Citizen Participation: The Local Perspective.

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This report is intended to complement a related publication that examines citizen participation from the perspective of federal policy and the managers of that policy. In contrast to that approach, this report examines citizen participation from the local perspective in order to provide a feel for what citizen involvement in decision making is really like at the local level. Seven federally sponsored city or county-based public agencies were selected for observation, including 1) a Neighborhood Health Services Center, 2) a Community Action Agency, 3) a Legal Services Center, 4) a Model City Agency, 5) a Tenant's Council in a public housing project, 6) an Urban Renewal Project Area Committee, and 7) a Community Mental Health Center. These local agencies represent programs sponsored by the same four major federal agencies examined in the related report. Rather than presenting separate case histories of each local agency, the report analyzes the seven agencies according to common categories of interest, including representation, aspects of participation, decision making, relationships with other agencies, aspects of minority community development, and federal relationships. (Author/JG)
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CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: THE LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

I. INTRODUCTION

In an earlier Institute report, we examined citizen participation from the vantage point of Federal policy and the managers of that policy. Whatever the merits of this previous report, it lacked a "feel" for what citizen involvement in decision making was "really" like at the local level. This later report, is an attempt to fill in the local perspective on citizen participation.

Seven city or county-based agencies, located in the far West, were selected for observation. These seven agencies were: 1) a neighborhood Health Services Center, 2) a Community Action Agency, 3) an OEO-supported Legal Services Center, 4) a Model City Agency, 5) a Tenants' Council in a public housing project, 6) an Urban Renewal Project Area Committee, and 7) a community Mental Health Center. These seven local efforts represent programs sponsored by three major Federal agencies: The Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Office of Economic Opportunity and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. One of the seven agencies, Model Cities, was also the sponsor of a Concentrated Employment Program, and in that way a Department of Labor supported effort was also observed. In effect, all four of the agencies whose policies were previously analyzed from the Federal vantage point, are now being looked at in the person of their locally supported constituents.

Two of the seven programs observed operate on a county-wide basis (the Community Action Agency and Legal Services); the other five agencies are all concerned with a population having a smaller than city base. These remaining five agencies are located in two different counties and four different cities. The Community Action Agency and the Legal Services Program are specifically concerned with poor people within their counties, and the other five programs are all selective of their target populations within a sub-area of a city or an unincorporated area of a county. In each of these five sub-areas the program's target population is substantially or predominantly black. In the tables which follow additional background material is indicated about each of the seven communities and agencies in which observations took place. (See Tables I and II.)

The above profile material on the agencies and communities observed, offers some verification that the seven projects differ from each other in areas other than the Federal sponsorship of the program under observation. These agency and community differences form a context, within which to understand the varieties of citizen participation in each of these local programs. These local variances in citizen participation, and the relationship of these variances to Federal policy are the focus of this analysis.

We must again note that this report is using a very limited definition of "citizen." The citizen we have in mind is one whose current
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Name of Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political unit in which program is based</strong></td>
<td>Community Action Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Political unit</strong></td>
<td>Model Cities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>Less than 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Community to be served by program</strong></td>
<td>Public Housing Tenants Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 25,000</td>
<td>Approx. 1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Blacks in Political unit</strong></td>
<td>Urban Renewal Project Area Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 1%</td>
<td>Approx. 5%+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of other visible minorities in Political unit</strong></td>
<td>Community Mental Health Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 5%</td>
<td>Approx. 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Blacks in Program area</strong></td>
<td>Health Services Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 5%</td>
<td>Approx. 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of other minorities in Program area</strong></td>
<td>Legal Services Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 10%</td>
<td>Approx. 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Community Action Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a Model Cities Unit in Program area?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a Community Action Agency serving Program area?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has there been an Urban Renewal Project in Program Area?</td>
<td>Yes in parts of Program area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of government</td>
<td>County Bd. of Supervisors City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of Community</td>
<td>Rural Agricultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Congressional Representative</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of visible minority group members in local govt. (Council or Bd. of Supervisors)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I (Continued)
### Table II

**DESCRIPTIONS OF PROGRAMS AND POLICY MAKING/ADVISING GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Policy Making/Advising Group</th>
<th>NAME OF PROGRAM</th>
<th>Primary source of funds for program</th>
<th>Federal policy with regard to citizen participation</th>
<th>Name of grantee for Federal funds</th>
<th>Involvement of local gov't on policy body</th>
<th>Size of Policy Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Action Board</td>
<td>Project Area Committee</td>
<td>Federal OEO, HUD</td>
<td>Federal, HUD, Federal HUD</td>
<td>County Housing Authority, City Gov't</td>
<td>Holds 1/3 of places on agency board</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Cities Board</td>
<td>Mental Health Center Bd.</td>
<td>Federal HUD</td>
<td>Strong encourage-ment of citizen participation</td>
<td>Mental Health Center Bd.</td>
<td>No city involvement, one county sponsored agency on board</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants Council</td>
<td>Federal HUD</td>
<td>Federal HUD</td>
<td>Permissive on citizen participation</td>
<td>City Gov't appt'd Redevelopment Commission</td>
<td>Appoints all members of Housing Authority</td>
<td>Open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Area Committee</td>
<td>Federal HEW</td>
<td>Federal HUD</td>
<td>Strong encourage-ment of citizen participation</td>
<td>Neighbor-hood Health Services Board</td>
<td>Appoints all members of Redevelopment Board--makes no appointments to Project Area Committee</td>
<td>Open ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Services Board</td>
<td>Federal HEW</td>
<td>Federal OEO, HUD</td>
<td>Strong encourage-ment of citizen participation</td>
<td>Legal Services Board</td>
<td>None--invited to Community Boards</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Services Board</td>
<td>Federal OEO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Federal OEO and HUD indicate the primary source of funds for the programs.
- The table lists various characteristics and involvement details for each program.
- The size of the Policy Group is represented in open-ended format for comparison.
### Table II (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Policy Making/Advising Group</th>
<th>Community Action Board</th>
<th>Model Cities Board</th>
<th>Tenants Project Area Committee</th>
<th>Mental Health Center Bd.</th>
<th>Health Services Board</th>
<th>Legal Services Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority of body, on which citizens participate</td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Advisory to City Council</td>
<td>Advisory to Housing Authority Mgmt.</td>
<td>Advisory to Redevelopment Agency site office staff</td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How citizens selected</td>
<td>Selection by local area Poverty Councils</td>
<td>Election by neighborhood residents</td>
<td>Community forum</td>
<td>Community forum</td>
<td>Community forum</td>
<td>Self-selecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of area residents on body</td>
<td>33-1/3%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>95%+</td>
<td>50%+</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Blacks on policy body</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>40%+</td>
<td>95%+</td>
<td>45%+</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of other visible minorities on policy body</td>
<td>25%+</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do % of Blacks on policy body exceed % of Blacks in program area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and/or ethnicity of Program Director</td>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>Redevelopment Dir.</td>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>Negro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do % of Blacks among community reps. exceed % of Blacks in Program area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
condition makes him the subject for Federal efforts at resource distribution. This citizen is defined by his disadvantage and by his disconnection from (or inadequate connection to) our major institutions. We will also refer to this citizen as a "neighborhood" or "community" representative. In these seven communities, by narrowing observation to those Federally supported programs which had citizen participation, we perforce became concerned with programs focused on devalued minorities. The Community Action Program, Legal Services and Public Housing were all concerned with poor people (many of whom were black or brown). The Health Services, Model Cities, and Urban Renewal Programs were concerned with populations which were almost totally black and largely poor. Only the Community Mental Health Program, because of Federal regulations forcing it to a minimum "catchment area" of 75,000, served a population which was primarily white and non-poor. Parenthetically, it should be noted that despite its diverse "catchment area," policy making for the Mental Health Program was firmly in the hands of black leadership.

In seeking to describe local citizen participation there is the obvious choice of constructing case histories for each agency or analyzing the seven different agencies according to common categories of interest. In choosing the task of common categories, we are hopeful that the identities of agencies and interviewees will be better protected, while at the same time enabling a reader comparison of the varieties of citizen participation experience. The Tables on pages 3 - 6 are meant to provide some background description of community and agency differences which may help to explain some of the apparent differences in citizen participation.
II. LOCAL STRUCTURES FOR PARTICIPATION AND POTENTIALS FOR INFLUENCE ON DECISION MAKING

In the preceding Institute report dealing with Federal policies toward citizen participation, we were strongly occupied with two structural questions pertaining to the citizen participation body: 1) Was the policy body a coalition of various community forces including community representatives, but not dominated by any of these forces, or was the policy body controlled by citizen representatives? 2) Was the citizen participation body advisory to another unit, or did policy control rest with it? A cross-play of these two dimensions--board composition and authority of the agency--creates the following four categories (and agency occupants of these categories) as observed in the field study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition/Policy</td>
<td>Coalition/Policy</td>
<td>Citizen Domination/Policy Advisory</td>
<td>Citizen Domination/Policy Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Services</td>
<td>Tenants' Council--Public Housing</td>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Action Agency</td>
<td>Urban Renewal--Project Area Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Agency</td>
<td>Model Cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given these four categories of "coalition/policy advisory," "coalition/policy control," "citizen domination/policy advisory," and "citizen domination/policy control," it is easy to argue that the

1. Hans Spiegel suggests that the concept "high degree of influence" would be more appropriate than "control." We recognize that the use of "control" conveys the idea of there being more power than actually exists for a citizen-dominated policy making body. We risk the use of "control" because it seems to accurately portray the quality of influence that some citizen groups are working for.
"coalition/advisory" structure gives citizen participants the least potential influence over decision making and the "citizen domination/policy control" structure gives to citizen participants the most potential influence. It is more difficult to assign an a priori position of influence to the two middle categories, which incidentally includes six of the seven agencies observed. But this is precisely where field observation becomes useful. The Community Action Agency, is nominally a coalition of three equal parts, divided among the public agencies, representatives of the poor, and private organizations. In fact all participants agree that the Board of the agency is effectively in the hands of the representatives of the poor. The same situation prevails in the Mental Health Agency, where a two-sector coalition made up of equal parts of neighborhood and Mental Health Agency representatives, seems to be effectively controlled by the neighborhood representatives. Thus, on a de facto basis, the Community Action Agency and the Mental Health Agency can be moved into the most powerful category (for the neighborhood); that of "citizen domination/policy control."

The Legal Services Agency Board has one-third of its members as representatives of the poor and some 51 percent who are professionals in the field of law. In effect, the power of the representatives of the poor is muted by both numbers and lack of professional status.

If two of our coalition groups come under the effective domination of their neighborhood representatives, it is equally interesting to ask whether the citizen dominated advisory groups, really perform as if they had de facto policy control. The answer seems to be that the Tenants' Council, and the Renewal Project Area Committee remain essentially advisory to
government-type agencies (the County Housing Authority and the City Redevelopment Agency) while the Model Cities Agency seems to develop something resembling policy control over its program. There are two possible explanations for this development. One may rest in the fact that the Model Cities Board is a coalition of forces numerically dominated by the neighborhood. As a coalition, its decisions may have more community-wide legitimacy, and therefore be less subject to review by the City Council. The Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee are both almost totally composed of the black, the brown and the poor. As such, they are solely representative of the client group, and the public bodies they are advisory to are less likely to grant them control of program policy. Secondly, the Tenants' group and the Renewal Committee are both advisory to operating agencies, and not to the policy-making bodies for these operating agencies. Conversely, the Model Cities Board is advisory to the City Council, which is the ultimate policy body for the Model Cities Agency.

Thus, despite certain structural similarities between groups of these agencies, the real alignments in terms of the power of neighborhood representatives to make decisions, resembles the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory</th>
<th>Policy Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Services</td>
<td>Model Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal Project Area Committee</td>
<td>Health Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants' Council</td>
<td>Community Mental Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Action Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perhaps a most important observation in the field study, is the trend towards greater de facto power for neighborhood representatives in decision making. In no case did a coalition body drift toward becoming advisory rather than policy making, and in no case did a citizen dominated group have its domination impaired through being forced into a coalition. In each agency under study, neighborhood representatives seem to be able to maximize their potential for influence over decision making. And in these seven agencies, the greater the percentage of black (and other minority) citizen representatives, the more likely the citizen representatives seem to be able to maximize their policy influence. The following table indicates this relationship:

Table III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boards Having Policy Control:</th>
<th>Percent Blacks (&amp; Other Minorities) on Boards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Mental Health</td>
<td>55+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Cities</td>
<td>75+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Action</td>
<td>35+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advisory Boards: a/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Area Committee</td>
<td>95+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants' Council</td>
<td>40+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Services</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. In the course of this report it will be clear that the Project Area Committee has often exercised power far beyond its advice-giving status.

To the reader interested in citizen participation and control, these conclusions based upon field observation must be tantalizing. What would the data be like in other areas of the country, or would the observations...
hold up if additional agencies had been looked at in the far West? On the other hand, the data does not seem to present surprises. The observer of citizen participation in Federal programs knows that where participation has been effective, there have been shifts in policy control. And he knows that this movement has been enhanced when the involved citizenry tends to be black.

At a later point in this paper we shall further examine the character of decision making in these seven agencies. It is much more important to know what kinds of issues citizens' influence tends to prevail over, rather than to know that citizen influence prevails most of the time. Or as one of the interviewees remarked about the Model City Agency, "the City Council did not overturn or modify any of their recommendations, because their program requests were temperate."

At this juncture it is enough to note that citizen representatives have almost always maximized the influence possibilities which were available to them. We may better understand their capacity to do so by examining who these representatives are, how they are chosen, and who they represent.

III. REPRESENTATION

A. Election and Selection

In none of the seven agencies observed, were citizen representatives selected by agencies they were to give advice to, or by other units within local government. There is little question that the practice of turning to the affected community to select its own representatives did not prevail prior to the OEO program, and we are not even certain that our observations
are typical beyond northern California (where field work was done). But the meaning behind this pattern of representative selection appears clear: Those who seek citizen involvement understand that they are seeking bona fide links to a special community, not reflections of their own image. This evidence of an unwillingness by public agencies to "lay hands on" the process of selecting representatives, is even more striking when it is understood that only one of the Federal funding agencies, OEO, has guidelines which stipulate "democratic selection procedures."

Those who sit on the Tenants' Council in no way appear to have their selection, or attendance, or voting patterns influenced by the Housing Authority. Council meetings appear open to all members of the Housing Project, and officers of the Council are selected by tenants at an open meeting. In addition, the Grievance Committee of the Tenants' Council, which has become an important force in influencing tenant eviction, has its four members elected by the Tenants' Council at an open meeting. The very name, "Tenants' Council," implies that its members will be selected by the tenants themselves. But there is some history which suggests that when a local Housing Authority or the Federal funding agency becomes unhappy with those who serve on a Tenants' Council, its functioning may be seriously impaired. In the Tenants' Council we observed, there was clear evidence that the Housing Authority viewed the Council as an important (and generally constructive) force; almost a local government in the making, which would pose some risks if it were to be tampered with.
One would expect the Community Action Agency to have more defined procedures for representative selection, because of more carefully defined federal policies affecting the local agency. One-third of the seats on the Community Action Agency we observed were allocated to representatives of poor people. These representatives were elected at open meetings held by local area councils. Only poor people could vote at these council meetings, although candidates for election to the Community Action Board did not themselves have to be poor.

The Model City Agency showed concern, similar to the Community Action Agency, in having the representatives on its Board come from a number of different geographic areas. But instead of elections being held in different local councils, elections were held at a single community forum, where the elector was restricted to voting for someone from his neighborhood. Thus in the Model Cities election, the franchise was restricted by geography; in the Community Action Agency it was restricted to those who were poor.

The Urban Renewal Project Area Committee also made use of a community forum to elect its officers. As in Model Cities, the electorate was composed of those who showed enough interest to come to the forum and participate in the election.

The election procedure is somewhat more elusive in the formation of the neighborhood Health Center's Board of Directors. In fact, it is unclear as to whether an election was ever held. The Board seemed composed of a small group of self-elected ghetto-area residents, all of them black,
and most of them active in other neighborhood organizations, who have incorporated themselves, and received major Federal funds to carry out a neighborhood health services program. At the time of this writing, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare staff were working hard to help this neighborhood board establish a constituency, from which might be elected future board members. Of the seven organizations observed, it was only the Health Services Board and the Tenants' Council which were not brought into being under the impetus of already established agencies. The Tenants' Council, which has been in existence longer than the Health Services Board, has an election procedure at least equal in formality to the other agencies examined. It is the local Health Services Agency (as distinguished from its Federal supporters) which seems the least concerned with the niceties of representative selection. A partial explanation may rest in a "democratic election" being a legitimating device; perhaps the kind of legitimation the neighborhood-controlled Health Center Board felt less in need of than other agencies in this study. Or to the contrary, the members of the Health Center Board may have subtly blocked an election for fear that it would lead to their replacement.

The Mental Health Center Board receives its "consumer" representatives in a two-step process. As a first step, a community forum is convened whose task it is to select representatives to a community advisory board. Unlike the community forums already described, attendance at the Mental Health meeting was primarily sought from organized groups operating in
the Mental Health Center's "catchment area." In fact, the invitation to the forum was addressed to: "Interested groups of the community." After this community forum elected its representatives, these representatives in turn elected their representatives to serve on the Mental Health Center Board.

The Legal Services Agency carried the notion of an organizational base to elections one step further. The Legal Services Agency requested organizations, which had been designated by the Community Action Agency as legitimately representing the interests of poor people, to select a representative to sit on the Legal Services Board of Directors. This process of selection seems to come closest to a "laying on of hands" in the selection process. It is the Community Action Agency which designates the appropriate organization to select representatives of the poor people. The disclaimer of course, is that the Community Action Agency in the county observed, sees itself as representing the interests of poor people, and therefore a legitimate designator of organizations which speak for poor people. Ironically, some 25 organizations had to be solicited for representation, before seven could be found which would designate a representative. Additional evidence indicates that when an organization did agree to select a representative, it was rarely accomplished by election, but rather by appointment or a request for a volunteer.

In the seven situations observed, five saw citizen representatives arrive on boards through some form of election; two were instances of selection. In both cases of selection (neighborhood Health and Legal
Services), the selection was by a group within, or presumably responsive to, the neighborhood. In none of the seven agencies observed did there appear recourse to an election procedure more comparable with community general elections. It should be noted that this is somewhat in distinction to elections held in the early days of the Community Action Program. In these earlier elections, generally held in larger cities, there were formally proposed candidates and an attempt to involve a large percentage of those eligible to vote. Almost always, such procedures resulted in very small participation by the electorate. Similarly, the observed tendency in this study to use community forums, rarely resulted in a large voter turnout.

In the Community Action Agency elections, turnouts to vote at local area council meetings produced some 20 to 30 participants on an average. In the Tenants' Council elections, some 10 percent of those eligible appear to turn out. The most recent Model Cities Board election drew a little over 100 voters in a model neighborhood of some 18,000 people. The percentage turnout from the Mental Health "catchment area" was even less impressive than the Model Cities election.

Despite the invariably small turnouts for election (if they were held at all) in these projects, nowhere did there seem much challenge to the legitimacy of those who were selected or elected. As one interviewee noted "the election process in this case does allow those with the greatest interest, the greatest opportunity to influence who gets elected." The use of the community forum seems to create an instant constituency, who care enough to come and to participate. As the same
interviewee added, "the results of the election must produce board members who care about the program and who will work for the program."

In their reliance on community forums, most of these seven agencies have apparently settled on a device which produces a relatively narrow base in the selection of leadership. Whether selected leadership really has a constituency can probably best be tested during times of urgency and strain for the program. At present the forum device for election seems useful to a sponsoring organization because of its relative simplicity, low cost, and apparent legitimacy. It is probably also acceptable to the limited number of "activists" in any community, in that it permits them influence far beyond their numbers. Whether this relatively limited base to citizen participation, will in time lead to a "grass roots" ferment which questions the legitimacy of community leadership, is unclear. It would seem that as long as the channels for representation are kept open, and candidacies can be vied for, the narrow base need not necessarily prove harmful. It may not be the size of a constituency which is important, but rather the opportunity the election system allows for newly active constituents to have their weight felt. Based upon this test, the community forum mode of election seems workable and satisfactory.

B. The Use of a Constituency

We previously argued that a reason for the non-interference by "establishment" agencies in the election/selection process was their desire to be linked to bona fide neighborhood groups. In effect, at the present time, a black man selected by a white man is perceived as
less of a black man. But the problem is more than the "legitimate" selection of a representative; the problem is the development of a constituency for the representative, so that he can periodically be told "how he is doing." The constituency also assures the "establishment" that it is connected to something that in turn is connected to something with roots in that community the "establishment" is trying to affect.

Let us turn again to each of the seven agencies to see how they developed constituencies for citizen representatives. Five of these seven agencies draw their representation from some kind of community forum. We would argue that the forum represents an instant (albeit potentially fleeting) constituency. At a point in time the forum says to observers that there are a group of community people who care enough about a program to come together and seek to influence its affairs. The interesting subject for analysis is how (or if) the "pressure" of the forum is sustained in between election periods.

In the Community Action Agency, its 10 representatives of the poor each represent local area councils. These councils meet monthly for a variety of tasks, including attempts to influence the policies of the Community Action Agency Board. One interviewee indicated that on two occasions the local area council which she represented had given her specific instructions on how to cast a vote at the Community Action Agency Board meeting. It is our impression that the vitality of the local area councils is an important determinant of the influence wielded by a representative from that council, on the Community Action Agency Board. It should be apparent that a representative speaks with a much louder voice,
within a coalition, when it is clear that he speaks for others as well as for himself. This becomes part of the dilemma for established public agencies. They are hesitant about dealing with representatives who do not represent, who have no constituency. Conversely, it may be costly to deal with those representatives having a strong constituency, because of the fact that they speak for more than themselves.

Those who attended the community forum for elections to the Model Cities Board have their neighborhood residence in common. But there is no encouragement for them to come together again as a group before the next election. However, there are three local councils in different parts of the model neighborhood, and through their involvement in Model Cities elections, they have come to constitute an informal constituency for neighborhood people on the Model Cities Board.

The experience of the Tenants' Council with regard to a constituency is somewhat different. In effect, all of the residents of the public housing project are a potential constituency for the Council. Those who actually come to Council meetings represent the "realized" constituency. It is this constant (monthly) affirmation of a constituency which says to Council leadership that the Council is alive; parenthetically it says the same thing to housing authority management.

The Mental Health Center's sophisticated attempt to establish a "built-in" constituency is a useful example. The community forum meets yearly to select a community board which will serve as a constituency for those neighborhood residents who are members of the Mental Health Center Board. It is the Community Advisory Board, composed solely of neighborhood residents.
that selects Board representatives. It is the Community Advisory Board that the representatives to the Agency Board reports back to. In a sense this Community Advisory Board performs the same function for neighborhood representatives on the Mental Health Board, as do local area councils for representatives of the poor to the Community Action Board and neighborhood councils for neighborhood representatives on the Model Cities Board. And if the analogy may be stretched, it is the same kind of function that the "home" organization performs for the representative it has selected to serve on the Legal Services Board. Surely, it is no accident that the four Boards which are coalitions of neighborhood-people and non-neighborhood people (CAA, Model Cities, Legal Services and Mental Health) all have constituent bodies composed solely of "consumer types," which to some extent monitor the activities of the coalition policy board. And here too, we suggest this is a development which was simply not observable prior to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. What is of great interest in this section is not so much that neighborhood people serve on policy boards; it is that these neighborhood representatives have a constituency which exerts some continuing connection between the representative and the community he is supposed to represent.

Observation would indicate that the above notions of constituency operate fairly well in the Model Cities, Community Action and Mental Health Program. We are less certain about the Legal Services Program where the representative functions on both the Legal Services Board and within one of the seven organizations that selected him for the Legal Services Board.
This form of multi-organizational constituency seems the least effective in that none of these seven organizations appears to have a major stake in the operation of the Legal Services Board. It may help to account for the relative invisibility of the representatives of the poor in the affairs of the Legal Services Agency.

