication, grade, syllabus, and diploma—acts out the choices and commitments it has made. None of these choices is "natural." All are human-made, subject to revision, born of values, inherently controversial, and rooted in time and place and economy and faith (Boyer and Kaplan, 1977, p. 29).

But we've learned that the road to an answer is long and circuitous and difficult and that we ourselves may never arrive. We've perhaps come to think that in this, as in so many other intellectual endeavors, it is the journey that matters, not the arrival. We have come to take a deep satisfaction in the joys of the quest, and as teachers we tend to hold that it is more important for students to learn how to work out answers for themselves than it is for them to have the answers. And so our first problem is to transform the need for an answer into a delight in the search (Schneewind, 1977, p. 48).

The teacher-student relation, if it is to be creative, must go through the stages of encounter, exploration, crisis, and transcendence, as every other creative relation does. If the teacher can take an affirmative view of the media, understanding that they can be not a mechanical agent but a living force in the lives of his students and in the classroom itself, he will be recruiting a strong resource for the learning process. And if he can use the student's own life situation and the experience of the culture as case histories in the winnowing and critical examination of values, he will be playing the magical role of the values catalyst. If he can see through some of his own values cast, and present confidently to the student the values that have survived his own scrutiny, there can be a values dialogue and a values exchange between them. In the end education is nothing much more than such a values dialogue.

Out of these values encounters will come in time something closer than we have today to a values elite—one that takes the lead in both the change and continuity of values and becomes a force for contagion in spreading them, in a larger dialogue with the people themselves.

Thus out of chaos—in Nietzsche's phrase—the teacher and the student together can fashion a dancing star (Lerner, 1976, pp. 126-27).
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