The Japanese university system has been evolving gradually from more traditional patterns to more modern ones in terms of increased efficiency and participation, as well as from an elite to a mass enrollment system. However, the basic patterns of control and decisionmaking have changed little. The universities have been able to resist intrusions by the Ministry of Education, but many needed reforms have not taken place. Frustrated in its attempts to introduce structural reforms in existing universities, the Ministry of Education has turned more to the use of incentives to accomplish its aims, and it has established some new institutions on its own initiative. In the long run, these are likely to have considerable influence on the shape of Japanese higher education. (Author)
Institution for Social and Policy Studies

YALE UNIVERSITY

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THE STRUCTURE OF ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN
by
Donald F. Wheeler
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Program of Comparative and Historical Studies of Higher Education
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
Yale University
1732 Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520
The postwar system of higher education in Japan reflects largely unchanged the hierarchy of universities already in place in prewar times. In this hierarchy, several prestigious universities served as models for, and exerted strong influence on, other institutions of higher education in such matters as curriculum, educational policy, and patterns of administration. They have also dominated the major higher education interest groups that articulate the position of the universities vis-à-vis the Ministry of Education and academic and professional associations. Finally, they have attracted the ablest students who have later been placed in the most influential positions in society.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

Tokyo Imperial University, the prestigious model for so many other universities in Japan, was established by the national government in 1886 as the first of seven Imperial
Universities that were to "provide instruction in the arts and sciences and to inquire into the mysteries of learning in accordance with the needs of the state." The two most prominent private universities today were also founded early. The Tokyo Senmon Gakko, predecessor of Waseda (1882), was founded by Okuma Shigenobu after he left the government; its purpose was to train progressive leaders. Keio (1871) was founded by Fukuzawa Yukichi to provide modern enlightenment and practical learning.

By 1925, Japanese higher education consisted of a national and a private sector, each containing two different types of institutions: universities and Special Schools or colleges (Senmon Gakko). National institutions were higher in prestige than were private institutions, and universities were higher than colleges. The prestige hierarchy among these institutions was, and to some extent continues to be, supported by the deliberate government policy of selective distribution of the most important resources of the development of the system: financial support, legal recognition, and easy access by graduates to the civil service. For example, before World War II Tokyo Imperial University (which later became Tokyo University or Todai)
Japan was the leader in the elite club of Imperial Universities. It received the greatest appropriations and its graduates could enter many branches of the higher civil service without an examination. In contrast, private institutions were denied legal recognition as universities until 1918, and received almost no government monies; moreover, their graduates were required to pass a battery of examinations for civil service posts.

From the point of view of the government, there was a definite division of labor between different types of institutions. The Imperial Universities, particularly Tokyo Imperial, were charged with the task of basic and applied research, including the introduction and diffusion of Western learning. They also had the task of educating the highest echelon of professionals and public officials. The national-level Special Schools trained middle-echelon technicians, professionals, and public officials. National institutions were established to serve the needs of the national government and were administered by the Ministry of Education. A few local government universities were established by municipalities and prefectures to fulfill particular needs of their localities.
The private sector was left with the task of responding to nongovernmental needs: the increasing demand for the opportunity for higher education and the manpower needs of industry and business. The private institutions originated as Special Schools. They were legally created as juridical persons under the authority of their own boards of trustees. Because the private colleges were dependent on student tuition for their survival, the curriculum was heavy on the side of the social sciences and humanities, fields that could accommodate many students in large lecture halls. Private colleges also increased their enrollments by establishing several courses of study requiring different levels of preparation. The best private Special Schools gradually added new and more advanced courses of study, and were eventually given status as universities, becoming the leading private universities.

After World War II the American occupation reforms replaced multitrack secondary education with a single-track system that made broader access to higher education possible. The Imperial Universities were downgraded and many Special Schools were upgraded to the status of universities. Graduates from any high school were allowed to take the entrance
Japan

Although these reforms opened up access to higher education and flattened the prestige hierarchy of universities somewhat, the prewar government policy of preferential resource allocation to certain elite institutions has continued and the prestige rankings of universities have remained basically unchanged. (See Table 1.)

**TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS**

Higher education in Japan today consists of the following types of institutions differing in prestige, relationship to the state (national, local government, or privately administered), and function (emphasis on research, education, or training).

**National Institutions**

The leading national research universities are multifaculty institutions including most disciplines and professions. They are largely composed of undergraduates working for the B.A. or B.S. degrees, but offer graduate education in each faculty leading to the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, accompanied by strong research programs. The chair system is exclusive to these universities and to the
Table 1
HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL AND PRIVATE
1935 and 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1935 Percentage of:</th>
<th>1970 Percentage of:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students Institutions</td>
<td>Students Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Universities*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other National Institutions**</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total National</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private and Local Universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large***</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Private and Local</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Private and Local</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

*In 1935, these institutions included Special Schools; Higher Normal Schools, and Teacher Training Institutes. In 1970, these included universities, technical colleges, and junior colleges.

