The stubborn memorandum of organizational forms and types of control stems naturally from the traditionalizing of their practices, the vesting of group interest in their continuation, and the justifying of ideologies. The momentum is increased when the forms and types acquire niches in the larger organizational ecology that protects them against competition and invidious comparison. Contrary to the popular view that old organizations are rigid and new ones flexible, there stands the likelihood that long-lived organizations, surviving wars, depressions, and political attacks, have devised adaptive mechanisms as well as protective niches. One primary adaptive feature of colleges and universities may be their cellular construction. The operating level of chairs, institutes, departments, divisions, and schools consists not of units linked in an integrated process of production or service, but of free-standing units, partly self-governing, that can be individually added or dropped, augmented or diminished. In the turbulent last quarter of the twentieth century, viability in national higher education systems hinges on balance of power and on differentiation—even disorder—among organizational types. In all nations, the task in reform is to balance the trends toward centralization and diversification.

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Post-secondary education is effected in every country through the daily operation of certain forms of organization (universities, teacher colleges, technical institutes, research centers) and types of control (personal domination, collegial rule, bureaucratic hierarchy, trustee supervision). As the forms and types develop historically, they are both embedded in the larger educational structure and linked to organized groups outside of education. Acquiring a fundamental momentum that carries them into the future, the fixed forms set the terms of reform: "the direction which a reaction assumes is determined by the direction of the forces against which it reacts. The reformer is as much indebted to his environment as the conservative" (Rashdall, 1936, Volume I, p. 166). Following this perspective, we grasp the underpinnings of current practice by studying the historical production of the present educational structure. We sense better the possibilities of success for proposed reforms as we become aware of the embeddedness and relatedness of the involved forms and their characteristic drift and momentum.
Appropriate research becomes a combination of organizational and historical analysis that centers on the evolution of types of institutions and the provincial and national systems that embrace them.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL TYPES

Three analytical problems may be posed for the educational structure of a nation: (1) why did certain forms that now comprise the structure originate? (2) once each form was initiated, why did it then persist into the present, sometimes even enduring over centuries of marked turmoil and change? (Stinchcombe, 1965, pp. 153-169) (3) extending question one, how did earlier forms condition later ones as they emerged? Several guiding ideas can be established before turning to specific cases of modern academic structures.

For a major type of organization to originate, there must be a domain of work into which it can squeeze, a territory within organized society no longer effectively monopolized by preceding types. Then, which particular forms are invented or adopted depends greatly on the existing social technology. Men may dream of many alternative ways of organizing but the ones that can be put into action and made to survive need a minimal fit to the real world: there must be an open domain and they must be able to draw resources, personnel, and clientele by serving one or more interests. Commonly, a new form initiated in the open domain of one sector of society is borrowed from another part of the same society and adapted to its new home. Or, a similar process may take place at the level of whole societies, as
nations borrow forms from one another and try to adapt them to local conditions. The origin of the university in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries is the great case of such phenomena in academic organization. An open domain was made possible by the inability of cathedral schools and monasteries and other existing forms that handle advanced learning to service the societal need for more lawyers, doctors, and administrators for state and Church, and the growing need of scholars themselves to collectively systematize their work and to look out for their collective welfare. In the opening that invited invention, the university began as a guild, or more accurately a confederation of guilds: the guild was then the common form for the organization of work in the cities (Rashdall, 1936; Haskins, 1957; Baldwin and Goldthwaite, 1972; Thrupp, 1968). Instructors, and in some cases students, borrowed this form as a way of collectively implementing a common interest; through acquiring certain rights and privileges, establishing self-government, and developing means of defense against adverse actions of other groups. Control by private trustees was not then an option, even though municipal boards were sometimes created as a form of public supervision, since neither the legal nor the social underpinnings of trusteeship had yet appeared. Nor was bureaucratic governance a reliable alternative, at a time when central control over local factions was so problematic. Thus, even when the formal initiation of a university was at the pleasure of a king or a pope, he either chartered a group as a recognized guild or soon found the academicians drifting into the guild style of self-regulation in which a group of Masters jointly controlled a territory of work, elected one of their own as head, took oaths of obedience and fealty, and individually exercised, in smaller domains, personal control
over journeymen and apprentices. In comparison to the conditions of later centuries that encouraged other options, the extensive fragmentation of operative authority characteristic of the late medieval period encouraged efforts in occupational home-rule by those who wanted to teach and learn advanced bodies of knowledge. The guild form became the first organizational base for the idea of the university, a foundation that has endured for centuries and still appears in modern higher education (Beeves, 1970; Ashby, 1974; Clark, 1976).

