The purpose of the essay is to stimulate action toward disarmament, defined as arms reductions to the lowest level possible without making internal law enforcement impossible. Intended as a guide for peace activists, the booklet identifies 13 issues that hold promise for leading toward a disarmed world: banning nuclear tests, tests of new missiles, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and incendiary and chemical weapons; limiting strategic arms, the use of nuclear weapons, international arms transfers, and military expenditures; initiating general and complete disarmament; and establishing nuclear weapon free zones, a transnational peace force and a United Nations Center for Analysis and Monitoring of Disarmament. Information presented for each issue includes definitions, a history of political and military action in connection with the issue, consequences of negative action, and proposals to accomplish the stated goal. Section II presents guidelines for assessing political desirability and feasibility of specific issues and for considering an issue's potential for education and mobilization. Section III identifies six proposals which offer the highest potential for action: reduce military budgets, a no-first-use pledge, comprehensive test bans, nuclear weapon free zones, general and complete disarmament, and the establishment of a transnational peace force. (Author/DB)
THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS: WHERE TO BEGIN

by

Robert C. Johansen
Institute for World Order
The purpose of this essay is to encourage reflection, provoke discussion, and stimulate action so that the disarmament process may begin, in the hope that the political struggle of many persons eventually will produce a future world that is peaceful and fair. In particular, it seeks to encourage peace activists to address the question: to which disarmament proposals should citizens devote their time and energy?

Institute for World Order, 1977

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Introduction

Despite almost continuous rounds of arms control negotiations since World War II, more deadly weapons exist in the arsenals of more national governments spending greater amounts of money for tools of more frightening destruction than at any time in history. Disarmament questions appear to have become so complicated that ordinary people cannot understand them. Yet, to leave such issues entirely in the hands of governments would be disastrous for humankind. Governments seldom strive to disarm unless moved to do so by public pressure. Disarmament, defined as arms reductions to the lowest level possible without making internal law enforcement impossible, is not even a goal for most governments.

The history of governmental failure to halt the arms buildup cautions us against assuming that disarmament can be achieved easily or without some major changes in attitudes and social institutions. The record of failure also suggests two wasteful tendencies of the past that citizens might do well to avoid in the future: on the one hand, the temptation to work for modest arms control measures that are achievable yet fail to lead toward disarmament; and on the other hand, the willingness to advocate directly the goal of comprehensive disarmament, yet without focusing attention and action on particular steps to begin the process that will lead to the desired destination. A more useful approach would be for citizens to set a clear policy direction by supporting proposals that are firmly linked to initiating a disarming process.

This essay aims to help citizens move disarmament closer to the top of the world's political agenda in preparation for the UN Special Session on Disarmament in May-June 1978. The paragraphs below contain a list of major disarmament issues and a set of criteria for selecting the issues that hold the most apparent promise for leading toward a disarmed world. A statement as brief as this necessarily omits many important questions and controversies that are connected with various proposals. In addition, experts do not agree on the selection of issues for action. Nonetheless, this statement can provide a place to begin discussion. Without some understanding of the range of issues and a set of guidelines for choosing where to begin, citizens' efforts will lack unity and have little likelihood of being politically effective in the campaign to reverse the present trend toward further militarization of our planet.
1. The Range of Issues

1.1 BANNING ALL NUCLEAR TESTS

The purpose of a comprehensive test ban is to close completely the door on nuclear testing, a door left open in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1974 Threshold Treaty. The former allows underground nuclear tests of any size, and the latter, which is not yet ratified, permits underground weapons tests up to 150 kilotons. A treaty banning all tests, if universally accepted, would prevent additional countries from developing their own weapons. Even if only the nuclear powers ratified such a ban, it would inhibit the further sophistication of nuclear explosives for weapons purposes. This in turn should slow the presently widening military gap between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon countries. As a result, non-nuclear-weapon countries would not be encouraged, as much as at present, to acquire nuclear weapons. The odds for this consequence occurring should not be exaggerated, however, because the test ban by itself would not affect innovations in advanced delivery and guidance systems. As long as these may be loaded with existing nuclear warheads, non-nuclear-weapon countries are not likely to be satisfied with the inferior status of remaining without nuclear weapons.

