Sixteen articles written for publication in newspapers discuss moral issues in contemporary society. The articles form the basis of a college-level course by newspaper which also includes a book of primary source readings, study guide, and source book. The course can be taken independently by individuals or in a structured class setting. The articles, or "lectures," are written mainly by university professors and researchers. Content covers 16 areas of problems of living, including sexual conduct, crime and punishment, business and political ethics, work, and science and technology. The articles identify the issues and present varying perspectives on them; the supplementary materials contain relevant readings, discussion questions, and other instructional resources. Each article is preceded by a paragraph which gives background information about the author. (AV)
MORAL CHOICES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Newspaper Articles for the Sixth Course by Newspaper

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PREFACE

The sixteen articles in this booklet examine the often controversial moral dilemmas surrounding such issues as abortion, sexual conduct, crime and punishment, business and political ethics, science, technology, work, and race: the perennial problems of how we are to live.

These articles were originally written for the sixth Course by Newspaper, MORAL CHOICES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, offered for the first time in the winter/spring of 1977. Philip Rieff, the Benjamin Franklin Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, coordinated this course.

Courses by Newspaper, a national program originated and administered by University Extension, University of California, San Diego, develops college-level courses that are offered to the public by hundreds of cooperating newspapers and colleges and universities throughout the country.

A series of weekly newspaper articles, written by a prominent “faculty,” comprises the “lectures” for each course. A supplementary book of readings, a study guide, and audio-cassettes are also available to interested readers, with a source book available to community discussion leaders and instructors. Colleges within the circulation area of participating papers offer the opportunity to meet with local professors and to earn college credit.

In those areas where a newspaper is interested in running the series and no local academic institution wishes to participate, credit arrangements can be made with the Division of Independent Study, University of California, Berkeley.

The first Course by Newspaper, AMERICA AND THE FUTURE OF MAN, was offered in the fall of 1973, with funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities and a supplementary grant from the Exxon Education Foundation. Subsequent courses have included IN SEARCH OF THE AMERICAN DREAM, two segments of THE AMERICAN ISSUES FORUM, and OCEANS: OUR CONTINUING FRONTIER. To date, almost 600 newspapers and more than 300 colleges have presented the courses. Approximately 15 million people read the articles for each course. More than 18,000 persons have earned credit through Courses by Newspaper.

For the past two years, Courses by Newspaper has been fully funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, a federal agency created in 1965 to support education, research, and public activity in the humanities. We gratefully acknowledge their support for this unique educational program.

We also wish to thank United Press International, which cooperated in distributing the articles to participating newspapers across the country.

The views presented in these articles, however, are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of California or of the funding and distributing agencies.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Philip Rieff

THE NATURE OF MORALITY

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Those of us who are in middle life have seen the moral world around us appear to turn upside down.

You name it — sex, politics, work, family, abortion, crime, law, drugs, race. Whatever the subject, things seem to be topsy-turvy.

Did our ancestors have it all wrong — at least for our time? Is there no real good and evil?

Some say that "ideals" are meant to be unattainable, like a moral alarm clock that we deliberately set much too early. All of us, then, could cheat a little and grab, say, an extra hour's sleep.

Still others say that in the second half of the twentieth century our old moral clocks have lost their hands, and we are free at last to make up our own version of what time it really is.

To answer these claims, consider how moral orders have worked from the oldest societies known to the very near present.

In every culture, guides are chosen to help men conduct themselves through those passages from one crisis of choice to another that constitute the experience of living.
NARROWING THE CHOICES

A culture in fact survives only as far as the members of a culture learn how to narrow the range of choices otherwise open to them. Safely inside their culture — more precisely, the culture safely inside them — members of it are disposed to enact only certain possibilities of behavior while refusing even to dream of others.

It is culture, deeply installed as authority, that generates depth of character; and character must involve the capacity to say no. A man can only resist the multiplicity of experience if his character is anchored deeply enough by certain values to resist shuttling endlessly among all.

These values forbid certain actions and encourage others; and they express those significant inhibitions that characterize us all alike in a culture. It is by virtue of these values and their shared character that members of the same culture expect each other to behave in certain ways and not in others.

To prevent the expression of everything: that is the irreducible function of culture. By the creation of opposing values — of ideals, of militant truths — a seal is fastened upon the terrific capacity of man to express everything.

Even now, with all their experience of default among candidates for the office, ordinary men still crave guides for their conduct. And not merely guiding principles. Abstractions will never do. Values have to be exemplified in order to be taught; or, at least, vital examples must be pointed to and a sense of indebtedness (which is the same as guilt) encouraged toward the imitation of these examples.

CULTURE IN CRISIS

Our culture is in crisis today precisely because no creed, no symbol, no militant truth, is installed deeply enough now to help men constrain their capacity for expressing everything. Internalized values from an earlier period in our moral history no longer hold good. Western men are sick precisely of those interior ideals which have shaped their characters. Accordingly, they feel they have no choice except to try to become free characters. And to believe that man is the supreme being for man.

What characterizes modernity, I think, is just this idea that men need not submit to any power — higher or lower — other than their own. It is in this sense that modern men really believe they are becoming gods.

ANTI-GODS

This belief is the exact reverse of the truth: Modern men are becoming anti-gods. Because, as I have said earlier, the terms in which our god was conceived can exist only so long as they limit the capacity of man to express everything, our old god was never so uninhibited as a young man. Our god was bound, after all, by the terms of various covenants.

In the next culture, there are to be no priests, not even secular ones. We are not to be guided — rather, entertainment, stimulation, liberation from the constraints drawn round us by the narrowing guidelines become the functional equivalents of guidance.

To emphasize the harmlessness of the new man — the individualist freed from cultural inhibitions — Oscar Wilde in one of his greatest essays compares him to both the artist and the child:

It will be a marvellous thing — the true personality of man — when we see it. It will grow naturally and simply, flower-like, or as a tree grows. It will not be at discord. It will never argue or dispute . . . It will know everything. It will have wisdom. Its value will not be measured by material things . . . It will not be always meddling with others, or asking them to be like itself. It will love them because they will be different. And yet while it will not meddle with others, it will help all, as a beautiful thing helps us, by being what it is. The personality of man will be very wonderful. It will be as wonderful as the personality of a child.

Nothing here hints how human personality can stabilize itself except by installing ideals in opposition to one another. What the author is saying is really that if nothing is prohibited, then there will be no transgressions.

But in point of psychiatric and historical fact, it is NO, rather than YES, upon which all culture, and inner development of character, depends. Ambivalence will not. I think, be eliminated: it can only be controlled and exploited. Ideal self-concepts, militant truths are modes of control. Character is the restrictive shaping of possibility. What Wilde called “personality” represents a dissolution of restrictive shapings. In such freedom, grown men would act less like cherubic children than like demons, for they would disrupt the restrictive order of character and social life.
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II: THE DILEMMAS OF SEX

by Jean Lipman-Blumen

Most twentieth-century analysts forget that they are not the inventors of the moral dilemmas surrounding sexuality. The issues of morality that instigate sexual behavior have always been with us.

Technology and changing values merely create the illusion that the current crop of problems are new and different.

Mass media’s obsession with details of pre-, post-, extra-, intra-, and inter-marital sex in pairs, trios, small groups or large crowds, falsely emphasizes their diversity and obscures their commonality. We lose sight of the important understanding that all forms of sexual behavior are linked by the same underlying moral issue: the relationship between intimacy and responsibility.

When procreation was seen as the essential rationale for sexual relationships, the responsibility bred by intimacy was apparent. With advanced medical technology and forms of birth control, the non-procreative aspects of sex have become the major and often disproportionate focus of concern. Our interest is more readily titillated by details of the latest fads in sexual behavior than by the “heavy,” subject of responsibility. But the question of responsibility and intimacy barks at our heels.

While technological change has reduced some previous difficulties involved in human relationships, it has substituted others. The telephone, the automobile, the plane, and improved contraception create the possibility to meet, communicate, and develop seemingly intimate relationships with a speed and frequency previously impossible.

Mass media, another outgrowth of technology, provide the knowledge, examples, and value context within which relationships grow. The incubation period for intimacy thus has decreased drastically, and often we find ourselves catapulted into seemingly intimate relationships before we are “ready.”

SEPARATENESS AND UNION

In one sense, we are never quite “ready” for intimacy. The human condition is one of polarity between essential separateness or uniqueness and union or communion with others. Because we are never totally “ready” for intimacy — never totally prepared to relinquish our separateness — the question of responsibility looms large.
Sexual union expresses the duality of human separateness and connectedness. It represents striving after confirmation of our uniqueness as an individual, at the same time that it reaffirms our loss of self in a larger cosmic process. This is true with regard both to the immediate sexual act with our partners and to the new life that may result from such a union.

Sexual relationships, the physical epitome of intimacy, inevitably breed responsibility, whether or not we choose to recognize it. Sexuality creates responsibility because our sense of ourselves as sexual beings—particularly sexually acceptable, attractive, and adequate beings—is central to our human identity. And it is the exposure of our essential being, our core meaning, that creates responsibility in ourselves and in the individuals who would accept our offer of intimacy.

Sexual relationships involve exposing our most vulnerable selves to one another. Protecting the other person’s vulnerable self from harm, humiliation, rejection, and embarrassment is a serious responsibility. The degree to which we do this is one measure of our own humanity.

While we may be mature in years, sexual maturity is a long, complicated process not systematically linked to physiological and chronological development. In fact, in modern societies, the individual’s sexual self is the least and last explicitly developed dimension of self.

Unlike the social and intellectual dimensions of the self, which are involved in human interaction and growth from the day of birth, the sexual self in modern society usually is protected from deliberate and conscious development and experience at least until adolescence. Perhaps our awareness of the disparity between the childlike state of our sexual being and experience and the sophistication of our intellectual, social, even political selves complicates the problem.

VULNERABILITY

Novelists from F. Scott Fitzgerald to J.D. Salinger have portrayed the anxiety of the young man’s first sexual encounter. It is a picture that arouses sympathy, horror, and humor because we recognize his “brand newness,” his raw vulnerability. It is this very vulnerability—both in women and men—that creates responsibility.

Often, we are so concerned with self-protection that we fail to recognize the other person’s equally great need. Opening oneself to another person, revealing an aspect of oneself that is at the center of one’s identity, is an act fraught with both danger and great potential. There is the danger of being diminished by rejection, the potential of being enhanced by confirmation and union. The possibility of self-reduction by treating others without responsibility adds still another level of intricacy to sexual relationships.

The responsibility we assume for both the other person and ourselves can act as a heavy burden or as a source of great joy, growth, and awareness, depending in part on the motivation behind sexual relationships.

The feminists have been quick to see that the moral issue at the heart of sexual intimacy is not if but why we establish sexual relationships.

MOTIVES FOR SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

Do we seek sexual relationships simply because we perceive the person as a “sex object,” someone who “turns us on”? Does the relationship mean the creation of “convenience sex,” not unrelated to “convenience foods” in an increasingly plastic society? Does the relationship signify a conquest, a power or ego “trip”?

Do we enter sexual relationships because refusing may label us as unsophisticated, unhindered, repressed, unmanly, unwomanly? Or do we engage in sexual relationships because we fear refusal will jeopardize other valued aspects of the relationship? Do we do so because we sense that denial will damage the other person’s sense of self?

