Faculty unions have achieved a prominent place in American higher education. This study attempts to focus on the consequences arising from collective bargaining in higher education. The Stanford Project on Academic Governance was begun in 1971 as an effort to study the impact of collective bargaining on governance and decision making in higher education. The two phases of the project studied 240 institutions regarding general academic governance and over 300 institutions regarding collective bargaining in particular. In addition, seven intensive case studies were conducted in institutions that were quite diverse in their characteristics and experiences. The findings of this study are examined as they relate to administrators. The discussion is in two parts: looking at the effect collective bargaining has on components within administrative ranks; and assessing the way management processes change when collective bargaining occurs. Specific areas discussed are the shifting power relationships; the thrust toward administrative power; the changing character of campus administrators; the replacement of generalists by specialists; the sharing of information with faculty representatives; the democratization of influence; and administration concern for long-range consequences. (JNF)
THE IMPACT OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON CAMPUS ADMINISTRATORS

By

Frank R. Kemerer
and
Victor Baldridge

February, 1976

Faculty unions are no longer considered a temporary aberration limited to the outer fringes of academia. They have achieved a prominent place in American higher education. As economic conditions worsen other professional groups are also attracted to unions because they have the political and economic clout missing in most professional associations. Reports appear frequently in the news media about doctors unionizing to fight such threats as prohibitive costs of malpractice insurance and controls on fees. Lawyer cooperatives are becoming commonplace. Scientists and engineers are increasingly looking to unions to safeguard their interests. Unionization has thus progressed far beyond the blue collar worker. Continued growth is assured as enabling legislation extends collective bargaining to professionals in public employment.

Much has been written about the causes and the progress of faculty unionization. Few studies, however, have focused on the consequences arising from collective bargaining in higher education or among professional employees in general.

Starting in 1971, the Stanford Project on Academic Governance, a study funded by the National Institute for Education, undertook a major research effort to study the impact of faculty collective bargaining on governance and decision-making in higher education.¹ The Stanford Project was conducted in two phases. For Phase One, in 1971 we selected 240 institutions at which to study general

¹In addition to the authors of this paper, the other principal investigators on the Stanford Project were David Curtis (Governor's State, Illinois), George Paul Ecker (Ohio State), and Gary Lee Riley (U.C.L.A.).
issues of academic governance. In this phase, collective bargaining was only one issue among a larger set of concerns. We used a variety of research tools. Over 17,000 questionnaires were sent to faculty members and administrators, with a 53 percent return rate. Another questionnaire went to the presidents of the institutions, with 100 percent return after several series of coaxing letters and phone calls. In addition, information about the colleges was gathered from published sources, both governmental and private.

Phase Two was conducted in 1974, and the prime focus was on collective bargaining. We resampled the original 240 institutions, but also added all the unionized schools in the United States. (The total was over 300, but several were eventually excluded because of their extremely specialized character.) In addition to providing longitudinal data, the two samples provided valuable contrast between a random sample of all colleges and universities and the specialized group that has faculty unions. In Phase Two, we used two questionnaires on collective bargaining. One went to the presidents of the institutions, both the 1971 national sample and entire population of unionized institutions in 1974. The other went to the faculty chairpersons of the local campus bargaining units. Both questionnaires had response rates in excess of 65 percent.

In addition to the questionnaire we also conducted seven intensive case studies in institutions that were quite diverse in their characteristics and that had different experiences with collective bargaining. These institutions were Rutgers, the City University of New York, the University of Hawaii, Central Michigan State, the Chicago City Colleges, Hofstra, and the State University of New York. We conducted nearly 100 interviews on these campuses, and carefully studied their contracts and other documents. The complete findings of the project are detailed in our recent book.¹

This article examines our findings as they relate to higher educational administrators. We have divided our discussion into two parts: the first looking at the effect collective bargaining has on components within administrative ranks and the second assessing the way management processes change when collective bargaining occurs. Many of our conclusions apply as well to non-educational organizations whose professional employees may eventually unionize.