The negative consequences that would flow from not having a comprehensive nuclear test ban are more clear. Many of the non-nuclear-weapon countries which signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) will not accept indefinitely a situation in which the nuclear powers continue to test, sophisticate, and deploy new weapons that are prohibited for non-nuclear powers. If one wants to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, a ban on tests in present nuclear-weapon countries is the essential place to begin.

Both the United States and Soviet Union have advocated a comprehensive test ban. The picture is somewhat complicated, however, by the USSR’s desire not to prevent peaceful nuclear explosions. In addition, the two powers have never agreed on verification procedures, but on-site inspections have become less and less important as seismic technology has advanced. Neither China nor France has ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, making their support for a comprehensive ban unlikely, at least until the Soviet Union and United States have halted their own nuclear arms competition. A majority of
The global arms buildup is out of control. Every year military programs now devour over 350 billion dollars. Governments buy and deploy weapons even when they fulfill no security need. Even worse, many weapons decrease human security and increase the danger of cataclysmic destruction.

In addition, these massive expenditures are destructive even if the weapons are never used in combat. At this very moment, they inflict painful economic hardship on millions of people. Military spending increases inflation, decreases an economy’s productivity, eliminates jobs (as compared with equal investment in non-military production), indirectly raises costs of many consumer goods and public services, depletes scarce resources desperately required for meeting basic human needs, slows development in poor societies and delays prosperity for poor classes in wealthy societies, and unnecessarily pollutes the environment.

The military priorities of the world’s major arms producers and purchasers stand in sharp contrast to unmet human needs:

- more than half a billion persons suffer serious malnutrition or starvation;
- nearly one-half of the world’s school-age children cannot attend school;
- one-half of the world’s people lack adequate shelter or healthcare;
- large areas of the oceans and atmosphere are seriously polluted, thereby contaminating and decreasing world food supply, damaging human health, and posing unknown threats to planetary climate and the quality of life for unborn generations;
- thousands of persons have been tortured or unfairly imprisoned or executed because the increasing militarization of the planet has halted and reversed the growth of human rights.

Non-nuclear-weapon states favor a comprehensive test ban, although some near-nuclear-weapon countries do not.

1.2 ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES

A nuclear-weapon-free zone protects states within a region from the potential threat posed by one of them acquiring nuclear weapons. For such a zone to be
"Arms control" normally is used to refer to international agreements aimed at stabilizing levels of armaments. Such agreements may specify that arms be modestly reduced, increased, or maintained at existing levels.

"Disarmament" refers to measures aimed at reducing arms to a point where only sufficient arms are retained to enable internal police forces to maintain domestic tranquility. Usually disarmament measures mean large reductions, but they may also refer to small reductions if they are a part of a process leading toward general and complete disarmament.

These definitions are followed in this paper.

most effective, all states of an area must agree to the prohibition, and if they are willing to do that, such zones may yield little advantage over regional adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). (The latter prohibits signatories without nuclear weapons from acquiring them.)

Nuclear-free zones do, however, offer flexibility not present in the NPT. First of all, they may cover regions of the globe, such as the Indian Ocean, where no state exercises sovereignty. Second, in nuclear-weapon-free zones states may undertake obligations they refused in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For example, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in the Latin American states that have ratified it, the United States and the United Kingdom both agreed not to use or to threaten to use nuclear weapons against any countries in the zone, a provision they refused to include in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China and France have also agreed to this provision even though they are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The main virtue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is to discourage non-nuclear countries within a region from acquiring nuclear weapons, and to prevent stationing, transport, or deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear countries within the territories of signatories. Such zones may be of little value if commitments to the NPT are honored and if nuclear-weapon countries could be persuaded to refrain from deploying their nuclear weapons in and using them against members of the treaty. In the absence of the latter condition, however, and with the prospect that some slightly more restrictive obligations might be accepted on a regional than a universal basis, the nuclear-weapon-free zones have merit.

There is important political mobilizing appeal in the idea that large sections of the globe can become sanctuaries where no nuclear weapons exist and where nuclear powers commit themselves never to use nuclear weapons. A majority of states support nuclear-free zones. In recent years the UN General Assembly
The world's military budget equals the annual income of 1,800,000,000 people in the thirty-six poorest nations.