The notion of constituency fits somewhat differently in the three agencies where neighborhood residents hold all of the seats on a policy making or policy advisory board. In the Tenants' Council, we described all of the residents of the Public Housing Project as the potential constituency, and those who attend Council meetings as the "realized" constituency. The same would appear true for the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee. All of the residents of the redevelopment area are the potential constituency; those who attend Council meetings are the "realized" constituency. In both the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee, the "realized" constituency fluctuates. A potentially interesting meeting of the Project Area Committee may draw 150 people, another meeting as few as 15. As in other comparisons, it is the Health Services Board which appears unique. It is on this Board, where neighborhood residents hold all seats on a policy making (not advisory such as the Project Area Committee or the Tenants' Council) body, that there appears to be the least felt need to develop a constituency. In effect, the Health Services Board reports to no one. It has received the best of all sanctions; a large grant from the United States Public Health Service. Not surprisingly, it is the Federal agency which is pushing the neighborhood Health Services Board to...
invigorate an area Health Council to serve as a constituency. Presumably, it would be this Council which would elect members to the Health Services Board. The Health Services Board, to this point has not been very aggressive in pushing for the growth of a Council which might serve as a constituency. During the course of this study, the writer sought to attend a Health Council meeting which he found cancelled upon arrival. No subsequent meetings of the Health Council have been called during the course of the field study, and Federal staff admit to a feeling of despair about the possibility of developing a Council.

One possible explanation for the Health Services experience might be that a constituency has two major uses—neither of which are pertinent in the case of the Health Services Board. One use of a constituency is to enhance the power of those who represent it; the other is to serve as a continuing reference group so that representatives are not too quickly won over to the norms of the organization they are trying to influence. Since the arrival of its major grant, the Health Services Board has not needed additional power. It controls the policy apparatus for the Health Center and apparently has adequate authority. In addition, Health Service Board members don't have to worry about being seduced by the "establishment," when it comes to health services in their neighborhood, they are the establishment.

Reviewers of this material have raised questions about the apparent insulation and assumed strength of the Health Services Board. There is wonder that a self-selected board is able to sustain itself in power in
an operation as potentially visible as a major health services center. We make no claim as to depth of connection between the Board and the residents of the health center's neighborhood. We would not be surprised if this Board were to split into irreconcilable factions, or if newly mobilized elements in the neighborhood were to challenge the legitimacy of the Board. Given the very small number of people in this neighborhood (or any neighborhood) who are involved in the center, it is always likely that new forces will arise to challenge the present Board. And since this Board's legitimacy rests in the Federal grant, and in the neighborhood's passive acceptance of the Board, and not in a publicly held election, there is always the likelihood of successful challenge to the current composition of the Board. However, we would argue that this Health Center Board is not a frail reed. The major organizational actors in this neighborhood include the churches, the community action program, the Model Cities effort, the Black Panthers and the Neighborhood Service Center Program. The Health Center Board, through its various members, is connected to key leadership in each of these community organizations. We suggest that it is these organizational connections coupled with Federal support which underlie the apparent strength of the Health Center Board. A key tactical problem for the Board is to refrain from acting in such a way as to encourage the formation of new groups in the neighborhood whose specific concerns are the operations of the Health Center. Such a new health-oriented faction, not connected to the current Health Center Board, might easily force the Public Health Service to withdraw its recognition from the Board as currently constituted.
To this point, in detailing the importance of a constituency, we have been primarily interested in those constituent groups which formally or informally select representatives. But there are other aspects of a constituency which also serve to increase the power and authority of neighborhood representatives. One aspect rests in the willingness (or the perceived willingness) of the constituent area or population to abide by larger community norms. Thus a black representative having a black constituency, even if not formally constituted, is likely to be listened to more carefully. And if his constituency has upset the local equilibrium on occasion, he is likely to be listened to even more carefully. It thus seems somewhat ingenuous for leadership of the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee to write: "We know that politically no plan is going to be carried out if there is serious, carefully evaluated, neighborhood opposition."

This is not yet the golden age of rationality, and a great deal of "carefully evaluated" opposition is for naught without a militant neighborhood presence to lend urgency to the care with which the opposition is evaluated.

If the blackness of a community is one aspect of constituency, there is another which is figuratively carried on the back of certain neighborhood leadership. For example, another reason the Health Services Board may be in no hurry to build a constituency, is that many of the Health Service Board members individually already have such a constituency. Observation indicates that a number of Health Service Board members already
are tied into, or are leaders of, the key organizations functioning in the neighborhood to be served by the Health Services Program. In a sense, these Board members integrate the organized black community in their own persons, and they may see little need to build what may seem like an artificial constituency.

Constituencies which are carried "on the backs of" individual leaders should not seem a foreign idea to anyone who has observed the membership of corporate boards or voluntary welfare organizations. Often such board membership is an attempt to build in, via different members, some of the external resources the organization may need. The same sophistication may prevail in poor neighborhoods, where particular kinds of leadership almost personify the organized differences within the local community.

C. Organizing the Community

It seems reasonable that the "catchment area" of the Mental Health Center, because of the fact that it represents one of the largest populations we are looking at, appears most like a collection of communities. The "catchment area" embraces much more than a black ghetto; it is much more than an area of low income residents; it is not an area of great common interaction amongst all residents and it does not embrace a single political boundary. Conversely, the Public Housing Project represents the smallest population we are looking at, and while lacking a common political boundary or racial homogeneity, it seems an area of sizeable citizen interaction and of "community."
Prior to the Community Action Program, one would have been hard put to discover community organization as a prominent area for Federally supported activity. Undoubtedly, some still question the intent and utility of community organization. However, it seems difficult to consider the idea of citizen involvement without also considering efforts to organize that citizenry. In the previous section we considered the uses of a constituency. A constituency which periodically comes together and functions as a collectivity of people is an aspect of an organized community. In the seven communities under observation, who organizes this constituency and how does the character of that organization affect citizen involvement?

In the community whose Community Action Agency we observed, we saw some 10 local area Councils as a fundamental part of the program's constituency. It was these Councils which elected representatives, and which continued to serve as an organized point of connection between the "people" and the program. At least one of these Councils was organized prior to the start of the CAA. Many of the others have been formed, and all have been nurtured, by the Community Action Agency. Quite appropriately the CAA activity which supports local area councils is called "grass roots."

We think the Community Action Program represents a clearly conceived model of an instance where a program determines that it will be advantaged (and its goals made more achievable), if the population it is concerned about is organized. Once this organization happens, the CAA further supports it by drawing a portion of its representatives from these organizations.
In effect, the CAA has used its resources to organize that portion of the community it is concerned about, and then has helped these organized groups to exercise control over the Community Action Agency's own policies.

There are, of course, other organized aspects of the community predating the OEO, which attempted to influence the local Community Action Agency. These include organizations with a racial or ethnic base. In the community under observation these organized groups have also been given representation on the policy board of the CAA, and in some cases given monies with which to operate programs.

The Model Cities Agency operates in a community where a pre-existing Community Action Agency had achieved some success in forming councils in the model neighborhood. These Councils have become a part of the organized community interested in effecting the Model Cities Program. In addition, pre-existing groups with a racial or ethnic focus became part of the organized community interested in identifying itself with the goals of the Model City Agency. Thus in the Community Action and Model City communities, the organized community base is very similar. Neighborhood groups, supported by these agencies, became part of the Model Cities and Community Action constituencies and in turn helped to supply representatives for community policy making. These neighborhood and area councils are supplemented by other organized community groups (often of a racial or ethnic character) in taking an interest in the program. Together, these neighborhood councils, and the racial/ethnic organizations become a primary constituency for the Model Cities and Community Action Programs.
The Urban Renewal Project Area Committee evolved from a group which had received its impetus under the OEO program, and before that from neighborhood organization efforts which were partially supported by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Office of Juvenile Delinquency funds). These various efforts at local organization have produced a group of apparent skill and muscle, concerned with the problems of housing. Thus when the redevelopment program was persuaded to enter into a formal advisory relationship with residents in the area, a logical choice was the Housing Committee which had evolved under the OEO program (although it had since separated from that program).

In seeking an advisory alliance with residents of the redevelopment area, the Renewal Agency chose not to organize a new segment of the community into an advisory group. By going to an already established group, the Redevelopment Agency contributed to the organizational integrity of the renewal area. A more recent development has seen this Renewal Project Area Committee become part of the area's Model Cities program. In this geographic area, there is interesting evidence of movement toward a central communal organization. We will examine this further in a section of the paper on "Aspects of Minority Community Development." Perhaps the most useful observation at this point is to outline the strategic choices which face these Federally-supported programs and members of the community being organized. One choice is to build on the existing base of organization in the community of concern; another is to further develop (or fragment) the community by attempting to organize new elements in it. A different aspect of this second
choice may be to conclude that existing organizations do not adequately represent the community, and based upon this analysis to attempt to organize presently unorganized elements of the community. At least in the black communities of America, we may have reached the point where the exercise of these options lies more with the affected community, than they do with the agency concerned with community organization.

We have indicated that the Mental Health Center, partially because of the relatively large size of its area of service, served the most heterogeneous community in the study. As one observer noted, if the Mental Health Program were to be successful it would have to reach at least, the black, the hippie, and the Japanese communities. Here again, the Federally-supported program chose a means of organizing its community which would be minimally fragmenting. The Mental Health Agency did not have the choice of building upon a single organized segment of its "catchment area"; at least not if it wanted to serve its three populations of concern.

The Mental Health Agency made the reasonable choice of organizing a new community group which was really an integration of existing groups including black, hippie and Japanese residents. The Community Advisory Board, comprising representatives of organized groups in the three sub-communities, represents a new community organization within a new concept of community for this "catchment area." Here again, lies an example of important choices confronting Federally-supported programs. In addition to choices which may fragment or help to consolidate an existing community (usually one with an
ethnic or racial base), a community organization program can be so structured as to enable the amalgamation of different sub-communities, or to build upon their separateness (particularly the growing sense of separation in the black community). In the case of the Mental Health Program, a "catchment area" was drawn to favor community amalgamation. The program's experience may not sustain this intended amalgamation. At the present time, almost 80 percent of the Community Advisory Board is black, despite the fact that blacks number less than one-third of the "catchment area."

The Public Housing Tenants' Council seems to come closest to being the community organization. Unlike neighborhood Councils, or the Mental Health Community Advisory Board, or the Renewal Project Area Committee, the Tenants' Council seems to potentially affect most of the life space of community residents. Because of this potential centrality in the life of project residents, the formation and nurturing of a Tenants' Council is an extremely difficult decision for a Housing Authority to take. All Housing Authorities have management problems and would undoubtedly like the assistance of tenants in dealing with those problems. But the consequence of such tenant assistance may be the emergence of an organized community able to challenge the authority of management in many different areas.

The Housing Authority is not unique in having to consider the costs and benefits of dealing with an organized group of "consumers." In the redevelopment area under observation, the Renewal Agency opted for the establishment of a Policy Advisory Committee (Federal regulations operative at the time required advisory committees only where rehabilitation
was being undertaken). The benefits to the Renewal Agency may be less disruption to the renewal process; its costs may be important modifications of the Renewal Agency's plan in order to secure agreement from the organized community.

We are not familiar with the process by which the Redevelopment Agency decided it would recognize (and strengthen) the Project Area Committee, nor are we familiar with the calculations by which the Housing Authority decided it would deal with the Tenants' Council. Theoretically, the Housing Authority and the Redevelopment Agency had a variety of options vis-à-vis their relations with citizen groups:

a) they could try to ignore them (or to play them off against each other);

b) they could seek to build new citizen groups; or

c) they could seek to work with and strengthen existing groups.

The Housing Authority and the Redevelopment Agency apparently chose the latter option. The Mental Health operation, Model Cities, the CAA and Legal Services all chose to build new citizen groups, in part or whole based upon and connected to existing citizen groups.

In all of the above situations, a public or quasi-public body, receiving Federal funds, had to determine what kind of alliance it was going to seek with its community of concern, and how it was going to contribute to the organization of that community. Model Cities, Community Action and Urban Renewal made alliance decisions which contributed to the support of neighborhood councils; Legal Services and Mental Health built...
their alliances with a variety of organized groups in their community of concern. In Public Housing, the Tenants' Council under observation is the embodiment of the organized community, and the Housing Authority’s "alliance" with it, contributes to the strength of the community and apparently to the strength of the Housing Authority as well. It is the Health Services Board which seems to turn its back on linking up with (and contributing to) the organized community in its area of service. And this apparent lack of concern for the organized community, may be explained by the fact that the Health Services Board anticipates no major challenges to its legitimacy from existing elements in the organized community in its geographic area of service. The Health Services Board embodies and represents that community in the persons of its key board members who are tied into the communal structure in the almost all black area which constitutes the area of service for the health program.

Observation in the field has been particularly useful in the case of these foregoing comments on community organization. At the Federal end, there is remarkably little knowledge of, and concern with, the issues of community organization. And what concern there is, probably views the organized community as troublesome, if not threatening. As one Federal field person commented, there appears to be no current Federal concern with the building of strong neighborhood units. But there is evidence in this field study, that local program units, whether or not Federally
mandated to involve citizens, must deal with the issues of community organization. Each of the programs under examination is attempting to deliver Federal resources to populations in need. Each of these programs (except Health Services) sought alliances with certain collective elements representing the program's "population of need." We have pointed out that there are certain options in the way these alliances are sought, and that different options contribute differently to the state of organization amongst the "population of need." It is very clear that there are "costs" to these alliances, in that they restrict the freedom of the program grantee, but not to make these alliances is to incur even greater costs. It is also becoming increasingly clear that despite the costs, all Federally supported programs seeking to affect aggrieved populations (and particularly black populations) will need to make these alliances with new or existing community organizations.

2. In the case of Health Services, it was the Federal Government which achieved a direct alliance with an organized aspect of a black community.
D. Multiple Service on Community Boards

We have continued to make note of the almost anomalous style of operation of the neighborhood Health Services Board. In part we have accounted for this anomaly by suggesting that in the Health Services Program the "community" is a program operator, and therefore doesn't have to seek alliances within its community. How does a group of 12 neighborhood people, largely self-selected, become the embodiment of the community? Part of the answer must lie in the degree of multiple organizational affiliations held by many members of the Health Services Board. Its chairman is a member of the Neighborhood Service Center Program Committee. Another Health Services Board member is chairman of the area's Model Cities Committee, and a former chairman of the area committee for the Community Action Program. Other members of the Board are equally tied into the policy structures for the Community Action, Model City and Neighborhood Service Center Programs. The Community Action program has spawned a number of program sub-structures, particularly around educational efforts, which have tended to involve and to create black leadership. In addition there are a variety of other organizations (political, religious, protective) involving the black community whose leadership seeks to be visible in new community activities such as the Health Services Program.

The simple observation seems to be that Federally supported programs, such as the seven in this study, have created grounds for a remarkably
rich, complex and exciting communal life for a growing number of people. Some impressionistic evidence may be useful. In the Model Cities program, some 20 percent of the neighborhood representatives on the Board, were also members of the Board of the Community Action Agency. The chairman of the Health Services Board "complained" that the same people are called upon to do everything. (In this particular community, the "crossover" of board membership is so pervasive, that one can't tell the identity of the meeting by looking at the people; they are the same people who attended "last night's meeting" for an entirely different program.) The extensive duplication of membership between the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee and that community's Model Cities Committee, undoubtedly facilitated the recent incorporation of the Project Area Committee into the Model Cities structure. In addition, the Project Area Committee has sub-committees on housing, education and recreation (amongst others) all of which tie into other existing communal structures.

Members of the Community Advisory Board of the Mental Health Center suggested that "consumer" representatives to the Mental Health Center Board be allowed to give their proxies to other delegates. The plea was that everyone is too busy doing his "community thing" to allow time to attend each board meeting. In interviewing one key black leader on the Mental Health Center Board, we asked him to account for the extensive involvement of other black leaders in the Mental Health Services Program.

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His response was that better mental health services is an extremely important concern for black people. This is undoubtedly true, but there may be equal truth to the observation that there are black governments in the making in many of our large cities. And like good public officials, the members of this government feel obligated to be everywhere on behalf of their constituents. It is also likely that leadership in a variety of communal activities, particularly those with access to Federal funds, helps to enhance the general influence and effectiveness of participants. (If Edward Banfield is right in suggesting that power is expendable, the converse may be that the potentials for power may be accumulated by enlarging one's arena of participation.)

It should be noted that the examples of multiple board membership we have presented are largely confined to black leadership. The Model Cities, Health Services and Urban Renewal Programs are almost totally focused on black communities and it is here that we are most impressed with the breadth of participation by some leaders and the notion of a developing black governmental structure. The Mental Health Center aspires to serve a community which is two-thirds non-black. But at this point, community representation is overwhelmingly in the hands of black leadership, and this leadership which is so visible in other activities affecting the black community.
The apparent ease with which black leadership has assumed numerical and actual control of the Mental Health Citizens Advisory Board, despite the fact that blacks represent only one-third of the "catchment" area needs further comment. In this particular neighborhood, the Mental Health Program entered a field which had been the scene of major community organization efforts amongst blacks by the Community Action Program. In addition, the activities of the Urban Renewal Program had stimulated extensive counter-organizational efforts amongst the black community in this area. Thus, as a result of the Community Action Program and Urban Renewal efforts, as well as very active Civil Rights organizing efforts, this neighborhood had a cadre of central resources, and were oriented to activities in the "catchment" area (as opposed to "downtown" activities).

Secondly, the Mental Health professionals (both Federal and local) seem to operate in such a way as to define the new mental health resources as being primarily oriented toward the black community in the "catchment" area. It was these white professionals who sought working alliances with black leadership, and who helped to structure the community forum for election of representatives, so that Negro organizations were over-represented in attendance, and this not surprisingly resulted in an elected black majority for the Citizens' Advisory Board.

If one views a potential community Mental Health Center (or any major Federal resource) as the start of a new game, it becomes important
to ask how and to whom, news of the game is communicated. And it be-
comes equally important to ask who is defined as a legitimate ballplayer
in this new game. In this "catchment" area, blacks were defined by the
white professional gate-keepers as the most legitimate ballplayers, and
it was to the black community that most of the messages about the new
game were addressed. And equally important there was a cadre of black
leadership who were willing and able to respond to the message. All of
this may account for the extent of black involvement in the Community
Mental Health Center, but it only partially accounts for the relative
failure by other groups to seek involvement. In this case, one might
conjecture that middle class white leadership living in this area is
oriented to "downtown," and middle class white organizations become
activated in the face of a perceived threat but not to seek their fair
share of new resources. We are less sure about the activities of the
Japanese and hippie-radical sub-groups, in that they appear to divide
the remaining places on the Citizens' Advisory Board.

The Public Housing Tenants' Council is a most useful example with
regard to developing black leadership. Some 20 percent of the residents
of the housing project are black, but almost 50 percent of the participat-
ing members of the Council are black, and the Council's leadership is
largely black. One has the impression that it is this black leadership
from the Tenants' Council which is most aggressive at playing the larger
community game. They have been active in dealing with the schools, seem
heavily involved in a local Headstart Program, and participate in the county-based Community Action Program.

Additional evidence that the notion of multiple board membership has its best fit to a black population, seems to appear in the Legal Services case. Here in a largely white county (black population of less than one percent), we noted that some 25 organizations representing poor people had to be canvassed before seven could be found who would select a representative for the Legal Services Board. And only one of these seven was black. In effect, the relative absence of a black population, seems to make it less likely for agencies to secure leadership who will publicly identify themselves as "consumers" of programs for people in need. A similar point was made by a Housing Authority official who felt that some white residents of the project were "ashamed" to identify themselves with the Tenants' Council.

3. The situation of blacks in the various county Housing Authority projects offers some interesting clues. The project we observed is the largest and most successfully integrated of the 13 county Public Housing Projects. It is the only project with a continuously successful Tenants' Council. It may be that there is a subtle selection program for tenants which picks the most middle-class aspiring blacks for residence in this project, and they in turn become the backbone and the most effective leaders of the Tenants' Council. Some corroboration, is furnished by the Housing Authority's director, who notes that the most competent black leadership seems to move quickly out of another project which is the second largest and almost all black in population. This may be some small evidence that more competent (by middle class standards) black people are attracted to (or maneuvered into) integrated housing projects. This same middle-class aspiring, black public housing tenant seems to leave segregated situations, if he can. Class may still be more important than caste in America.
The above arguments are consistent with the experience of those who have attempted organization in communities of poor people. Organization of anyone to take action is difficult; but it seems less difficult amongst black people. The argument may be extended by suggesting that poor white people are not willing to publicly admit to having a community of interest. Black people seem to be increasingly willing to claim a community of interest for themselves, even (or especially) where that community is devalued by the larger society. And they are strongly aided by the fact that blackness is a cover for people with a wide range of competencies and aspirations. It is our impression, that black leadership who play the community game, even as representatives of the poor, tend to be as competent, as sophisticated and as middle-class aspiring as any of their white middle-class counterparts. It may be likely that Federally-supported programs which have sought community participation, have, in the black community, tapped into a "population of need" whose needs owe very little to personal failings. Rather these needs are the product of an abusive social structure. Federally supported programs, in seeking citizen involvement, seem to have created a major new opportunity system for the utilization and development of black leadership.

E. Profile of the Representative:

In developing a profile of the citizen representative on the Boards of these seven agencies, it seems clear that the black community in every instance maximizes its opportunities for involvement. In each of the seven
projects the percentage of blacks amongst the community representatives on the Policy Board of the Agency exceeded the percentage of blacks in the community to be served by the program. And it seems that this is more than simply a matter of blacks being the population of greatest need in the communities to be served. If there is a greater likelihood of mental illness amongst blacks (and we don't know that there is) it hardly warrants that almost 80 percent of the community representatives be black in a "catchment" area where blacks total one-third of the community. And it is hard to argue that the 80 percent white population in public housing is less needy than the 20 percent black population; yet black participation on the Tenants' Council runs to almost 50 percent. The data is less overwhelming, but clearly in the same direction, in the Model Cities, Urban Renewal and Health Services projects, where the black population runs over 80 percent, while black control of community representation approaches 100 percent in each instance.

This evidence of black dominance in neighborhood representation has its counterpart in the staff hiring patterns of these agencies. In four of the six instances where a policy board has had influence over staff hiring, the director of the project is black. In the Mental Health and Legal Services Programs, the directors are white, and this may owe something to the scarcity of black candidates in the legal and psychiatric areas.

One aspect of the representatives' profile seems to show a gap between commonly held assumptions and reality. In almost every community
where black leadership is active there are expressed wishes for greater male involvement. It is a wish that is assumed to be difficult to realize because many observers of poor and black communities are aware of the difficulties which act to block male participation. Yet the data in this study seems to indicate success in securing black male leadership. In four of the five projects having black chairmen, the chairman was a male. In five of the six projects having significant black participation (Legal Services is not counted in that it had but one black Board member), the most aggressive and effective leadership appeared to come from males. Only in the Urban Renewal Committee was leadership predominantly female, and this may well change now that the Project Area Committee has been absorbed into a more masculine-dominated Model Cities' structure. At least in these six communities having black involvement, the era of female dominance appears to be ending.

It is likely that this movement toward black male leadership will be furthered as efforts are made to secure the involvement of youth in community decision making. At this point only two of the projects, Model Cities and Mental Health, appear to have tried and been successful in securing the participation of youthful members in the black community.