SHIFTING POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Faculty collective bargaining is one more problem administrators must face in their struggle to manage institutions that are rapidly changing under the onslaught of environmental pressures. Many administrators perceive collective bargaining as threatening to their management power, and fear that campus polarization will make effective decision making virtually impossible. Substantial percentages of administrators at public colleges with faculty unions indicated on the SPAG questionnaire that collective bargaining had decreased their power. (See Figure 1, Question A) Still, almost equal percentages felt that their power had not been affected. Only presidents at private liberal arts institutions said they have either maintained or actually gained power. Union chairpersons, however, uniformly report great losses of administrative power at all institutions. When we questioned what might happen in the future, almost no union officials and only about one-fifth of all presidents agreed that "where it occurs, faculty collective bargaining will increase the power of the administration at the expense of the faculty." (See Figure 2, Question A) Administrators at two-year institutions perceived less hope for administrative gains than presidents of other institutions. This is not surprising since the union goal at two-year colleges is to enfranchise the faculty -- at the expense of the administrators who
previously dominated institutional decision making.

How realistic are these fears—or hopes, depending on one's perspective—of administrative impotence? Our observations show a complex, multi-faceted picture. First, unionism can weaken the administrative dominance of many two-year institutions, and those administrators can expect major changes.

Second, we do not believe that unions have thus far jeopardized administrative authority on most four-year campuses. Most of the evidence seems to point to union, not administrative weakness. Faculty contracts lack union security agreements, the scope of bargaining is limited, controversy often rages within faculty ranks about the idea of unionism, and faculty unions often lack effective sanctions to apply against the administration.

Of course, the picture may change as unions gain tactical experience and wider legislative support. At the same time, administrators may also gain some of the same political advantages. In short, our general conclusion is that although collective bargaining does complicate the administrative process, administrators do not appear to have lost power, and may potentially have more— as we will explain next.

3-hed THE THRUST TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

While a net decline of administrative power at unionized schools is questionable, it is evident that the locus of decision making within the administrative hierarchy has changed.
THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON YOUR CAMPUS
(Respondents from Campuses with Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Power of Administration has:</th>
<th>B. Power of Off-Campus State Agencies has:</th>
<th>C. Power of Faculty on Administrative Issues has:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Remained Same</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents (N = 205)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairpersons (N = 185)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROKEN DOWN BY INSTITUTION TYPES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Multiversities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents (N = 8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairpersons (N = 9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public Colleges and Universities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents (N = 49)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairpersons (N = 42)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
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<td>3. Liberal Arts Colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents (N = 11)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairpersons (N = 12)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 2-Year Colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents (N = 135)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairpersons (N = 126)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### FIGURE 2
THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presidents, Non-Union Institutions (N = 134)</th>
<th>Presidents, Union Institutions (N = 204)</th>
<th>Chairpersons, Union (N = 193)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A.</strong> Collective bargaining will increase the power of the administration at the expense of the faculty.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B.</strong> System management is increasing all the time.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C.</strong> I prefer binding arbitration as a strategy for settling disputes.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D.</strong> Collective bargaining will increase the influence of outside agencies (arbitrators, courts, or state agencies).</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E.</strong> Collective bargaining will stimulate greater faculty concern about state and local politics.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F.</strong> Collective bargaining will cause specialists (e.g., lawyers, management experts) to replace generalists in the administrations.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G.</strong> Collective bargaining will democratize decision making by giving junior faculty a greater role.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H.</strong> Collective bargaining will increase the effectiveness of campus governance.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. All respondents, both unionized and non-unionized campuses. Response dealt with general national trends, not necessarily what would happen on the respondent's specific campus.
The range of answers was "strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree." In this chart "agree" equals all "strongly agree" or "agree."
Until recently most large four-year institutions were decentralized organizations, with departments, schools, and colleges traditionally involved in institutional decision making. But fiscal stringencies have forced many governing boards to take a more active role in campus affairs—at the expense of both decentralized decision making bodies and presidential authority. This pattern exists whether the institutions have unions or not. Although many trustees consider themselves novices in academic affairs, deferring to the faculty, they are confident about fiscal matters; and present financial crises have moved trustees to the front line of decision making.

