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A Collective Bargaining Research Agenda: Hypotheses

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### ABSTRACT

If a comprehensive list of the rewards and incentives which direct teachers can be identified, the impact of collective bargaining on this reward system can be studied. Secondly, if the connection between specific rewards and performance of various teaching tasks can be specified, the way that collective bargaining shifts remphases from task to task can be studied. Eight types of rewards are available to teachers, including: 1) wages, salaries, and fringe benefits; 2) stable and comfortable working conditions; 3) advancement possibilities; 4) recognition for one's work; 5) a sense of personal competence; 6) a sense of stimulation and personal growth; 7) satisfying interpersonal relationships in the work environment; 8) a sense that one's work is meaningful or important to society. Only those rewards that are compensations for work performed are directly controlled by collective bargaining agreements. The four major functional tasks required of teachers are associated with the above rewards. These tasks include: 1) supervision of students at school: 2) socialization and accultration of students; 3) instruction cf students in mental, physical, and social skills; and 4) certification of students' learning accomplishment or lack of accomplishment. Collective bargaining will most likely focus attention on the certification activities of teachers. (Author/JG)

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# A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RESEARCH AGENDA:

HYPOTHESES AND METHODS

### by

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November 18, 1976


Presented as part of a symposium entitled "Organization, Collective Bargaining and Work", at the annual meeting of the California Educational Research Association, Burlingame', California.

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The idea that work behavior is motivated and directed by a system of incentives and rewards is fundamental to a theory of management. From this perspective, collective bargaining represents one of the mechanisms for controlling the flow of certain rewards and incentives within the schools and thus of directing the efforts of those who receive these benefiles. Research on the effects of collective bargaining on school management can be effectively developed once a working theory provides insight into two problems. First, if a comprehensive list of the rewards and incentives which direct teachers in their work can be specified, the impact of eollective negotiations on this reward system can be studied. Secondly, if the connection between specific fewards and the performance of various functional teaching tasks can be specified, a study can be made of the ways in which collective bargaining shifts emphasis from some tasks to others.

We believe that an adequate conceptual framework can be developed which will permit very effective research on the impact of collective bargaining on school management. The key concepts of such a framework are presented in Figure 1.

We can identify eight general types of rewards or incentives which are available to teachers. These include: 1) wages, salaries and fringe benefits, 2) stability, comfort and convenience in working conditions, 3) the possibility of promotion or advancement, 4) recognition or esteem for one's work 5) a sense of competence; effectiveness, or productive efficacy in the performance of a task, 6) a sense of stimulation, personal growth or excitement, in the performance of the work, 7) satisfying inter-personal relationships with others in the work environment, and 8) a satisfying sense that one's work is a meaningful or significant contribution to the society



as a whole or to individuals who are important. These rewards and incentives can be grouped into four sets by recognizing that those on the left side of Figure 1 are extrinsic and come as <u>compensations</u> while those on the right side of the figure are intrinsic to the performance of the work itself and are experienced as <u>satisfactions</u>. Similarly, the four rewards in the top half of the figure are connected directly to the performance of <u>specific</u> <u>tasks</u> while those in the lower half of the figure are interpersonal and are derived from the social system within which the work is performed.

It can easily be seen that only those rewards in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1 (i.e., wages/benefits and working conditions) are directly controlled by collective bargaining agreements. All of the other rewards and incentives arise from processes which cannot be directly controlled in contract agreements. This is not to say, of course, that contract provisions do not affect the flow of these other rewards and incentives, but only that They do not do so directly. Indirectly, contracts affect the flow of the other rewards and incentives by either a) establishing rules which limit their availability, or b) divert resources needed for other rewards to enhance wages or working conditions. To cite one example: a recent California school district contract calls for the provision of a "preparation period" of forty minutes in length each day for all teachers. Whether a teacher would get any satisfaction or reward from this preparation period could not of course, be written into the contract. However, the protection of the "prep period" probably does indirectly affect the level of satisfaction for a significant number of teachers, and it certainly diverts funds away from wages and fringe benefits.

Associated with the rewards and incentives listed in Figure 1 are the four major functional tasks required of teachers. These tasks include:

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1) the supervision and control of students while they are in the custody of the school, 2 the socialization or acculturation of the students through the inculcation of various social and political behavior and attitude norms required to be good "citizens" in the school and, hopefully, in the society after leaving the school, 3) instruction in the mental, physical and social skills required to be knowledgeable and productive as acults, and 4) certification of learning accomplishment or lack of accomplishment so as to determine whether students are eligible for more advanced learning opportunities or special remedial or compensatory opportunities. As suggested in Figure 1, teachers experience different rewards and incentives in the performance of these different tasks. For example, teachers persistently report that the greatest rewards derived from instructing children are related to the sort of satisfactions we have Tebeled a sense of productive efficacy and a sense of stimulation or excitement at seeing children learn.

What this theoretical framework clearly implies is that collective bargaining agreements will most likely focus attention on the certification activities which teachers are called upon to perform. In this sense, collective bargaining is compatible with other efforts at developing "accountability" within the schools. Our theory proposes that the most likely demands to be made of teachers who are seeking higher wages and better working conditions is that they be able to certify increased student achievements in return. A number of critical hypotheses follow from this theory which should be tested through intense research. These include:

<u>Hypothesis 1:</u> Management demands brought to the collective bargaining table will emphasize the need for teachers to produce certifiable student progress in order to qualify for higher wages and better working conditions.

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Hypothesis 2: Under collective bargaining contracts, principals will recognize that they have <u>less</u> authority over the establish ment of wages and working conditions and will turn their attention to other rewards and incentives.

<u>Hypothesis 3:</u> Under collective bargaining arrangements teachers who seek upward mobility within the organization will be more willing to trade off those resources needed for the establishment of instructional efficacy and personal growth, while less upwardly mobile teachers will be more willing to trade-off resources needed for supervision (such as aides, additional administrators and specialist teachers, etc.,) in order to secure higher salaries and/or more satisfactory working conditions.