In two days the world spends on arms the equivalent of a year's budget for the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The developed nations spend 20 times more for their military programs than for economic assistance to the poorer countries.

The developing nations import arms at the rate of more than $6 billion a year.

The US and USSR together account for 60 percent of the world's military expenditures and for 75 percent of the world's arms trade; they have more military force than all other nations combined.

Although first in military strength, the super-powers rank lower than many other nations in indicators of social well-being.

World military expenditures average $14,800 per soldier; public expenditures for education $230 per school-age child.

The cost of one Trident submarine equals the cost of a year's schooling for 16,000,000 children in developing countries.

The $80 billion a year spent on arms procurement makes munitions one of the largest industries in the world.

Military and space research together get more public research funds than all social needs combined.

The cost of the existing stockpile of weapons in the world is estimated at more than twice the value of the capital stock of all manufacturing industry in the United States.

has endorsed the idea in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and the South Pacific. In addition, without mentioning nuclear weapons specifically, the General Assembly in 1971 declared the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" where foreign military deployments should be prohibited. This declaration, which has yet to be made legally binding in a treaty, received the support of China, Japan, and India. The United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France opposed it as violating the freedom of the seas.

1.3 LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS

Even if a Soviet-United States treaty based upon the Vladivostok principle becomes a reality, it will not have stopped the overall strategic arms buildup, to say nothing of reversing it. Once the ceilings on strategic launch vehicles (land- and sea-based missiles, and long range bombers) become formal obligations, however, they do provide a point of reference for scaling down the numbers. Yet subsequent reductions in the number of strategic vehicles easily could be more than offset by improving the accuracy of the remaining missiles or by adding more independently targetable warheads on each missile, because the Vladivostok Accord did not limit qualitative improvements in weapons. As a result, only very large reductions in numbers, say greater than 80 percent, would substantially reduce the strategic arms buildup.

A reasonable proposal to accomplish this would be for the superpowers to reduce the number of their strategic delivery vehicles by 20 percent a year for ten years. Additional nuclear powers could begin similar annual reduction within several years after the treaty first took effect.

1.4 PROHIBITING TESTS OF NEW MISSILES

A second useful proposal for strategic arms limitation would be a ban on missile flight testing for vehicles with a range beyond 600 kilometers. This would prevent the development of new types of multiple warheads and the maneuvering re-entry vehicle.

Although the United States and Soviet Union have long opposed third party involvement in their bilateral arrangements for strategic arms limitation, it is inappropriate to view such deliberations as of interest to the superpowers alone. Any large strategic reductions would require the participation of all the other nuclear powers. Alternatively, the failure to achieve strategic reductions is of military, political, and economic significance for the other states of the world.

Verification of both proposals for strategic arms reductions (1.3 and 1.4) is possible through aerial surveillance by satellites and other means of inspection not requiring foreign inspectors on any country's territory. Therefore, the major stumbling block to agreement is the resistance of the world's most highly armed governments to dismantle the arsenals that protect their powerful status. For this reason, the involvement of less powerful states throughout the world will be necessary to bring strong pressure to bear on the superpowers to disarm.
1.5 STOPPING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear proliferation is widely discussed as a problem by strategic experts in the nuclear-weapon countries. It would be a mistake, however, to separate the spread of nuclear weapons to new governments from the continued possession of nuclear weapons by old members of the nuclear club. The poor and presently less powerful countries will not be inclined to give up access to nuclear weapons permanently without a reciprocal prohibition against the right of nuclear-weapon countries to retain them indefinitely. Even a universally applied comprehensive test ban would be inequitable in its political consequences unless accompanied by nuclear disarmament. In short, there is no reasonable or politically feasible means for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without drastic changes in the policies of the nuclear-weapon countries themselves.

The important issue here is the continued existence of nuclear weapons in any national government's hands, not the potential possession of nuclear weapons by additional governments. Although the proliferation issue is seldom viewed in this light, non-proliferation proposals become realistic and politically attractive only when combined with a broad policy of denuclearization that includes all present nuclear-weapon countries and perhaps even civil nuclear power installations from which materials may be taken to make bombs. Indeed, the question must be raised: can an effective non-proliferation policy be decoupled from complete nuclear disarmament or from the curtailment of civilian uses of nuclear power?