In both public and private institutions, the movement toward coordination and centralization of policy making, particularly on economic issues, has climbed upward from departments, to schools, to the central administration, and ultimately to off-campus authorities. In New York, for example, the grim forecast of limited funds, declining enrollments, and a surplus of people with advanced degrees has forced the Commissioner of Education to recommend phasing out some doctoral programs at both public and private institutions. As the Commissioner noted in a 1975 interview, "The old notion of complete institutional autonomy is out. Nobody can do as he exactly pleases."

In addition to these other forces, faculty collective bargaining helps to push power upward with boards and administrators functioning as "employers" involved in governance. It is conceivable that some administrations and boards may reclaim authority from faculty senates in order to bargain effectively with a faculty union. Because collective bargaining has so far concentrated on economic issues, it is expected to be an especially strong stimulus to increasing trustee
involvement. A recent study of trustees at unionized community colleges uncovered a new form of "shared authority"—trustee participation in decisions that were once the president's perogative. (Channing, Steiner, Timmerman, 1973) Trustees were more inclined to ask questions, to be more aware of the ramifications of issues such as class size and faculty work load, and to take an active role in decision making alongside the union. A similar study of six upstate New York community colleges revealed that local government officials who become involved in bargaining tend to impose on the campus the industrial bargaining model with which they are familiar—at the expense of campus collegiality. A majority of campus administrators and faculty members surveyed in the study said that outside participation contributed to the adverse relationships during periods of negotiation. (Falcone, 1975)

In addition, the dynamics of collective bargaining force many changes. A union adapts to the organization it wants to influence, that is, "parallel power pyramids" are constructed. If the campus is organized locally, the union organizes locally. If the campus is part of a system, the union organizes systemwide; and system-level influence is growing. Our survey asked presidents of non-unionized and unionized campuses their reaction to the statement, "System management is increasing all the time." The responses in Figure 2, Question B, show that about 75 percent of both two-year and four-year college presidents agreed with the statement. In multicampus systems the bargaining unit is usually systemwide, with a membership that includes other academic employees as well as faculty. Large bargaining units inevitably force centralized boards to claim the
bargaining authority over a wide range of issues.

At public institutions the intrusion of state officials into campus affairs is most likely to occur in the financial area. The difficulty is that economic and academic issues are hard to separate, and that budget control may thrust state agencies directly into academic matters. To begin with, negotiations almost always occur at the system level, but the daily give and take under the agreement will happen on the local campus. Nevertheless, the unresolved problems and the major fights will inevitably set precedents and have ramifications for the whole system. And the system experts—the lawyers, the contract specialists—will leap into action. The pattern of increased outside control is echoed in our survey. One question asked, "How has faculty collective bargaining affected the power of off-campus, central agencies on your campus?" Few felt that central power had decreased, and about half said it had increased as a result of collective bargaining. The results were fairly consistent for all types of institutions. Union officials were less pessimistic than presidents. (See Figure 1, Question B)

Our respondents also agreed that "Wherever it occurs, faculty collective bargaining will result in greater influence on campus decision making by outside agencies (e.g., arbitrators, courts, or state agencies)." (See Figure 2, Question D) Generally most felt that collective bargaining in public institutions will stimulate greater faculty concern about state and local politics. (See Figure 2, Question E)

In short, these responses indicate that collective bargaining is one more factor promoting centralized decision making. Up to now
collective bargaining has been a relatively weak force; it is still in its infancy. Yet, the reciprocal circle feeds on itself: power moves off campus to systemwide boards, the union organizes on a system basis to gain influence, and in turn this drives even more issues from the local campus into the hands of the system board.