**In 1935, these institutions included Special Schools; Higher Normal Schools, and Teacher Training Institutes. In 1970, these included universities, technical colleges, and junior colleges.

***In 1935, these were the only local and private universities. In 1970, these universities enrolled 8,000 or more students.

****In 1935, these were Special Schools. In 1970, these included universities, technical colleges, and junior colleges.

medical faculties of other national universities.

Highest in prestige is the University of Tokyo, followed by Kyoto University. Considerably below these are the other former Imperial Universities (Tohoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido, Osaka, and Nagoya). The prestige ranking corresponds to the order in which they were founded. Several other important national universities located mainly in Tokyo, such as Tokyo University of Education (now becoming Tsukuba University), Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Hitotsubashi University, are also leading research universities.

The remaining national universities have from one to several faculties and some graduate programs leading to the M.A. degree. All were formerly Special Schools upgraded to universities in the postwar system. Multifaculty universities are generally the result of the amalgamation of several former Special Schools. There is at least one of these national universities in each of Japan's forty-seven prefectures and more than one in the most populous prefectures, such as Tokyo and Osaka. Ranking below these universities are the short-cycle technical colleges and junior colleges.
Private and Local Government Institutions

The most prestigious private and local government universities have more than 10,000 students and were given university status before World War II. At the top in prestige are Waseda and Keio, followed by Chuo, Doshisha, Hosei, Jochi, Meiji, Rikkyo, and others. Each university is likely to have some prestigious undergraduate faculties and a few graduate departments offering the Ph.D. Although their commitment to research is much less than that of the leading national research universities, the best of these institutions are equivalent in prestige to some of the research universities. There are a few small prestigious private universities such as International Christian University and the big three private women's institutions: Japan Women's University, Tokyo Woman's Christian College, and Tsuda College. Universities administered by prefectures and cities have been able to maintain rather high standards and prestige because of local government support.

The smaller private universities and junior colleges are less prestigious institutions. Some are the successors of Special Schools; others are newly created postwar institutions with meager resources. The two-year junior
colleges admit mainly women and are at the bottom of the prestige hierarchy.

Factors Affecting Prestige

From the above, it is clear that several factors are highly correlated with prestige: (1) founding body; (2) time of founding; (3) centrality of research or training function; (4) number of faculties and graduate faculties; (5) number of prestigious faculties; and (6) size. The most prestigious university is likely to be national, founded early, research oriented, comprehensive, with a large number of renowned faculties and graduate faculties, and large in terms of student enrollment and number of faculty members. The University of Tokyo (Todai) best fits the description and occupies a commanding position in Japanese higher education, not matched by any other single university in the countries treated in this book.

The steep prestige hierarchy of institutions of higher education strongly influences, and is reinforced by, patterns of student admissions and career recruitment. To oversimplify the matter, the best students go to the most prestigious universities and receive the best career opportunities.
The prestige ranking of a university is maintained through its ability to place graduates in the most prominent companies and government bureaus.

The basic device for allocating students of differing ability to universities of differing reputation is competition via the university entrance examination. Powerful pressures are exerted on most Japanese young people from an early age to go to the best university they are capable of entering. Parents see this as the path to security and upward mobility. Secondary schools push their students because their reputation depends on their success rates in entrance examinations. A national university is preferable because of low tuition, but the places available are limited (only 20 percent of the students go to national universities).

Entrance examinations are administered by the individual faculties of universities and are open to all secondary school graduates. Students usually take the exams of several of the highest-ranking faculties of universities they think they could enter. They judge their probability of success on the basis of commercially administered practice exams and advice from secondary school counselors. Most students who fail try again after a year of individual study or
examination-preparation school.

The basic mechanism for allocating talented graduates to key employment positions is the corporate practice of hiring a set quota of graduates from a selected group of high-prestige universities each year for top and middle management positions in the future. These universities maintain their reputations by supplying larger numbers of graduates than other institutions to the best corporations. The corporations can still be highly selective concerning whom they hire from within these universities. The prestigious universities are also favored in the higher civil service—not through quotas, since anyone can take the qualifying examination—but through the rapid promotion of their graduates after entering.

This system, based on the delicately balanced relationship between the prestige hierarchy of universities, selection of students, and employment of graduates, is widely regarded as fair (based on achievement and high motivation rather than favoritism), efficient (there is a manageble method for selecting a few from the many), and effective (the net is cast wide and highly talented persons are found). However, the high priority placed on written entrance examinations is criticized because of the emphasis on rote learning and
because life chances depend too much on the results of one examination and too little on subsequent performance. The university entrance examination system thus supports the patterns of student admissions and career recruitment which, in turn, reinforce the hierarchy of universities.

**LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION**

Although decision making differs considerably between the four kinds of institutions identified earlier—leading national research universities, other national universities and colleges, high-prestige private and local government universities, and lower prestige private universities and colleges—our brief analysis of the process at various levels of organization will emphasize features that are common to many universities. Because the leading research national universities exemplify some of these features, they will be our primary example.