Whatever the conditions and choices that gave rise to certain forms, the more intriguing questions are found in the capacity of types to persist, often with remarkably little change in basic structural characteristics. Stinchcombe has shown, for economic organization in the United States, that "structural characteristics of a type of organization tend to persist, and consequently there is a strong correlation between the age at which industries were developed and their structure at the present time" (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 159). Persistence may be rooted in apparent effectiveness: a given form seems to remain a more efficient tool than its possible competitors. Or persistence may stem from lack of competition: the form in question never has to face an open battle against other forms that may indeed be equally or more effective. Types of colleges and universities, as well as specific institutions, clearly develop protected niches in the ecology of higher education, controlled domains where competitive or predator forms cannot effectively get at them. Public sponsorship so often offers better guarantees of survival than does private support, since public authorities usually grant monopolies or quasi-monopolies of functions and territories to their agencies. A set of nationally-supported public universities may become a
sunk cost in a state budget that realistically can be only marginally adjusted from year to year, an entrenched sector that then amounts to a site shielded from the performance of other types of organizations.

The third, and probably the most important, source of persistence is the set of sociological forces that turn organizational tools into ends in themselves, organizations into social institutions. Certain ways of carrying out a social task become traditionalized, made a matter of common habit. In some countries, the professor habitually lectures to large numbers, while in others he tutors a few; in some structures, he is full-time, while in others his university duties are regularly only a part-time commitment. The established way becomes the unconsciously assumed and valued way. Also, participants become interested, personally and jointly, in perpetuating a form that serves and protects them, and that interest become vested as core values of the organization recognize that certain participants have certain legitimate rights. Additionally, appropriate ideology develops, justifying the traditionalized ways and the vested interests. These sociological forces of tradition, vested interest, and ideology—the internal forces of institution-building—are at the heart of organizational persistence. They help to fix public definitions of what forms are naturally appropriate and to establish the ecological niche that protects against possible competitors. They are basic to the stubborn capacity of colleges and universities to survive all types of pressures, including the efforts of powerful reformers, and to project their own ways and molds of organization into the future.

Earlier forms condition later forms in at least two important ways. First, the earlier forms set the general expectations of what is the right and valuable way. In the countries where the
university has been virtually the sole form of higher education for centuries, the general public as well as educators have great difficulty in accepting such possible new forms as the two-year college or the separate teacher-training enterprise. Second, the earlier form or forms sit astride much if not all of the organizational domain. Any new form has to find a viable niche either by taking up a task no one else wants, or by occupying new desirable ground on the border of the old terrain, or by successfully invading territory that is already occupied. In short, the old forms operationally define the division of labor among enterprises into which the new forms will need to fit or will have to struggle to adjust. The common result is a power struggle in which victory for the new form is by no means guaranteed. It may secure only a marginal position. For example, schools for adults and evening divisions that provide adult education have been institutionalized in the United States in the twentieth century at the margin of larger enterprises, public school systems and universities, whose primary commitments lie in the education of the young. The idea of adult education has had widespread support but supporting units typically end up in a precarious position. A more central location may yet be achieved in the last quarter of this century, aided by such new ideologies as that of recurrent education, but the fate of the idea is dependent on the organizational context and the wisdom of supporters in developing appropriate forms and maneuvering those forms in an organizational contest. A new form may also be defeated and eliminated from the scene. For example, the four-year community college in the United States, covering the last two years of secondary education and the first two years of tertiary education, was a promising educational movement in
The superstructure of public administration was also initiated almost simultaneously, as city-states and other temporal authorities attempted to regulate the academic bodies, but it developed genuine strength only later as the national state emerged and strengthened itself by learning to use modern means of administration. In one country after another, nation-building meant the encapsulation of higher education in a public bureau. There was either the nationalization of higher education in which all or nearly all units were placed under one or more ministries of the national government, e.g., in France especially after Napoleon, in Italy after unification in 1870; or, there was strengthened public control at a sub-national level, as in Germany, where the universities became located within a bureau of Land government. In each case, in either the national or the federal variant, the structure came to express two sets of interests: those of senior professors and those of ministerial officials.