Off-campus officials well versed in academic affairs may turn out in the long run to be as equally effective decision makers as are the local faculty and administrators. But sometimes state officials not well-trained in the subtleties of academe might allow political demands and debts to interfere with the peaceful operation of institutions. This same process could also expose campus administrators to increasing political pressures.

THE LOSERS IN THE POWER PLAY

The shift of power within administrative ranks associated with collective bargaining often result in a loss of power and influence for several classes of administrators. While quite obviously local conditions have a great bearing on who wins and loses in the redistribution of power, we believe it is possible to identify several administrative components who generally stand to lose the most.

Department chairpersons have traditionally performed at least some administrative tasks on most campuses. This fact has created a problem of immense proportions when collective bargaining arrives. Should department chairpersons be included in the bargaining unit? Because department chairpersons are neither employer nor employee, there is no simple answer. Yet there is no middle ground in collective bargaining—they must be classified as one or the other. Department
chairpersons themselves are not usually clear about their role. For example, at the University of Delaware, a poll conducted prior to the unit determination revealed that one-third of the chairpersons considered themselves "managers" and preferred to stay out of the unit. (Boyer, 1974)

Excluding chairpersons from the bargaining unit has obvious consequences for shared governance: influential faculty leaders would be on the opposite side of the managerial fence from their colleagues, and peer decision making in the departments would undoubtedly be affected. The implications are greatest at institutions with a history of strong faculty influence over departmental policies, because excluded chairpersons would be more management-oriented. That division could paralyze the department, thereby encouraging critical decision making to be usurped by the school deans.

But department chairpersons included in the unit may be subject to pressures from all sides. Under most collective bargaining agreements, they are required to administer procedural aspects of the contract such as faculty evaluation, workload adjustments, and grievance processing. At the same time, they must retain their functions in substantive decision making such as tenure conferral, dismissals, and appointments. A new collective bargaining contract often produces a "shirt-pocket contract mentality," with faculty members acting as quasi-lawyers, checking their ever-ready contracts against possible administrative violations. This relentless and defensive faculty behavior can frustrate department chairpersons from imposing
sanctions or making hard decisions. A reprimand or tenure denial may produce an instant confrontation with the union and the possible filing of a grievance.

In CUNY's four-year institutions the departments have been instrumental in hiring, promoting, and tenuring faculty, and the department chairpersons have always played a key role in the process. Under collective bargaining, the unit determination included department chairpersons with the faculty. As a result, chairpersons wear three hats: (1) **Supervisor**: Management expects department chairpersons to be accountable for careful decision making at a time of declining growth and "tenuring in"; (2) **Faculty Spokesman**: Faculty expect their elected department chairpersons to be their advocates; and (3) **Shop Steward**: The union after battling with the administration to secure procedural guarantees in personnel decision making, expect department chairpersons to scrupulously oversee contract provisions.

Nevertheless, the CUNY union has often lodged grievances against department chairpersons. (While grievances are formally filed against the university, department chairpersons are usually called as administrative witnesses in hearings.) And yet, the union does not want department chairpersons to be considered management, although the administration has defended department chairpersons against union attack. In short, the chairpersons becomes the man in the middle, subjected to all kinds of cross-pressures.

"Playing the middleman is obviously a difficult role. In the words of a union past-president,"
At Rutgers when you file a grievance, if it was your department that made the decision, the grievance is against the dean (grievances are always formally filed against the administration or the institution). This clearly defines the adversaries. The department members who made the decision can then serve as witnesses for the dean in a formal hearing. But the thing that does disturb us is that it leaves us open to the accusation that we are evading faculty responsibility by acting as agents of the dean. (Laity, 1972, p. 71)

One escape for the department chairperson is to back out as a witness supporting the dean and to let the dean seek the assistance of university counsel. This suggestion by a CUNY union chairperson would essentially destroy peer review, for the right to demand that professional experts alone can judge professional performance is balanced by the professional responsibility to accept and support the decisions. However, this buck-passing tendency is almost unavoidable when the department chairperson is part of the union; the role is much too complex and chairpersons, pulled in too many different directions.