Do we enter such relationships to transform ourselves and others? Do we seek sexual union to create new life or instill vitality in old lives? Do we enter sexual relationships in order to give or to take or to establish a balance between the two?

Very often the emotional and intellectual intimacy that we seek with another person is absent, and we attempt to create it artificially through sexual intimacy. But when sexual intimacy stands alone, unintegrated with the development of knowing, caring, and feeling, we face the “depersonalization,” the anonymity of sex.

SEX OBJECT

The new “buzzwords”—‘depersonalization” and “sex object”—bespeak our concern with protecting our sense of self. When our sexual identity is reduced to sexual functioning, replaceable bodily parts, we experience the anomie, the existential isolation that transforms sexual relationships into a parody of human existence.

Only the responsibility that we take for protecting one another’s unique individuality and self in sexual relationships insures us against the tragic realization that our most central self is simply “another body,” not a special unique being to another person.

Trust is an important component of responsibility. When we enter sexual relationships before we have exposed the nonsexual aspects of ourselves, it is impossible to guarantee responsibility for protecting this unknown, unique individuality of another person. And when one individual cannot hold out the promise of responsibility, the other individual cannot hold out the expectation of trust.

Yet, getting to know another person takes time. Marathon self-revelation is no substitute for seeing an individual’s personality reveal itself under different circumstances over time. When we telescope the interpersonal aspect of knowing another person and enter a sexual relationship on the basis of “instant understanding,” we cannot guarantee that we will truly like, respect, and be responsible for this individual whom we shall know differently as time passes. The disjunction between the physical intimacy and the interpersonal anonymity takes its toll in loneliness and despair.

The relationship between responsibility and intimacy is obviously very complex. The complexity arises from the interweaving of responsibility, trust, and intimacy, uniqueness and commonality, isolation and communion, self and other. The moral dilemmas posed by this relationship cannot be reduced or understood by separating the inseparable parts.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christopher Lasch

THE FAMILY AND MORALITY

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THE FAMILY AND MORALITY

Christopher Lasch

It is the impression of the writer that the social and economic complex has required that the education of the individual be not only determined but accomplished in the leisure hours of the day. In the first instances of the individual, the education of the individual is the education of the family. More particularly, the education of the family is the education of the children. The education of the children is the education of the family. The education of the family is the education of the individual. The education of the individual is the education of the society. The education of the society is the education of the generations. The education of the generations is the education of the world. The education of the world is the education of the universe.
In the course of bringing Filene's bargain-basement "culture" to the consumers of it, the advertising industry, the school, and the mental health and welfare services have taken over many of the socializing functions of the home. The ones that remain have been placed under the direction of modern science and technology.

While glorifying domestic life as the last haven of intimacy, these agencies of mass tuition have propagated the view that the family cannot provide for its own needs without outside assistance.

The advertising industry insists that the health and safety of the young, the satisfaction of their daily nutritional requirements, their emotional and intellectual development, and their ability to compete with their peers for popularity and success all depend on consumption of vitamins, Band-Aids, cavity-preventing toothpaste, cereals, mouthwashes, and laxatives.

"Domestic science" urges the housewife and mother to systematize housekeeping and to give up the rule-of-thumb procedures of earlier generations. Modern medicine orders the abandonment of home remedies. The mental health movement teaches that maternal "instinct" is not to be trusted in childrearing.

Even the sex instinct has come to be surrounded by a growing body of scientific analysis and commentary, according to which sexual "fulfillment" depends on study, technique, discipline, control.

THE NEW SOCIAL WELFARE

The diffusion of the new ideology of social welfare and "civilized" consumption has had the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

By convincing the housewife, and finally even her husband as well, to rely on outside technology and the advice of outside experts, the apparatus of mass tuition—the successor to the church in our secularized society—has undermined the family's capacity to provide for its "instinctual" needs. The agencies of mass socialization have thereby justified the continuing expansion of health, education, and welfare services.

Yet rising rates of crime, juvenile delinquency, suicide, and mental breakdown belatedly suggest to many experts, even to many welfare workers, that welfare agencies furnish a poor substitute for the family. Dissatisfaction with the results of socialized welfare and the growing expense of maintaining it now prompt efforts to shift health and welfare functions back to the home.

THE DEMISE OF FAMILY AUTHORITY

It is too late, however, to call for a revival of the patriarchal family or even of the less authoritarian family that replaced it. The socialization of reproduction has fatally weakened not only the father's authority but that of the mother as well.

Instead of imposing their own standards of right and wrong, now thoroughly confused, parents influenced by psychiatry and the doctrines of progressive education seek to understand the "needs" of the young and to avoid painful confrontations. Instead of guiding the child, the older generation struggles to "keep up with the kids" to master their incomprehensible jargon, and even to imitate their dress and manners in the hope of preserving a youthful appearance and outlook.

Under these conditions, children often grow up without forming strong identifications with their parents. Yet it was precisely these identifications that formerly provided the psychological basis of conscience or superego—that element of the psyche which internalizes social prohibitions and makes submission to them a moral duty. Lacking an internalized sense of duty, children become "other-directed" adults, more concerned with their own pleasure and the approval of others than with retaining their mark on the world.

The ease with which children escape emotional entanglements with the older generation leaves them with a feeling not of liberation but of inner emptiness. Young people today often reproach their parents with indifference or neglect, and many of them seek warmth and security in submission to spiritual healers, gurus, and prophets of political or psychic transformation.

Permissive styles of childrearing, instead of encouraging self-reliance and autonomy, as might have been expected, appear instead to intensify the appetite for dependence.

SUPERSTATE

The only alternative to the superego, it has been said, is the superstate. Formerly, the absorption of parental values enabled the young to overcome childhood dependency and to become morally autonomous.

Today, the wish for dependence persists into later life, laying the psychological foundations of new forms of authoritarianism.

At first glance, the decline of conscience might appear to make it more difficult for the authorities to impose themselves on the rest of the population. Not only parents, but all those who wield established authority—teachers, magistrates, priests—have suffered a loss of "credibility."

Unable to inspire loyalty or even to command obedience, they therefore attempt to impose their will through psychological manipulation. Government becomes the art of personnel management, which treats social unrest as a kind of sickness, curable by means of therapeutic intervention.

Yet, in many ways the new forms of authoritarianism and social control work more efficiently than the old ones. As religion gives way to the new antireligion of mental health, authority identifies itself not with what ought to be but with what actually is, not with principles but with reality. The individual's conduct is governed less by his superego than by his conception of reality; resistance to the status quo becomes not "unprincipled," but "unrealistic."

Political authority no longer rests on the family, which formerly mediated between the state and the individual. Indeed, the state has accommodated itself so well to the weakening of parental authority that efforts to strengthen the family are likely to be perceived as threats to political stability.

Through the proliferating apparatus of mass socialization, the state now controls the individual more effectively than it controlled him through appeals to his conscience. Even though the new methods of social control might exact a mounting economic, social, and psychological price, those methods will be discarded only when the price threatens to become altogether unbearable.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Daniel Callahan

ABORTION and AGING AND THE AGED

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Even in a nation well familiar with acrimonious debate, the struggle over abortion takes a special place. It intimidates politicians, and divides the churches. It often sets husbands and wives at odds, and remains an open source of dispute among physicians, who are as divided as the rest of society.

This debate is not peculiar to our time and place. Abortion has been a subject of fierce argument for at least 3,000 years. It was capable of dividing primitive tribes and families and has, in our century, seen a
THE MORAL DIMENSION

Is it possible, in the midst of such strife and passion, to get some moral grasp on just what is at stake?

The key problem is to decide how and in what way it is a moral problem. For those who hold that the fetus is nothing but "tissue," no more important than a hangnail, then of course there is no moral issue at all: abortion becomes one more item of elective surgery. For those who hold that women have no rights whatever over against the right-to-life of a fetus, then that position equally dissolves any moral dilemmas.

But even if people talk that way in public, I have met very few who are able to be so clear-cut in private. How could they be? Whatever one's theory of the fetus, it is undeniable that, even after 7-8 weeks, it looks suspiciously familiar.

It looks, well, human. Maybe it should not be called a person, or a human being—but there it is, and it appears more than a trace like the rest of us.

Yet what does that tell us of moral significance? For it is argued that the fetus is too little developed to claim the status of a person, and much too little developed to say that its interests and welfare must always override those of a woman who wants an abortion. That is not an easy view to dismiss.

WHAT IS A PERSON?

There is no agreement whatever in this country about when human life, much less personhood, begins. It is not just that the public is divided. So are philosophers, theologians and scientists. If we mean by "human being" or "person" only that which is genetically unique, then the fetus would obviously qualify. If we mean something more—an ability to relate to other people, or to reason, for example—then the fetus would clearly not qualify.

Or we may choose to look for some mid-point in the development of the fetus, a dividing line which would avoid the dubious result of declaring even a newly-fer tilitized egg a person, as well as the equally dubious result of failing to declare a fetus a person until shortly before or even after birth. "Viability," which is normally thought of as possible after 24 weeks of gestation, is one of those attractive dividing lines. So at least the U.S. Supreme Court decided in its famous 1973 abortion decision.

The trouble with trying to find such a line, however, is that it is very difficult to explain just why that line, whatever it is, rather than some other line. Why not use the first sign of brain activity (which occurs as early as the 7th week of gestation)? Or the beginning of a heartbeat?

ALLOCATING RIGHTS

These are serious puzzles. They become all the more troubling if we look at the broader problem of deciding how we should allocate rights and to whom. Should we in the first place even try to determine who is a person and who is not? Blacks, one recalls, were solemnly declared non-persons as late as the 17th century. In our own times, the Nazis had no hesitation whatever about killing those they thought unworthy of legal protection.

In short, if we even begin trying to decide who should and should not count as a person, we may be setting the stage for any manner of moral abomination.

Still, one cannot ignore the claims of those women who feel they should have the right, in the case of the fetus only, to decide its fate. Even if it is a hazardous moral enterprise to allow one group of people (whites, women) to have total power over another group (blacks, fetuses), it may also be hazardous to deprive individuals of those free choices which may decisively determine their basic health and well-being. (This is exactly the way many women frame their demand for abortion.)

The great strength of the claim, however, that women should have the right to choose is—whether we like it or not—that the status of the fetus is morally uncertain. It may have rights, it may not; who can know with any certainty? For me personally, that uncertainty is just enough to tip the scale in favor of the woman who wants an abortion.

It is a choice, though, with which I at least live uneasily. Women have been oppressed through the ages, in great part by being given no choice about their own bodies. As a symbol of a final liberation from the bondage of a fixed biological destiny, the right to abortion is powerful.

Yet what a disturbing symbol. For it is a symbol of freedom which can only be realized by crudely affirming still another symbol—the strong killing the weak.

Even if a fetus is not human, or not a person, it is the beginning of all individual life. In killing a fetus, we kill possibility and we kill life. It may be that the world is so inherently rotten and irrational that we must choose one good (freedom) at the expense of another (life).

Yet I wish I could dismiss a nagging thought. The fault may not lie in the way the world is. It may lie in ourselves, ever prone to elevate our private self-interests to the status of high moral good.
CONFLICTING IMAGES OF OLD AGE. Old man alone with his thoughts and his poverty, and maestra Arthur Fiedler at the age of 80 rehearsing young members of the Boston Ballet Company.