Most important, the emerging governmental frameworks did not have historical primacy but had to embrace existing faculties and universities which had retained guild properties. The professor holding a Chair was a direct descendant of the guild Master of old, possessing life-long appointment, exercising considerable personal domination over assistants and students, and, together with other Chairholders, exercising a considerable monopoly in deciding what would be done within the University and such major sub-units as the Faculty and the Institute, particularly in determining membership in the teaching staff and in what would be taught. Thus, guild authority was maintained, in a combination of personal and collegial rulership, while faculty units moved from the general status of being voluntary associations to being parts of governmental bureaus (Clark, 1976). The understructure
the late 1940s and early 1950s, capturing eight locations in California, the state that led the nation in the development of community colleges. However, that particular reform soon peaked and then quickly fell from favor as counterforces were brought to bear: among other resistances, the thousands of senior high schools of the country were not about to give away their upper two years. The organizational ecology of American higher education proved to have ample room for the two-year community college, as a key part of structural adjustment to mass higher education, but not for a four-year version that would cut sharply into the jurisdiction of established forms of secondary education and would realign the deeply institutionalized boundary between the understood territories of secondary and higher education.

These guiding questions and conceptions may be applied to contemporary systems of higher education. Simplifying considerably, we review the development of the European mode of academic organization which occurred first in time and remained dominant until well into the twentieth century. We then turn to the British variation on that mode, a model which also has had a world-wide import, and finally to the special patterns found in the United States.

THE EUROPEAN MODE

The general modern structure of academic organization on the Continent can be characterized as a combination of faculty guild and state bureaucracy. Each of these forms has had a long history. As indicated earlier, the understructure of guild-like faculty clusters originated in the medieval period.
continued to effectively vest the interests of senior faculty, down to the point of personal privilege and, at times, semi-hereditary rights. Traditionalized ways and expectations developed over centuries, since the twelfth-century beginnings in Bologna and Paris, and appropriate ideologies were never hard to find. Indeed, the leading educational ideals of the nineteenth century, those of the German research-centered university, gave a modern rationale to rule by professors. While allowing for a ministerial framework, the reforms worked out in Germany between 1800 and 1830, highlighted the necessity of freedom in research and teaching if scientific progress and national advance were to be served. The apparent success of German academic science during the rest of the century gave world-wide credence to chair-based organization in which the prerogatives and especially the autonomy of the individual professor and small clusters of professors were central.

The ideals were congruent with baronial academic power and extensive collective self-rule.