While the chairperson's behavior may change through inclusion in faculty bargaining units, the administration's attitude toward departmental effectiveness also may be altered. As one CUNY dean noted, the department chairpersons more and more "waffle and buck-pass where hard decisions are needed." The power of chairpersons diminishes as
higher administrators begin to distrust the decisions being forwarded, and as they shift administrative functions to higher level administrators. Under such circumstances the first line of objective, serious decision making will not be the department, but will be at the school dean's level or in school wide faculty review committees.

Some institutions may formalize this shift of power by administrative reorganization. An administrator at the University of Scranton suggested as a solution the elimination of departments altogether, consolidating them into several academic divisions administered by a new level of assistant deans. In our opinion eliminating departments is unlikely because they are more than mere administrative sub-units. They are the disciplinary homes of professionals trained in a particular world-view, who are not likely to surrender their identification for administrative convenience. Conceivably, departments might be combined into division units at small, single-campus institutions with little faculty participation in personnel matters. Such organizational changes would have to be made before unions arrive to resist structural realignment.

The most likely trend for campus administration is to add associate deans and other specialists to fill the administrative functions not effectively served by chairpersons who, as members of faculty bargaining units, are partly under union control. The growth of middle management seems inevitable, but at the same time our case studies revealed that frustration, isolation, and insecurity are prevalent within the ranks of deans, assistant deans, budget officers, and others within the middle management category. In most instances, middle-level administrators are not included in either faculty bargaining
units or at the bargaining table as part of the employer contingent. Yet the decisions reached through bargaining affect their salaries and fringe benefits, their professional roles, and their managerial responsibilities. Middle-level administrators consequently fear being squeezed between the opposing forces of collective bargaining and economic retrenchment. At Rutgers University one administrative official and his co-workers discussed their paranoia about the bargaining process, noting that most campus employee groups were unionized, and that students also had gained access to decision-making channels, leaving out only middle management. "When the cut in personnel costs comes," said one staffer, "you can guess who will be forced to absorb that blow."

With only a slight involvement in faculty unions and a tenuous identification with the top administration, middle-level administrators may evidence a half-hearted commitment to effective decision making. Middle managers and even deans may join department chairpersons, refusing to handle decisions if the benefits they receive do not outweigh the costs of increasing antagonism and conflict from co-workers. And this is particularly true as they become aware that the trend toward administrative centralization has removed their ability to make effective decisions. As one dean said, "I'm damn sick of the Vice President holding me accountable, yelling that I pass the buck, when everybody knows he long ago took away most of the deans' real power." Collective bargaining, then, reinforces already existing trends that have long been undermining middle management.
Most labor legislation excludes supervisors, but some state laws, such as New York's Taylor Law, allow middle management to form unions. Recently a study was completed of the contracts negotiated by administrative bargaining units at four community colleges in New York--Onondaga, Orange, Suffolk, and Ulster. The Ulster contract describes the bargaining as: "all full-time professional administrative personnel with the exception of the President, Dean of the Faculty, Dean of Administration, and Dean of Students." Interestingly, the study of these four contracts concluded that they closely resembled contracts bargained for by faculty groups. (Newsletter, The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, March/April, 1975) Middle-level managers, faced with problems similar to those threatening faculty members, are likely to also seek the right to form unions--thus creating still another potential campus veto group.

Usually campus presidents are not considered middle management, but in large state systems the twin forces of system-level centralization and collective bargaining may make them so. Our survey data clearly show that presidents of unionized campuses within state systems see their power dividing between faculty unions and system management. In addition, they are becoming more accountable to an enlarging circle of evaluators; local union officials, system officers, and legislators with political ambitions. Will campus presidents fall between the cracks?

