This study was designed to assess and compare the roles of intelligence and moral judgment in relation to patterns of behavior in temptation situations. Six Resistance to Temptation (RTT) tasks were administered to 106 sixth grade students. One year later, four Kohlberg Moral Judgment (MJ) tasks were administered to 100 of the same subjects. IQ scores were available for all subjects. Two measures of temptation behavior were derived from the six RTT tasks: Total RTT, a summary score based upon extent of RTT in the six situations, and Consistency (C), based upon the variance of an individual's RTT scores across the six situations. Results indicated that MJ and RTT did not correlate significantly. MJ and C were positively correlated, although examination of the data by sex revealed a significant correlation for boys only. IQ was correlated significantly with total RTT and with C. The relationships were also examined according to levels of IQ, indicating different relationships between most variables when high IQ subjects were compared with low IQ subjects. The results provided support for the view that intelligence is generally related to the extent and consistency of resistance to temptation. Moral judgment may account more for consistency of behavior among males. (Author/BD)
RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION AND MORAL JUDGMENT: BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF KOHLBERG'S MEASURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

Edward A. Nelsen
North Carolina Central University
Robert E. Grinder and Jane Howard Challas
University of Wisconsin
September, 1969

*Current address (9/77)
I. D. Payne Laboratory
College of Education
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ. 85281

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Edward A. Nelsen
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND
USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM"
RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION AND MORAL JUDGMENT: BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF KOHLBERG'S MEASURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

Edward A. Nelson*
North Carolina Central University
Robert E. Grinder and Jane Howard Challas
University of Wisconsin

Hartshorne and May (1928), upon publication of their classic investigation, Studies in Deceit, confuted the notion that moral behavior issued from "an inner entity operating independently of the situations in which the individuals are placed" (Hartshorne, 1932, p. 209). The monumental study demonstrated that, in general, conformity to rules and moral standards varied as a function of diverse situational and personal factors. The idea of a unitary, fixed moral faculty was no longer tenable. Thus freed from the bogey of dualism, and influenced by psychoanalytic theory and post-Hullian behavior theory, social learning theorists subsequently focused upon more narrowly defined aspects of morality, e.g., consequences of transgression, resistance to temptation, and other behaviors presumed to reflect children's internalization of moral standards.

It is noteworthy that Piaget's 1932 treatise, The Moral Judgment of the Child, nearly coincided with the appearance of the Hartshorne and May (1928) investigation. Piaget's work, however, was concerned fundamentally with developmental types of moral judgment and modes of interpreting rules. Over the past quarter-century, Piaget's theory has stimulated extensive research concerning cognitive aspects of morality (e.g., Kohlberg, 1958; Durkin, 1959; Johnson, 1962).
In spite of major advances within the two disparate theoretical positions, investigations stemming from each have been strikingly parochial. On one hand, social learning theorists have focused primarily upon child rearing and situational determinants of resistance to temptation and reactions to deviation, and have shown little concern for children's interpretations of the situations. On the other hand, cognitive theorists have focused primarily upon developmental relationships between stages and forms of moral judgments, and have paid scant heed to environmental and behavioral correlates of the stages.

Failure to examine both behavioral and cognitive aspects of morality precludes, however, an adequate understanding of the complex processes involved. Indeed, concepts such as morality, honesty, and integrity imply correspondence between behavior and personal or social standards. Kohlberg (1958, 1963a, 1964b), for example, has emphasized the importance of considering individual differences in the manner of perceiving and judging temptation conflicts. He has pointed out that resistance to temptation fails to reflect directly the strength of internalized moral standards and has insisted that "we can only discuss morality of action when we can relate the actor's behavior to his actual judgments of right and wrong in the situation" (Kohlberg, 1965, p. 3).

One means of relating moral judgment to resistance to temptation is based upon behavioral comparisons among children who use different modes of moral judgment. If one child characteristically judges situations in one manner, while another is disposed to judge them in a different manner, one may ask whether these modes of judgment influence or mediate particular patterns of behavior in temptation situations.
Furthermore, several principles derived from cognitive-developmental theories do suggest that moral behaviors, such as resistance to temptation, depend upon children’s attitudes toward rules and capacities to understand moral alternatives. Piaget (1932) has postulated that in the first stage of moral development the child behaves according to his desires and imagination, gradually learning other people’s rules and imitating their behavior, but egocentrically practicing the rules "according to his own fantasy" (Piaget, 1932, p. 35). In a subsequent stage the child gradually learns from authorities to accept and follow rules, although his interpretations of rules may be singular and his corresponding behavior rigid. Finally, the mature, morally autonomous individual, according to Piaget, understands the unification and codification of rules, and looks upon laws as due to mutual consent; also, he may ignore or violate rules which appear arbitrary or unjust.