Guild organization that combined personal and collegial rulership largely withered away in industry and commerce during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, defeated competitively by capitalistic modes of production, as emphasized by Marx, that took a bureaucratic form, as stressed by Weber (Marx, 1965; Weber, 1950). Elements of guild organization clearly still appear in modest craft unions and professional associations, with the question of continuity between the old guilds and the new forms remaining unanswered in historical inquiry (Thrupp, 1968). But the entrepreneur and the factory did not penetrate the arenas of Continental Higher education; nor, in general, the realms of state activity and public administration in which there was no profit-seeking activity. As a result--a crucial matter in the development
of higher education—the guild-like university never had to face this competitive form. Then, as provincial and national states laid down their administrative superstructures, bureaucratic forms were strengthened but generally remained incomplete in implementing control over the deeply-rooted academic guilds. Ministries established national rules in such policy sectors as budget, admission, curriculum, and personnel, but other than under occasional authoritarian suppression, no one would check up on conformity to the rules since inspector generals would improperly invade the rights of professors to freedom of teaching and research. Extensive rule-making coupled with weak rule enforcement and much rule evasion became characteristic of "bureaucratic" systems of higher education. As Chairholding professors became protected civil servants, their right to rule also generally became enacted into state law and codified in state administration and hence the rules of the state were often even turned to the strengthening of personal rulership and collegial monopoly at the operating levels. In this setting, administration at the level of the university had little chance to develop. The professors did not want it: the Ministry took care of overhead services; and the "administrative directors" and other field agents of the Ministry located at the universities generally had little leverage on the professors and their elected deans and rectors.

In cross-national perspective, the common Continental combination of faculty guild and national ministry may be seen as a structure that minimizes institutional competition and the play of market forces. Such nationalized structures as those of France and Italy have attempted to achieve equity by administratively equating institutions: the university degree is an award of the national system and not of the individual institution, and to study
law at one university is formally equal to studying law at another. Faculty are appointed within a single national personnel system, and promotion involves movement from one civil service category of rank and pay to another. Unitary standards damp the incentives for the separate institutions to better themselves by competing for talent and emphasizing distinctive approaches. And the unitary approach has had the great unanticipated consequence of inducing faculty members to transport their guild forms of authority, originally meant and still appropriate for small-scale organization, to the large-scale organization of national systems, or, in Germany, to a sub-national but still complex level, in order to protect themselves against politicians and bureaucrats. Central offices become permeated with and often captured by committees of senior professors that are simultaneously cases of collegial rule and national academic oligarchy: The guild as much as the bureaucracy prefers closed monopoly of a domain of work.

The historical production of modern academic organization on the Continent thus led gradually to the error of excessive order, with institutions inclined toward unity and uniformity. New forces, new plans, and new organizational forms have had great difficulty in penetrating such structures. As a result, the main thrust of reform in recent decades has been increasingly against national neatness. As these systems have attempted to move from elite to mass higher education, in a setting of the modern complex economy, they have had to face more heterogeneous consumer and manpower demands, thus giving them the problem of creating diverse programs and approaches in structures that are organically uncomfortable with planned as well as unplanned diversity. Adaptiveness then becomes a very great problem: neither the deliberate actions of planners nor the unplanned interaction of competitive
institutions is a powerful force compared to the institutionalized strength of academic oligarchs and ministerial bureaucrats. Major efforts in reform may be mounted occasionally by central edict, under such special conditions of crisis and regime as existed in France in 1968. But such efforts probably have lasting impact only as they disperse control and otherwise open up the domains long monopolized by the old forms. This may possibly be done by central edict, with the commander officially disbanding some old units and turning the troops loose to experiment and regroup. The French post-1968 reform, officially disbanding "Faculties" and allowing instructors to regroup in new units of education and research (UERs), has moved in this direction. A more basic hope of reform in the nationalized system lies in the broader effort in many countries to regionalize government. A general shift toward a decentralization of government and a deconcentration of administration would increase regional and local influences on the character of educational forms and admit more institutional competition.