Centralized bargaining may cut both ways, sometimes helping the local presidents, sometimes hurting. A local campus president may
sigh with relief that most of the conflict between administrators and union officials occurs at central headquarters, and not in his office. Off-campus decisions leave more time for local presidents to strengthen their academic and intellectual leadership. A CUNY central administrator told us that despite the perceptions of local presidents, this is exactly what has happened within the system as a result of centralization of bargaining. Other benefits may result as well. In CUNY, collective bargaining has actually helped tie the sprawling system together. "Evidence abounds that local chief administrators are now accountable to the central administration in ways not deemed necessary before collective bargaining. And at the local units, employees now have information about budgets, salaries, etc., information difficult to acquire before the time of collective bargaining." (Doh, 1974, p. 39)

Not all the results are positive, however, and the costs can be high. By shifting power upward and off campus, centralized collective bargaining lessens the decision making autonomy of administrators, schools, and departments on the local campuses. In addition, the fragmentation of union groups leads to a "multiple adversary system," with many of the adversaries making end runs around the local administrators, appealing directly to all "employer" groups who can influence bargaining. Elected officials, government bureaucrats, and campus administrators perform employer-like functions with little coordination and, frequently, with much contradiction of effort. For both the union and the campus president, this proliferation of "bosses" poses complex problems. Both union and president at CUNY,
for example, have to deal in several arenas that include the Board of Higher Education of New York, the New York City administration, and the New York State legislature. The intricate situation invites a round-robin of buck passing.

In short, the complexities of power-sharing may eventually reduce local campus presidents to middle managers who execute policy but have little influence on the decisions. And although faculties have viewed their presidents as bargaining adversaries, they may regret losing their academic spokesmen.

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF CAMPUS ADMINISTRATION

As campuses struggle with new problems and demands, the character of campus administration changes. One consequence is an expansion of the administrative ranks, for the growing complexity of campus management creates a need for new groups of experts. At the same time, many faculties, seeing their own numbers level off or decline, are suspicious and resentful of "administrative featherbedding." On some campuses, faculty resentment has led to a new game—"phone book research." The phone book often shows a greater percentage of administrators today than a decade ago, giving solid ammunition to those who complain that administrators are not sharing the consequences of retrenchment. There are good reasons, however, to explain why the number of administrators is increasing and their tasks are changing. Collective bargaining, coinciding with a host of other demands, helps produce a different kind of campus management.

SPECIALISTS REPLACE GENERALISTS

One sign of the changing times in the institutions studied is
the influx of specialists into administrative ranks. Faculty
generalists, long the source of most administrators, usually lack
the experience and skills to cope with negotiating and administering
a collective bargaining contract. One specialist critical to successful
bargaining is the institutional researcher. At Central Michigan
University, for example, a research team is considered necessary to
(1) prepare for negotiations by gathering background data on the in-
stitution and its faculty; (2) provide detailed and specific informa-
tion to administrators engaged in negotiations, (e.g., costing out
a union retirement proposal); and (3) record grievances, questions,
contract violations, and unexpected costs occurring during the
administration of the contract. As one CMU official noted,

The consensus of the administration is that success
is the direct product of planning and preparation.
Preparation means investigating all possible proposals
before those proposals come to the bargaining table.
The bargaining team must know as much about policies-
costs, and political ramifications so that nothing
surprises them. Every possible issue must be identi-

ified and then a continuum developed from the 'best
of all worlds' to the 'worst of all worlds.' Thus
the team can identify the limits within which they
can potentially agree. (Kieft, 1973, p. 6)

Lawyers are considered essential to successful negotiation and are
becoming more vital to contract administration, particularly in rela-
tion to personal policy and practices. In addition, labor relations
experts and budget officers are playing a larger role in educational administration. While it may seem anomalous to be enlarging the administration when deficits demand cost-cutting, hiring specialists may be a shrewd management technique that actually cuts long-run costs, particularly those which, like fringe benefits, "pyramid" far into the future.