Kohlberg (1958, 1963a, 1964b, 1965) has also described developmental changes in the influence of rules upon behavior. For example, in Kohlberg’s pre-moral stage, the child’s behavior is not directly affected by rules; he is hedonistically responsive to situational factors, such as risk of punishment, opportunity for gratification, and presence of authorities. During the conventional stage he is expected to have “feelings of concern about conformity to conventional expectations and standards” (1965, p. 9); during the principled stage he is likely to act according to "a morality of self-accepted moral principles" and, thereby, to demonstrate autonomy of action.

Thus, both Piaget and Kohlberg have viewed moral development as a hierarchical process in which the child begins with narrow, situation bound schemas; he develops, subsequently, the cognitive capacities necessary to
behave according to rules imposed by authorities; and ultimately, he may acquire the structures which enable him to make autonomous decisions about rules.

Paraphrased in terms of social learning theory (e.g. see Burton, 1963; Bandura and Walters, 1963) the cognitive-developmental account of moral development might be described as the acquisition of mediational responses, which in turn account for secondary stimulus generalization. Initially, according to this view, the young child responds to temptations directly on the basis of internal and external cues that are operative in the situation: Cues associated with reward and punishment acquire saliency during early childhood and represent the primary determinants of behavior in accordance with laws of primary stimulus generalization, schedules of reinforcement, etc. As the child grows older, he eventually learns from authority figures to respond to certain temptations with implicit reactions, i.e. rules and labels such as 'right', 'wrong', 'good', or 'bad'. In accordance with laws of secondary stimulus generalization, these rules and labels mediate given modes of behavior in a variety of situations to the extent that the child has learned to apply the same rules and labels in the various situations. It may be said, then, that the child is exercising 'self control' when he resists temptation in the absence of coercing agents (Bandura and Walters, 1963). With further learning, perhaps in part as a result of "conceptual conflicts" (Berlyne, 1965) among rules, more complex mediational capacities may develop, such that an individual may be considered "morally autonomous" or "principled". Thus complex situations may be encompassed or mediated by a very basic and complex rule or principal that supercedes certain narrower rules in determination of behavior.
Moral development, according to both the cognitive-developmental and the social learning frameworks, is thus characterized as a learning and maturation process in which the child eventually acquires the capacities for self control, autonomy, and organization of behavior on the basis of more and more complex rules and principles.

To say that the morally "mature" individual has acquired the capacity to understand rules and principles is not to say, however, that he will necessarily conform to any given rule in a particular situation. Kohlberg (1965), for example, has pointed out that his theory does not lead to the expectation of a direct correspondence between the stage of moral judgment and resistance to temptation or conformity to rules in all situations. At each stage the behavioral act of resisting or yielding is determined by a variety of factors. The personal and social context for a moral judgment, as well as a child's moral stage, must be considered in predicting his behavior in relation to a given rule. For example, the influence of a particular religious philosophy, of a subcultural code, of expectations of one's parents or peer group and/or an individually reasoned judgment, could each represent, in one sense or another, "moral" bases for violating certain conventional standards; each might also reflect varying degrees of maturity of moral judgment. Over and above the interpretations of right and wrong, a variety of personality variables may relate to an individual's capacity to resist temptation. Need for peer recognition (Shelton, 1966), intelligence (Hartshorne and May, 1928), attention control (Grim, Kohlberg, and White, 1964), capacity to delay gratification (Mischel, 1963), and other variables have all been related to behavior in temptation situations.

Although recent research and theoretical advances have thus led to a clearer identification of the types of variables that are related to con-
formity to rules, there have been only a few studies that directly compared measures derived from differing conceptual frameworks. A recent paper by Nelsen, Grinder, and Biaggio (1969a) reported a factor analytic study of personality and cognitive-developmental measures in relation to resistance to temptation. The personality measures, derived chiefly from a psychoanalytic framework, included ego overcontrol, neurotic undercontrol, internalized guilt, externalized guilt, and approval motivation. Also included were a measure of intelligence and an assessment of moral maturity based upon four of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Situations.