THE BRITISH MODE

The British mode of academic organization has also been historically rooted in a substructure of guilds, but the nature of the superstructure has caused a quite different combination of interests than those vested in the European mode. The state bureaucracy has had a lesser hand. (Ashby, 1966; Reeves, 1970; Halsey and Trow, 1971; Moodie and Eustace, 1974). As chartered corporations composed of chartered colleges that could and did accumulate their own endowment, Oxford and Cambridge, dating from the thirteenth century, developed extensive autonomy from the controls of local and national departments of government. The four Scottish universities—St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh—originating in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, also were rooted outside the governmental bureaucracy. In the nineteenth
century, after six centuries of an Oxbridge monopoly, England developed civic universities in such industrial cities as Manchester and Birmingham and a unique academic holding company for the nation and the Empire, in the form of the University of London, which had affiliated colleges in India and Ceylon, Africa and the West Indies as well as in England. Again, the mechanism of a chartered autonomous corporation was used, rather than the Continental device of placing the university inside of a governmental bureau and teachers inside the civil service. Autonomy meant that each institution was free to admit its own students, arrange its own courses, hire its own faculty, own its own property, largely raise its own income, and pay its own bills.

Guild control flourished in this British pattern of remote state supervision, especially in the two oldest universities whose historical primacy and towering prestige have subtly defined for all other universities a British style of academic control. Immensely elaborate and only partly codified rules and norms of personal privilege and collegial hegemony developed in a web of chairs, departments, faculties, colleges within universities, senates, councils, and courts. But within the autonomy gained by the individual university, guild authority was not the only form of authority. Especially outside of Oxford and Cambridge, laymen have been systematically included in an upper tier of academic government (the "Council") and a key administrative post has been provided in the form of the Vice-Chancellorship. These participants have not been completely dependent on the professors, nor have they operated as functionaries of the state. Responsible for the welfare of the institution as a whole, especially the Vice-Chancellor, their role mandates have helped tilt the guild interests of the professors...
toward a sense of corporate identity.

In short, compared to academic organization on the Continent, the British institutions have been responsible for their own administration and have evolved several forms of participation in that responsibility. Bureaucratic and trustee principles of authority have had a local role -- a major role compared to the Continent, a minor one when compared to academic structure in the United States -- with the forms appropriate for those principles interfused with the old autocratic and collegial rights of the professoriate. Compared to the top-bottom concentration of sources of power found in the European systems, the British mode has a weaker top but a strengthened middle. The crucial test has been that the faculty clusters have had to relate primarily to administrators and laymen who hold university-level responsibilities rather than to officials who are directly a part of a bureau of government.

Professorial control exercised across autonomous institutions has also been subtly elaborate in Britain, more so than in the United States. The practice of "external examiners," in which students are tested by professors from other institutions (and hence in which their own teachers are indirectly and informally assessed), has provided much linkage among institutions. When such inter-visitations become standard, a whole "interorganizational field" that is not deliberately administered may at the same time be well-organized and brought to common practice by mutual tacit agreement, a set of norms about acceptable behavior grounded in a basic consensus (Warren, Rose, and Bergunder, 1974). Such controls that are elaborated from the bottom-up can be more compelling than the formal regulations of national systems. Their great play in Britain helps to explain (a) why that country apparently had
a system long before it had a formal system; and (b) why uniform practice and common commitment to certain standards might possibly obtain more in a set of autonomous institutions than in a nationalized administrative framework. Collegial pressure can be more cohesive than bureaucratic pressure, among institutions as well as between them.