In addition to neighborhood representation being largely black and increasingly male, we have previously suggested its essential middle-class characteristics. This is not to say that black representation would often meet middle-class income criteria. But they are generally not poor,
and as a body black leadership gives the impression of a group of people whose economic outlook is optimistic. In no case is there an income qualification for serving as a community representative, although in most cases there are residential criteria. And here too, observers have noted that black residents of an area tend to have a larger range of income, than white residents in a similar area; the simple explanation being that when white residents "make it" they move out. Blacks have fewer housing options, even with increased income. Some evidence of this tendency appears in the Public Housing Project where white residents appear more transient, while blacks tend to remain and to furnish the core of the Tenants' Council leadership.

Nothing in the study permits us to comment on how black community representatives feel about the issues of separatism and racial integration. We do sense a willingness to work with whites, and an interest in racial accommodation if not in integration. Occasionally, the language is militant, but more frequently there appears an astute political sense about what is possible, what is priority and what kind of exchanges have to be engaged in to move ahead. Perhaps the most appropriate characterization of the community representative is that he insists on his prerogatives. He wants a clear statement about what falls into his domain, and he expects to be listened to, if not followed.

Here too, the all black, all neighborhood Board of the Health Services Center has a "different" feel. It is the one Board which refused
to extend an invitation to the writer of this report to attend a Board meeting. We do not view this as an anti-white manifestation.

In fact, the Federal staff representative to the program (also white) frequently attends Board meetings and offered to help the writer secure entry. In addition, this observer has worked with many of the Health Services Board members in other settings. Rather, it seemed that the Health Services Board was going through an extremely difficult period, and apparently saw no need to constrain its behavior in the face of a white observer, whose Federal connections (via the Urban Institute) were unclear.

In drawing upon material to construct a representatives' profile, we were unable to use our observations of the Legal Services Agency in that many of these observations did not "fit." However, the fact that three of this Agency's representatives from "poor" organizations were older adults, seems worth commenting on. These were the only older adults we observed as community representatives (although we may have deceived ourselves).
We have implicitly argued that even when the black man loses his economic disability, he cannot lose the society-imposed disability of his pigmentation. In the same way, the older adult has difficulty in discounting the disabilities which a youth-oriented society casts upon him. If Gunnar Myrdal could develop an analogy between the condition of the Negro and the condition of the female, he perhaps could develop a more powerful one for the Negro and the older adult. It might be that in reassessing Federal policies for citizen participation, the untapped (and probably willing) interest of the older adult needs to be looked at. In six of the seven projects we have observed, he is notable by his absence.
IV. ASPECTS OF PARTICIPATION

A. The Quality of the Experience

It is possible to observe a single meeting involving community representatives and come away with the carefully considered opinion that it is both terrible and wonderful. It is even easier to come to a variety of conclusions when one compares a variety of efforts as we are doing in this study.

On one level it is unequivocally and absolutely wonderful. Everywhere in these seven programs, formerly excluded community elements now have a public forum where their voices are heard and frequently taken account of. Surely the political life of our communities must be much healthier when people with real and deep grievances have the opportunity to "move the system." But, if we assess the quality of the experience instrumentally—what has citizen involvement done to achieve particular goals—the observer must become less sure and even discouraged. As one interviewee said of the Community Action Agency, there has been a great deal of talk of action during the past three years, but very little action. The lack of action, if, in fact, it is true, may have little to do with the presence or absence of citizen involvement. We don't know. We also find ourselves not knowing what difference citizen involvement has made upon the product of all of these deliberations. We know the process has been different; new faces, new language, new sensitivities. And maybe all of this has improved the quality of life, and even bought time for us in the racial disaster which seems to be knocking at our
national door. To all of this we must confess that we don't know. We don't know what difference it has made, but it is absolutely clear that it feels different. Our ambiguity somewhat mirrors the reaction of an older adult Board member of the Legal Services Agency who bluntly said that his "opinion is not worth a damn" on a Board controlled by lawyers. He added that he could think of no issue where he or any other representative of poor people had influenced a key decision of the Board. But he quickly added that he thought of himself as having a real voice on the Board, and assured the interviewer that he was "nobody's rubber stamp."

Or as another interviewee noted in the language of social science, "citizen involvement has to be viewed developmentally." What does the quality of participation feel like developmentally? In the Community Action Agency, there was common agreement that, initially, the representatives of the poor were considered inconsequential. They could be chewed up verbally and numerically by representatives of the public sector. Now the community representatives have succeeded in firing a CAA director (whose retention was desired by the "establishment"), and in naming a black director who was considered one of them (despite the fact that blacks constitute only 10 percent of the Board and less than one percent of the county population). There seems to be agreement that public agencies have grown less aggressive as low-income representatives have grown in strength and skill in this Community Action Agency. Public agency representatives are reported as staying away from meetings rather than risking a fight on issues they anticipate losing. On their part, low-income representatives have become increasingly aware of their power, and have been aggressive in demanding involvement in issues which concern them. Federal staff confirm this by
noting great growth in a sense of their own strength by community representatives on this CAA Board. But there is some counter evidence as well. One observer notes that community representatives attend in great numbers at the time programs are decided upon, after which attendance drops off. The CAA director expressed concern because a lack of knowledge on the community representative's part makes him too easy a target for staff manipulation.

What has citizen influence meant in terms of tangible achievement by the CAA? Programmatically, not much; certainly very little in terms of the size of the problems in this relatively rural county. Yet there is a machinery for decision making which is responsible to a very new set of influences. There are local area councils which have created a new sense of community amongst those who are very poor. There is a relatively effective working alliance between blacks, Mexican-Americans and Indians, in a county where they did not count for very much a few short years ago. Is all this not "worth a damn?" or is it important new machinery for decision making which is not the "rubber stamp" of the "establishment?"

The developmental history of the Tenants' Council is somewhat different from that of the Community Action Agency. A key black leader on the Council, without hesitation, calls it a "great organization."

The Council's existence has earned favorable publicity for the Housing Authority, which also recognizes that the Council has been effective in helping the Authority to deal with management problems. The Council began five years ago when tenants came together and successfully pressed for the development of a recreational area.
After their initial success, tenants took the initiative in hanging together. The Council has become an important device for adjudicating tenant and management grievances, and very recently the Council pressed for and won a change in the rental structure, from variable to fixed rents. The Council in turn has broadened its agenda to where it is concerned with items other than communication with Housing Authority management. Despite problems of erratic participation at meetings and the great need for some funds with which to support Council expenses (and even to secure some staff assistance) there is little question that the Council is emerging as a unit with some governing authority over the residents in the housing project. Fortunately this emergence of the Council has occurred simultaneously with and has been helped by a change in Department of Housing and Urban Development attitudes about the importance of tenant self-government. It is not clear that staff in the local Housing Authority are totally sympathetic with this change. But there is no mistaking that the Housing Authority and this Tenants' Council cannot return to a relationship of authority paternalism and autocracy. For those who have tasted of self-determination in this Tenants' Council the quality of the experience must indeed seem "great," and not easily surrendered.

The Model City Board, controlled by its black representatives, has had the experience of seeing its first-year plan of action accepted with almost no changes by the City Council. Community representatives were in control of the Board since its inception, but this control has been strengthened by the decreasing participation of non-neighborhood representatives on the Model Cities Board. A white member of this Board says
that black leadership is not out to "disturb things." However, our examination of Board minutes reveals repeated splits between black members on the Board. The director of the Model City Agency also notes that attendance of community representatives at Board meetings has been excellent, particularly in view of the small number who turn out to elect these representatives. In some respects the Model City Agency has the feel of an emerging unit of self-government in the same way that the Tenant Council does. However, the Model City Agency is concerned with a largely black area of residents, and is in turn controlled by black leadership from that area. For its part, this leadership seems to participate and make decisions with an acute sense of what is possible. Some observers might say that this Model City leadership has traded relevance to the problems of the area for survival as an agency. We are in no position to make this cynical an assessment; but we are equally unsure of the difference that black control of this program has made.

In the Mental Health Center, an agency staff member instrumental in developing the project, admitted that the original plan was for 20 percent of the Board to be composed of community representatives. Nominally, the community now has half the membership, but there is general agreement that on a de facto basis, community representatives control the decision-making process. There is a general elation with this state of affairs. The professional staff who helped to engineer this in keeping with their own ideological orientation are pleased, and neighborhood leadership feel they
have been dealt with squarely. In fact, some have proclaimed that they are
the only Mental Health Center Board in the country with this much community
control. It is too early in the history of this Board to tell what
difference community involvement and control makes. A Federal observer
feels that life for the Board will be much more complex when it has to
wrestle with priority-making decisions which may split the three sub-
communities of black, hippie, and Japanese. At this time, there is little
question that blacks have the numbers and the organizational skills to
win any such showdown. We don't know whether they would want to win.

One last comment about the quality of participation on the Mental
Health Board seems generic to the other projects. Black leadership often
seems unwilling to differ with other blacks in front of other non-black
Board members. It was only in the Model City Agency, with an assured
dominance by black leadership, a black director, and two years of
experience of living with each other, that differences seemed to emerge
more freely.

The Legal Services Board did not hold a meeting during the period
of our field study. We have already noted the feeling of one of the
interviewees that the attorneys on the Legal Services Board dominated the
decision making. Attendance at Board meetings was reported as poor, and
perhaps the Board lacks a strong enough faction to "take on" the attorneys,
and by doing so create more interesting (if not meaningful) Board meetings.
Unlike the Community Action Agency whose one-third representatives of
the poor found immediate allies on their Board, the one-third representatives
of the poor on the Legal Services Board appear without natural allies and probably divided amongst themselves. All of this may not seem very encouraging, but viewed developmentally its perspective is very different. A short while ago the principle that only lawyers could make policy for legal services appeared sacrosanct. And even more radical, this Legal Services Agency is in the process of organizing an advisory board composed of those who have used the Agency's services. The potential consumer of health services is being refined to the actual consumer of legal services. The opportunities for continuing change in this Legal Services Agency seem very real, based upon these developments.

The Urban Renewal Project Area Committee began its community career as a militant combatant with the Redevelopment Agency. It now serves in a formal advisory capacity to that agency, shares physical facilities with it, and receives $40,000 of its funds. In addition, many members of the Project Area Committee, and its predecessors, have found employment with the Redevelopment Agency. Have these radical developments changed the quality of the experiences for those on the Project Area Committee? We suspect so, but we have no evidence over time. What does seem clear is that the formerly volatile relationships between leadership of this area and the Redevelopment Agency have almost disappeared. It is equally clear that there is movement toward the building of new housing in a manner which would permit those who live in this area to remain there. Cynical comments are heard about the Project Area Committee being "in bed" with the Redevelopment Agency. But the romance appears about to give
birth to some very wanted children for both parties to the seduction.

And a series of field interviews produced strong affirmation that the Project Area Committee has become an important force in influencing the redevelopment of an area with great physical and social needs.

Does the above relationship between the Redevelopment Agency and a formerly militant neighborhood group seem like a classic instance of co-optation? We suspect so. But just who has been co-opted? It can be argued that the Redevelopment Agency has been co-opted by the neighborhood group, in that neighborhood leadership is now privy to, and influential over, most decisions affecting redevelopment in their area. But the neighborhood has also been co-opted in that it is no longer as abrasive with a Redevelopment Agency over which it feels it has a measure of control. From a tactical point of view, there are costs to both parties (the neighborhood and the agency) when neighborhood leadership begins to operate inside a program's decision-making system. The agency may surrender autonomy in order to win cooperation; the neighborhood in turn surrenders independence of action in return for what it hopes is greater influence over decision making.

Community leadership may cope with these costs by supporting groups with differing functions; some to operate inside and others to remain outside. We will repeatedly argue that for the program agency the options are more limited; to operate without seeking to bring representatives of client groups into the decision system is becoming increasingly unthinkable (and impossible).

We gather that the all-black, all-neighborhood controlled Health Center has become something of a showpiece for the U.S. Public Health Service.
Its uniqueness would appear to warrant HEW's pride, but upon second thought there is nothing terribly unique about a lay group making policy for a health services operation, at least if that lay group is not black and/or poor. In some fashion (with more or less struggle between professionals and lay people), this policy pattern prevails in many of the hospitals in our country. Assuming the Health Center goes into operation (at the time of this writing the center's facilities have just been completed), it is clear that a small group of neighborhood leaders, backed by the confidence of HEW, will bring an entirely different medical presence to a neighborhood in great need. Participation has indeed made a difference. There is little question that the decentralization of services could have been accomplished by the County Health Department and/or the private medical community. But it was not. Is the difference useful or regressive in terms of the quality of medical care? We don't know. There is little question that the Health Services project will make a great difference in terms of the accessibility of medical care, and surely that must count for a great deal.

In assessing the quality of participation, we ended where we began. We are enormously impressed with the changes in the way decisions are now being made because of community representation. In all communities there appears to be an acceleration in the delivery of resources to people in need. Whether this acceleration is due to community involvement (or in spite of it), we don't know. It is conceivable that equal sums of resources delivered to hospitals, schools, redevelopment agencies, and mental health
centers would have yielded even greater increments of services (and more
quickly) if there had not been community involvement. At least in the
case of the Redevelopment Agency, this speculation appears invalid.
Movement in the redevelopment area had been at a standstill until the
Redevelopment Agency appeared to open itself up to community influence.
In the other instances, more rapid development if there had been no
citizen involvement is certainly theoretically possible. But to this
observer it appears a trivial speculation. We have argued in the first
section of this study that citizen involvement need not be looked at
instrumentally—that is, to see whether things happen differently with
or without it. Citizen involvement is an end in itself; it is consistent
with our national ethos, and a necessary part of the way we must make
decisions even if it slows down new housing, schools, medical services,
etc. There is certainly no evidence in this study that citizen involve-
ment has caused any such slowdown.

B. The Road to Jobs

Does it appear surprising that poor people and those of very moderate
means would display an interest in bettering their lot? Conceivably,
if one explains poverty as a condition of apathy, one would expect
poor people to be impervious to the "goodies" which were being passed
out in new Federally-supported programs. But of course they are not
impervious, and the attraction of jobs has in some cases proved destructive
to citizen involvement on policy boards. In other cases it has led to
ethical anomalies, where those who make policy for an agency are directly
advantaged by their own involvement. This of course is a common (and approved) occurrence in the private sector of our society, and an unhappily frequent occurrence in our public sector as well.

Within the above context it may be easier to understand the impact upon community representatives of being exposed to the creation and filling of numerous attractive employment opportunities. We have noted in the urban renewal case example, that the Redevelopment Agency seems to have consciously gone about creating positions for neighborhood leadership to fill. And it appears that the Redevelopment Agency is indulgent of its staff members who wish to remain involved in community affairs on agency time. We trust the reader will not miss the analogy to our businesses and industries which generously make the time of their staff available to engage in voluntary welfare decision making and fund raising.

In the Community Action Agency a formerly active neighborhood leader (and chief antagonist of the agency in its early days) has through a succession of jobs become the director of the agency. This same Community Action Agency has experienced a number of resignations from the Board of one of its delegate agencies. These Board members have all planned to apply for the newly vacant position of director of their agency.

Perhaps the most extensive involvement of community representatives and agency jobs occurred in the Health Services Program. We are unsure, because interviewees appeared reluctant to talk about it, although all indicated that it was present and widespread. It is likely that the unwillingness of this Health Board to be observed had its source in the bitterness which the contest for jobs had engendered between Board members.
The Model City Agency displayed a tactic which has become common in many agencies serving low income communities. A number of positions were created which could best be filled by relatively untrained people who are neighborhood residents. In addition to the Model City Agency, this kind of job creation is prevalent in the Community Action Agency, the neighborhood Health Services, the Redevelopment Agency, the Legal Services Agency and will undoubtedly be adopted in some aspects of the Mental Health Services operation. It is only the Public Housing Authority (where the Tenants' Council has little influence over authority expenditures) which has not established aide positions to be filled by project residents.

These apparent connections between participation in policy making and access to jobs has of course had an impact upon these Federally supported programs. At times these situations have been used by the press to hold these programs up to question, and at other times, disgruntled job seekers have complained to their Congressional representatives about local hiring practices. Some local agencies have been less than meticulous about the ethical implications, although most agencies now appear to have policies which prohibit an agency employee from participating in policy making for that agency.

There have been other more positive consequences with regard to jobs for neighborhood people. The growth of the "new careers" idea has been strongly abetted by having community representatives in positions where they influence hiring. In addition, neighborhood people, not so enamoured
of "professionalism," have questioned the credential requirements which are sometimes inappropriately established to fill positions. In this respect, community representatives on the Mental Health Board seem particularly anxious to question the qualifications established for new positions.

In sum, there is little question that in most of the seven agencies observed, participation has been a road to jobs. But this needs to be seen in the general context of why people volunteer for anything. One might just as easily suggest that some of the attorneys who volunteer for the Legal Services Board, are doing it to protect their own incomes (i.e., seeing that Legal Services do not serve clients who can pay, or assuring that Legal Services takes those indigent clients who might normally be a burden on a private attorney). While the short-term impact of competing for jobs can be negative as in the case of the Health Services Program, the general results as seen in these seven projects seem normal and even salutary.

C. Stipends and Allowances

There is an aspect of double standard with regard to stipends and allowances in the same way as seems to exist in the area of jobs. Some observers express anger when neighborhood people use their policy positions as a means of access to employment, forgetting the normalcy of this practice for other groups. In the same way, surprise may be expressed when community representatives request or receive stipends and expense reimbursement for their participation on policy boards. It hardly needs to be added that volunteer board members who work on company time receive salaries and allowances. And of course, it is common practice for members.
of public commissions to receive honoraria for their service. In addition, middle class volunteers can use their expenses as a tax deduction; an option which may yield little benefit to the poor person.

In the area of stipends and allowances, OEO was a pioneering agency, at least with regard to the development of policy. However, the partial failures of both the Legal Services and the Community Action Agency in implementing these OEO policies would indicate some feeling on the part of local lay or staff people that stipends and/or allowances are not justified expenses. In the Legal Services Agency, reimbursement for travel and other out-of-pocket expenses are available, but no representative of the poor has put in any claim for such funds. Stipends are not available. In the Community Action Agency, poor people do receive travel allowances and other out-of-pocket expenses but stipends are not available. Neither stipends nor allowances are available for participants in the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee or to members of the Mental Health Center Board. They are obviously unavailable to members of the Tenants' Council who do not have access to any budget at all. It is the Health Services Program and the Model Cities Agency which are most aggressive in this area.

With the express agreement (and urging) of the U.S. Public Health Services Staff, a stipend is available to participants on the Health Services Board.

The Model Cities Agency pays a flat $10 stipend (in lieu of any allowances) to those attending regular Board meetings who sign a statement indicating their attendance would not be possible without receipt of the stipend.
In the earlier Institute study we detailed the spotty nature of Federal policy in this area of stipends and allowances. It seemed to us that if programs are really serious about enabling low income participation, they are going to have to put their "money where their mouth is." The field study bears out the erratic nature of policy, but even more interesting is the partial failure of the two local OEO supported programs to implement OEO's national policy in this area. Apparently, there is a strong pull toward having our volunteers be real volunteers (except of course when they are organization employees, doing their "volunteering" on company time).

D. Board Composition

In another paper (ATP Journal, July 1969), this writer has noted a development in Federal programs from citizen participation in coalitions to programs where neighborhood residents predominate. The Community Action Program with its formalization of the one-third, one-third, one-third formula, seems to epitomize the idea of a coalition. In the Model Cities Program, there has been tendency towards neighborhood domination and even total control of policy making. There seems to be little Federal agreement as to what constitutes adequate participation, and we expect this to be reflected in the variance of Board composition in the seven programs observed.

4. An interesting example of the erratic course of Federal policy with regard to stipends was demonstrated at an NIMH conference on citizen participation, attended by this writer. All participants, including key public officials, psychiatrists and welfare recipients received a standard honorarium plus expenses.
The Legal Services Board is almost the perfect reflection of formal OEO polity as to Board composition. Its Board of 21 has seven representatives nominated by organizations assumed to represent poor people. None of the 11 attorneys on the Board are members of one of the visible minority groups, and as previously noted, only one of the seven representatives of the poor is a black person. It should not be surprising then that the representatives of the poor are a de facto as well as a de jure minority on the Legal Services Board. This minority status is further enhanced by the fact that attorneys, as well as non-minority representatives control the majority of the Board.

Conversely, the Model City Agency is both de jure and de facto in the control of neighborhood representatives. Fifteen of the 28 places on the Model City Board are in the hands of neighborhood representatives. In addition, the neighborhood representatives could count on support from representation assigned to CORE, NAACP and the United Council of Spanish Speaking Organizations. In the nature of the program planning process in the Model City Agency, important authority rested in the planning task forces. All but one of the task forces were firmly in the hands of neighborhood representatives. The physical improvement committee was the only one on which non-neighborhood people predominated.

The neighborhood Health Services Board and the Public Housing Tenants' Council are of course totally in the hands of community representatives. However, the authority of these two groups is radically different. The Health Services Board, composed of 12 black neighborhood
residents, is the final authority for health services decisions affecting the neighborhood Health Center. So jealous is this Board of its prerogatives that it ostensibly fired its first executive director (also black) because he was seen as usurping Board authority. At the present time, with the apparent urging of the Public Health Service, there is some thought to securing a Chinese representative on the Board, in that the Health Services area has been redefined to include an area of Chinese residents.

If the issue of "racial balance" has come very recently to the Health Services Board, it has also come in a rather unaccustomed way. It is the black majority which is called upon to exercise largesse in making room for a non-black. In a subtler way, some of the same problems of "racial balance" confront the Public Housing Tenants' Council. If the Council is to retain legitimacy in a community where blacks are outnumbered four to one, it must be careful not to seem black-dominated. We gather that black participation has run about 50 percent, and they seem to provide the effective leadership for the Council. Care seems to be taken to retain a balance on the Tenants' Grievance Committee; a Committee which has developed important influence in determining whether tenant evictions are to take place.

The question of race being what it is in our society, it would not be surprising to find tension and conflict along racial lines in the Tenants' Council. At no time during the course of our observation was such conflict visible. And none of those interviewed referred to evidence of conflict.
of a sometimes unresponsive landlord, is adequate to mute the issues of black and white. Whatever the reason, along the dimension of race relations the public housing tenants' group was the most exciting group observed.

The Urban Renewal Project Area Committee is, like the Tenants' Council, advisory to another body. And like the Tenants' Council, the Project Area Committee is almost totally composed of neighborhood residents. The fact that the Project Area Committee occasionally has participants who are not neighborhood residents seems a curious relic of a previous pattern of citizen participation in this area. Some seven years ago when this writer first made contact with the redevelopment area, he was surprised to find that the local neighborhood council consisted almost totally of professional persons who worked in the area but lived elsewhere. In seven years, the situation has completely reversed itself, with a reminder of the past in that fact that the Project Area Committee includes a few non-residents who work in the area. It should be added that not only has the seven years witnessed an almost total movement to indigenous participation, but with that movement has come the almost complete elimination of white participation in groups which represent this neighborhood in community affairs.

We have elsewhere noted that the Community Action Agency is effectively controlled by community representatives, despite the fact that these representatives nominally hold only one-third of the Board seats. The remaining Board seats are divided between public agencies and "community organizations." The 10 organizations represented on the Board were almost all characterized as groups which fight
"for the poor." Given the common equation of poverty and minority status, this observation is borne out in the fact that seven of the 10 organizational representatives are members of visible minority groups. These include three Mexican-Americans, two blacks and two Indians. The 10 representatives from local area councils, chosen to represent the poor (but not necessarily poor-themselves) include one black, two Mexican-Americans and one Indian.

As with most other Boards observed, the public agencies did not select minority group members to represent them on the Community Action Agency. Thus a combination of 10 low-income representatives plus seven minority group members from the middle ("community organization") sector totalled 17 members out of a Board of 30. Given occasional splits amongst the public agencies, coupled with poorer attendance patterns, it is apparent that community representatives (and their organizational allies) could generally control Community Action Agency decision making. It should be noted that Community Action Agency, like the Legal Services Agency, the Health Services Board, and the Mental Health Board, are all Boards with final authority, whose decisions are not subject to local governmental review. It is also worth noting that three of these four agencies (the Legal Services Agency excepted) are strongly responsive to their community representatives in decision making.