The study found that Kohlberg's measure of moral judgment and a paper and pencil measure of intelligence related more highly with resistance to temptation than did the other scales, although it should be noted that the personality measures were administered several years after the temptation measures, thus confounding the comparisons with the temporal differences. The positive relationship of intelligence and moral judgment with resistance to temptation was clear, none-the-less, especially for boys; but the method of data analysis employed in the study did not allow for comparison of the separate contributions of intelligence versus moral judgment to the variance in temptation behavior, because the two measures were moderately correlated. In view of the correlations between IQ and moral judgment it was important to scrutinize the relationships closely in order to analyze the unique influence of each, and to analyze possible moderating effects of one measure upon the other. Therefore, the current study undertook a reanalysis of the data to differentiate and clarify the nature of relationships of moral judgment and intelligence with resistance to temptation. The analysis was particularly concerned with assessing the contribution of Kohlberg's measure to the total variance in resistance to temptation.
Two composite measures of behavior in various temptation situations were calculated for this study, one a measure of total resistance to temptation, the other a measure of consistency of behavior in the various temptation situations. The measure of total resistance to temptation could not be included in the Nelsen, et al (1969a) study for methodological reasons, i.e. because it was derived from other scales that were included in the factor analysis. It was of interest, nevertheless, in this study because such a composite scale minimizes behavioral variation that is unique to specific situations. Thus the composite measure provided a more reliable assessment of the individual's general disposition to resist temptation (Nelsen, Grinder, and Mutterer, 1969b).

Consistency of behavior in various temptation situations was also of interest because this type of measure may reflect— even more directly than a measure of total resistance to temptation—the extent to which behavior is organized or mediated by a given rule and/or other responses common to the various situations. Thus, if an individual consistently conforms to a rule, or if he consistently violates the rule, one might infer that his behavior is mediated by the rule, although certainly other cognitive and noncognitive factors (e.g. intelligence and/or ability to delay rewards) might also be playing a role. If the extent of consistency is associated with a given measure of attitudes toward rules, then one has stronger evidence that the rules are mediating the behavior, especially if other possible explanations can be ruled out.

Following from the above arguments, one should expect that a given set of rules, such as rules against cheating, may account for consistency of behavior across situations, but this will be true only if the individual applies the rules to the various situations in a like manner. As Kohlberg has pointed
out; the morally autonomous individual will violate rules if they conflict with human welfare in the individual's judgment. In the absence of such specific constraints, however, the extent of consistency should reflect the differential mediating influence of explicit or implicit rules against cheating, for example, in relatively mature versus immature individuals.

**Method**

**Subjects and Procedure**

Six temptation tasks were administered to 106 Ss in the fall of 1964 when the Ss attended 6th grade classes at four different elementary schools surrounding a semi-rural community. The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Test was administered one year later, in the fall of 1965, when the Ss were all 7th graders in the community's only junior high school. One hundred of the original 106 Ss were tested—four had moved and two were unavailable during the second testing session. Thus, the final sample for this study consisted of 45 boys and 55 girls.

Hemmon-Nelson IQ's were available for all Ss from school records. Mean IQ for males was 108.8 and for females, 114.5.

**Measures**

Maturity of moral judgment was assessed from four of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Situations. For this task, Ss were questioned about situations focusing upon hypothetical moral dilemmas in which acts of obedience to legal-social rules or to commands of authority conflicted with the human desires, needs, or welfare of other individuals. On the basis of the moral choices in each situation, and the reasoning underlying his choices, Ss were given scores according to developmental types and levels. Responses oriented towards punishment and obedience or instrumental hedonism were
classified as Level I (Type 1 or 2). Responses oriented towards good relations and approval or towards authoritarian standards were classified as Level II (Type 3 or 4). Responses revealing concern for democratically accepted law or individual principles of conscience were classified as Level III (Type 5 or 6). On the basis of procedures developed by Kohlberg, the S's type score for each situation was also weighted, and the scores were summed across the four situations to yield a total measure of moral maturity. Complete instructions for administering and scoring of the test are presented elsewhere (Kohlberg, 1958).