The smallest unit of organization in the leading national research universities is the chair. Headed by the chairholder, who is a full professor (kyōju), the chair includes an associate professor (jokyōju) and one to three
assistants. Since the chair consists of several members and not simply the full professor, it is often referred to as a "sofa" rather than a chair. The chair is fundamentally a unit for research activities and for the organization and teaching of a given body of knowledge on both undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also the basic administrative unit for calculating the budget for teaching and research (excluding salaries). There are three kinds of chairs with differing but fixed stipends: the ordinary chair, the experimental chair, and the clinical chair. Four times the ordinary chair budget is available for the experimental chair and more than that for the clinical chair. Chairholders are not usually heads of research institutes in their universities (as they are in Germany), but they may have a research institute chair in addition to their university chair.

The degree of control the chairholder has over decision making related to his chair differs greatly by university faculty and in individual cases. The chairholder tends to be more powerful in fields where the chair budget is high and outside research funds are available, as in the natural sciences and medicine. In some cases, the chairholder plays
a dominant role in the selection of the other personnel for his chair, including his heir apparent. The chairholder may also determine the research topics of the other personnel of the chair and graduate students. Typically, however, the members of the chair accommodate each other.

In many cases the locus of decision making on Level 1 is in the department (札) rather than the chair. For almost all Japanese universities—national, local, and private—the department is the basic unit of organization. The allocation of research funds formally tied to the chairs and personnel decisions generally take place at the departmental level. Junior faculty members usually carry more weight in such departments than in the chair-system national universities.

The faculty (Level 2) is a federation of chairs in a few national universities (as formerly in Germany and France and still in Italy), and a federation of departments in most universities. An autonomous, self-contained educational and administrative unit, the faculty has power to establish its own educational program within broad limits set by the Ministry of Education. The faculty is administered by a dean (elected by the faculty members for a two-year term) and the faculty council (Kyojukai), assisted by an administrative
staff of Ministry of Education employees in the case of the national universities. The dean receives no extra salary and usually continues to teach although with a reduced course load. The dean has little independent power since decisions are arrived at through group consensus. Policy decisions are made by the faculty council with professors, associate professors, and in some cases, lecturers (kōshi) and assistants (jōshū) participating. Faculty committees, such as those handling academic affairs, student affairs, and admissions, often do spadework for the faculty council relying on the clerical assistance of civil servants from the Ministry of Education.

On Level 3 are the president, the university senate (in national and other public universities) or the board of trustees (in private universities), and the administrative staff. The president is elected by the faculty members typically for a first term of four years with the possibility of reelection once. Most universities and certainly the most prestigious ones invariably elect one of their own faculty members as president. The less prestigious national universities often select as president an eminent professor from a prestigious university who is approaching the usual.
mandatory retirement age of sixty.

The university senate of the University of Tokyo illustrates the typical composition of senates: It includes deans (10) and two additional elected faculty representatives from each faculty (30 in all), directors of research institutes (14), the director of the administrative staff (jimukyokuchô) who is ex officio, and the president of the university as chairman. Members of the senate are assigned as chairmen of university committees such as academic affairs, student affairs, and the library.

The director of the administrative staff is appointed by and responsible to the Ministry of Education, although the university president often plays a part in his selection. He serves under the president, but he is also the direct representative of the ministry in many matters. Within the ministry this position carries little prestige or political power. Members of the administrative staff are rarely experts in the substance of the educational matters they deal with. However, in private universities the professionalization of administrative staff and their initiative in policy matters have increased greatly in recent years. Their skills have been greatly needed in the face of financial problems and student disputes.
The senate (national universities) has impressive formal powers, but these are largely delegated to an informal and much more manageable body called the "dean's meeting" (Gakubucho Kaigi), which typically gathers once a week in contrast to the senate's monthly meetings. The main criterion of a good president is his ability to achieve consensus among the deans. There are virtually no legitimate means for making important overall decisions without a consensus of the deans. The opposition of a dean or even his absence from a meeting can prevent or postpone decisions for a long period.

The boards of trustees of private universities are structurally equivalent to university senates in national universities and serve similar functions. They are composed mainly of alumni, friends of the university, and often faculty members. The top university administrators are typically members of the board. There is little support in Japan for the concept that those who represent outside interests or the "public" interest should be on the governing boards of either private or national universities. It is assumed that outsiders could never comprehend the unique complexities of a particular university. Behind this
rationale is the realistic prognosis that outsiders would make the achievement of consensus much more difficult. In the case of private universities, however, the concept of "insider" includes representatives of the interest of the founder or establishing group, such as a religious body.

The standing committee of the board of trustees (doumu rijiki) of private universities corresponds to the dean's meeting in national universities in that it works out a consensus for the trustees' approval. It differs from the dean's meeting in that the leading members are loyal aides of the president, helping to formulate and implement his policies. Although members of the standing committee are faculty members and are largely untrained for administration, they and the president act as full-time administrators. Committee members are likely to have (and to need) more power than the president and senate members at national universities since they directly bear the highest responsibility for administration and finance. Private universities cannot fall back on the ministry to carry them through a crisis.