V: AGING AND THE AGED

by Daniel Callahan

To one who recently reached the advanced age of forty-six, the rapidly approaching prospect of old age is both entrancing and terrorizing.

My children will be grown, my life will once again be my own. That is entrancing.

But I am not altogether reassured by some of the elderly people I see around me, who spend a good deal of their extra leisure visiting hospitals, going to the funerals of old friends, and restlessly looking for something to do with idle time.

That's if one is doing relatively well.

Many of the elderly are in nursing homes, those cunning institutions created to make certain that the elderly are not under foot around the house. The prospect that I might end my days in one of those places — staring at walls or ever-blaring television sets — terrifies me, but only slightly more than the prospect of aging itself.

CONFLICTING IMAGES

I am also puzzled.

History has delivered at least two conflicting images of old age. There is the image of lost youth, declining power, creeping decay, and a final lonely passing on.
There is also the image of a crowning culmination of life, respect and honor, the loving circle of one's grown children with their children, and a peaceful death enhanced by the knowledge that a full and worthy life has been lived. No doubt both images are true. Yet no one has satisfactorily explained to me why some of the aging realize one image and some the other.

One thing now seems certain, however. Slowly but surely we are almost guaranteeing that old age will be if not outright misery (which will be the lot of many) then loneliness, poverty, and isolation.

Modern medicine must share part of the blame. It has become increasingly ingenious at keeping people alive, but has proven singularly unable to do anything about the kinds of lives people live.

If the gift of life is another ten years in a nursing home, is that pure gain? Is life on a machine a benefit? Or consider the job market.

Perhaps it is reasonable that the elderly should be forced into retirement at a certain age and that youth should be given their chance to take over. But that is a very different matter from the other message our culture also delivers. If one is not a "productive" (that is, a money-making) member of society, then one is a pure liability.

"A BURDEN ON MY CHILDREN"

Those familiar complaints, however, do not get to the bottom of the matter. The problem of age for me is summed up in a phrase I have heard people, including the elderly, utter ever since I was a child: "I don't want to be a burden on my children."

What an understandable and yet, at the same time, strange thing to say. It is understandable because the prospect of helplessness and dependency is part of the fearful image of old age.

It is also very strange. Those same children upon whom one does not want to become dependent are the very ones who were for so long dependent upon the parents. If children need parents for eighteen or even now twenty years — for their life, their food, their housing, their education — why should it seem so wrong for children to take up the burden of caring for their parents when the latter's time of need and dependency has come?

It seems a matter of simple justice and reciprocity, a point well recognized by older cultures, which would have found bizarre the notion that parents owe everything to children, but children owe nothing to parents.

THE MYTH OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The fact that the elderly themselves say they do not want to become dependent upon their children does not remove the moral scandal.

The root of the evil is the equally strange notion that everyone should be dependent upon himself alone. It is a heady, but wholly false myth. No one is wholly self-dependent, not as a child, not as an adult, not as an old person.

That we should try to be our own person, have our own ideas, and maintain some direction over our own lives are very different matters from being self-sufficient. We need other people, not just because someone has to grow the food we eat, build the houses we live in, or print the books we read, but because we cannot even realize our human potential without the company and pleasure of others. What good is language if we have no one to talk with?

The irony of the insistent demand for self-sufficiency is now apparent. Economically, it is impossible in fact for most people to achieve self-sufficiency. Having given up dependence upon family and kin, we are now dependent upon Social Security, Medicare, or the capricious charity of the state.

Emotionally, it is hardly more possible to be self-sufficient. I have seen all those independent souls sitting listlessly on park benches, desperate for someone to talk with, eager to find someone who cares about them. Who needs that kind of freedom?

We have sought the ideal of independence and given up that of the mutual dependence of the old and the young. We are left, then, with no full, rich, and positive vision of old age.

The result is neglect, isolation, and meaningless anguish for millions of old people.

THREAT TO SURVIVAL

If the prospect in the years ahead was only more of the same, that would be sad enough. But the worst is still before us.

The most obvious problem is that the proportion of aged in the population will continue to grow, from 9 percent at present to 11 percent within another twenty years or so. There will, in particular, be a very large increase in the number of those seventy-five and over, a great proportion of whom will need considerable care and attention if they are to survive.

But will they be allowed to survive? One price to be paid for their survival will be an increasingly expensive investment of medical resources.

The array of medical miracles which can stave off death is increasing, and so is the cost of those miracles.

Should the elderly have access to incredibly expensive open-heart surgery, or by-pass operations, or round-the-clock medical care? Why, some are now asking, should large sums be invested in research on diseases which afflict primarily older people (cancer, heart disease) rather than on diseases which impair the lives of younger people (genetic disease, for example)?

These are pertinent and reasonable questions, which would arise even if we did not already have a problem about respecting the elderly.

Put in the context, however, of a growing indifference to the elderly, they become ominous.

If the elderly are already unwanted, but still at least grudgingly tolerated, the rising cost of medical care and technology may make the next step possible. That step is, in the name of medical scarcity, to begin denying aid to the elderly.

Our culture is still not so grotesque that it would act in an openly brutal way. It always needs its moral excuses.

Medical scarcity, rising costs, the needs of youth — they may do very well as those excuses, and all the more cleverly because there is more than a grain of truth in them.

They will not have to be invented. They will be there for the taking.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Robert W. Tucker

POLITICS: THE DOMESTIC STRUGGLE FOR POWER
and
POLITICS: THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR POWER

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VI: POLITICS:
THE DOMESTIC STRUGGLE FOR POWER

by Robert W. Tucker

Is there any relation between morality and politics? Or is politics the 'realm of animal—or worse, unnatural—action'?

These questions are asked with no less persistence and provoke no less disagreement today than in the past. They are not easily answered, but they will not go away.

The moral problem in politics responds to the distinctive nature of politics. It is central preoccupation with power. Politics is set off from other spheres of human activity. The exercise of power over others—whether it is sought only as an indispensable means toward the achievement of some distant goal or as an end in itself—is the characteristic and distinguishing feature of politics.

Moreover, the instruments by which the power of government is exerted are not limited as is the ‘politicity’ of any number of private organizations. When it is aimed at controlling the state, politics seeks to command an institution that asserts the right to exercise a
monopoly of coercion—above all, physical coercion—over society.

It is the means characteristic of the pursuit of power that raises the moral issue at its most fundamental level. The primary function of morality in politics may be defined as the acceptance of restraints on the modes of group conflict in societies where, because of a scarcity of goods (wealth, power, status, etc.), men cannot fulfill all of their desires. Thus one definition of morality in politics deals primarily not in terms of the ends men seek (however noble or base) but in terms of the restraints they observe in seeking those ends.

Admittedly, this manner of looking at the moral dimension in politics cannot be reconciled with the revolutionary for whom the ends of politics are everything, or very nearly so. It is at the polar extreme from the view expressed in Lenin's dictum: "Morality is a function of the struggle of the proletariat."

It is instead articulated by James Madison in The Federalist Papers (No. 51). "If men were angels," Madison wrote, "no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."

The first purpose of civil society is not to improve men but to restrain them, and not least of all to restrain the governors themselves.

A POLITICS OF RESTRAINT

If this view appears to many as too narrow, it is because we commonly overlook the relative novelty of a "politics of restraint." It is, after all, only since the late seventeenth century that western societies began to observe that most elementary of restraints in politics, the forebearance from killing or physically mistreating those who have lost out in the struggle for power.

Throughout much of the world today this restraint, the beginning of constitutionalism, is not yet observed with any regularity. Even in western societies it was fully consolidated only quite recently. American history affords notorious examples of groups—the Indians and the blacks—excluded in practice from a "politics of restraint" when daring to oppose, however peacefully, a status quo they found unbearable.

Once the moral restraints of constitutionalism are accepted, the relation between morality and politics varies greatly in modern societies. The American concern over morality in its domestic political life has always been something of a puzzle to Europeans. But this preoccupation has been with us from the beginning. The Puritan impact on the early development of American political institutions was a heavy one, and the American Revolution was, as the late political scientist Clinton Rossiter has written, "preached from the pulpit." From Cotton Mather to Ralph Nader, moralists have played a continuing and major role in American political history.

PRIVATE GAIN AND ABUSE OF POWER

What have been the sources of evil that moralists have characteristically sought to root out of American society? Clearly, the most visible and flagrant of all forms of corruption has been the use of public office for private gain. Venality remains today the chief sin in the eyes of many and is commonly so recognized by politicians.

During the Watergate crisis, former President Nixon thought it was sufficient to turn back his accusers by insisting that he was not "a crook" and that "nothing was stolen" (statements which the release of his tax returns tended to cast doubt upon). In equating political immorality with venality, Nixon was in tune with a view widely shared by Americans.

At the same time, there has been another and more profound view that, while not ignoring the use of public office for private gain, identifies immorality in politics primarily with the unlawful aggrandizement of power. It is the latter concept that fueled the crusades against the trusts and the railroads in the 19th century and that underlies the contemporary attack upon corporate and governmental power by public interest groups. The identification of corruption as the abuse of power was also at the heart of the case brought against Richard Nixon in the 1974 House impeachment proceedings.

Watergate illustrated, therefore, two quite different forms of corruption in politics. The one, personal gain, is the more readily recognized by the public, and it is the one that codes of ethics adopted for public officials commonly aim to eradicate. The other, aggrandizement of power, is less easily comprehended—as the 1974 impeachment proceedings demonstrated. Yet it is the aggrandizement of power that many political theorists have seen as the supreme danger to a free society.

AMERICAN PRAGMATISM

We remarked earlier that Europeans have commonly seen Americans as a nation of moralists in politics. There is another side to the American character, though, and it is marked by suspicion of the do-gooder in the political arena.

The roots of this suspicion may be traced in part to the prevailing American view of politics, which is clearly pragmatic. In part it may also be traced to the conviction that politics is a special realm, a "lower calling," that attracts only the "second best." While this view is altering today, its force is far from spent, and it has not been eliminated by public acceptance of the need to improve the moral level of political life.

But we remain today, as in the past, quite ambivalent about the proper role of morality in politics. A passion to infuse politics with moral purity is coupled with a certain skepticism about the appropriateness of linking these separate spheres of life. As Americans painfully discovered in the case of Prohibition, efforts to promote morality through governmental action may have the effect of debasing rather than purifying the political process.

Moreover, in their voting behavior, Americans have always evidenced a certain fondness for pragmatists as political leaders. Given their idealistic tradition, Americans still tend to respond positively to a political leader who summons them to embark on a great crusade. Politics is, after all, still something of a morality play in the United States.

But the people are only likely to follow such a leader with their votes if—like Franklin D. Roosevelt or Dwight D. Eisenhower—the crusader is perceived as having practical skill and judgment.
VII: POLITICS:
THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR POWER

by Robert W. Tucker

International society is marked by the absence of effective collective procedures, by competition rather than cooperation, and by the lack of commitment to a common good.

It is precisely these conditions that create a moral problem. For in the absence of an international organization entrusted with a monopoly of legitimate force, there tends to be anarchy; and in the absence of an international civil society, right tends to depend largely upon might.