We may be premature in asserting that community representatives will control the Mental Health Services Board. Technically the Board is constructed to create a situation of parity between the agencies who are constituent members of the Mental Health Center and community representatives. Each such agency is to receive one place on the Board.
and this place is to be matched by one member drawn from the Community Advisory Board, which was elected by the community forum. But there are two factors which upset this nominal parity between agencies and community. First, the Chairman of the Community Advisory Board is ex-officio on the Mental Health Center Board. But second, and far more important, pressure from the community representatives has succeeded in enlarging the roster of agencies which are considered to furnish mental health services to the "catchment area." These newly included agencies were not originally considered part of the mainstream of mental health suppliers in this area. Their clientele and staff were more likely to be black and/or hippie. The inclusion of these agencies on the Mental Health Board, as part of the agency sector, will undoubtedly create a corps of agency allies who can be counted on to vote with community representatives on most key issues.

The subtleties of the maneuvering displayed in the Mental Health Agency, may be incomprehensible to the reader who comes to the situation "cold." It is not the intricacies of the process that are important—it is the purpose of the process. And the purpose, as exemplified in five of the seven projects being examined goes beyond community participation in decision making; the purpose now appears to be community control of that decision making. Control is not now a factor in the legal services and public housing situations. Control has been effectively won in the Community Action, Mental Health and neighborhood Health Programs.

While the decisions of the Model City Agency are subject to City Council
review, it is clear that community representatives control enough of the process to prevent anything they dislike from happening with Model Cities funds in their neighborhood. And more positively, the community-dominated Model Cities Board initiates all new program ideas for which Model Cities funds will be expended.

The Urban Renewal Project Area Committee is by common agreement, only advisory to the Redevelopment Agency. But as previously noted, in a joint article signed by the director of the Redevelopment Agency and the Project Area Committee, there was an understanding that "no plan is going to be carried out ... if there is serious, carefully evaluated, neighborhood opposition." If the Project Area Committee does not have control, it certainly appears to have a likely veto over Redevelopment Agency activities. And with the embrace of the Project Area Committee by the Model City Agency, the movement toward neighborhood control may be entering a new phase.

It should be a truism that those who make policy are important. They are the authorities, although they may sometimes not act that way. Under the impetus of Federal policy, Federal staff encouragement and the increasingly skillful participation of community representatives, new faces have begun to compose the cast of policymakers and policy influencers in these seven programs. Apparently, the lesson has been

5. At the time this was being written, a new salvo in the battle for community control appeared to have been fired. The Model City Agency called for the review of a construction contract between the Redevelopment Agency and a white-owned construction firm which was a high bidder for its job. Instead, the Model City Agency suggested giving the contract to a black firm, which was the low bidder, but which was unable to meet bonding requirements. The Redevelopment Agency, while sympathetic, cautioned that this move would delay construction for a long time.
learned that it is easier to influence the making of agency policy when one controls the policy apparatus than by pressing that apparatus from the outside. And this may be what citizen participation is really all about; changing the composition of policy making bodies so that the aggrieved elements of our society have representation inside, where decisions affecting them are being made. The evidence of the field study may be weak with regard to what new products these newly composed policy boards are turning out. However, the evidence is strong, that whatever the product, there is a totally new aura of legitimacy to the process when the voice of community representatives is effectively heard.

E. Training

If most Federal policy with regard to citizen participation is erratic and piecemeal, policy with regard to the training of citizen participants is almost non-existent. Little wonder then that there is such scant attention to, and understanding of, the issue in the field.

The Mental Health Center Board, the neighborhood Health Service Board and the Project Area Committee for urban renewal, all represent a wasteland with regard to the issue of training Board members, or the specific training of community representatives on these Boards. From the Federal point of view, all of these are programs which are not yet widespread enough to have warranted systematic consideration about the issue of training. That may be a charitable comment; a greater likelihood is that neither the Federal nor the local level has even thought about the issues in the training of policy makers. People need to understand...
the purposes of the agency they are asked to make policy for, they need to understand the problems they are dealing with, and they need to understand the skills involved in effective participation. One may malevolently say that there are some at the local and Federal levels who are not particularly anxious to impart this knowledge and skill to community representatives. There are obviously others who feel the skills and knowledge are "caught not taught." And others may feel that training is accomplished on the job; picked up in the process of acting as a Board member. Whatever the rationale for not training, in the three programs indicated (Project Area Committee, Mental Health and neighborhood Health) there is little thought and no action with regard to the issue of training community representatives.

The issue of training is not yet relevant for the Tenants' Council because there is no one at the Federal or local level, with money, who views the Tenants' Council as its constituent. This is hardly to say that Federal staff and the local Housing Authority are not on balance, pleased with the existence of the Tenants' Council. They are, but they appear not to have the new funds, or the desire to change their priorities in the use of old funds, to make things like staffing and training for the Tenants' Council realizable.

The Legal Services and Community Action Agency represent totally different situations. Both are funded by OEO, an agency whose conception of the issues of citizen participation has repeatedly been shown to be at a level different from that of other Federal agencies. In the Western
region, the OEO supports a regional training center whose activities include circuit riding for the purposes of training policy makers on community action boards. The Community Action Agency under observation has held board-training sessions. Two diverse reactions to these sessions are worth noting. One is that the Public Agency people don't show up. The second reaction, from a community representative, was her surprise that agency people were invited in the first place. Apparently she viewed community representatives as having different needs and interests which would preclude a common training session with public agency representatives. Covertly this community representative may have been asking in adversary terms, "why advantage the opposition by giving them training--first teach us."

The Legal Services Agency, while aware of the advantages of training, and the resources available for training, has not engaged in any. There was an apparent intent to change this. At this point the agency may be too new, and the director too new, to reasonably expect that they would have taken advantage of OEO's training resources.

The Model Cities Agency has engaged in training sessions for all members of its board. Training resources were purchased out of the agency's planning budget as well as furnished in the person of the agency's director. Such training for the Model Cities Board is indeed a necessity, in that it was expected to participate in the development and approval of a complex product called for by the guidelines to the Model Cities' program. This product was to include a five-year general plan and a one-year action...
program to materially improve the quality of life in the model neighborhood. In addition to training sessions sponsored by the local Model Cities Board, the Federal Model Cities administration sponsored regional training sessions, with all travel expenses authorized, and with the participation of community representatives specifically called for by the Federal office.

The sum of training experiences for community representatives in these seven projects is indeed thin. Except for the Model Cities and Community Action Agency, there is almost no Federal attention to the issue, and perhaps as a consequence no local attention. It may well be that the proper auspice has not yet been found for the conduct of training. The OEO regional training center is a promising idea, and OEO has also experimented with college-based training centers, although less successfully. The writer recalls that the voluntary welfare sector often sponsors training for agency board members. There is not yet present a Federal point of view (outside of OEO and Model Cities) which has learned to view community representatives on local boards as part of their constituency. The training tasks could be supported by the other Federal agencies which fund the programs described in this study if they came to see community representatives as an integral part of their locally sponsored programs rather than as some exotic sport.

V. DECISION MAKING

A. The Character of Decisions Influenced by Community Representatives

Whatever else the accumulation of knowledge stimulates, it surely stimulates the need for additional knowledge. Nowhere in this study of
citizen participation is the need for additional knowledge as evident as it is in the area of citizen influence on decision making. We simply do not have enough systematic evidence as to what kinds of influence community representatives have in decision making. And we early confessed that our evidence was even more fragile with regard to what is different (in product, as opposed to process) because of citizen involvement. In this section on citizen influence over decision making we can offer some clues, based upon observation of formal decision-making processes and interviews with a wide variety of persons involved in the making of decisions in these seven agencies.

The Tenants' Council in the Public Housing Project and the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee both came on their respective scenes after the agencies they give advice to were in operation. If one is interested in community influence upon decision making, it would be useful to compare the operations of the Housing Authority and the Redevelopment Agency prior to the formation of their respective advisory bodies. If such data were not available, one might attempt to compare the operations of housing authorities and redevelopment agencies with and without citizen advisory bodies.

We do not have the data to form the basis for a comparison of decision-making influence. But we do know that the Tenants' Council came together over the issue of recreational facilities, and achieved its most tangible success in stimulating the Housing Authority to "find" $5,000 in its budget with which to install playground equipment. It of course can be argued that a benign Housing Authority management would
have "found" the $5,000 on its own impetus; and therefore, the Tenants' Council helped to achieve nothing different. The point is moot. What is not moot is that the Tenants' Council hastened the expenditure of funds for playground equipment, and from there has gone on to become a body concerned with a range of community issues affecting those who live in the housing project. In addition, the Housing Authority has apparently welcomed a role for the Tenants' Council with regard to tenant eviction. It is reported that the Council has influence over some 80 percent of the eviction proceedings concerning project residents. In addition, when the Housing Authority initiates eviction proceedings directly with a tenant, he is told that he may seek recourse against management action with the aid of the Tenants' Council. It is of course conceivable that the Tenants' Council would be harsher in making judgments about tenant eviction than would the Housing Authority acting alone. That may be an interesting outcome of community involvement, but it in no way detracts from the fact of important community influence over a sensitive process, which in other housing projects is the sole prerogative of the Housing Authority.

One major difference organized tenant influence has made is in the structure of rent payments for project residents. All other housing projects in the county under observation have a variable rental structure; rent payments are in some fashion geared to ability to pay. The Tenants' Council has been instrumental in helping the Housing Authority to adopt a system of fixed payments; in effect, rentals are based on size of space occupied as opposed to ability to pay. Thus
community representatives have helped to remove an additional means test in the lives of tenants and have moved the rental system to a point where it approximates the rental structure in the private housing market. In the process, a hardship may have been worked on families with large numbers of children and those least able to pay. The reader may view this as evidence that when community based leadership asserts itself it tends to make decisions in terms of "community of orientation" (the middle class) rather than its "community of occupancy" (the lower class public housing dweller). Or it may be that a rental "means test" is as distasteful to public housing tenants as to those of the middle class, and therefore the "means test" is overthrown when tenants have influence over rental policies.

If the Tenants' Council can be viewed as an embryonic self-government for the residents of the public housing project, it is equally clear that some of the prerogatives of self-government are not about to be surrendered by the Housing Authority management. One staff member of the Authority, while appearing sympathetic to the Council, was concerned over it being "easy for them to decide they want to take over." While there may be fluidity about which decision areas fall into the Council's domain, the Housing Authority is clear that the hiring and firing of personnel is not one of them. As we shall see in the other projects, personnel matters become a primary focus for citizen influence. And it seems likely, that until personnel matters fall into the purview of the Tenants' Council, they shall remain a good distance from approximating a system of self-government.
In terms of authority, the position of the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee is analogous to the Tenants' Council. They are both advisory groups, and the Redevelopment Agency and the Housing Authority have full legal authority to proceed with or without the sanction of their respective advisory groups. The *de facto* situation is somewhat different. Community leaders of the Project Area Committee were firm in their belief that redevelopment site office personnel would have to be removed if the Project Area Committee withdrew support from them. In fact, the redevelopment site office staff makes an effort to involve the Project Area Committee in many of its hiring decisions, taking obvious care to employ black personnel (and particularly those resident in the redevelopment area).

The Project Area Committee has also been influential in selecting architects, planning consultants, and developers to work on the redevelopment project. During the course of interviews, Project Area Committee leadership could recall no issue where their advice was not sought and given weight in the making of final decisions. Those familiar with the redevelopment process, and in particular with the feelings that black leadership have about the redevelopment process, might suggest that someone was being less than candid, or that the interviewer was incredibly naive. The facts seem otherwise (at least the facts with regard to candor--our naiveté will have to be assessed by those who know the community in question). The Project Area Committee is influential over the decisions affecting its area, which are made by the Redevelopment Agency. There is
no pretense by the Redevelopment Agency that the Project Area Committee is even exposed to many (or most) of the redevelopment decisions affecting the project area. The complexity of the redevelopment process would make that difficult and unnecessary. As we shall note in a later section on technical assistance, staff are the most influential decision makers on a day-to-day basis in all projects. Very often lay decision makers are not made aware of the issues which affect them. These issues are decided solely by staff on the grounds that they are "administrative" rather than "policy" type decisions.

This practice of staff decision making is hardly unknown to members of the Project Area Committee. It can be more easily lived with (or at least not tested in public struggle) on two counts: (1) the director of the project area for the Redevelopment Agency is a black man, and (2) in an effort to build an alliance with the neighborhood, the Redevelopment Agency put large numbers of black people on its site office staff. This staff has indeed proved a bridge, but it has also functioned as an informal information network to let the Project Area Committee know when decisions are being made which are questionable from a neighborhood point of view.

If one accepts this reviewer's impression, that a Project Area Committee holding only advisory powers, has been markedly influential, the question of "why?" deserves further comment. One answer may lie in the realm of structure. A Redevelopment Agency site office physically based in an almost all black redevelopment area, with a black director, and many black staff in influential positions has certain
predictable sympathies with the residents of its area. And just as predictably, it has strains with its central office, based downtown, seemingly responsive to the business interests of the larger community, and having "downtown" staff and policy personnel who are predominantly white. In addition to this organizational strain, the site office of the Redevelopment Agency understands that the support (or at least the neutrality) of the area's residents are as important a resource for it as any other that can be conceived of.

The result becomes a "natural" alliance between the site office of the Redevelopment Agency and the black leadership of the community as represented on the Project Area Committee. This "natural" alliance is hardly unique to the community-under analysis. It seems relatively successful here because the community was well enough organized to form an alliance with, the Redevelopment Agency played the decision making game in relative good faith, and the Project Area leadership dealt in the realm of what was politically possible. They did not raise the issue of a continuing alliance to the point where it would have been "too expensive" for the Redevelopment Agency to continue the relationship. The resulting influence for the neighborhood's leadership, if this influence is sustained, may produce important increments for all parties to the process.

Before moving to other projects in our analysis of citizen influence on decision making, it is useful to again note that the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee are two of the three structures in our study where citizen representatives sit in a policy advisory rather than policy making role. An intent of our analysis has been to indicate the immense
potential influence which lies in the advisory role. The potentials of the advisory role appear to be best realized in the Model City Agency. In the Model City Agency, a policy advisory body composed of 15 community representatives and 13 organizational representatives develops policy for the approval of the City Council. Unlike the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee, which were made up solely of community representatives, the Model Cities Board is a coalition of community and organizational representatives. And perhaps because of this, the Model Cities Board's advisory role to the City Council has evolved into a de facto situation of policy authority for the Model City Board. None of the Model City Board's policy or programs have been rejected in City Council review.

How shall we account for the strength of this influence by a neighborhood dominated policy advisory body? One suggestion is that the goals established by the Model City Board are simply not threatening to very many people, as one interviewee said, "The program is bland." Others, suggested that community representatives on the Model Cities Board were politically astute and realistic. They avoided "zero-sum" choices (choices where gains are achieved which entail equal costs for others), while seeking to enhance the resources available to the black community. For example, some of the new housing planned will be located outside the model neighborhood. But none of this new housing will be in areas which are not already integrated. One black Model Cities Board leader noted that they wouldn't spend a nickel to bus kids in order to integrate schools, and they weren't going to use their Model City funds to break racial barriers in housing. This Board member said that the only kind of integration they were interested in was "on the job."
We don't really pretend to know whether the extent of community influence in the Model Cities program is best explained by the community representatives having asked for too little, or having asked for that which holds little threat to other institutional forces. Or another explanation may be that the City Council views dilution of its influence over the Model Cities Program as a reasonable "price" to pay for an alliance with black community leadership which may result in a more peaceful city.

In the three projects where citizen representatives sit only on advisory bodies, this body appears most influential in decision making when it is a coalition of forces dominated by community representatives (e.g., the Model Cities coalition). The evidence with regard to coalitions which themselves are decision making, rather than advisory to other decision makers is somewhat more mixed. The Legal Services Agency represents the one policy making/advisory Board having community representatives where these representatives are a legal and factual minority. The seven community representatives appear to be minimally influential in the decisions of the Legal Services Board. One Federal observer of this project commented that "the poor get boxed out of decision making." However, we did not find evidence that the representatives of the poor are deliberately shunted aside in the Legal Services Agency. They do get manipulated, in a sense, by their numerical minority, their lack of natural allies, their relative lack of sophistication with regard to legal issues, the lack of common interests.
between the representatives of the poor, and their inability to draw upon a constituency which might occasionally go "to the community mat" for the things they believed in.

Community representatives have fared much differently on the Community Action Agency Board. Unlike the community representatives to the Legal Services Board, the CAA community representatives have a constituency in the 10 local area councils, there are a significant number who share the common problems of color, and an alliance was realized between organizational representatives and representatives of the poor selected by local area councils. It seems clear that the community representatives and their allies on the Community Action Agency Board determine the Agency's program goals. It is they who have selected the current priorities of education, housing and transportation for the program. These priorities have not been fought by the public agencies, but it is equally clear that these agencies, on and off the Community Action Agency Board, possess a de facto veto over all programs which require the use of public funds.

Analytically, one might suggest that the community representatives in the CAA have achieved control over those matters which are internal to the agency. They can run a program so long as it doesn't require outside resources or sanction. And they can effectively control internal agency staffing policies. In addition to being able to hire a black director (who is not exactly held in great favor by the public agencies), the community representatives were able to concert their strength and fire a previous director, despite overt opposition to the firing by the public agencies.
Of course, the influence of the community representatives in the CAA is not all internal. It is commonly acknowledged that community representatives have been among the most influential in working to secure the establishment of a county Housing Authority. But there is a sense in the CAA (and perhaps amongst others as well) that "more and more they may be dealing with less and less." The price for neighborhood control may have been an erosion of the CAA's capacity to be influential in a broad environment, beyond the CAA's increasingly limited resources. And the strategic implications for how the CAA deals with its community environment, given its absence of "muscle" in that environment, may be too difficult for the CAA to face. To this observer, the implications would involve a CAA (such as the one under discussion) in a level of conflict which the current national administration may no longer be prepared to tolerate.

Community representatives in the Mental Health Service Program also serve as part of a coalition on a policy making Board. It is a Board on which they were to have parity but which they now effectively control. Part of the reason for this control rests in a decision influenced by community representatives to enlarge the number of agencies in the Mental Health "consortium" to include new Mental Health Agencies which are "grass roots" in character. This enlargement of the Board has taken a parity situation and moved it to one of effective community dominance. To this point, the impact of this change in the Board's balance of influence has only begun to be felt. Community
representatives have been most influential in moving the agency to a primary concern with the problem of drugs. It is not clear how this Board will act when it has to decide how to allocate program funds; will it allocate everything for drug programs, or use some of its funds to "buy into" other mental health efforts?

The Mental Health community representatives have also asserted their interests in the issue of jobs. While this Board did choose a white director (psychiatrist), there is strong feeling that the "second man" must be black, and equally strong concern by community representatives that all new positions be examined for the potential employment they offer to "catchment" area (read black) residents.

Given the youth of this Mental Health Agency and the fact that its program decisions are yet to be made, it is difficult to detail examples of community influence that go beyond procedural questions. Federal staff expect the agency to be newly sensitive to issues affecting black people and/or poor people. At this point the influence attempts by community representatives have been focused around personnel, program priorities, and procedures. In doing so, community representatives appear to have brought the Mental Health Agency under their effective dominance. "Power is as power does." What the resulting differences and program achievements will be, beyond "sensitivity" (no small difference) are not yet clear.

Again, in this area of decision making, the experience of the neighborhood controlled Health Services Center appears categorically different. The 12 members of the Health Services Board have no
"alien" forces within their own organization to contend with for influence. This is not to suggest that there aren't important struggles with the County Health Agency, the Public Health Service, the hospital community, etc. And perhaps the most important commentary in this section on decision making, is that the Health Services Board has handled its decision-making tasks with enough acumen to push the construction of a major new facility to completion, and to win over an $800,000 grant from the U.S. Public Health Service.

As with other agencies examined, the Health Services Board was concerned with the issue of personnel. But the quality of concern was different. Rather than community representatives seeking influence in the hiring of personnel, in this case the Health Services Board fired a director who it felt was competing with their authority to operate the center. With regard to medical personnel, the Health Center Board has negotiated a series of complex agreements with an organization representing the practitioners who will use the center. Through this agreement, the Health Center Board has convincingly asserted lay authority over the conditions for center usage by medical personnel.

In this section, examining the character of decisions influenced by community representatives, there is evidence that all areas pertinent to the operation of a program concern citizen representatives. These include personnel, programs, priorities, procedures, etc. We state the obvious to make the point that community representatives have the interest capacity to concern themselves with all of those things which
organizational decision makers are a party to. It was only in the Legal Services Agency, with no established community of interest between representative of the poor and a numerically insignificant minority community, that community representatives appeared unable to assert their special interests. It should be apparent throughout this study, that we are taken with the notion that poor/black/brown people potentially represent special interests blocs. In fact, the whole movement toward community representation (or whatever the euphemisms we have used in place of community representation) is based on the recognition that community groups having special interests with regard to issues which concern them have until now been systematically excluded from much of community decision making. In the next section we will examine the relationship of some of these special interest groups to each other as they work to influence decisions in the agencies under observation.

B. Relationships Between Factions in Making Decisions

The notion of "factions" provides yet another perspective for understanding the policy making/advisory systems we are examining. In these seven agencies there appear three essentially different structures for incorporating the special interests of poor/black/brown people into the policy making system. In one of these structures, the blacks as an aggrieved special interest group, constitute the total internal decision system. The neighborhood Health Services Board reflects this structure. Whatever factions or special interests there are, become submerged under the pervasive "blackness" of the Health Services Board.

6. It is of course conceivable that "hidden" factions on this Board will erupt, and even imperil the life of the agency.
On the Mental Health Board, the Community Action Board, the Model Cities Board, and the Legal Services Board, aggrieved special interest groups constitute a special and distinct faction within the structure of the policy board. In the case of the Legal Services and Community Action Agencies, special legislative attention has been given to the size of the factions seen as representing the special interests of poor people.

In both of the local communities being observed, additional thought was given to how this faction would be selected and how it would be augmented (i.e., in the Community Action Agency; organizations were chosen to serve on the Community Action Agency Board whose representatives were likely to serve as allies of the representatives of the poor). In the Model City Agency and Mental Health Agency great energy was expended in determining the size of the faction which would represent the "consumer." Of great importance is that in both these cases a number was arrived at which would insure parity or dominance of the "consumer" faction on the policy board.

A third form occurs where the policy making agency, recognizing the narrowness of its connection to (and legitimation from) the aggrieved groups, enters into a special policy advisory relationship with a group composed almost solely of members from these aggrieved groups. Such groups are the Tenants' Council, composed entirely of people resident in public housing and the Project Area Committee composed almost entirely of black residents of the area to be redeveloped. In this situation the special interest group is placed at arm's length from the policy making system, but in a very special relationship to it.
These three modes for accommodating aggrieved special interest groups into the policy system may be captured in the following diagram:

A: INTERNAL CONTROL

- Health Service Center

Black residents of the service center area are the sole occupants of policy making positions.

B: COALITION

- Other factions

Representatives of aggrieved groups are one of a number of factions on the policy making/advising board.

C: ADVISORY

Policy making Board

Policy advisory body made up almost completely of representatives of aggrieved groups.