There are some multicampus universities (Level 4) in Japan, but the pattern of control does not significantly differ from that of other faculties within universities—that
is, they operate as semiautonomous units and represent their interests through participation in the university senate (national) or board of trustees (private). There are two prominent examples: The University of Tokyo has facilities spread throughout Japan; its Faculty of General Studies, where all undergraduates spend their initial two years, is ten miles from the main campus where the facilities for upper classmen, graduate students, and most of the research institutes are located. It is represented on the university senate. Japan's largest private university, Nihon (80,000 students), has several campuses with representatives on the board of trustees. In this case, however, there is a high degree of financial independence for each campus.

Before World War II, the control of the Ministry of Education (Level 6) over higher education was direct and pervasive. Only the Imperial Universities were favored with autonomy and academic freedom. This was with the expectation that open inquiry would in the long run lead to a greater contribution to the state. Faculty members of Imperial Universities could choose their deans and president. Their faculty councils had independent authority. Other national institutions of higher education were not granted autonomy.
or academic freedom. Although private universities had independent boards of trustees and status as juridical persons, they were also subject to periodic state inspections. Direct interference in the internal affairs of all types of institutions of higher education occurred regularly during World War II.

The American occupation forces successfully diminished the power of the Ministry of Education and decentralized control of higher education. These reforms were enthusiastically supported by the universities, the "progressive" political parties, news media and public opinion. A strong "allergy" to state interference in the internal affairs of universities had developed as a result of the state's abuses of the university during the war.

The occupation reforms were translated into national policy through Article 23 of the Constitution of 1947 which states, "Academic freedom is guaranteed," and also through the Fundamental Law of Education (1947) and the Basic School Education Law (1947). Other laws gave guidelines for the establishment of the new university system. Because of the strong opposition of the university community and the public to interference, the Ministry of Education was not able to pass
any law regulating the internal governance of the university until 1969. As the 1964 White Paper on Education states:

[In the postwar period] universities began to function without having clarified the relationships between university administrative organs, its teaching members, and the other employees or the regulations for smooth cooperation. Such important questions as the extent of the powers of the faculty conference, its size and its relation to the deans and the president; the relations between the autonomy of the university and the political freedom of individual teachers; the connection between the supervisory rights of a university as an educational institution and the self-governing activities of the students, etc. were optimistically left for the future to solve.8

This helps to account for the haphazard, nonbureaucratic manner in which decision making in universities evolved in the postwar period. The Ministry of Education often attempted to exert its influence in an ad hoc manner. The boundary lines of authority were unclear, and it was in the interest of the universities to keep them unclear since any clarification
would very likely mean a diminution of their autonomy. For many reasons, including the lack of legal authorization and the opposition of the university community and the public, the Ministry of Education has exercised its powers with considerable restraint. In most cases "reasonable" compromises have been worked out between the Ministry of Education and university officials.

As a result of American occupation reforms of higher education, the government no longer gives accreditation and supervises the standards of established academic institutions. To regulate standards, the universities established the University Accreditation Association. However, the Association has not succeeded in enforcing adequate standards for initial accreditation, nor has it reviewed the many cases where accredited institutions have significantly relaxed their standards.

Though substantially reduced since the war, the powers of the Ministry of Education are hardly negligible, particularly as they apply to the national universities and colleges for which it has direct responsibility: (1) the ministry determines national policies toward higher education; (2) through its organ, the University Chartering Council, it establishes and
abolishes institutions; (3) it establishes new chairs, faculties, and institutes; (4) with the approval of the Ministry of Finance, it determines the budget for higher education and individual institutions as well as salaries and student fees; (5) it approves university recommendations of staff promotions and appointments of faculty members, deans, and presidents; and (6) it sets standards for degrees.

The Ministry of Education also has some control over course offerings through setting degree requirements, although not over the content of the courses.

The Ministry of Education has exercised its authority in a variety of ways. Under the strong influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (in power except for a few short lapses throughout the postwar period) the ministry has set policies for higher education. It has commissioned its own appointed internal consultative organ, the Central Council for Education (CCE) to study aspects of higher education and make recommendations. The CCE has strongly reflected the views of Japan's financial circles and because of this and because the ministry exercises firm control over its agenda, procedures, and reports, most scholars—particularly those of a liberal bent—have refused to serve on it. The
Japan Teacher's Union, the National Universities Association, various private university associations, the Japan Academy of Science, and various on-campus political groups of students and professors have firmly opposed the general policies of the CCP. Thus CCP policies have been implemented only slightly.

The leading national research universities usually control their everyday internal affairs with considerable autonomy (sometimes by default), and can more adequately respond to the "carrot and stick" approach of the ministry than can the other national universities. Private universities can avoid the "stick" but because of their weak financial situation are often vulnerable to the "carrot."