The autonomy of individual universities from state supervision has been so strongly rooted in Britain that we can speak of the bottom controlling the top of the national "system" until World War II. The University Grants Committee, created in 1919 as a way of funneling increasing amounts of government money to the universities, has been a group of university professors who received money directly from the British Treasurer and doled out lumped sums to the individual universities. This "buffer" mechanism became heralded internationally as an excellent way of preserving institutional autonomy, as formerly independent organizations became parts of an emerging national system. It was also, of course, a grand case of national academic oligarchy, one in which commitment to high standards of traditional performance became institutionalized. But increasingly during the 1950s and the 1960s, growing national financial support has meant more direction from the top. The University Grants Committee lost its own autonomous position in the late 1960s as it was placed under the national Department of Education and Science. The Department has become a more formidable instrument of government policy; for example, willing and able to pump monies into a non-university sector at the apparent expense of the universities, particularly the older ones that appear to be expensive bastions of privilege. The Department and the UGC now operate as policy centers in a national system, selecting directions of effort, determining salary scales, and establishing guidelines that encourage some universities not to do certain things they would have
done if left to their own initiatives. In these respects, the British have moved toward the Continental mode in which nearly all units of higher education fall under a national bureau. Traditionalized autonomy remains a force of fragmentation that resists this nationalizing movement; but, at the same time, the movement into a national mold is coming about at a time when the central government has (a) modern means of administration for exacting integration, (b) a compelling economic need to conserve in a high-cost sector, and (c) at least some of the time, the ideological inclination to eliminate private enterprises and to seek equality and equity through the administrative arms of the central state. In a system in which there has been much voluntary convergence, centering in emulation of the academic styles of Oxford and Cambridge and the subtle linkages forged by external examiners, there has been added much induced convergence through nationalized administration.

**THE AMERICAN MODE**

The general modern structure of academic organization in the United States is a confusing mixture of forms of organization and types of authority, a unique combination that has resulted from the conditions under which different sectors have emerged, the ways in which interests became vested, and the impact of earlier forms on later ones. The first institutional type to emerge was not the university, as in Europe and Britain, but the small college now known as the private liberal arts college. That form was organized
from the top down, as Protestant sects in the colonial period set up boards of managers, drawn primarily from outside academic life and from outside governmental authority, to hire and fire teachers, appoint and dismiss a president, and otherwise be responsible for the enterprise (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955). Trustee authority thus came first, before either administrative or faculty authority, a way of governing that later became habitual even in the public sector. There was little or no sense of craft and no guild organization on the part of either faculty or students. These small "private" colleges multiplied rapidly in the westward expansion of the nineteenth century, especially under the spur of zealous denominational competition. And while some decades saw high institutional deathrates as well as high birthrates, in this voluntary-association form of higher education that was without a state-supported niche, some nine hundred of them were in existence by 1900, with the sector as a whole firmly fixed in the educational structure of the country.

By that time, several other sectors had emerged, conditioned by the existence and nature of the college. The university came late to America: the first newly-established university, Johns Hopkins, dates only from 1876; other institutions evolved from college to university, with Yale developing "graduate work" in the 1850s and awarding the first American Ph.D. in 1861 and Harvard establishing a graduate department in the 1870s. With others soon newly organized or following a similar evolution, a major prestigious sector of private universities was well in place by the turn of the century. At the same time, a sector of public universities was also emerging. The first universities supported by the governments of the individual states date from the 1780s and 1790s, but it was not until after the Civil War and
toward the end of the nineteenth century that they developed full form, partly due to the strengthened resources provided the states by the national government through the famous land-grant legislation of the Morrill Acts (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965; Storr, 1953).

The coming of the university, after the institutionalization of the four-year college, meant a two-tier structure: advanced specialization was handled as graduate work and professional school training, a distinctive component of the university, by placing it on top of the college structure. If the German university had been borrowed in its entirety, the American university would have accepted students directly out of high school as qualified to enter directly the professional schools and the graduate school. But the borrowed idea of the research-centered university had to have its supporting forms adapted to American established expectations and the well-vested interest in the undergraduate college. Thus a new type of university emerged, one not only more comprehensive in fields covered but also more vertical in scope, layered to include general education at the bottom and specialized education at the top. The bottom part in the state university was the main basis of appeal for support from the state population and the state authorities. The undergraduate part in the private university was a similar basis for support from the alumni and for effective competition against the hundreds of colleges that did not become universities. The upper level, particularly centered on research in the graduate school, vested the interests of the scientific disciplines and the research scholar.