This dependence of right on might is even given institutional expression in the principle of self-help. As the very term suggests, self-help is the "right" of the state to determine when its legitimate interests are threatened, or violated, and to employ such measures as it may deem necessary to protect those interests.
In theory, this principle points to the equality of states, for the right of self-help is equally available to all. In practice, it has always been a prime expression of the essential inequality of states, since the utility of a right of self-help necessarily depends upon the power of those exercising this right.

Among unequals, a right of self-help may be expected to preserve, or even to increase, inequalities. What Thucydides records the Athenians as saying to the Melians—that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must—is true of any state system that is governed only by the unimpeded "right" of self-help.

POWER VERSUS RIGHT

These considerations have always led some to conclude that self-help is subject to no constraints other than power itself, that self-help is a power, not a right, and that the international system is characterized by the absence of right and order.

This is the view associated with Machiavelli and, even more clearly, with Hobbes. In the absence of civil society, there is only the anarchy of the state of nature. But the state of nature is a state of war, if only potentially. In this state of war, Hobbes wrote, "nothing can be unjust. Notions of right or wrong, justice or injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, no injustice."

Moral behavior, Hobbes is saying, requires the sacrifice of self-interest if necessary to achieve the conditions of harmonious life in society. But the obligation to act morally is necessarily based on a reasonable expectation of reciprocity. Where this expectation of reciprocal observance of morality cannot be counted upon, there is no obligation to act in such a way as to make oneself a prey to others.

BALANCE OF POWER

When it has not been simply condemned, this view has been criticized for drawing too sharp a contrast between the conditions of domestic and international life. Thus it has been argued that the extreme consequences of self-help have often been avoided in international society by virtue of other moderating factors—above all, by the balance of power.

There is no gainsaying the contention that the balance has frequently served to moderate the ambitions of the great powers. It has done so, however, to the degree that war has been the indispensable, if ultimate, means to the effective functioning of the balance of power.

In the past, at any rate, the principal promise of the balance was not the avoidance of war, but the prevention of hegemony by any great power over the others. Our age, however, has come to fear the dangers of war between the great powers almost as much as the dangers of hegemony.

The avoidance of war between the nuclear powers is no longer merely a hoped-for outcome; it is now termed a balance of deterrent power, belief in this outcome has become a psychological and moral necessity for continued effective support of the new balance.

To the extent that the moral problem in foreign policy is one of placing limits on the means the statesman may employ, even when acting on behalf of the state's security and independence, it is apparent we are no closer to a solution today than in the past. On the contrary, the dilemma of means has become more critical than ever because of nuclear weapons.

These weapons raise novel moral issues by virtue of their sheer destructiveness. In introducing a new quantitative dimension into the conduct of war, nuclear weapons take the issues that force has always raised and threaten to carry them to an extreme.

PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL COMMUNITY

If nuclear weapons have given extreme expression to the political-moral dilemmas attending the means of statecraft, is there much prospect that these dilemmas may be transcended in the foreseeable future? May the international state of nature be gradually transformed into a global community that will make the nation-state obsolete?

To many, a global community is seen today as the expected consequence of a growing interdependence. This interdependence, in turn, is seen to result from weapons that can no longer protect, let alone aggrandize, the state; from a technology that no longer permits the "separate" state; from transnational economic and social factors that have come to function largely independently of the state; and from the process of industrial growth which creates problems that cannot be resolved in isolation by the state.

In almost all its variations, the theme of interdependence points to the state's growing loss of autonomy. Yet the very forces commonly found to be draining the state of its former autonomy—new technologies, increased economic development, and so on—are, on closer inspection, quite ambiguous in their significance. In some respects, these forces clearly weaken the state. In other respects, they just as clearly strengthen the state. Thus the same communications that from one perspective no longer permit the "separate" state, from another perspective may be found to give the state making full use of them powers over its own population rarely possessed in the past.

When we examine the contemporary world, what we find is not the state in atrophy but, if anything, the state triumphant. This triumph of the state is not simply a matter of the growth of independent states in the wake of the dissolution of empire. It is also a triumph of the state in depth, that is, a triumph of the state's persistent claims to men's loyalties.

What seems characteristic of the present period is not a widespread and growing skepticism toward the state, but the faith with which so many people have accepted the state, or the nation-state, as the principal institution for achieving a hoped-for destiny.

This being so, the prospects for an emergent global community cannot appear promising today. Instead of a universal conscience in the making, throughout most of the world we can observe discrete national consciences in the making. The vision of a shared humanity that, once internalized, could prompt peoples to sacrifice on behalf of a common good remains, at best, only embryonic.

For the time being, the global challenges posed by nuclear weapons, grinding poverty, and burgeoning populations—to mention only the most pressing—will have to be dealt with by a world that is, in many respects, as divided as ever.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lon L. Fuller

LAW AND MORALITY

LON L. FULLER is Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Emeritus, at Harvard University, where he has been a member of the Law School faculty since 1939. He previously taught at the University of Oregon, the University of Illinois, and Duke University. A member of the Massachusetts Bar, he was in private practice in Boston for a number of years. His published works include The Law in Quest of Itself, The Morality of Law, a casebook in the law of contracts, which he edited, and numerous articles on jurisprudence.
Law and morality, to varying degrees, regulate human interaction in society, sometimes reinforcing one another, at other times imposing contradictory obligations.

But there are also many laws that have little to do with the larger issues of moral conduct—such as securing justice, equality, or such other forms of “good” as may be deemed desirable. These laws are, rather, pragmatic regulations for facilitating or making possible orderly relations between people.

Still other decisions affecting the conduct of society are not guided even by these pragmatic regulations. Such decisions cannot be reached through the application of impersonal, objective rules; indeed, the basis for them cannot be found in either law or morality, and yet they are binding on the individuals concerned.

To understand these issues, I suggest we examine some of the actual operations of a legal order and the ways in which legal rules and processes are employed to shape and control human behavior.

THE RULE OF THE ROAD

I should like to begin with a body of law regulating vehicular traffic and known as “the rule of the road.” Over most of the world the rule is that you pass the oncoming vehicle on the right and overtake the vehi-
pañ big enough to contain a family of one, but it is not simply a house for living in. It is a contract, a legal agreement. The law of divorce is thus not merely punitive; it is essentially facilitative. It lets the driver know, with some assurance, what he can expect, not only from the traffic officer, but from other drivers as well.

This matter of knowing what to expect is basic in any functioning legal order. In his book, The Law of Primitive Man, Adamson Hoebel writes that a visitor to the Musk Ox Eskimos in Canada learned that all fifteen adult males in the community in the early 1920s had been either a principal or an accessory in a murder. Hoebel reports:

For each of them “the motive was invariably some quarrel about a woman.”

In part, the Eskimo difficulties are enhanced by the lack of marriage and divorce rituals which might demarcate the beginning and the end of a marital relationship. Marriage is entered into merely by bedding down with the intention of living together; divorce is effected simply by not living together any more.

There may be a certain irony in comparing a marriage ceremony with a highway stop sign, but the analogy is not lacking in a certain validity.

THE LAW OF DIVORCE

Let us consider briefly the law of divorce. In former times that law was to a large extent “objective” and “impersonal.” To obtain a divorce a party to the marriage had to prove some specified act or omission on the part of his or her partner. Among the acts that marriage had to prove some specified act or omission on the part of his or her partner. Among the acts that would justify the granting of a divorce were adultery, desertion, habitual drunkenness, and other similar forms of misbehavior. This meant that the law of divorce was, like the rule of the road, impersonal and “act oriented.”

Recently there has been a development in many jurisdictions that is called “the theory of the breakdown-of-the-marriage.” Instead of having to prove some specifically defined misconduct by the party against whom the divorce suit is brought, what has to be established is that the parties have lost the capacity for functioning marital relationship.

Perhaps the best test of a loss of this capacity is to have a skilled mediator attempt a reconciliation of the parties. But the judge who has the ultimate power to decide the case may or may not have any special aptitude for guiding a mediative procedure toward an ultimate reconciliation.

If, after discussing with the husband and wife their conceptions of the problems that have caused their marriage to fail, the judge grants a divorce, this does not mean that the standards that have guided him to that conclusion can properly be categorized as either “moral” or “legal.” Neither party may have acted immorally or illegally, but their divergent dispositions may have made a successful marriage impossible.

RELAXING THE RULES

In our complex and densely populated societies there are many decisions that cut deeply into men’s lives, but that cannot be shaped or justified by standards derived directly from morality or law. An example would be zoning regulations. These regulations may limit the size of a house, determine how closely the house can be located to the street it faces, stipulate how high a radio antenna on the roof can be, and so forth.

Regulations of this sort can often be relaxed on a showing of a special need to make an exception in the case at hand. The request for a relaxation of a particular restriction will be brought before an administrative agency, which in deciding whether to grant the relaxation will proceed in a manner much like that of a court of law.

But what may be lacking is the guidance of formal rules stating with some precision under what conditions the normal restraints may be lifted. On what basis, then, is an exception to the regulatory law to be granted? The householder may have an expensive radio and may ask to be given the privilege of extending his antenna to a height above that normally allowed. He may rest his request on any number of claims tending to establish that his situation is a special one: He is working on an invention affecting radio transmission that requires a higher antenna; he is a physician who wants to give advice to patients who have radio sets, but no telephones, since they live in a somewhat distant mountain range.

WHICH ONE SHALL HE SENTENCE?

Let me conclude with another hypothetical case that may not be readily decided either by rules of law or familiar principles of morality. Two men, strangers to one another, are charged with committing identical crimes. Both admit their guilt.

If it happens that the only available prison is so packed with convicts that there is only a single cell with room for one more. The judge cannot send both men to prison; which one shall he sentence?

It would hardly be befitting for the judge to suggest that the convicted men throw dice to see which one of the two goes in and which one stays out. Suppose that one of the convicted parties has over the years been convicted of ten different crimes and served a term of imprisonment for each. The result is that jail has become for him almost like a home, and he has no special dread of serving another term. The other man has never before been convicted of a crime and serving a term in jail might or might not put an end to his incipient criminal tendencies.

The judge cannot send both men to jail; which one shall he sentence?
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ernest van den Haag

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT

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IX: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT

by Ernest van den Haag

Some acts, although harmful to any society that wishes to secure the life and liberty of its members, may yet seem advantageous to individuals. Therefore, criminal laws must proclaim these acts to be wrong and threaten punishment to those who commit them.

Courts distribute the threatened penalties to persons they find guilty of having committed the acts the law forbids.

If the laws prohibiting acts such as murder are morally justified, so is the punishment of those who break them—provided that the punishment is effective in reducing law breaking.

The temptation to do what is forbidden by law has always been with us. We were expelled from paradise because we succumbed to such temptation. In Tolstoy's words, "The seeds of every crime are in each of us." The threats of the law are needed to prevent them from flowering, to control crime, to enforce the rules indispensable to moral and to social life.

We may be tempted to defy natural laws too, but the law of gravity enforces itself by defeating us if we defy it. However, unless we are punished, we can defy human laws and profit from our defiance. Therefore, threats of punishment must be attached to legal prohibitions. Like promises, these threats remain credible only if they are carried out. And unless they are credible, they cannot be effective.