The power of the Ministry of Education to establish new institutions has been amply used. The University Chartering Council (the Private University Chartering Council, in the case of private universities) must screen all applications. In the process, the chartering council influences decisions on the number and kinds of faculties, the disciplines that will be included in each faculty, and even the names given to the faculties. For example, several years ago the council refused to approve a Human Sciences Faculty at Wako University.
During most of the postwar period, the University Chartering Council has had lax quality standards, sometimes approving new universities that did not meet minimum standards. One scholar argues that, in order to meet the increased demand for places in the university and industry's needs for skilled manpower at the least possible cost, there was a conscious ministry policy of encouraging the rapid expansion of private universities— with disastrous consequences for the quality of education.10

The Ministry of Education also shapes the development of higher education through selective granting of requests for new chairs, faculties, institutes, and campuses to existing institutions. For example, the number of chairs in the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Tokyo increased rapidly after the ministry changed its science policy in response to Sputnik. The University of Tokyo was able to take advantage of this policy to maintain its position of eminence in higher education, but at the expense of the previous balance between the humanities and pure and applied sciences.

The degree of discretion the Ministry of Education can exercise over the budget is limited and is largely related
to the support of new institutions it charters and to the establishment of new chairs, faculties, institutes, and campuses at older institutions. The Ministry of Education is beholden to the more powerful Ministry of Finance for approval of item changes before the budget is sent to the National Diet. Most of the funds for higher education are recurring expenses with regular annual increases.

The power of the Ministry of Education to approve university-recommended staff promotions and appointments of faculty members, deans, and presidents can influence the university choices of candidate although the ministry almost never exercises a veto.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION MAKING:**
**CONSENSUS AND THE CONTAINMENT OF CONFLICT**

A simple description of the formal levels of organization tells us less about how decisions are made in Japanese universities than in the universities in other countries treated in this book. The reason is that the attempt to get a broad consensus between levels is a central characteristic of decision making in Japanese universities and informal intermediary levels play an important role in this. Every
attempt is made to avoid open conflict. In this pattern of decision making it is often difficult to locate the main sources of a decision.

First, let us examine this process in the case of establishing a new chair at a national university. Proposals for new chairs come from the chairholders or departments (Level 1). All requests are then discussed in the faculty councils of each faculty (Level 2) and their priority listing is taken to the dean's meeting for discussion (Level 3). The dean's meeting then makes its priority listing of new chairs to be requested from the Ministry of Education (Level 6). The merits of each proposed chair and the probability that the Ministry of Education would grant the request are discussed, but the crucial factor in setting priorities within dean's meetings is "whose turn it is," based on the granting of previous requests. After the priority list is decided, the president (Level 3) sounds out the Ministry of Education on what new chairs are likely to be granted. The president then proposes these chairs to the university senate; the senate officially requests them; and they are normally granted.

Certain distinctive characteristics of the
consensus-formation process become clear:

1. Leaders from each level of organization must join in making important decisions. Leaders on each level forge consensus on their level. Then they join with the leaders of the other levels to form a consensus between levels. Seniority and position in the organization dictate the extent to which an individual participates in the decision making and insists on his own viewpoint. In the end, ideally, all participants support the leader, and the leader takes all participants into account according to their different status in the group. However, students are not considered to have an independent role in university decision making. They are viewed as apprentices of individual faculty members or as clients of a faculty committee on student affairs. Student self-government associations are officially for student affairs not for university affairs.

2. Each unit filters all its requests through one unit above it in the hierarchy. The unit above harmonizes all requests from below. Again, students have no formal part in this process.
3. Achieving a consensus between levels is greatly assisted by sending the proposal up and down the line (ringi). The ringi may occur when a proposal is initiated, when the decision is being made, or after the decision has been made as a confirmation of consensus.

4. Informal units such as the dean's meeting work out the consensus and prepare formal proposals for smooth passage by the official bodies. Informal negotiations (nemawashi) between official representatives—such as those between university presidents and officials of the Ministry of Education—are also important.

5. Formal decision-making bodies such as the university senate ratify the consensus that has already been achieved.

There is little communication between different units on the same level of organization except through leaders who meet to resolve differences between the units they represent, for example, in the dean's meeting. Units on the same level of organization are competing with one another for favorable treatment by the unit above. Thus cleavages and conflict within the university usually follow faculty and departmental lines. Often, however, cleavages based on generational or
or ideological differences (which overlap somewhat) cut across faculty and departmental lines and threaten the usual mechanisms of consensus formation. The "traditionalists" (usually senior professors in positions of responsibility) aim at unanimity (formalism of ends) by including only the most senior people on each level in the consensus making between levels. The "modernists" resist the traditional value of unanimity on the grounds that their concerns are not given due consideration. They press for the use of formal democratic procedures (formalism of means) such as written agendas, open meetings, and majority votes—mechanisms that could destroy the present consensus-formation process, based as it is on agreement between the leaders of units on each level of organization. In practice, the traditionalists often accommodate the modernists on substantive issues in order to avoid procedural changes that would undermine their control. The New Left radicals on the faculty reject piecemeal reforms and often refuse to participate. The modernists have gradually gained in numbers and influence during the postwar period; the active constituency involved in decision making has gradually broadened.
Conflict Control Mechanisms

Several important mechanisms exist for controlling conflict while consensus is sought.