The device of a trustee board was carried over from the private colleges into the public as well as the private universities; it had become by the first half of the nineteenth century the American mechanism for bridging between public accountability and the professional autonomy of academicians.
and their institutions, in sharp contrast to the assumption on the Continent and in most countries of the world that a governmental ministry was the appropriate mechanism. With trustees formally in charge and formally responsible, administrative services and responsibilities did not develop importantly at some level of organization above them, e.g., in a state department of education or a governor’s office, but rather became grouped under them in the form of campus administration. In the private universities and even more in public ones, a separate group of administrators developed, topped by a President appointed by the trustees and holding powers delegated downward from the board. Presidential leadership came into its own during the latter part of the nineteenth century—swashbuckling captains of erudition in the eyes of Thorstein Veblen (Veblen, 1954)—and bureaucratic administration located within the institution itself, rather than within a higher state ministry, became by the turn of the century another distinctive form in the American mode (Veysey, 1965).

Then, too, the setting in which trustees and administrators operated was always inherently competitive, within the major sectors as well as between them, within the individual states as well as among them. The competitive dynamism that was endemic among the small colleges took a great leap forward in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the autonomous private universities and the state-supported public universities set out to become great research universities; or at least to become a well-regarded American university that would bring some honor to supporters; or, as last resort, to establish enough of a niche to give hope that students would continue to appear, the faculty would not leave, and the bills would be paid. So much about the present structure of American higher education is a result of the role given to private initiative and voluntary association in the
to nineteenth century, together with the dispersal of public responsibility from the national level to that of the individual states which, it then turned out, was to mean not ten or twelve provincial authorities in a territory the size of a European state but the exceedingly large number of forty-eight to fifty independent governmental authorities originating and developing public higher education under conditions that varied greatly according to time of settlement and regional differences within a large continental territory. No national office played any continuing role in this unplanned aggregation of institutions, as in the French central-administration version of the European mode; no state dominated the others, or even set the pace, as in the Prussian influence on the other Länder in the German federal-structure version of the European style. Instead, the American conditions led to an unparalleled national diversity of institutions, dispersed control, and marked institutional competition.

If the university came late to America, guild forms of academic control came even later. Preceded by the trustee mechanism and even, in real strength, by university administration, faculty claims of authority were never able to claim historical primacy. As forms of faculty control emerged, they were conditioned by and blended with trustee and administrative control and the unitary nature of organization that had been thereby established. Unlike on the Continent where academic organization began as a confederation of guilds, the original building block was the unitary college. Beginning in the first half of the nineteenth century, the unitary college needed sub-division in order to handle specialization, the department emerged as an operating unit that was to be both a collegial order and a bureaucratic form. Within it, personal rule could obtain in specialties and the faculty members could together decide on certain matters, much in the style of the Chairholding
professors on the Continent. An ideological claim to guild-like rule was also gradually elaborated, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, drawing on the oldest traditions of the university, the great nineteenth-century German model of the research university, and the concept of academic freedom. More operational leeway was needed for the emerging function of research and for a critical approach to received ideas. The department also emerged as the lowest unit in a bureaucratic structure, with the chairman so responsible to administrative superiors as well as to colleagues that he became a classic and enduring case of the managerial man-in-the-middle. Professors had to win their way to collegial primacy in matters of curriculum and selection of personnel within the context of established powers of strong administration working under the ultimate and residual powers of lay trustees.