The SPAG survey asked respondents how collective bargaining has affected the need for specialized administrative manpower on their campus. Over 85 percent of the presidents responded that the need had increased; not a single president reported a decrease. Sixty percent of the union chairpersons agreed the need for specialists had increased; and like the presidents, the consensus was uniform across institutional types. Not only do presidents feel that more specialists will be needed, but they expect these experts eventually to replace the generalists. On this issue, however, the union officials disagreed—see Figure 2, Question F.

INFORMATION SHARING

Collective bargaining gives the faculty greater access to decision-making channels because it compels the administration to bargain with faculty union representatives in good faith, and it compels them to share information with the union, something administrators have been hesitant to do with faculty groups in the past. Administrator's control of information acts to curtail effective faculty participation in campus decision making. For example, a department cannot decide whether to add a seminar with 20 students or an introductory course with 200 unless it has access to the budget allocations
and to the long-range plans and priorities of the institution.

The laws and the rulings of collective bargaining boards have made information exchange a mandatory part of the bargaining process. This is one reason the faculty, frustrated by administrative reluctance to share needed information with governing bodies, turn to unionization in the first place. If administrators want traditional senates and committees to co-exist with unions, information must be presented to both union and senate. At unionized campuses this has resulted in an increased faculty impact on administrative decision making. The SPAG questionnaire asked whether collective bargaining has increased faculty influence over issues that were previously the domain of administrators on their campus. Roughly a third of the campus presidents indicated that the influence of the faculty had increased, with the highest level of agreement—42 percent—in two-year institutions. There were about twice as many union chairpersons who said faculty influence had increased. While many in both groups reported no significant change in faculty influence, only a handful said collective bargaining had decreased it. (See Figure 1, Question C)

THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INFLUENCE VERSUS THE PROLIFERATION OF VETO GROUPS

Gains in faculty power are not restricted to a few, but are spread among a range of faculty members. Because bargaining units in higher education are broadly comprised of many different kinds of academic employees, often from disparate institutional types, a "leveling" action has occurred. Large unionized units can democratize decision processes—sometimes at the expense of previous power holders.
Judging whether this outcome is good or bad depends on one's values, the local institution's history, and one's beliefs about professionalism. At unionized schools about 25 percent of presidents and 72 percent of faculty chairpersons agreed that faculty collective bargaining will democratize decision making by allowing junior faculty to play a greater role. (See Figure 2, Question G).

As more groups become involved in decision making, some people fear that campus processes may grind to a halt because decision making committees will be trapped by the competing claims of interest groups. David Reisman, in The Lonely Crowd, popularized the term "veto groups". These are groups in a complex society that cancel each other out, that can stop action, and that rarely cooperate enough to accomplish anything. Is it possible that veto groups are now expanding on our complex campuses? Are the environmental stresses and the economic problems generating so many conflicting demands and so many hostile interest groups that creative action may be stifled?

Unionism will probably contribute to this complex environment. Certainly, the respondents to our questionnaire had divided opinions on this issue. We asked for agreement or disagreement with the statement "Collective bargaining will increase the effectiveness of campus governance." The answers were sharply different between presidents and union officials: between 10 and 20 percent of the presidents agreed, but an overwhelming 77 percent of the union chairpersons agreed. (See Figure 2, Question H).

Bargaining, then, tends to increase faculty influence over administrative issues and to democratize faculty power. To the extent that this enfranchises the faculty in general and junior faculty in
particular, it broadens participation in governance and also re-stricts administrative arbitrariness. However, to the extent that it produces another entrenched veto group on campus, it threatens to stalemate effective governance.

ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALIZATION VERSUS PARALYSIS OF THE NITTY GRITTY

The economic crisis and collective bargaining combine to force administrators to perform a more efficient management function. In order to conduct negotiations, the administration must analyze the cost of various proposals advanced by union bargainers, and must project future impacts on the institution. As one authority on collective bargaining in the industrial sector noted, "Whether the union influence is weak or strong, it will always tend to force management to consider the probable consequences of its proposed decisions and to adjust those decisions accordingly." (Schlicter and others, 1960, p. 952)

Since most union demands concern economic issues and personnel decision making, it is especially crucial that administrators consider the long-range consequences of accepting proposals such as a new fringe benefit plan or shortening the probationary period for tenure. Once these matters are settled, it is unlikely that the administration can successfully regain what might have been imprudently bargained away.