1. Lower levels of organization, after being consulted, are expected to conform to the consensus. Groups unlikely to conform, such as students, can be isolated from the decision-making process.

2. Informal negotiations up and down the hierarchy provide a means for ironing out differences between units.

3. The division of labor between informal and formal decision-making bodies eliminates the strains that would ensue if the same unit both resolved differences and legitimized the decisions. The informal units, free of public scrutiny, harmonize differences and present a unified proposal. The formal bodies enact the proposals they receive and give them official sanction. In Western systems, informal consultations are usually held on an ad hoc basis between individuals rather than in regularized group meetings. In the Japanese university the usual practice is to combine formal decision making with regularized informal
group consultation on various levels.

4. In order to minimize conflicts of interest, personality clashes, and ideological differences, attempts are made to adhere to established criteria for decisions. These criteria exhibit deference to traditional authority. First, precedents applicable to a particular situation are respected, and senior members of a faculty are in the best position to know and apply these precedents. Second, the principle of "fair share" also helps control conflict; each unit has an equal claim to its share (not necessarily an equal share) of the available resources, and merely has to wait its turn to get it. The seniority and prestige of a group play a part in determining its "fair share" and when it will receive it. Consultation is carried on according to established procedures in order to prevent opposition on procedural grounds. However, customary procedures differ according to the occasion. Again, senior members of the group are likely to make the most convincing case for the relevant precedents.
The consensual style of decision making in universities has functioned well in encouraging communication, participation, and a sense of solidarity on the part of the teaching and research staff. Trusted leaders from each level have been able to work out consensus between levels. At the same time individual units have had considerable autonomy to decide their own affairs, to the extent that they did not interfere with others. The consensual style has also been important, though it has functioned less well, in relationships between individual universities and the Ministry of Education.

The consensual decision-making process has serious shortcomings as well. From the standpoint of efficiency, it is very time-consuming. Furthermore, the timing and even the content of decisions depend more on the complex needs of the group process than on the needs of the situation for which a decision is required. From the point of view of effectiveness, the bias against specialization and division of labor, and against reliance on the technical expertise of "outsiders" often leads to poorly grounded decisions. From the point of view of broad participation, although all involved parties are consulted before a decision, in the end it is the leaders at various levels who determine the consensus. Once a
decision has been made, public expressions of dissent are considered disloyal.

Stresses on the consensus-formation process can be illustrated by the University of Tokyo dispute of 1968-1969. There was strong sentiment among faculty and students, and also in the press and public, that President Kazuo Okochi had not attempted to deal with the students and their grievances in good faith. After he was forced to resign, the new acting president, Ichiro Kato, promised to meet the students and include them in the settlement. He accepted the consensus ideal, which put him in the position of having to try to satisfy the demands of the students and also those of the Ministry of Education. Kato first approached the Zenkyoto, a left-wing student group. Their demands had the broadest student support and they had fewer off-campus political ties that could influence their negotiating position. A settlement with the Zenkyoto would undoubtedly split their weak organization and have the additional advantage of weakening the influence of a rival left-wing student organization, the Minsei, because they would be left out of the settlement. However, the Zenkyoto refused to compromise. This left Kato with no alternative but to
accept the Minsei offer of a moderate solution: the election of student representatives from each faculty to work out with the university a compromise to be ratified in a public meeting. The Minsei carried through their plan, an agreement was signed by student representatives and the president, and after a few days the president called in the police to clear the campus of the Zenkyoto students. The Ministry of Education refused to accept the agreements between student representatives and the university as binding. The president strongly and publicly defended the agreements. But gradually, enormous loopholes became apparent. Superficially, all the major parties got what they wanted, but there was less to the settlement than met the eye. The Zenkyoto held out to the end in order to spread the "struggle" to other schools, but the defeat and arrests at Todai were very costly. The Minsei got credit for arranging the compromise, but they won few concessions in the end. The president settled the dispute, but later could not translate this into university reform. The Ministry of Education counteracted the Minsei thrust for more influence on campus, but gained no influence itself. Nothing had been solved, but the consensus form of decision making had been saved.
The previous example illustrates some of the stresses on the consensual decision-making process that have aggravated its weaknesses. Other such strains are the overloading of administrative machinery, facilities, and educational programs; insufficient financial resources; student and faculty dissatisfaction; and the constant activities of the student movement.

In the late 1960s students born in the first postwar "baby boom" descended in droves on the campuses, fresh with new democratic ideals and high expectations. In contrast to their immediate predecessors they had no direct experience of the devastation and humiliation of defeat in World War II. They were educated in the postwar educational system by teachers who renounced the wartime regime or remained silent. Optimism and hope for change were fed by unflagging rapid economic growth. Thus many students were sensitive to the vestiges of "feudalism" they found in their professors and in the responses of university administrators to their demands. By the late sixties, the major cities had large numbers of dissatisfied university students. Students with a bent toward
activism could channel their anger and hope for change through any one of three left-wing student movements differing in style and opposed in ideology: the Minsei; various New Left militant sects spawned about the time of the anti-Security Treaty struggles of 1960; and the Zenkyoto.17

Campus disputes highlighted many long-term complaints against the universities. In the beginning there was considerable public sympathy with the aims of striking students. Many faculty members were also sympathetic with the students' critique of the universities. The campus disputes gave reform-oriented faculty members an opportunity to work for basic changes. Already the ministry's Central Council of Education was working on its model of university reform.