To assess resistance to temptation and consistency of behavior, each S was exposed to the following six temptation conflicts:

1) The raygun game. Ss operated a shooting gallery individually according to a prescribed set of rules specifying the number of shots, recording of performance, etc. Rewards were offered for high scores, but the game was programmed to produce a fixed score when all rules were followed. Transgression was assessed in terms of the number of points Ss added beyond the programmed score. The features of the apparatus and instructions for playing the game have been described in detail elsewhere (Grinder, 1961, 1962).

2) The magic-mirror game. Ss operated a pencil-light to illuminate the path of an invisible maze. Rules and scoring procedures similar to those devised for the raygun game were employed, except that M & M's were offered as an incentive for performance beyond the programmed criterion. Details concerning the apparatus and procedures for this and all subsequent resistance to temptation measures are described in Nelsen, et al. (1969b).

3) The multiple-choice (copying) test. This task was modified from the duplicating technique of Hartshorne and May (1928). Ss were offered an opportunity to make illegitimate use of answers to a multiple-choice test with a
number of very difficult items. Ss with scores beyond a criterion were to have their names posted on a "top of the class" sheet, while remaining Ss were to have their names posted on another sheet. Transgression scores were based on changes made during a self-scoring procedure; the tests had been previously scored by the examiner.

4) The speed tests. This procedure was adapted from the Hartshorne and May double-testing procedure (1928, I, pp. 76-82). The subtests were comprised of tasks such as addition, number matching, and digit cancellation, administered under carefully timed conditions. After two "practice" trials, Ss were given a third trial with an opportunity to score their own papers. The fastest class was to win a "Speed-King" trophy. Transgression was based upon the discrepancy between the practice and test trials.

5) The squares (peeping) test. This test was adapted from the improbable achievement technique (Hartshorne and May, 1928, I, p. 61). Ss were presented with a single sheet of paper upon which five large squares were drawn, one inside the other, and were asked to shut their eyes and to follow the path between the lines of the squares with their pencils for five timed trials. After trying each square they were asked to open their eyes and score their own papers. Ss were presented with performance norms and were asked to do their best. Publicly distributed M & M's were offered for performance beyond a criterion. Papers were rated by judges according to degree of transgression.

6) The circles (peeping) tests. This test is similar in most respects to the squares test except that the incentive was only pride in accomplishing a task successfully, as high performance norms were presented to the Ss, who were then asked to do their best. Ss were asked to close their eyes and "hit" each of 10 circles on a sheet with a pencil mark. Transgression scores were
based upon the number of points beyond a criterion.

Performance on each task was scored according to the extent of transgression. If the S did not yield to temptation, he was given a score of zero. If he deviated below the median for all yielders on that task, he was given a score of one. If he yielded above the median for all transgressors he was given a score of two. These scores were summed across the six tasks, providing a summary measure of degree of transgression. Internal consistency reliability of this measure was .60. The variance (s²) among each S's scores was also calculated. This measure provided an index of his inconsistency across the situations. The procedure employed was similar to that originally used by Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth (1930). It was not feasible to determine the reliability of this measure. To simplify presentation and interpretation of the results, the transgression and inconsistency scores were transformed by subtracting them from a constant, so high scores represent high resistance to temptation and high consistency, instead of high transgression and high inconsistency.

Results

Insert Table 1 about here

The means and standard deviations for the measures of Resistance to Temptation (RTT), Consistency (C), Moral Judgment (MJ), and Intelligence (IQ) are presented in Table 1. The sexes did not differ with respect to the two measures of moral behavior, but females were somewhat higher with respect to IQ and considerably higher with respect to MJ level. It should also be noted that the range of scores on the MJ measure placed nearly all Ss within
the first two levels, according to Kohlberg's schema. Approximately one-half fell within the preemoral level, and one-half within the level of conventional role conformity. Only three Ss, all females, fell clearly into level three, representing morality of self-accepted principles. Three additional Ss operated at the principled stage in some of the moral situations.

The intercorrelations between the measures are presented in Table 2 for the total sample and separately within sexes. The r's were all positive and all in the expected direction. The correlations between MJ and RTT, however, failed to attain statistical significance for either sex or for the sample as a whole. The correlations between MJ and C were significant for the total sample, and for boys alone, but not for girls. IQ was significantly correlated with all of the variables, for the total sample and for the sexes separately.