A contract signed and ratified by the union membership restrains the exercise of administrative authority. Faculty have turned to bargaining primarily to protect their jobs from arbitrary administrative action. The specific wording of employment rules in
collective bargaining, contracts provides concise guidelines for an insecure faculty. In addition, everyone from the president on down who discharges administrative duties must understand not only the implications of contractual provisions, but also the explicit details. At SUNY-Cortland, for example, the first contract was quickly followed by related policy changes from the Board of Trustees and an additional "twenty-one typed, single-spaced pages of memoranda of understanding at the local level which have the force of the agreement." (Hedgepeth, 1974, pp. 11-12).

Administering-by-the-book can dramatically affect the free-wheeling administrator. Department chairpersons as well as campus presidents may simply be overwhelmed by paperwork and complex procedural requirements. For example, one study suggests that an increasing amount of a community college president's work day is committed to contract-related noneducational matters. Chief among them is grievance processing, advising lower-level administrators, and planning for the new bargaining sessions. (Channing, Steiner, and Timmerman, 1973)

To summarize, on one hand procedural regulations will help rationalize the administration and protect the faculty from arbitrariness; on the other hand, the proliferation of organizational rules could create a situation best termed "the paralysis of the nitty gritty."

CONCLUSION

We have explored the impact of bargaining on campus administration. Since the discussion has been often involved and beset with seemingly contradictory information, our conclusions are summarized
as follows:

1. Presidents on unionized campuses say they have lost power to unionized faculty; all presidents foresee a steady erosion of presidential administrative capacity by faculty unions.

2. In spite of presidential opinions, other evidence indicates that there is actually a shift toward administrative power, particularly governing board power at single campuses.

3. Systemwide collective bargaining drives power to the system administrators; "parallel power pyramids" are arranged to coordinate union and system.

4. Presidents of campuses in state systems are particularly vulnerable to a two-directional power loss--to unionized groups and to central headquarters.

5. A majority of both campus presidents and union chairpersons foresee outsiders such as arbitrators and courts playing a greater role in campus decision making.

6. In order to negotiate and administer contracts successfully, the administration is likely to replace traditional faculty-related generalists with specialists such as lawyers, labor relations experts, and institutional researchers.

7. Despite increasing numbers, middle-level administrators are likely to feel that bargaining occurs at their expense.
complex provisions of contracts compound the difficulties of administration.

9. Campuses are increasingly balkanized into "veto groups" under the influence of external economic and social forces.

10. Administrative discretion to respond to campus problems will be increasingly circumscribed by contractual provisions, particularly in personnel areas.

We cannot evaluate the overall impact of faculty collective bargaining on campus administration because too much depends on prior institutional and individual characteristics, and on the ability and desire of those involved in bargaining to understand and control it. Whether the overall result is beneficial also depends on one's position in the system; obviously all observers, including these authors, bring prejudices and vested interests. Nevertheless, we believe it is possible to identify several positive and negative impacts collective bargaining has had on campus administration. On the negative side, collegeality among administrators and faculty is likely to suffer as specialists such as lawyers, labor relations experts, and institutional researchers replace traditional faculty generalists in the administrative ranks. Under the influence of external economic and social forces, campuses are balkanized into veto groups, making them even harder to manage. At the same time, administrative discretion to respond to campus problems will be increasingly circumscribed by contractual provisions, particularly
in personnel areas.

On the positive side, the increasing flow of information stimulated by the collective bargaining process will help academicians better understand and share in the governance process, as well as tie sprawling systems of education together. By applying contractual constraints to the exercise of administrative power, collective bargaining helps curtail administrative arbitrariness and assure that critical decisions, especially those in personnel areas, will be reached fairly and with a maximum of input from faculty groups.
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