Faculty influence has varied considerably among the major institutional types of the diffuse American system, correlating generally with age and prestige. For example, while high in leading private and public universities and the leading private colleges, it has been lower in the rearguard institutions of each of these sectors. And it has been relatively low in two sectors that emerged late in time, where origins and development were connected to the already established modes of American administration in elementary and secondary education. One of these sectors began in the last half of the nineteenth century in the form of a "normal school" for training elementary school teachers, which then evolved into a "teachers college" in the first decades of this century that awarded a bachelor's degree and prepared secondary-school as well as elementary-school personnel, and then still later evolved into a "state college," a public comprehensive college,
and recently sometimes into the title and even the competence of "state university." The historical association of this form with state boards of education responsible for the lower schools and with the schools themselves admitted patterns of heavy dominance by trustees and administrators that were more characteristic of the lower levels than of post-secondary education, and control from the top has persisted later in time. Such control has been even stronger in the now-major sector of community colleges, a twentieth-century phenomenon that was operational before World War II but did not flower across the country until the great expansion into mass higher education of the 1950s and 1960s. This form originated and developed considerably as an upward reach of systems of secondary education. It has been extensively staffed by secondary-school administrators and teachers and governed by local boards of laymen that also governed the lower schools or by boards that were modeled on that type of control.

It has been primarily in the community college sector and secondly among the state colleges that instructors have been inclined to join faculty unions as a new form of faculty influence. The relatively weak power position of teachers in these settings has been exacerbated by the growing scale and complexity of large organization that removes the top further from the bottom and horizontally separates divisions. The reach for the union means yet another experiment in how to combine collegial and bureaucratic rule, with union officialdom added to the set of groups whose interests become vested in legitimate rights.

CONCLUSION

The stubborn momentum of organizational forms and types of control stems naturally from the traditionalizing of their practices, the vesting of group...
interest in their continuation, and the working out of justifying ideologies. The momentum is increased when the forms and types acquire niches in the larger organizational ecology that protects them against competition and invidious comparison. Judged in all these terms, colleges and universities and other carrying mechanisms in higher education often score high. Comprehension of the sources and direction of the momentum of educational structure is needed in each country if policy is to speak realistically to the possibilities of reform.

Contrary to the popular view that old organizations are rigid and new ones flexible, there stands the likelihood that long-lived organizations, surviving war, depression and political attack, have devised adaptive mechanisms as well as protective niches. One primary adaptive feature of universities and colleges may be their cellular construction: the operating level of chairs, institutes, departments, divisions, and school consists not of units linked in an integrated process of production or service, but of free-standing units, partly self-governing, that can be individually added or dropped, augmented or diminished. The structure responds spasmodically to the quasi-independent dynamics of academic disciplines, with the addition of such new cells as departments of biophysics and biochemistry. Cells linked to declining fields and functions are not easily lopped off, but generally receive the fate of lingering death by personnel attenuation, reduced budget, and meager emotional and moral bonding to the evolving larger complex. Perhaps universities persist so well because each is typically an organization of disposable parts whose own self-renewal is rooted considerably in the internal thrust of developing fields of knowledge. Their survival is enhanced by the particularly by slack and redundancy built up over time and the capacity of faculty clusters
withdraw into the bunkers of guild self-organization whenever they are under heaviest attack. Reasons abound why the older a university or college is, the less likely it is to die.

The long-view of structure of post-secondary education reveals the primary importance of monopoly, authoritarianism, and disorder among organizational forms. A monopoly of power may be a great instrument of change, as when an authoritarian ruler revamps an existing melange of institutions by placing them all in a national imperial university. But a monopoly of power or of form is also the great source of rigidity, establishing conditions that once institutionalized effectively preclude major change for decades (and sometimes centuries) to come. In the turbulent environment of the last quarter of the twentieth century, the touchstone of viability in national academic systems has become balance of power and differentiation, even disorder, among organizational types. In possessing these characteristics, some nations are historically luckier than others.

In all nations, the bedrock task in reform is to help balance unilinear and multilinear trends. The unilinear trend is toward the embracing system, at provincial and national levels; the multilinear evolution is toward differentiation and diversification within the whole that expresses a host of interests and allows for spontaneous adjustment in the thousand and one segments that compose the organized social complexity of education. The enlightened institutional leader, governmental official, and educational planner must to anticipate the consequences of current policy alternatives for long-run balance between the forces of diversity and unity, division and cohesion.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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