We expect that the above three types of structures will reflect different relationships between the aggrieved special interests factions and other special interest factions, inside or outside the policy board. In the case of the four agencies we see as having coalition structures (Mental Health, CAA, Legal Services, Model Cities), we will be interested in the relationship between the black/brown/poor factions and other groups on the board. In addition, in all seven boards, we will be interested in evidence of factionalization along any of the following role dimensions: black-brown, professional-nonprofessional, staff-lay, minority-majority, etc.
The neighborhood Health Services Board is primarily organized around two factors: the blackness of its members and their area of residence. In this respect it may be no different from thousands of other policy boards which are distinguished by homogeneity as to color and area of residence. In these latter instances, color is a most subtle factor in board organizations. One doesn't set out to have an all-white board; an all-white board grows because the significant constituencies of the agency are all white. In the neighborhood Health Services case, the most significant constituency is all black. And the board is all black. Other constituencies, such as health professionals, public officials, hospital officials are negotiated with as needed from a distance, rather than incorporated, as factions, into the Health Services Board.

Based on the structure of the Health Services Board one might argue that its most significant conflicts would be with its environment, not with representatives of that environment who might otherwise be seated inside the board. Despite the theoretical argument that the structure of the Health Services Board should diminish internal conflict, while maximizing the potential for external conflict, the evidence is not convincing. The Health Services Board seems to have developed useful relationships with part of the private medical community, with some

7. We have noted elsewhere that the composition of the Health Services Board may be changed to include a Chinese member, in that a Chinese area of residence has been incorporated into the Health Center's area of service.
hospitals, and with the County Health Department. Conversely, there appears to be some factionalizing within the Health Services Board along what may be class lines. We have previously noted dissension around the matter of board members taking jobs with the Health Center. There are also suggestions of other important internal splits within the board, based upon individual board member values. These splits should come as a surprise to no one, in that all policy groups experience occasional or frequent internal struggle. It is only "surprising" in the case of the Health Services Board where black fights black, and where blacks join together to fire a black director. In our present racially charged atmosphere, public conflicts between blacks, subject to view by a white audience, are increasingly rare. And the firing of a black director, which would be concurred in by black board members on a racially mixed board, would be just as rare. All this by way of suggesting that the Health Services Board represents some small evidence that when given the opportunity, class rather than caste lines can become more important. It would seem that whatever opportunity we still have for an integrated society would rest in maximizing other possibilities for class interests prevailing over caste positions.

The Tenants' Council and the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee both represent factions organized around the grievances of their members. In that respect they are similar to the Health Services Board. But unlike the Health Services Board, they possess little authority and few resources. However, with respect to resources, the Project Area Committee is far richer than the Tenants' Council, possessing a budget of
$40,000 and a sometimes angry black constituency to lend credibility to
its advice giving.

The Tenants' Council, in a way totally different from the Health
Services Board, seems additional evidence that class interests can
predominate over caste lines. The Council seems to have an active
membership almost equally divided between blacks and whites. While they
undoubtedly come to the Council as blacks and whites, their primary
performance seems to be in their role as tenants of a public housing
project. The natural grievances inherent in this role, and the need to
develop internal tenant unity if they are to effectively deal with the
Housing Authority and other agencies, seems to have enabled this Tenants'
Council to submerge caste lines in favor of class interests. However,
we would not be optimistic about the Tenants' Council ability to remain
relatively insulated from the racial passions of the larger society.
In fact, it would be possible for a Housing Authority which became
threatened by a racially mixed Tenants' Council to break the Council by
playing black against white. We have seen no evidence of this in the
Tenants' Council we observed; to the contrary, the Council's success as
an integrated group owes much to the caliber of its tenant leadership
and the pragmatic good sense of certain Housing Authority personnel.

The Project Area Committee seems to have successfully dealt with
two strainful elements, which have occasion torn apart other black
groups. The Committee's leadership has come from a nucleus of tough
and skillful black women. This female leadership has not always been
viewed kindly by a rising younger black male leadership. In addition, the Committee's apparent capacity to sustain an alliance with the Redevelopment Agency has made it suspect amongst the area's more "militant" elements. To the outside observer it seems that the capacity of the Project Area Committee to sustain itself in the face of male and "militant" factions (and even incorporate them) is further evidence of a maturing black community.

In the first part of this section, we suggested that the four "coalition" agencies would represent the most interesting grounds on which to observe factionalization: In the Legal Services Agency, the division between lawyers and non-lawyers masks class differences as well, and might also have masked racial differences. Whatever the potentials of this factional split on the Legal Services Board, the impact seems minimal. The lawyers on the Board are firmly in control of policy making for the Agency. As previously noted, the representatives of the poor do not function as a group with common interests, and they have been unable to build useful alliances with the three Agency representatives on the Board. Various interviewees report that there are no issues which divide the Board along legal vs. non-legal lines, and parenthetically, no issues on the Board which seem to divide the representatives of the poor from others. It is likely that the issues are there; it is unlikely that the Legal Services Board as currently structured will encourage these issues to surface.

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In the Community Action Agency, the firing of a previous executive
director became the grounds for a coalescence of representatives of the
poor and their allies against the representatives of the public agencies.
This coalition was further strengthened by its capacity to name a new
black agency director. There is little question that members of the CAA
Board understand their functioning in terms of which side of the coalition
they sit on. There is a small hint that the public agency faction may be
breaking down now that the dominance of the representatives of the poor is
clear. Interviewees report that some of the younger representatives of
the public sector have taken to voting with representatives of the poor
on a number of issues. The rise of the faction representing the poor
becomes even more interesting when it is realized that this faction embraces
sub-groups with distinct special interests; the Mexican-American, the Negro,
the Indian, and the Caucasian poor. Given the diminishing resources of the
OE0, and the history of black-brown splits in other more urban areas, one
might not be too sanguine about the possibilities of this CAA holding
together its coalition of poor people and those of color. What may save
the coalition, is that in this relatively rural county, no one minority
faction by itself, has the capacity to dominate the program. The control
by representatives of the poor rests in the willingness of these factions
to unite across minority group lines.

In the Community Action Agency the dominance of those who are poor
and/or of color is not predictable from an initial look at the structure of
the board of directors. In the Model Cities Agency there appears to have
been a deliberate attempt to structure the dominance of black neighborhood residents with regard to decision making. But there is some evidence that the dominance of black membership on the board, coupled with very strong representation on the staff, has permitted the surfacing of other factions on the board. As in the Health Services Center, this observer saw some evidence of black lay leadership engaging in open conflict with some black staff members. Another interviewee reported that on a number of issues, the dominant split is not along black/white lines, but along class lines. This interviewee reported that on certain issues, there appears an informal alliance between more middle class black board members and "white liberal" members.

Perhaps the most interesting observation in the Model City Agency was that under conditions where blacks hold a variety of organizational roles (lay leaders and lay followers--top staff and bottom staff); and in a group which has a task orientation, color becomes relatively insignificant as actors pursue the imperatives of their various roles in moving toward organization and personal goals.

Two other instances in the Model Cities experience appear worth reporting on. One is a factional split which has not occurred. The 15 neighborhood representatives are equally apportioned among three different areas of residence. These neighborhood representatives have different local councils as a constituency base. And yet despite these differences, there is no report that representatives of an area tend to divide against each other in the allocation of agency resources. Another split which
has occurred apparently did not assume major proportions. In the various planning committees which met to develop program, there were reports of anti-professional attitudes voiced by community representatives. Here too, the potentials of the split may have been muted because neighborhood representatives were so clearly in control of all nine planning committees, except for the one dealing with physical improvements.

As of the time of this writing, it was the Mental Health Agency, more than any of the other three "coalition" agencies which was faced with two factional splits, each supporting and deepening the other. The community representatives are overwhelmingly black and the agency representatives are overwhelmingly white; the professionals are overwhelmingly white and the lay people are largely black. The deepness of these divisions and their strength seem mirrored in two apparently contradictory observations by interviewees.

One black observer noted that the professionals in the Mental Health Agency can always bring community people to "heel" with their greater knowledge. Conversely, a white observer felt that it was impossible for non-blacks to stand up at board meetings and argue an issue once the black representatives had cast the issue in terms of race. This was corroborated by another interviewee who noted that there is little public division on issues; he said
that agency people tend "to clam up" when the going gets rough. It was the Mental Health Board which seemed to best reflect the observation that only blacks are able "to take on" other blacks in public or in arguments over issues with racial implications.

Despite the apparent depth of division along racial lines in the Mental Health operation, this observer was equally impressed with the optimism that both black and white informants held for the project. Blacks felt that they had been dealt with squarely and that they were going to be allowed a genuine voice in the Mental Health operation. One key white professional went so far as to base his optimism on a different prognosis for black-white relationship in the West. He said feelings were less bitter; there was more trust and more possibility in the West for bridging the difficulties which separate black and white.

It may be that much of the material for this section on factions provides a shaky basis for generalization to the rest of the country. The working coalition between black and brown and white poor in the Community Action Agency may be idiosyncratic. Racially integrated public housing, and a Tenants' Council with strong participation by black and white, may be quite unique. A Model Cities Agency
where middle class blacks and "liberal" whites frequently vote together may be an atavism. A "militant" black-area grossly deprived and not too long ago the scene of rioting may be the least likely context for an ex-chairman of the Project Area Committee to co-author an article with the white head of a Redevelopment Agency on "collaborative planning." All of this may be evidence which is spurious, or in fact, may mask serious black-white conflicts which were invisible to this observer. There are undoubtedly other "truths" in the situations which are unknown to us. But we believe that the above material is also true. Blacks and whites can work together. This working together is supported when blacks occupy some positions of authority in the decision system, and when blacks as a group have significant influence over decision making. These may not be sufficient conditions to enable black-white cooperation; based upon this study they appear necessary if cooperative relationships are to have a chance.
C. Caussing and Bloc Voting

Some of the foregoing evidence of factions is arrived at by inference and of course much by post facto explanation of events. Perhaps some of the most reliable evidence of factions, occurs in voting behavior and physical attempts of factions to caucus. Not surprisingly, it was the Legal Services Agency which reported that its representatives of the poor did not see themselves as a bloc, and that they had never caucused. Conversely, it was reported that there was a time in the Community Action Agency when black and brown members of the board would caucus prior to meetings to prevent splitting the vote of black and brown delegates. Similarly, there appears to have been periodic meetings of community representatives to the Model City Agency Board in order to educate themselves and attempt to develop their common positions. It was stressed that these meetings were not to "plot control, in that we knew we had it."

The notion of a caucus has a different kind of fit to the Tenants' Council and to the Project Area Committee. In a real sense, the Council and the Committee represent on-going caucusses of tenants and black residents in their respective areas. This is not to say that there is an absence of difference between members of the Tenants' Council or the Project Area Committee. It is rather that we have no evidence of bloc voting in either group, and no evidence of factions meeting
separately in order to plan control of the larger meeting. In the same way, we would suggest that the neighborhood health service operation represents a case where the Public Health Service gave legitimacy to a black neighborhood caucus interested in influencing the distribution of health resources in their area. With the Public Health Service grant, the caucus was transformed into an operating agency whose policy was made by former members of the black neighborhood health caucus. In the nature of organizational development, it would not be unlikely for the Health Services Agency to be split into new factions which reflect factors other than race or areas of residence.

From the point of view of caucussing and bloc voting, it is the Mental Health Agency which presents the most sophisticated operation. The reader may recall that the Board of the Mental Health Agency has parity in representation between the Mental Health Agencies and the community representatives. In addition, all of these community representatives serve on and are elected by a Citizens' Advisory Board. It is the Citizens' Advisory Board, composed of community representatives and some representatives of community serving agencies, that in effect represents a permanent on-going caucus of the community representatives who serve on the Board of the Mental Health Agency. There is no need for these representatives to meet curtly; the legitimate function of the Citizens' Advisory Board is to meet periodically to develop positions for community representatives to take on the larger board. It would be
most interesting to observe whether the agency representatives on the board develop their own caucus as a reaction to the Citizens' Advisory Board.

The notion of caucussing is common knowledge to any observer of the national political scene. In many circumstances, a caucus serves an important democratic purpose. It insures that the representative in fact represents those who selected him to stand for a particular position. It seems no accident that caucussing was most common in the "coalition" agencies (all except Legal Services) where representatives of aggrieved groups would need to learn to function with a common purpose, in the face of sometimes hostile elements. If in fact the whole push towards citizen representation is meant to serve other than symbolic purposes, we must look with favor upon devices such as caucussing and reporting to a constituency. It is these devices which help to insure that the citizen representative represents and is accountable to someone other than himself in community decision making.

D. Advice or Consent--The Elusive Difference.

The Board of the Mental Health Center, the Community Action Agency, the neighborhood Health Center and the Legal Services Agency are all Boards of final authority. The Boards are the locus of decision making as opposed to decision advising. In expending the resources under their control, these Boards need not go to anyone else for consent. Each of these four Boards having final authority has community representatives.
In fact, only one of these Boards (Legal Services) is not de facto controlled by its community representatives, and one of them (Health Services) is entirely controlled by community representatives. Thus, any community representative who serves on one of these four Boards knows that it is his consent, rather than his advice that is being sought. In these instances, the difference between advice and consent is not elusive. But even in these four Boards, there is interesting evidence of additional channels for seeking advice from others.

The Health Center seeks advice from a medical group composed of those health practitioners who operate out of the Center. The role of this medical group is clear; they are advisory only. As individuals they are tenants of the Health Center, subject to policies made by the all black, all neighborhood Health Services Board.

8. In reviewing this material, Robert A. Levine argues that the strong citizen control in the Health Services Program, appears strong because the policy board's scope for action is smaller than in other agencies. In effect, the decision-areas reserved to professionals must be high and the policy topics left to citizen-control are correspondingly smaller. Levine's observations may explain policy making in the Health Services Program at a more mature stage of operation. During the period of this field study the Health Center was not yet offering medical services, and had a very small number of medical personnel in its employ. It may be that the Health Services Board was highly dependent upon other sources to spell out its options for decision making. And as in the other six projects, the Health Services Board was dependent upon Federal funds so that it would have something to make decisions about. But there is no question that within the constraints that it operated, the 12 citizen representatives on the Health Services Board had the greatest amount of authority possessed by any of the neighborhood groups in this study.
The Legal Services Agency at the time of this writing is attempting to form an advisory body composed of ex-users of the agency's services. In conception, it is clear that this would be an advisory group, although as we have seen in other cases, the actual experience might be somewhat different. Parenthetically, one might guess that this interest (at least by the agency director) in forming a consumer's body is a reflection of the minimal impact that representatives of the poor currently have on the Legal Services Board.

It is of course clear that the Citizens' Advisory Board is meant to be only advisory to the Mental Health Agency Board. But we have argued that in practice it is much more than that: We see it as an on-going caucus which will strongly influence the positions taken by the community representatives selected to serve on the larger board. If the Citizens' Advisory Board is able to exert increasing control over the positions taken by community representatives, and if these representatives in turn are the dominant element on the larger Mental Health Board, then on a de facto basis, power over the Mental Health Program comes to rest with the Citizens' Advisory Board. In effect, it is the consent of the Citizens' Advisory Board that will be required for major new decisions.

The Community Action Agency takes a much different approach to seeking advice from others. It seeks consent. The CAA has further subdivided its authority so that it agrees not to operate a
program in any area where a local council does not approve of that program. In effect, the CAA gives a veto over program to local area councils. Thus, with regard to the issues of advice and consent, it is only the CAA which turns to other groups and surrenders its sovereignty over programs to councils which presumably better represent intended program recipients than does, the CAA.

If the foregoing four agencies have the authority to make decisions, it is equally clear that two other agencies, the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee have no such authority. They are advisory bodies only; the Tenants' Council to the Public Housing Authority and the Project Area Committee to the Redevelopment Agency. While the presumed limits inherent in advice-giving are clear, the consequences of being in an advisory role are not always understood or accepted. On the one hand, the agency which enters into an advisory relationship is sometimes deliberately fuzzy about how much of its authority it is giving away. Thus, as previously noted, the director of the Redevelopment Agency can sign his name to an article which encourages the Project Area Committee to believe that "serious, carefully evaluated" opposition on the part of the Project Area Committee would be enough to block a program. And another top official of the Redevelopment Agency notes that "no contract goes through without their Project Area Committee's approval." At the same time, he adds this is not an "absolute veto"
in that there is nothing to legally prevent the Redevelopment Agency from acting without the approval of the Project Area Committee. We would suggest that it is precisely around these kinds of ambiguous procedures that the difference between advice and consent becomes elusive.

If agencies contribute to the fuzziness of the boundaries between advice and consent, the advisory groups often deliberately further the fuzziness. When dealing with their more militant constituents, advisory groups sometimes feel the need to act as if they have the power of consent. And in many other cases, the difference between advice and consent becomes confused by precedent. An advisory group begins to look as if it is much more than that when its advice is almost followed. Authority is not God given; it is man made. If a body with presumed authority repeatedly defers to another group in making decisions, it is embarked on a process of transferring its authority to that other group. If the Housing Authority never makes an eviction decision without the concurrence of a majority of tenants on the grievance committee, it is surely beginning to share its authority with (as opposed to seeking advice from) a tenants' group. After a time it is the consent of the tenants' group, to proceed with an eviction, rather than their advice, which is being sought.

Given the above nuances of "advice" and "consent," it is clear that the Project Area Committee is much further advanced than the
Tenants' Council in its quest for authority. Apart from previously noted statements of redevelopment officials, members of the Project Area Committee indicated that they could not recall when their recommendations were overridden by the Redevelopment Agency. Surely this recounting of past history indicates an expectation of what the future will be like with regard to making decisions. Another community representative explained this seeming transfer of authority by suggesting that the "muscle" of the black community has given the Project Area Committee a de facto veto over redevelopment programs.

Nevertheless, when pressed, all community representatives interviewed agreed that the Redevelopment Agency has the legal authority to override the advice of the Project Area Committee. It is precisely this confusion of expectation and legality that makes the advice-giving relationship so volatile.

The Public Housing Tenants' Council did not have the same expectations with regard to how much muscle it had. These differences may be captured in the comment of one Tenants' Council leader who said the council would be "disappointed" if they were not consulted on a major decision. Surely "disappointment" over not being consulted is very different from the Project Area Committee's stated feeling that "everything" which happens in the site office of the Redevelopment Agency is the business of the Project Area Committee.
While the advisory relationship of the Tenants' Council may be weak as compared to the Project Area Committee, there is nevertheless a history of important achievement which has helped to sustain the Council. There is a strong feeling amongst Council members that their recommendations are "listened to." They continue to be influential in eviction procedures, and they have a major recent achievement in moving their basis of rentals from variable to flat rents. In addition, representatives of the Council have had the experience of pleading the Council's case before the County Housing Commissioners.

Thus the Council is beginning to function as an advisory group to 2 major elements affecting the housing projects; the commissioners who make policy affecting the project, and the management personnel who implement those policies.

The Model Cities Agency is the hybrid. In many respects it resembles the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee in that it has limited authority to act. Legally, all of the Model Cities Agency's requests for funds and its program decisions are subject to the approval of the City Council. But yet, like other "coalitions," the Model Cities Agency has representation from other public agencies and a large staff which is responsible to it. Unlike the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee, the Model Cities Agency deals with a body (City Council) which is only minimally knowledgeable about the programs over which it has final authority. This is a sharp
reversal from the redevelopment and public housing situations where the administering agencies have the staff resources and a detailed knowledge about the programs which community representatives are trying to influence. Thus it should come as no surprise that the City Council has never initiated a program proposal, and that the City Council approved without alteration, all program proposals submitted to it for approval by the Model City Agency. With this kind of precedent, one might suggest that the City Council has started a process of shifting some of its authority to the Model City Agency.

While the Model City Agency may benefit by certain shifts of authority from the City Council, it also possesses certain real authority which was given to it as part of the decision system as initially conceived. The Model City Agency is formally a part of the process by which program decisions are made, and its consent is necessary before the City Council can request funds for a program. This is precisely where the Model Cities system for decision making (in the city under observation) is generically different from the advisory relationship which prevails between the Project Area Committee and the Redevelopment Agency. There is no formal procedure by which the Redevelopment Agency agreed to defer to certain advice from the Project Area Committee. Not so with the Model City Agency; the City Council must seek its advice, and by local agreement the City Council binds itself not to act without the consent of the Model City Agency.
However, the reader must not be led to think that the Model City Agency possesses the same authority to act as does the Mental Health Agency or the Community Action Agency. It does not. The Model City Agency cannot act without the consent of the City Council. This relationship has been called the "dual green light system," because both parties (the Model City Agency and the City Council) have to say "yes" in order for action to take place. Each party needs the other party's consent to act with regard to the Model Cities Program. This gives the Model City Agency far more authority than the Tenants' Council and the Project Agency, but far less authority than any of the other 4 agencies under observation. The net result for the Model Cities Agency is that it can effectively stop action in the Model Cities Program, but it is only advisory to the City Council with regard to the starting of program.

It is conceivable that this "dual green light system" may be particularly useful accommodation between the desires of community representatives for additional influence and our national need to keep government and its resources closely connected to the problems.

9. Hans Spiegel has captured additional subtleties to this system by calling it a "triple veto." In addition to the possibility of negative and positive sanctions by the neighborhood board and the city government, there is a final veto resting in the hands of the Federal Government, which must decide whether to provide funds for the program.
of the poor and minority communities. It is a system which bears close watching. One of its most important negatives would appear—
that it makes it much easier not to act than to act, and that would appear to be a road to disaster in our current urban crisis.

Another negative, is the all too apparent one of the Model Cities Agency producing bland innocuous programs, calculated to win City Council approval, and to create the illusion of action for the Model City Agency. That way appears to lie another road to disaster. At this point it is too early to tell. One might only suggest, that in its potential—

the "dual green light" system of making decisions in this Model Cities Program, seems to overcome the ambiguity of advice giving, while giving to community representatives genuine authority to block action which appears disadvantageous. It also retains enough "muscle" for local government so as to keep it an active partner in program development. It would seem important to develop a careful evaluation of the costs and potentials of the "dual green light" system of decentralized decision making.

E. Technical Assistance for Decision Making

The Model Cities guidebook notes that the "neighborhood-citizen participation structure... must have the technical capacity for making knowledgeable decisions. This will mean that some form of professional technical assistance, in a manner agreed to by neighborhood residents,
will be provided." In other Model Cities materials the above ideas are captured under the heading of "independent technical assistance."

Presumably the technical assistance given to community representatives is to be independent of city government planning staff and is to be chosen by the "community" and not by city government. The implicit model, is one of an adversary proceeding. That is, if the final decisions for Model Cities Programs are being made by local government, then neighborhood advisors must have staff resources independent of city government.

We have previously suggested that the Model Cities guidelines offer the most sophisticated Federal material with regard to the idea that community representatives need staff resources of their own choosing. Other Federal agencies appear to have given little thought to the provision of special technical assistance to neighborhood groups or to the potential adversary nature of the relationship between public agencies and citizens affected by the actions of such agencies.

The furnishing of technical assistance in the seven agencies under observation, reflects the primitive stage of policy development in this area. First let us be clear that all seven agencies charged with making final decisions in these programs, have their own technical staff which they can hire and fire. Neighborhood Health Services has a medical director and an administrative director, both responsible to the Board of Health Services Agency. The Legal
Services Agency, the Housing Authority, the Redevelopment Agency,
the Mental Health Agency, and the Community Action Agency all have
executive directors who serve at the pleasure of their respective
boards. In the Model Cities Agency, things become somewhat more
complex. The City Council has a technical staff headed by a city
manager. The Model Neighborhood Board, which shares certain con-
sent authorities with the City Council, also shares its executive
director with the city. This executive director is a city employee,
and is responsible to the city manager, who exercises important
weight along with the Model Neighborhood Board in the hiring of the
director. Thus the director of the Model City Agency serves a dual
constituency; the City Council through his responsibility to the
city manager and the Model Neighborhood Board dominated by community
representatives.