The punishment of lawbreakers may gratify the vindictiveness of victims and perhaps of those who, although tempted, restrained themselves from breaking the law. Indeed, legal punishment may serve to prevent them from seeking revenge on their own. But, above all, punishment is indispensable to make the threats of the law credible and thereby to deter others from violating the law as the punished lawbreaker did. Without actual punishment legal threats would amount to bluffs, and crime would pay.

PUNISHMENT AS DETERRENT

One reason the crime rate is currently rising is that so few offenders are punished—less than 1 percent of all crimes lead to prison terms—that crime does pay for many people. However, legal threats, if they remain credible by being carried out as promised, deter most people, most of the time, from doing what the law prohibits. It is possible that additional people might be
deterring by still harsher or more certain punishment, but we prefer tolerating more burglaries to cutting off the hand of a third-time burglar, as is done in some countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.

Most of us do not seriously entertain the criminal opportunities offered by life, let alone deliberately weigh the threats of the law against the possible advantages of crime. We have absorbed the laws’ prohibitions and the moral norms on which they rest through the socialization process that is part of normal growing up. We don’t consider committing crimes because we have learned to feel that they are morally wrong.

The long-standing and effective threat of punishment contributed to our automatic rejection of criminal opportunities as morally unacceptable. “Some men,” the English judge J. F. Stephen wrote, “probably abstain from murder because they fear ... that they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One reason they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged.”

They are not hanged any longer, whether because we regard the life of the victim as too cheap to make the murderer pay with his, or that of the murderer as too precious to forfeit. The murder rate—about 18,000 annually in the United States—certainly seems high.

Lately some very persuasive statistical evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment has been presented. For example, University of Chicago professor Isaac Ehrlich, after an elaborate statistical analysis, concluded that one more execution per year during the period 1933 to 1969 would have probably deterred an average of seven or eight murders per year. It seems that by failing to execute a convicted murderer, we may risk failing to prevent other murders that might have been prevented by the execution. This risk strongly argues in favor of the death penalty.

DOES DETERRENCE WORK?
The size of the threatened punishment and the probability of suffering it are only two among many influences that deter us from crime. The effect of legal threats differs, depending on personality and social situation; thus the perception of the threat and the intensity of the desire for doing what the law proclaims to be wrong will differ from person to person.

Even the strongest threat will not deter some persons; therefore the threat of punishment, while it controls crime, cannot eliminate it. Offenders already guilty of crimes obviously have not been deterred. Among them, the proportion of people who cannot be deterred at all may be high.

However, most people are deterrible. Society could not function at all if the law did not directly and indirectly deter them from doing what it prohibits, whether it be something universally regarded as evil —for example, murder—or something prohibited to secure some practical good, such as exceeding the speed limit or practicing medicine without a license.

The evidence, statistical and experimental, shows clearly that a higher probability of severe punishment effectively reduces crime rates. In one experiment of note, for example, the experimenters found that a credible threat of punishment reduced cheating among college students by two-thirds, but moral exhortation was ineffective.

EXTERNAL FACTORS
Whether the criminal potential that more or less strongly inheres in all of us is activated depends on external as well as internal factors. Some people would become criminals under nearly any circumstances; they are internally driven to defy social rules.

Others might not have become offenders had they lived under more favorable conditions. The wife murderer may not have become one had he married someone else. The poverty-stricken slum dweller might have been law abiding had he been less poor; the dead-end kid might have been law abiding had he not been born into a disintegrating family.

The threat of punishment is thus only one of many factors influencing crime rates. But threats can be more easily controlled than, say, family disintegration, which contributes importantly to high crime rates.

Further, some of the social changes from which improvement had been expected have had no discernible effects on crime rates. Poverty and ignorance often have been blamed for crime. However, only 11 percent of all families now fall below the poverty line compared to 50 percent in 1920. Yet the crime rate has risen. Education, too, has greatly increased, as has psychiatric care, but the crime rate has risen even more.

RISING CRIME, DECLINING PUNISHMENT
On the other hand, rates of punishment have decreased. Between 1960 and 1970 the crime rate (per 100,000 people) rose 144 percent; the arrest rate did not keep pace: It rose only 31 percent. And while 117 persons were in prison per 100,000 inhabitants in 1960, only 96 were in 1970. In other words, while crime rates went up, punishment rates went down. The decline in punishment occurred in the face of accumulating scientific evidence (by Isaac Ehrlich and others) which shows (contrary to what had been believed among criminologists until about ten years ago) that swift, certain, and reasonably severe punishment can significantly reduce crime rates.

PUNISHMENT AS REHABILITATION
Why, despite rising crime rates, are convictions’ hard to obtain? Why are courts lenient, despite the fact that 50 percent of all violent crimes are committed by persons out on probation, parole, or bail? One reason is that we have long accepted the generous idea that offenders are misguided or sick and could—and therefore should —be rehabilitated rather than punished.

But no effective ways of rehabilitating offenders have been discovered, either in this country or in any other. Whatever the merit of various humanitarian programs, none have led to lower recidivism rates than occur in their absence.

Further, the evidence shows that the proportion of offenders who suffer from psychological impairment is no higher than that of nonoffenders in the same socioeconomic group.

The conclusion is inescapable that by making punishment as uncertain, rare, and mild as we have, we have licensed crime.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John P. Sisk

JOHN P. SISK is professor of English literature at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington, where he first joined the teaching staff in 1938. He has served as a special consultant to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the Aspen Institute's Program on Communications and Society. He has contributed numerous critical essays and reviews to both learned and popular journals, and he is the author of *A Trial of Strength*, which won the Carl Foreman Award for the best short novel in 1961, and *Persons and Institutions*. 
Lovers of Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn* are generally bewildered when they learn of the shock and outrage with which it was first greeted by "genteel" critics.

It was considered irreverent, degrading, immoral, and a corruption of language.

Twentieth-century readers, accustomed to associate nothing but virtue with the vernacular tradition, are likely to think such a reaction more appropriate for Henry Miller's *Tropic of Cancer*. Few of our classics seem less objectionable, whether in matters of sex or in the treatment of violence, than *Huckleberry Finn*.

Twain demonstrated that he could go far beyond *Huckleberry Finn* in his notorious underground "1601" pamphlet—a "lurid and scandalous conversation," as he referred to it with considerable satisfaction. To Maxwell Geismar, one of Twain's recent biographers, "1601" is a healthy eruption from a man who was highly moral but whose genius was too often frustrated by the prudish censorship of his world.

Modern readers, nurtured on William S. Burroughs, Jerzy Kosinski, Gore Vidal, and Norman Mailer, may find Twain's bawdy fantasy a bit tame, but Geismar helps us see something important in the Twain of *Huckleberry Finn* as well as in the American character. Thirty-five years ago the British writer V.S. Pritchett put it this way: "The subject of *Huckleberry Finn* is the comic but also brutal effect of an anarchic rebellion against civilization and especially its traditions."

**PROFANITY AS LIBERATION**

In such a context, Twain is truly an American prophet. He prophesies Lenny Bruce, for instance,
whose profanations of conventional morality are just as liberating and life oriented to some critics as ‘1601’ is to Geismar.

Falling also in the direct line of Twain’s prophecy is the Berkeley Filthy Speech movement of the 1960s (which the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, among others, endorsed as liberalizational), the tabloids Berkeley Barb and Rolling Stone, the stage play Che!, the musicals Hair and Oh! Calcutta!, the Erica Jong novel Fear of Flying, and the movies Deep Throat and Sandstone.

Dartmouth professor James M. Cox has suggested a somewhat different Huck (and ultimately Twain): a figure driven not by conscience but by the pleasure principle. At the end of the novel, Huck lights out for the Territory—“not to lead civilization, but to play outside it.”

This Huck looks ahead to the psychedelic utopia of Timothy Leary, to the flower children of Haight-Ashbury, to the rock fans of Woodstock and Watkins Glen, and to books like Charles A. Reich’s The Greening of America and Richard Neville’s Play Power that celebrate the liberational impulse in the counterculture of the 1960s.

This version of Huck seems to provide a precedent for those who are convinced that the forces that frustrate our potential for growth and fulfillment can best be attacked where they are most virulently concentrated: in conventional notions about sex and family life as they are expressed in language and the visual arts.

Such a conviction goes beyond the commonsense recognition that a culture of any complexity must find ways of living with profane reactions to the more intense versions of its pieties. It has deep roots in Western civilization. One finds it at work in early Christian gnosticism, in the medieval heresy of the Free Spirit, in Reformation radicals like the English Ranters, in the Enlightenment, in the more audacious moments of Romanticism, and in nineteenth-century realism and naturalism.

Until fairly recently, however, writers were not free to use the obscene and pornographic as tools; even the too frankly erotic could mean confiscated editions or prison.

ELEVATING PORNOGRAPHY

Nevertheless, the underlying if often implicit theme of this adversary and transgressive tradition has always been that set forth in our time by Herbert Marcuse: that eros is always revolutionary, and eros is everywhere in chains. In time, with the relaxation of censorship that has followed the weakening of Judeo-Christian concepts of sexual morality, this view has meant not simply a release from restrictions believed by more radical critics to be life denying, but an elevation of the obscene and pornographic to the liberational and holy.

Thus, as Northwestern University professor Peter Michelson argues in The Aesthetics of Pornography, pornography in its highest degree of development “has taken on the moral and artistic ‘high seriousness’ necessary to make it a properly artistic genre.” Even the smut tabloids, Michelson contends, turn “traditional journalism into a mode of moral revelation.”

Perhaps this argument should be extended from pornography to include films like Straw Dogs, Dirty Harry, Mean Streets, and The Wild Bunch, in which an intense experience of ugliness and violence can be seen also as serving to expose the corruption of contemporary society and as being therefore of moral value.

Clearly, we live in an atmosphere in which some people with liberal sympathies find it hard to resist the claim that books like Fear of Flying, Naked Lunch, and Portnoy’s Complaint are liberating profanations. They believe that films like Deep Throat have redeeming social value because they expand sexual horizons and induce a healthier attitude toward sex by demonstrating that there is nothing shameful about acts once considered unnatural.

IS SHAME NECESSARY?

Shame is therefore a crucial term when we attempt to make ethical choices among conflicting versions of the good life. Some, like the Marquis de Sade, regard shame as a cowardly impulse, hostile to nature and harmful to a free society. For author William S. Burroughs, when shame ceases to exist, “we can all return to the garden of Eden without any God prowling around like a house dick with a tape recorder.” For Alex Comfort, one of the most popular philosophers of sexual liberation, shame implies fear, and there is no longer anything to be afraid of.

On the other hand, there is that older but still vital tradition for which the psychiatrist Karl Menninger speaks: The capacity to feel shame is inseparable from a capacity to feel guilty, and both are indispensable to humane living. For critic George Steiner, it is pointless to talk of the saving shamelessness of pornography but very much to the point to note its “massive onslaught on human privacy” and its promise of a totalitarian politics as it brutally standardizes sexual life.

The question now is whether the debate over pornography and obscenity generated by two such conflicting visions will lead toward more or less freedom to be truly human. What will be at stake is not only the definition of culture, but the question of the extent to which any culture can tolerate degradations of its values in language and visual image before it ceases to be a form in which human nature can be developed.