Despite the unbalanced obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the nuclear haves and have-nots, the overriding importance of discouraging nuclear wars is sufficient to justify continued efforts to gain universal adherence to the NPT if at the same time the nuclear-weapon countries are pressed to move toward nuclear disarmament. The latter do not favor placing the non-proliferation issue in this broader context, but the non-nuclear-weapon states generally do.

1.6 Restricting the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The first steps toward nuclear disarmament should be aimed at the most heavily armed nuclear powers. A campaign could be initiated to call into question the right to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Insofar as nuclear weapons are indiscriminate in their destructive consequences, they are genocidal and hence illegal under international law. Moreover, they pose unfathomable destruction to the environment and to unborn generations.

As a first step toward discouraging the use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon states could be asked to accept a pledge never to launch nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries. A second pledge could
be given by all nuclear powers never to use nuclear weapons first. This might produce a national self-restraint similar to the prohibition against poisonous gas. The first commitment would help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while the second would help stabilize relations during a possible war between nuclear powers. These steps would also provide an incentive for non-nuclear states to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty because they would have an assurance that their security would not be undermined by their giving up the chance to obtain nuclear weapons.

A no-first-use pledge is significant because it would be a first step in the process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons in general. If taken seriously, it would immediately dampen nuclear arms competition between the superpowers because there would be no point to developing a nuclear war-fighting capability beyond a minimal deterrent—something that existed more than a decade ago. More importantly, a commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons is a logical prerequisite to universal commitments never to use them at all and eventually to remove them from national arsenals.

Non-nuclear-weapon countries and the Soviet Union have long favored a no-first-use pledge. The United States has opposed it, but Washington has accepted a regional application of the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

1.7 PROHIBITING INCENDIARY WEAPONS

In an effort to protect civilians during war, especially guerrilla war, the UN General Assembly in the early 1970's sought to restrict conventional weapons, such as napalm, which cause "excessively injurious and indiscriminate effects." Although no list of such weapons has been agreed upon, work is scheduled to resume on this in 1977 in the context of revising the 1949 Geneva Convention on the rules of war.

1.8 PROHIBITING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banned the use of chemical and biological weapons. The treaty did not, however, prohibit research, development, manufacture, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. (Biological weapons were covered in a separate agreement.) Because of their potential destructiveness to human life and the environment, it would be useful to gain wide adherence to a treaty banning the manufacture or possession of lethal chemical weapons, such as nerve gas.

Even before arrangements for inspection and verification have been worked out, a treaty could be concluded and operative without immediately jeopardizing any state’s security. At the same time, means for monitoring compliance could be studied now and implemented as soon as possible after an agreement has been concluded.
1.9 CURTAILING INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

In 1976, the United States proposed a study, under UN auspices, of means to control international transfer of arms. A large majority of states, most of which purchase weapons, were unenthusiastic about the idea. They claimed that arms transfers should be curtailed only after the greatest military powers cut back their own deployments. The latter refused to do this, and also refused to exercise sufficient self-restraint to prevent their own arms sales from continuing at unprecedented rates. Although roughly thirty countries export arms, over three-fourths of all sales come from the United States and the Soviet Union. Among the major arms suppliers, the competition for customers has provided more economic and political payoffs than the incentives to halt the sale of instruments for destruction. Even if some modestly restrictive agreements are reached among arms suppliers, it is unlikely that the arms trade can be brought under control without fundamental shifts in the military, political, and economic goals of the world’s major powers.

1.10 REDUCING MILITARY EXPENDITURES

If nations agreed to reduce their military expenditures by a given percentage each year, this could become an effective means for disarming. At the point where annual expenditures would pass below the amount needed for simple maintenance of existing weapons, they would be effectively reduced because of obsolescence and decay. Budget cuts avoid the loopholes present in limited arms control agreements that restrict one type of weapon while allowing new deployments of other weapons. Thus the chief virtue of this approach is that it is comprehensive and comprehensible.

If public pressures for budget cuts are strong enough, a program of reductions could be begun even before the establishment of any alternative, transnational means for providing security. When the persons now representing vested interests that favor high military expenditures would begin to recognize that future security would not depend upon large national military arsenals, then for the first time they would begin seriously to pursue the creation of alternative arrangements for protecting security--arrangements more in harmony with global equity and self-determination.