It was apparent that IQ accounted for part of the correlation between MJ and C, since it correlated positively with both. With IQ partialed out, the correlation between MJ and C for the total sample dropped from .16 to .06, a value which obviously is not significant. For males, the correlation dropped from .37 to .31, a value which remained significant at the .05 level ($t = 2.07, df = 42$).

Since IQ was significantly related to all of the other variables, and since the range of IQ's was rather great—from 70 to 141—there appeared to
be a possibility that the variables might be interrelated differently for children of different ability levels. To examine this possibility, the total sample, with sexes combined, was divided into three ability levels: low, medium, and high. The intercorrelations between the variables were recomputed, and the results are presented in Table 3. Most striking is the finding that the correlation between IQ and MJ, within the low IQ group, increased to .53 in spite of the marked attenuation of IQ variance. By contrast, the corresponding r's for the medium and high IQ groups decreased to values of .19 and .16. These findings suggested that MJ and IQ may have been curvilinearly related, and indeed, examination of the scatter plot (not presented) strongly suggested this. IQ appeared to define an upper bound for the moral judgment scores, especially within the low IQ range. In interpreting the differential r's from Table 2 it should be kept in mind that the range and variance of IQ's was considerably greater for the low IQ group than for the medium or high IQ groups.

Discussion

The analyses for this study were designed to compare and differentiate measures of intelligence and moral judgment as correlates of two types of resistance to temptation measures. On the whole, IQ was positively related to Total RTT and to Consistency of RTT, whereas Moral Judgment was unrelated to the RTT measures, except that Moral Judgment and Consistency were positively related among males. Total RTT and Consistency were moderately correlated, suggesting that consistent honesty was more common than consistent dishonesty, although these relationships may have been due to an artifact, since the measures were not independent.
The low and nonsignificant correlations between Moral Judgment and Total RTT are generally consistent with the findings in studies that compared similar measures (e.g., Grinder, 1964). Interpretation of the low correlations in this and previous studies should be tempered by an important methodological consideration, however, i.e., the fact that the internal consistency reliability of the Total RTT measure in this was only .60. As Nelsen, et al. (1969b) pointed out in their discussion, the Total RTT scale at this level of reliability, must be considered only minimally adequate as a measure of a general trait of honesty. Measures that sample RTT in only one or two situations are presumably even less adequate, because the reliability of these measures would be much lower.

Several additional methodological limitations should be considered in evaluating the results. To begin with, the MJ measure was administered approximately one year after the RTT measures. During this period, the Ss had all transferred to a new school. Furthermore, a considerably shortened version of the Kohlberg test was administered. All of these factors would tend to attenuate the size of the correlations obtained.

On the other hand, the low correlations of Moral Judgment with the Total RTT are a bit surprising in view of the previously reported findings in the Nelsen, et al. (1969a) study, which indicated that MJ loaded positively on several factors with several of the individual RTT measures, particularly the Multiple-Choice (Copying) measure, for both males and females. It is possible that the common loadings were spurious, resulting from the mutual correlations of IQ with both MJ and certain resistance to temptation measures. It is also possible, however, that moral judgment is related to resistance to temptation in certain situations, but not others. This would imply that situational parameters, hitherto ignored in this and similar
... need to be considered more systematically in examining possible relationships between cognitive-developmental measures and resistance to temptation. More refined research strategies will be needed to evaluate the possibility that these situational parameters moderate the relationships between moral judgment and temptation behaviors.

The finding that MJ correlated positively with Consistency for males, but not females, is difficult to interpret. In the first place, conclusions concerning sex differences are not warranted, because the difference between the correlations for males and females was within the range of sampling error. In the second place, no previous studies have investigated the correlations between measures of moral judgment and consistency, so one has little basis for generalizing about the relationship. Should the positive relationship be replicated, for one sex or the other, however, it would suggest more strongly that moral judgment does mediate reactions to temptation situations. In other words, it would suggest that under certain circumstances persons with higher moral judgment behave consistently, if not always honestly, across different temptation situations.