Few people would want a society so unanimous that obscenity and pornography would be impossible, for this might well be the kind of tyranny in which (as in Hitler’s Germany) the obscenity and pornography of violence in some of their most frightful forms become possible.

But how many of us aspire to a condition in which obscenity and pornography are conceived to be necessary means in a permanent revolution, a revolution which assumes that culture in any conceivable form is bound to prove intolerably restrictive to the human spirit?

Perhaps the question can be put this way: Do those of us who feel compelled to light out for Huck Finn’s Territory want to reclaim it for civilization, or do we want simply to play in it, utterly autonomous, utterly beyond shame, and therefore utterly free?

In any event, Twain — possibly suspecting that a utopian playground would make a very dull story—ended his novel before Huck could go there.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Hans Jonas

SCIENCE AND MORALS: FREEDOM OF INQUIRY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

and

SCIENCE AND MORALS: THE ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH

HANS JONAS is Alvin Johnson Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research, where he joined the Graduate Faculty in 1956. Born and educated in Germany, he has also taught at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Carleton College in Ottawa. His books include The Gnostic Religion, Philosophical Essays, and The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology.
IS THE SCIENTIST RESPONSIBLE? J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who directed the Manhattan Project that developed the first atomic bomb, and A-bomb test, Nevada. The anguish of many of the scientists who worked on the atomic bomb dramatized the loss of moral immunity once associated with the pursuit of "pure" science.

XI: SCIENCE AND MORALS: FREEDOM OF INQUIRY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

by Hans Jonas

What are the points of contact between science and morals?

At first glance there seem to be none, beyond the internal morality of being true to the standards of science itself. The sole aim of science is knowledge, its sole business the pursuit of it.

This clearly defined purpose imposes its own code of conduct, which can be called the territorial morals of the scientific realm: abiding by the rules of method and evidence, being rigorous and intellectually honest. These virtues are conditions of good science and imply no commitment beyond it. So considered, science constitutes a moral island by itself.

But is this the whole truth? Something like it was true so long as the contemplative sphere and the active sphere were cleanly separate (as they were in pre-modern times), and pure theory did not intervene in the practical affairs of men. Knowledge could then be considered a private matter of the knower. Being merely a state of his mind, it could do no harm to the good of others, as it sought only to comprehend and not to change the state of things.

However, the rise of natural science at the beginning of the modern age changed the traditional relation of theory and practice, merging them ever more intimately. We still pay homage to the dignity of "knowledge for its own sake." But it would be hypocritical to deny that in fact the emphasis in the case for science
increasingly irresistible spill-over from theory, however pure, into the vulgar field of practice in the shape of scientific technology. In the early 17th century, Francis Bacon had precociously directed science to aim at power over nature for the sake of raising man's material estate. But it was more than 100 years later that his charge belatedly and almost suddenly became working truth beyond all expectation.

Thereafter, the subject of "science and morals" begins in earnest. For whatever of human doing impinges on the external world and thus on the welfare of others is subject to moral assessment. As soon as there is power and its use, morality is involved.

The very praise of the benefits of science exposes science to the question of whether all of its works are beneficial. It is then no longer a question of good or bad science, but of good or ill effects of science (and only "good science" can be effectual at all). If technology, the offspring, has its dark sides, is science, the progenitor, to blame?

The simplistic answer is that the scientist, having no control over the application of his theoretical findings, is not responsible for their misuse. His product is knowledge and nothing else: its use-potential is there for others to take or leave, to exploit for good or evil, for serious or frivolous ends. Science itself is innocent and somehow beyond good and evil.

Plausible, but too easy.

TEORy AND PRACTICE FUSED

The soulsearching of atomic scientists after Hiroshima tells as much. We must take a closer look at how theory and practice are interlocked in the way science is nowadays actually "done" and essentially must be done. We shall then see that not only have the boundaries between theory and practice become blurred, but the two are now fused in the very heart of science itself.

The ancient alibi of pure theory and with it the moral immunity it provided thus no longer hold.

The first observation is that no branch of science remains in which discoveries do not have some technological applicability. (The only exception I can think of is cosmology.) Every unravelling of nature by science now invites some translation of itself into some technological possibility or other, often even starting off a whole technology not conceived of before.

If this were all, the theoretician might still defend his sanctuary this side of the step into action: "That threshold is crossed after my work is done and, as far as I am concerned, could as well be left uncrossed." But he would be wrong. What is the true relationship?

First, much of science now lives on the intellectual feedback from precisely its technological application.

Second, science receives from technology its assignments: in what direction to search, what problems to solve.

Third, for solving these problems, and generally for its own advance, science uses advanced technology itself: its physical tools become ever more demanding. In this sense, even pure science now has a stake in technology, as technology has in science.

Fourth, the cost of those physical tools and of the staff to use them must be underwritten from outside.

The mere economics of the case calls in the public purse or other sponsorship; and this funding of the scientist's project (even with "no strings attached"), is naturally given in the expectation of some future return in the practical sphere. There is mutual understanding on this. The anticipated pay-off is put forward unashamedly as the recommending rationale in seeking grants or is specified outright as the purpose in offering them.

SCIENCE AS SERVANT

In sum, science has its tasks increasingly set by extraneous interests rather than its own internal logic or the free curiosity of the investigator. This is not to disparage those extraneous interests nor the fact that science has become their servant, that is, part of the social enterprise. But it is to say that the acceptance of this functional role (without which there would be neither science of the advanced type we have nor the type of society living by its fruits) has destroyed the alibi of pure, disinterested theory. It has put science squarely in the realm of social action where every agent is accountable for his deeds.

Even that is not all. The involvement of scientific discovery with action goes beyond its eventual application. How does the scientist get his knowledge? Through most of the history of the theoretical endeavor—from the freaks to the beginning of the 17th century—the seekers after truth had no need to dirty their hands. Of this noble breed, the mathematician is the sole survivor. Modern natural science arose with the decision to wrest knowledge from nature by actively operating on it, that is, by intervening in the objects of knowledge. The name for this intervention is "experiment," vital to all modern science. Observation here involves manipulation.

MORALITY OF MANIPULATION

Now, the grant of freedom to thought and speech, from which freedom of inquiry derives, does not cover action. Action always was, and remains, subject to legal and moral restraints. Originally, experimentation kept to inanimate matter and to small-scale models in the laboratory, which still secured some insulation of the cognitive arena from the real world.

But experiments nowadays can be ambiguous. An atomic explosion, be it merely done for the sake of theory, affects the whole atmosphere and possibly many lives now or later. The world itself has become the laboratory.

One finds out by doing in earnest what, having found out, one might wish not to have done. Moreover, the younger life sciences have extended the aggressive methods of physics to animate matter, and experimentation on living things inevitably deals with the original, not with substitutes: here, ethical neutrality ceases at the latest when it comes to human subjects. What is done to them is a real deed. "The interest of knowledge," cannot be used as a blanket warrant for the morality of such deeds. In short, the very means of "getting to know" may raise moral questions before the question of how to use the knowledge poses itself.

From both ends therefore—that of its technical fruits and that of its methods of producing them—modern science finds itself exposed to the winds of ethical challenge.
XII: SCIENCE AND MORALS: THE ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH

by Hans Jonas

In modern science, man's quest for knowledge has lost its time-honored purity and become thoroughly alloyed with mundane action.

Not only in what science seeks knowledge about, but also in how it obtains that knowledge, the line between thought and deed often vanishes.

This merging of thought and action must affect the venerable "freedom of inquiry." We are wary of interfering with this freedom, once painfully wrested from earlier thought control and reemphasized for us by its shameful repression in the communist East. Yet we must remember that complete immunity of theory from public constraints depends on its separation from practice.

Never has absolute freedom been claimed for action, and surely never been accorded to it. Thus to the extent that science becomes shot through with action, it comes under the same rule of law and the same social censure as every outward action in civil society. Obviously, this consideration bears on the admissibility of experiments, which are not necessarily innocent because they promote knowledge.

To make the point by just citing notorious atrocities is to weaken it. One easily agrees, for example, that one must not, in order to find out how people behave under torture (which may be of interest to a theory of man) try out torture on a subject or that one must not kill in order to determine the limit of tolerance to a poison.

Remembering Nazi research in concentration camps, we know too well that the perpetrators of such scientific experiments were despicable and their motives base, and we can wash our hands of them. Here was "freedom" of inquiry as shameful as its worst suppression. One might even argue that the case falls outside the realm of science and wholly into that of human depravity.

WHAT MEANS FOR WHAT ENDS?

Our problem is not with that phenomenon, nor with crooked or perverted science, but with bona fide, regular science. Keeping to indubitably legitimate and even praiseworthy goals, we ask whether in their pursuit there are limits to the experiments we may perform. May one, for example, inject cancer cells into noncancerous subjects, or (for control purposes) withhold treatment from syphilitic patients — both actual occurrences in this country, and both possibly helpful to a desirable end?
I do not rush into an answer, which is in any case not our business here. I do say that here moral and legal issues arise in the inner workings of science — issues that crash through its territorial barriers and present themselves before the general court of ethics and law.

Biomedical research, more than any other field of science, involves such moral and legal issues. Medicine, of course, is by definition not a disinterested science but committed to a goal sanctioned by every standard of private and public good. However, it relies heavily on scientific research that, although geared to those practical ends, has its component of pure theory.

In that respect medicine is a branch of biology. This in turn, once mostly a theoretical discipline, is becoming increasingly pregnant with potentials of use. Applied biological knowledge, medical or otherwise, is a technology to which theoretical inquiry is then wedded.

What better use can there be for a science than to benefit its very subject when this is life itself? Yet, no scientific-technological alliance is so rife with moral issues as personal autonomy and dignity.

Returning from these extravagant, futuristic perspectives of "biological engineering" to present realities, we have the problem of consent, which besets even the most defensible experiments on humans and is bound up with the mechanics of recruiting subjects.

**INFORMED CONSENT**

The law prescribes "informed consent." But who can be really "informed," that is, who can fully understand, except fellow scientists who should indeed be the first to volunteer?

In mere point of numbers, however, this recruiting base is statistically too small. Next best for giving informed consent are the educated classes — "professionals" mostly. They also are socially best placed to satisfy the second ethical requirement, namely, that the consent be "voluntary."

But for obvious reasons, numerical and other, actual recruiting falls back on more captive populations: students, welfare patients, prison inmates, for whom freedom of consent (which equals freedom to refuse) is questionable. And for the last two groups, the meaning of "informed" is almost empty. Here lies a twilight zone of great ethical vulnerability for much of today's vital research.

**DISPUTABLE GOALS**

Often the research goal itself falls into the twilight zone.

For example, prevention and interruption of pregnancy are not, by the original meaning of medicine, properly medical goals, unless pregnancy be equated with disease and the fetus with a tumor. They may be approved, nonetheless, on nonmedical grounds. Pursuing research toward them implies a tacit option for birth control, free sex, free abortion — surely choices in ethics.

Behavior control is another disputable goal. It may be socially useful and easily too useful, for example, for providing more efficient government by engineered docility. But even apart from such abuses (not abuses by the lights of the leading proponent of behavior control, B.F. Skinner) the whole concept of behavioral control is in tension with such ultimate values as personal autonomy and dignity.