The strongest argument against a program of annual reductions of military budgets is that cross-national comparisons of budgets and verification of cutbacks by outside observers are extremely difficult and imprecise. For this reason, it would be useful for the military powers in the United Nations to establish common criteria for standardized measuring of military expenditures and to suggest transnational means for verifying reductions in military outlays. Budget cuts could also be made more effective by tying them to force levels.

The less developed countries in the General Assembly have called since 1950
for reductions of military expenditures. In 1973, the Assembly asked for a 10 percent reduction in the budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union favored this idea in principle, but the proposal was not considered seriously by the four other powers.

1.11 INITIATING GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

General and complete disarmament is a policy recommendation that has received little attention in recent years because it lacks sufficient support to make it appear even remotely feasible politically. This position calls for comprehensive arms reduction by all national governments, according to a specific timetable, to a minimal level consistent with the need for police forces to maintain domestic tranquility.

The strongest reason for advocating total disarmament is that presumably a disarmed world is, or at least should be, the ultimate goal of more modest proposals for reversing the arms buildup. If one in fact seeks a disarmed world, then it makes little intellectual or political sense to advocate anything less. One can, of course, promote small steps within a comprehensive plan for general disarmament.

Pressing consistently for general disarmament may eventually build the necessary climate of support to make it politically feasible. Although small steps toward a disarmed world appear to be politically easier to take than large ones, thirty years of negotiations for partial measures offer little hope that they will achieve a reversal of the increase in arms. Perhaps disarmament will be achieved only when it is placed in a broad political context that includes strengthening transnational means for peaceful change and security maintenance. To the extent that this is true, advocating general and complete disarmament -- rather than partial steps -- reminds us of the need to consider fundamental institutional change. In addition, such a posture underscores the need to measure the presently armed world against the goal of a disarmed world, rather than against small steps of arms control which, even if achieved, seem to legitimize the weapons that remain.

If sufficient public pressure can be generated for comprehensive disarmament, then the burden for working out complicated details will be shifted to governments. In any case, such details are too complex to be used to mobilize popular support. Once reluctant elites recognize that the public will no longer support growing national military arsenals, these elites will begin to use their knowledge and skills for creating alternative, transnational means for carrying out the security function.

1.12 ESTABLISHING A TRANSNATIONAL PEACE FORCE

Reducing national arms to the minimal level necessary for maintaining internal order probably cannot be achieved without constructing some
alternative mechanisms for protecting security. Thus the creation of a permanent transnational peace force, individually recruited and responsible to a global authority, takes on genuine importance. Even though a disarmed world lies some distance in the future, it would be useful to begin the incremental process of legitimizing a transnational force as soon as possible.

Such a permanent force could not only discourage outside intervention in brushfire wars, but also be used to enforce positive international law on which there is nearly universal agreement, such as against racial oppression in Zimbabwe or South Africa. By adding a more positive justice-facilitating role to the older notion of peacekeeping, the proposed force would offer desirable consequences that should increase the support for it among many nations.

1.13 ESTABLISHING A UNITED NATIONS CENTER FOR ANALYSIS AND MONITORING OF DISARMAMENT

Since the obligations eventually established for achieving disarmament must be universally applied and impartially verified, only a global agency can adequately and authoritatively perform this task. The necessary monitoring function could be given to an expanded and strengthened Disarmament Center within the UN Secretariat. It could supplement the efforts of existing private and governmental agencies by providing global assessments of present arms trends and suggesting areas for arms reductions, as well as monitoring disarmament agreements. The sooner that such an agency begins to operate, even if by inspecting existing arms control agreements that are bilateral or regional in scope, the more likely that such an agency will gain the experience and legitimacy necessary in time to facilitate and monitor more comprehensive arms reductions among all states.

Such a Center would increase somewhat the knowledge and political leverage of those societies and peoples not heavily armed or militarized. Without increasing the influence of such groups, the militarily strongest countries are likely to perpetuate a world system in which military power will continue to play a dominant role.