By the end of 1970, more than 300 reform plans had been produced, most of them by university reform committees established for that purpose.18 However, the enthusiasm for creating plans was not matched with implementation, for several reasons. First of all, public opinion shifted against the striking students in favor of restoring order first, and thinking of reforms later. Second, the settling of campus disputes and exhaustion, fragmentation, and defeat of the New Left student movement took away the urgency of reform.
The government pushed the first postwar university control law through the National Diet on August 3, 1969. The law, called Provisional Measures Concerning University Administration, called on universities to solve their disputes or to face intervention by the Ministry of Education—initially with a warning; then, if the dispute was not settled in six months, by directly administering the university; and finally, by dissolving the university. The immediate response to the law was an increase in campus disputes, but the threat of ministry intervention was by itself sufficient to spur university officials to bring in the police and most disputes were settled within a few months.

Third, there were basic disagreements between the interested parties concerning the goals of university reform. The political hawks saw their chance to get the universities under control. The overwhelming majority of the faculty members hoped for more efficient administration that could lighten the everyday burden of university management. Many students, on the other hand, saw the "real" problems as being those of more relevant education and greater student participation in university decision making. University administrators feared that granting broader participation would play into the hands...
of the Japan Communist Party and its strategy of advocating moderate reforms. Fourth, many reforms would involve closer relations with the Ministry of Education and there was little enthusiasm for that.

Yet some reforms did take place. Minor changes in the consensus-oriented decision-making process were speeded up by the outbreak of "reform fever" in the late sixties. Some bureaucratization of university administration has occurred along with an increase in administrative support staff. Administrators are more carefully selected and trained, particularly at the private universities. Also, university deans and presidents are relying much more on the executive skills of cabinet groups they form to assist in administration. New offices for public relations and information gathering have been established at most universities.

A new breed of campus politician has appeared in this increasingly difficult situation to provide much needed help in achieving consensus: they could be called "facilitators." Sometimes the facilitator is a member of an ad hoc task force "pointed" by the president or a dean and sometimes he has no official designation, but the role is nevertheless similar: gathering and analyzing information for decision.
making, communicating across generational and ideological gaps, negotiating behind the scenes with a certain anonymity.

Increasing bureaucratization has added to the responsibilities of individual professors since it is they who are assigned to the most important administrative tasks. In fact, one of the most notable changes has been the proliferation of faculty committees with expanded participation of junior faculty members and a consequent increase in the time it takes to make decisions.

Increased student participation in decision making was an important issue for faculty and students in Japan as in the other countries treated in this book. However, except for some cases of peripheral involvement in the election of university presidents, there has been almost no increase in participation. In addition to the usual lack of faculty enthusiasm or further complicating the decision making process by including students, and student doubts about the effectiveness of their participation, the Ministry of Education has opposed it. Moreover, university administrations hesitate to deal with the various politically motivated student groups because they are unrepresentative and any attempt to deal with one group will rouse the active opposition
of the others, Most administrators attempt to limit such groups' influence by restricting participation in the decision-making process largely to professors and associate professors.

In June 1971, the Central Committee on Education produced a set of Basic Guidelines for the Reform of Education. The main proposals dealing with the structural reform of higher education met with almost universal opposition from the universities because they appeared to be designed to increase Ministry of Education control over the universities at the expense of university autonomy.

The result has been a deadlock on structural reform. The "big bang" of the university disputes threw the university into disorder, but as soon as the disputes died down, the universities returned to predispute patterns.

Because the government was unable to institute basic reforms in the structure of higher education, it has taken other steps. Finally forced by the university disputes to recognize the financial plight of the private universities, the Ministry of Education, supported by the Ministry of Finance, agreed to subsidize half of the salary costs of the teaching staff at private universities. Later they agreed
eventually to support half of the current operating expenses of the private universities. This support is administered by the Private School Promotion Foundation, a quasi-governmental agency that includes substantial private university representation. Undoubtedly a pattern of slanted resource allocation will develop that will help maintain the present prestige hierarchy of institutions. However, since the government is providing the money, it also may increase its control, including stricter quality standards for those that receive the highest sums. 22

By far the most important of several new academic institutions started by the ministry is an academic city at Tsukuba outside Tokyo. It will include many research institutions including some related to the United Nations University. The central component of the academic city is Tsukuba University, founded in October 1974. Tsukuba University is a result of the initiative of some of the leaders of Tokyo University of Education who wanted to move from the narrow confines of their Tokyo campus and create a new type of university. Although the controversy over moving split the faculty, the Ministry of Education gave strong support to those advocating the move. The organization of Tsukuba University includes many of the experimental reforms that
the Ministry of Education failed to introduce at existing universities. There is strong central administration with no semiautonomous faculties. The university is organized with various flexible research and educational clusters that are coordinated by committees of faculty members on the model of American cluster colleges.