At one point in the history of the Model City Agency, there
was a suggestion that planning committees have access to technical
assistance which would be independent of the Model Cities director's
staff. Obviously this request was consistent with the previously
quoted Model Cities guideline. However, the neighborhood-dominated
board turned this request for independent staffing of committees
down. The Model Cities director was firmly against the provision
of such special staff, being quoted as saying that neither he nor
his staff needed a "watchdog."
Two factors make this rejection of independent staff understandable. First, the neighborhood-dominated board also has the dominant voice (3 votes to 2 for city government) in determining the hiring of the director. Secondly, the director, and a majority of his staff, like the majority of the Model Neighborhood Board, are black. It is also clear to the observer, that the director and his key staff, view themselves as working for the neighborhood despite their nominal status as city employees. In effect, a vote by community representatives to authorize independent technical assistance, could have been interpreted as a vote of "no confidence" in the director and his staff.

Theoretically, the most useful examples of independent technical assistance ought to be found with bodies such as the Tenants' Council and the Project Area Committee, both of which are advisory to large, complex, well-staffed agencies. The actual experience is very different. The Tenants' Council has no budget or staff resources of its own. The Housing Authority has indicated that funds for staffing the Tenants' Council are not available, although the Authority makes meeting space available. On some occasions the Authority's staff has helped the Tenants' Council in its dealings with other agencies. The county's anti-poverty program represented an excellent potential source of funds for staffing the council, but according to reports, the county Community Action Agency showed little interest and a formal
request for staffing funds was never made. From time to time the Tenants' Council has been helped by professional personnel from other areas of the county who attend Council meetings. At the time of this writing, the Council seems to be interested in seeking a foundation grant which would help to secure staff assistance.

The experience of the Project Area Committee as compared to the Tenants' Council is markedly different in securing funds. But ironically, the Committee's net position with regard to staffing may be the same as the Council's. The Project Area Committee recently signed a contract with the Redevelopment Agency which makes $40,000 available to the Committee. However, none of this money is to be used for technical assistance, in that staff hired by the Committee is intended to be of assistance administratively but not technically. The result may be that the Committee will be a more efficient organization in managing its affairs, but it has not secured the staff resources which would make it technically more knowledgeable in giving "advice" to the Redevelopment Agency.

The Legal Services Agency does not presently have advisory groups, and therefore the notion of independent assistance is not applicable. However, we have noted some initial attempts to form an advisory group of ex-users of legal services. At this point, staff resources for the attempt to form this group are being provided by the Legal Services Agency.
The Community Action Agency being observed presents a situation of some turmoil with regard to technical assistance. Nationally, as well as in this local Community Action Agency, there is a specific effort to further decentralize the Community Action Program to community corporations and to neighborhood councils. We have already noted that local area councils have a veto over programs intended for their areas. Given this state of affairs, one might expect an increase in efforts to provide staff assistance to local area councils. In fact, such staff assistance had been provided and is now being withdrawn (or to put it more kindly, restructured). Formerly, each local area council selected its own "grass roots" worker, who was paid for with Community Action funds made available through an agency charged with community organization for the county. These "grass roots" workers became staff for the local councils, and undoubtedly on occasion proved annoying to the Community Action Agency, by helping local councils take positions counter to the Community Action Agency staff. At the time of this writing, "grass roots" workers are being centralized, so that they will no longer be responsible to individual local councils. In return, the local councils have been promised staff assistance on an "as needed" basis. Theoretically, this centralizing of staff should make the staff assistance available to the councils less independent and more responsive to the
interests of the central Community Action Agency. One might cynically comment that independent technical assistance (that is assistance which is independent of "an establishment," no matter how benign it may be) is a far more attractive idea in the abstract than in reality. In this situation, the Community Action Agency appears to have contributed to eroding the independence of the technical assistance available to local area councils.

The matter of technical assistance reflects an interesting turn about in the Neighborhood Health Services situation. The most significant groups in the environment of the Health Services Board are all composed of professional personnel. A reasonable assumption is that the Health Services Board needs technical assistance in dealing with these groups (hospitals, county health department, private practitioners). It would appear somewhat ludicrous for the Health Services Board to concern itself with strengthening staff assistance to professional groups. In fact, several of the health technicians, hired by the Health Services Board, are expected to serve as advocates of the Board's position in the professional community, as well as consultants to the Board in how to deal with these outside professional agencies.

At the present time, in the Mental Health Agency, there is no discussion of special staff assistance for the Community Advisory Board. The director of the Mental Health Agency is staff advisor to the Agency's Board and also to the Community Advisory Board. We
would guess, that if community dominance of the Mental Health Board were not to remain an accomplished fact, it would lead to the non-acceptance of the agency director as an appropriate staff assistant to the Community Advisory Board. The Community Advisory Board might seek its own staff assistance in that it might come to view itself as being in an adversary relationship to the Mental Health Board.

The observation that loss of community dominance over a decision-making body, might result in a withdrawal of community confidence from the staff hired by that body, seems particularly important. We are suggesting that on policy bodies where neighborhood representatives are not an effective majority, these representatives will seek additional connection to a body (such as a neighborhood council) which is dominated by neighborhood representatives and which has independent staff resources. We admit that the evidence for this assertion in this study, is slim. In four of the agencies, community representatives do have a working majority of the Agency Board, and therefore see themselves as having control over staff resources. In the Legal Services Agency, there appears to be no working community of interest among representatives of the poor, and no apparent interest in, or capacity by these representatives to organize a caucus external to the Agency. In the case of the Tenants' Council, there is a clear articulation of their desire for staff independent of the Housing Authority. In the Project Area Committee, resources for independent
staff were won, but the staff was apparently hired for its administrative rather than its technical skill. However, the recent absorption of the Project Area Committee into the structure of that neighborhood's Model Cities Agency, now gives the Committee access to an array of technical skills which are independent of the Redevelopment Agency.

VI. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

A. Influence on the Established Agency Community

In six of the seven programs we are looking at (the Legal Services Program excepted) there exists a body dominated by a combination of black/brown/poor representatives. On page after page of this study we have attempted to detail the influence these community representatives have had within their program's decision-making system. In this section we turn our attention to relationships between these neighborhood dominated groups and other agencies in their environment. In a sense we are looking for changes in community equilibria, as existing agencies learn to cope with (and to manipulate) a new collective force strongly reflecting a new set of interests.

On the national scene, one might suggest that the Community Action Program has been "coped with" to the point where it may be effectively neutralized. And yet there is an emerging literature which details the panic originally felt in many communities at the
advent of the Community Action Program. In the community under observation the County Board of Supervisors voted (unanimously) not to exercise the options of the Green Amendment. This amendment, as part of the 1967 Economic Opportunity Act, allowed local government to assert sponsorship (and authority) over the Community Action Agency. One interviewee suggested that by rejecting sponsorship of the CAA, the County meant to disconnect itself from the "wrangling" in the program and from its minimal program achievements. This interviewee also noted that the agency representatives, who are holding the 10 public agency seats on the CAA Board, were becoming "younger and more liberal." This might be interpreted as a downgrading of the CAA by the public agencies. It would be somewhat akin to a national policy which saw us sending junior level black foreign service officers to staff American embassies in the new black nations of Africa. We have noted elsewhere that some of these new public agency representatives will frequently vote with representatives of the poor. One of these agency representatives made the point repeated very often in other communities, that non-agency people with little stake in the current way of doing things, make the most potent force for community change. This of course, is the potential of the Community Action Program, and other programs with extensive citizen involvement. It is important to note that the point is still given credence by some of those who are involved with the Community Action Program.
Some have remarked that the Model Cities Program was an attempt to rectify the "abuses" of citizen participation in the Community Action Program. In this study's Model City community, there appears to have been City Council acquiescence in establishing a Model City Agency dominated by neighborhood representatives and holding significant authority. There are occasional reports that some City Councilmen would like to change the situation, but apparently the "costs" for attempting to do so are considered too great. In addition, some Councilmen and other community leaders (both black and white) appear impressed with the possibility of the Model Cities Board emerging as the spokesman for the black community.

In addition to its expected relationship to the City Council, the Model City Agency has had extensive contacts with other community agencies in the development and operation of program. There is ample evidence that Model City staff and lay people, feel free to publicly reprove established agencies for their "insensitivities" to the needs of black people. But this pressure by the Model Cities Agency on established public agencies is not always perceived by agency staff as dysfunctional. Operating people in an agency (and particularly those agencies whose central administrations lie outside the community) can find Model Cities pressure very beneficial, as these operating staffs seek to bargain within their own bureaucracies for
increased allocations. It is precisely this kind of situation which makes an attack by the Model Cities Agency a welcome event in the life of some agency staff. It is also likely that as Model City leaders better understand the complexity of relationships within large public bureaucracies, they will be even more effective in forming covert or overt alliances with certain public agency figures.

The Urban Renewal Project Area Committee reflected the Model Cities experience in the way the Committee's "militancy" was used by the site office officials of the Redevelopment Agency to press their central office for greater autonomy and additional resources. Presumably these additional resources were to enable the site office to deal more effectively with its militant neighborhood. In addition, the central Redevelopment Agency office had learned that a "militant" Project Area Committee was useful to the Redevelopment Agency as it sought to secure particular kinds of action from other public agencies. In effect, the Redevelopment Agency can press particular kinds of demands with other public agencies by pleading that a Project Area Committee (read volatile blacks) are "on their backs" for action.

In a much lower keyed vein, there are certain similarities to the above situations in the relationship between the Housing Authority and the Tenants' Council. It was reported that the Housing Authority was initially "hostile" to the formation of the Tenants' Council. While we did not detect unrestrained enthusiasm for the Council on the part of its
of the Housing Authority personnel, it was equally clear that they were learning to live with the Council and even to like it. The Council apparently contributed to a better run project and the success of the Council clearly earned "credit" for the Housing Authority with the regional office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. In fact, the Housing Authority now appears to be encouraging the Council to become involved in pressuring other public agencies for action. In this way, the Council may serve to "loosen up" some of the public agencies that the Housing Authority has been dealing with. Here again, the opportunities for alliance are enormous. Community representatives will learn that the Housing Authority has a variety of goals, many of which would be agreed to by project residents, which the Authority is pressing with other public agencies. (i.e., schools, highway department, city manager's office, etc.). There is some evidence, in many of the programs we observed, that community representatives are learning to make these differential assessments, and learning how to use short-term alliances to achieve limited objectives.

While the Tenants' Council has sought to influence agencies in addition to the Housing Authority, it is clear that the commissioners of the Housing Authority remain a key target for Council influence. It is both reasonable and predictable that tenants of the Authority will soon serve among the commissioners. The seating of tenants as commissioners is publicly supported by DHUD, although with few apparent results at the local level.
In this section on influencing the established agency community, it seems safe to conjecture that the Health Services Center will be nationally visible and possibly influential as well. Unless the Health Services Center meets with catastrophe, it is likely that a health agency totally responsive to black neighborhood leadership, will be influential no matter what it does. It has already been successful in securing commitments to work out of the Health Center from a large number of medical personnel who formerly offered no services in this almost all-black neighborhood. The existence of the center has, for the while, stilled the argument in this community over whether blacks are best served by bringing medicine to their neighborhoods or by bringing the black residents to the existing complex of city and county medical services. Initially, the County Health Department fought the Health Services Project as a move toward the "ghettoization" of medicine. Whatever the philosophical differences (and this observer believes they are large and important), the County Health Department is now cooperating with the Health Services Center and furthering their mutual goals of securing better medical services.

In the health services experience, the community of agencies is being impacted by the growth of the center, and by the need of the existing health agencies to come to terms with the center. These Health Agencies of course have the option of attempting to strangle
the center, but this would indeed be a risky strategy in this particular community. In the mental health experience, the Mental Health agencies in the "catchment" area are on the inside, not the outside looking in, as in the Health Services Project. There is some question as to whether the participating agencies knew they were entering a situation where the control of policy for the Mental Health consortium would drift to community representatives. It is equally certain that these agencies have not yet begun to feel the impact of their involvement in a consortium whose policies may be controlled by neighborhood representatives. One Federal observer astutely commented that even the initial decision not to build a major new agency, but rather to work through the existing community of Mental Health agencies might have been a very different one had it been subject to community representative influence.

It is likely that the model of agency participation in the Mental Health Project holds important information with regard to the way in which community representatives influence change. Of the seven projects being described, it is only in the Mental Health Agency that the agencies which are expected to deliver the program resources have joined together to form a new policy board with a like number of community representatives. The tantalizing question for those interested in change is whether this new community-dominated board will only be able to
influence the use of new resources which come into the Mental Health consortium, or whether this board will be able to influence all of the activities by these agencies which impact the residents of the "catchment area." The evidence has not yet begun to come in. However, one interviewee wise in the matter of community involvement, suggested that it was crucial not to raise expectations for change which the institutions in the consortium have no intention of delivering.

In this section on "influencing the established agency community" we have begun to come closer to the question of "what difference does citizen involvement make?" One apparent differences is that it makes community decision making a far more interesting and complex affair. The parties which were formerly the subject of negotiation (the black/brown/poor) are now a party to the negotiations. In a number of instances, they are not just a party, they are the dominant party with regard to the allocation of particular resources. For example, if the Health Services Center survives, it is unlikely that any major decisions which are locally made affecting the delivery of health services to the black residents of this area will be made without the participation of the Health Services Board.

One other apparent difference of great import is that new kinds of communal alliances are being built. Many community representatives will no longer be able to divide the community into "us" and "them."
Their own experience has taught them differently. Members of the Tenants' Council will stand in alliance with the Housing Authority on certain issues. Members of the Project Area Committee will ally themselves with the Redevelopment Agency against other community agencies on a variety of issues. Representatives of the poor in the Community Action Agency will remember that they were supported in a variety of instances by certain established agencies. The cynic (or the realist) may reply that all of the above is window dressing; on the crucial issues it will remain "them against us." We don't have the answer to this speculation. We do know, based upon the experience of these seven projects, that neighborhood participation in community decisions and neighborhood control over some aspect of that decision making does appear to temper the differences which on occasion appear to be tearing our society apart.

B. Relationships Between Agencies Having Citizen Involvement

In the first part of this study, which looked at citizen participation from the Federal manager's perspective we have detailed some of the conflict evident between Model Cities and Community Action Agencies. These conflicts were less apparent in this second part of the study. There was no Model Cities Program serving the Community Action Area, and our Model Cities Agency was partially insulated from the Community Action Agency which was headquartered in the County seat, some 30 miles distant.
In addition to the potentials for conflict with each other, Model Cities and Community Action Agencies, as comprehensive planning mechanisms were also potentially in conflict with all other agencies having citizen involvement located in their area of operation. For example, the Community Action Agencies in the Health Services and Mental Health Project communities, could both reasonably say that their citizen representatives are the bona fide spokesman for their communities as opposed to the self-appointed members of the Health Services Board, or to the representatives selected through the device of a community forum for the Mental Health Board. We shall detail some of these conflicts, as well as other aspects of the relationship between agencies having citizen involvement, and then discuss them further.

One model of relationship, which was not found elsewhere, prevailed between the Legal Services Agency and the Community Action Agency in its county. The CAA furnished to the Legal Services Agency, names of organizations including poor people. The Legal Services Agency then solicited these organizations to nominate representatives to serve on the Legal Services Board.

Community Action Agencies did not always find their relationship so simple and benign. Members of the Tenants' Council expressed anger that the County Community Action Agency had not seen fit to provide staff assistance for the Council. The Health Services...
Agency had originally received aid from its local CAA in conducting a health survey. It also made use of some borrowed staff from the CAA, but it strongly resisted other CAA overtures, for fear that the CAA wanted to "take over" the Health Services Board. The Project Area Committee could trace its lineage back to the Community Action Agency in its area. The Committee was originally established by the CAA to serve as a "watchdog" over redevelopment efforts. With the decline in fortunes of the local community action operation, the Project Area Committee could safely ignore its parent. And now the move away from the CAA has become complete with the integration of the Project Area Committee into the neighborhood's new Model City's structure.

Perhaps the blow which would have hurt the Community Action Agency advocates most, would have been to hear the Community Action Agency described by members of the Mental Health Citizens' Advisory Board, as "members of the establishment." Other evidence of the low estate to which one Community Action Agency has fallen is the fact that the CAA represented only 1 of 26 different organizations represented on the Mental Health Community Advisory Board.

We have previously suggested that relationships between the Model Cities Agency, and the Community Action Agency in its county were diminished because the two agencies were headquartered in different cities. But this did not prevent certain early struggles
between the two agencies. Soon after its establishment, the Model Cities Agency wrested the sponsorship of the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) from the CAA. This, despite the fact that according to DOL regulations, the CAA was the "presumptive sponsor" of CEP. Conversely, the community organizing efforts of the CAA in the model neighborhood did not appear to have been aggressively concerned with stimulating neighborhood involvement in the Model Cities effort.

We previously suggested, that in the Model Cities community, there was movement toward developing the Model Cities Board as the spokesman for the black community. If this Model Cities Board had to contend with a variety of programs in the model neighborhood (e.g., Health Services, Mental Health, Redevelopment) over which it had no influence, its position as black community spokesman would become somewhat of a joke. It is thus not surprising that the Model Cities Board fought for sponsorship of the Concentrated Employment Program and that victory in turn validated its claim to black community leadership.

We earlier suggested that the Community Action and Model Cities Agencies because of their charge to be comprehensive planning agencies, would be forced into seeking relationships with and influence over other programs affecting their respective domains. (In the case of the CAA, its domain is poor people within an area; in the case of the Model Cities Agency, the domain is all people resident within a more
limited geographic area.) We would argue that the failure of the Community Action Agencies to sustain influence in the Health Services Program, the Mental Health Program, the Model City Area, and the Redevelopment Area all imperil the CAA's aspirations to community leadership in programs affecting poor people.

The CAA and Model Cities Agencies, by virtue of their charge to "act comprehensively" are impelled to go out and seek relationship with, and influence over, programs within their domain. No such charge confronts the more limited efforts of the Health Services Agency or the Mental Health Agency. Rather these "single-purpose" agencies may see advantage in not linking themselves to the Community Action or Model Cities Agency. One apparent advantage is greater autonomy. Another is the opportunity to devise one's own system for securing community representatives, as opposed to working through the structures of the Model Cities or Community Action Agencies. In turning to a community forum device in order to secure representatives, the Mental Health Agency is saying that the Community Action Agency in its area has not adequately organized the community. Unfortunately for the Community Action Agency in this area, its failures to organize the neighborhood are all too clear in the existing plethora of organizations which claim to represent the black community in the "catchment area."

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These matters of relationships between agencies having community involvement, and the capacity of Community Action and Model Cities Agencies to extend their influence, are not trivial. They are crucial to the development of an organized minority community. Where the model neighborhood is almost all black (or all brown), the Model Cities Agency has the potential for becoming the embodiment of the organized minority community. Clearly, there is some movement in this direction in the Model Cities Agency we are describing.

Where the Community Action Agency's concern for poor people masks its preoccupation with a minority group of a particular color, the Community Action Agency also has the potential for organizing the minority community into a functioning body. In this particular study, the Community Action Agency under observation does not serve areas of high minority group concentration, and therefore its role in organizing the minority community is less pertinent. In the next section of the paper we will examine the evidence in these seven projects with regard to minority community development.

VII. ASPECTS OF MINORITY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Three of the seven projects we are looking at serve communities which are largely or almost totally black. These are the communities served by the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee, the Model Cities Agency, and neighborhood Health Services. The Mental Health Agency
serves a "catchment area" of 160,000 which is thought to be roughly one-third black. However, the dominance of black leadership in the Mental Health Project is so apparent (and not unexpected), that it presents excellent material for this section on minority community development.

The Legal Services and Community Action Agencies both operate in counties where the minority populations are relatively small. In the Legal Services county the combined black and Mexican-American population runs to 1-1/4 percent, or approximately 2,500 people. In the Community Action county, the combined Mexican-American, American-Indian, and black population approximates 5 percent, 4 percent of this being Mexican-American, and the Indians and blacks splitting the balance. In absolute numbers, the Mexican-American population numbers some 9,000 with a little over 1,000 each for blacks and American-Indians. As a result of these relatively minor figures, we will be less able to comment upon minority community development in these two programs. Nevertheless, certain observations should be reported. The Community Action Agency has become the grounds for a relatively successful coalition of its black, brown and poor members. The preponderance of minority members in this county who are poor is recognized in that almost one-half of the agency's 30 board members are black or brown. In addition, the Director of the Agency is black and as an interesting footnote, the telephone caller to the Agency is greeted with "Buenos Dias - good morning."
Throughout this study we have treated the public housing project as a relatively self-contained community. While much of the surrounding area is white, the black population in this public housing population of some 1,200 runs a little over 20 percent. We have been greatly impressed with the capacity of black and white residents to work together in the Tenants' Council. However, we have noted that black participation in the Council is much higher than would be expected based upon the percentage of blacks in the public housing population. In this respect, the experience is somewhat like the Mental Health "catchment area" where blacks participate far beyond their percentage of the area's population. However, we will not offer further materials about the housing project in this section because there did not appear to be a black organizational structure, backing up and serving as a constituency for black participants in the Tenants' Council. This organized black constituency does exist in the "catchment area," and it is this existence which makes the Mental Health program a useful point of departure in discussing minority community development.

We asked an important black community leader (one who was head of a major action organization in the "catchment area") to account for the extensive participation by black leadership in the Mental Health project. He responded that Mental Health services were an area of great concern to black people; that mental illness was a
problem very close to home in many black families. This response is a sensitive one and of course true. But there may be other explanations for the extent of black participation which better clarify the development of the black community.

Observers of the community forums which selected representatives to the Mental Health Citizens' Advisory Board commented that the participation was largely black and very sophisticated. Those who organized the forum virtually assured its "blackness" and its sophistication, by soliciting attendance from a largely black set of organizations in the "catchment area." An organizational overlay of this area would yield a great number of black organizations, with a strong cadre of leadership who know how to play "the community decision-making game." As one observer commented, this leadership represented an "achieved" rather than an "ascribed" elite in the "catchment area." This leadership protests strongly that it is overburdened with meetings and activities. Yet this same "busy" leadership attended the Mental Health Community forum and vied for election to the Citizens' Advisory Board and then to the Mental Health Policy Board.

In this area of over 50,000 black residents, there is a core of leadership which has entered into public decision making (and conflict) in many different situations and with many different public figures. It is this leadership which knows how subject to influence certain decision systems are, and it knows how sensitive to pressure.
are programs which use public funds. To this leadership, the Mental Health Program with potentially large resources, and a relatively open decision system, represents a worthwhile area for their investment of energy. These community leaders have learned the crucial lesson, that in much decision making "power is as power does." To play the game, to invest one's self, to care, is to insure influence over a set of decisions.

In the Mental Health Program, the Mental Health Agency did not go to one, or even a small number of organizations, and say "you represent the community—give us your representatives." Such a move would have been too risky, because there was no one black organization that "represented" the black community in this area. But there seems to be a group of black leaders, who by their energy and visibility, are coming to represent the organized black community. Some of these leaders appear to be present on the Mental Health Board, and their dominance may help the Mental Health Services Agency to become an instrument of a developing black community.