2. The Selection of Issues

2.1 FEASIBILITY

It is not easy to decide which of the various disarmament issues should receive the most attention from individuals and groups seeking to reverse the arms buildup. Probably the most common decision-making approach is to select an issue based on an estimate of what is politically feasible. Although this guideline seems sensible at first glance, it is only of limited use on one hand, in selecting a very modest measure, one might be wasting energy on an idea that would have been approved by governments even without any citizen action. On the other hand, only slightly more far-reaching measures may fail to win government approval even with maximum efforts. A third possibility is that a vigorous campaign for a more radical measure, even though ending in apparent defeat, may have positive educational value in the long run. We have no understanding of social change adequate for calculating whether it is best to select a policy stance close enough to official postures so that private groups retain credibility with them, or far enough away from official policy that proposals presently perceived as radical would look moderate when contrasted with even more radical suggestions. Thus the short run political feasibility of a proposal is not, by itself, a useful guideline for choosing issues.

2.2 DESIRABILITY

A second kind of difficulty arises from uncertainty about which proposals are most likely to reverse the arms buildup, regardless of what positions officials might be willing to advocate. In 1968, for example, one might have asked: Will negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty start momentum for nuclear disarmament, or instead legitimate existing nuclear arsenals and dampen the movement for comprehensive disarmament? By 1977 the answer seemed clear. It helped legitimize the nuclear club. Should one aim to stabilize arms at present levels in order to avert even larger deployments, or instead ignore immediate increments while working for major change?

The question of desirability deserves more attention than the issue of short-run political feasibility because the proposals most likely to start a chain of events moving toward disarmament probably should be advocated even if
their political feasibility is low at the present time. It is more sensible to work
at making the presently unfeasible more feasible in the future than at
implementing presently feasible proposals which will not substantially affect
future arms policies. To be sure, the ideal proposal is one that is both
reasonably feasible and likely to lead to further arms reductions.

From among the variety of proposals, those that most deserve support are the
ones that lead toward both major arms reductions and changes in the present
international warfare system. The goal of such a transformation is to create a
more genuinely global system that possesses a transnational capacity for
peace-keeping, for enforcing disarmament agreements, and for implementing
the conditions necessary to achieve a humanely disarming world: namely, a fair
chance for those people and societies with legitimate grievances to initiate
peaceful change that will produce greater equity, global economic well-being,
and social justice.

Freezing arms at roughly equal levels for major rivals is probably not
feasible, even if it were desirable, because each nation's perceptions of its
opponent's capabilities and intentions are so influenced by self-interest and the
demands of competing national sovereignty that "equality" cannot be agreed
upon. Moreover, a disarmed world is probably not possible without significant
strides toward economic justice and political equality, because the presently
privileged would fear a world revolution if they lost the arms used now to
protect their privilege, and the presently underprivileged would fear a world of
permanent injustice if they lost a chance to use arms for stimulating
fundamental change. In other words, arms control is of limited practical value
unless it leads to disarmament, and disarmament is probably impossible unless
it is accompanied by reform of global political and economic institutions.

Table I is a crude effort to show which of the various proposals are most
desirable from the standpoint of arms reductions and of building a more
peaceful world system. It seems to me that four proposals, if implemented,
clearly hold the most promise for building a warless world: reductions of
military budgets; a universal pledge by national governments not to be the first
to use nuclear weapons, as a step towards prohibiting such weapons in national
 arsenals; creation of a standing, transnational peace force; and initiation of
phased reductions for general and complete disarmament.

Of course, the proposals with the most far-reaching potential (indicated in
the two right-hand columns of Table I) appear to be among the least feasible
politically. However, this may be an instance where appearances are deceiving.
For example, it is by no means clear that an effective non-proliferation
agreement is any more feasible than restricting the budgets for military
expenditures. (In fact, some Third World states may resist the former until the
First and Second World leaders make progress on the latter.) Similarly, many
experts argue that a comprehensive test ban is clearly one of the most feasible
of the various proposals, but it is in fact doubtful that universal acceptance of
Table I: Estimate of the Impact of Proposals Upon the Prospects for Disarmament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Stabilization of one category of arms</th>
<th>Reduction of one category of arms</th>
<th>Arms stabilization that will encourage system change</th>
<th>Arms reduction that will encourage system change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Banning all nuclear tests</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limiting strategic arms</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibiting tests of new missiles</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibiting incendiary weapons</td>
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<td>Prohibiting chemical weapons</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curtailing international arms transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reducing military expenditures</td>
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<td>Initiating general and complete disarmament</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing a transnational peace force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing a United Nations Center for Analysis and Monitoring of Disarmament*</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* This is not an arms stabilization measure, but it could encourage system change.
such an idea can occur without major arms reductions by the leading military
powers.