The correlations of IQ with both the Total RTT and the Consistency measures suggest that intelligence plays a general role in relation to behavior in temptation situations. The complex and varied correlates of IQ preclude any simple conclusions regarding the role of intelligence, but several possible lines of explanation might be noted. First, as Burton (1963) has suggested, IQ may reflect the extent to which the individual is disposed to mediate various temptation situations with common labels, rules and/or principles of a moral and/or nonmoral nature. Second, as Kohlberg (1964b) has suggested, IQ may reflect the general ego strength or self control that is characteristic of an individual. A third general interpre...
tation is based upon the related possibility that the brighter individual has learned to respond to achievement related and temptation situations under rather different conditions than the dullest child. He has presumably experienced more success and mastery, learned to anticipate a different set of outcomes in such situations, and therefore, he has presumably developed different modes for coping with such situations. Certainly other explanations might be offered, and it is likely that a combination of factors, all related to intelligence, might be operating simultaneously to influence responses to temptation situations.

Comparisons of the overall pattern of correlations within the three IQ groups suggest that basically different factors may be operating to determine the behavior of the Ss with below-average intelligence in contrast with the Ss of above-average intelligence. One can only speculate as to the differential nature of these processes, but it does seem important to invest further research effort in exploring the issue. Methodological factors, such as ability to understand instructions, should certainly be investigated, as well as personality factors such as approval motivation, fear of failure, and ego-control.

Consider, along with Hartshorne and May's (1930) finding that age and intelligence relate positively with consistency and honesty for middle-class children, the results of this study offer support for the proposition that cognitive factors are related to choices and behavior in temptation situations.

Finally, it might be noted, in view of the relationships of intelligence and moral judgment with consistency, that the generality question, as discussed originally by Hartshorne and May (1928) and more recently by Burton (1963) and Nelsen, et al. (1969b) must be considered in light of individual differences. If morally mature and/or intelligent individuals are more con-
istent, then one will observe a greater degree of generality, or a greater proportion of behavioral variance attributable to persons, in a population composed of brighter, morally mature persons. The generality question then becomes an issue that is relative to particular population parameters, such as intelligence, mental or chronological age, and perhaps, socioeconomic status. These observations would seem to have important implications for future research on the generality question and related issues, in that provisions should be made for controlling these variables in designing future studies.

Summary

The study was designed to assess and compare the roles of intelligence and moral judgment in relation to patterns of behavior in temptation situations. Six Resistance to Temptation tasks and four Kohlberg Moral Judgment situations were administered to 100 sixth and seventh graders in a semi-rural community. Henmon-Nelson IQ's were available for all Ss. Two measures of temptation behavior were derived from the six RTT tasks: Total RTT, a summary score based upon extent of RTT in the six situations, and Consistency, based upon the variance (s^2) of an individual's RTT scores across the six situations. MJ and RTT did not correlate significantly (r = .14). MJ and C were positively correlated (r = .16, p < .05), although examination of the data separately by sex revealed that the relationship was significant for boys only (r = .37, boys; and r = .06, girls). IQ was correlated significantly with Total RTT (r = .33) and with C (r = .28). The relationships were also examined according to levels of IQ, indicating different relationships between most variables when high IQ Ss were compared with low IQ Ss. The results provided support for the view that intelligence is
generally related to the extent and consistency of resistance to temptation, and moral judgment may account for consistency of behavior among males.
References


Kohlberg, L. The development of children's orientations toward a moral order: I. Sequence of the development of moral thought. *Vita Humana*, 1963, 6, 11-33. (a)


Footnotes

*Office of Research and Evaluation, North Carolina Central University, Durham, North Carolina 27707.

The analyses presented in this paper are based upon data collected for master's theses submitted to the University of Wisconsin by Marcia L. Mutterer and Jane Howard (Challas).
### TABLE 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Resistance to Temptation, Consistency, Moral Judgment, and IQ Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males (N=45)</th>
<th>Females (N=55)</th>
<th>Total (N=100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTT</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJ</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ</td>
<td>108.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>114.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 2.**

Intercorrelations between Resistance to Temptation, Consistency, Moral Judgment Level, and IQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>N=100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJ x RTT</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ x RTT</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJ x Cons.</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ x Cons.</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ x MJ</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTT x Cons.</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05 level of significance, using one-tailed tests

** p < .01 level of significance, using one-tailed tests
### TABLE 3

Intercorrelations between Resistance to Temptation, Consistency, Moral Judgment Level, and IQ within Three Levels of IQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low IQ (70-108)</th>
<th>Med IQ (109-119)</th>
<th>High IQ (119-141)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=35</td>
<td>N=35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJ x RTT</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ x RTT</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJ x Cons.</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ x Cons.</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ x MJ</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTT x Cons.</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*p < .01 level of significance, two-tailed tests