If traditional semiautonomous faculties protect the interests of faculty members too much, the committee method being experimented with at Tsukuba would seem to protect them too little. Many of the dissenting faculty members, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, are resigning after Tokyo University of Education is phased out in 1978. Tsukuba University has failed to attract high quality faculty members in large numbers. There has been a widespread negative reaction against what is considered a violation of the consensus norm in the decision to establish Tsukuba University and the weakened influence of traditional faculty authority there.

Among its other efforts the ministry initiated the University of the Air, which will offer a B.A. degree. The ministry plans to grant charters to new medical faculties in order to have at least one faculty of medicine in each of the
forty-seven prefectures by 1980. It plans to establish several new teacher training institutions but will face strong opposition from the Japan Teacher's Union. However, in 1975 the ministry pushed through a law to limit the founding of new institutions and faculties of higher education and to limit the expansion of student bodies in the private sector. This reflects the desire of the conservative party to limit its subsidies to private institutions, but also the desire to improve the quality of education.

The ministry is now considering proposals from the University of Tokyo and other prestigious schools to allow them to set up graduate schools that would be administratively separate from the present faculties. This could be done without special legislation simply by granting charters to new faculties, setting up new chairs, and giving the funds. The interests of several groups coincide on the desirability of this proposal. The Ministry of Education and many faculty members want to upgrade research and graduate education. Also, many faculty members would like to be free of undergraduate teaching. This proposal has the advantage of not requiring the restructuring of any existing faculties, which
Japan would be almost impossible.

Despite the deadlock on basic structural reform, as William Cummings points out, "the University crisis marked a turning point in Japanese higher education."²³ It was clear that the government could not make basic structural changes without the cooperation of the universities. The confrontation had nevertheless exposed many flaws in higher education. The financial crisis pointed to the need either to stop the phenomenal growth of higher education or to provide a rationale for it and improve the quality. The attention given to the university problem created a general awareness of need for change in the examination system and admissions policy, improvement of educational quality, internationalization, more flexibility in transferring and accepting credits from other institutions, and adaptation of the curriculum to changing societal needs.

Significant changes in personnel in the Ministry of Education under Cabinet Minister Michiya Sakata, during the university dispute of 1968-69, paved the way for the reshaping of policies in the direction of those liberal reforms. Also, the confrontation between conservatives and progressives over higher education policy lessened.²⁴
After it became clear that radical restructuring was not forthcoming, the leadership of former Vice Minister Ieao Amagi in a new (1972) consultative body, Higher Education Roundtable, contributed greatly to the detente, as did the appointment of Dr. Michio Nagai, a former professor and a "dove," as Minister of Education.

The subsidies to private universities have steadily increased, a standardized entrance exam for national universities (for the first screening) was carried out in 1976, and significant steps toward internationalization of the curriculum (language study, foreign visiting scholars) are being encouraged by the ministry. Although these are minor gains that could be lost, the present detente and the continuation of reforms are encouraging.

In summary, the Japanese university system has been evolving gradually from more traditional patterns to more modern ones (in terms of increased efficiency and participation), as well as from an elite to a mass enrollment system. However, the basic patterns of control and decision making have changed little. The universities have been able to resist intrusions by the Ministry of Education, but many needed reforms have not taken place.
Frustrated in its attempts to introduce structural reforms in existing universities, the Ministry of Education has turned more to the use of incentives to accomplish its aims, and it has established some new institutions on its own initiative. In the long run, these are likely to have considerable influence on the shape of Japanese higher education.
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Reform in Japan" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972).

6. Iva'Hall: personal communication.

7. Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago:


9. William K. Cummings, Kazuo Amano, and Donald F. Wheeler,
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10. T.J. Pempel, "The Politics of Enrollment Expansion in
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11. Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley: University of

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of Government Bureaucracy," in Modern Japanese Organization
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13. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
14. A more complete analysis can be found in Donald F. Wheeler, "The Japanese Student Movement: Value Politics, Students Politics and the University of Tokyo Struggle" (Ph.D Diss., Columbia University, 1974).

15. Although the Ministry of Education set maximum limits on enrollments based on the number of teachers and other factors, they were not enforced. Private universities enrolled more in order to get tuition and fees. National universities had no similar incentive since they received no extra government subsidy for students above the limit and tuition rates were so low it did not "pay" to add students just to get their fees. For statistics see Japan, Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics in Japan: Present, Past, Future (August 1971), pp. 38-41.


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21. The final report was published in English in 1972 by the Ministry of Education. An abridged version of the
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22. Cummings, "The Japanese Private University," Minerva,
23. Cummings, "The Aftermath of the University Crisis," Japan
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25. Cummings, "Japanese Education and Politics in the
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Institution for Social and Policy Studies
16A Yale Station (111 Prospect Street)
New Haven, Connecticut 06520