Given the political difficulty of implementing the proposals that are the most
desirable in terms of their potential for disarmament, and acknowledging that
even modestly desirable proposals may not have high feasibility, perhaps the
decisive weight in selecting issues should be given to other considerations, such
as the mobilizing and educational value of issues, to which we now turn.

2.3 POTENTIAL FOR EDUCATION AND MOBILIZATION

In addition to the questions of political feasibility and desirability, activists
should consider an issue's potential for raising consciousness, generating public
support, and sustaining a disarming process. For these purposes, an issue
should be easy to understand and clearly desirable. It should appeal to people's
sense of what is morally right and what is in their self-interest. If possible,
success in accomplishing a policy goal should give direct payoffs to the people
supporting the initiative. The payoffs might come in the form of tax reductions
or increased quality of life from alternative uses of the funds for arms. The
issue should be formulated in such a way that people feel some personal stake
in the success of the campaign. The issue should suggest clear tactics and
strategies for activists within domestic societies so that they can bring pressure
to bear on their own governments, which as a result will feel some need to take
seriously the drive to move away from the war system. Finally, the issue
should be based upon a positive vision of the way the world can be, rather than
merely a negative criticism of the present. At the same time, activists should
not feel that they bear the responsibility for working out all the detailed
arrangement for alternatives to the present war system. The best issues are
those that place some burden on governmental leadership to carry out related
policies that must flow from serious disarming initiatives taken early in the
process of disarmament.

With these considerations in mind, Table 11 summarizes my estimates of the
extent to which the various proposals are easily understood, assumed by a large
percentage of the informed publics throughout the world to be desirable, and
useful for educating and mobilizing reluctant elites and larger publics for the
disarming process. The most desirable proposals in this table are those that
possess all of the characteristics indicated in the three columns.
## Table II: Estimate of the Value of Issues for Initiating a Disarmament Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Issue is Easily Understood</th>
<th>Issue is Generally Viewed as Desirable</th>
<th>Issue Possesses High Potential for Education and Mobilization for Disarmament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banning all nuclear tests</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting strategic arms</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibiting tests of new missiles</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibiting incendiary weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibiting chemical weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtailing international arms transfers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing military expenditures</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating general and complete disarmament</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a transnational peace force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a United Nations Center for Analysis and Monitoring of Disarmament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant opposition to this issue exists in near-nuclear countries and in France, China, and India.

** Especially when a prohibition against first use is discussed in context with a prohibition against any use.
3. Issues for Action

When Table II estimates are combined with the assessments of Table I, six proposals possess advantages over the rest. Although advocating proposals outside the realm of these six may not be harmful, the other issues do not hold as much promise for reaping maximum disarmament benefits from citizens' efforts.

The clearly most promising issue is to reduce military budgets. This idea would hold even greater appeal if a portion of the budget cuts were automatically channeled into multilateral efforts to abolish poverty or protect the environment. A second proposal, a no-first-use-pledge, also ranks high because of its importance in stabilizing deterrence while opening the way for prohibiting all nuclear weapons.

Two additional issues hold promise because they are understandable and likely to be relatively popular, although they ranked lower on the question of desirability: the comprehensive test ban and nuclear-weapon-free zones. To increase their relatively low educational value and impact for disarmament, their advocacy could be accompanied by intense efforts to relate them to "next steps." The first could be linked to bans on the testing of non-nuclear aspects of weapons technologies, such as new missiles and guidance systems. And a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Indian Ocean, for example, could be linked to the spread of such zones around the globe, including expanding segments of the superpowers' own territories.

Two final issues—general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a transnational peace force—were rated both highly desirable (Table I) and educationally very valuable (Table II). Therefore, even though these are not easily understood or presently popular, they probably should be vigorously promoted by citizens seriously engaged in a quest to dismantle military arsenals and to transform the warfare system.