10. We continue to use the notion of "organized black community" as a way of distinguishing between the individuals who are active in community decision organizations and those who more passively reside in this community of 50,000 Negroes inside a "catchment" area of some 160,000. In Reveille for Radicals, Saul Alinsky used the figure of 2 percent as representing the percentage of a community which was organized and involved in his Chicago efforts. We would be very surprised if the 2 percent figure was approached in the "catchment" area's black community of 50,000. Whatever the actual figure, it is our impression that this "organized black community" in the "catchment" area is comparatively large, aggressive, and often very skillful. In short, it would be almost impossible for major new resources affecting black people to enter this community without the activity and sanctions of important elements in the "organized black community."
In looking at the Mental Health Board, the question arises as to why the local Community Action Agency's neighborhood organization failed to become the area's representative organization, and therefore the supplier of community representatives to the Mental Health operation. The answer may lie in the fact that the Community Action Agency's neighborhood organization developed too early to be reflective of the differences in the black community. It became a protagonist in local black affairs rather than an embracing community organization. In addition, it did not have the will and/or the skill to become predominant in many areas of concern to the black community. Thus, other leaders arose, often around other Federally-sponsored projects, and these leaders were unprepared to accept the Community Action Agency as the determiner of neighborhood representation for the Mental Health Program. In fact, one black leader suggested that in the person of the Community Action Agency, the Federal Government was supporting the disorganization of the black community. At the same time, he expressed great interest in the emergence of a black organization, with a base broad enough to speak for the entire black community in the "catchment area." It appears to this observer, that Federal policy, by omission or commission, will help to determine whether such a central black organization emerges. At this point, the Mental Health Project, with its attempt to build its own
constituency based on a large variety of organizational constituencies, does not appear to have advanced the development of a central black communal organization.

It may be unfair to imply fault with the Mental Health Program for not contributing to the development of an embracive black communal organization. Presumably, black community organization was not on the agenda of the Mental Health Program. (Although, some definitions of social psychiatry would say that such a communal organization could be a major contributor to the mental health of black people.) The experience of the Model City Agency, in terms of its contribution to black communal development, needs to be assessed somewhat differently. By virtue of its charge, its means of seeking representation, its hiring policies and its total mode of operation, the Model Cities Agency appears to be strongly flitting with the idea that it may emerge as the central organization for the black community in the largely black model neighborhoods of its city. If black leadership is toying with the idea of Model Cities as the central communal agency, the same idea has not escaped members of the City Council. Undoubtedly, the "moderation" and "reasonableness" of Model City leadership has contributed to its attractiveness to white city leadership.

There are other factors which raise questions about the above trends. An election process for neighborhood representation to the Model Cities Board which sees a turnout of far less than one percent
of the eligible electorate cannot be seen as strong evidence of legitimacy (or interest by the black community). In addition, there are some black leaders who hope to see the Model Cities Board as an instrument of concerted action involving both blacks and whites, rather than (or in addition to), being an instrument of the black community. It was this leadership and their allies who turned down a Model Cities Board motion that Board voting privileges be restricted to those who are neighborhood representatives. Lastly, the credibility of the Model Cities Agency as an instrument of anybody may be demolished if the Federal Government is unwilling to deliver adequate program resources through the Model Cities Agency, as its local vehicle.

Despite the mixed evidence as to the future communal role of the Model Cities Agency, there are certain other factors apparent now which point to a central role for the Model Cities Agency. The Model Cities Agency has the authority to block program expenditures of Model Cities funds in the model neighborhood. This authority, if skillfully nurtured could well be extended to the expenditure of non-Model Cities funds. The Model Cities Agency also employs the largest staff of skilled black technicians in its community. While these staff are nominally city employees, there is little question that the black staff view their primary
constituency as the black community. In effect they have become an emerging secretariat for the black community. This development is abetted by the comparative weakness of the Community Action Agency, and its physical location some distance away. In addition, the City Council seems willing, at the present time, to honor the program decisions made by the Model Cities Agency, thus affirming its strength as the spokesman of the black community.

In this Model Cities community, it seems clear that the Model Cities Agency has become an important spur to and example of black communal development. A skillful black staff and equally skillful and moderate black leadership have proved an attractive partner to city government. The result appears to be an important movement by the Model Cities Agency toward becoming the spokesman for the organized black community.

The experience of the Urban Renewal Project Area Committee offers some additional evidence in another city of the willingness of black leadership to use the neighborhood's new Model Cities Agency as a vehicle for black communal development. The Project Area Committee, which had itself been an outgrowth of the Community Action Agency, has become integrated into the Model Cities Agency. This step toward communal integration was facilitated by the fact that the director
of the Model Cities Agency formerly was employed by the Redevelopment Agency. In this latter position he gave important aid to the Project Area Committee in its development as the advisory body to the redevelopment program. This example of the way in which black staff become key forces in communal development is an important clue to future study. It could be argued that black staff, as much as (or more than) lay leadership, have become key factors in the development of the projects we are looking at. In many instances these staff were brought in as a symbol of the employing agencies good faith and as a bridge to the black community. They have become more than that. As we suggested in describing the Model Cities experience, they have become an emerging secretariat responsive to and loyal to the black community. In the case of the Project Area Committee, this black staff has served as a means to link different elements of black leadership.

The neighborhood Health Center seems a generically different experience within the comparison of seven agencies in the development of black communalism. A prospectus for the Health Center notes that it is "planned for and built by and for the people of _______." This prospectus goes on to note that the Center "is owned by the residents of _________ and managed by the people of _________ or by someone of their choosing." Unlike the examples
of the Mental Health Board, the Model City Agency or the Project Area Committee, the directors of the neighborhood Health Service stand in alliance with no one at the local level. Their financial resources are all Federal, although a reading of the aforementioned prospectus would never have revealed this. The Health Center has also been successful in securing the majority of its physicians from the black community, although it is doubtful that many of these black physicians live in the neighborhood area.

The Health Center represents the purest form of black communalism of any of the projects of this study. It is the one project with a total absence of non-blacks in its decision structure, and a total absence of dependence on "white" organizations for sanction (other than the Federal Government) or for the implementation of program. In its racial purity, the Center may be one model of what some black leaders mean by "black self-help" or "black separatism." And yet even here the example is not monolithic. The Health Center was willing to accept the services of a white Federal civil servant as its interim director; there is talk of enlarging the Policy Board to include Chinese representation; and there is a willingness to accept some white health personnel in the operation of the Center. There is also an apparent willingness to enter into some exchange relationships with the County Health Department and various "white controlled" hospitals.
To this point it is not clear how the Health Center will become integrated into other efforts controlled by and affecting the black community. The Health Center has been wary of accepting help from the Community Action Agency (which is under black staff direction and black policy control). And the Center had not yet had to deal with the local Model Cities effort, which after two and one-half years of trauma, is still largely a paper organization. The Health Center has taken care to keep itself organizationally disengaged from the variety of black dominated efforts in its neighborhood. It has even managed to keep itself relatively free of any formal responsibility to a constituency. But what the Center lacked in relationship to organized groups in and serving the black community, it compensates for in the persons of its board members. As with certain black members of the Mental Health Agency, certain board members of the Health Center, figuratively, carry the black community in their pocket. These are the men who play the community game with great skill, enhanced by an enormous expenditure of their own time. It may be that this leadership will soon be ready to formalize its influence over the black community through a single agency. The Model City Program might have offered that unifying grounds for the black community and may yet do so.
At least in four of our projects, there is strong evidence of a developing black community. The movement is uneven, and the evidence is still unclear that this community will find a common organizational vehicle to represent its interests. To many in the black and white communities, an embracing black communal vehicle must become the inevitable instrument for black separatism. Despite the rhetoric of those who are most militant in the black community, the evidence is far from clear that the black man in the street wants anything resembling the full implications of separatism. What he does want as indicated in these projects is strong influence over the resources and communal decisions which affect his life chances. And in this area of citizen participation and influence over resource expenditures it is the Federal Government whose policies become the most significant to black leadership and developing black communities. For it is the Federal Government, through its programs of direct aid to localities and grants-in-aid to the states, that sponsors the programs which deliver the most important resources for the black, the brown, and the poor. Thus in the last section of this study we shall look at the role of the Federal Government as it is perceived in these seven projects.
VIII. FEDERAL RELATIONSHIPS

Each of the seven projects we are looking at exists primarily on Federal funds. And each of these local projects is related to a Federal program which in some fashion specifies its interests in citizen participation. Some of the Federal programs are very specific and detailed in their concern for citizen involvement; for example the Community Action Program, Legal Services and Model Cities. Other Federal programs are rather vague but encouraging about citizen participation; for example, the community Mental Health Center Program, the Partnership for Health Program and public housing. And one, Urban Renewal's Project Area Committee, conveys a firm mandate for citizen involvement, with some lack of certainty and specification about how it all comes about.

This small sample of seven agencies would indicate a rather erratic correlation between the strength and clarity of Federal policy as compared to the strength and clarity with which policy is carried out at the local level. There is little question that the Legal Services Agency in this study represents the weakest, least organized local effort with regard to citizen involvement. Explanations may rest in the newness of the program, the mysteries of making policy for Legal Services, or the fact that the minority community is a relatively insignificant element in this suburban affluent county.
On the other hand, there is little question that the Neighborhood Health Services Program represents the boldest of these local efforts with regard to testing the implications for citizen involvement. This, despite the fact that the legislation and the guidelines under which the Public Health Service had funded the Health Services Program do not exactly reflect stirring mandates for citizen involvement.

This erratic correlation between Federal citizen participation policies and local program efforts suggests that there are local factors which are more important than Federal policies in determining the character of citizen involvement. Much of the foregoing analysis has been an attempt to explore what these local factors might be. But these local factors need to be seen in the context of two Federal developments: (1) Each of these seven local projects were connected to a Federal program which has something to say in its legislation and/or its guidelines about citizen involvement, and (2) each of these Federal programs has made it clear to its potential local constituents that it is interested in having local programs make a specific attempt to reach those who are poor, black and brown. It seems to us that in the attempt to meet this second aspect of Federal concern, each of these local programs, of necessity, became involved in the issues of citizen participation.
The reader must recognize one other caution. We did not randomly select seven Federally-supported programs, examine them, and produce the startling evidence that all are concerned with citizen participation. We deliberately selected seven Federal programs where we knew there to be Federal concern with the issues of participation. And we deliberately selected local programs where we knew there to be some local concern with implementing Federal citizen participation policies. The purpose of the field study was not to emerge with evidence that nothing is being done. It would be relatively easy to structure that kind of study. The purpose of the field study was to understand the way in which the problems of citizen participation were being dealt with. To achieve this purpose, we needed local agencies which in fact were wrestling with and implementing Federal policies in the area of citizen participation.

Each of the seven local agencies had Federal field staffs assigned to them. We interviewed these seven different staff members, and found virtually all of them knowledgeable about the local level projects, and concerned about issues of citizen involvement. In fact, we would guess that this staff is quite atypical in the extent of their personal concern about citizen involvement. It may be that this Federal staff concern was a hidden factor in helping to account for the quality and extent
of citizen involvement we have observed. Each of the staff has visited the communities they are assigned to, and almost all of the staff are known to local citizen leadership.

Despite the extent of this contact between local projects and Federal staff, there was not much local mention of the influence which Federal staff had on the development of citizen participation. Clearly, one Public Health Service staff person was counted as a most influential figure by local agency participants. This person had served as an interim director of the Health Services Agency during the time when the Agency was seeking to find a replacement for its first director. This practice of having Federal personnel out on loan to staff local programs is a rare one, but not unknown. In the case of the Public Health Service, the loan of staff may have reflected the extraordinary stake the Public Health Service Agency felt in the success of the Health Services Project. The stake undoubtedly results from the skeptics within and outside the Department of Health, Education and Welfare who questioned the wisdom of funding a Health Service Program entirely under the policy control of a lay, neighborhood-based (and black) group.

The Federal Community Mental Health field person reported that her advice had been specifically sought by the local agencies.
with regard to citizen involvement. She recalls that her advice rested on two points: (1) that the size of the citizen group must be adequate to have influence in policy making, and (2) that the citizen representatives should be selected by the community and not by the agencies which were putting the program together. The reader might agree that these two points represent a wise potential foundation for all Federal citizen participation policy.

Federal staff assigned to the redevelopment area (from the Urban Renewal and Model Cities Programs) appear to have been influential in laying the groundwork for the amalgamation of the Project Area Committee and the Model Cities Agency. It is the one bit of evidence we have of Federal staff consciously working to unite two programs and parenthetically to unite community representatives rather than to further fragment them.

In both the Community Action Agency and the Legal Services Agency, the ratio of community representatives to others was in direct response to Federal regulations and guidelines. Despite the similarity of these guidelines, it is useful to note that local adaptations by the Community Action Agency assured that the one-third of the board who were representatives of the poor would be augmented by allies from other sectors represented on the board.
The Model City Agency represented the one project where community representatives felt that action by the current Federal administration might take away authority which the City Council had given to the neighborhood-dominated board of directors. Shortly after receiving a department memorandum from Secretary Romney of DHUD, the Model Cities director had to speak to a special meeting of community representatives to calm their fears about possible Federal intervention which might dilute citizen influence. This incident is outstanding in its uniqueness. In every other situation, Federal policy and Federal staff are perceived as supporters of local efforts to involve community representatives. Despite this, a number of those questioned wondered whether this Federal support for citizen involvement would continue.

On this note, with regard to the questioning of Federal intentions, it might be appropriate to draw the report of this

11. We previously noted one informant’s concern that Federal support of a local Community Action Agency was for the purpose of fragmenting a black community. Even if this were so, it represents an idiosyncratic situation, where, based upon a single action, Federal policy is viewed by some as hostile to citizen participation. The change in HUD policy with regard to aspects of community control in Model Cities decision making, still seems to represent the only departmental change in policy in the current administration which is perceived as antithetical to neighborhood interests.
field study to a close. Obviously, it would be possible to continue on
with regard to examples of Federal influence. There is little question
that Federal policy establishes the enabling context for all the citizen
participation developments we have seen. And there is little question
that most Federal staff are seen as sympathetic to this policy and con-
cerned with the fact of its implementation. The message for Federal
policy makers is that their efforts are not in vain. Federal policy
establishes a floor for the local character of citizen participation.
Changes in Federal policy can change the level of that floor. But
this field study would indicate that it is the local factors which are
most significant in explaining what happens and what doesn't happen in
the area of participation. In summarizing this study we will pay partic-
ular attention to these local factors.

IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our earlier Institute study began with a comparison of Federal
policies regarding citizen participation in four agencies: DOL, HEW, HUD
and OEO. We were surprised to find a much larger body of Federal policy
concerned with citizen involvement than we had thought existed. But we
were not surprised to find that such policies were dissimilar between
agencies, and equally dissimilar between the various departments of a
single agency. Based upon these variations in Federal policy, we assumed a
similar local variance in the implementation of these Federal policies.
This follow-on companion study engaged in field work within seven local programs, all of which received the great majority of their financial support from the Federal Government. These seven local programs were the local constituents of three Federal agencies; HUD, OEO and HEW. And one of these local efforts, the Model Cities Program, was also a prime sponsor of a Department of Labor Concentrated Employment Program. The reader of the field study material must be impressed with the great local variance in citizen participation we have detailed in every section of this report. Some of this variance clearly flows from the policy guidelines of the supporting Federal program. But a national policy may not be that important a constraining factor. For example, it is apparent that the representatives of the poor are less influential in making policy for the Legal Services Agency in the study than are the members of the Project Area Committee. This, despite the fact, that Legal Services' national sponsor, OEO, has the most sophisticated Federal body of citizen participation policy, while Urban Renewal policies in support of Project Area Committees are new and somewhat ambiguous. This inverse relationship between strength of national policies and strength of a local program, with regard to citizen influence, is captured in the following diagram.
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<th>Program</th>
<th>National Policy with Regard to Citizen Participation</th>
<th>Citizen Influence on Local Policy Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OEO-Legal Services</td>
<td>Strong and sophisticated</td>
<td>Weak--almost invisible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Renewal</td>
<td>Moderate and ambiguous</td>
<td>Apparently strong</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A simple-minded quest for the factors which help to invert the relationship between national policy and local practice in the Legal Services and Urban Renewal Programs might take us to the black constituencies of the respective local projects. The black population of the county in which Legal Services operates is less than one percent of the county population, and blacks hold one of twenty-one seats on the policy board. The redevelopment area and the membership of the Project Area Committee both approach 100 percent in the blackness of their composition.

The above inversion between Federal policy and local practice would seem strong evidence of the importance of local factors in determining the quality of citizen participation. Equally interesting are the local counterparts to the Partnership for Health and Community Mental Health Programs. Policy in both national programs might be best characterized as weak and laissez faire with regard to the specification of citizen involvement. The local neighborhood Health Services Program reflects the strongest
potential for citizen influence of any of the seven projects studied. And the Mental Health Center Board represents one of the best local examples, in this study, of the way in which neighborhood leadership have maximized their potential influence over a project. In these latter two examples, the character of local citizen influence bears little resemblance to the body of pertinent Federal policy.

A look at local factors which might explain these developments, again draws us to the nature of the black population to be served by these programs. Both of these communities include large black populations; in each case well over 25,000. Both black populations contain leadership which is tough, aggressive and experienced in the realm of Federal programs, and each of these programs has been attractive to this leadership. Each of the local programs dealt with Federal staff who were sympathetic to the idea of citizen participation. And the Mental Health Center Project also included local agency staff who were prepared to risk their professional careers in order to establish local conditions favorable to citizen influence.

In these opening pages of the summary, we have made a number of points which now need to be treated more systematically. In our search for local factors which may explain the way in which local programs realize (or fail to realize) the implications of national citizen participation policy, we are attracted to the
following: Size and density of the black population (and by inference other minority populations) and the influence of Federal and local professional staff who have behaved as advocates on behalf of poor and minority program clientele. We will proceed to summarize additional findings in these two areas of the character of the minority population, and the advocacy behavior of Federal and local staff. We will also include additional findings with regard to representation, participation, decision making, interagency relationships, minority community development and Federal relationships; all of which have been treated extensively in the course of the study. But this summarization of findings based upon the local experience in even these seven projects can in no way be seen as denial of the influence of Federal policy. In each program, Federal policy establishes a context for local factors to assert themselves in. The mere expression of Federal policy interest, even when weak and laissez faire as in the case of the Partnership for Health and Community Mental Health Programs, can establish a base for local initiative as well as provide sanction for Federal staff activity on behalf of citizen involvement.

In effect, we argue that all seven of these projects show evidence of citizen influence because they operate in a context of national policy interest in citizen participation. Whether and how they maximize national policy interest is heavily dependent upon local factors.
The reader must remember that there was one sharp limit to the kind of variance we found in local programs. We did not find any situations where there was no evidence of citizen influence on policy. We suggested that our failure to find programs with no citizen influence owes to our limiting the field study to agencies whose national sponsors have some body of policy with regard to citizen participation. This assumption could of course be tested by surveying a sample of agencies which receive their support from Federal programs which have given no formal consideration to the issues of citizen participation.

With this restatement of the function of Federal policy, in serving as a context and a base for local citizen participation efforts, we will further summarize findings which help to explain the variance in these local efforts.

A. Character of the Minority Population:

Five of the seven projects we have observed have a body, either decision making or decision advisory, which is dominated by those on it who are black. Neither of the remaining two projects is controlled by a Mexican-American or an Anglo-Caucasian poor population, although the Community Action Agency is dominated by these two groups in coalition with black and American-Indian representatives to the CAA Board. Thus, in presenting material about the character of the minority population as an influence on local citizen participation, we are primarily talking about the character of various black populations.
We have already suggested that black population size and density (percentage of the area's population which is black) are important determinants of local patterns of participation. The project with the weakest de facto citizen influence, Legal Services, served a black population of 1,400 representing a density of less than one percent in that county. Blacks were similarly small in density and percentage in the Community Action county, but they were able to coalesce with a similarly sized American-Indian population and a much larger Mexican-American population, to take effective control of the Community Action Agency.

In each of the five communities where blacks were numerically large (over 10,000) or large in density (some 20 percent of the public housing project), there appeared to be a core of black leadership whose skills in community decision-making organizations helped them to maximize the potentials of their project's structure for citizen influence. This leadership has learned of the relative "openness" of decision making in certain new Federally-supported programs, and it has learned of the needs these programs have for alliance with the black community, where that community is to be affected by a planned program. The sophistication of this leadership, aided by sympathetic Federal staff, has helped it to understand where Federal policy looks with favor upon citizen involvement.
This black leadership has also learned how to exploit the norm-violating behavior of their own or other black communities in bargaining for influence over decision making. There is ample evidence, in this and other studies, that disruptive behavior by some part of the black population often serves to strengthen the hand of black leadership in negotiating for participation in and control of decision-making mechanisms.

What we seem to have in the four largest black communities (Health Services, Mental Health, Model Cities and Project Area Committee) are black governments in the making. These "governments" are represented by tough and aggressive leaders, who, like good public officials in any community, make the point of being in many places to bargain on behalf of their constituents. It is this leadership which seems to have been so influential in accounting for the growth in black influence in the federally-supported projects in their areas. This leadership also seems to have learned that it is easier to influence a course of action when one is inside a structure, helping it to make decisions (or controlling those decisions) as opposed to being outside. It is this willingness

12. We hardly mean to argue the continuity of this relationship between norm-violating behavior and black influence. We may have reached the point of diminishing and even negative returns to the black community, because of norm-violating behavior.
by black leadership to seek influence within programs, which seems to account for the influence they have won, and which parenthetically seems such a hopeful sign in these projects. For once, the notion of a "self-fulfilling prophecy" seems to have salutary effects. The black leader says to himself (and his constituency) that he can be influential in community decision making; then in acting on this assessment, in Federally-sponsored programs, he in fact becomes influential. His prophecy is fulfilled.

Of course, it is not a "disembodied" black leader who becomes influential as a community representative. In many cases his claim to leadership has been validated by his activity in black political, religious and protective organizations. In some communities, the willingness of leadership from these organizations to become involved has lent strength to black demands for citizen participation and/or control of decision making. This appears to have been particularly so in the Community Action, Mental Health and Model Cities Programs we have observed. In other cases, neighborhood based Councils, or other citizen groups established under the impetus of the Community Action Program, have become important factors in providing a nucleus of leadership that would bargain for influence in new programs. This influence by a local CAA or its offspring in determining the
decision-structure of a new program is apparent in the Health Center, Model Cities, Project Area Committee, Legal Services and Mental Health. Despite the influence of its offspring in structuring the aforementioned programs, in no case was the Community Action Agency able to become the dominant force representing the neighborhood in these programs.

All of the above reflects evidence, which can be found in the detail of the field study, of the way in which the character of minority group (black) leadership has influenced decision-making structures in the seven projects. In each community where black leadership dominated community representation, or was able to enter into an alliance with other aggrieved groups (as in the Community Action Agency), this black leadership appeared instrumental in maximizing the potentials for citizen influence inherent in the Federally-sponsored program. However, in all cases, this black leadership appears to have been limited (or aided) by the character of Federal policy. As we have noted before, this black leadership was particularly successful in those two Federally-sponsored efforts where Federal policy with regard to citizen involvement was best characterized as "we would like citizen participation, but we're not going to tell you how to go about doing it." Of great interest, is that these two programs, Mental Health and Neighborhood Health Services, have developed into efforts whose policy making is dominated by community representatives.
B. Advocacy Behavior on the Part of Local and Federal Staff:

In seeking to account for variance in the structure of citizen participation, we were also attracted to the influence of Federal and local staff. We have already suggested that professional staff in the Mental Health Project were particularly aggressive in helping to enlarge the role for citizen influence on decision making. We do not know whether this staff action was animated by personal or professional values, or both. Given the purposes we have delineated for citizen participation, there is no question that some mental health practitioners would argue for citizen involvement as being therapeutically useful to those involved.

In other cases, the influence of staff is not so easily attributed to professional orientation. There are the obvious cases where black professional staff in established agencies, out of a sense of "brotherhood," seek to develop the possibilities for community influence. There was strong evidence of this with regard to staff performance by a highly placed black employee in the Redevelopment Agency. In still other cases, agency staff helped to develop the influence of neighborhood groups so as to aid agencies in their management tasks, and to aid them in dealing with higher levels in their own bureaucracies.

The Public Housing and Redevelopment projects are excellent cases in point.