It is, therefore, quite in order to ask whether scientific inquiry should move in that direction at all — again a question of ethics outside the jurisdiction of science.

Yet one more research goal with powerful appeal but ethical pitfalls concerns aging and dying.

Averting premature death is a prime duty of medicine. But, according to latest biological thinking, there is nothing definite about a "natural" span of life, and measured against the theoretical hope for control of aging, every death is "premature."

Leaving undecided whether indefinite longevity is an unalloyed good for the individual, we look at the social price that finite living space will exact: proportionate diminishing of births, and hence of youth and new beginnings in the aging social body. Is that good for the human cause?

Whatever the answer, it should influence the goal choices of scientific inquiry. Here and elsewhere (not confined to the life sciences), we must confront the moral interface between science and society.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Martin E. Marty

THE MORALITY OF WORK AND PLAY
and
THE MORALITY OF BUSINESS

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XIII: THE MORALITY OF WORK AND PLAY

by Martin E. Marty

Nothing works.

My television set does not work because it was casually assembled. My payments on it are messed up because the billing system is automated and something went wrong with it. The person in the retailer's complaint department did not listen to me because she was bored, waiting only for coffee break. When the TV repairman finally came to my home he left behind some cigarette ashes on my floor, an outrageous bill, and a still malfunctioning set.

So goes the typical citizen complaint.

"Nothing works" often really means "No one works." Many people work as few hours as possible, as carelessly as possible, finding little meaning in what they do.

Meaninglessness also carries over into the world of those who do work, who overwork: the managers and the competitive executives. They have become workaholics, compulsive and ulcerous types. They can hardly serve as models for a moral or healthy ap-
Work represents only half our waking lives. The other half includes leisure, play, and sport. Here there are just as many complaints. A person hears that "no one plays." Everyone watches. We are becoming a nation of broad-buttocked viewers, numbed by spectatoritis.

We seem to be joining the corrupt Romans in late stages of their civilization. And the gladiators or athletes we watch today also do not play. They are "things," "meat": they are working only for money in commercialized and grim sports.

When people do play, it is said, they are compulsive about it. They jam highways on weekends in order to be able later to speed across lakes or drink themselves into stupors at lakesides. The word, of British visitor Lord Bryce in 1880 seems confirmed: "Life is very tense in America ... a tension which appears to be increasing."

RELIGION AND THE WORK ETHIC

Because work and play come so close to the heart of the meaning of life itself, they have usually been associated with religious ideas. Thus the Hebrew scriptures say that in the beginning, work was a curse, God's punishment for man having sinned. But that same God later endowed work with meaning. The Greeks thought less of work. They tried to get slaves to do it, and then measured life by what people were when they were at leisure.

Attitudes about work and play came to America via Europe. The northern Protestant people gave us our "work ethics," because they did find meaning in all kinds of work. People served God not especially in the monastery or priesthood but in all vocations or callings. Following a divine order, they worked to please God. But they were less good at play.

In this admittedly mystic picture, the southern European Catholic people came to the rescue. Less gifted at finding meaning in work, they knew how to punctuate the day with the siesta and the year with fiesta. So long as work and play thus fit together, all was well. Today they no longer fit together and thus pose a major problem for our society.

These pictures may all be overdrawn. Some things do work, many people enjoy their work and play, and few of us would give up the mixed blessings of our present technical and industrial order.

ETHICS OR ESTHETICS

On closer examination, many of the complaints have less to do with ethics than with esthetics, less with morals than with tastes. Fastidious upper-class people simply do not appreciate the style of those who while away the leisure hours at the poolhall and frequent bingo games at the Legion Hall. In turn, the bingo players have, no use for the country club set and its pattern of what appears to be decadent leisure.

So also with work. The workaholics and steadfastly employed people complain about welfare cheaters and idlers, while the elites, in turn, are resented because they are overpaid.

THE SEARCH FOR VALUES

After all the talk of tastes and prejudices is past, it remains clear that we do have a problem with work and play. At its root may very well be the loss of the old religious sense of vocation, the values that made it possible for people to see life as a harmonious whole, lived out under the eye of eternity.

But even where religious values survive, as they do in the lives of millions, many people feel alienated in their work — divorced from nature and their own essential nature, deprived of power and meaning and standards, interchangeable, isolated from each other, used as objects.

It would appear that many people, lacking a sense of vocation, work tediously only in order to have leisure. But such leisure also offers few fulfillments. Not a few pleasure seekers have agreed with the poet Charles Baudelaire: "One must work, if not from taste then at least from despair. For, to reduce everything to a single truth: work is less boring than pleasure."

THE AGE OF THE PERSON

Attempts to recover value and meaning, whether for those who remain religious or for those who do not, will have to begin with efforts to see work and play again as complementary and interacting parts of life. Moral recovery will begin with consistent resistance against the processes that make persons into things, whether in their roles as alienated workers or as numbed consumers or spectators.

The German social ethicist Dietrich von Oppen, in his book The Age of the Person, found possibilities for the recovery of what it means to be a person and to care for other persons in the very midst of technological society. But the "Age of the Person" will emerge only if people make rather thoughtful and serious efforts to help it along.

As leisure time increases, the question "What do you do?" will mean less than it did when work was the encompassing feature of life. The new test will have to do with the kind of care and concern people can show each other — for example, in retirement homes and leisure centers.

If work is not and cannot become — very satisfying, then personal fulfillment must come in part by diminishing the portion of life which people give over to work and by investing leisure life with better alternatives. George Orwell sneered that such efforts meant that reformers were "saving their souls by fretwork," by hobbies and crafts. But "fretwork" can also symbolize a way in which people can again achieve excellence and pride in the work of their hands and minds.

If, on the one hand, work and play contribute to moral confusion when they cause persons to become like things or when they lead to the misuse of persons by others, they also can begin to present moral opportunities when personal values are restored. Such a reversal is more likely to happen when the spheres of both work and leisure become less "tense" and more complementary.

No single strategy will satisfy everyone in a culture in which a register of vocations lists over 20,000 different kinds of jobs and in which a catalog of avocations would list even more hobbies, crafts, and styles of games.

But we must all concentrate single-mindedly on the root problem of how work and play interact and what they should mean: this can be a first step toward realizing "The Age of the Person."
"The only time a businessman makes the national media is when he is polluting the streams, making obscene profits or corrupting a poor, innocent politician."

With those words columnist Patrick Buchanan budded up to the business people in his audience at the California Trucking Association last year. Buchanan was expressing a widely-shared distaste for "the national media," and he knew he could be sure about the "poor, innocent politician."

What Buchanan's words further suggest, however, is the familiarity with which the business person has entered the nation's Rogue's Gallery. As recently as 1957 Father Walter Ong could speak of "the complete social acceptability of business in the United States." That acceptability has diminished considerably since then.

Citizens daily see media images of prominent business leaders who have polluted something, done something "obscene" in the world of profits, or corrupted someone. Payoffs, bribes, false advertising, expense account cheating, and price-fixing make weekly headlines.

The whole business system is under attack, and people of conscience within it have sometimes joined outside critics in questioning its value and future.
"SNATCHING TO HOARD"

To speak as most people do of a "moral breakdown" implies that once the business world stood up morally. Nostalgia, however, casts a false warm glow over the past. It obscures the centuries-old complaint that the search for profits based on competition has always brought out the worst in people. The "robber barons" are familiar figures in our past. What economic historian R. H. Tawney called "the life of snatching to hoard" always seemed to go with the territory.

It would be hard to find a historian who believes that human nature has fundamentally changed—or to find one who does not now believe that the selfish principle has gotten out of hand or that corruption is an acute problem. What went wrong?

A MORAL DECLINE

Most observers agree that the turn from small-scale business in intimate society to our unresponsive huge corporation in the proverbial "mass society" made possible a decline in business people's sense of responsibility. Prices today are virtually fixed and the range of options is limited in an area of near-monopoly by large corporations. Meanwhile, these firms have learned to use advertising to lull consumers into the notion that their interests are being well-served when in fact they may not be.

A second reason for breakdown is usually associated with the fact that the value-system behind business in earlier times has been virtually destroyed. Once, in this view, people shared beliefs about a divine purpose in what they were doing. They agreed on certain moral norms and goals. Sociologist Daniel Bell notes that "the great historic religions of the West" have all drawn the lesson "that a community has to have a sense of what is shameful, lest the community itself lose all sense of moral norms." That sense disappears as moral cynicism spreads.

The ancient idea that what I as a businessman do is part of a sacred purpose and that that purpose imposes some restraint is hard to cherish when the society loses its religious outlooks. This decline of the spiritual outlook does not lead to a mere vacuum. G. K. Chesterton noted that "When people don't believe in God, they don't then believe in nothing, they believe in anything." They believe in competition and profit for their own sake, and make idols of these. "I'll get mine." Or, says Bell, they believe in simple hedonism and the pleasure principle.

IN DEFENSE OF BUSINESS

A spokesperson for business might respond to these attacks by reminding us that our society as a whole has made a choice to organize the world with business near its center. And business is simply not based on altruism or self-sacrifice. Business does not exist fundamentally for the service of all. The first moral duty of business is to return a profit on its investors' outlay. Secondarily, the business apologist might say, the public can be served when competition does lead to excellence and the lot of consumers is improved.

The moralists and the business apologists, then, operate in different worlds and the public is caught between them. But people have neither become satisfied with the way things are nor are they ready to turn to revolutionary alternatives. They will look for reform within the order we now have, or for a transforming of that order on gradual terms. Three proposals stand out above others among reformers and transformers.

A PROGRAM FOR REFORM

The first asks business people to see that "we are members one of another." For them to insist on being entirely isolated and independent is futile. Business leaders who stopped caring about the causes of poverty or crime in the cities are paying a price as their investments suffer with the death of the cities. The essence of business may remain competition and profit making, but conscientious leaders see more reasons for having their concern spill over into a regard for their employees' well-being, for recognizing the dignity of labor, for human relations in a time of change in the understanding of the role of women, of racial minorities, and the like.

Second, while self-sacrifice and business are not simply compatible, some of the business leaders are taking a second look at their polluting, their misuse of limited natural resources, their exploitation of employees and customers. Some are beginning to see that working for long-range self-interest, which includes some vision of a future, is preferable to short-range and thus destructive self-interest.

Finally, personal morality can make a difference even in a partly unreformed system—the only kind of system humans will ever get. "All the kids do it," the excuse few adults really tolerate, has been elevated to principle in many parts of the business world. But if many "kids" indeed "do it" and some of them end up exposed in the Rogue's Gallery, others manifestly do not. What one moral thinker calls an "ethics of character" seems to be coming back, not as a substitute for reform of the system but as an agent of its reform.

If the code words Vietnam and Watergate are to mean anything in the future, they will represent a public awareness that those spheres of Big Business, Big Government, and the like—in short the Establishment Power Structure—are run by little people. It was individuals who chose or might not have chosen illegal acts. It was persons who went to court. And it was men and women who acted morally to turn the directions. Some along the way their character had been formed to withstand the temptations to "get their own" or to be content with short-range self-interest of the worst sort.