13. During the field study we were constantly impressed with the apparent "dual loyalties" felt by black staff; to their agencies and to the black community. This is hardly a new phenomenon amongst racial or ethnic group members. It seems particularly widespread amongst a rising black professional class, and its consequences need to be better understood.
It is less easy to capture the influence of Federal staff in the development of local citizen participation structures. It is an influence we know to exist based upon personal experience in three major Federal programs. But it is an influence which is not apparently counted for much by some local informants. Federal staff impact seems to have been strongest in those two programs where citizen participation guidelines were the least well developed; Health Services and Mental Health Services. Federal staff also appear to have played a central role in the amalgamation of the Model Cities Agency and the Project Area Committee. In the case of Legal Services, Community Action and Model Cities, the influence of staff apparently rested in the more specific Federal agency policies they transmitted and interpreted.

Our evidence is not strong, but it seems likely that in the matter of influencing the development of local citizen participation structures, Federal staff helped to establish a context. Presumably, they do this based upon the policies of the agency they work for. We know that staff often have great latitude in the way they go about interpreting Federal policy as it applies to local efforts. But staff, like the policy they interpret, provide a context for the negotiation; staff are generally not principals in the negotiation. The principals are program operating agencies (or local units of government) and the locally organized minority community. The evidence.
in this study, is that the strength of the minority community is reflected in the outcome of its negotiations with the program operator/unit of government in realizing the potentials of the Federal policy context for citizen participation.

We do not claim that the character of the minority community and its allies (or enemies) on Federal staff and in local agencies are the sole local factors in accounting for variances in citizen participation structure. Clearly, there are other factors beside staff, residing in the character of local government which would help to account for some variation. But there is little question, based upon our field study that factors associated with the local minority community, coupled with Federal and local staff performance, are among the most powerful explainers of local variation in citizen participation.

In proceeding with this summary, we shall now re-examine some of the more general findings in the areas of representation, participation and decision making. We will not develop separate summary materials for the sections on interagency relationships, minority community development and Federal influence. The area of interagency relationships has yielded few findings which are generalizable. In the immediately preceding sections, we have already indicated findings in the areas of

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14. The follower of this argument, may recognize an antecedent situation, where some Federal staff attempt to be principals in negotiation, because there is no well organized minority community. In other cases, Federal funds helped to establish "social brokers" (e.g., Mobilization for Youth) who would bargain on behalf of the unorganized minority community. The era of the "social broker" and Federal staff as principals in negotiating for citizen involvement seems strangely out of joint with current developments in black and brown communities.
minority community development and Federal influence in seeking to account for variations in local structure. We will interweave additional comments from these areas in helping to explain representation, participation and decision making.

1. Representation

The concluding section of our prior study—on Federal policies—raises some questions about representation. "Who selects a man and how is he selected? Does he in fact represent somebody?" Our field work has given us a set of answers which, given the variance between the seven projects observed, have a remarkably good "fit" to most of the agencies.

In no case were representatives selected by the agencies they were to give advice to. This is a seemingly innocuous point, but we think it a major departure from the way in which most community organizations secure their membership. In many cases, members of a public body are selected by the chief officers of that body. In other cases, organizations appoint nominating committees, whose selections are generally approved in single-slate elections. In still other cases, the leadership of a private agency will select new board members who represent resources the agency would like to connect itself to. Interestingly, the closest any of the field study agencies come to the above processes of selection was the all-black, all-neighborhood, Health Services Board of Directors. As previously suggested, the Health Services...
Board may have felt under less pressure to legitimate itself before its black neighborhood constituency. By appearance and residence, it was de facto legitimate.

Five of the seven agencies secured their board members, or advisory committee members, through some process of election as opposed to selection. The format of these elections were most frequently of the community forum variety (all those interested can attend and vote), and the turnouts were invariably small, at least as compared to general community elections. Thus, in relying on community forums and similar election procedures, the agencies which used them appear to be settling for a device which would provide a narrow base for their community representatives. Despite this narrowness, the forum device for elections seems pragmatically useful; it is low in cost, simple to handle, and most important of all, it appears to be legitimate in the eyes of the community being represented. We concluded that so long as channels to board membership are visibly open and candidacies can be vied-for, the narrow base that a forum provides need not be harmful. Perhaps it is not the size of the constituency that is most important, but simply the fact that one exists, it has the authority to elect, and the forum allows the opportunity for newly-active constituents to have their weight felt. Against these criteria, the process of election through community forums seems to perform admirably.
The notion of constituency and the organization of that constituency are not very prominent ideas in Federal citizen participation policy. Only the policies of OEO and HUD's Model City Program pay them any serious attention. But the wisdom of practice in the field seems to accord "constituency" a very different kind of prominence. In each case where there was a coalition board of directors, those who could be construed as community representatives had a constituency body they could relate to. Community representatives on the Mental Health Board were selected by and met monthly with a citizens' advisory board; representatives of the poor in the CAA were selected by local area councils and were occasionally told how to vote by those councils; representatives of the poor on the Legal Services Board were also members of the organizations which selected them and which they remained in contact with; neighborhood representatives on the Model Cities Board were informally connected to neighborhood councils. The two advisory bodies, the Project Area Committee and the Tenants' Council, both were involved in continuous meetings with their constituencies, in the persons of those who came to periodic meetings. Only the Health Services Board seemed less than aggressive in activating a Health Council as its constituent body.

We do not claim that relationship to a constituency was a dominant factor in the organizational life of a community representative. But in each case, some relationship to a constituency was there as evidence of a continuing connection between those who were ostensibly
being represented and those doing the representing. Because of this importance attached to a constituency, each project was in some fashion involved in the issues of community organization. And because of this, each project (except for Legal Services) contributed to the development of the organized minority community in its area of service. The argument here would seem transparent; when a constituency is influential in selecting communal decision makers, and when this constituency is successful in retaining influence over the activities of these decision makers, it would seem that we are beginning to emerge with something resembling a "community of competence." To this observer, the impact most of these seven projects have had on the building of local communities with competence seems a most noteworthy, even if unanticipated consequence of efforts to involve citizens. The conclusion is inescapable, that to talk of effective citizen participation, in areas of black and brown residents, is to talk of building local constituencies able to exert increasing influence over selected areas of their communal life.

The concern in these seven Federally sponsored programs for citizen involvement, has created what seems to be a new "opportunity system" for the emergence of minority group leadership, as well as for the creation of organized minority group constituencies. In the projects observed, the great majority of citizen representatives were minority group members. To this observer, this leadership tends to seem
competent, sophisticated and middle-class aspiring. Even where these minority community representatives are themselves poor or representatives of the poor, the economic prognosis for them seems optimistic. It seems reasonable to conclude that in these communities, and with these citizen representatives, these Federally supported programs have tapped into a population whose current needs owe less to personal failings than to the failures of their environment. And it is precisely with this kind of population that citizen participation as an idea seems to make sense.

As evidenced in the seven programs, the search for citizen involvement is not a foolhardy effort to have the "blind lead the blind." Particularly in minority communities, there appears to be a cadre of leadership, increasingly young and increasingly male, who have helped to transform community decision making into a far more complex and useful "game" than it was previously. We do not suggest that this minority leadership is similarly aggressive or competent in each community. In fact communal differences help to account for the variance between local programs. But in each case (except Legal Services), no matter what the competence or size of local leadership, it has been able to use Federal-staff participation policy as a vehicle for moving into the middle of community decision making.

2. Participation

The materials gathered in field work were useful in conveying a sense of what participation as a community representative means.

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In the main body of this report we were moved to note that these Federally supported programs have created the grounds for a remarkably rich, complex, exciting communal life for a growing number of people. The reader of this report, to this point, knows that its tone has been one of optimism with regard to the practice and the potentials of citizen participation. If the reader is personally familiar with local programs involving neighborhood participants, he may be moved to discount the optimism of this report. One basis for such discount may be the reader's conclusion that experience in Northern California is different, and doesn't lend itself to generalization. Another criticism may be that the writer has greatly exaggerated the "complexity," the "richness" and the potentials for citizen participation. Surely the small turnouts to elect representatives do not make one sanguine. And the report of the CAA director's concern as to the ease of manipulating of citizen participants is borne out in other observations. Citizen representatives do get manipulated; some staff seem to conspire to create the illusion of participation while control of decisions rests in the hands of staff. One can attend board meetings where there is widespread ignorance about the issues being discussed. And one can be repulsed by the pursuit of jobs by agency board members. One can also be appalled at the
"thinness" of participation, and the shaky grounds on which many decisions are made. And in the case of black leadership, one can be angry with the periodic anti-white rhetoric, the stridence, and the sheer nonsense of some of what passes for "militancy."

It is very easy to be "turned off" by any or all of the above failings. It is easy to come away saying that it is much more terrible than it is wonderful. Our observation suggests that such conclusions, as easy as they are to come to, would be gross errors. One must see the quality of citizen involvement within the context of all communal participation. One must see it against the image of one Congressman droning away before a largely empty chamber, while a few of his colleagues are lost in their own conversation. One must see it against all of the other experiences we have about the way in which people exercise their potential sovereignty over their lives. And measured in this way we must conclude that there is indeed richness and complexity to citizen participation in these seven projects, and that the prognosis is good, if Federal policy continues to abet the local developments we have observed. And the prognosis might be even better if Federal policy were more deliberate, widespread, and clear about the purposes of citizen participation.

What is some of the evidence for the above optimism? For one, there is a strong impression that when blacks hold positions of influence on a decision-making body and when they hold important
staff positions, there seems a concomittant willingness to work together with whites, and an interest in racial accommodation, if not integration. While we have noted situations where blacks refuse to differ with other blacks in the presence of a white audience, we have also noted situations where class interest rather than caste position prevails.

We are also impressed with the way in which the community representative tends to view his participation. It is true that for many black spokesmen, the notion of participation has lost its relevance; it is control of decision making they say they are after. And some white "friends" of the black community insist that control is in fact the only relevant issue, and Federal policy ought to move in that direction. But the local situation seems more diffuse. It is not at all clear that the black man in the street and the black leader really want control which would involve a separation from the larger community. We think the call for control masks the following desires of the community representative: to know what his decision-making prerogatives are and to be listened to if not followed; and to have strong influence over the resources and communal decisions which affect his life chances. This may sound like control, and in some situations control may indeed be the demand the appropriate resolution: For example, it is clear that control was the issue in the Neighborhood Health Services Program.
and it is likely that the results of control in that case will be salutary for the black community and for the quality of medical services in that community.

Because we think control is appropriate and has important demonstration value in certain instances (e.g., Neighborhood Health Services), we have recommended that Federal policy allow for the possibility of local control— but not mandate it. We cannot recommend control as a mandatory policy because of our deduction that control has a potential for facilitating increased racial separatism, and because of our observation that many blacks are really asking for something different than control. Ironically, the movement toward control may be hastened by the actions of some white leadership in abdicating situations of integrated decision making. In effect, the militancy of black leadership (which can be misread as a demand for absolute control) coupled with the timorousness of white public officials, may be leading to a situation where community control, adversary relationships and increasing racial separatism are the only possible consequences.

In fact, there is evidence in the field study that there is movement toward situations of control, although we are unsure as to whether the causes of this movement rest in black demands, white disinterest and abdication, or both. The evidence includes the following:

a) In each agency except Legal Services the percentage of blacks on a policy making or policy-advising board exceeded the percentage of blacks in the community to be served.
b) In four of six projects where a policy board having community representation, influences staff hiring, the director of the project is black.

    c) Community representatives generally have greater de facto power in making decisions than would be expected based upon the percentage of seats they hold on a board. This trend toward greater than expected influence for community representatives is exaggerated further, when the community representatives are black.

d) In no case did a coalition decision group drift toward becoming advisory, and in no case did a citizen dominated group become diluted through coalition.

    e) Of the two groups which were advisory, the one which was almost all black seemed best able to maximize the influence inherent in its advice-giving status.

The weight of the evidence in these seven projects seems to be that we are moving to situations of neighborhood dominance and control. But our impression of the national scene would indicate that this movement is a long way from being complete, and ironically it may not be desired by neighborhood leadership or local government. None of this is to argue that there is not a black (or a brown) community, whose grievances are deep and whose special interests as a group are real. Some Federal policy has been specifically concerned with the inclusion of these aggrieved special interest groups in decision making. In fact, the notions of "citizen representative," "community
representatives," "community involvement," "community decision maker," "neighborhood representative," as used throughout this report, are all euphemisms used by Federal agencies to refer to representatives of aggrieved groups. But there remain real and very different options as to how the participation of these representatives shall be structured into community decision making.

One option is to organize the aggrieved group as an advisory adjunct to the decision-making process, as in the Project Area Committee or the Tenants' Council. Another option is to include representatives of these groups as part of a coalition of decision makers, as in the CAA, the Mental Health Board and the Legal Services Agency. Yet another option is to turn decision making and program control over in its entirety to representatives of these aggrieved groups as in the Neighborhood Health Services. At this stage in the development of citizen participation policy, and in the conflict between races, we see all of these as appropriate structures for citizen involvement. We are less convinced that a structure confined to advice giving is tenable in big-city black communities.

And here we would suggest attention be given to the Model Cities hybrid structure. In this hybrid, a neighborhood-dominated advisory group acts as advisory to a City Council, but the City Council in turn is barred from any program moves affecting the neighborhood without the consent of the neighborhood-dominated-advisory group. We have labelled this the
"dual green light" system, and it may hold great promise in our search for decentralized modes of decision making which simultaneously allow for the application of central rationalities (e.g., those developed by a city government).

3. Decision Making

In the previous summary sections on "representation" and "participation" we have sketched the form, but not the content of decision making involving citizen representatives. There is little question that the form has changed. In every one of the seven projects, and seven communities under observation, the "feel" of decision making is different now that the parties who were formerly the object of the process have become a party to the negotiations.

While we are certain that the process of decision making is different, we are less certain as to the differences in the product. In the nature of this kind of field observation, we cannot emerge with any substantial data pointing to differences and results which can be attributed to citizen involvement. At the very least one would need a field study in which were compared agencies having similar purposes, but varying formats for citizen involvement, and most specifically, no citizen involvement at all.

We did present some material in the body of the report which attempted to attribute program movement to citizen participation.

15. David Grossman, formerly with DHUD and OEO called this the "Polish parliament" system of decision making, when we observed its scattered occurrence in the Community Action Program. Actually, it has much in common with the checks and balances built into our executive-legislative relationships at the Federal level.
Among such evidence was the ability of the Housing Authority to "find" funds for playground equipment when prodded by the Tenants' Council; the movement toward redevelopment and new housing in an area which appeared hopelessly stalemated prior to the involvement of a citizens' group; the move to establish a county housing authority because of the influence of the citizen-dominated CAA; the incipient change in health service patterns for the residents of a greatly deprived all-black neighborhood. These are indeed evidences of difference which might be attributed to citizen involvement. And with more careful attention to this issue of program difference we could undoubtedly produce additional evidence.

It would be nice to be able to argue that citizen involvement is instrumental in changing all kinds of patterns in the delivery of resources to people in need. It would not hurt the case for citizen participation at all. In the relative absence of such evidence, we choose to make the case for citizen participation on non-instrumental grounds. It is not that citizen participation helps us to get any place faster; although it may in fact do all the good things that have been claimed for it (e.g., decrease alienation, create a program constituency, calm would-be rioters, etc.). Rather we base the case for a broadly conceived Federal citizen participation policy on the argument that participation represents an unfulfilled goal in and of itself. It fits us well as a society. It is what the American experiment is about. And perhaps
in the process of giving aggrieved groups influence over their resources and communal decisions because it is right we will increase the life chances for all of us.

In the last part of this concluding section we will return to the common set of issues which we felt needed to be taken account of in the development of Federal interagency minimum performance standards and in the development of policy for a single agency program. These issues were "representatives and a constituency," "access," "technical assistance," "stipends," "maximum standards," and "monitoring." We return to these issues because it is likely that the field study has something to add to what was written at the close of the first section of this report. But we also return out of the imperatives behind this report. We strongly believe in the feasibility and wisdom of Federal minimum performance standards for citizen participation in all programs affecting resources for aggrieved groups. We think such performance standards would need, as a minimum, to deal with these six issues, which have already been described in some detail at the close of the first section of the report.

a) **Representatives and a Constituency.**

Field study makes our initial recommendations favoring democratic selection of representatives seem less than bold. The issue of election vs. selection of representatives is well understood.
in the field. There seems an intuitive understanding that attempts by "establishment" agencies to select community representatives, must in fact debase the legitimacy of those representatives.

The field study material noted that in each of the seven projects citizen representatives were selected by those to be represented, and not by the agencies they were to be representative to. Equally important, from the point of Federal policy is that none of these communities chose general public election procedures to secure their representatives. In most cases, inexpensive, easy to operate community forums were held, where those attending had the opportunity to participate in the election of citizen representatives. Based upon observation in these seven communities, coupled with an assessment of Federal reaction to these developments, we are sanguine about securing interagency agreement to a performance standard which would call for "democratic selection" of citizen representatives.

We cautioned that it might be less easy to secure Federal agency agreement as to the organization of a constituency for citizen representatives. Again, in these seven agencies, the state of practice argues that in our current climate, citizen representatives and a constituency will "find each other." As we noted, in each project (although minimally in Health and Legal services) community representatives had a constituency which exerted some continuing connection between the representative and the community he is supposed to represent.
A wise Federal policy would require that citizen representatives stand in some relationship to an organized citizen constituency. But if Federal agencies are not ready to deal with the implications for community organization, there is room for optimism that in communities with relatively large minority populations, the issue would be resolved at the local level. In a number of the black communities we observed, the level of local organization insures a constituency for community representatives.

In addition, even if Federal policy were only to specify as a minimum, "democratic selection procedures," it seems likely that such procedures in themselves would help to create a constituency, with or without Federal requirements. The purpose of Federal requirements would be to sharpen the policy context in those communities where local factors are not strong enough to insist on democratic selection and the organization of a constituency for citizen representatives.

b. Access

We have previously argued that performance standards ought not to limit the potential variation in structures to enable access between neighborhood groups, their representatives and the established decision-making bodies. The field study identified three such structures for access: 1) those where neighborhood residents sit in an advisory relationship to established bodies; 2) coalitions
where neighborhood representatives share decision-making authority with representatives of other communal sectors; 3) decision-making bodies which are controlled by neighborhood representatives.

Each of these structures for access to decision making, hold negative and positive consequences. Federal policy must not prematurely cut off our experience with any of them. What Federal policy must do as a minimum is to insure that a situation of no access by citizens to decision making cannot prevail in a Federally-supported program.

The field study indicated that the two structures reflecting advisory access (Tenants' Council and Project Advisory Committee) were each able to exert more influence on decision making than seemed inherent in the advisory role. The Project Area Committee was particularly successful in this regard. Yet the advisory structure for access may not allow for adequate citizen influence. Because of this failure, the advisory structure may not prevail as an acceptable form. We have indicated our great attraction to the Model Cities advisory relationship where a neighborhood-dominated advisory body, also had the authority to block program development for its neighborhood which it did not approve of.

We think Federal minimum performance standards ought to educate communities as to the variety of structures enabling neighborhood access to decision making. But it ought not to stipulate or mandate any of them, although such mandates might indeed be appropriate for individual agency
programs (e.g., Model Cities, Community Action). The only stipulation of Federal interagency policy ought to be the non-acceptance of situations where neighborhoods and their representatives have no organized access to decision making within Federally sponsored programs.

c. Technical Assistance

We were not previously optimistic about the development of an interagency agreement providing technical assistance to aid neighborhood groups in developing alternatives and influencing decisions. Practice in the field was supportive of this pessimism in that there was almost no evidence of the furnishing of technical assistance. There was one important piece of evidence to the contrary where the black director of the Model Cities Agency frowned on the notion of independent technical assistance to neighborhood groups, saying that he did not need a "watchdog."

Observation in the field has refined what we think would be appropriate for a minimum performance standard. We think the provision of independent technical assistance ought to be linked to the structure for citizen access that a local community chooses. Where a local community chooses neighborhood control, or coalition as a structure, the notion of independent technical assistance becomes less pertinent. It is most needed where access is via an advisory structure. In our study, the Tenants' Council had the greatest apparent need for technical
assistance. A minimum performance standard might require that in communities where citizen representatives were given access through an advisory structure, funds must be made available to furnish staff assistance to that advisory structure. It would seem possible and useful to get interagency agreement on this kind of policy for the provision of technical assistance.

d. Stipends:

Despite the chaotic state of practice with regard to the provision of stipends and allowances, we remain convinced that the area lends itself to interagency agreement. It is a simple matter of equity, which all those close to the issue perceive, but seem unwilling or, unable to do anything about. A mandatory policy with regard to the payment of stipends and allowances will be particularly useful to those neighborhood representatives who do not apply for such payments, even where they are eligible for them. Unfortunately, their sense of "pride" is aided by project directors who choose not to force the issue, and in the process wind up with additional program funds to be spent elsewhere. A Federal policy which earmarked certain funds for the express purpose of stipends and allowances would be most useful.

e. Maximum Standards:

We have commented that the idea of limiting certain forms of citizen participation is appropriate for individual agency
programs, but not appropriate for an interagency performance standard. For example, Model Cities might well stipulate that a city government could not surrender program accountability to a citizen group, because the retention of the city government as an accountable partner is intrinsic to the purpose of the Model Cities Program.

Our field work indicates program variety, and costs and benefits associated with each of these varieties, which would be lost by an across-the-board prohibition of certain practices. Within certain policy minima, we make a plea for an experimental approach to citizen involvement. Field study indicates that local projects are prepared to engage in such experimentation within the context of Federal regulations. We would suggest that there is too much that we don’t know in this area, to arbitrarily cut off experimentation because of performance standards which specify maxima in addition to minima.

f. Monitoring:

We have recommended that interagency performance standards specify a minimum level of Federal staff monitoring of citizen participation efforts. During the course of the field study, we found that each of the seven Federal staff responsible for local projects was knowledgeable about the citizen participation effort, and in most cases sympathetic with its goals. It is unlikely that any agreed upon performance standards for monitoring would have
affected the amount of time this staff was spending with regard to citizen participation, except possibly in the case of the Tenants' Council. Federal staff in the Western Region are clearly involved with the issue of participation and accorded it an important share of their time. It is even likely that the quality of the local effort owes something to the quality of Federal staff concern and help. Surely it may be no accident that the Public Health Services staff and the NIMH staff, both of whom represented programs with loose citizen participation guidelines, were deeply involved with the Health Service and Mental Health Projects. Possibly, as a consequence, both of these local programs reflected some of the field study's most aggressive and experimental steps with regard to citizen involvement.

We do not know whether the quantity and quality of Federal staff presence in the West is duplicated in other parts of the country. It is even possible that more extensive Federal involvement in certain regions of the country would depress the level of local performance and experimentation with regard to citizen participation. We would be strongly in favor of risking this possibility through a performance standard which mandated a certain level of Federal staff concern about citizen participation in local projects.
A Concluding Note

It may be that the quantity and complexity of material from the field study has obscured the study's most salient points. These are that citizen participation is there to be observed, it works, it seems to have secured important commitment by Federal and local staff, and it appears to have something very useful to contribute to the amelioration of tensions in our society. And it fits the American experience beautifully; so beautifully that we have repeatedly argued that citizen participation is best viewed as a goal for policy rather than an instrument toward achieving other goals (although it will accomplish that too).

Counterposed against the above visible benefits are the equally visible lacunae with regard to policy and practice. Citizen participation policy at the Federal level is erratic, piecemeal, misunderstood, and possibly not really cared about. But this patchwork of Federal attitudes and practices may have had great utility in contributing to Federal and local experimentation, with regard to participation, in the decade of the 60's. We would suggest that we have now learned enough to move beyond the benefits of a benign anarchy in policy, to a setting forth of what it is we have learned and where we want to go with a Federal policy for citizen participation. To continue the "benign anarchy" of citizen participation policy into the 70's would be a denial of the utility of these experimental years. Even more discouraging
would be the additional evidence that we do not know how to create a sequence between the development of knowledge and the development of policy.

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