Employees and competitors usually know what standards are being projected "at the top." Business people concerned about the moral condition are finding it necessary to begin by exploring their own value systems, the images they project, the decisions they make in the pyramids of power. Business does not have to be as culpable and tainted as it currently is. To see business in a larger context of values, to have it work for at least longer-range self-interests, and to help society develop and accent people of moral character in power is not a program that will satisfy all moralists, prophets, or utopians.

But these are at least first steps for those who want to produce a more humane world, both for the people who are responsible for business and for those who are its victims and beneficiaries.
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XV: MORAL Duplicity AND AMERICAN RACISM

by Kenneth B. Clark

Probably one of the most disturbing experiences in the development of any sensitive and intelligent child is to be confronted with the fact that his parents, his teachers, his rabbi, or his priest are capable of saying one thing and believing or behaving in terms of the opposite.

Almost every child at some time before adolescence is required to cease questioning flagrant moral inconsistencies on the part of some authority figure by being indirectly or explicitly told, “Do as I say, not as I do.”

The frequency with which individuals are required to adjust to various forms of moral duplicities in complex societies suggests that apparent acceptance of these inconsistencies is an index of socialization and maturity.

Those who, for whatever reason, persist in demanding moral consistency are at best told to “grow up” or are dismissed or punished as deviants and “trouble makers.”
MORAL SCHIZOPHRENIA

One could speculate that a society which prides itself on its democratic principles of justice, equality, and human responsibility for the welfare of one's fellow human beings places a major additional and inescapable moral burden upon its citizens.

When Thomas Jefferson translated the Judaic-Christian principle of human equality into the political principles of "inalienable rights" that justified the American Revolution at the same time that he and other founding fathers continued to accept and justify human slavery, they laid the foundation for the "moral schizophrenia" that continues to dominate America. Every American child must be socialized to come to terms with the twin realities of the morality of the American ideals and the "practical" reality of the required violation of these ideals.

Our children are taught that all men are created equal in segregated schools and segregated churches that are concrete mockeries of the words of justice and equality. The teachers who are required to teach the values of democracy are at the same time required to justify by rationalizations or silence the persistent absence of democracy in their classrooms.

Members of the clergy and their religious leaders must be careful not to alienate their parishioners by being too demanding in a literal interpretation of the concept of the "fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man."

Parents must find ways to have their children understand that there are limits to the extent to which principles of equity can be permitted to threaten the status and the aspirations of the family.

COPING WITH MORAL CONFLICTS

Moral duplicity is therefore an inherent and inescapable aspect of the "democratic" socialization of all American children. These moral conflicts have their personal and social consequences. Individuals are required to cope with them by one or more devices.

Most human beings appear to accept the given moral inconsistencies of their society either passively or cynically. They accept the facts of injustice as given, adopt a personal "dog-eat-dog" philosophy, and function in terms of the prevailing rationalizations of their society as long as they are not personally victimized.

More sensitive human beings tend to internalize guilt; they remain personally concerned about the moral duplicity of their society and sometimes work for social progress even at the risk of ridicule and ostracism.

In recent years we have seen an increasing number of young Americans seeking to resolve their moral conflicts by rebelling against the success and affluence of their families, by escaping into cults and communes and wandering off into morally unchartered jungles for personal self-destruction.

It is ironic and indicative of the depth of racist indoctrination of American children that even at the height of the collective rebellion of American youth in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, they did not make the rejection of American racist practices a clear and sustained objective of their protests.

RATIONALIZING Duplicity

The problems of coping with societal moral duplicity do not remain personal. They start with society, they infect individuals, and they become institutionalized. They become parts of the pattern and fabric of our political, economic, educational, and religious life.

Moral duplicity becomes euphemistically rationalized by such terms as "practical," "realistic," "hard headed," and "tough minded." When examined, it is revealed that these terms mean that the discrepancy between moral values and immoral practices must be accepted. We tell ourselves and our children that the verbal ideals can be accepted so long as they do not interfere with "convenience," "efficiency," and "success."

Individuals are the agents for the perpetration and perpetuation of social moral insensitivity. These are generally successful individuals, rewarded individuals.

These individuals are frequently found in governmental, corporate, educational, and religious leadership roles. These are the main characters of Watergate. These are the corporate leaders who design and implement bribes in obtaining economic advantages from government officials.

These are the educational and intellectual leaders who seek to justify racial segregation in our schools, colleges, and universities—or remain silent in the face of this flagrant contradiction of the meaning and purpose of education. These are men who consider segregation normal and who find it difficult to understand those who question their right, indeed their obligation, to function in terms of an unquestioned and "realistic" Machiavellian dualism.

MACHIAVELLIAN DUALISM

The advice which Machiavelli gave to the prince can be summed up as not to confuse personal morality with those imperatives which are required as the leader of the state.

This simplistic Machiavellian dualism seems to be the foundation of contemporary governmental, economic, and educational leadership. This is true in spite of the fact that Machiavelli was advising the prince in the early sixteenth century.

The world of the present, the nuclear age, demands not only a critical reexamination of Machiavellianism but also major efforts to modify personal behavior and the operation and leadership of social institutions toward moral consistencies.

In the contemporary nuclear age, Machiavellian dualism is not only anachronistic, but it also threatens survival of the human species. Collective, institutional immorality, no matter how sophisticated and intellectually rationalized, now emerges as even more destructive potentially than interpersonal forms of immorality.

Accepted collective moral duplicity merely postpones human extinction. This anachronism invites the ultimate catastrophe.

Racism and all other forms of institutionalized and rationalized inhumanity and cruelties are forms of moral duplicity. If mankind is to survive, the most "practical" and "realistic" basis for human interaction must now be a rigid adherence to consistent moral ideals.
People are not born as morally responsible citizens; they are educated to be so.

Education for morality has, therefore, engaged the attention of every society. Today there is considerable disagreement over both the aims and the proper agents of moral education in our contemporary society.

In earlier societies, each generation was traditionally socialized by the transmission of apparently stable value systems and more or less explicit codes of conduct. Some parts of modern society still rely upon such traditional socialization.

Many modern educators, however, appear to believe that such transmissions are no longer possible. They point to a "decline of traditional societies" and the rise of "anti-authoritarian attitudes" that appear to be conditioned by such factors as the increasing rationality of people whose moral potentials have been shaped in advanced, highly mobile, technologically productive societies. In short, traditionalist moral educations are associated with cultures of low material productivity.

THE AIM OF MORAL EDUCATION

What a modern education for morality should do is a vexing question. Instead of stable and long-established social structures into which its members are born, modern society is characterized by increasing leisure and by shifting membership in voluntary social structures.

Many educators argue that modern education for moral conduct must take into account that people will live together increasingly in situations that lack any persistent constraints, such as the economic constraint to make a living. Behavior will no longer be governed, they argue, by prudence and fear of penalties, imagined or real, for deviancy in that behavior. You can see morality changing basically when the word for immorality becomes "deviancy" — or "marginality."

Another major question concerns who has the primary duty for moral education, cultivating the sense of good and evil, right and wrong, however that sense be stipulated in conduct. Specialists on the subject disagree as to whether the family is irreplaceable as the main agent of moral education and, indeed, as to whether or not the modern family is declining as a moral educator.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Nevertheless, despite continuing disagreement on the current educative function and capacity of the
family, what is more generally agreed is that humans are started off very early in the direction their moral conduct is likely to take, given the fortunes and misfortunes of circumstances in later life.

Freud and other modern students of moral development elaborated new, if not entirely persuasive, versions of the old idea that "character is destiny" and that character — that is, the moral quality laying all our various activities — is formed during the first five years or so of life.

Contending against this view, though not entirely opposed to it, is the view that, despite the fact that humans develop in moral no less than biological stages, they can make moral decisions that run against the direction shaped in earlier years or in any particular stage of moral development. This latter view of moral development usually invokes some agency of decision not entirely describable within the stages of moral development. "Instinct," which knows no stages, and "God's will," which knows no moral development, are two such extradevelopmental agencies of decision; "chance" is yet another.

Current theories claim that moral education is largely developmental in character. Morality grows and evolves, as does the body. Each stage of moral growth demands its own distinct education, as if the body, during its various phases, is best nurtured by different foods and regimens. Whether these different stages of moral development are marked by fairly distinct lines or run continuously has exercised the imagination of many an investigator.

Certainly, two major schools still appear very influential in the field of moral education. One school may be called the Freudian, the other by the name of the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget.

THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL

The Freudian school continues to contend that once certain primary patterns of emotional relation to the mother and father — often ambivalent — are established, most people develop morally along a series of events that can be traced back to that very early set pattern. The pattern keeps repeating itself, even though the individual "growing up" in this pattern is rarely aware of the pattern, nor can he have any conscious memory of how it established itself.

Even later intellectual growth, however powerful the mind becomes, takes directions set by the early emotional pattern established unawares in relations between children and their parents — or parent equivalents. Thus the full weight for the moral development of individuals falls on the family unit, and on emotional arrangements between members of that family unit.

THE PIAGETIAN SCHOOL

Jean Piaget takes quite a different view of moral education. Piaget and his followers place much less emphasis than the Freudian school on ambivalent repression and the changing focus of the child's essentially sexual energy.

For Piaget, there are two turning points in moral development. First, there is that stage at which every normal child begins to be able to see things from the point of view of another person (Freud would call this "identification"). Moral development is bound up with the change from a certain narrow-minded self-reference. The second major stage, according to the Piagetian school, occurs when children are able to handle abstract ideas.

What unites otherwise contentious schools of thought on moral education is the generalization that children pass through various stages of emotional and intellectual development. The task of moral education is to devise ways of teaching how to behave appropriate to each such stage of the child's understanding and emotions.

CONSTITUTION AND MORALITY

The human cannot depend upon instinctual endowment. Yet there are some quite competent scientific investigators who continue to raise serious questions about the relationship between inheritance, physical constitution, and moral conduct.

For example, some scientific investigators have concluded that those humans they have studied who have an extra Y sex chromosome are congenitally disposed to come into early conflict with any legal order, whatever the law might be. Other investigators have even sought to make correlations between human height and crime — which may be another expression of the old notion that most of the trouble in the world is caused by short men.

It is a still unsettled question whether and which constitutional characteristics affect human morality, and what moral education could do to offset the supposed effects of such constitutional factors.

MORAL LITERACY

Another question of concern is how moral literacy can be taught when there are so many different languages of morality bombarding the individual. It is usually thought by educators in this field that morals have to be taught in fairly long cycles of preparation in languages rich in both precision and nuance, so as to match the subtleties of changing circumstance. The very acuteness of contemporary interest in moral education, and the variety of moral languages that fill the air, may have the consequence of creating moral illiterates — or, at least, people who are exposed to too many moral languages and never learn any of them well enough for effective use.

Moral judgments are rarely made without considerable emotional involvement. Yet the variety of moral education now available, and the openness within that variety to criticism from temporary representatives of other varieties, may create a condition of emotional uninvolved.

Such uninvolved may render all forms of modern moral education increasingly able to produce only one kind of moral man: the kind that would rather switch moralities than fight about any or, what amounts to the same type, the one that will fight without any belief that his morality is any better than anybody else's — the sort who could just as easily switch to the other side, with equal conviction.

The great Irish poet, Yeats, expressed this in these two celebrated lines: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity." Perhaps the great problem of modern moral education lies in the paradox that the best sort of people it can produce lack all conviction.